

**Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa*: A Translation of Chapters
Three, Four, and Five, Examining the *āyatana*s, Aggregates,
and Elements**

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Introduction¹

The Madhyamaka² school is one of the two major philosophical schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism, along with the Yogācāra school. The Madhyamaka is best known for its doctrine of emptiness (*śūnyatā*). The idea of emptiness is found in the "perfection of discernment" (*prajñā-pāramitā*) sūtras, some of which are among the earliest Mahāyāna sūtras. While the sūtras expound emptiness in a discursive way, the Mādhyamikas use systematic argument.

Emptiness, for the Madhyamaka school, means that dharmas are empty of intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*). All Buddhists hold that conditioned dharmas arise in dependence on causes and conditions. For the Mādhyamikas, this fact of dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*) implies that dharmas can have no intrinsic, self-sufficient nature of their own. Since dharmas appear when the proper conditions occur and cease when those conditions are absent, the way in which dharmas exist is similar to the way in which mirages and dreams exist.³ Thus attachment and aversion are undermined, since ultimately, they have no substantial objects and lack any self-sufficient status of their own.⁴

Moreover, the Mādhyamikas argue that if things existed by their own intrinsic nature, they would be changeless;⁵ but this contradicts our everyday experience. As Bhāvaviveka says in his commentary on MMK 5-7, "Like pictures painted on a wall, living beings' particular ages, sizes, and postures would not increase or decrease."

The Madhyamaka school was founded by Nāgārjuna (active c. 150-200), the author of the *Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā* (MMK).

The MMK inspired a number of commentaries which not only expounded the meaning of the MMK but also often acted as vehicles for the commentators' own views. The *Akutoḥhayā* seems to be the earliest of the extant commentaries. It is of uncertain authorship, although it is sometimes ascribed to Nāgārjuna himself.⁶

The earliest extant commentary on the MMK by a known author⁷ is that of Buddhapālita (c. 500). Buddhapālita closely followed Nāgārjuna's own method, which utilized mainly *prasaṅga* arguments. These are arguments which show that the opponent's position leads to consequences (*prasaṅga*) unacceptable to the opponent himself, without, however, committing the Mādhyamika to affirming a contrary position.

Bhāvaviveka (c. 500-570) was the next important Mādhyamika philosopher. Besides his commentary on the MMK, the *Prajñā-pradīpa*, he wrote some notable independent works, such as the *Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā* and its autocommentary, the *Tarkajvālā*. Bhāvaviveka seems to have been the first to use the formal syllogism of Indian logic in expounding the Madhyamaka; and he strongly criticized Buddhapālita for failing to do so. He felt that the author of a commentary should state independent inferences (*svatantra-anumāna*) rather than simply giving *prasaṅga* arguments.⁸ Bhāvaviveka's position was later criticized by Candrakīrti, who defended Buddhapālita in his own commentary on the MMK, the *Prasannapadā*.

Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa* is, in the first place, of great interest for its explanation and elaboration of the MMK. In the second place, it is important in the history of the Madhyamaka. Bhāvaviveka's criticisms of Buddhapālita in the *Prajñāpradīpa* resulted in the division of the Madhyamaka into two subschools: the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka of Bhāvaviveka and the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka of Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti. (The names of these subschools, derived from *svatantra-anumāna* and *prasaṅga*, seem to have originated some centuries after Candrakīrti and are known to us only from Tibetan sources.⁹)

Moreover, the *Prajñāpradīpa* is the first commentary on the MMK to make use of the formal apparatus of Buddhist logic and the first to discuss non-Buddhist philosophical schools extensively. Bhāvaviveka's accounts, in the *Prajñāpradīpa* and elsewhere, of the positions of other Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools give valuable information on the state of Indian philosophy in his day. (These two characteristics, the use of syllogistic reasoning and the statement and refutation of the positions of other schools, are very much in evidence in chapters three, four, and five of the *Prajñāpradīpa*.)

Chapters three, four, and five of the MMK form a closely related set.¹⁰ In chapter three, "Examination of the *āyatana*s," Nāgārjuna draws on the pattern of analysis developed in chapter two in order to analyze the process of vision.¹¹ The analysis is then extended to the other sense organs and their respective sense objects. The five physical sense organs plus the mind (*manas*), together with the six corresponding sense objects, constitute the twelve *āyatana*s. (Dharmas are the object of mind.)

Nāgārjuna finds the process of perception by the sense organs to be unintelligible if one tries to understand it in terms of entities which possess their own intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*). As is often the case in the MMK, the word *svabhāva* is not used and has to be inferred from the context of the work as a whole. Without some qualification such as "by intrinsic nature," a statement such as "... visible [objects] (*drastavya*) and the visual organ (*darśana*) do not exist" (MMK 3-7a; PŚP: 3-8a) is difficult to explain or defend.

Chapter four, "Examination of the Aggregates," deals with the five aggregates (*skandha*). Matter (*rūpa*), the first aggregate, is examined in terms of the relation of cause (*kāraṇa* or *hetu*) and result (*kārya*). This analysis of causality complements the analysis of causal conditions (*pratyaya*) in the first chapter of MMK. The discussion of matter is extended to the other aggregates and to all entities (*bhāva*). The last two verses of chapter four (MMK 4-8,9) concern the way in which the Madhyamaka is expounded.

Chapter five, "Examination of the Elements," discusses the six

elements (*dhātu*). Space (*ākāśa*) is discussed by means of an analysis of what is characterized (*lakṣya*) and its defining characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*). If defining characteristics and the things they characterize are not possible, then entities (*bhāva*) are not possible; and without an entity, one cannot have its absence, a nonentity (*abhāva*). Thus space cannot be a defining characteristic, a thing characterized, an entity, or a nonentity. The same applies to the other five elements. The concluding verse (MMK 5-8) states that those who see entities and nonentities do not see the quiescence (*upaśama*) of the visible (*draṣṭavya*). This mention of the visible harks back to the subject-matter of chapter three. The phrase, "tranquil quiescence of the visible" (*draṣṭavyopaśamaṃ śivam*), also recalls the characterization of dependent origination as "the tranquil quiescence of conceptual proliferation" (*prapañcopaśamaṃ śivam*) in MMK 1-Bb.

Thus chapters three, four, and five examine three sets of categories, the *āyatana*s, the *skandha*s, and the *dhātu*s. These categories are fundamental to the Buddhist analysis of phenomena. (Note that in chapter five of the MMK, *dhātu* refers to the six elements, not the eighteen *dhātu*s. The latter are the twelve *āyatana*s plus the six corresponding sense cognitions.) In each chapter, the analysis is made more specific by singling out a particular member of the set for detailed treatment. It is then pointed out that the same analysis applies to the other members of the set as well.

As we have seen, one could also say that chapter three deals with perception, chapter four with causality, and chapter five with the characteristics by which we define and identify the constituents of the world. From this point of view, also, the subjects treated in these three chapters are both important and interrelated.¹²

Aside from a few quotations in the *Prasannapadā*, the *Prajñā-pradīpa* has been lost in the original Sanskrit. It exists in Tibetan and Chinese translations. The Chinese translation is reportedly rather poor;¹³ but the Tibetan translation, done by Jñānagarbha and Cog ro Klu'i rgyal mtshan in the early ninth century, seems to be

excellent. The same translators also translated Avalokitavrata's massive subcommentary on the *Prajñāpradīpa*, called the *Prajñāpradīpa-tīkā*. (Avalokitavrata's work is not extant in Sanskrit, and apparently no Chinese translation was ever made.)

The present English translation was made from the Tibetan. I consulted the Peking, Narthang, Derge, and Cone editions¹⁴ and made my own edition of the text. Most of the variants found in the different Tibetan editions are either obvious scribal errors or else represent different orthographic conventions. Rarely do the variants offer significant alternatives for the meaning of a sentence.

I also made extensive use of the Peking and Derge editions¹⁵ of Avalokitavrata's subcommentary. Since the *Prajñāpradīpa* is often terse, allusive, or technical, sentences frequently need to be amplified with phrases in square brackets; and explanatory notes sometimes need to be provided. For both purposes, Avalokitavrata's work is invaluable. Also, since the subcommentary quotes the entire *Prajñāpradīpa*, it is sometimes helpful in establishing the text.

An English-Tibetan-Sanskrit glossary has been provided for important terms. Although we do not have the Sanskrit text of the *Prajñāpradīpa*, the Tibetan practice of using standardized translation equivalents enables one to infer the Sanskrit original of many terms with a high degree of confidence. Sanskrit terms in the glossary are given in the translation in parentheses at their first occurrence, unless the English translation equivalent is so widely used that this seems unnecessary. Sanskrit and Tibetan words and phrases which are not in the glossary are also sometimes quoted in parentheses, especially when the translation is a bit conjectural.

Notes to Introduction

¹For the convenience of the reader, the introductions to my translations of chapters one and two of the *Prajñāpradīpa* (Ames (1993) and (1995)) are repeated here, except that material specific to chapters one and two has been replaced by a discussion of chapters three, four, and five largely taken from my dissertation (Ames (1986)). For more details on all the matters discussed in this introduction, see Ames (1986), "Part I: Introduction," and the sources cited therein.

²As a general rule, "Madhyamaka" is the name of the school and its philosophy; a follower of the school is called a "Mādhyamika." See Ruegg (1981), p. 1 and n. 3.

³See, e. g., MMK 7-34 and 17-33.

⁴See, e. g., chapter 23 of the MMK, which is discussed in Ames (1988).

⁵See MMK 15-8.

⁶On the *Akutobhayā*, see Huntington (1986).

⁷There is also a Chinese translation of a commentary ascribed to Asaṅga which deals only with the dedicatory verses of MMK (MMK 1-A,B). See Ruegg (1981), p. 49, and Keenan (1989).

⁸In this connection, it is interesting to note that in his commentary on MMK 2-19 (see Ames (1995)), Bhāvaviveka admits that Nāgārjuna gives a *prasaṅga* argument. In his commentary on MMK 1-1 (see Ames (1993), pp. 222-3, 225-6, 234) and elsewhere, Bhāvaviveka criticizes Buddhapālita's *prasaṅga* arguments because, among other reasons, they could be converted into syllogisms asserting things which Buddhapālita does not, in fact, wish to say. For example, Bhāvaviveka claims that Buddhapālita's *prasaṅga* argument against things' originating from themselves could be converted into a syllogism showing that things originate from another. In the case of MMK 2-19, however, Bhāvaviveka converts Nāgārjuna's *prasaṅga* argument against a goer and his or her going's being the same into a syllogism which simply negates sameness without asserting difference. Thus Bhāvaviveka seems inconsistent, if not biased, on this point.

⁹See Ruegg (1981), p. 58.

¹⁰The translations of chapters three, four, and five presented here are revised versions of those in my dissertation (Ames (1986)).

¹¹See MMK 3-3, which explicitly refers to chapter two.

¹²David Kalupahana gives an analysis according to which chapter three examines the source of knowledge (exemplified by vision), chapter four examines the object of knowledge (exemplified by matter), and chapter five examines the locus of the object (space). See Kalupahana (1986), p. 148.

¹³See Kajiyama (1963), p. 39.

¹⁴For the *Prajñāpradīpa*, the Peking edition is text no. 5253; the Derge edition is no. 3853.

¹⁵For Avalokitavratā's *ñikā*, the Peking edition is text no. 5259; the Derge edition is no. 3859.

Translation of *Prajñāpradīpa*, Chapter Three:
Examination of the *āyatana*s¹

Now [Nāgārjuna] begins the third chapter with the aim of showing that the *āyatana*s have no intrinsic nature by means of negating a particular [instance of] origination, [which would be] a counterexample (*vipakṣa*) [to nonorigination].² Alternatively, he begins the third chapter in order to show that the *āyatana*s are empty by means of negating motion ('*gro ba*, *gati* or *gamana*), [which would be] a counterexample [to nonmotion].³

When one examines [the *āyatana*s] in the first way, then the counterexample is adduced [as follows:]

Objection:

[Thesis:] One should grasp that in ultimate reality (*paramārthataḥ*), the internal (*ādhyātmika*) *āyatana*s⁴ do indeed originate, [Reason:] because the [kind of] object is specific (*pratiniyata*) [to each kind of organ].

[Dissimilar Example:] Here what does not originate has no specific object, as, for example, the *āyatana*s of a childless woman's son have no specific objects.

[Application:] The internal *āyatana*s do have such specific objects; namely, the objects of the visual organ (*darśana*),⁵ the auditory organ (*śravaṇa*), the olfactory organ (*ghrāṇa*), the gustatory organ (*rasana*), the tactile organ (*sparsana*), and the mind (*manas*) are, respectively, visible forms (*rūpa*),⁶ sounds (*śabda*), odors (*gandha*), tastes (*rasa*), tangibles (*spraṣṭavya*), and dharmas.

[Conclusion:] Therefore, by means of the stated reason, one should grasp that the internal *āyatana*s do indeed originate.

When one examines [the *āyatana*s] in the second way, then because [Nāgārjuna] has said,

Therefore [the activity of] going, the goer, and that which is to be traversed do not exist, [MMK 2-25cd]

[our] opponents reply:

Objection:

[Thesis:] One should understand that going does indeed exist,

[Reason:] because it is the result of activity (*kriyā-phala*),

[Example:] like seeing visible form and so on.

Answer: In answer to both positions [i. e., the two preceding objections], [Nāgārjuna] says:

The visual organ, the auditory organ, the olfactory organ, the gustatory organ, the tactile organ and the mind (*manas*)

[Are] the six sense organs (*indriya*). Their domain (*gocara*) is the visible (*draṣṭavya*) and so on. [MMK 3-1]

Here it is called "the visual organ" because it sees (*lta zhes bya ba ni lta bar byed pa'i phyir ro, paśyatīti darśanam iti?*). For the remaining [sense organs] also, [the etymology] is similar. They are called "sense organs" (*indriya*) because of exercising power (*indriyatva*) and mastery (*bdag po nyid*, probably *ādhipatya*) over that [particular] group [of sense objects], since they grasp visible form and the rest.⁷ [As for the word,] "six": The number [of sense organs] is also established by the [preceding] list of [their] individual names; but that [number, six] is specified in order to make it known that even conventionally (*vyavahārataḥ*), there is no agent who apprehends visible form and so on [and who is] different from those [sense organs].

"Their" (*eteṣāṃ*) [means] "of those six sense organs." "Domain" (*gocara*) [means] "object" (*viśaya*); the meaning is that [the sense organs] have power (*mthu*) over those [sense objects].⁸ "The visible and so on" (*draṣṭavyādīni*) [refers to] objects of vision (*draṣṭavya*), objects of hearing, objects of smell, objects of taste, objects of touch, and objects of thought.⁹

Moreover, that specific relation (*pratiniyama*) of organ (*viśayin*) and object (*viśaya*) is conventional (*vyāvahārika*), not ultimate (*pāramārthika*). Therefore, since the reason exists only in the set of all dissimilar examples,¹⁰ [the opponent's reason] has a

contradictory meaning.¹¹

[Nāgārjuna] will [now] explain this [point, namely] how in ultimate reality, the eye¹² and so on cannot have the relation of organ and object (*viṣayi-viṣaya-bhāva*). To begin with, with regard to the eye-organ (*cakṣur-īndriya*) alone, [he says,]

If the visual organ is its own self, that (*tat*) [eye] does not see that (*tam*) [own self] at all.¹³ [MMK 3-2ab]

"The visual organ" [is so called] because it sees (*lta ba zhes bya ba ni lta bar byed pa'i phyir, paśyatīti darśanam iti?*); [the term means] "the eye-organ." "If it is its own self (*svātman*)" [means] "if it has its own intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*). As for "that does not see that at all," why does it not see at all? [Nāgārjuna] clarifies that position by the meaning of the statement which occurs below.¹⁴ Why? Because that (*tat*) [eye] does not see that (*tam*) [own self]. The idea is that that [fact] is common knowledge. The phrase "at all" has the meaning of specification. Here one should see [i. e., understand] that [the eye] does not see at all. Otherwise, one would understand that it does see another [thing, though not itself].¹⁵

Objection: In that case, what will you prove? When [you] have said that the eye does not see its own self, then [we] accept that it does see visible form which is different [from its own self].

Answer: As for that which you maintain:

When it does not see itself,¹⁶ how will that [eye] see others?¹⁷
[MMK 3-2cd]

The meaning of the sentence is that the eye lacks the very power (*mthu*) of seeing visible form. As to that, the former half of the verse [i. e., MMK 3-2ab] shows the [proving] property, [namely,] that the eye does not see its own self; and the latter half [i. e., MMK 3-2cd] indicates the property to be proved, [namely,] that it does not see visible form. Therefore, because a [property]

to be proved and a proving property are adduced, it is considered to be a syllogism:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the eye-organ does not see visible form at all,

[Reason:] because it does not see its own self,

[Example:] like the ear and so on.

Alternatively, the former half [of the verse], having indicated that the eye-organ is just not graspable (*grāhya*) [by the eye-organ itself], adduces the eye-organ's own self as a similar example (*sādharmya-dr̥ṣṭānta*).¹⁸ The latter half, by showing that the eye-organ does not see visible form, indicates the property to be proved, [the fact] that visible form is not an object of the eye-organ. Here, according to that [explanation], the syllogism is:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, visible form is not an object of the eye-organ,

[Reason:] because it is a collection [of atoms] (*bsags pa*, perhaps *samcita*),

[Example:] like the eye-organ's [own] self.

[The reasons in the two preceding syllogisms, namely, the eye-organ's] not seeing its own self and [form's] being a collection, are mentioned [as] a use of words to imply more than is expressed (*mtshan nyid kyi sgra'i tshul*, perhaps *lakṣaṇā-śabda-naya*).¹⁹ Therefore, in both cases, inferences should also be stated [employing] reasons such as "because of having resistance (*sapratigha*)," "because of being dependent on the elements (*bhautika*)," "because of being secondary matter (*upādāyarūpa*)," and "because of belonging to the aggregate of matter (*rūpa-skandha*)."²⁰

Objection:²¹ It is correct that the eye does not see its own self, because it is invisible (*anidarśana*); but (visible) form [i. e., *rūpa-āyatana* or *rūpa-dhātu*] is visible; therefore [the eye] sees that [visible form].

Answer: As to that, [you] have established, by that other reason, the reason and example which we have stated; therefore there is no conflict [with our own position].²²

Objection: The Ābhidhārmikas²³ say: If [you] say that the

eye, without [further] qualification, does not see visible form at all, that establishes what is [already] established [for us], since [our] position is that an eye which is non-functioning (*tatsabhāga*)²⁴ does not see forms. But if you say that the eye's not seeing visible forms is stated about a functioning (*sabhāga*)²⁵ [eye], in that case there would be a conflict with what [you yourself] accept. For it is said in the Abhidharma,

The functioning (*sabhāga*) eye sees visible forms; [visual] cognition which is based (*āśrita*) on that [eye does] not.
[AK 1-42ab]

Answer: As to that, because just the functioning (*sabhāga*) eye is the subject [of our syllogism] (*pakṣīkṛta*) here, [our argument] does not establish what is [already] established [for you]. Nor is there a conflict with what [we ourselves] accept, since it is said [in the *Ārya-bhava-samkrānti-sūtra*],²⁶

The eye does not see visible form, and the mind (*manas*) does not know dharmas.

That which the world does not penetrate (*gāhate*) is the highest truth (*paramam satyam*).

Because [we] do not accept that the eye sees visible form in ultimate reality and because of the extensive inferential argument (*anumāna*) which has been expounded, that [fact that the functioning eye does not see visible form]²⁷ is established. Therefore, [Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the functioning (*sabhāga*) eye does not see visible form,

[Reason:] because it is an eye-organ,

[Example:] like the non-functioning (*tatsabhāga*) [eye].

Alternatively, [there is no conflict with what we ourselves accept] because [the functioning eye's seeing visible forms] is negated [using the following reason and example:] "because the [eye-]organ is material (*rūpin*) like the ear."²⁸ Nor will there be

a conflict with common knowledge [i. e., that the eye sees visible forms]. [This is so] because that [common knowledge] has not been abandoned since we have stated a qualified thesis, and because [that objection] has been answered [already].²⁹

Objection: The Kāśmīras³⁰ say: The eye does indeed see [forms] because it is the agent (*kartr*) of vision.

*Answer:*³¹ That is not [logically] possible, because [the reason] is one part of the meaning of the thesis³² and because there is no agreement (*anvaya*) [with a similar example, since no example is given] and because the negation [of the thesis that the eye sees forms] has [already] been stated.

*Alternative Answer:*³³ What the Kāśmīras said is not [logically] possible [for the following reasons:] For those who hold that [all things] are momentary (*kṣaṇikavādin*), activity is not possible [for the eye] because it is instantaneous. For those who hold that [all things] are not momentary, also, it is not possible for that same [eye which which previously does not see to become] different from that.³⁴

Objection: The Sautrāntikas³⁵ say: Since conditioned dharma³⁶ are inactive, neither the eye nor anything else sees. What then? In a sūtra,³⁷ it is said that visual cognition (*cakṣurvijñāna*) originates in dependence on the eye and visible forms. Therefore your statement that the eye does not see just establishes what is [already] established [for us].

Answer: Just by [our] negation of origination [in the first chapter of the MMK], visual cognition is not possible; therefore [we] do not establish what is [already] established [for you]. [Also,] there is no conflict with what [we ourselves] accept, because we do accept the meaning of [that] sūtra [as being] in accord with conventional truth and because in ultimate reality, there is no reasoning [which establishes] the meaning of [that] sūtra.

Indeed, a difference of that [manner in which the eye sees]³⁸ is not possible, because we have negated the origination of the *āyatana*s of eye and visible form and because [we] have negated

[the relation of] seer and seen between eye and visible form. Nevertheless, desiring to enlarge the understanding of the listener, [I] will give just an indication (*phyogs tsam*, *dirimātra*) [of that argument].

If the visual organ is its own self, that [eye] does not see that [own self] at all. [MMK 3-2ab]

As before, having indicated that [the fact] that [the eye] does not see its own self is the property of the subject [which proves the thesis], [Nāgārjuna says,]

When it does not see itself, how will that [eye] see others?
[MMK 3-2cd]

This sets forth the property to be proved [i. e., that the eye does not see visible forms whether it is in contact with them or not].³⁹ Therefore, wishing to refute other conceptual constructions imagined (*parikalpita*) by others, [I] will state syllogisms.

In that connection, to those⁴⁰ who say that the eye grasps [visible forms] with which it is not in contact (*aprāpta*), [we reply:] [The eye does not grasp visible forms with which it is not in contact. It knows them only indirectly] because "seeing" has the meaning of "knowing" [not "grasping"],⁴¹ just as kings know from [their] agents⁴² [things which they themselves do not see]. [This is so] because [the eye] does not see itself. The meaning of [that] reason is that [the eye] does not know itself.⁴³

[Therefore we can state syllogisms such as the following:]
[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the eye does not grasp an object with which it is not in contact (*aprāpta-viṣaya*),
[Reason:] because it does not see [i. e., know] its own self,
[Example:] like the nose and so on.⁴⁴

Likewise,

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, visible form is not graspable (*grāhya*) by an eye-organ which grasps an object with which it is not

in contact,

[Reason:] because it is dependent on the elements (*bhautika*),

[Example:] like odor and so on.

[The reasons in the two preceding syllogisms, namely, the eye's] not seeing its own self and [visible form's] being dependent on the elements, are mentioned [as] a use of words to imply more than is expressed (*mtshan nyid kyi sgra'i tshul*, perhaps *lakṣaṇā-śabda-naya*).⁴⁵ Therefore in both cases, inferences should also be given [employing] reasons such as "because of having resistance (*sapratigha*);"⁴⁶ and appropriate syllogisms should be fully stated.

Alternatively, [one may state the following syllogism:]

[Thesis:] It is not maintained that in ultimate reality, the eye grasps an object with which it is not in contact,

[Reason:] because it has an object of the present [moment] which is [immediately] evident (*pratyakṣa*),⁴⁷

[Example:] like the nose and the other [physical sense organs].

*Objection:*⁴⁸

[Thesis:] The eye does [indeed] grasp an object with which it is not in contact,

[First Reason:] because it grasps obstructed visible form⁴⁹ and

[Second Reason:] because there is no difference of effort and

[Third Reason:] because there is no difference of time⁵⁰ and

[Fourth Reason:] because it grasps an object greater [in size]⁵¹ than itself,

[Example:] like the mind (*manas*).

Answer: That also is not good, [for the following reasons:]

[1] Here "grasping [an object] with which it is not in contact" has the meaning of "grasping visible form which is obstructed;" and the meaning of [the first reason,] "because it grasps visible form which is obstructed," is also just that. Therefore [the meaning of the first reason] is one part of the meaning of the thesis.⁵² [2] Also [the second and third reasons,] "because there is no difference of effort and because there is no difference of time," are not established.⁵³

Even if the reason[s] were established, no agreement (*anvaya*)

[with a similar example] is established. [This is so] because in ultimate reality, it is not established that even the mind grasps [an object] with which it is not in contact; [and therefore the example given is invalid]. Alternatively, [the example] also has a contradictory meaning.⁵⁴

Objection: The Sāṃkhyas say: [Your proof] that the eye does not grasp an object with which it is not in contact establishes what is [already] established [for us, since we hold that the eye apprehends an object with which it is in contact].

Answer: One should reply: [Just] because [we] have shown that the eye is empty of the property of grasping an object with which it is not in contact, [it does] not [follow that we] have shown [that fact] as a consequence of (*yogena*) proving that it does grasp an object with which it is in contact. Therefore [you] become encouraged without justification (*asthāne*).

Moreover,

[Thesis:] It is not maintained that the eye grasps an object with which it is in contact (*prāpta-viṣaya*),

[Reason:] because it is a sense organ,

[Example:] like the mind (*manas*).

Nor is [that argument] inconclusive due to the nose and so on, since those [other sense organs] will also be shown below to be just like that [eye].⁵⁵

Also, what is the meaning of "grasping [an object] with which it is in contact"? If [you] say, "[The eye] goes out from [its own] location [i. e., the eyeball]⁵⁶ in the direction of the object and grasps [it]," [then we reply:]

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the eye's function (*'jug pa*, probably *pravṛtti* or *vṛtti*) [of grasping its object]⁵⁷ does not go outward from the location of the "synonym of visual cognition,"⁵⁸

[Reason:] because it is a function,

[Example:] like the function of the nose-organ and so on.⁵⁹

Likewise,

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, visible form is not graspable (*grāhya*)

by an eye-organ which grasps an object with which it is in contact,

[Reason:] because [visible form] has a cause,⁶⁰

[Example:] like sound and so on.

Objection: The extensive inferences shown in both cases⁶¹ refute one position by means of the other (*phyogs gcig gis gcig bsal ba*). Therefore nothing at all has been established.

Answer: Because both [ways of grasping a sense object] do not exist, [our] desire not to establish [either position] is fulfilled (*mi sgrub par 'dod pa grub po*, perhaps *asiṣādhayiṣā siddhā*).

*Objection:*⁶² The eye's rays of light ('od zer) go in the direction of the object and grasp the object.

Answer: To those who have [that] opinion, the following should be said:

[Thesis:] One should understand that even conventionally, the eye-organ does not possess rays of light,

[Reason:] because it is a cause⁶³ of the apprehension (*dmigs pa*, probably *upalambha* or *upalabdhi*) of visible form,

[Example:] like visible form [itself].

*Objection:*⁶⁴

[Thesis:] The eye-organ does indeed possess light rays,

[Reason:] because it is an eye-organ,

[Example:] like the eyes of nocturnal animals such as mice.

Answer: That is not [logically] possible, [1] because the eye-organ is invisible and [2] even if the location⁶⁵ of that [eye-organ] possesses light-rays, the example is not established and [3] because [your reason] suffers from [the fault] that it is counterbalanced.⁶⁶

Enough of [this] extensive deliberation! [We] will deal just with the subject at hand.

If the visual organ is its own self, that [eye] does not see that [own self] at all.

When it does not see itself, how will that [eye] see others?

[MMK 3-2]

[*Buddhapālita's commentary:*] Here [*Buddhapālita*]⁶⁷ says: Here if the intrinsic nature of entities is seen in their own selves, [then] because [they] possess that [nature], it will also be apprehended in the selves of others. For example, if wetness is perceived [literally, "seen"] in water, [then] because it possesses that [wetness], [wetness] will also be apprehended in earth. If heat is perceived in fire, [then] because it possesses that [heat], [heat] will also be apprehended in water. If a sweet smell is perceived in the jasmine flower, [then] because it possesses that [sweet smell], [a sweet smell] will also be apprehended in clothing.⁶⁸ But how will that entity which does not appear in its own self be apprehended in the selves of others? For if a bad smell is not perceived in the jasmine flower, it will not be apprehended in clothing [perfumed by it], either.

[*Buddhapālita continues:*] Therefore if the visual organ saw its own self, then it would be possible to say, "because it sees visible form, it is the visual organ (*rūpam paśyatīti darśanam iti*);" but the visual organ does not see its own self. Now how will that which does not see its own self see others? Therefore it is not possible to say, "because it sees visible form, it is the visual organ."

[*Buddhapālita continues:*] *ācārya* Āryadeva, also, has said,

If the intrinsic nature of all entities is seen first in themselves,
Why does the eye not also grasp the eye itself? [*Catuh-śataka*
13-16]⁶⁹

[*Other Buddhists' objection to Buddhapālita's argument:*]⁷⁰ As to that, here [our] fellow Buddhists say: If [you] say that just as that vision⁷¹ which apprehends visible form does not exist in the eye, so also it does not exist in visible form, then [that merely] establishes what is [already] established [for us]. For even so, it has been said,⁷²

That [visual cognition?] does not exist in the eye or visible form; nor does it exist between the two.

That [place?] where that [visual cognition?] abides neither exists, nor does it not exist.

[*Bhāvaiviveka's critique of Buddhapālita's explanation:*]⁷³ If [you, Buddhapālita] say that [the eye] does not have the power of seeing its own self, [then] jasmine flowers are not suitable as an example of that. [This is so] because sweet smells occur in jasmine flowers by virtue of a group (*sāmagrī*) [of causes and conditions], just as sesame seed oil becomes sweet-smelling through contact with flowers.⁷⁴ Also, [this argument is wrong for the following reason:] Since no one accepts that [the eye possesses] the activity (*kriyā*) of seeing visible form [because it possesses the activity of seeing itself],⁷⁵ it is not correct to refute that [position].

But if [you, Buddhapālita] prove that just as [the eye] does not grasp itself, [so] also it does not grasp others, [then] in that case also, [your] example cannot [prove that]. [This is so] because [your examples,] fire and jasmine flowers, do not grasp⁷⁶ [either] their own or others' selves. Therefore that [explanation of yours] is not [logically] possible.

Therefore in that way, since it is not established that the eye sees, origination is also not established; [and] motion is not established, either, since [in both cases, the alleged] example does not exist.⁷⁷ Alternatively, the reason is also contradictory.⁷⁸

*Objection:*⁷⁹ Having imputed a [false] meaning to [your own] proof,⁸⁰ you say that the eye does not see visible form because it does not see its own self. By saying that, [you] have shown that if that [eye] lacks power over its own self, it also does not have that [power] over the self of another.⁸¹ Even so, [your reason] is inconclusive (*anaikāntika*), for although fire lacks the power to burn its own self, [nevertheless] it does have the power to burn the self of another.

Answer:

The example of fire is not adequate (*paryāpta*) for establishing the visual organ. [MMK 3-3ab]

[That is,] to charge that [our] reason is inconclusive [by means of the example of fire, is inadequate]⁸² for establishing that meaning, [i. e.,] that the eye has the intrinsic nature of a visual organ (*darśana-svabhāva*). The idea is that [this is so] because in ultimate reality, it is not established that fire burns and because even conventionally, it is not established that [the eye] has the intrinsic nature of a visual organ.

Alternatively,

The example of fire is not adequate for establishing the visual organ... [MMK 3-3ab]

because of the fault in [your] reason⁸³ which [will be] stated. The idea is that [this is so] because that [notion that] the intrinsic nature of fire is to illuminate [both] its own and others' selves does not exist even for the opponent's position (*parapakṣa*),⁸⁴ and because even conventionally, it is not established that the intrinsic nature of fire is to burn.⁸⁵ "Burning," moreover, is a transformation (*'gyur ba*, probably *pariṇāma* or *vipariṇāma*) of fuel, which is produced by fire; therefore it is not the intrinsic nature of fire.

Moreover,

The example of fire is not adequate for establishing the visual organ.

That [example] has been answered, along with the visual organ [itself], by [the examination of] the traversed (*gata*), the untraversed (*agata*), and that which is being traversed (*gamyamāna*). [MMK 3-3]

"Along with the visual organ" (*lta bcas, sadarśanaḥ*) [means] "together with the visual organ (*lta ba dang bcas pa, saha darśanena?*). What [is said to be "along with the visual organ"]? The example of fire. What has been done? [The example of fire, along with the visual organ,] has been answered. By means of what? By means of [the examination of] the traversed, the untra-

versed, and that which is being traversed [in chapter two of the MMK].

Previously, it was explained that in ultimate reality, going does not exist on the traversed, the untraversed, or that which is being traversed. [This is so] because [the traversed] has been traversed [already], because [the untraversed] has not [yet] been traversed, and because that which is being traversed is not cognized apart from the traversed and the untraversed.

In just that way, the [following] syllogisms⁸⁶ should be stated successively: In ultimate reality, fire, too, does not burn fuel which has been burned, which has not been burned, or which is being burned. [This is so] because [burned fuel] has been burned [already], because [unburned fuel] has not [yet] been burned, and because [fuel] which is being burned is not cognized apart from the burned and the unburned.⁸⁷ And likewise, in ultimate reality, the eye, too, does not see visible forms which have been seen, which have not been seen, or which are being seen. [This is so] because [the seen] has been seen [already], because [the unseen] has not [yet] been seen, and because [visible forms] which are being seen are not cognized apart from the seen and the unseen.

[*Buddhapālita's commentary*]: Here [Buddhapālita]⁸⁸ says:

Objection [according to Buddhapālita]: The visual organ and so on are established in the same way as fire. For example, although fire burns, it just burns others; but it does not burn its own self. Likewise, although the visual organ sees, it just sees others; but it does not see its own self.⁸⁹

Answer:

The example of fire is not adequate for establishing the visual organ.

That [example] has been answered, along with the visual organ [itself], by [the examination of] the traversed, the untraversed, and that which is being traversed. [MMK 3-3]

[The example is not adequate] because that [fire] also does not

burn another.⁹⁰

[*Bhāvaviveka's*⁹¹ critique:] That is not [logically] possible, for since the opponent's position (*pūrvapakṣa*) is quite worthless (*aśāra*) due to [its being] a mere example, it is not right to refute that [position].⁹²

Objection:

[Thesis:] The eye does indeed possess the activity (*kriyā*) of seeing,

[Reason:] because it is so taught in the science of grammar (*śabda-śāstra*).

[Application:] Here, in the science of grammar, [it is taught that] when one uses⁹³ a primary suffix (*bya ba'i rkyen*, *kṛt-pratyaya*)⁹⁴ in [the sense of] an agent (*kartr*), [then one says,] "Because it sees, it is the visual organ (*lta bar byed pas lta ba zhes bya ba*, probably *paśyatīti darśanam iti*; cf. MMK 3-4c)."

[Similar Example:]⁹⁵ Whatever is taught in that [science] is so, for example, [it is taught that] when one uses a primary suffix in [the sense of] an agent, [then one says,] "Because one understands (*thugs su chud par mdzad pa*, *bodhati?*) or because one understands [by oneself] (*thugs su chud par gyur pa*, *budhyate?*), [one is called] 'Buddha' (*sangs rgyas*, *buddha*)."⁹⁶

Answer: That proof exists [i. e., is valid] within conventional truth (*vyavahāra-satya*); but it does not exist in ultimate reality. Why? Because in this very [chapter], the eye's seeing (*mig lta ba*) has been negated and because [in the first two chapters] the origination of that [vision] has been negated, [the eye] is devoid of vision.⁹⁷

When it does not see anything, it is not the visual organ.
[MMK 3-4ab]

When it does not see a door-bolt or a stool or anything at all, then it is not the visual organ. Therefore,

How can that [statement] that the visual organ sees be [logically] possible?⁹⁸ [MMK 3-4cd]

How can that [statement] that the visual organ sees be [logically] possible? The meaning of the sentence is that that is just not possible. Therefore,

The visual organ does not see at all. What is not a visual organ (*adarśana*) does not see at all. [MMK 3-5ab]

The idea is [that what is not a visual organ does not see]

because it is empty of the power of seeing, like a lump of earth and so on.

Therefore in ultimate reality, the explanation of the word *darśana* and the word *buddha* in the science of grammar is simply not correct, because the example [i. e., the Buddha] does not exist. Nor does [the preceding statement] contradict [our] doctrine, because in ultimate reality, the Blessed One, too, is without intrinsic nature and also because below [Nāgārjuna] will say,

That which is the intrinsic nature of the Tathāgata is the intrinsic nature of this world.

The Tathāgata is without intrinsic nature, [and] this world is without intrinsic nature. [MMK 22-16]

Alternatively, [we can] examine [the meaning of MMK 3-4,5ab] differently: Here, when one uses a primary suffix in [the sense of] an agent, in regard to that [eye] which is a visual organ, [one says,] "Because it sees, it is the visual organ." Or else when one uses a primary suffix in [the sense of] an agent in regard to what is not a visual organ, [one says,] "Because it sees, it is the visual organ." What follows from that?⁹⁹ If it is said in regard to that [eye] which is a visual organ, [then]

When it does not see anything, it is not the visual organ.
[MMK 3-4ab]

Well, what [is a visual organ]? Just that which sees¹⁰⁰ is a visual organ. Therefore an eye in which the activity of seeing has originated sees; [but] in that case, there is that same fault of reason and example.¹⁰¹

Objection: Because that [eye] is the agent of the activity of seeing, it is indeed the visual organ.

Answer: Then if that [eye] is the visual organ [already], a [second] activity of seeing would just be pointless.¹⁰² Therefore,

How can that [statement] that the visual organ sees be
[logically] possible? [MMK 3-4cd]

The meaning of the sentence is that it is simply not [logically] possible, because [the eye would already] possess the activity of seeing.¹⁰³

But even if it is said in regard to that [eye] which is not a visual organ,

When it does not see anything, it is not the visual organ.
[MMK 3-4ab]

Then if that [eye] does not have the intrinsic nature of a visual organ, it is devoid of the activity of seeing, like a lump of earth and so on. Therefore that which is not a visual organ also does not see at all.

Therefore, because in that way neither possesses the activity of seeing,

The visual organ does not see at all. What is not a visual organ does not see at all. [MMK 3-5ab]

Objection: If there is a double negation [as in MMK 3-5b], the

original meaning is understood. Therefore an eye in which the activity of seeing has originated sees.

Answer: That is not good, because [here] it has been negated that [an eye for which the activity of seeing] exists or does not exist is the cause [of seeing],¹⁰⁴ like the negation [in MMK 1-6] of a causal condition for an existent or a nonexistent [thing].

*Objection:*¹⁰⁵ Having applied [the quality of] being a visual organ [to the eye] figuratively on account of [the fact that it will see in] the future,¹⁰⁶ that [eye] is the visual organ.

Answer: [In that case, the thesis which you] maintain has been lost for the sake of establishing conventional truth.¹⁰⁷

Alternatively, [one may explain MMK 3-5ab as follows:]

Objection:

[Thesis:] One says that an eye for which the activity of seeing has originated sees,

[Reason:] because [that] conventional designation of activity exists.

[Dissimilar Example:] It is not said that that [organ] for which the activity of seeing has not originated sees, as [in the case of] the ear.

[Application:] Because the eye possesses the activity of seeing, one conventionally designates that the eye sees.

Answer: The *ācārya* [Nāgārjuna] replies: In that case,

The visual organ does not see at all. [MMK 3-5a]

The idea is that [this is so] because the opponent has not shown that an activity of seeing has originated in ultimate reality for any seer, and because before an activity of seeing has originated in the visual organ, it is not established as a visual organ.

Because it is difficult to show that what was formerly not a visual organ will later possess the activity of seeing,

What is not a visual organ does not see at all. [MMK 3-5b]

Thus the meaning of the reason [in the opponent's last syllogism] is not established, or else it has a contradictory meaning.¹⁰⁸ Therefore the thesis is lost.

Objection: Here the Sāṃkhyas and Vaiśeṣikas say:¹⁰⁹ Because one sees by means of this, it is the visual organ ('*dis lta bar byed pas lta ba ste*, probably *anena paśyatīti darśanam*). [This is so] because a primary suffix is used in [the sense of] an instrument (*karana*). That one to whom that instrument [of the activity of seeing] belongs is the seer. That [seer], moreover, sees by means of that [instrument]. For example, a cutter (*chettr*) cuts (*chinnati*) wood to be cut (*chedya*, etc.) by means of an axe; but the axe itself does not cut. Therefore that [statement of yours] that the eye does not see [merely] establishes what is [already] established [for us].¹¹⁰

[Thesis:] Instruments have a [corresponding] agent,

[Reason:] because they are instruments,

[Example:] as the axe and so on have a cutter [who wields them].

Answer:

One should understand that the seer has been explained by means of the visual organ itself. [MMK 3-5cd]

"One should understand that it has been explained" [means] "one should understand that it has been answered." By means of what? By means of the visual organ itself. [The explanation] of what? Of the seer. The idea is that [this is so] because the refutation of the conceptual construction that there is a seer is also similar.

As there the property of the eye [which proves that it does not see visible forms] is [its] not seeing its own self,¹¹¹ so here also the property of the self (*ātman*) [which proves that it does not see visible forms] is [its] not seeing its own self. [This is so] because it is not possible for the self to see its own self, since acting (*'jug pa*, probably *pravṛtti* or *vṛtti*) on its own self [would be] contradictory. For example, that same edge of a sword does not cut that

very sword edge. Thus the inference is:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the self, too, is not a seer,

[Reason:] because it does not see its own self,

[Example:] like the ear.

Nor can the opponent spoil (*bslad*) [our argument] with the poison of suspicion (*āśaṅkā* or *śaṅkā* that the meaning of [our] reason is not established.¹¹² Wherever it is explained that the self sees the self, there that [statement] is made conventionally, having imposed the word "self" [in the sense of "mind"] because the mind (*manas*) is beneficial (*phan 'dogs pa*, perhaps *upakārin*).¹¹³

Here [the reason in the preceding syllogism,] "not seeing its own self" is mentioned [as] a use of words to imply more than is expressed (*mtshan nyid kyi sgra'i tshul*, perhaps *lakṣaṇā-śabda-naya*).¹¹⁴ Therefore inferences with reasons and examples such as the reasons "because it is an entity (*bhāva* or *vastu*)," "because it is an object of knowledge (*jñeya*)," or "because it is an object of speech (*brjod par bya ba*; *abhidheya*, *vaktavya*, *vācya*, etc.)" and [corresponding] examples such as "like the ear and so on," "like sound and so on," or "like its own self," should also be fully stated.

Thus,

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the self does not see visible form,

[Reason:] because it is an entity,

[Example:] like the ear and so on.

Likewise,

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the self does not see visible form,

[Reason:] because it is an object of knowledge,

[Example:] like sound and so on.

Likewise,

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the self does not see visible form,

[Reason:] because it is an object of speech,

[Example:] like its own self.

[Syllogisms] should likewise be stated appropriately in regard to visible form also.¹¹⁵

There are also no faults of the thesis and so on,¹¹⁶ [1] because

conventional truth is under discussion (*dbang du byas pa, adhi-kṛta*), [2] the self [as] generally accepted¹¹⁷ is the subject [of the syllogism] (*phyogs su byas pa, pakṣīkṛta*), [3] because a property of that [conventional self] is indicated [as the reason in the syllogism], and [4] because that [conventional self] is also adduced as an example.

Likewise, since an axe and so on are not established in ultimate reality, the example [in the opponent's last syllogism] also does not exist. Therefore [when we show that the eye does not see, we] do not establish what is [already] established [for the opponent].

Objection: That very [statement] that the seer does not see nihilistically negates (*apa-vad*) that meaning [i. e., its own meaning].¹¹⁸ Therefore there will be a fault in [your] thesis.

Answer: Here [that objection] has [already] been answered [in our discussion of the statement], "dependent origination is without origination (*pratītyasamutpādo 'nutpādaḥ*)."¹¹⁹ Therefore it is not necessary to repeat [that answer] again.

Moreover, here that seer either has the intrinsic nature of a seer; or it does not have the intrinsic nature of a seer. In that connection, [let us first suppose that] it has the intrinsic nature of a seer, just as the Sāṃkhyaas say that the intrinsic nature of the spirit (*puruṣa*) is consciousness (*caitanya*).¹²⁰ As to that, if that seer of that [Sāṃkhya] has the intrinsic nature of a seer, [then] because intrinsic nature is not made [by any causes or conditions], it would be a seer even without a visual organ.¹²¹

*Objection:*¹²² If that cutter has no axe, it is not possible [for him] to be a cutter. Likewise, [only] if that [self], too, is not apart from¹²³ a visual organ, should one see [i. e., regard] it as a seer.

Answer: In that case, the self's being a seer is conventional, because a cutter is conventional.¹²⁴ If [you] suppose so,

A seer who is not apart [from the visual organ] does not exist.¹²⁵ [MMK 3-6a]

"Because that [self] is accepted as a seer [only] if it is not apart

from the visual organ" is the rest of the sentence. Here, before [the seer, i. e., the self] possesses the visual organ and after it has separated from the visual organ, the visual organ does not exist. If the visual organ does not exist, [the activity of] seeing (*lta ba*) the visible also does not exist. Therefore since it is not possible that [the self] is a seer, the seer does not exist. The meaning is that [the self] does not have the intrinsic nature of a seer.

Nor is that [seer] established like fire, because fire is not established without fuel.¹²⁶

Alternatively, [one can interpret MMK 3-6a by saying that] the rest of the sentence is, "Even if [you] say that [the self] is a seer when the visual organ exists, [nevertheless] the seer imagined (*parikalpita*) by the Sāṃkhyas does not exist." Here one infers that [something] is a seer because it apprehends and sees visible forms. But that apprehension of visible form also exists [only] if the eye, visible form, light, space, and attention exist. Therefore the collection (*tshogs*)¹²⁷ called "Devadatta" is designated a "seer" [only when he] possesses those [conditions]; but [a seer] other than that does not exist. [This is so] because even if there were some existence [of a seer] imagined to be different from that [collection], the apprehension of visible form does not exist in the mind (*rgyud*, *samtāna* or *samtati*, literally, "series") of a blind person. [Therefore the seer imagined by the Sāṃkhyas could not be a seer by intrinsic nature.]¹²⁸

Efficient causes (*byed pa'i rgyu*, *kāraka-hetu* or *kāraṇa-hetu*) are conventionally designated as the agent. As in the case of a lamp, it is indeed [logically] possible [to do so, even though they lack the intrinsic nature of an agent]. For example, even though a lamp has no volition (*cetanā*), it is said to be an illuminator because it is a cause of illumination. Therefore even conventionally, that [seer established by intrinsic nature] does not exist.¹²⁹

Objection: [What is called the seer] does not have the intrinsic nature of a seer. As the Vaiśeṣikas say, "When the cognition of visible form has originated from the conjunction (*sbyor ba*, probably *saṃyoga* here) of the four [the self (*ātman*), the mental

organ (*manas*), the sense organ (*indriya*), and the object (*vi-śaya*)),¹³⁰ [the self] sees."¹³¹

Answer: Even so, there is that same fault [that there is no seer other than the group of factors conventionally called "Devadatta," etc.]. [This is so] because the supposition (*brtag pa*, *kalpanā*) that that [seer] is an existence which is not commonly known is not possible.¹³²

Objection: Accepting [the self] as the common [seer well known in the world], that [self still] exists [independent of the eye, visible form, and so on].¹³³

Answer: Even [so, Nāgārjuna] says,

[A seer] who is apart from the visual organ also [does not exist]. [MMK 3-6b]

What is [the meaning of MMK 3-6b]? The context is "the seer does not exist" [from MMK 3-6a]. [This follows] because if it is apart from the power of the visual organ, [the self] does not have the intrinsic nature of that [seer].

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, it is not possible that that [self] sees visible form,

[Reason:] because it is different from the eye,

[Example:] like a jar.

Thus for neither position is it established that there is a seer.¹³⁴

Alternatively, even if one imagines that [the self] has the intrinsic nature of a seer, [Nāgārjuna replies,]

A seer who is not apart [from the visual organ] does not exist, nor does one who is apart from the visual organ. [MMK 3-6ab]

The idea is that whether it possesses or lacks a visual organ, [the self] does not have the intrinsic nature of a seer.

To begin with, [suppose that] one maintains the following: "When that seer has an eye, he sees." In that case, the estab-

lishment of the apprehension of visible form [by the seer] exists [only] if the eye exists. Therefore [his] being a seer is conventional, just as burning (*bsreg pa nyid*) [exists only] if fire exists [and thus is conventional]. [In that case,] one ought to maintain that [the seer] is the eye itself. But if one says, "Even without a visual organ, [the self] is a seer," [then] since the apprehension of visible form does not exist in the mind (*rgyud*, *saṃtāna* or *saṃtati*, literally, "series") of a blind person, it is not [logically] possible that that [self] is indeed a seer.¹³⁵

Objection:

[Thesis:] One should understand that just that which possesses the activity of seeing is the seer,

[Reason:] because that has an instrument (*karāṇa*) and an object (*karman*).

[Dissimilar Example:] Here what has no activity has no instrument or object, as a sky-flower [does not].

[Application:] That seer (*draṣṭṛ*) has an instrument, the visual organ (*darśana*), and an object, the visible (*draṣṭavya*).

[Conclusion:] Therefore one should understand that just that which possesses the activity of seeing is the seer.

Answer: Because the organ of vision has been completely negated [as existing] in ultimate reality and [because] if the visual organ does not exist, the seer is also not possible, [Nāgārjuna says,]

If the seer does not exist, how will your visible [object] and visual organ exist? [MMK 3-6cd]

The idea is that [this is so] because that which no one sees cannot be a visible [object] and because an instrument [of vision] is also not [logically] possible, since a seer who sees by means of this [instrument] does not exist at all. Therefore the meaning of your reason, "because [its] instrument and object exist," is not established; or else the meaning [of the reason] is contradictory.¹³⁶

Objection: Some¹³⁷ among [our] fellow Buddhists say: Con-

cerning conditioned factors,¹³⁸ which are subject to other (*para-tantra*) causes and conditions and are immobile,¹³⁹ it is [logically] possible to say that the eye does not see and that a self different from that [eye] does not exist as a seer. But,

[Thesis:] [We] do not maintain that visible [objects] and visual organs do not exist,

[Reason:] because their four results, cognition (*viññāna*) and so on, exist.

[Dissimilar Example:] That which does not exist does not have the results called "cognition, contact (*sparśa*), feeling (*vedanā*), and craving (*trṣṇā*),"¹⁴⁰ just as the eye of one blind from birth [does not give rise to cognition and the rest].

[Application:] Visible [objects] and visual organs have the four results, cognition and so on.

[Conclusion:] Therefore visible [objects] and visual organs do exist.

Answer: If it has been shown, by the method which [we] have stated, that visible [objects] and the organ of vision are not established, then¹⁴¹

Because visible [objects] and the visual organ do not exist, the four, cognition and so on,
Do not exist. [MMK 3-7ab,c1 (PSP: 3-8ab,c1)]

The idea is that [this is so] because [their] causal conditions do not exist. Therefore if [cognition and so on] are not established because those [i. e., visible objects and the visual organ] are not established, [then] it is also not [logically] possible to establish visible objects and the visual organ [as a consequence of the existence of cognition, etc.] because [your] example also does not exist.¹⁴²

*Objection:*¹⁴³ In ultimate reality, cognition and so on do indeed exist, because their results, appropriation (*upādāna*) and so on, exist.

Answer:

How will appropriation and so on exist? [MMK 3-7c2,d (PSP: 3-8c2,d)]

The idea is that [this is so] because those are also not established, like cognition and so on. "Appropriation" (*upādāna*) [means those things] "which are to be appropriated" (*upādeya*). They are: [1] sensual pleasure (*kāma*); [2] the overestimation of moral conduct and ascetic practices (*śīla-vrata-parāmarśa*); [3] the doctrine of the self (*ātma-vāda*); and [4] views (*drṣṭi*).¹⁴⁴ [The phrase] "and so on" (*ādīni*) indicates those [items in a list] at the beginning of which [the word preceding *ādī* stands]. Those, moreover, are samsāric existence (*bhava*), birth (*jāti*), and old-age-and-death (*jarā-marāṇa*).¹⁴⁵ Therefore you have that same fault [in your argument].

At the beginning of the chapter, the opponent adduced the auditory organ, etc., and sound, etc., as examples.¹⁴⁶ Now [Nāgārjuna], wishing to show by the method which has been stated that they are similar [to the visual organ in not existing by intrinsic nature], says,

One should understand that the auditory organ, the olfactory organ, the gustatory organ, the tactile organ, and the mind (*manas*)

Have been explained, [along with] the hearer (*śrotr*), audible [sounds] (*śrotavya*), and so on, by means of the visual organ. [MMK 3-8 (PSP 3-9)]

One should understand that the auditory organ, the olfactory organ, the gustatory organ, the tactile organ, the mind, the hearer, audible [sounds], and so on have also been rejected (*lan ... btab pa*, literally, "answered"). By means of what? By means of the visual organ itself. As with the negation of the visual organ, the negation of the auditory organ and so on should also be shown appropriately by means of full inference[s], together with elaboration (*prapañca*).¹⁴⁷

Therefore neither origination nor motion, which [the opponent] conceptually constructs from the outset (*ārambha*) of the chapter, is established.¹⁴⁸ As to that, here the meaning of the chapter [is as follows:] The emptiness of the *āyatana*s has been expounded by means of stating the faults in the proofs offered by opponents.

Therefore [scriptural] statements such as the following are established:¹⁴⁹ [From the *Ārya-brahma-viśeṣa-cintā-paripṛcchā-sūtra*?],¹⁵⁰

That which is the internal earth-element (*ādhyātmika-prthivī-dhātu*) and that which is the external (*bāhya*) earth-element have a nondual meaning (*advaya-artha*). By means of discernment (*prajñā*) and wisdom (*ye shes, jñāna*), the Tathāgata has fully and perfectly realized (*abhisambuddha*) that that also is nondual, is not divisible into two (*gnyis su dbyer med pa*), and has a single defining characteristic (*eka-lakṣaṇa*), namely, no defining characteristic (*alākṣaṇa*).¹⁵¹

Likewise, [from the *Ārya-Mañjuśrī-vikrīḍita-sūtra*],¹⁵²

[Mañjuśrī said,] "Girl, how should one see the elements (*dhātu*)?"

The girl said, "Mañjuśrī, [they should be seen] like this, for example: When the three worlds have been consumed by fire [at the end] of the *kalpa*, there is not even ash [left behind]."¹⁵³

Likewise, [from the *Ārya-bhava-saṃkrānti-sūtra*],¹⁵⁴

The eye does not see visible form, and the mind (*manas*) does not know dharmas.

That which the world does not penetrate (*gāhate*) is the highest truth (*paramam satyam*).

Likewise,¹⁵⁵

He does not know, does not see all dharmas. That [bodhi-sattva?] does not apprehend, does not ponder (*cintayati*), does not think of (*manyate*) even the preacher of the Dharma (*chos smra ba, dharma-bhāṇaka*).

Likewise, [from the *Ārya-Mañjuśrī-vikrīḍita-sūtra*?],¹⁵⁶

Sister (*sring mo*, *bhagini*), the eye does not see, does not cognize (*vijānāti*) visible forms. Enlightenment (*bodhi*), too, is free from eye and visible form. The ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind (*manas*) also do not grasp, do not cognize dharma. Enlightenment, too, is free from mind and dharma.

Likewise, [from the *Bhagavatī-prajñāpāramitā-suvikrāntavikrāmi-sūtra*,]¹⁵⁷

Suvikrāntavikrāmin, matter¹⁵⁸ is not the domain (*gocara*) of matter. Feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition are also not the domain of cognition. Suvikrāntavikrāmin, [what is called] "domain" is [the fact] that matter does not know, does not see matter and [the fact] that feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition do not know, do not see cognition. That which is [the state of] not knowing, not seeing matter and not knowing, not seeing feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition, is the perfection of discernment.

The third chapter, "Examination of the *āyatana*s," of the *Prajñāpradīpa*, a commentary on [Nāgārjuna's] *Mūlamadhyamaka* composed by *ācārya* Bhavyakara/Bhavyakāra (Legs ldan byed)¹⁵⁹ [is concluded].

Notes to Translation of Chapter Three

¹The twelve *āyatana*s are the six sense organs (the five physical sense organs plus the mind, *manas*) and the six corresponding sense objects (dharma in the case of mind). This chapter deals mostly with the first six *āyatana*s, the sense organs (*indriya*). Hence in the Sanskrit of the *Prasannapadā*, chapter three is called *cakṣurādīndriya-parīkṣā* (PSP 122.8), while in the Tibetan translation of the *Prasannapadā*, the title is simply *dbang po brtag pa, indriyaparīkṣā* (May (1959), p. 331.8). The Tibetan translations of the *Akuobhayā* and Buddhapālita's commentary have the same title for this chapter as the Tibetan of the *Prajñāpradīpa* (Saito (1984), translation, p. 243 n. 1).

²This translation of *skye ba mi mthun pa'i phyogs kyi khyad par* (*utpāda-vipakṣa-viśeṣa*?) follows Avalokitavrata's explanation (Ava P2b-3,4; D2a-4,5). The particular instance of origination alleged by the opponent in the following paragraph is the origination of the *āyatana*s.

³See Ava P5b-6, D3a-1. Note that chapter one of the MMK deals with origination, while chapter two deals with motion.

⁴That is, the six sense organs.

⁵*darśana* may mean either "vision" or "the organ of vision." (Note Pāṇini 3.3.115 and 3.3.117.) In his commentary following MMK 3-2ab, Bhāvaviveka glosses it as *cakṣur-indriya*; and this seems to be its meaning throughout most of his commentary on this chapter. (The situation is complicated, however, by the fact that the Tibetan word *lia ba* translates both *darśana* and *dr̥ṣṭi*, as well as some other forms derived from the root *dr̥ś/paś*.) Buddhapālita has the same interpretation of *darśana* (Saito (1984), p. 50.11), as does Candrakīrti (PSP 113.7,8). (Jacques May, though, translates *darśana* as *la vision*; see May (1959), p. 78 n. 131.)

Similar remarks apply to the terms for the other four physical sense organs (*śravaṇa*, etc.). Note that the physical sense organs, being made of translucent matter (*rūpa-prasāda*), are not identical with the visible eye, ear, etc.; see May (1959), *ibid.*, AK 1-9, and LVP AK I, p. 15 n. 1.

⁶*rūpa* as one of the twelve *āyatana*s or eighteen *dhātus* refers to "visible form," i. e., color and shape (*varṇa-samsthāna*); see AK 1-10a. *rūpa* as the first of the five aggregates (*skandha*) refers to "matter" in general; see AK 1-9ab and May (1959), p. 79 n. 132.

⁷Compare AK 2-2ab.

⁸See Ava P4-8 to 5a-1, D4b-2,3.

⁹*bsam par bya ba*, perhaps *mantavya* here, corresponding to *manas*.

¹⁰"Set of all dissimilar examples" translates *vipakṣa* here.

¹¹See Ava P5a-3,4,5; D4b-5,6,7. In other words, the reason (*hetu*) in fact proves the opposite of the *sādhya*, since the predicate to be proved (*sādhya*) is ultimately real origination and the reason applies only to (some) things which are conventional. Such things belong to the *vipakṣa* because they lack the *sādhya*. Note that the phrase "in ultimate reality" (*paramārthataḥ*) is understood as qualifying the predicate (*sādhya*) of the thesis (*pratijñā*), not as qualifying the subject (*dharmīn*).

¹²*mig*, *cakṣus* will be translated as "eye," *śrotra* as "ear," and so on; but one should bear in mind that the five physical sense organs are made of subtle, translucent matter (*rūpa-prasāda*). They are not identical with visible parts of the body such as the eyeball, etc., though they are located on or in them. See note 5 and AK 1-44ab.

¹³The Tibetan of MMK 3-2ab in PP differs from the Sanskrit and Tibetan of PSP. (See PSP 113.10 and 113 n. 5.) See the discussion in Saito (1984), translation, p. 244 n. 5. As Saito points out, the Tibetan of MMK 3-2a in PP corresponds to *sva ātmā ced darśanam hi* or *svātmani darśane sati*.

¹⁴MMK 3-2cd, according to Avalokitavratā (Ava P5b-2,3; D5a-4,5).

¹⁵The Sanskrit of MMK 3-2b is *tat tam eva na paśyati* (PSP 113.10). Bhāvaviveka seems to be saying that one must understand that *paśyaty eva* is meant (but not written for reasons of meter) rather than *tam eva*, since Nāgārjuna will deny not only that the eye sees itself but also that it sees other things.

¹⁶PP has a Tibetan translation of MMK 3-2c slightly different from that of the *Akutobhayā*, Bp, and PSP. PP corresponds to *yadā plus ātmanam*, rather than *yad*

ātmanam. See note 67 and Saito (1984), translation, p. 244 n. 5.

¹⁷The idea behind this argument seems to be something like the following: If it is the intrinsic nature of the eye to see, then its seeing must be independent of anything other than the eye itself. (Intrinsic nature is independent of other conditions by definition; see MMK 15-1,2.) Therefore the eye's seeing cannot depend on the presence of visible forms. But then the only thing left for the eye to see is its own self. Now it is well known that the eye does not see itself. Therefore the eye does not see by intrinsic nature.

¹⁸Similar to the eye's not seeing visible form; see Ava P6ab-4, D5a-5.

¹⁹On this and the following sentence, see Ava P7a-4 to 7b-3, D6b-4 to 7a-3.

²⁰These four reasons apply both to the eye-organ (in the first syllogism) and to visible form (in the second). They have resistance because they are *rūpa*, in the sense of "matter," but are not *avijñapti* (see LVP AK I, pp. 25-27). The terms *bhawika* and *upādāya-rūpa* are synonymous and refer to matter dependent on the four great elements (*mahābhūta*), as distinct from the elements themselves. See May (1959), pp. 91 nn. 195 and 198, 164 n. 505.

²¹Avalokitavrata identifies the objectors only as *nikāyāntariyāh*, "members of other (Buddhist) schools." He has them cite a scripture which expounds the doctrine of *rūpa* found in the *Abhidharmakośa*; see Ava P7b-4 to 8a-3, D7a-3 to 7b-1.

²²In other words, as far as the Mādhyamikas are concerned, the opponent's statement that the eye does not see itself because it is invisible simply proves the Mādhyamikas' own contention that in ultimate reality, it cannot see form either. See Ava P8a-3 to 6, D7b-2,3,4.

²³The name "Ābhidhārmika" seems not to have referred to a particular school but to mean simply "a specialist in Abhidharma." See LVP AK I p. x and n. 2, p. 39 n. 1, and LVP AK V p. 45 n. 3. Since the objection here ends with a quotation from the AK, presumably the "Ābhidhārmikas" are Vaibhāsikas in this case.

²⁴On *tat-sabhāga*, literally, "similar to that," see LVP AK I pp. 75-78.

²⁵See the reference in the preceding note.

²⁶Identified by Avalokitavrata, who explains that the Mādhyamikas accept that in superficial reality (*samvṛtyā*), the functioning eye sees visible forms but that in ultimate reality, it does not. See Ava P8b-6 to 9a-3, D8a-3 to 7. (This verse is also quoted by Bhāvaviveka near the end of this chapter.)

The Sanskrit of this verse is found in PSP 120.4,5, where it is ascribed merely to the Bhagavān. De Jong identifies it as verse 14 of the *Bhavasamkrāntisūtra*, ed. N. Aiyaswami Sastri, Adyar, 1938, p. 6. See de Jong (1978), p. 40.

²⁷See Ava P9a-4,5; D8b-1.

²⁸See Ava P9a-8 to 9b-2, D8b-3,4,5. It seems that one should read *gzugs mthong ba bkag pa'i phyir* in Ava P9b-1, D8b-4 for *gzugs mi mthong ba bkag pa'i phyir*.

²⁹That is, our thesis is qualified by the phrase "in ultimate reality." Since we accept that according to superficial reality the eye sees forms, while denying that it does so in ultimate reality, we are not in conflict with what is well known in the

world. (Worldly convention makes no such distinction between superficial and ultimate reality.) Moreover, this objection has been answered in the first chapter, where we pointed out that origination exists superficially but not ultimately. See Ava P9b-3,4,5; D8b-6 to 9a-1.

³⁰The Kāśmīra-Vaiṣṇavikas, according to Avalokitavrata (Ava P9b-6, D9a-11).

³¹*kha cig na re*, "some say," usually indicates an objection; but according to Avalokitavrata (Ava P9b-8, D9a-3), this is Bhāvaviveka's own view; and the context supports that attribution.

³²That is, to say that the eye sees and to say that it is the agent of vision amount to the same thing. See Ava P10a-1,2,3; D9a-4,5.

³³*gzhan dag na re*, "others say." Avalokitavrata (Ava P10a-5, D9a-7 and P10b-3, D9b-4) identifies "others" as *ācārya* Devaśarman, who wrote a commentary on the MMK called *dkar po 'char ba*. This commentary, which Bhāvaviveka also quoted with approval in chapter one of the *Prajñāpradīpa* (see Ames (1994), p. 110 and pp. 129-130 n. 105), has not survived. See Kajiyama (1963), pp. 37-38 and Ruegg (1981), p. 49 and n. 128, p. 62 and n. 187.

³⁴If the eye is momentary, it ceases as soon as it has arisen; and it has no time in which to perform an activity. If it is not momentary, it must persist unchanged. Therefore it cannot change from a former state of not seeing an object to a subsequent state of seeing it; and hence it cannot perform the activity of seeing. See Ava P10a-6 to 10b-3, D9a-7 to 9b-4.

³⁵Following AK 1-42, there is a long discussion in the *bhāṣya* on the question of whether the eye sees or visual cognition sees; and the positions of various schools are given. (See LVP AK I, pp. 81-86.) The position ascribed there to the Sautrāntikas is identical to that given here.

³⁶*samskārah*, in the sense of *samskr̥tā dharmāḥ*. See LVP AK I, pp. 11, 28.

³⁷See, e. g., *Samyutta-nikāya* II p. 72, IV pp. 32-33.

³⁸According to Avalokitavrata, "that" refers to a dispute between the Vaiśeṣikas and the Sāmkhyas as to whether the eye perceives an object which it has "reached" (*prāpta*), i. e., one with which it is in contact (the Sāmkhya position), or one which it has not reached (allegedly the Vaiśeṣika position). See Ava P11b-1 to 6, D10b-1 to 4.

This characterization of the Sāmkhya position is correct; see, e. g., Sinha (1952), pp. 60-61; Frauwallner (1973), Vol. I, p. 309; and Larson and Bhattacharya (1987), p. 340. On the other hand, it is clear that the Vaiśeṣikas did, in fact, hold that the sense organ perceives objects only through contact with them. See, e. g., Sinha (1956), pp. 386-7, 470; Frauwallner (1973), Vol. II, pp. 31-32; and Potter (1977), pp. 161-2.

It is quite surprising that Avalokitavrata would be confused about the position of a major Indian philosophical school on this issue. Perhaps he was misled by the fact that Bhāvaviveka later mentions the Sāmkhyas explicitly in this context and then, in his commentary on MMK 3-6ab, indicates that the Sāmkhyas and Vaiśeṣikas held opposing views on the issue of whether the self is inherently a seer. Thus Avalokitavrata might have assumed that they held different views on

this issue, too.

In fact, though, it was the Buddhist Abhidharma schools who maintained that the eye sees objects with which it is not in contact; see AK 1-43cd. It may be that *bye brag pa dag*, "Vaiśeṣikas," is a mistake (present in both Ava P and D) for *bye brag tu smra ba dag*, "Vaibhāṣikas." There is an instance in Avalokitavratā's subcommentary on chapter five where Ava P has 'os pa pa dag, "Ārhatas," twice for Ava D's 'ug pa pa dag, "Aulūkyas." See note 69 to my translation of chapter five.

³⁹See Ava P12a-6,7,8; D11a-4,5.

⁴⁰The Vaiśeṣikas, according to Avalokitavratā; see Ava P12b-3, D11b-1 and note 38.

⁴¹See Ava P12b-5,6; D11b-2,3.

⁴²*rtog chen*. This translation is conjectural. Avalokitavratā lists *rtog chen* with *bya ma rta*, "runner, courier," and *nyan rna ba*, "spy" (Ava P12b-7, D11b-4). The point is that the eye sees only indirectly by way of other conditions (*pratyaya*) and not directly. Thus its seeing is only conventional (Ava P12b-7 to 13a-2, D11b-3,4,5).

⁴³The idea seems to be that conventionally, the eye is said to see visible forms not because it grasps them directly but because it knows them indirectly through other conditions (such as the presence of light, etc.). Even conventionally, however, it does not "see," that is, "know" itself.

⁴⁴The nose does not smell odors with which it is not in contact (see AK 1-43cd,44ab); and it does not smell itself.

⁴⁵On this and the following sentence, see Ava P13b-3 to 14a-4, D11a-5 to 11b-5.

⁴⁶See the similar discussion of the two syllogisms following MMK 3-2cd and note 20.

⁴⁷See AK 1-44cd. The objects of the five physical senses are simultaneous with them.

⁴⁸According to Avalokitavratā (Ava P14a-8, D13a-1), the objectors are the Vaiśeṣikas; but see note 38.

⁴⁹"Obstructed" by space, according to Avalokitavratā (Ava P14b-2, D13a3). In the *bhāṣya* on AK 1-42, it is pointed out that the eye sees visible forms which are obstructed by transparent objects; see LVP AK I p. 83.

Here "obstructed" translates *bar du chod pa*. Note that Lokesh Chandra's *Tibetan-Sanskrit Dictionary* gives *vyavahita* for *bar du chod pa* (s.v.). According to Monier-Williams' *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, *vyavahita* (s.v.) may mean either "obstructed, concealed" or "separated, placed apart."

⁵⁰If the eye had to go out to its object in order to make contact with it, it would take different amounts of time and effort to see objects at different distances. See Ava P14b-2 to 8, D13a-3 to 7.

⁵¹See Ava P15a-4, D13b-3; and compare LVP AK I p. 93.

⁵²That is, this reason simply restates the thesis in different words and hence is invalid. See Ava P15a-7 to 15b-1, D13b-5,6.

⁵³Avalokitavratā gives an argument based on the idea that all things are

momentary, so that the process of grasping an object encompasses many different moments of effort and grasping. See Ava P15b-2,3,4; D13b-7 to 14a-2. Bhāvaviveka does not mention the fourth reason here, but Avalokitavratā says that it is refuted simply by MMK 3-2. See Ava P15b-4,5,6; D14a-2,3.

⁵⁴If the example is said to be established in superficial reality, but not in ultimate reality, then it cannot be used to support a thesis which is held to be true in ultimate reality. See Ava P16a-3,4,5; D14a-6 to 14b-1.

⁵⁵The opponent might object that although the mind does not grasp an object with which it is in contact, the nose, tongue, and body do. (See AK 1-43cd.) Thus the reason, "because it is a sense organ," is inconclusive. Bhāvaviveka replies that it will be shown (in MMK 3-8) that the other sense organs, just like the eye, grasp neither an object with which they are in contact nor one with which they are not in contact. See Ava P16b-7 to 17a-4, D15a-1 to 5.

⁵⁶See Ava P17a-5,6; D15a-5,6. The idea is not as ludicrous as it sounds if one recalls that "the eye" is composed of invisible *rūpa-prasāda* and is not the visible eyeball.

⁵⁷See Ava P17b-1, D15b-1,2.

⁵⁸*mig gi rnam par shes pa'i rnam grangs, caksur-vijñāna-paryāya*, glossed by Avalokitavratā (*ibid.*) as *mig gi 'bras bu*, "the eyeball."

⁵⁹Here Avalokitavratā argues that if the eye had to go out to its object, then when one opened one's eyes, it would take longer to see the sun or moon than to see the top of a nearby tree. See Ava P17b-2,3,4; D15b-3,4, and note 50.

⁶⁰The idea may be that since visible form has a cause conventionally, it does not exist in ultimate reality.

⁶¹Or "in [regard to] both positions," *phyogs gnyi gar*. The positions referred to are the view (ascribed by Avalokitavratā to the Vaiśeṣikas) that the eye grasps an object with which it is not in contact and the Sāṃkhya's view that it grasps an object with which it is in contact. The opponent charges that since the Mādhyamika rejects both positions, he has failed to establish any position of his own. See Ava P18a-3 to 6, D16a-2,3,4.

⁶²The opponents here are the Mīmāṃsikas, according to Avalokitavratā. See Ava P18a-8, D16a-6. In fact, the view expressed was also that of the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas. See Frauwallner (1973), Vol. II, pp. 32-3 and Potter (1977), pp. 117,119,161.

⁶³Ava P18b-2, D16a-7 has *byed rgyu, kāraṇa-hetu* for PP's *rgyu, hetu* or *kāraṇa*. Here *kāraṇa-hetu* is used in the narrower (*pradhāna*) sense of "productive cause." See LVP AK II p. 247, where the eye and visible form are said to be the *kāraṇa-hetus* of visual cognition in this sense.

⁶⁴Again, Avalokitavratā ascribes this objection to the Mīmāṃsikas. See Ava P18b-6, D16b-3. The argument concerning the eyes of nocturnal animals is found in *Nyāyasūtra* 3-1-44.

⁶⁵That is, the eyeball. See Ava P19a-3, D16b-8.

⁶⁶*gal ba 'khrul pa med pa*, probably *viruddha-avyabhicārin*. See Ames (1995), n. 126.

⁶⁷Literally, "some;" identified by Avalokitavratā as "the commentator (*vr̥tti*-

kāra) Sthavira Buddhapālita." Text in Saito (1984), p. 51.2-19; translation in Saito (1984), translation, p. 51. See also Saito (1984), translation, p. 244, nn. 5, 6, 7.

As Saito points out, although the text of the Tibetan translation of MMK 3-2ab in Bp agrees with that of PP, Buddhapālita's commentary seems to reflect the version of MMK 3-2ab found in PSP. Also, Buddhapālita's interpretation of *yadātmānam* in MMK 3-2c as *yad ātmānam*, rather than *yadā* plus *ātmānam*, agrees with PSP, not PP. In the latter case, this difference is reflected in the Tibetan text of MMK 3-2c in Bp.

⁶⁸In other words, if water itself is wet, it can moisten earth; if fire itself is hot, it can heat water; if jasmine itself is sweet-smelling, it can impregnate clothing with a sweet smell.

⁶⁹See Lang (1986), pp. 122-3, where the text is slightly different.

⁷⁰See Ava P20a-1, D17b-3.

⁷¹*Ita ba*, glossed by Avalokitavratā as "visual cognition" (*cakṣur-vijñāna*). See Ava P20a-2, D17b-4.

⁷²Identified by Avalokitavratā only as coming from "the common doctrine of [our] fellow Buddhists" (*rang gi sde pa spyi'i grub pa'i mtha'*, probably *svayūthyasāmānya-siddhānta*). See Ava P20a-5, D17b-6.

⁷³*kha cig na re*, literally, "some say." Avalokitavratā identifies "some" as Bhāvaviveka himself and says that the following paragraph is his criticism of Buddhapālita's explanation of MMK 3-2. See Ava P20a-6,7; D17b-7.

⁷⁴Avalokitavratā explains that a sweet smell does not exist in jasmine flowers by its own self but by virtue of causes and conditions like seed, earth, etc. Thus it arises adventitiously (*glo bur du*, probably *akasmāt*), just as sesame seed oil is not inherently sweet-smelling but becomes so if it comes in contact with flowers. See Ava P20b-3,4,5; D18a-3,4,5.

⁷⁵See Ava P20b-6,7,8; D18a-5,6,7.

⁷⁶*'dzin pa*, root *grah*. Perhaps a translation other than "grasp" would be better here, since Avalokitavratā explains that in ultimate reality, fire burns neither itself nor others; and jasmine flowers make neither themselves nor others sweet-smelling. See Ava P21a-3,4; D18b-2,3.

⁷⁷This refers to the opponent's first two syllogisms at the beginning of the chapter, in which the fact that the visual organ sees visible forms is used to argue for the existence of origination and motion, respectively. See Ava P21a-5 to 21b-1, D18b-4 to 7.

⁷⁸If one says that the eye does see visible forms conventionally, it is contradictory to use that conventional fact to support a thesis about ultimate reality. See Ava P21b-2, D18-7 to 19a-1.

⁷⁹The objectors are identified by Avalokitavratā only as "proponents of origination" (*skye bar smra ba dag*, probably *utpāda-* or *utpatti-vādinah*). See Ava P21b-4, D19a-2.

⁸⁰See Ava P21b-5, D19a-3.

⁸¹Avalokitavratā here glosses "power" as "the power of grasping" (itself or another). See Ava P21b-6, D19a-3,4.

⁸²See Ava P22a-7 to 22b-1, D19b-3,4,5.

⁸³The "reason" referred to here is the notion that fire illuminates both itself and another. See Ava P22b-2,3,4; D19b-5,6.

⁸⁴Fire does not illuminate itself because there is no darkness in it and hence nothing which needs to be illuminated. See Ava P22b-5,6; D19b-7 to 20a-2.

⁸⁵Conventionally, the nature of fire is heat. See Ava P23a-2, D20a-4.

⁸⁶Although Bhāvaviveka calls these "syllogisms" (*sbyor ba'i tshig, prayoga-vākya*), they lack examples, which full-fledged syllogisms must have.

⁸⁷Compare MMK 10-13cd. Chapter ten of the MMK is devoted to the subject of fire and fuel.

⁸⁸*gzhan dag*, "others," identified by Avalokitavrata (Ava P23b-7, D20b-6).

⁸⁹Text in Saito (1984), pp. 51.20-52.1.

⁹⁰Compare text in Saito (1984), p. 52.10.

⁹¹*gzhan dag*, "others," identified by Avalokitavrata. See Ava P24a-4, D21a-3.

⁹²The opponent gives only an example without giving a reason; hence it is enough to point out that his argument is deficient. Buddhapālita's refutation (given in full by Avalokitavrata) is not necessary. See Ava P24a-4 to 24b-4, D21a-3 to 21b-2.

⁹³*brjod nas*, literally, "having uttered," here and below in the same context. The Sanskrit may be a form of *abhi-dhā*, but there are a number of other possibilities.

⁹⁴The more obvious reconstruction of *bya ba'i rkyen* would be *kriyāpratyaya*. As far as I have been able to determine, this term is not used in Sanskrit grammar, whereas both *lyut* (-ana) and *kta* (-ta) are *kṛt-pratyayas*. (That is, they are added directly to verbal roots.)

⁹⁵For the rather unusual structure of this syllogism, see Ava P24b-6 (where *dang sgrub pa'i chos* is omitted), D21b-3; P24b-7, D21b-4; and P25a-2, D21b-6.

⁹⁶*thugs su chud par mdzad pa* is transitive. *thugs su chud par gyur pa* is normally passive, but may represent the Sanskrit middle (*ātmanepada*) here. The point seems to be that the root *budh* may be conjugated according to either the first conjugation *parasmaipada* (*bodhati*) or the fourth conjugation *ātmanepada* (*budhyate*).

Compare Yaśomitra's *Sphuṭārthā Vyākhyā* on AK 1-1: *buddha iti kartari kta-vidhānam* | ... *karmakartari kṛavidhānam ity apare* | *svayam budhyata iti buddha ity arthah* | ... (Shastri edition, *Bauddha Bharati Series*, Vol. 5, p. 5 - see Bibliographical Abbreviations). Avalokitavrata's subcommentary tends to support the interpretation of *thugs su chud par gyur pa* as (*svayam*) *budhyate*. See Ava P25a-2,3,4; D21b-6 to 22a-1. In this connection, note Pāṇini 3.2.188.

⁹⁷See Ava P25a-8 to 25b-1, D22a-3,4.

⁹⁸Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti's interpretation of MMK 3-4c differs from that of Bhāvaviveka. See Saito (1984), translation, p. 245 n. 14.

⁹⁹*des cir 'gyur*, probably *tena kiṃ bhavati*, literally, "What comes about by means of that?"

¹⁰⁰*lta ba nyid*, probably *paśyamānam*; cf. MMK 3-4a.

¹⁰¹The same fault which Bhāvaviveka found in the opponent's last syllogism,

that is, the fault that the argument is correct conventionally but not in ultimate reality. See Ava P26b-4,5; D23a-4,5,6.

¹⁰²This is similar to the argument in chapter two that one who is a goer does not go, because he is (by assumption) already a goer and hence has no need to perform an activity of going. Moreover, there would be two simultaneous activities of going, that due to which the goer is called a "goer" and that activity of going which the goer is said to perform. The point is that "goer" and "going" only exist in relation to each other and cannot be established as independent entities. See especially MMK 2-7 through 11 (translated in Ames (1995)). See also Ava P26b-6,7,8; D23a-6,7.

¹⁰³See Ava P26b-8 to 27a-2, D23b-1,2.

¹⁰⁴*yod pa dang med pa'i rgyu nyid*, probably *sad-asad-hetutva*. See Ava P27a-8 to 27b-3, D23b-6 to 24a-1. Avalokitavratā makes the point that the opponent assumes that the negations in MMK 3-5ab are implicative negations, whereas in fact they are simple negations.

¹⁰⁵*rtog na*, "if [you] suppose."

¹⁰⁶*phyis 'byung ba'i tshul gyis lta ba nyid du nye bar brtags nas*, probably something like *bhaviṣyad-yogena darśanatvopacārāt*. (*upacārāt* should strictly be *nye bar btags nas*, but *btags* and *brtags* are often confused in the texts.) The opponent's idea is that the eye at first does not perform a particular activity of seeing and then later performs it. Thus the eye is established prior to and independent of its activity of seeing. At the first stage, the eye does not see and thus is not a visual organ; but it is said to be one figuratively because it will see later. See Ava P27b-4,5; D24a-2,3.

¹⁰⁷Figurative designation may be sufficient to establish conventional truth; but the opponent had wished to prove that the eye sees in ultimate reality, that is, by its intrinsic nature. Since intrinsic nature cannot change, it is impossible for the eye first not to see and then later to see.

¹⁰⁸The reason, "because [that] conventional designation of activity exists," is not established in ultimate reality. If it is asserted as conventional truth, it cannot prove anything about ultimate reality. See Ava P28b-1 to 4, D24b-5,6,7.

¹⁰⁹Avalokitavratā remarks that up to this point, the position of those who maintain that the eye itself is the seer (*draṣṭṛ*) has been refuted. Now Bhāvaviveka is going to deal with the position of those who hold that the self (*ātman*) sees by means of the eye, so that the self is the seer and the eye is the instrument (*karana*) of the activity of seeing. See Ava P28b-4,5; D24b-6,7.

¹¹⁰Avalokitavratā makes it clear that what it is being said here is that the eye is called *darśana*, "visual organ," not because it is the agent (*karṭṛ*) of the activity of seeing but because it is the instrument of that activity. The seer (*draṣṭṛ*), the agent who sees, is the self (*ātman*). The self sees by means of the instrument of seeing, the eye. See Ava P28b-6 to 29a-5, D25a-1 to 6.

¹¹¹Avalokitavratā (Ava P29b-4,5; D25b-4,5) glosses "property" (*chos*, *dharma*) as *lta ba gzugs la lta bar mi byed pa'i sgrub pa'i chos* (*sgrub pa'i chos* = *sādhana-dharma*, i. e., *hetu*). See also the following syllogism.

¹¹²The "suspicion" referred to is the suspicion that the self might, after all, be

able to see itself. See the rest of the paragraph and Ava P30a-2 to 5, D26a-2,3,4.

¹¹³See Ava P30a-6,7,8; D26a-5,6,7. Avalokitavrata glosses "wherever" as "in our own and others' systems (*siddhānta*).". He says that the real meaning of this expression is that the mind sees that the self does not exist.

¹¹⁴See Ava P30b-2,3,4; D26b-2,3.

¹¹⁵Avalokitavrata explains that one should show that visible form is not an object of the self as seer, by means of syllogisms using the same reasons and examples. See Ava P30b-8 to 31a-2, D26b-6 to 27a-1.

¹¹⁶According to Avalokitavrata, an opponent charges that [1] the Mādhyamika's thesis (in the preceding syllogism) is faulty because for the Mādhyamika, conventional designation does not exist in ultimate reality; [2] the subject (*pakṣa*) of the thesis is not established because the self is not established for the Mādhyamika; [3] since the self, the subject of the thesis, is not established, the ground (*gzhi*, probably *āśraya*) of the reason is not established; and [4] likewise the last example, "like its own self," is not established. Bhāvaviveka answers those four objections in order. See Ava P31a-2 to 5, D27a-1,2.

¹¹⁷Presumably meaning the conventional self, which the Buddhists also accept on the conventional level.

¹¹⁸Avalokitavrata explains that, according to the opponent, the statement that the seer does not see is "inconsistent with its own words." He gives as an example of such a self-contradictory sentence, the statement, "I am a childless woman's son." See Ava P31b-2,3,4; D27a-4,5.

¹¹⁹The reference here is to the two initial verses of the MMK (MMK 1-A,B). Avalokitavrata explains that in superficial reality, there is dependent origination but that in ultimate reality, there is no origination. Likewise, here what is superficially or conventionally a seer does not see in ultimate reality. See Ava P31b-5,6; D27b-1,2.

¹²⁰Note that in *Sāmkhyakārikā* 19, the *puruṣa* is said to be a *draṣṭṛ*, "seer." See Sinha (1952), pp. 35-6 and Larson and Bhattacharya (1987), pp. 81, 258.

¹²¹In other words, since intrinsic nature is not dependent on anything other than itself, then if one is a seer by intrinsic nature, one will see whether one has eyes or not. See Ava P31b-8 to 32a-4, D27b-4 to 7, and MMK 15-1,2.

¹²²Avalokitavrata ascribes this objection to the Vaiśeṣikas; see Ava P31b-7, D27b-3. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school holds that the self is not inherently conscious but becomes so only through conjunction with the *manas*. See, e. g., Sinha (1956), pp. 386-7, 656 and Potter (1977), p. 125.

¹²³*ma spangs na, atiraskṛtya*, literally, "not having set aside."

¹²⁴Avalokitavrata explains that if the self is a seer only through dependence on the visual organ, and not by intrinsic nature, then its being a seer is purely conventional, not ultimate. See Ava P32a-8 to 32b-1, D28a-2,3.

¹²⁵Avalokitavrata explains that whatever depends on something else in order to see is not a seer in ultimate reality or by intrinsic nature. Hence in ultimate reality, no seer exists. See Ava P32b-2,3,4; D28a-4,5.

¹²⁶Avalokitavrata says that an opponent might hold that fire is a burner by intrinsic nature but does not burn unless there is fuel. Likewise, the self is a seer

by intrinsic nature but does not see without a visual organ. The answer is simply that intrinsic nature (by definition) cannot depend on the presence of something else. See Ava P32b-7 to 33a-2, D28a-7 to 28b-2.

¹²⁷Glossed by Avalokitavrata as "collection of elements and matter dependent on the elements." See Ava P33b-3, D29a-1,2.

¹²⁸See Ava P33b-5 to 8, D29a-3,4,5.

¹²⁹On this paragraph, see Ava P33b-7 to 34a-6, D29a-4 to 29b-2. According to Avalokitavrata, Bhāviviveka here answers an objection that if a seer does not exist by intrinsic nature, even the conventional designation "seer" would not exist. The reply is that the collection of efficient causes, the eye, visible form, and so on, are designated as the seer; but of course, they do not have the intrinsic nature of a seer.

¹³⁰See Ava P34b-2, D29b-5.

¹³¹On the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika account of perception, see Sinha (1956), pp. 386-7, 470-1 and Potter (1977), pp. 161-2.

¹³²See Ava P34b-3 to 8, D29b-6 to 30a-2. Even if one says that there is a seer contingently, and not by intrinsic nature, there is no reason to suppose that it is the *āṣman* postulated by the Vaiśeṣikas, which the Buddhists do not accept. Rather it is the collection of factors conventionally called a "person" or "sentient being," which everyone accepts on the conventional level.

¹³³See Ava P34b-8 to 35a-1, D30a-2,3.

¹³⁴That is, neither the Sāṃkhya's position that a *puruṣa* who has the intrinsic nature of a seer sees nor the Vaiśeṣika's position that an *āṣman* who does not have the intrinsic nature of a seer sees is established. See Ava P35b-1,2; D30b-1,2.

¹³⁵In other words, if the self can see only by means of the eye, its being a seer is conventional, not intrinsic. If one claims that the self is intrinsically a seer, independent of the eye, that is obviously false since the blind have selves (according to the non-Buddhist schools) but cannot see.

¹³⁶Ultimately, the instrument and object of vision do not exist. On the other hand, it is contradictory to try to use the fact of their purely conventional existence to prove a thesis about ultimate reality. See Ava P36a-8 to 36b-1, D31a-5,6.

¹³⁷Identified by Avalokitavrata as the Sautrāntikas and Vaibhāṣikas. See Ava P36b-1, D31a-6. The position expressed, however, seems to be that of the Sautrāntikas; see LVP AK I, p. 86.

¹³⁸*du byed dag, saṃskārāḥ*, in the sense of *saṃskṛtā dharmāḥ*.

¹³⁹*gYo ba med pa*, that is, "inactive." Because the *saṃskāras* are momentary, they have no time in which to perform an activity.

¹⁴⁰In the twelvefold dependent origination, the six *āyatana*s constitute the fifth member (*aṅga*). Contact, feeling and craving are the sixth, seventh, and eighth members. Cognition (or consciousness) is the third member, but the six *āyatana*s can also be said to give rise to cognition. See MMK 26-3,4.

¹⁴¹PSP's verse 3-7 is a quotation from *Ratnāvalī* 4-55, mistakenly numbered by de La Vallée Poussin as a *kārikā* of MMK. See de Jong (1978), p. 40. Thus PP's 3-7 corresponds to PSP's 3-8, and PP's 3-8 corresponds to PSP's 3-9.

¹⁴²Reversing the dissimilar example in the opponent's preceding syllogism, we

have as an example a functioning eye which gives rise to cognition and the rest. But we have just shown that cognition, etc., do not exist because their causal conditions, visible objects and the visual organ, do not exist. See Ava P37a-5 to 37b-1, D32a-1 to 5.

¹⁴³Also from other Buddhists. See Ava P37b-3, D31a-6.

¹⁴⁴The four appropriations constitute the ninth member of the twelvefold dependent origination. See MMK 26-6cd and LVP AK III, pp. 86-7.

¹⁴⁵Samsāric existence, birth, and old-age-and-death are the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth members of the twelvefold dependent origination.

¹⁴⁶See the opponent's first syllogism in this chapter.

¹⁴⁷Avalokitavrata seems to gloss *prapañca* as "answers to objections." See Ava P39a-1, D33b-1. Avalokitavrata gives arguments for each of the other five senses which parallel the arguments given in the case of vision. See Ava P38b-7 to 39b-5, D33a-7 to 34a-4.

¹⁴⁸See the first paragraph of this chapter and the opponent's first two syllogisms. See also Ava P39b-6 to 40a-1, D34a-4,5,6.

¹⁴⁹According to Avalokitavrata, sūtra quotations are introduced at this point in reply to those who might charge, "[The emptiness of the *āyatana*s] has been established by a mere limited treatise of desiccated logic." The MMK establishes the meaning of such scriptural passages (by means of reasoning) and is, in turn, supported by them. See Ava: (1) P40a-4,5, D34b-1,2; (2) P40a-7,8, D34b-4; (3) P40b-6,7,8, D35a-2,3; (4) P41a-1,2, D35a-4,5; (5) P41a-5,6, D35a-7; and (6) P41b-1,2,3, D35b-3,4,5. See also Ames (1994), p. 134 n. 176, and Ames (1995), n. 203.

¹⁵⁰Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P40a-5,6; D34b-3. I have not been able to locate this passage in the *Sde dge bka'* 'gyur edition of the sūtra.

¹⁵¹Avalokitavrata comments that "internal earth-element" refers to the internal *āyatana*s, i. e., the sense organs, while "external earth-element" refers to the sense objects. They are nondual in that neither exists by intrinsic nature. They cannot be divided into two, because the sense organs lack the quality of being grasping subjects (*grahakatva*) and the sense objects lack the quality of being graspable objects (*grāhyatva*). Thus because they are not different by intrinsic nature and cannot be distinguished as subject and object, they have one and the same defining characteristic; but that is no characteristic (since they have no intrinsic nature).

He adds that they are said to have one defining characteristic in order to reject the extreme (*anta*) of multiplicity (*tha dad pa nyid*, perhaps *nānātva*); they are said to have no defining characteristic in order to reject the extreme of oneness (*ekatva*). The nonapprehension of both extremes is the perfection of discernment (*prajñā-pāramitā*). See Ava P40a-8 to 40b-5, D34b-4 to 35a-1.

¹⁵²Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P40b-5, D35a-1. This passage is found in the *Sde dge bka'* 'gyur, Mdo sde Kha 230b-2, where instead of ... *bsregs pa na thal ba yang med pa ltar ro*, one has ... *bsregs par gyur pa de bzhin du'o*.

¹⁵³Avalokitavrata remarks that similarly, the nonapprehension of any internal or external elements is the perfection of discernment. See Ava P40b6,7,8; D35a-2,3.

¹⁵⁴Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P40b-8, D35a-3. This same verse was quoted earlier in this chapter, in the commentary following MMK 3-2cd. See note 26.

¹⁵⁵Identified by Avalokitavrata simply as being "from other *sūtrāntas*." See Ava P41a-2, D35a-5.

¹⁵⁶Identified by Avalokitavrata only as being "from other Mahāyāna sūtras." See P41a-3, D35a-5,6. This quotation seems to be a rephrasing of a passage from the *Mañjuśrī-vikrīḍita-sūtra*, found in the *Sde dge bka'* 'gyur, Mdo sde Kha 222a-3,4.

¹⁵⁷Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P41a-6, D35a-7 to 35b-1. Sanskrit text in Hikata (1958), p. 29. The one major difference between the Sanskrit and the Tibetan is that the Sanskrit has *agocara iti* (29.13) where the Tibetan has *spyod yul zhes bya ba ni = gocara iti*. Compare the similar quotation preceding MMK 1-9ab. See Ames (1994), p. 113.

¹⁵⁸*rūpa* as the first of the five aggregates. See note 6.

¹⁵⁹See Ames (1994), p. 135 n. 188. See also Ejima (1990) (in Japanese).

Translation of *Prajñāpradīpa*, Chapter Four:
Examination of the Aggregates (*skandha*)

Now [Nāgārjuna] begins the fourth chapter with the aim of showing that the aggregates have no intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*), by means of refuting a particular counterposition (*vipakṣa*) [which holds] that the *āyatana*s exist.¹

At the end of the immediately preceding chapter, [Nāgārjuna] said,

One should understand that the auditory organ, the olfactory organ, the gustatory organ, the tactile organ, and the mind (*manas*)

Have been explained, [along with] the hearer, audible [sounds], and so on, by means of the visual organ. [MMK 3-8 (PSP 3-9)]

Objection: Therefore [our] fellow Buddhists² say:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the *āyatana*s do indeed exist,

[Reason:] because they are included (*bsdus pa*, probably *saṃ-grhīta*) in the aggregates.

[Dissimilar Example:] Here that which does not exist is not included in the aggregates of matter³ and so on, like a sky-flower.

[Application:] The internal *āyatana*s⁴ possess inclusion in the aggregates, for the ten material (*rūpin*) *āyatana*s⁵ are included in the aggregate of matter, while the *āyatana* of dharmas is included in three aggregates and one part of the aggregate of matter,⁶ [and] the *āyatana* of mind is included in the aggregate of cognition (*vijñāna*).

[Conclusion:] Therefore, by the stated reason, in ultimate reality, the internal *āyatana*s do indeed exist.

Answer: Here, in brief, matter is twofold: elemental matter (*bhūta-rūpa*) and matter dependent on the elements (*bhautikarūpa*).⁷ Bringing all those [kinds of matter], which are different due to

distinctions of time and so on, under one [heading], they are called "the aggregate of matter."

As to that, to begin with, [we] will consider [the five aggregates] starting with matter, because the reason [in] the opponent's [syllogism] is held to be [the fact that the material *āyatana*s,] the eye and so on, are included [in the aggregate of matter], and because [matter] is easy to explain.

Matter⁸ is not apprehended apart from the cause (*kāraṇa*) of matter. [MMK 4-1ab]

"Matter" is what can be damaged.⁹ The cause of that is the cause of matter. What is that [cause]? The four great elements, earth and so on. "Apart from (*nirmukta*) those" [means] "if those are removed."¹⁰

"Matter is not apprehended (*upalabhyate*)" [means that it is not apprehended] in ultimate reality. What then? For purposes of conventional designation, one designates "matter" in dependence on the cause of matter, the four great elements.¹¹

Thus this [first half of verse one] has indicated the property of matter which is to be proved, [namely,] that it is a mere combination (*'dus pa; saṃghāta*, etc.) of earth and so on; and [it has also indicated] the property of matter which proves [that, namely], that the cognition (*buddhi*) of that [matter] does not exist if [matter's] own cause is not grasped. The examples [are indicated] by virtue of that [property to be proved and proving property]; they are an army, a forest, and so on.¹²

Here the inference is:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, matter does not exist as a real substance (*dravya-sat*),

[Reason:] because the cognition of that [matter] does not exist if [matter's] own cause is not grasped.

[Similar Example:] Here if the cognition of something does not exist when [that thing's] own cause is not grasped, that [thing] does not exist as a real substance, like an army and so

on.

[Application and Conclusion:] Likewise, since the cognition of matter does not exist if [matter's] own cause, earth and so on, is not grasped, matter also does not exist as a real substance.

Alternatively, there is also another way of formulation (*sbyor ba'i lam*, probably *prayoga-mārga*):

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the cognition of matter does not have as its object (*viṣaya*) an entity which exists as a real substance,

[Reason:] because it is a cognition,

[Example:] like the cognition of a forest and so on.

Alternatively, there is still another way of formulation:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, this word "matter" does not have as its object a thing (*padārtha*) which exists as a real substance,

[Reason:] because it is a word,

[Example:] like the word "army" and so on.

Because cognition (*viññāna*) and mental factors (*caitta*) are also of the same sort (*rigs mthun pa*, probably *sajātīya*) as [matter] which is to be established (*sādhya*), they are to be negated in the same way. Therefore it is not the case that [our] reason is inconclusive.¹³

*Objection:*¹⁴

[Thesis:] Matter does exist in ultimate reality,

[Reason:] because the cognition of that [matter] does not cease although that [matter] has ceased.

[Dissimilar Example:] Here if the cognition of something ceases when [that thing] has ceased, that [thing] exists in superficial reality, like a jar.

[Application:] Although blue matter [or "visible form"] and so on have ceased, the cognition of them does not cease in that way.

[Conclusion:] Therefore matter exists as a real substance.

Answer: That is not good, because there is no agreement (*anvaya*) [with a similar example].¹⁵

Thus, to begin with, secondary matter (*upādāya-rūpa*)¹⁶ has been examined. Now [Nāgārjuna] will explain the subject of elemental matter.

Objection:

[Thesis:] Secondary matter does indeed exist,

[Reason:] because the cause of that [secondary matter] exists.

[Dissimilar Example:] Here no cause can be grasped for that which does not exist, like a sky-flower.

[Application:] Secondary matter has a cause, [namely,] those [elements] earth and so on.

[Conclusion:] Therefore secondary matter does indeed exist.

Answer: Therefore [Nāgārjuna] says,

Apart from matter, the cause of matter is also not seen.
[MMK 4-1cd]

Here apart from visible forms, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangibles - which have the defining characteristic of secondary matter - the cause of matter, [the elements] earth and so on, are also not seen and cannot be grasped.¹⁷ Here again, [this half of the verse] indicates the property of elemental matter which is to be proved, [namely,] that it is a mere combination of visible form and so on, and the property which proves [that, namely], that if visible form and so on are not seen, those [elements] earth and so on are also not seen. Therefore, by virtue of that [property to be proved and proving property], the example is also manifest.

As to that, to begin with, here [I] will state a syllogism regarding earth (*prthivī*). Also, because [we] do not show that [the elements] are mere combinations in ultimate reality, [there is no conflict with our position that the elements are unoriginated in ultimate reality].¹⁸ Here the author of [this] treatise [Nāgārjuna], by showing that [the elements] are mere combinations [according to superficial reality], has shown just the negation of [their] existence as real substances [in ultimate reality], because the negation of that is of great importance (*mahārtha*). Why is it of

great importance? Because lack of intrinsic nature is established [in that way], since that which is a dependent designation (*upādāya-prajñapti*) conventionally does not exist as a real substance in ultimate reality [and] therefore it [ultimately] has no origination.

As it is said in such [passages] as the following from the *Ārya-laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*:¹⁹

Because cognition does not grasp [any] entity, apart from [mere] combinations (*samavāya*),

Therefore I say that [an entity] is empty and unoriginated and without intrinsic nature. [*Laṅkāvatāra* 3-88]

Here nothing at all originates or ceases by means of causal conditions.

Origination and cessation are also just mere causal conditions. [*Laṅkāvatāra* 2-140 = 10-85]

Here the syllogism is:

[Thesis:] One should understand that in ultimate reality, earth does not exist as a real substance,

[Reason:] because that [earth] is not seen if the cause of that [earth] is not seen.

[Similar Example:] That which is not seen if [its] cause is not seen does not exist in ultimate reality as a real substance, like an army and so on.

Likewise, [syllogisms] should also be stated as appropriate in the cases of the cognition [of earth] and the word ["earth"].

Alternatively, [one shows that] apart from the cause of [secondary] matter, [namely,] those [elements] earth and so on, [secondary] matter which is different from them is not apprehended. The property of [secondary] matter [which proves that] is that it is not grasped if its own cause is not grasped. Here the syllogism is: [Thesis:] In ultimate reality, [secondary] matter is not different from its own assembled (*tshogs pa*) parts (*yan lag*, *aṅga* or *avayava*),

[Reason:] because the cognition of that [secondary matter] does not exist if that [assemblage] is not grasped,

[Example:] like the own self of [the elements] earth and so on.

It is not the case that the meaning of [our] reason is unestablished, because here the activity (*kriyā*) is considered to reside in [its] direct object (*karman*), so that "not grasping" is a property of cognition.²⁰

Objection: The Sāṃkhyas say: Since [we hold that] earth and so on are not different from visible form and so on, that [argument of yours merely] establishes what is [already] established [for us].²¹

Answer: That is not good, because [our] negation of difference does not show nondifference²² and because [we] do not accept the nondifference maintained by the opponent, either.

Objection: The Vaiśeṣikas object that [our] reason is inconclusive, because in the case of a jar, the cognition of that [jar] exists even though a lamp [to illuminate it] is not grasped, provided that [a source of illumination] different from that [lamp] exists.²³

Answer: That also is not good. [Our reason] is not inconclusive [1] because [we] have specified [as our reason], "because the cognition of that [matter] does not exist at all [if its parts are not apprehended]," and [2] because the proving property [in our syllogism] does not exist in [your] counterexample (*vipakṣa*), since the cognition of that [jar] exists even without a lamp, if the light of a jewel, a light-ray, a herb, the moon, or the sun is present. Because [we] have specified a qualified thesis, "[matter] is not different from its own assembled parts," a lamp is not a jar's own assembled part[s].²⁴

Also, [our reason] is not inconclusive because there is [ultimately] no counterexample [to nondifference], since below [Nāgārjuna] will show,

It is not possible for anything which is together with (*sārdham*) something to be different [from it], [MMK 14-4cd]

and] therefore it is not established that a jar is different from a

lamp in ultimate reality.

Objection: Real substances which have parts, such as an army, are composed [of those parts].²⁵ Therefore the example in [your] inferences proving that earth and so on do not exist as real substances, is not established.

Answer:

[Thesis:] The parts of an army do not compose a part-possessing real substance called an "army,"

[Reason:] because they are parts,²⁶

[Example:] like the parts of a tree, [its] roots, trunk, branches, twigs, and so on.

Alternatively, it is not the case that [our] example does not exist because

[Thesis:] That which is a part of that [elephant], complete in the elephant, does not compose a chariot or a horse, etc.,

[Reason:] because it does not exist in them,

[Example:] like threads (*rgyu spun*, literally "warp and weft") and so on.

Likewise,

Apart from matter, the cause of matter is also not seen.
[MMK 4-1cd]

Here also, one should state inferences extensively, employing a [property] to be proved and a property which proves [it] as before.²⁷

As [the elements] are not different from visible form and so on, so also earth, etc., are not nondifferent from [i. e., not the same as] visible form and so on.²⁸ [This is so] because below²⁹ nondifference will also be negated and because, due to [their] being nondifferent, either milk would just be curds or curds would just be milk; but [that] is not possible.³⁰ Therefore the following [verse from the *Ārya-laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*]³¹ is established:

An entity which is nondifferent or different from the group

(*kalāpa*) [of its causes and conditions]³² nowhere exists
In the way in which the spiritually immature have conceptually
constructed oneness and difference. [*Laṅkāvatāra* 3-102 =
10-598]

Therefore in that way, the meaning of the [opponent's] reason,
"because they are included in the aggregates," which was stated in
order to establish the *āyatana*s, is not established; or else [its]
meaning is contradictory.³³

It is unintelligible that matter exists even apart from the cause
of matter. If [you] nevertheless suppose [so], [Nāgārjuna replies,]

If matter [existed] apart from the cause of matter, it would
follow that

Matter would be without a cause. [MMK 4-2ab,c1]

"The cause of matter" (*rūpa-kāraṇa*) [means] "the cause of the
existence of matter," because the middle word is not manifest,³⁴
just as "the cause of fire" [means "the cause of the existence of
fire"]. "Apart from that (*tannirmukte?*)" [means] "apart from the
cause of matter (*rūpakāraṇena nirmukte?*);" the idea is [that this
means] "without the cause which shows the existence of matter."
"If matter [existed] (*rūpe*)" [means] "if one maintains that that
[matter] is like that because of a mere assertion (*pratijñā-mātra*)."
"It would follow that matter would be without a cause" means
"[matter] would not be possible." Since that also is not main-
tained, the stated fault [in your reason] is not avoided.

Objection: Those who hold that [things] have no cause
ahetuvādin or *nirhetuvādin*)³⁵ say: Since [we] accept that all enti-
ties originate from no cause at all, the establishment of matter is
also similar to [the establishment of] those.

Answer: If there were anything of the kind which you have
described [i. e., something which originates without a cause], that
origination of matter without a cause] would also be possible; but

There is not any thing (*artha*) without a cause anywhere.
[MMK 4-2c2,d]

Therefore, since there is no example [of a thing without a cause], that doctrine (*vāda*) is also without proof. Since we refuted those who hold that [things] have no cause at the very beginning [MMK 1-1], also, that [contention of theirs] is pointless.

Objection: Those who hope to be learned in the doctrine of the Sāmkhyas say: Since you have said that earth and so on are not different from visible form and so on, [you] have accepted their nondifference. Therefore,

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, earth and so on can be known to exist as real substances,

[Reason:] because they are not different from visible form and so on,

[Example:] like the own self of visible form and so on.

Answer: Because, by the method which has been explained, nondifference is not established, the meaning of [your] reason is not established. [Your] example also does not exist, because the own self of visible form and so on have been rejected.

Objection:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, earth and so on do indeed exist,

[Reason:] because their results exist.

[Dissimilar Example:] Here that which does not exist has no result which can be grasped, as a sky-flower [has no result].

[Application:] Earth and so on do have results, visible form and so on.

[Conclusion:] Therefore earth and so on do indeed exist.

Answer:

If a cause of matter existed apart from matter,

It would be a cause (*kāraṇa*) without a result (*kārya*); [but] there is no cause without a result. [MMK 4-3]

For our position, if a cause of [secondary] matter, [that is, the

elements] earth and so on, existed apart from [secondary] matter, it would therefore be a cause without a result, because it would be a cause without a result due to the defining characteristic of the result, visible form and so on. [This is so] because [the cause would be] different [from the result], like *rtsi rkyang*³⁶ and so on.³⁷ "There is no cause without an result." The idea is that [this is so] because that [cause] also has the nature (*-ātmaka*) of a combination of visible form and so on.³⁸

Therefore there is the fault that the meaning of the previously stated reason, "because their result exists," is not established, since the result also, like the cause, is not established. If you state [that] as a reason which is generally common knowledge [in the world], [its] meaning is contradictory.³⁹

There is also another answer criticizing (*dūṣaṇa*) [the opponent's position]. Here⁴⁰ if one conceptually constructs a cause of matter, it must be conceptually constructed for either existent or nonexistent matter. [Nāgārjuna] explains that [a cause] is possible for neither:

Even if matter existed, a cause of matter would not be possible. [MMK 4-4ab]

[This is so] because [matter already] exists, like a jar and a cloth which exist [already and therefore do not need a cause to produce them].

But even if it does not exist,

Even if matter did not exist, a cause of matter would not be possible. [MMK 4-4cd]

Earth and so on are considered [to be the cause of secondary matter]. The idea is that [a cause of nonexistent secondary matter is not possible] because [secondary matter] does not exist prior to [its] origination, like [something] different from that [secondary matter].⁴¹ Here the criticism (*dūṣaṇa*) explained in the chapter on

nonorigination (*anutpāda*) has been repeated; therefore one should understand that [MMK 4-4] is a statement of the [same] criticism [as MMK 1-6].⁴²

Objection: Those who hold that [things] have no cause say: [Matter] is just without a cause.

Answer: To them, [Nāgārjuna] replies,

Matter without a cause is not at all (*naiva naiva*) possible.
[MMK 4-5ab]

The idea is that [this is so] because that is not accepted even in superficial reality.

Alternatively, [one may explain MMK 4-5ab as follows:]

Objection: The Vaibhāṣikas say: Future matter also exists.

Answer: To them, [Nāgārjuna] replies,

Matter without a cause is not at all possible. [MMK 4-5ab]

The idea is that [this is so] because it is not established that the future, which has not appropriated a cause of [its] origination,⁴³ which has not attained its own existence,⁴⁴ exists even conventionally.

Because in that way matter having the nature of the elements and [matter having a nature] dependent on the elements are not possible in any way,

Therefore one should not construct any conceptual constructions concerning matter (*rūpa-gata*). [MMK 4-5cd]

[The verse refers to] one who is wise,⁴⁵ [who] wishes to comprehend the reality of dharmas [or "the Dharma," *dharma-tattva*], which is quite free from conceptual construction, [and whose] eye of right cognition has fully opened. He or she should not conceptually construct [any of] the many conceptual constructions which have such objects as matter which exists as a real sub-

stance, which is different from [its] cause, or which is not different from [its] cause, or the distinctions of color and shape of those, etc.⁴⁶ [Those conceptual constructions] are like the objects seen in a dream about a son who is not [yet] born, such as the son's [bodily] form and enjoyments, after one has awakened.⁴⁷

Therefore because in that way the cause of matter is not possible, [the reason in the opponent's last syllogism] is not free from the faults which [we] have stated.

Moreover,

Objection: Here the result is similar to [its] cause, by the defining characteristic that the qualities of the cause are seen also in the result, due to a continuous process.⁴⁸

Answer: To them, [Nāgārjuna] replies,

It is not possible [to say] that the result is similar (*sadrśa*) to the cause. [MMK 4-6ab]

It is not possible to teach that the result is similar to the cause. The meaning is that that cause is just not the result. Here [the fact] that the alleged cause⁴⁹ is not the cause is the property to be proved; and the teaching that [cause and result] are similar is adduced [as] the property which proves [that]. The example [is indicated] by virtue of that [property to be proved and proving property]: "like a [similar] real substance in a different series." Here the syllogism is:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the alleged cause, blue threads, are not the cause of a blue blanket,

[Reason:] because they are similar [to it],

[Example:] just as [they are not the cause of] a blue blanket different from that [blue blanket allegedly caused by these blue threads].⁵⁰

Objection: Here the Sāṃkhyas say: Since it is not established that the alleged cause of the blue blanket is not also present in a blue blanket different from that, [your] example does not exist.⁵¹

Answer: That is not good. [There is no fault in our example]

because [we] take as [our] example just what is established *not* to be the entity which is the cause of that [blanket] which occurs now.⁵² Also, there is no fault [in our example] because this negation [in the thesis of our syllogism] has its expressive force (*mthu*, probably *śakti* here) used up by just the negation of the meaning to be expressed [by] that word with which it is connected. [This is so] because that [negation] does not indicate a particular quality (*viśeṣa*) of that [object of negation], as [in the negation,] "He is not a *brāhmaṇa*."⁵³

Objection: [Our] fellow Buddhists,⁵⁴ who hold that the result may be [either] similar or not similar to [its] cause, say: With regard to a subsequent moment which originates from a previous moment with a similar defining characteristic - as in [the flame of] a lamp, a stream of water, and so on - [the moment of the result] is similar to the moment of the cause; therefore [in this case, cause and result] are similar. With regard to a subsequent moment which originates from a previous moment with a dissimilar defining characteristic - as in [the origination of] ashes and curds [from] wood and milk [respectively], and so on - [the moment of the result] is not similar to the moment of the cause; therefore [in this case, cause and result] are not similar.

Answer: In that connection, that result which is similar to [its] cause has been negated by the very inferences which [we] have [already] stated. Concerning that result which is not similar to its cause, [Nāgārjuna] says,

It is also not possible [to say] that the result is not similar to the cause. [MMK 4-6cd]

Here also [the fact] that [the result, such as] a sprout, is not a result of the alleged cause, [such as a seed,] is the property to be proved; and the teaching that [cause and result] are not similar is adduced [as] the property which proves [that]. Therefore the remaining member [of the syllogism] is also manifest as before. Here the inference is:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, a sprout is not a result of [its] alleged cause,

[Reason:] because it is not similar [to that alleged cause],

[Example:] like gravel and so on.

Objection:

[Thesis:] The seed ('*bru*, *dhānya*) is indeed the cause of the sprout,

[Reasons:] because [the sprout] occurs when that [seed] exists or because [the sprout] is conventionally designated by means of that [seed].

[Examples:] like the sound of a kettledrum or a barley-sprout.

Answer: That is not good. Since the origination of [things supposedly] possessing origination (*utpattimat*) has been negated in every way, [your] example is not established. Therefore [your syllogism] has the fault of [being] an incomplete proof.

Objection: Since the result of the eye, etc., [namely,] visual cognition, etc., is not similar to [the eye],⁵⁵ [your] reason, "[because] it is not similar," is inconclusive.

Answer: That also is not good. Because visual cognition and so on are also of the same sort (*rigs mthun pa*, probably *sajātīya*) as what is to be established,⁵⁶ they are likewise to be negated. Therefore since no counterexample (*vipaksa*) exists, there is no occasion for inconclusiveness [in our reason].⁵⁷

Alternatively, [the argument against the origination of sprouts from seeds or the origination of visual cognition from the eye] is similar to the method which has been stated, [that is,] "Because the alleged [cause], earth and so on, are not the cause [of secondary matter], visible form is not established. Therefore the meaning of the reason [in your syllogism preceding MMK 4-3], 'because their result exists,' is not established or is contradictory."⁵⁸

Objection: The Vaibhāṣikas say: The result may be either similar or not similar to [its] cause, since [we] accept that the "nonobstructing cause" (*byed pa'i rgyu*, *kāraṇa-hetu*) of [a dharma] conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) by a nonobstructing cause is every [dharma other than itself].⁵⁹ Therefore [your] example does not exist [since

a seed, for instance, is a nonobstructing cause of gravel].

Answer: That is not good, because [we] wish to negate the particular efficacy (*sādhana*) of the special (*asādhāraṇa*) cause which produces [something] of the same kind [as itself], etc.⁶⁰

Thus that section of the text [i. e., the first six verses of chapter four] has negated elemental matter and matter dependent on the elements; therefore it has been shown that the aggregate of matter is not possible. Now [Nāgārjuna] will show that the negation of [the other aggregates,] feeling and so on, also [proceeds by] the same method as the negation of matter.

For feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and mind (*citta*),⁶¹

As well as all entities in general (*sarvaśaḥ*), the method (*krama*) is just the same as [for] matter. [MMK 4-7]

The idea is that [this is so] because the negation of feeling and so on also [proceeds by] the same method as the negation of matter. [Previously,] it was shown that

[Thesis:] in ultimate reality, matter does not exist as a real substance,

[Reason:] because the cognition (*buddhi*) of that [matter] does not exist if [matter's] own cause is not grasped,

[Example:] like an army and so on.

Likewise, one should understand in detail that

[Thesis:] in ultimate reality, feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition (*viññāna*) also do not exist as real substances,

[Reason:] because if [their] own cause is not grasped, the cognition of them does not exist,

[Example:] like an army and so on.

It should be stated appropriately [in each case] that the causes of feeling and so on are contact (*sparsā*), the eye, visible form, light, space, attention, and so on.⁶²

[Previously,] it was shown that in ultimate reality, matter is not

different from its own causes because

[Thesis:] in ultimate reality, [secondary] matter is not different from its own assembled parts,

[Reason:] because the cognition of that [secondary matter] does not exist if that [assemblage] is not grasped,

[Example:] like the own self of [the elements] earth and so on.

Likewise, it should be stated here also that in ultimate reality, feeling and so on are not different from their own causes. Here [the opponent's] criticisms and [our] answers to [his] criticisms are also as before.

[Nāgārjuna] mentions "all entities," although there is no conditioned dharma different from the aggregates, because he wishes to state a negation of the varieties of those [aggregates]. [Thus he mentions "all entities"] in order to negate [the idea] that conceptually constructed (*parikalpita*) [things], such as jars and cloths, exist as real substances and are different [from their causes].⁶³ Here also, as before, syllogisms should be stated as appropriate.⁶⁴

Thus because the aggregates are not established, the meaning of the reason [in the opponent's initial syllogism], "[because] they are included in the aggregates," is not established; and [his] example does not exist. Why [does his example not exist]? Because it does not exist [i. e., is not true] that [dharmas] which are included in the aggregates of matter and so on exist in ultimate reality.⁶⁵

Alternatively, the meaning of the reason is also contradictory, because what is included in the aggregates exists just conventionally.⁶⁶

Thus by that reasoning,⁶⁷

For that [opponent] who would give an answer (*parihāra*) when [the Mādhyamika] has made a contention (*vigraha*)⁶⁸ by means of emptiness,

Everything is [in fact] unanswered. It becomes the same as what is to be proved (*sādhyā*).^{69,70} [MMK 4-8]

As to the defining characteristic of the examination of reality (*tattva*), if [the Mādhyamika] undertakes the examination of the ultimately real⁷¹ intrinsic nature of some entity,⁷² he makes a contention and disputation (*'gyed pa*, probably *vivāda*) by means of emptiness. [That is, he does so] following (*parigṛhya*) the proof (*pramāṇa*) that in ultimate reality, the *āyatana*s are without origination and do not exist as real substances.⁷³ When [the Mādhyamika thus contends], for that [opponent] who speaks in reply by giving a rebuttal (*uttaratarka*), all those [contentions] are [in fact] unanswered. [This is so] because [his rebuttal] becomes the same as what is to be proved. The idea is that [the opponent's] rebuttal is not established because the examples and reasons which show that [rebuttal] are equally as unestablished as [the property] which is to be proved.⁷⁴

Likewise,

For that [opponent] who would utter a censure (*upālabha*) when [the Mādhyamika] has made an explanation (*vyākhyāna*) by means of emptiness,

Everything is [in fact] uncensured. It becomes the same as what is to be proved. [MMK 4-9]

If [the Mādhyamika] shows that the aggregates, *āyatana*s, and *dhātus*⁷⁵ have no intrinsic nature, he explains and analyzes the formulation⁷⁶ by means of emptiness. When [the Mādhyamika thus explains], one whose intellect is contaminated by false means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) utters a censure by [saying], "The aggregates and so on do indeed exist, because they are included in the [Four Noble] Truths⁷⁷ and so on," etc. For that [opponent], all those [explanations] are also [in fact] uncensured and uncriticized (*adūṣita*). The remainder of the statement is that [this is so] because it becomes the same as what is to be proved. Why? Since [that criticism] is similar to the object of [the Mādhyamika's] criticism, it is the same in general as the unprovenness of what is to be proved.⁷⁸ [Thus *ācārya* Āryadeva] said,

One who sees one entity is considered to see all [entities].⁷⁹
 Just that which is the emptiness of one is the emptiness of all.
 [Catuḥśataka 8-16]

As to that, here the meaning of the chapter is that the aggregates have been shown to be without intrinsic nature, by means of stating the faults in the proof adduced [by the opponent] to show that the *āyatana*s exist.

Therefore those [scriptural] statements such as the following are established.⁸⁰ [From the *Bhagavatī-prajñāpāramitā-suvikrāntavikrāmi-paripṛcchā-sūtra*.]⁸¹

Suvikrāntavikrāmin, that which is a teaching belonging to [the doctrine of] the production (*abhinirvṛtti-paryāpannanirdeśa*)⁸² of the five aggregates is not the perfection of discernment.⁸³ Suvikrāntavikrāmin, matter is free from (*apagata*) the intrinsic nature of matter. Likewise, cognition is free from the intrinsic nature of feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition. That which is free from the intrinsic nature of matter, feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition is the perfection of discernment. Suvikrāntavikrāmin, matter lacks the intrinsic nature of matter (*rūpaasvabhāva*). Likewise, cognition lacks the intrinsic nature of feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition. That which lacks the intrinsic nature of matter, feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition is the perfection of discernment.

Likewise, [from the *Ārya-brahma-viśeṣa-cintā-paripṛcchā-sūtra*.]⁸⁴

I taught the aggregates to the world, [and] the world came to dwell on them.⁸⁵

One who is wise does not dwell on them and is not soiled by worldly dharmas.

The world has the defining characteristic of space, and space has no defining characteristic.

Therefore that [wise one], comprehending that, is not soiled by

worldly dharmas.

Likewise, [from the *Vajracchedikā-prajñāpāramitā*,]⁸⁶

A bodhisattva should not give a gift [while] basing himself (*pratiṣṭhita*) on visible forms, sounds, odors, tastes, tangibles, and dharmas.

Likewise, [from the *Ārya-laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*,]⁸⁷

The three spheres of samsāric existence (*tribhava*)⁸⁸ are mere designation (*prajñaptimātra*); they do not exist with the intrinsic nature of an entity (*vastu-svabhāvataḥ*).

Thinkers (*tārkika*) conceptually construct [them] as the nature of an entity [which is in fact mere] designation (*prajñapti-vastu-bhāvena*). [*Laṅkāvatāra* 3-52 = 10-86]

If one examines [dharmas?] with the intellect, [their] intrinsic nature cannot be ascertained (*nāvadhāryate*).

Therefore they are taught to be inexpressible and without intrinsic nature. [*Laṅkāvatāra* 2-175 = 10-167]

The fourth chapter, "Examination of the Aggregates," of the *Prajñāpradīpa*, a commentary on [Nāgārjuna's] *Mūlamadhyamaka* composed by *ācārya* Bhavyakara/Bhavyakāra (*legs ldan byed*)⁸⁹ [is concluded].

Notes to Translation of Chapter Four

¹See Ava P42a-1, D36a-3,4; read as D.

²Ava P42b-2 has *rang gi sde pa dang mdo sde pa bye brag tu smra ba dag*; D36b-3 has *rang gi sde pa dang bye brag tu smra ba dag*. Read *rang gi sde pa mdo sde pa dang bye brag tu smra ba dag*, "[our] fellow Buddhists, the Sautrāntikas and Vaibhāsikas."

³As pointed out in note 6 to the translation of chapter three, *rūpa* as the first of the five *skandhas* is "matter" in general. As one of the twelve *āyatana*s or eighteen *dhātus*, *rūpa* has the more restricted sense of "visible form." See the references in the note mentioned.

⁴The internal (*ādhyātmika*) *āyatana*s are the six sense organs, the five physical sense organs plus the mind (*manas*). The external (*bāhya*) *āyatana*s are the corresponding six sense objects (with dharmas as the object of mind). See AK

1-39ab.

Oddly enough, the opponent refers here to the internal *āyatana*s and then goes on to speak of all twelve. Saṃghabhadra mentions a view according to which the sense objects were to be considered as internal in any moment when they serve as conditions for the arising of cognition, and as external in any moment when they do not serve as such conditions. (I would like to thank Collett Cox for this information.)

⁵That is, the five physical sense organs and the five corresponding sense objects.

⁶The three aggregates referred to are feeling (*vedanā*), perception/conception (*saṃjñā*), and mental formations (*samskārah*). "One part of the aggregate of matter" refers to the *avijñapti* posited by the Vaibhāsikas. It is considered to be material and thus to belong to the *rūpa-skandha*; but since it is held to be an object only of the mind and not of the physical senses, it belongs to the *dharma-āyatana*. See Ava P42b-7,8; D36b-7 to 37a-1. On *avijñapti*, see LVP AK I, pp. 21, 25-7, and IV, pp. 3, 14-27.

⁷On the four great elements (*mahābhūta*), earth, water, fire, and air (understood as solidity, cohesion, heat, and motion), and matter dependent on them, see LVP AK I, pp. 21-24, 64-67 and II, pp. 144-149, 313-315. See also May (1959), pp. 88-89, n. 184.

⁸"Matter" is here taken to mean "matter dependent on the elements" (*bhautika*). Thus the elements are its cause. See Ava P43b-3,4; D37b-3.

⁹*gzugs zhes bya ba ni gzugs su rung ba'o*, probably either *rūpaṇād rūpam iti* or *rūpyata iti rūpam*. On the various interpretations given to *rūpaṇa/rūpyate*, see LVP AK I, pp. 24-25 and notes.

¹⁰*btsal* is an alternative spelling of *bsal*. (In fact, Ava P43b-4, D37b-3 has *bsal na* for *btsal na*.) The Sanskrit may be *nirākṛta*.

¹¹According to Avalokitavratā, matter dependent on the elements is designated in dependence on the elements in the same way that a forest is designated in dependence on its constituent trees. See Ava P43b-5,6,7; D37b-4,5.

¹²In other words, the meaning of MMK 4-1ab is the following, according to Bhāvaviveka: Matter dependent on the elements does not exist by intrinsic nature because it is a mere combination of the elements. This is so because matter dependent on the elements is not apprehended apart from the elements, just as a forest is not perceived if the trees which make it up are not perceived. See Ava P43b-7 to 44a-2, D37b-6 to 38a-1.

¹³According to Avalokitavratā, this paragraph is a response to an objection of the Ābhidharmikas, who hold that mind and mental factors exist as real substances. They charge that the Mādhyamika's reason, "because it is a word," is inconclusive. Although the word "army" does not refer to a real substance, the words "mind" and "mental events" do. The Mādhyamika retorts that he also negates the ultimately real existence of mind and mental events. See Ava P44b-4,5,6; D38b-2,3. The phrase "of the same sort as what is to be established" alludes to MMK 4-8 and 4-9.

¹⁴Avalokitavratā attributes this objection to "fellow Buddhists." See Ava

P38b-6, D45a-1.

¹⁵For the Mādhyamikas, nothing exists as a real substance or in ultimate reality. Hence there is no example which the opponent can cite.

¹⁶*upādāya-rūpa*, "secondary matter," is synonymous with *bhautika-rūpa*, "matter dependent on the elements."

¹⁷This may be a reference to the Vaibhāṣikas' theory that matter can only exist in the form of molecules (*saṃghāta-pāramāṇu*) composed of four atoms (*dravya-pāramāṇu*) of the elements and varying numbers of atoms of secondary matter. Thus the elements are also dependent on secondary matter for their manifestation. See AK 1-35d, AK 2-22, and LVP AK II, pp. 144-149.

¹⁸See Ava P46a-2,3,4; D39b-5,6,7.

¹⁹The Sanskrit text is in Nanjio (1923). Verse 3-88 is on p. 200; verse 2-140 is on p. 84. In 2-140c, the Tibetan seems to correspond to something like *utpādaś ca nirodhaś ca*, while the Sanskrit has *utpadyante nirudhyante*. In 2-140d, the Tibetan has 'ba' *zhig*, *kevalāḥ* for the Sanskrit's *kalpitāḥ*. Note also that Bhāvaviveka quotes only the second two (out of three) lines of 3-88.

²⁰According to Avalokitavrata, an opponent objects that since "matter" is the subject of Bhāvaviveka's thesis, the "not grasping" mentioned in the reason must be a property (*dharma*) of matter; but that is absurd because matter is unconscious and cannot grasp (i. e., perceive) anything in any case. Bhāvaviveka replies that an activity (*kriyā*) resides in both its agent (*kartr*) and its object (*karman*). Here the activity is "not grasping;" the agent is cognition (*buddhi*); and the object is matter. Thus "not grasping" is a property of cognition. See Ava P47b-2 to 48a-4, D41a-4 to 41b-5.

²¹Since the Sāṃkhyas hold that everything (except *puruṣa*) is composed of the the three *guṇas* of *prakṛti*, for them all entities are nondifferent in any case. See Ava P48a-5,6; D41b-6,7 and Larson and Bhattacharya (1987), pp. 65-73.

²²Avalokitavrata points out that the negation here is a simple negation, not an implicative negation. See Ava P48a-8, D42a-1,2.

²³The Vaiśeṣikas mean that even if the assemblage of its parts is not apprehended, matter might be apprehended by some other means, just as a jar may be seen by means of various sources of illumination. See Ava P48b-3 to 8, D42a-3 to 42b-1. The Vaiśeṣikas hold that wholes are different entities from the sum of their parts. See Sinha (1956), pp. 596-6; Frauwallner (1973), Vol. II, pp. 117-8; and Potter (1977), pp. 74-79.

²⁴Bhāvaviveka replies that he does not argue that matter is not different from its causes in general, but specifically that it is not different from its own assembled parts. Unlike the Vaiśeṣikas' example of a lamp and a jar, the apprehension of matter's assembled parts is a necessary condition for the apprehension of matter, whereas a jar can be illuminated by something other than a lamp. Moreover, it is obvious that a lamp is not a jar's own assembled parts, so the Vaiśeṣika's alleged counterexample is not comparable to Bhāvaviveka's thesis. See especially Ava P49b-2 to 6, D43a-2 to 5.

²⁵Literally, they "possess composition" (*rtsoṃ pa, ārambha*)." On the Vaiśeṣikas' *ārambhavāda*, another term for *asatkāryavāda*, see Frauwallner (1973),

Vol. II, p. 59 and Potter (1977), pp. 14-15, 57-60, 443.

²⁶According to Avalokitavrata, because they are parts according to superficial reality, they do not compose a part-possessing real substance in ultimate reality. See Ava P50b-3,4; D44a-2,3.

²⁷That is, according to Avalokitavrata, the property to be proved is that the elements are a mere combination of visible form and so on; and the property which proves that is the fact that if visible form and so on are not seen, the elements are also not seen. See especially Ava P51a-8 to 51b-1, D44b-6.

²⁸Avalokitavrata points out that the negations of difference and sameness are simple negations, not implicative negations. See P51b-6 to 52a-1, D45a4,5,6.

²⁹See, e. g., MMK 14-5cd.

³⁰If the negation of difference must imply sameness, then because milk and curds are not different (since curds are a transformation of milk), they would have to be identical; but that is absurd. Compare Ava P52a-2,3,4; D45a-7 to 45b-2 and MMK 13-6.

³¹See Ava P52a-6, D45b-3. The Sanskrit text is in Nanjio (1923), pp. 202 and 339. In the first *pāda*, 3-102a has 'nyonyah while 10-598a has hy anyah. The Tibetan here, *gzhan pa ma yin*, corresponds to *ananyah*. Also, both Sanskrit verses have *tīrthyair* in the fourth *pāda*, while the Tibetan corresponds to *bālair*.

³²See Ava P52a-7, D45b-4.

³³If the reason refers to ultimate reality, it is not established. If it refers to superficial reality, it is contradictory to try to prove a positive thesis about ultimate reality with a reason which is only conventionally valid. Compare Ava P52b-4, D45b-1.

³⁴*bar gyi tshig mi mngon pa'i phyir*, probably *madhya-pada-pralopāt*.

³⁵"Lokāyatas and so on," according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P53a-8, D46b-3.

³⁶*rtsi rkyang* is defined as *rtswa zhig*, "a [kind of] grass," in Chos kyi grags pa (1957), s. v.

The idea may be that grass is a purely conventional entity and thus is different from the elements if, as the opponent holds, they exist in ultimate reality. Secondary matter, too, only exists conventionally and thus would be ontologically different from its alleged cause. See the following note.

³⁷Avalokitavrata's interpretation of this passage is as follows: If you (the opponent) hold that the elements exist in ultimate reality, then it follows that they would have no result. This is so because in ultimate reality, their supposed result, secondary matter, is empty of intrinsic nature. But if you hold that secondary matter exists in superficial reality while the elements exist in ultimate reality, then one cannot be the cause of the other, because of their (ontological) difference. See Ava P55a-3 to 8, D47a-4 to 7.

³⁸According to Avalokitavrata, since the elements are a mere combination of secondary matter, visible form and so on, they have no intrinsic nature in ultimate reality. See Ava P55b-1, D48b-1.

³⁹Once again, the reason is not established in ultimate reality. While it may be valid conventionally, it cannot prove a positive thesis concerning ultimate

reality.

⁴⁰In ultimate reality, according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P55b-7, D48b-6.

⁴¹In other words, consider the time at which the cause allegedly produces a result. If the result exists at that time, its production by a cause is superfluous. If it does not exist at that time, one might as well say that the cause produces a sky-flower, since the result is nonexistent. Compare Ava P56a-2,3,4; D49a-2,3. Such an analysis depends on the idea that a seed, for instance, is the cause of a sprout only at the moment when it actually produces it.

⁴²See Ava P56a-4 to 7, D49a-4,5,6. Although the title of the first chapter of the MMK is *pratyaya-parīkṣā* in all the commentaries, Bhāvaviveka often refers to it as dealing with *anutpāda*, as indeed it does.

⁴³*skye ba'i rgyu ma blangs pa*, probably *anutpāta-utpāda-hetu*. A result is said to "appropriate (*upā-dā*)" its causes; see, for instance, PSP 259.1-5.

⁴⁴*bdag nyid kyi dngos po ma thob pa*, probably *alabdha/aprāpta-ātmabhāva*.

⁴⁵Or "skillful," *mkhas pa*. According to Avalokitavrata, this refers to the bodhisattva who has attained receptivity to the fact that dharmas do not originate (*anutpatika-dharma-kṣāntī*). See Ava P57a-1 to 57b-1, D50a-1 to 50b-1. This attainment is said to occur on the eighth *bodhisattva-bhūmi*. See Lamotte (1976), pp. 290-1.

⁴⁶*de dag la sogs pa*, that is, matter as conceived of in those and other ways.

⁴⁷That is, the bodhisattva who has attained *anutpatika-dharma-kṣāntī* has awakened from the sleep of *samsāra* and realizes that the objects which he used to conceptually construct have no intrinsic nature. See Ava P57a-4 to 57b-1, D50a-4 to 50b-1.

⁴⁸*snga na yod pa'i rim gyis*, perhaps *prāg-bhāva-kramena*, literally, "by the stage[s] of prior existence."

⁴⁹*smra bar 'dod pa'i rgyu*, probably *vivakṣita-kāraṇa*, "the cause of which [the opponent] wishes to speak," as, for example, the opponent wishes to say that the elements are the cause of secondary matter. See Ava P58a-1,2; D50b-7.

⁵⁰In other words, the opponent wishes to say that a blue blanket is caused by the blue threads out of which it is woven, because they have the same color. But the threads also have the same color as other blue blankets, and the opponent does not admit that these particular threads are the cause of those other blankets.

⁵¹After the periodic destruction of the universe, all matter is "recycled;" and on a more mundane level, when Devadatta's blue blanket becomes torn, threads from Yajñadatta's blue blanket may be used to mend it. See Ava P58b-1,2,3; D51a-6,7.

⁵²In other words, our example is Devadatta's presently existing blanket; and the opponent must admit that the threads presently existing in Yajñadatta's blanket are not the cause of Devadatta's presently existing blanket. See Ava P58b-5 to 8, D51b-2,3,4.

⁵³When Bhāvaviveka says that in ultimate reality, threads are not the cause of the blue blanket, it is a simple negation. It does not imply that the threads exist in ultimate reality as a noncause of the blanket. See Ava P59a-1 to 5, D51b-5 to 52a-1.

⁵⁴The Ābhidharmikas, according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P59a-7, D52a-2,3.

⁵⁵The eye is material (*rūpin*), and visual cognition is not. See Ava P60b1,2,3; D53a-4,5.

⁵⁶That is, the origination of visual cognition from the eye and the origination of a sprout from a seed are both instances of a result's arising from a dissimilar cause. Thus they are both equally in need of proof. See Ava P60b-3,4,5; D53a-7 to 53b-1.

⁵⁷On this line of argument, see MMK 4-8 and 4-9, with Bhāvaviveka's commentary.

⁵⁸See Ava P60b-8 to 61b-1, D53b-2 to 54a-3, for an explicit statement of the analogous argument.

⁵⁹Every dharma is said to be the *kāraṇa-hetu* of every conditioned dharma other than itself, in the sense that it does not obstruct its origination (necessarily, since we only consider dharmas which exist at some time or other and thus do originate). See AK 2-50a and LVP AK II, pp. 246-8; see also Ava P61b-2 to 7, D54a-3 to 7. One might expect *kāraṇa-hetu* to mean something like "productive cause;" and the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya* tells us that this is its primary (*pradhāna*) meaning (see LVP AK II, p. 247). All dharmas other than the productive cause are also called *kāraṇa-hetu*, however, in the extended sense of not obstructing origination.

⁶⁰That is, we are only concerned with the productive cause and not with *kāraṇa-hetu* in the broad sense. See Ava P62a-1,2,3; D54b-1,2,3.

⁶¹Here Nāgārjuna uses *citta* as the name of the fifth *skandha*, in place of the more usual *viññāna*, apparently for metrical reasons.

⁶²According to Avalokitavrata, contact is mentioned as the special (*asādhāraṇa*) cause of feeling. The eye and the rest are mentioned as the special causes of visual cognition and its conjoined mental factors (*samprayukta-caitta*; see AK 2-23a,34 and LVP AK II, pp. 177-8). The mental factors belong, variously, to the three aggregates of feeling, perception/conception, and mental formations. See Ava P62b-8 to 63a-6, D55a-7 to 55b-5.

⁶³Avalokitavrata says that opponents might conceptually construct jars, cloths, etc., and use them as reasons and examples in arguments which attempt to refute the Mādhyamika's arguments concerning the aggregates. Avalokitavrata also adds nondifference [from the cause] as something which the Mādhyamika negates. See Ava P63b-8 to 64a-3, D56a-6 to 56b-1.

⁶⁴Avalokitavrata spells out syllogisms for a jar and a cloth parallel to those already given for matter. See Ava P64a-3 to 64b-1, D56b-2 to 7.

⁶⁵In his opening syllogism at the beginning of this chapter, the opponent gives a dissimilar example, a sky-flower, which does not exist and is not included in the aggregates. Here Bhāvaviveka is saying that things which *are* included in the aggregates do not exist in ultimate reality, either. See Ava P64b-3 to 6, D57a-1,2,3.

⁶⁶Again, it is contradictory to try to prove a positive thesis about ultimate reality with a reason that holds only conventionally. See Ava P64b-6,7; D57a-3,4.

⁶⁷That is, by the reasoning which has been explicitly formulated here for matter and then extended to all dharmas. See Ava P64b-8 to 65a-1, D57a-5.

⁶⁸The Mādhyamika's argument that all dharmas are empty of intrinsic nature is called a "contention" because it is directed against those who hold that entities do have intrinsic nature. See Ava P65a-2,3; D57a-6,7. Candrakīrti is more explicit: *tatra parapakṣadūṣaṇam vīgrahaḥ*, "there *vīgraha* is criticism of another's position." He glosses *vīgrahē ... kṛte* as *śasvabhāvavāde pratisiddhe*, "when the doctrine that [things] have intrinsic nature has been negated." (See PSP 127.5,6.)

⁶⁹Avalokitavratā gives the following example: An opponent replies to the Mādhyamika's argument that such-and-such a thing is empty of intrinsic nature by saying that it is not empty because its cause exists. But this is no answer, because the cause is just as empty of intrinsic nature as the thing in question. See Ava P65a-4 to 7, D57a-8 to 57b-3.

⁷⁰MMK 4-8 and 4-9 have been the subject of some discussion by modern scholars, particularly with regard to Nāgārjuna's use of the expression *samam sādhyena*. See Matilal (1974), pp. 211-24; Bhattacharya (1974), pp. 225-30; Ruegg (1981), pp. 12, 22 n. 49; and Ruegg (1983), p. 210.

⁷¹*don dam pa, paramārtha*, glossed by Avalokitavratā as *don dam pa pa, pāramārthika*. See Ava P65b-1,2; D57b-5.

⁷²The sentence up to this point is paraphrased by Avalokitavratā as, "If when he examines the defining characteristic of the reality of all dharmas, he then undertakes the examination of the ultimately real intrinsic nature of some external or internal entity..." See Ava P65b-2, D57b-5.

⁷³Avalokitavratā says that the proof of nonorigination is given in chapter one and the proof of not existing as a real substance is given in this chapter. See Ava P65b-3 to 8, D57b-6 to 58a-3. In general, *pramāṇa* means "valid means of knowledge;" but since the *pramāṇa* in question here is *anumāna*, "inference," I have translated it as "proof."

⁷⁴Since no dharma originates by intrinsic nature or exists as a real substance, there is no example and no proof which the opponent can successfully adduce. See Ava P66a-7 to 66b-4, D58b-2 to 5.

⁷⁵The eighteen *dhātus* are the twelve *āyatanas* (the six sense organs and the six sense objects) plus the six corresponding sense cognitions (e. g., the eye, visible form, and visual cognition).

⁷⁶*śbyor ba rnam par dbye ba byas te | rnam par bshad pa'i tshe*, apparently glossing *vyākhyāne ... kṛte* as *vyākhyāne prayoga/yoga/vidhi-vibhāge kṛte*. Avalokitavratā seems to say that it means analyzing the same formulation that the Mādhyamika used when he made a contention by means of emptiness. He may also be referring to the technical sense of *yoga-vibhāga*. See Ava P67a6,7; D59a-6,7. On the technical sense of *yoga-vibhāga*, see Ames (1994), p. 133 n. 172 and Ames (1995) n. 74.

⁷⁷See Ava P67b-4, D59b-4.

⁷⁸The entities cited by the opponent in his reason and example are included in the Mādhyamika's original criticism that all entities are not established by intrinsic nature. Therefore one can state in general that they are just as unestablished as

what the opponent is trying to establish by means of them. See Ava P67b-7 to 68a-3, D59b-7 to 60a-3.

⁷⁹The Sanskrit of this *ardhaśloka* is *bhāvasyaikasya yo draṣṭā draṣṭā sarvasya sa smṛtaḥ*, "One who is a seer of one entity is considered to be a seer of all" (quoted PSP 128.3,4). See also Lang (1986), pp. 82-3.

⁸⁰See note 149 to the translation of chapter three. Avalokitavrata's remarks here are similar. See Ava P68a-6 to 68b-1, D60a-6,7; P68b-2, D60b-1; P68b-8, D60b-5,6; P69a-5,6, D61a-3; P69a-7,8, D61a-4,5; and P69b-3,4,5, D61a-7 to 61b-2.

⁸¹Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P68b-1, D60a-7.

⁸²Avalokitavrata explains *abhinirvṛtti-paryāpanna-nirdeśa* as *skye bar bsdu pa ston pa*, "a teaching summed up in origination." See Ava P68b-2,3; D60b-1,2.

⁸³The Sanskrit text of this sentence is found in Hikata (1958), p. 37. The remainder of the passage is found on p. 29 of the same work.

⁸⁴Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P68b-7, D60b-5. See note 100 to the translation of chapter five.

⁸⁵*de la ... gnas par gyur*. Avalokitavrata glosses *gnas par gyur* as *chags shing lhag par chags par gyur*, "became attached and clung." See Ava P68b-8 to 69a-1, D60b-6,7.

⁸⁶Identified by Avalokitavrata as the *Ārya-triśatikā-[prajñāpāramitā]-sūtra*, another title of the sūtra; see Ava P69a-4,5; D61a-2. The Sanskrit text is in Conze (1957), p. 29.

⁸⁷Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P69a-6, D61a-4. The Sanskrit text is in Nanjio (1923). Verse 3-52 is on p. 168; verse 2-175 is on p. 116.

⁸⁸The three *bhavas* are the same as the three *dhātus*, i. e., the realms of desire (*kāma*), form (*rūpa*), and formlessness (*ārūpya*).

⁸⁹See note 159 to my translation of chapter three.

Translation of *Prajñāpradīpa*, Chapter Five:
Examination of the Elements (*dhātu*)¹

Now [Nāgārjuna] begins the fifth chapter with the aim of showing that the elements have no intrinsic nature by means of negating a particular counterposition (*vipakṣa*) to emptiness.²

Objection: Because [Nāgārjuna] stated, in the immediately preceding chapter, that

Apart from matter, the cause of matter is also not seen,
[MMK 4-1cd]

therefore, to begin with, [our] fellow Buddhists say: Here the Blessed One taught the defining characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) of the six elements called "earth, water, fire, air, space (*ākāśa*), and cognition (*viññāna*)," by saying, "Great king, these six elements are the person (*puruṣa*)."³ [Those characteristics are, respectively,] solidity, cohesion, heat, motion, providing room (*skabs 'byed pa*, perhaps *avakāśa-dāna*), and knowing (*rnam par shes par byed pa*, probably *viññānanā*). It is not taught that nonexistent [things] like a sky-flower and so on are the cause of a person. Therefore that assertion (*pratijñā*) made by the *ācārya* [Nāgārjuna], that the cause of matter does not exist even in earth and so on, will conflict with what [he himself] accepts.⁴

[The Mādhyamika] may reply that there is no fault [in his position] because he accepts that the Tathāgata taught that conventionally, the six elements are the person.

[If so, we respond that] it is not the case that there is no fault [in the Mādhyamika's position], because it is accepted that [that statement] is taught as ultimate reality.

[The Mādhyamika] may reply that since that is not established,⁵ [his alleged fault] is not [logically] possible.

[If so, we respond that] it is not the case that it is not established.

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the elements, earth and so on, do indeed exist,

[Reason:] because their defining characteristics exist.

[Dissimilar Example:] Here that of which the Blessed One has said, "It does not exist in ultimate reality," has no defining characteristic, like a sky-flower.

[Application:] Earth and so on have the defining characteristics of solidity and so on.

[Conclusion:] Thus because their defining characteristics exist, the elements, earth and so on, do indeed exist.

Answer: As to that, here it is easy to show that the intrinsic nature of space is empty;⁶ and it is also easy to negate the remaining elements by showing that that [intrinsic nature of space] does not exist. Therefore, the *ācārya* [Nāgārjuna] says, with reference just to the element of space,

There is not any space prior to the defining characteristic of space. [MMK 5-1ab]

The idea is that [this is so] because they are inseparable (*dbyer med pa*, perhaps *abheda*).

Here, since the Vaibhāṣikas teach that space is just nonobstruction (*anāvaraṇa*),⁷ nonobstruction itself is space. But since [they attempt to] prove also that that [space] exists, that which is to be proved by the existence of nonobstruction and [the reason] which proves [it] are [both] not established. For instance, [as in the fallacious proof,] "Sound is impermanent because it is impermanent," likewise, here also it would be said [in effect] that space exists because it is space.⁸

Alternatively, [one may explain MMK 5-1ab as follows:]

Objection: [Fellow Buddhists]⁹ who are averse to the doctrine (*naya*) of the *Madhyamaka-sāstra* say: [We] do not accept [any] difference of the thing characterized (*lakṣya*) and [its] defining characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*), due to which [difference] that [space] would not be possible [either] sequentially or simultaneously [with

its defining characteristic]. For example, it is not [logically] possible that the great man (*mahāpuruṣa*) is different from the marks of the great man. Here [we] say that that is a characteristic because it is to be characterized,¹⁰ since a primary affix (*bya ba'i rkyen*, probably *kṛt-pratyaya*) is used in [the sense of] the direct object (*karman*).¹¹

Answer: Even if those [i. e., the characteristic and the thing characterized] are accepted in that way,¹² [nevertheless,]

There is not any space prior to the defining characteristic of space. [MMK 5-1ab]

If space itself is [its own] defining characteristic, to use (*nye bar sbyor bar byed pa*) [that] in order to establish that [space] by means of that [space] itself cannot be a [valid] reason, because the meaning [of that reason] is not established. Therefore what would establish what?¹³

Objection: It is common knowledge that conventionally existent space is nonobstruction.

Answer: A reason is not required (*iṣyate*) in order to show that [well-known conventional existence of space].

Objection: Because [the existence of space] in ultimate reality is not common knowledge, one should strive to show [that it is] so.

Answer: Even in that [case], there are faults of the reason and example,¹⁴ [so that your syllogism] remains a mere assertion.

Alternatively, [one may also explain MMK 5-1ab as follows:]

Objection: The Vaibhāṣikas and Vaiśeṣikas say: Space exists as a substance (*dravya*) and is unconditioned.¹⁵

Answer: To them, [Nāgārjuna] says,

There is not any space prior to the defining characteristic of space. [MMK 5-1ab]

[This half-verse] sets forth the thesis, [understood as referring to space] which is a substance. [The fact] that that [space] is unorigi-

nated, which is common knowledge to both sides [the Mādhyamika and the opponent], is the [proving] property. The example, a hare's horn and so on, [is indicated] by virtue of that [property to be proved and proving property]. Here the inference is:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, space does not exist as a substance,

[Reason:] because it is unoriginated,

[Example:] like a hare's horn.

Likewise, reasons such as "because it has no cause," "because it has no result," "because it does not exist," etc., should also be stated.

*Objection:*¹⁶ Space is the defining characteristic of sound.

Answer: For those [who hold that position], also, since sound itself is space, the fault in the reason is as before.¹⁷

*Objection:*¹⁸ If this meaning [which you have explained] were the intention of the author of the treatise [Nāgārjuna], in that case, the author of the treatise would simply have said that

There is not any space which is different from the defining characteristic of space.¹⁹

Answer: [Nāgārjuna] establishes the negation of difference just by showing that priority and posteriority are not possible. Therefore that [objection of yours] does not contradict [my explanation].

Objection: The Vaiśeṣikas assert that the thing characterized and [its] defining characteristic are different.²⁰

Answer:

[Thesis:] If those two [i. e., the thing characterized and its defining characteristic] are different, they will also sometimes be antecedent and subsequent,

[Reason:] because they are different,

[Example:] like a jar and a cloth.

Therefore [Nāgārjuna] says,

If [space] were prior to [its] defining characteristic, it would

follow that it would be without a defining characteristic.
[MMK 5-1cd]

"Without a defining characteristic" (*mtshan nyid med pa, alakṣaṇa*) [means] "having no defining characteristic" (*mtshan nyid yod pa ma yin pa*, perhaps *asal-lakṣaṇa* or *avidyamānalakṣaṇa*). The meaning is that that [space] would not be something characterized [by the defining characteristic, nonobstruction, as] alleged [by the opponent].²¹

If [space] were prior to [its] defining characteristic: [MMK 5-1c]

This [*pāda*] indicates that difference of time is the [proving] property of that [subject, space]. Here the inference is:

[Thesis:] Space is not something characterized by [its] alleged defining characteristic,

[Reason:] because it exists at a time earlier than that [alleged defining characteristic],

[Example:] like [something] other than that [space].

Alternatively, [one may explain MMK 5-1cd as follows:]²²

It would follow that [space] would not belong to [its alleged] defining characteristic (*alakṣaṇa*). [MMK 5-1d]

"Not belonging to the defining characteristic" (*mtshan nyid la med pa*, perhaps *lakṣaṇasya nāsti*) [is the sense of] *alakṣaṇa*. The meaning is that that [space] would not have [the property of] being something characterized (*lakṣyatva*).

If [space] were prior to [its] defining characteristic: [MMK 5-1c]

[Here] "space" is the topic under discussion (*skabs*). This [*pāda*] indicates that the difference of the defining characteristic from the

thing characterized is the [proving] property of that [subject, the defining characteristic]. Here the inference is:

[Thesis:] The alleged defining characteristic cannot characterize the thing characterized, space,

[Reason:] because it is different [from space],

[Example:] like [a defining characteristic] different from that [alleged defining characteristic].

[If the thing characterized and its defining characteristic are different,] it contradicts the opponent's²³ own inference, [since] he does not maintain that the defining characteristic does not belong to the thing characterized and the defining characteristic.²⁴ Therefore the conceptual construction of difference should also be abandoned.

Objection: Because they cannot be turned back [even] with a stick,²⁵ [our opponents say:] If [we] state a reason pertaining to superficial reality (*sāmyrta-hetu*), it is not the case that the meaning of [our] reason is not established; but it is difficult to avoid [its] having a contradictory meaning.²⁶ Therefore it is not established that a defining characteristic is a different thing (*artha*) [from the thing that it characterizes] or that it is a nondifferent thing. Hence space is [an entity] "without a defining characteristic" (*alakṣaṇa*).

Answer: It is also unintelligible that that [space] is an entity without a defining characteristic. For,

There is not any entity anywhere without a defining characteristic. [MMK 5-2ab]

An ultimately real entity [without a defining characteristic]²⁷ is not established anywhere, [for] the position of others or [for] our own position.

*Objection:*²⁸

[Thesis:] The thing characterized, space, does indeed exist,

[Reason:] because a defining characteristic applies to that.

Answer: Specifying that that is also not [logically] possible, [Nāgārjuna says,]

If an entity without a defining characteristic does not exist, to what does the defining characteristic apply (*kramatām*)? [MMK 5-2cd]

Since there is no basis (*gzhi*) [to which the defining characteristic might apply], the [opponent's] reason, like [that] basis, is not established. [That is,] the reason, [the defining characteristic's] applying [to the thing characterized], is not established for a non-existent object (*viśaya*). Therefore there will be the fault that the meaning of the reason is not established.

Alternatively, [one may explain MMK 5-2cd as follows:] In the case of nondifference, [that is,] if the thing characterized and the defining characteristic are nondifferent, that [thing] itself cannot characterize that [very thing]. Because a defining characteristic different from that [space] does not exist, space has no defining characteristic.

Also, in the case [where the thing characterized and the defining characteristic] are different,
 [Thesis:] The alleged defining characteristic is not the defining characteristic of the thing characterized,
 [Reason:] because it is different [from that thing],
 [Example:] like [a defining characteristic] different from that [alleged defining characteristic].

Since a defining characteristic does not exist, by that [argument] also, space has no defining characteristic. If an entity without a defining characteristic, called "space," does not exist, to what will the defining characteristic apply? The meaning is that it is just not established that that [defining characteristic] applies [to anything].

Moreover, the meaning of that reason [of yours], "[because the defining characteristic] applies to the thing characterized," [is the following:] Here the thing characterized is known by means of that necessary connection (*med na mi 'byung ba, avinābhāva*) of this defining characteristic with the properties, existence and so on, of the thing characterized. But when, for our position,

A defining characteristic does not apply (*pravṛtti*) to [a thing] which has no defining characteristic nor to one which does have a defining characteristic, [MMK 5-3ab]

then the idea is that [this is so] because a defining characteristic is not established for a nonexistent [thing which has no defining characteristic] and because an entity which has a defining characteristic is also not established.

A thing characterized which is different in kind (*vilakṣaṇa*) from the sort which has been described,²⁹ is also not established. Therefore,

[A defining characteristic] also does not apply to something other than [a thing] which has a defining characteristic and [a thing] which has no defining characteristic. [MMK 5-3cd]

Therefore in that way, the meaning of what you maintain is not established in ultimate reality, because it is not established that a defining characteristic applies to a contradictory (*viruddha*) entity, and because there is no example.³⁰

Alternatively, [one may explain MMK 5-3 as follows:] Because that defining characteristic does not exist in [things] without a defining characteristic, such as sky-flowers, etc., it does not apply [to them]. That [fact] is common knowledge.

Now, [as for] "nor to one which has a defining characteristic" [MMK 5-3b2], that initial mention (*skabs*, probably *prastāva*) of [the idea] that a defining characteristic does not apply to [a thing] which has a defining characteristic, sets forth the thesis. The [proving] property of that [defining characteristic] is that it is a defining characteristic of [a thing] "which has a defining characteristic" if it is [already] characterized by some defining characteristic. By virtue of that [property to be proved and proving property], the example is defining characteristics other than that [alleged defining characteristic]. Here the inference is:
[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, nonobstruction is not the defining

characteristic of space,

[Reason:] because it is a defining characteristic,

[Example:] like solidity and so on.

Objection: Those who have a twofold doctrine³¹ say: A defining characteristic applies to [a thing] which [both] has a defining characteristic and does not have a defining characteristic, according to the mode (*rnam grangs las*, probably *paryāyena*). Therefore there is no fault [in our position].

Answer: In order to refute that [position] also, [Nāgārjuna] says,

[A defining characteristic] also does not apply to something other than [a thing] which has a defining characteristic and [a thing] which has no defining characteristic. [MMK 5-3cd]

That, too, is not [logically] possible [1] because an entity which has the nature of both is not possible³² and [2] because relational determination (*bltos pa'i nges pa*) will also be negated below in chapter [ten], "Examination of Fire and Fuel,"³³ and [3] because the two faults shown in both cases [separately] will come about.³⁴

[*Buddhapālita's commentary:*] [Buddhapālita]³⁵ says:

A defining characteristic does not apply to [a thing] which has no defining characteristic. [MMK 5-3a,b1]

Here, because in that way there is not any entity without a defining characteristic, therefore if an entity without a defining characteristic does not exist, it is not possible that a defining characteristic applies to a nonexistent basis (*gzhi med pa*).

Nor to one which has a defining characteristic. [MMK 5-3b2]

Here also, it is not possible that a defining characteristic applies to an entity which has a defining characteristic, either, because it is unnecessary (*niṣprayojana*).

[*Bhāvaviveka's critique:*] That is not [logically] possible, [1] because if a defining characteristic exists, it is not possible that it does not exist in [that thing] which possesses it and [2] because the thing characterized likewise exists.³⁶ Also, in [the case of] an established entity which possesses a defining characteristic, it is not contradictory to apply the defining characteristic to the thing characterized in order to remind the opponent.³⁷ Therefore that [explanation of Buddhapālita's] is not able [to establish that the defining characteristic and the thing characterized have no intrinsic nature].³⁸

Therefore, since in that way it is not possible that the defining characteristic applies to the thing characterized,

If the defining characteristic does not apply [to it], the thing characterized is not possible. [MMK 5-4ab]

[Thus Nāgārjuna] concludes [his refutation of the opponent's initial syllogism]³⁹ by virtue of the meaning which has been shown.

Objection: Here some who have the conceit of hoping to be learned⁴⁰ [and] who cannot bear to reflect upon⁴¹ the faults of their own position [as] stated [by the Mādhyamika] say: When [we] said that space exists because [its] defining characteristic exists, you imputed priority and posteriority to the thing characterized and [its] defining characteristic [in MMK 5-1] and said that the meaning of [our] reason is not established. [That] is like the [following] example: To [someone] who says that sound is impermanent because it is made, [someone else] replies, "If the fact of being made (*byas pa nyid, kṛtatva*) exists before sound has originated, [then] since sound has a variable connection (*vyabhicāra*) [with the fact of being made], [that fact] cannot be a reason [which proves a thesis about sound]. But if the fact of being made does not exist before sound has originated and exists later, then the meaning of the reason is not established [because there is an interval when sound does not have the property of being made]."

[The opponent continues:] That statement of that [latter

person] is not based on valid reasoning (*rigs pa dang ma ldan pa*, probably *ayuktimat*), because it states a specious nonestablishment [of the first speaker's reason] (*ma grub pa ltar snang ba*, probably *asiddhy-ābhāsa*). Likewise, you wish to criticize [our] stated reason ["because its defining characteristic exists"]⁴² by saying,

There is not any space prior to the defining characteristic of space, etc., [MMK 5-1ab, etc.]

[but as in our example,] that statement [of yours] negating an existent defining characteristic is also not well said.

Answer: The defining characteristic is also included in the thing characterized, due to [its] particular property (*viśeṣa*) of being the same or different, etc.;⁴³ but in ultimate reality, [we] have rejected the ultimately real existence of those *āyatana*s, [which are] the thing characterized. Therefore if the thing characterized is not possible, [its] defining characteristic is also not possible. [Thus we] make no effort in order to negate that [reason of yours, "because its defining characteristic exists"].⁴⁴

Listen also to that which [you yourself] have said, "Having imputed priority and posteriority to the thing characterized and [its] defining characteristic," etc. [We] have indicated a negation of difference [of the thing characterized and its defining characteristic] precisely (*eva*) by showing that [their] priority and posteriority are not possible. Therefore it is not the case that the nonestablishment [of your reason, "because its defining characteristic exists,"] is specious.⁴⁵

*Objection:*⁴⁶ That [property] which is different [from the property to be established] but is related [to it] by the defining characteristic of necessary connection, is the reason.⁴⁷ Therefore [your] statement that the meaning of [our] reason ["because its defining characteristic exists"] is not established because [the defining characteristic] is different [from the thing characterized], is also a specious nonestablishment.⁴⁸

Answer: That is not good, because in ultimate reality, [both]

difference and relation by the defining characteristic of necessary connection are not established [and] therefore [we] wish to get rid of attachment to them, also. That reason (*sādhana*) [i. e., that nonobstruction is the defining characteristic of space]⁴⁹ shows an entity which belongs to conventional truth; therefore it is in accord with convention [but not ultimate reality].⁵⁰

Enough of [this] digression (*zhar la bshad pa*, probably *pra-saṅga*)!

Objection:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, space does indeed exist,

[Reason:] because it *is* a defining characteristic.

[Dissimilar Example:] Here whatever does not exist is not considered to be a defining characteristic, as a sky-flower [is not].

[Application:] Space is a defining characteristic, because [in a sūtra] it is said, "Great king, these six elements are the person."⁵¹

[Conclusion:] Therefore that [space] does indeed exist.

Answer: Because it has been shown that the thing characterized is not possible, therefore,

If the thing characterized is not possible, [its] defining characteristic also does not exist. [MMK 5-4cd]

The idea is that [this is so] [1] because the defining characteristic is also included in the thing characterized [and] therefore it is likewise unestablished, and [2] because there is also no example.⁵²

Because the thing characterized and [its] defining characteristic are not possible if they are investigated in that way with discernment, therefore the author of [this] treatise [Nāgārjuna] sums up [by saying],

Therefore the thing characterized does not exist, [and its] defining characteristic does not exist at all. [MMK 5-5ab]

The idea is that [this is so] because there is no inference

showing that [existence] and because there is an inference showing that that does not exist.

Objection: The Vaibhāṣikas say:

[Thesis:] Space is an entity,⁵³

[Reason:] because [the yogin] abandons desire which wishes (*chanda-rāga*) for that object (*viṣaya*) [when he leaves the meditative sphere of the infinity of space (*ākāśa-anantya-āyatana*) and enters the meditative sphere of the infinity of cognition (*vijñāna*)],

[Example:] like matter [desire for which is abandoned when one enters the meditative sphere of the infinity of space].⁵⁴

Alternatively, [space is an entity,]

[Reason:] because it is the object (*ālambana*) of a meditational attainment,⁵⁵

[Example:] like cognition and so on.

Alternatively, [space is an entity,]

[Reason:] because it is unconditioned,

[Example:] like nirvāṇa.

Answer: Here if [you] maintain that that space is an entity in ultimate reality, it must be [either] a thing characterized or a defining characteristic; [but we] have shown previously how those [i. e.,] the thing characterized and [its] defining characteristic, are not possible. Therefore, because for our position,

Apart from something characterized and [its] defining characteristic, an entity also does not exist, [MMK 5-5cd]

therefore without showing an example, there is no establishment of [the property] to be proved. [There is no example of an entity] because it is not established that nirvāṇa or anything else is an entity.

Objection: Those who belong to other schools (*nikāya-antarīyāḥ*) say:

[Thesis:] Space does indeed exist,

[First Reason:] because it is the boundary (*yongs su chad pa, pariccheda*) of matter and

[Second Reason:] because it is unconditioned.

Answer: This [half-verse]⁵⁶ has also answered [those] proofs (*sādhana*) by [showing their] faults. One should also state that the meaning of [each of those] reasons is not established.

Objection: The Sautrāntikas⁵⁷ say: Space is not an entity. Then what [is it]? For us, that [space] is the mere absence of a substance which possesses resistance (*sapratigha-dravya-abhāva-mātra*).

Answer: Those [reasons given by the Vaibhāsikas], "because it is the object of a meditational attainment" and "because [the yogin] abandons desire which wishes for that object," exclude [space's having] the intrinsic nature of a nonentity (*abhāva*). Nevertheless, [Nāgārjuna] wished to state a very clear negation in order to negate those conceptual constructions about space [by] those [Sautrāntikas]; [and he] explained that same [point in a previous verse]:

Matter is not apprehended apart from the cause of matter.
[MMK 4-1ab]

Since that [fact that matter is not an entity]⁵⁸ has been shown, therefore,

If an entity (*bhāva*) does not exist, of what will there be an absence (*abhāva*)? [MMK 5-6ab]

If an entity called "matter which possesses resistance" does not exist, of what will there be that absence which you have designated as "space"? Since there is no inference which shows that [absence], that meaning is not established.

Alternatively, one may examine [the meaning of MMK 5-6ab]⁵⁹ differently:

*Objection:*⁶⁰ [We] have not been able to show that point (*artha*), [namely,] that space is an entity.⁶¹ You have said that since

Apart from something characterized and [its] defining characteristic, an entity also does not exist, [MMK 5-5cd]

[therefore] there is no example; and [you have said that] even if an example had been established, [the property] to be proved and the proving [property] would indeed not be established. Therefore we will establish that same [point with the following syllogism]:

[Thesis:] Matter and so on do indeed possess existence (*bhāva*) [as entities],

[Reason:] because their nonexistence (*med pa*, perhaps *nāstitva*) exists in relation (*bltos pas*, probably *apekṣayā*) [to their existence].

[Similar Example:] Here that which exists has a [corresponding] absence (*abhāva*) in relation [to it], like the nonexistence of flavor (*ro nyid, rasatva*) in [some] matter.

[Dissimilar Example:] That which does not exist has no absence in relation [to it], as [one does not speak of the nonexistence of flavor]⁶² in a horse's horn.

[The Vaibhāṣika continues:] Nor is the meaning of [our] reason unestablished, for you have said more than once that the aggregates, *dhātus*, and *āyatana*s do not exist as [the intrinsic nature of]⁶³ the aggregates and so on. Therefore because their nonexistence exists in relation [to their existence], [their] existence (*bhāva*) [as entities] does indeed exist.

Answer: We have simply made a negation of the existence of entities such as matter and so on; but we have not shown that they do not exist.⁶⁴ Therefore if an entity called "matter" does not exist, what will be without flavor? Since that [existence of an absence in relation to an existent entity]⁶⁵ does not exist, [your] example is not established. Therefore the meaning which [you] maintain is not established.

*Objection:*⁶⁶

[Thesis:] Entities and nonentities do indeed exist,

[Reason:] because their cognizer⁶⁷ exists.

[Similar Example:] Here that which has a cognizer exists, for ex-

ample, *dharmatā* ("dharmaness," the way the dharmas are).⁶⁸

Answer: That cognizer of entities and nonentities, whom the opponent's fancy (*vid la bsam pa*, probably *manoratha*) constructs, must also be [either] an entity or a nonentity. Since the negation of both of those has also been shown, it is not established that their cognizer exists.

If [you] suppose that there is some other cognizer, different in kind from an entity or a nonentity, that also is not possible. Therefore [Nāgārjuna] says,

Who that is different in kind (*vidharman*) from an entity or a nonentity knows entities and nonentities? [MMK 5-6cd]

The meaning of the sentence is that that [sort of cognizer] simply does not exist.

Objection: One who is different in kind from an entity or a nonentity [and] cognizes them [does indeed] exist, [as] supposed by the proponents of the modal point of view.⁶⁹ Therefore there is no fault [in our position].

Answer: That is not [logically] possible. [Nāgārjuna's] idea is that [this is so] [1] because two incompatible (*mi mthun pa*) natures are not possible in one thing and [2] because relativity (*bltos pa*) is not possible [in this case]⁷⁰ and [3] because there is no inference which shows that.

Because if one investigates in that way, space cannot bear logical analysis,⁷¹

Therefore space is not an entity, not a nonentity, not a thing characterized,

Nor a defining characteristic. [MMK 5-7ab,c1]

[Thus Nāgārjuna] has summed up by virtue of having refuted the criticisms, [that is,] the proofs⁷² which have been stated by opponents, [purporting] to show that [space] is an entity, etc.

[Those] which are the other five elements are also the same as space. [MMK 5-7c2,d]

The meaning of "element" (*dhātu*) is the meaning of "mine" ('*byung khungs, ākara*).⁷³ Like a gold mine, space and the rest are also mines of suffering (*duḥkha*), unhappiness (*daurmanasya*), and so on.

Alternatively, the meaning of "element" (*dhātu*) is the meaning of bearing (*dhāraṇa*) [its] specific characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*) without effort.⁷⁴ "The five" [are] earth, water, fire, air, and cognition. [They are called] "other" [or "latter"] (*apara*) because they are to be negated after space.⁷⁵ "[Those] which [are the other five elements] are also the same as space" means "those which are the other five elements are also to be negated in the same way as space."

Previously, the negation of space was shown by [the verses] beginning from

There is not any space prior to the defining characteristic of space, [MMK 5-1ab]

up to

Therefore space is not an entity, not a nonentity, not a thing characterized,

Nor a defining characteristic. [MMK 5-7ab,c1]

Likewise, here also one should state in full [the negation of the other elements] beginning from

There is not any earth, etc., prior to the defining characteristic of earth, etc.,

up to

Therefore earth, etc., are not entities, not nonentities, not things characterized,
Nor defining characteristics.

Because those which are the other five elements, earth and so on, also have the same negation as space, one should show that [they] are similar.⁷⁶

The teaching in the Blessed One's discourses (*pravacana*) that those elements exist in that way, has expounded those [elements]. Through [the Buddha's] compassion (*anukampā*) for persons to be converted, [what is] common knowledge conventionally (*vyavahāra-prasiddha*) is included in conventional truth (*vyavahāra-satya*);⁷⁷ but in ultimate reality, the elements do not exist. Because the elements exist [conventionally], there is no conflict with what [we ourselves] accept; but neither are the *āyatana*s established.⁷⁸

Objection: Again, some⁷⁹ say: Because you have nihilistically negated (*apavādita*) all entities in ultimate reality, [you] have [just] repeated the false view (*mithyā-dr̥ṣṭi*)⁸⁰ which takes the form (*tshulcan*) of nihilistically negating all entities. With a counterfeit discourse of the Blessed One, [you] have made a proof of what the Lokāyatas maintain. Therefore since this is not the Blessed One's word, it should be abandoned.

Answer: As to that, here the opponents are like those who have an eye disease resulting from an imbalance of the humors⁸¹ [and who try to] remove unreal hairs, flies, mosquitoes, and so on. For when we stated [our] negation of the existence of the *āyatana*s, we only made a negation of [their] having intrinsic nature; but [we] did not say that they are nonentities.⁸² As it is said in the [*Laṅkāvatāra*]-*sūtra*,⁸³

As long as there is the domain (*gocara*) of the mind (*citta*), there will also be the two extremes of existence and nonexistence.

When [its] domain has ceased, the mind also ceases com-

pletely. [*Laṅkāvatāra* 3-9]

And likewise,

One who has not fallen into [a belief in] entities, does not make any dharma into a nonentity by means of a nonentity.

Likewise, the *ācārya* [Nāgārjuna] himself has also said elsewhere,⁸⁴

This is a negation of existence; it is not an embracing (*parigraha*) of nonexistence,

Just as when one says, "It is not black," one does not express, "It is white."⁸⁵

Therefore both those kinds [of views, existence and nonexistence,] are indeed bad views (*kudrṣṭi*), because they are an obstacle to the wise one who desires the bliss (*sukha*) of the quiescence of all conceptual proliferation. How [are they an obstacle]? Here [suppose that] in ultimate reality, the realms of desire, form, and formlessness (*kāma-rūpa-ārūpya-avacara*), the supramundane, and the wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral (*kuśala-akuśala-avyākṛta*), [all] had the intrinsic nature of coming into existence (*ātma-lābha*) in that way in which they are conventionally designated. Therefore,

[Thesis:] Effort for the sake of producing and not producing wholesome and unwholesome dharmas [respectively] would just be pointless,

[Reason:] because they exist [already],

[Example:] like a jar and a cloth which [already] exist.

Therefore those who are happy would have [their] particular happiness undiminished, and those who are suffering would also have [their] particular suffering undiminished. Like pictures painted on a wall, living beings' particular ages (*vayas*), sizes, and postures (*īryā-patha*) would not increase or decrease.

But if the three realms [of desire, form, and formlessness], the supramundane, and the wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral

were nonexistent [by] intrinsic nature,⁸⁶ in that case also,
 [Thesis:] Effort for the sake of producing and not producing
 wholesome and unwholesome dharmas [respectively] would
 just be pointless,

[Reason:] because they do not exist,

[Example:] just as effort for the sake of sharpening a hare's horn
 [is pointless].

Therefore conventional activity would be destroyed (*chad par 'gyur*).

Therefore this [following verse] is stated. Those whose intellectual eye is impaired by the eye disease of bad views, [that is,]

The weak-minded (*alpa-buddhi*) who see the existence and
 nonexistence of entities,

Do not see the tranquil quiescence of the visible. [MMK 5-8]

The meaning is that just as one with an eye disease, whose sense organ is impaired, sees unreal double moons, etc., [so also] the weak-minded who see the existence and nonexistence of entities do not see the tranquil quiescence of the visible. [That quiescence of the visible] is the very subtle ultimate truth, the domain of the eye of noble discernment (*ārya-prajñā*).

[It is called] "the quiescence of the visible" because here all identifying marks (*nimitta*) of the visible do not appear. [It is called] "tranquil" because it is free from all harm. As it is said in a sūtra,⁸⁷

[When] some [view] establishes the existence of some [entity]
 by means of causal conditions, there will be nonexistence.⁸⁸

[That] bad view, the doctrine of origination, teaches existence and nonexistence.

That wise one whose intellectual eye is faultless because [he or she] possesses the eye ointment of the vision and meditative cultivation of emptiness,⁸⁹ [whose] intellectual eye has fully opened,

sees the true state of entities. As the Blessed One said [in the *Ārya-Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*],⁹⁰

When one sees the world as neither existent nor nonexistent
nor [both] existent and nonexistent,
Then the mind turns back (*vyāvartate*); and one comprehends
absence of self (*nairātmya*). [*Laṅkāvatāra* 3-22 = 10-476]

Likewise, as it is said [in the *Kāśyapa-parivarta* of the *Ārya-mahā-ratna-kūṭa-sūtra*],⁹¹

Kāśyapa, this [view,] "It exists," is one extreme. This [view,]
"It does not exist," is also one extreme.

As to that, here the meaning of the chapter [is as follows:] By stating the faults of that reason, "because [their] defining characteristics exist," which was adduced [by the opponent] to show that the elements, earth and so on, exist, [we] have shown that the elements are without intrinsic nature.

Therefore [scriptural] statements such as the following are established:⁹² [From the *Ārya-brahma-viśeṣa-cintā-paripṛcchā-sūtra*?],⁹³

That which is the internal earth-element (*ādhyātmika-prthivī-dhātu*) and that which is the external (*bāhya*) earth-element have a nondual meaning (*advaya-artha*). By means of discernment and wisdom, the Tathāgata has fully and perfectly realized (*abhisambuddha*) that that also is nondual, is not divisible into two (*gnyis su dbyer med pa*), and has a single defining characteristic (*ekalakṣaṇa*), namely, no defining characteristic (*alākṣaṇa*).⁹⁴

Likewise, [from the *Ārya-Maṅjuśrī-vikrīḍita-sūtra*],⁹⁵

[Maṅjuśrī said,] "Girl, how should one see the elements (*dhātu*)?"

The girl said, "Maṅjuśrī, [they should be seen] like this, for example: When the three worlds have been consumed by [fire at the end of] the *kalpa*, there is not even ash [left behind]."⁹⁶

Likewise,⁹⁷

One should not be attached (*abhini-viś*) to that which is

formless, invisible, and baseless, which does not appear and is not made known (*avijñaptika*).⁹⁸

Likewise, [from the *Bhagavatī-prajñā-pāramitā-suvikrānta-vikrāmi-sūtra*,]⁹⁹

Śāradvatīputra, all dharmas have the defining characteristic of nonattachment (*asaṅga-lakṣaṇa*). That which is the defining characteristic of some dharma is a noncharacteristic (*alakṣaṇa*) of that [dharma]. Therefore no dharma serves (*pratyupasthīta*) for the production (*abhinirvṛtī*) of a defining characteristic.

Likewise, [from the *Ārya-brahma-viśeṣa-cintā-paripṛcchā-sūtra*,]¹⁰⁰

I taught the aggregates to the world, [and] the world came to dwell on them.

One who is wise does not dwell on them and is not soiled by worldly dharmas.

The world has the defining characteristic of space, and space has no defining characteristic.

Therefore that [wise one], comprehending that, is not soiled by worldly dharmas.

Likewise, [from the *Bhagavatī-prajñā-pāramitā-suvikrānta-vikrāmi-sūtra*,]¹⁰¹

Śāradvatīputra, [the fact] that all dharmas have no defining characteristic and no perfection (*pariniṣpatti*) is called "nonattachment."

The fifth chapter, "Examination of the Elements," of the *Prajñāpradīpa*, a commentary on [Nāgārjuna's] *Mūlamadhyamaka* composed by ācārya Bhavyakara/Bhavyakāra (*legs ldan byed*)¹⁰² [is concluded].

Notes to Translation of Chapter Five

¹In this chapter, "element" translates *dhātu*, in the sense of the six *dhātus*, earth, water, fire, air, space (*ākāśa*), and cognition (*viññāna*). In other words, the six *dhātus* are the four *mahābhūtas* plus space and cognition. I have also trans-

lated *bhūta/mahābhūta* in chapter four as "element;" but hopefully this will not cause confusion. On the various senses of the term *dhātu*, see May (1959), p. 97 n. 222 and Edgerton (1953), pp. 282-4.

²Avalokitavrata explains, "Emptiness is [our] own position. The counterposition to that is the opponent's position, namely, the doctrine (*vāda*) that the *āyatanas* and so on do exist by intrinsic nature." The particular form of that counterposition to be refuted in this chapter is the view that the elements exist because their defining characteristics exist. See Ava P69b-8 to 70a-2, D61b4,5.

³On the scriptural sources of this quotation, see LVP AK I, p. 49 n. 2. *Majjhima-nikāya* III, p. 239, has *bhikkhu* for *mahārāja*. Candrakīrti gives a Sanskrit version with *mahārāja* (PSP 129.3,4). Later, Avalokitavrata tells us that the "great king" being addressed is the Buddha's father, Śuddhodana. See Ava P94a-5, D84a-3.

⁴*abhyupagama-bādha*. That is, it will conflict with the Buddha's teaching, which Nāgārjuna, as a Buddhist, must accept. See Ava P70b-1,2; D62a-4,5.

⁵That is, as far as the *Mādhyamika* is concerned, it is not established that that teaching refers to ultimate reality. Thus the fault alleged by the opponent does not exist. See Ava P70b-5,6; D62b-1,2.

⁶*nam mkha'i ngo bo nyid stong pa nyid kyi bstan sla ba'i phyir*, more literally, "because it is easy to show the intrinsic nature of space as being empty (*śūnyatayā* or *śūnyatvena*)." Here, of course, Bhāvaviveka is speaking of the fact that space is (ontologically) empty of intrinsic nature. He is not referring to the physical emptiness of what is commonly called "empty space."

⁷In fact, the *Vaiśbhāsikas* make a distinction between space as one of the three unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*) dharmas and space as one of the six *dhātus*. The former is defined as *anāvarana* or *anāvṛti* (AK 1-5d); the latter is considered to be the visible space between objects, a combination of light and shadow (AK 1-28ab). The *Sautrāntikas*, on the other hand, make no such distinction. For them, space is simply the absence of anything tangible (*spraṣṭavya-abhāvamātra*). See LVP AK I, p. 50 n. 1 and LVP AK II, p. 279.

⁸The *Vaiśbhāsikas* have attempted to show in their preceding syllogism that the six *dhātus* exist because their defining characteristics exist. For instance, space exists because its defining characteristic, nonobstruction, exists. But the elements are identical with their defining characteristics (see AK 1-12cd). Thus the *Vaiśbhāsikas'* reason is no different from their thesis. See Ava P71a-5 to 71b-1, D62b-6 to 63a-3.

⁹See Ava P71b-2,3; D63a-4.

¹⁰*mshon par bya ba yin pas mshan nyid*, perhaps *lakṣyata iti lakṣaṇam*.

¹¹See note 94 to the translation of chapter three. Once again, the *kṛt-pratyaya* in question is *lyuṭ* (-ana).

The opponent rejects the view that *lakṣaṇa* refers to the instrument (*karana*) of the activity of characterizing, while *lakṣya* refers to the object (*karman*) of the action. For him, *lakṣaṇa* also refers to the object and thus is identical with *lakṣya*. See Ava P71b-5 to 72a-4, D63a-6 to 63b-5.

¹²*de dag gi de ltar khas blangs pa nyid la yang*, perhaps *tayor evam*

abhyupagatatve 'pi.

¹³Since the reason and the thesis are identical, does the reason establish the thesis or *vice versa*?

¹⁴If the opponent seeks to prove that space exists in ultimate reality, his appeal to convention is contradictory (since a conventionally valid reason cannot prove a positive thesis about ultimate reality). Also, there is no example for the ultimately real existence of space, since no entity exists in ultimate reality. See Ava P73a-2,3,4; D64b-1,2,3.

¹⁵On the Vaiśeṣikas' doctrine of space, see note 7. The Vaiśeṣikas hold that *ākāśa* (usually translated as "ether" in this context) is an eternal, ubiquitous substance. See Sinha (1956), pp. 372-4; Frauwallner (1973), Vol. II, pp. 147-8; and Potter (1977), pp. 90-1.

¹⁶Avalokitavratā identifies the opponent here as a Sāṃkhya. The Sāṃkhyas hold that *ākāśa* (usually translated "ether" in this context also) arises from the "subtle essence" (*tanmātra*) of sound; and thus *ākāśa* is the defining characteristic of sound. See Ava P73b-7,8; D65a-6. For the Sāṃkhya account of ether and sound, see Sinha (1952), pp. 19-20; Frauwallner (1973), Vol. I, pp. 279-80; and Larson and Bhattacharya (1987), pp. 50-3.

For the Vaiśeṣikas, the ether (*ākāśa*) is the substrate, and thus a cause, of sound. See Sinha (1956), pp. 371-4; Frauwallner (1973), Vol. II, pp. 147-8; and Potter (1977), pp. 90-1, 161-2.

¹⁷That is, since sound and space, its defining characteristic, are identical, the reason becomes the same as the thesis. See Ava P73b-8 to 74a-2, D65a6,7.

¹⁸According to Avalokitavratā, the opponents here are "Vaiśeṣika commentators." See Ava P74a-3, D65b-1,2.

¹⁹In other words, if Bhāvaviveka's interpretation were correct, MMK 5-1ab should have *anyad ākāśalakṣaṇāt* instead of *pūrvam ākāśalakṣaṇāt*.

²⁰For the Vaiśeṣikas, substance (*dravya*) and quality (*guṇa*) are distinct categories (*padārtha*). The qualities of a substance (including its defining characteristic) inhere in that substance but are not identical with it. See Sinha (1956), p. 317; Frauwallner (1973), Vol. II, pp. 141, 152-3; and Potter (1977), pp. 49, 84.

²¹See Ava P75a-2,3; D66a-6,7. "Alleged" translates *smra bar 'dod pa*, probably *vivakṣita*.

²²Avalokitavratā points out that Bhāvaviveka's first explanation of MMK 5-1d leads to a negation of the thing characterized; his second explanation leads to a negation of the defining characteristic. See Ava P75b-7,8; D67a-3,4.

²³The Vaiśeṣika, according to Avalokitavratā. See Ava P76a-1, D67a-5.

²⁴Avalokitavratā glosses this as "the defining characteristic does not belong to the thing characterized, and the thing characterized does not belong to the defining characteristic." See Ava P76a-1 to 4, D67a-4 to 7. Of course, as far as the Tibetan is concerned, ... *la med pa* could also be translated as "does not exist in," as well as "does not belong to."

²⁵Like a refractory ox who cannot be turned back with a stick, the opponent may refuse to concede defeat and shamelessly assert that space exists without a defining characteristic. See Ava P76a-6 to 76b-1, D67b-1 to 4.

²⁶Conventionally, space does have a defining characteristic; but that fact can not be used to prove the thesis in the opponent's initial syllogism, that space exists in ultimate reality.

²⁷See Ava P76b-2,3,4; D67b-5,6.

²⁸Avalokitavrata identifies the opponents here as "Vaiśeṣikas, etc." See Ava P76b-4, D67b-6,7.

²⁹That is, a thing characterized which neither has nor does not have a defining characteristic. See Ava P78a-3,4; D69a-4,5.

³⁰The opponent maintains that a thing characterized, such as space, exists because a defining characteristic applies to it. ("The meaning of what you maintain" translates *khyod kyi 'dod pa'i don*, literally, "your desired meaning.") A "contradictory entity" is one which neither has nor does not have a defining characteristic. Since it has been shown that a defining characteristic does not apply to a thing which has one, a thing which does not have one, or a thing which neither has nor does not have one, there is no example of something to which a defining characteristic applies. See Ava P78a-6,7; D69a-6,7.

³¹*nam pa gnyis su smra ba dag*, identified by Avalokitavrata as '*os pa pa dag*, *ārhatāḥ*, that is, the Jains. See Ava P79a-1, D70a-1 (P has '*os pa dag*). On the Jains' *ānekāntavāda*, see, e. g., Sinha (1952), pp. 197-208; Frauwallner (1973), Vol. II, pp. 199-200; and Sharma (1960), pp. 49-54.

³²An entity with two mutually incompatible natures, like a bird which is half dead and half alive, is not seen in the world. Therefore an entity which both has and does not have a defining characteristic is not possible. See Ava P79a-5,6; D70a-4,5.

³³The opponent replies that the example of a bird which is half dead and half alive [reminiscent of Schrödinger's cat!] is not applicable. Rather it is like the fact that a man is a son in relation to his father and a father in relation to his son. In reply, Avalokitavrata quotes MMK 10-8:

If fire is dependent on fuel and if fuel is dependent on fire,

Which of the two is established first, in dependence on which there would be fire and fuel?

See Ava P79a-6 to 79b-3, D70a-5 to 70b-2.

³⁴That is, to say that a thing both has and does not have a defining characteristic is to incur the faults which have been shown for each alternative separately.

In Bhāvaviveka's first explanation, MMK 5-3cd refers to an entity which neither has nor does not have a defining characteristic. In his second explanation, it refers to an entity which both has and does not have a defining characteristic.

³⁵*gzhan dag*, "others," identified by Avalokitavrata as "the commentator (*vṛtti-kāra*) Sthavira Buddhapālita." See Ava P79b-7, D70b-5. Text in Saito (1984), p. 67, ll. 9-13 and 16-18; translation in Saito (1984), translation, p. 67.

³⁶Here Bhāvaviveka criticizes Buddhapālita's commentary on MMK 5-3a,b1 on the grounds that he tacitly assumes that the *lakṣya* exists while negating the *lakṣya*. See Ava P79b-8 to 80a-4, D70b-6 to 71a-2.

In fact, Nāgārjuna's own method in chapter five is to reject the ultimately real existence of the *lakṣya* in the first three and a half verses and then to negate the

lakṣaṇa in MMK 5-4cd. Given his use of simple negation and the *prasaṅga* method, it does not seem that he must affirm the existence of the *lakṣaṇa* while arguing against the *lakṣya*; and the same is true for Buddhapālita.

³⁷Here Bhāvaviveka is criticizing Buddhapālita's commentary on MMK 5-3b2. One can say, "This is the defining characteristic of this thing," in order to remind someone who has forgotten that fact. See Ava P80a-4 to 8, D71a-2 to 5.

It is not clear that this is the sense of "application" (*pravṛtti*) that Nāgārjuna and Buddhapālita have in mind. They seem to be thinking of a logically necessary relationship between the defining characteristic and the thing characterized, rather than of the use of words to communicate a fact.

³⁸See Ava P80a-8, D71a-5.

³⁹See Ava P80b-4,5; D71b-1,2.

⁴⁰Avalokitavrata describes these opponents as Buddhists and others who falsely consider themselves learned in the science of logic (*rigs pa'i bstan bcos, nyāya/yukti-śāstra*). See Ava P80b-6,7,8; D71b-3,4.

⁴¹*brnag pa*. See Dass (1902), s. v.

⁴²See Ava P81b-3,4; D72a-7 to 72b-1.

⁴³Avalokitavrata remarks that in superficial reality, the defining characteristic's particular property of being neither the same as nor different from the thing characterized includes it in the thing characterized. See Ava P81b-6,7; D72b-2,3.

⁴⁴See Ava P81b-8; D72b-4.

⁴⁵Avalokitavrata says that Bhāvaviveka's arguments are not comparable to the opponent's example. In the argument, "sound is impermanent because it is made," the words, "because it is made," produce a cognition that sound is impermanent; but the fact that sound is impermanent exists before the reason is uttered. Thus it is incorrect to argue that the reason is not established. On the other hand, Bhāvaviveka argues that the thing characterized and its defining characteristic cannot be different by showing that they cannot exist at different times. See Ava P82a-3 to 82b-5, D72b-6 to 73a-7.

⁴⁶The opponents are those who say that the thing characterized and its defining characteristic are different. See Ava P82b-6, D73b-1.

⁴⁷The reason (e. g., "being made,") must invariably be accompanied by the property to be established (e. g., "being impermanent"). The reverse need not be true.

⁴⁸In his commentary on MMK 5-2cd, Bhāvaviveka gave the following syllogism: The alleged defining characteristic is not the defining characteristic of the thing characterized, because it is different [from that thing], like [a defining characteristic] different from that [alleged defining characteristic]. See Ava P82b-6 to 83a-3, D73b-1 to 5. See also Bhāvaviveka's second syllogism following MMK 5-1cd.

⁴⁹See Ava P83b-1,2; D74a-3. This probably refers again to the opponent's initial syllogism in this chapter.

⁵⁰The Mādhyamikas do not reject the necessary connection of the thing characterized and its defining characteristic on the level of superficial reality, because to do so would contradict perception. See Ava P83a-6,7; D73b-7 to 74a-1 and

P83b-1,2; D74a-3,4.

⁵¹See note 3.

⁵²The opponent cannot cite a similar example, that is something which exists (in ultimate reality) and is a defining characteristic. See Ava P84b-2,3,4; D75a-2,3.

⁵³The *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya* on AK 2-55cd contains a long debate between the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas as to whether the three unconditioned dharma, especially nirvāṇa, are entities (*bhāva*) or nonentities (*abhāva*). See LVP AK II, pp. 278-87. See also the sources translated in La Vallée Poussin (1930).

⁵⁴See Ava P85a-3 to 7, D75b-2 to 5. For a discussion of the four formless (*ārūpya*) meditative spheres, see LVP AK VIII, pp. 133-44 and LVP AK III, p. 21 n. 1. See also Avalokitavrata's long and interesting discussion in Ava P86a-3 to 87b-6, D76b-3 to 78a-2.

⁵⁵On this term, see LVP AK VIII, p. 182 n. 4 and Edgerton (1953), pp. 569-70. The *samāpatti* referred to is again the sphere of the infinity of space, while the example refers to the sphere of the infinity of cognition. Strictly speaking, space and cognition are the objects not of the *samāpattis* named after them, but of the preparatory exercises for those *samāpattis*; see AK 8-4ab,c1.

⁵⁶MMK 5-5cd, according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P88a-4, D78a-6,7.

⁵⁷See note 53. I have generally translated the terms *bhāva* and *abhāva* as "entity" and "nonentity," respectively. Some contexts, however, require translations like "presence" and "absence" or "existence" and "nonexistence." Thus in the following discussion, *abhāva* has sometimes been translated as "nonentity" and sometimes as "absence;" and once, *bhāva* has been translated as "existence." (Note that in still other contexts, *bhāva* may mean "nature.")

⁵⁸See Ava P89a-4,5; P79a-6.

⁵⁹See Ava P89a-8 to 89b-1, D78b-2,3.

⁶⁰According to Avalokitavrata, the opponent here is a Vaibhāṣika. See Ava P89b-3, D79b-4. This identification seems justified by the fact that the opponent here alludes to the arguments advanced earlier by the Vaibhāṣikas. The syllogism which follows, however, is reminiscent of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position. On the latter, see Sinha (1956), pp. 346-53; Frauwallner (1973), Vol. II, pp. 110-1; Sharma (1960), pp. 182-3; and Potter (1977), pp. 53, 110, 141-6.

⁶¹This refers to the Vaibhāṣika's three syllogisms following MMK 5-5ab. See Ava P89b-3,4,5; D79b-4,5.

⁶²See Ava P90a-4,5; D80a-4,5.

⁶³See Ava P90b-3, D80b-3.

⁶⁴Avalokitavrata points out that the negation of *bhāva* is a simple negation, not an implicative negation. See Ava P90b-8 to 91a-1, D80b-7 to 81a-1.

⁶⁵See Ava P91a-2, D81a-1,2.

⁶⁶Avalokitavrata attributes this objection to both the Sautrāntikas and the Vaibhāṣikas. See Ava P91a-4, D81a-3. In fact, while the Sautrāntikas do hold that both *bhāvas* and *abhāvas* can be objects of cognition, the Vaibhāṣikas argue that only a *bhāva* can be an object of cognition. See LVP AK V, p. 62.

⁶⁷One would usually translate *śes pa* as "cognition" (*jñāna*, etc.); but given

kaḥ in MMK 5-6d and given Avalokitavrata's subcommentary, it seems to mean "cognizer" (*shes pa po; jñātr*, etc.) here.

⁶⁸As the Buddha, the cognizer of *dharmatā*, exists, so the yogin who cognizes entities and nonentities exists. See Ava P91a-5,6; D81a-4,5.

⁶⁹*nam grangs kyi tshul smra ba dag, paryāya-naya-vādinah*. On the Jaina doctrine of the modes (*paryāya*) of a thing and the different points of view (*naya*) from which it can be considered, see the references in note 31. See also Ames (1995), nn. 82 and 83.

Ava P92a-1,2 and 6 identify the opponents as here as '*os pa pa dag, āratāḥ*; Ava D81b-7 and 82a-4 have '*ug pa pa dag, aulūkyāḥ*, i. e., the Vaiśeṣikas. Since the view described here seems clearly to be that of the Jains, '*os pa pa dag* must be the right reading.

⁷⁰Avalokitavrata explains that although a man may be a son in relation to his father and a father in relation to his son, he cannot be said to be alive in relation to death and dead in relation to life. That is, he must be either alive or dead. Likewise, he cannot be an entity from one point of view and a nonentity from another. See Ava P92a-1 to 8, D81b-7 to 82a-6.

⁷¹*'thad pa mi bzod pa*, perhaps *upapatty-akṣama*.

⁷²One might be inclined to translate "criticisms [and] proofs;" but Avalokitavrata says the those proofs themselves are also criticisms against the Mādhyamika. See Ava P92b-5,6,7; D82b-3,4.

⁷³See LVP AK I, p. 37.

⁷⁴*byed pa med par* might also mean "without an instrument" or "without activity." For *svalakṣaṇa-dhāranād dhātuh*, see *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya* on AK 3-3, Shastri edition, p. 385; Pradhan edition, p. 112.

⁷⁵Avalokitavrata explains that Nāgārjuna has negated space first because it is generally believed in the world that space is nothing at all (*ci yang ma yin pa*, perhaps *akimcit*), whereas earth and so on are considered to be entities, etc. Once space has been negated, it can serve as an example in syllogisms negating the other elements. Thus space is dealt with first, despite the fact that earth comes first in the list given in the sūtras. See Ava P93a-6 to 93b-2, D83a-3 to 6.

⁷⁶Similar in being nothing at all (*ci yang ma yin pa*), in that they are neither entities nor nonentities nor things characterized nor defining characteristics, according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P94a-3 to 94a-5, D84a-1,2.

⁷⁷The syntax from the beginning of the paragraph to here is not entirely clear. For Avalokitavrata's commentary, see Ava P94a-8 to 94b-3, D84a-5,6,7.

⁷⁸Since the elements exist conventionally, the Mādhyamika need not reject the Buddha's teaching on that subject; rather, the Mādhyamika regards it as conventional truth. On the other hand, since the elements do not exist in ultimate reality, the opponent cannot use the purely conventional existence of the elements to prove that the *āyatana*s exist in ultimate reality. Compare Ava P95a-1,2; D84b-6.

⁷⁹Avalokitavrata identifies the opponents as "some of our fellow Buddhists, Saṃghabhadra and so on." See Ava P95a-4,5; D85a-2. Presumably, this refers to the Vaibhāṣika master Saṃghabhadra who wrote a rebuttal to Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. See, e. g., LVP AK I, "Introduction," pp. xxii-xxiii.

Parts of Samghabhadra's work are translated in La Vallée Poussin (1930), (1931-2), and (1936-7).

⁸⁰See AK 5-7 and LVP AK V, p. 18.

⁸¹*skyon cha ma mnyam pa*, probably *doṣa-viśama*. Avalokitavrata glosses this as "an imbalance of the three *doṣas* of wind, bile, and phlegm;" see Ava P95a-8, D85a-5.

⁸²Avalokitavrata explains that the *Mādhyamika* negates the existence of the *āyatanas* in ultimate reality by means of a simple negation, not an implicative negation. Thus his negation does not entail the affirmation that the *āyatanas* are non-entities. Hence the *Madhyamaka-śāstra* is free from the two extremes of the views of permanence and annihilation. See Ava P95b-7, D85b-2,3.

⁸³Avalokitavrata does not identify the source of this and the following quotation. See Ava P95b-7 to 96a-1, D85b-3,4,5. The Sanskrit text of the *Laṅkāvatāra* verse is found in Nanjio (1923), p. 147.

⁸⁴Identified by Avalokitavrata as "the *śāstra* called *Lokaparīkṣā* composed by *ācārya* Nāgārjuna himself." See Ava P96a-2,3; D85b-6. Only this single verse of this lost work of Nāgārjuna's is known to modern scholarship; see Lindtner (1982), p. 14 n. 27. (Christian Lindtner has informed me that the same verse is quoted, with a variant, in the *Tarkajvālā* on *Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā* 4-58.)

⁸⁵Avalokitavrata explains that the verse illustrates simple negation. See Ava P96a-3,4; D85b-7 to 86a-1.

⁸⁶*ngo bo nyid med pa yin par gyur na*. One might translate this as "if they were without intrinsic nature," but that translation seems wrong in this context. Also, Avalokitavrata has the gloss *kun rdzob tu tshul gang gis tha snyad gdags pa tsam gyi tshul der yang med pa yin par gyur na'o*, "if they were nonexistent even in that way in which they are mere conventional designations in superficial reality." See Ava P97b-1, D87a-4.

⁸⁷Avalokitavrata comments on this verse, but he does not identify its source. See P98a-6 to 98b-1, D88a-1 to 4.

⁸⁸When the existent thing has ceased, there will be nonexistence. See Ava, *loc. cit.*

⁸⁹A reference to the path of vision or seeing (*darśana-mārga*) and the path of cultivation (*bhāvanā-mārga*). In the Mahāyāna, these paths coincide with the *bodhisattva-bhūmis*. Avalokitavrata explains that the vision of emptiness is the "non-seeing" of the existence and nonexistence of entities, which takes place when one comprehends supremely profound dependent origination, which is free from the extremes of permanence and annihilation. See Ava P98b-2 to 5, D88a-5,6,7.

⁹⁰Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P98b-5, D88a-7. The Sanskrit text is found in Nanjio (1923), pp. 152-3 and pp. 324-5.

⁹¹Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P98b-8, D88b-2. The Sanskrit text is found in von Staël-Holstein (1926), p. 90.

⁹²See note 149 to the translation of chapter three. Avalokitavrata's remarks are similar here. See Ava: (1) P99a-4,5, D88b-5,6; (2) P99a-7, D89a-1; (3) P99b-1,2, D89a-3; (4) P99b-3,4, D89a-5; (5) P99b-7,8, D89b-1,2; (6) P100a-2,3, D89b-4; and (7) P100a-8 to 100b-1, to D90a-1,2,3.

⁹³Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P99a-5, D88a-7. The same passage was quoted by Bhāvaviveka toward the end of chapter three. I have not been able to locate this passage in the *Sde dge bka'* 'gyur edition of the sūtra.

⁹⁴See note 151 to the translation of chapter three.

⁹⁵Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P99a-8, D89a-2. The same passage was quoted by Bhāvaviveka toward the end of chapter three. See note 152 to the translation of chapter three. The quotation here differs from that in chapter three in having *bskal pas* for chapter three's *bskal pa'i mes*.

⁹⁶See note 153 to the translation of chapter three.

⁹⁷Identified by Avalokitavrata only as being "from other *sūtrāntas*." See Ava P99b-1,2; D89a-4. The passage is very similar to a sentence which occurs three times in the *Kāśyapa-parivarta*; see von Staël-Holstein (1926), pp. 86-7, 90 (related sentence, p. 144).

⁹⁸Avalokitavrata explains the last two phrases by saying that it does not appear as an object [of the six senses] and that it cannot be grasped by the cognition of the eye, etc. The referent is *paramārtha-satya*. See Ava P99b4,5,6; D89a-5,6,7.

⁹⁹Identified by Avalokitavrata only as *Bhagavati-prajñā-pāramitā-sūtra*; see Ava P99b-6, D89a-7 to 89b-1. The Sanskrit text is found in Hikata (1958), p. 61.

¹⁰⁰Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P99b-8 to 100a-1, D89b-2. The same two verses were quoted by Bhāvaviveka toward the end of chapter four. The first two *pādas* of the first verse are found in the *Sde dge bka'* 'gyur, Mdo sde Ba 36b-3 (with a slightly different Tibetan translation). For the third *pāda*, compare *byang chub sems dpa' mkhas pa der* || on 36b-4. The second verse is found on 37a-1,2, with a rather different third *pāda*: *de dag de yi 'gro rig nas* ||. Avalokitavrata remarks that the first two *pādas* of the second verse also occur in the *Ārya-sarva-buddha-viṣaya-avatāra-jñāna-āloka-alamkāra-sūtra*. See Ava P100a-4, D89b-5,6.

¹⁰¹Identified by Avalokitavrata only as "that same *Bhagavati-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra*." See Ava P100a-5,6; D89b-7. The Sanskrit is found in Hikata (1958), p. 62.

¹⁰²See note 159 to my translation of chapter three.

Sanskrit Text of MMK, Chapters Three, Four, and Five, according to PSP as emended by J. W. de Jong (1978) and further emended by Akira Saito (1985)

Chapter Three

darśanam śravaṇam ghrāṇam rasanam sparśanam manah |
indriyāṇi śaḍ eteṣāṃ draṣṭavyādīni gocarāḥ | | 1

svam ātmānam darśanam hi tat tam eva na paśyati |
na paśyati yad ātmānam katham draṣyati tat parān | | 2

na paryāpto 'gnidrṣṭānto darśanasya prasiddhaye |
sadarśanaḥ sa pratyukto gamyamānagatāgataiḥ | | 3

nāpaśyamānam bhavati yadā kim cana darśanam |
darśanam paśyatīty evam katham etat tu yujyate | | 4

paśyati darśanam naiva naiva paśyaty adarśanam |
vyākhyāto darśanenaiva draṣṭā cāpy avagamyatām | | 5

draṣṭā nāsty atiraskṛtya tiraskṛtya ca darśanam |
draṣṭavyam darśanam caiva draṣṭary asati te kutah | | 6

pratītya mātāpitarau yathoktaḥ putrasambhavaḥ |
cakṣūrūpe pratītyaivam ukto vijñānasambhavaḥ | | 7

draṣṭavyadarśanābhāvād vijñānādicatuṣṭayam |
nāstīty upādānādīni bhaviṣyanti punaḥ katham | | 8

vyākhyātam śravaṇam ghrāṇam rasanam sparśanam manah |
darśanenaiva jānīyāc chrotrṣrotavyakādi ca | | 9

Chapter Four

- rūpakāraṇanirmuktaṃ na rūpaṃ upalabhyate |
rūpenāpi na nirmuktaṃ dṛśyate rūpakāraṇaṃ | | 1
- rūpakāraṇanirmukte rūpe rūpaṃ prasajyate |
āhetukaṃ na cāsty arthaḥ kaścīd āhetukaḥ kvacit | | 2
- rūpeṇa tu vinirmuktaṃ yadi syād rūpakāraṇaṃ |
akāryakaṃ kāraṇaṃ syān nāsty akāryaṃ ca kāraṇaṃ | | 3
- rūpe saty eva rūpasya kāraṇaṃ nopapadyate |
rūpe 'saty eva rūpasya kāraṇaṃ nopapadyate | | 4
- niṣkāraṇaṃ punā rūpaṃ naiva naivopapadyate |
tasmād rūpagatān kāmścin na vikalpān vikalpayet | | 5
- na kāraṇasya sadṛśaṃ kāryaṃ ity upapadyate |
na kāraṇasyāsadrśaṃ kāryaṃ ity upapadyate | | 6
- vedanācittasaṃjñānāṃ saṃskārāṇāṃ ca sarvaśaḥ |
sarveśāṃ eva bhāvānāṃ rūpeṇaiva samaḥ kramah | | 7
- vigrahe yaḥ parihāraṃ kṛte śūnyatayā vadet |
sarvaṃ tasyāparihṛtaṃ samaṃ sādhyena jāyate | | 8
- vyākhyāne ya upālambhaṃ kṛte śūnyatayā vadet |
sarvaṃ tasyānupālabdhaṃ samaṃ sādhyena jāyate | | 9

Chapter Five

- nākāśaṃ vidyate kimcit pūrvam ākāśalakṣaṇāt |
alakṣaṇaṃ prasajyeta syāt pūrvam yadi lakṣaṇāt | | 1
- alakṣaṇo na kaścic ca bhāvaḥ saṃvidyate kvacit |

- asaty alakṣaṇe bhāve kramatām kuha lakṣaṇam || 2
- nālakṣaṇe lakṣaṇasya pravṛttir na salakṣaṇe |
salakṣaṇālakṣaṇābhyām nāpy anyatra pravartate || 3
- lakṣaṇāsampravṛttau ca na lakṣyam upapadyate |
lakṣasyānupapattau ca lakṣaṇasyāpy asaṃbhavaḥ || 4
- tasman na vidyate lakṣyam lakṣaṇam naiva vidyate |
lakṣyalakṣaṇanirmukto naiva bhāvo 'pi vidyate || 5
- avidyamāne bhāve ca kasyābhāvo bhaviṣyati |
bhāvābhāvavidharmā ca bhāvābhāvāv avaiti kaḥ || 6
- tasman na bhāvo nābhāvo na lakṣyam nāpi lakṣaṇam |
ākāśam ākāśasamā dhātavaḥ pañca ye 'pare || 7
- astitvaṃ ye tu paśyanti nāstitvaṃ cālpabuddhayaḥ |
bhāvānām te na paśyanti draṣṭavyopaśamaṃ śivaṃ || 8

Glossary

English	Tibetan	Sanskrit
about to originate	skye bar 'dod pa	utpitsu
absence of self	bdag med pa nyid	nairātmya
action	las	karman
activity	bya ba	kriyā
aeon	bskal pa	kalpa
agent	byed pa po	kartr
affliction	nyon mongs pa	kleśa
	kun nas nyon mongs pa	saṃkleśa
afflictive	nyon mongs pa can	kliṣṭa
aggregate	'phung po	skandha
appropriation	nye bar len pa	upādāna
	nye bar blang ba	
appropriator	nye bar len pa po	upādātr
assertion	dam bcas pa	pratijñā
attachment	mngon par zhen pa	abhiniveśa
attention	yid la byed pa	manasikāra
basis	gzhi	āśraya, etc.
(a) being	sems can	sattva
Blessed One	bcom ldan 'das	bhagavan
causal condition, condition	rkyen	pratyaya
cause	rgyu	hetu
	rgyu	kāraṇa
cause of maturation	rnam par smin pa'i rgyu	vipāka-hetu
cognition	blo	buddhi
	rnam par shes pa	vijñāna
	shes pa	jñāna
coming into existence	bdag nyid thob pa	ātma-lābha

common knowledge	grags pa	prasiddhi, prasiddha
conceptual construction	rnam par rtog pa	vikalpa
conceptual proliferation	rtog pa spros pa	kalpanā prapañca
concomitance	lhan cig nyid, lhan cig gi dngos po	sahabhāva
conditioned	'dus byas	saṃskṛta
conditioned factor	'du byed	saṃskāra
conflict	gnod pa	bādha
confusion	gti mug	moha
conjoined cause	mtshung par ldan pa'i rgyu	samprayukta- hetu
consciousness	shes pa yod pa nyid	caitanya
convention, conventional designation, conventional activity	tha snyad	vyavahāra
conventional truth	tha snyad kyī bden pa	vyavahāra-satya
conventionally	tha snyad du	vyavahārataḥ
conviction	dad pa	śraddhā
counterbalanced	'gal ba 'khrul pa med pa	viruddha- avyabhicārin
counterexample, dissimilar case, set of all such; counterposition	mi mthun pa'i phyogs	vipakṣa
craving	sred pa	trṣṇā
criticism	sun dbyung ba	dūṣaṇa
defective vision	rab rib	timira
defining characteristic	mtshan nyid	lakṣaṇa

dependent designation	brten nas gdags pa	upādāya prajñāpti
dependent origination	rten cing brel par 'byung ba	pratītya-samutpāda
desire	'dod chags 'dod pa	rāga kāma
direct object	las	karman
disadvantage	nyes dmigs	ādinava
discernment	shes rab	prajñā
doctrine	tshul mdzad pa 'i mtha' grub pa 'i mtha' spyod yul bdag po 'i rkyen	naya kṛtānta siddhānta gocara
domain		adhipati/ādhipateya-
dominant causal condition		pratyaya
element	'byung ba khams	bhūta dhātu
(to) emanate	sprul pa	nir-mā
emancipation	byang grol	apavarga
entity	dngos po vastu grub pa grub pa la sgrub pa	bhāva
established		siddha
establishing what is [already] established		siddha-sādhana
fact of having this as a causal condition	rkyen 'di dang ldan pa nyid	idampratyayatā
feeling	tshor ba	vedanā
fellow Buddhist (more literally, "coreligionist")	rang gi sde pa	svayūthya
founders of non-Buddhist sects	mu stegs byed	tīrthakara
futile rejoinder	ltag chod	jāti

hatred	zhe sdang	dveṣa
higher realms	mtho ris	svarga
identifying mark	mtshan ma	nimitta
immediately preceding causal condition	de ma thag pa'i rkyen	(sam)anantara- pratyaya
implicative negation	ma yin par dgag pa	paryudāsa- pratiśedha
imputation	sgro 'dogs pa	samāropa
in superficial reality	kun rdzob tu	saṃvṛtyā
in ultimate reality	don dam par	paramārthataḥ
inconclusive inference	ma nges pa rjes su dpag pa	anaikāntika anumāna
inherent nature	rang gi ngo bo	svarūpa
instrument	byed pa	karana
internal	nang gi	ādhyātmika
intrinsic nature	ngo bo nyid rang bzhin	svabhāva svabhāva
invariable locus	'khrul pa med pa gzhi (as in āśraya-asiddhi)	avyabhicārin āśraya
logical mark [logically] possible	rtags rigs pa	liṅga yukta
manifestation	gsal ba	vyakti
material matter	gzugs can gzugs (as first aggregate)	rūpin rūpa
matter dependent on the elements	'byung ba las gyur pa'i gzugs	bhautika-rūpa
meditation	bsam gtan	dhyāna
meditational attainment	snyoms par 'jug pa	samāpatti

meditative concentration	ting nge 'dzin	samādhi
(in) meditative concentration	mnyam par bzhag pa	samāhita
meditative cultivation	bsgom pa	bhāvanā
meditative sphere	skye mched	āyatana
mental factor	sems las byung ba	caitta
mental formation	'du byed (as fourth aggregate)	samskāra
mere assertion	dam bcas pa tsam	pratijñā-mātra
merit	bsod nams	punya
mind	sems yid	citta manas
moral conduct	tshul khrims	śīla
necessary connection	med na mi 'byung ba	avinābhāva
negation	dgag pa	pratiṣedha
neutral	lung du ma bstan pa	avyākṛta
nihilistic negation	skur pa 'debs pa	apavāda
noble	'phags pa	ārya
nonconceptual wisdom	rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye shes	nirvikalpaka- jñāna
noncondition	rkyen ma yin pa	apratyaya
nonobstructing cause	byed pa'i rgyu	kāraṇa-hetu
object	yul	viśaya
object, object to be grasped [by a subject]	gzung ba	grāhya
object of cognition	dmigs pa	ārambana, ālambana
object of correct knowledge	gzhal bya	prameya

object of knowledge	shes bya	jñeya
one who desires	chags pa	rakta
one who hates	sdang ba	dvista
original meaning, point under discussion	skabs kyi don	prakṛta-artha
overextension	ha cang thal ba	atiprasaṅga
perception- conception	'du shes	saṃjñā
perfection	pha rol tu phyin pa	pāramitā
person	gang zag	pudgala
position	phyogs	pakṣa
positive concomitance	rjes su 'gro ba	anvaya
potentiality	nus pa	śakti
previous position	phyogs snga ma	pūrvapakṣa
primary matter	gtso bo	pradhāna
primordial matter, original nature	rang bzhin	prakṛti
property of the subject [which proves the thesis]	phyogs kyi chos	pakṣa-dharma
property to be proved	bsgrub par bya ba'i chos	sādhya-dharma
proving property	sgrub pa'i chos	sādhana-dharma
question raised in objection	brgal zhing brtag pa	paryanuyoga
reality	de kho na	tattva
reason	gtan tshigs	hetu
reasoning	rigs pa	yukti, nyāya
refutation	sun dbyung ba	dūṣaṇa
result	'bras bu	phala
	'bras bu	kārya
samsāric existence	srid pa	bhava

scripture	lung	āgama
	gsung rab	pravacana
secondary matter	rgyur byas pa'i gzugs	upādāya-rūpa
self-contradiction	dgag pa mi mthun pa	vipratīṣedha
sense organ	dbang po	indriya
separate	tha dad pa	prthak, bhinna, vyatirikta, etc.
set of all similar examples	mthun pa'i phyogs	sapakṣa
similar cause	skal pa mnyam pa'i rgyu	sabhāga-hetu
similar example	chos mthun pa'i dpe	s ā d h a r m y a - dr̥ṣṭānta
simple negation	med par dgag pa	prasājya- pratīṣedha
simultaneously arisen cause	lhan cig 'byung ba'i rgyu	sahabhū-hetu
specific specification	so sor nges pa nges par gzung ba	pratiniyata avadhārāṇa, nirdhārāṇa
specious spirit	ltar snang ba skyes bu	-ābhāsa
spiritually immature	byis pa	puruṣa bāla
state of existence	'gro ba	gati
student	slob ma	śiṣya
subject [of a thesis]	chos can	dharmin
subsequent reasoning	rtog ge phyi ma	uttara-tarka
substance, real substance	rdzas	dravya
superficial reality	kun rdzob	samvṛti
superficial truth	kun rdzob kyi bden pa	samvṛti-satya
superficially real	kun rdzob pa	sāmṛta

supramundane	'jig rten las 'das pa	lokottara
sylogism	sbyor ba'i tshig	prayoga-vākya
system	gzhung lugs	mata, samaya
thesis	dam bcas pa	pratijñā
thing	mtshan nyid kyi gzhi	lakṣya
characterized		
tranquil	zhi ba	śiva
trace	bag chags	vāsanā
treatise	bstan bcos	śāstra
true state	yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin nyid	yāthātathya (?)
ultimate reality	don dam pa	paramārtha
ultimate truth	don dam pa'i bden pa	paramārtha- satya
ultimately real	don dam pa pa	pāramāṛthika
unconditioned	'dus ma byas	asamskṛta
undesired	thal ba	prasaṅga
consequence		
universal cause	kun tu 'gro ba'i rgyu	sarvatraḡa-hetu
unreal	yang dag pa ma yin pa	abhūta
unwholesome	mi dge ba	akuśala
valid means of	tshad ma	pramāṇa
knowledge		
virtue	chos	dharma
visible form	gzugs (as an āyatana)	rūpa
wholesome	dge ba	kuśala
wisdom	ye shes	jñāna

Bibliographical Abbreviations

- AK The *Abhidharmakośa* and *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* of Vasubandhu - See *Abhidharmakośa* and *Bhāṣya* of Ācārya Vasubandhu with *Sphuṭārtha* Commentary of Ācārya Yaśomitra, ed. Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, Bauddha Bharati Series, vols. 5, 6, 7, and 9, Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973 and *The Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam of Vasubandhu*, ed. Prahlad Pradhan, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, vol. 8, Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1975 (2nd rev. ed.).
- Akutobhayā In Dbu ma Tsa: D vol. 1; P vol. 95.
- Ava Avalokitavrata's *Prajñāpradīpāṭikā*. Chapters one and two in Dbu ma Wa: D vol. 4; P vol. 96. Chapters three through sixteen (part) in Dbu ma Zha: D vol. 5; P vol. 97; Chapters sixteen (part) through twenty-seven in Dbu ma Za: D vol. 6; P vol. 97. Text numbers: Peking no. 5259; Derge no. 3859.
- Bp Buddhapālita's *Buddhapālita-Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti*. In Dbu ma Tsa: D vol. 1; P vol. 95 and in Saito (1984).
- C Co ne edition of *bstan 'gyur*, Dbu ma Tsha. Published on microfiche by the Institute for the Advanced Study of World Religions, Stony Brook, New York, 1974. ("C" without further specification refers to PP C.)
- D *Sde Dge Tibetan Tripitaka Bstan Hgyur*, Dbu Ma, eds. K. Hayashima, J. Takasaki, Z. Yamaguchi, and Y. Ejima, 17 volumes and index, Tokyo: Sekai Seiten Kanko Kyokai, 1977. ("D" without further specification refers to PP D.)
- LVP AK *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu*, tr. Louis de La Vallée Poussin, 6 volumes, Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1923-31

(reprinted 1971-2 as vol. 16 of *Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques*). (Roman numerals following "LVP AK" refer to chapter numbers, not volume numbers.)

- MMK Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*. Sanskrit in PSP. Tibetan in Dbu ma Tsa: D vol. 1; P vol. 95 and also in *Akutobhayā*, Ava, Bp, PP, and PSP.
- N Snar thang edition of the *bstan 'gyur*, Dbu ma Tsha. Photocopy of the blockprint in the Royal Library, Copenhagen. ("N" without further specification refers to PP N.)
- P *The Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking Edition*, ed. D. T. Suzuki, 168 volumes, Tokyo-Kyoto: Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute, 1957-61. ("P" without further specification refers to PP P.)
- PP Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa*. In Dbu ma Tsha: D vol. 2; P vol. 95. Text numbers: Peking no. 5253; Derge no. 3853.
- PSP Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā*. Sanskrit in *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā, Commentaire de Candrakīrti*, ed. Louis de La Vallée Poussin, Bibliotheca Buddhica, vol. 4, St. Pétersbourg: Académie Impériale des Sciences, 1913. Tibetan in Dbu ma 'a: D vol. 7; P vol. 98.

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