The Madhyamaka school is one of the two major philosophical schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism, along with the Yogācāra school. The Madhyamaka is best known for its doctrine of emptiness (śūnyatā). The idea of emptiness is found in the "perfection of discernment" (prajñā-pāramitā) sūtras, some of which are among the earliest Mahāyāna sūtras. While the sūtras expound emptiness in a discursive way, the Mādhyamikas use systematic argument.

Emptiness, for the Madhyamaka school, means that dharmas are empty of intrinsic nature (svabhāva). All Buddhists hold that conditioned dharmas arise in dependence on causes and conditions. For the Mādhyamikas, this fact of dependent origination (pratītya-samutpāda) implies that dharmas can have no intrinsic, self-sufficient nature of their own. Since dharmas appear when the proper conditions occur and cease when those conditions are absent, the way in which dharmas exist is similar to the way in which mirages and dreams exist. Thus attachment and aversion are undermined, since ultimately, they have no substantial objects and lack any self-sufficient status of their own.

Moreover, the Mādhyamikas argue that if things existed by their own intrinsic nature, they would be changeless; but this contradicts our everyday experience. As Bhāvaviveka says in his commentary on MMK 5-7, "Like pictures painted on a wall, living beings' particular ages, sizes, and postures would not increase or decrease."

The Madhyamaka school was founded by Nāgārjuna (active c. 150-200), the author of the Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā (MMK).
The MMK inspired a number of commentaries which not only expounded the meaning of the MMK but also often acted as vehicles for the commentators' own views. The *Akutobhayā* seems to be the earliest of the extant commentaries. It is of uncertain authorship, although it is sometimes ascribed to Nāgārjuna himself.⁶

The earliest extant commentary on the MMK by a known author⁷ is that of Buddhapālita (c. 500). Buddhapālita closely followed Nāgārjuna's own method, which utilized mainly *prasaṅga* arguments. These are arguments which show that the opponent's position leads to consequences (*prasaṅga*) unacceptable to the opponent himself, without, however, committing the Mādhyamika to affirming a contrary position.

Bhāvaviveka (c. 500-570) was the next important Mādhyamika philosopher. Besides his commentary on the MMK, the *Prajñāpradīpa*, he wrote some notable independent works, such as the *Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā* and its autocommentary, the *Tarkajvalī*. Bhāvaviveka seems to have been the first to use the formal syllogism of Indian logic in expounding the Madhyamaka; and he strongly criticized Buddhapālita for failing to do so. He felt that the author of a commentary should state independent inferences (*svatantra-anumāna*) rather than simply giving *prasaṅga* arguments.⁸ Bhāvaviveka's position was later criticized by Candrakīrti, who defended Buddhapālita in his own commentary on the MMK, the *Prasannapadā*.

Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa* is, in the first place, of great interest for its explanation and elaboration of the MMK. In the second place, it is important in the history of the Madhyamaka. Bhāvaviveka's criticisms of Buddhapālita in the *Prajñāpradīpa* resulted in the division of the Madhyamaka into two subschools: the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka of Bhāvaviveka and the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka of Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti. (The names of these subschools, derived from *svatantra-anumāna* and *prasaṅga*, seem to have originated some centuries after Candrakīrti and are known to us only from Tibetan sources.⁹)
Moreover, the *Prajñāpradīpa* is the first commentary on the MMK to make use of the formal apparatus of Buddhist logic and the first to discuss non-Buddhist philosophical schools extensively. Bhāvaviveka's accounts, in the *Prajñāpradīpa* and elsewhere, of the positions of other Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools give valuable information on the state of Indian philosophy in his day. (These two characteristics, the use of syllogistic reasoning and the statement and refutation of the positions of other schools, are very much in evidence in chapters three, four, and five of the *Prajñāpradīpa*.)

Chapters three, four, and five of the MMK form a closely related set.¹⁰ In chapter three, "Examination of the āyatanas," Nāgārjuna draws on the pattern of analysis developed in chapter two in order to analyze the process of vision.¹¹ The analysis is then extended to the other sense organs and their respective sense objects. The five physical sense organs plus the mind (*manas*), together with the six corresponding sense objects, constitute the twelve āyatanas. (Dharmaś are the object of mind.)

Nāgārjuna finds the process of perception by the sense organs to be unintelligible if one tries to understand it in terms of entities which possess their own intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*). As is often the case in the MMK, the word *svabhāva* is not used and has to be inferred from the context of the work as a whole. Without some qualification such as "by intrinsic nature," a statement such as "... visible [objects] (**dr**aṣṭavya) and the visual organ (**darśana**) do not exist" (MMK 3-7a; PSP: 3-8a) is difficult to explain or defend.

Chapter four, "Examination of the Aggregates," deals with the five aggregates (*skandha*). Matter (**rūpa**), the first aggregate, is examined in terms of the relation of cause (**kāraṇa** or **hetu**) and result (**kārya**). This analysis of causality complements the analysis of causal conditions (**pratyaya**) in the first chapter of MMK. The discussion of matter is extended to the other aggregates and to all entities (**bhāva**). The last two verses of chapter four (MMK 4-8,9) concern the way in which the Madhyamaka is expounded.

Chapter five, "Examination of the Elements," discusses the six
elements (dhātu). Space (ākāśa) is discussed by means of an analysis of what is characterized (laksya) and its defining characteristic (lakṣaṇa). If defining characteristics and the things they characterize are not possible, then entities (bhāva) are not possible; and without an entity, one cannot have its absence, a nonentity (abhāva). Thus space cannot be a defining characteristic, a thing characterized, an entity, or a nonentity. The same applies to the other five elements. The concluding verse (MMK 5-8) states that those who see entities and nonentities do not see the quiescence (upaśama) of the visible (dṛṣṭavya). This mention of the visible harks back to the subject-matter of chapter three. The phrase, "tranquil quiescence of the visible" (dṛṣṭavyopaśamaḥ śivam), also recalls the characterization of dependent origination as "the tranquil quiescence of conceptual proliferation" (prapañcopaśamaḥ śivam) in MMK 1-Bb.

Thus chapters three, four, and five examine three sets of categories, the āyatanas, the skandhas, and the dhātus. These categories are fundamental to the Buddhist analysis of phenomena. (Note that in chapter five of the MMK, dhātu refers to the six elements, not the eighteen dhātus. The latter are the twelve āyatanas plus the six corresponding sense cognitions.) In each chapter, the analysis is made more specific by singling out a particular member of the set for detailed treatment. It is then pointed out that the same analysis applies to the other members of the set as well.

As we have seen, one could also say that chapter three deals with perception, chapter four with causality, and chapter five with the characteristics by which we define and identify the constituents of the world. From this point of view, also, the subjects treated in these three chapters are both important and interrelated.  

Aside from a few quotations in the Prasannapadā, the Prajñā-pradīpa has been lost in the original Sanskrit. It exists in Tibetan and Chinese translations. The Chinese translation is reportedly rather poor; but the Tibetan translation, done by Jñānagarbha and Cog ro Klu'i rgyal mtshan in the early ninth century, seems to be
excellent. The same translators also translated Avalokitavrata’s massive subcommentary on the Prajñāpradīpa, called the Prajñāpradīpa-tīkā. (Avalokitavrata’s work is not extant in Sanskrit, and apparently no Chinese translation was ever made.)

The present English translation was made from the Tibetan. I consulted the Peking, Narthang, Derge, and Cone editions and made my own edition of the text. Most of the variants found in the different Tibetan editions are either obvious scribal errors or else represent different orthographic conventions. Rarely do the variants offer significant alternatives for the meaning of a sentence.

I also made extensive use of the Peking and Derge editions of Avalokitavrata’s subcommentary. Since the Prajñāpradīpa is often terse, allusive, or technical, sentences frequently need to be amplified with phrases in square brackets; and explanatory notes sometimes need to be provided. For both purposes, Avalokitarāta’s work is invaluable. Also, since the subcommentary quotes the entire Prajñāpradīpa, it is sometimes helpful in establishing the text.

An English-Tibetan-Sanskrit glossary has been provided for important terms. Although we do not have the Sanskrit text of the Prajñāpradīpa, the Tibetan practice of using standardized translation equivalents enables one to infer the Sanskrit original of many terms with a high degree of confidence. Sanskrit terms in the glossary are given in the translation in parentheses at their first occurrence, unless the English translation equivalent is so widely used that this seems unnecessary. Sanskrit and Tibetan words and phrases which are not in the glossary are also sometimes quoted in parentheses, especially when the translation is a bit conjectural.

Notes to Introduction

For the convenience of the reader, the introductions to my translations of chapters one and two of the Prajñāpradīpa (Ames (1993) and (1995)) are repeated here, except that material specific to chapters one and two has been replaced by a discussion of chapters three, four, and five largely taken from my dissertation (Ames (1986)). For more details on all the matters discussed in this introduction, see Ames (1986), "Part I: Introduction," and the sources cited therein.
As a general rule, "Madhyamaka" is the name of the school and its philosophy; a follower of the school is called a "Mādhyamika." See Ruegg (1981), p. 1 and n. 3.

See, e. g., MMK 7-34 and 17-33.

See, e. g., chapter 23 of the MMK, which is discussed in Ames (1988).

See MMK 15-8.

On the Akutobhayā, see Huntington (1986).

There is also a Chinese translation of a commentary ascribed to Asaṅga which deals only with the dedicatory verses of MMK (MMK 1-A,B). See Ruegg (1981), p. 49, and Keenan (1989).

In this connection, it is interesting to note that in his commentary on MMK 2-19 (see Ames (1995)), Bhāvaviveka admits that Nāgārjuna gives a prasāṅga argument. In his commentary on MMK 1-1 (see Ames (1993), pp. 222-3, 225-6, 234) and elsewhere, Bhāvaviveka criticizes Buddhapālita's prasāṅga arguments because, among other reasons, they could be converted into syllogisms asserting things which Buddhapālita does not, in fact, wish to say. For example, Bhāvaviveka claims that Buddhapālita's prasāṅga argument against things' originating from themselves could be converted into a syllogism showing that things originate from another. In the case of MMK 2-19, however, Bhāvaviveka converts Nāgārjuna's prasāṅga argument against a goer and his or her going's being the same into a syllogism which simply negates sameness without asserting difference. Thus Bhāvaviveka seems inconsistent, if not biased, on this point.

The translations of chapters three, four, and five presented here are revised versions of those in my dissertation (Ames (1986)).

See MMK 3-3, which explicitly refers to chapter two.

David Kalupahana gives an analysis according to which chapter three examines the source of knowledge (exemplified by vision), chapter four examines the object of knowledge (exemplified by matter), and chapter five examines the locus of the object (space). See Kalupahana (1986), p. 148.


For the Prajñāpradīpa, the Peking edition is text no. 5253; the Derge edition is no. 3853.

For Avalokitavrata's ūkā, the Peking edition is text no. 5259; the Derge edition is no. 3859.
Translation of *Prajñāpradīpa*, Chapter Three: Examination of the āyatanas

Now [Nāgārjuna] begins the third chapter with the aim of showing that the āyatanas have no intrinsic nature by means of negating a particular [instance of] origination, [which would be] a counterexample (*vipākṣa*) [to nonorigination]. Alternatively, he begins the third chapter in order to show that the āyatanas are empty by means of negating motion ('gro ba, gati or gamana), [which would be] a counterexample [to nonmotion].

When one examines [the āyatanas] in the first way, then the counterexample is adduced [as follows:]

**Objection:**

[Thesis:] One should grasp that in ultimate reality (*paramārtha-tah*), the internal (*ādhyātmika*) āyatanas do indeed originate,
[Reason:] because the [kind of] object is specific (*pratiniyata*) [to each kind of organ].
[Dissimilar Example:] Here what does not originate has no specific object, as, for example, the āyatanas of a childless woman's son have no specific objects.
[Application:] The internal āyatanas do have such specific objects; namely, the objects of the visual organ (*darśana*), the auditory organ (*sravana*), the olfactory organ (*ghṛāṇa*), the gustatory organ (*rasana*), the tactile organ (*sparśana*), and the mind (*manas*) are, respectively, visible forms (*rūpa*), sounds (*śabda*), odors (*gandha*), tastes (*rasa*), tangibles (*spraśtavya*), and dharmas.
[Conclusion:] Therefore, by means of the stated reason, one should grasp that the internal āyatanas do indeed originate.

When one examines [the āyatanas] in the second way, then because [Nāgārjuna] has said,

Therefore [the activity of] going, the goer, and that which is to be traversed do not exist, [MMK 2-25cd]
[our] opponents reply:

**Objection:**

[Thesis:] One should understand that going does indeed exist,
[Reason:] because it is the result of activity (kriyā-phala),
[Example:] like seeing visible form and so on.

**Answer:** In answer to both positions [i.e., the two preceding objections], [Nāgārjuna] says:

The visual organ, the auditory organ, the olfactory organ, the gustatory organ, the tactile organ and the mind (manas) are the six sense organs (indriya). Their domain (gocara) is the visible (draṣṭavya) and so on. [MMK 3-1]

Here it is called "the visual organ" because it sees (Ita zhes bya ba ni lta bar byed pa'i phyir ro, paśyātīi darśanam iti?). For the remaining [sense organs] also, [the etymology] is similar. They are called "sense organs" (indriya) because of exercising power (indriyatva) and mastery (bdag po nyid, probably ādhipatya) over that [particular] group [of sense objects], since they grasp visible form and the rest.7 [As for the word.] "six": The number [of sense organs] is also established by the [preceding] list of [their] individual names; but that [number, six] is specified in order to make it known that even conventionally (vyavahārataḥ), there is no agent who apprehends visible form and so on [and who is] different from those [sense organs].

"Their" (etesām) [means] "of those six sense organs." "Domain" (gocara) [means] "object" (visaya); the meaning is that [the sense organs] have power (mthu) over those [sense objects].8 "The visible and so on" (draṣṭavyādīni) [refers to] objects of vision (draṣṭavya), objects of hearing, objects of smell, objects of taste, objects of touch, and objects of thought.9

Moreover, that specific relation (pratiniyama) of organ (visayin) and object (visaya) is conventional (vyāvahārika), not ultimate (pāramārthika). Therefore, since the reason exists only in the set of all dissimilar examples,10 [the opponent's reason] has a
contradictory meaning.\(^{11}\)

[Nāgārjuna] will [now] explain this [point, namely] how in ultimate reality, the eye\(^{12}\) and so on cannot have the relation of organ and object (\(viṣayi-viṣaya-bhāva\)). To begin with, with regard to the eye-organ (\(cākṣur-indriya\)) alone, [he says.]

If the visual organ is its own self, that (\(tatt\)) [eye] does not see that (\(tama\)) [own self] at all.\(^{13}\) [MMK 3-2ab]

"The visual organ" [is so called] because it sees (\(lta ba zhes bya ba ni lta bar byed pa'i phyir, paśyatīti darśanam iti\?)\); [the term means] "the eye-organ." "If it is its own self (\(svārānt\))" [means] "if it has its own intrinsic nature (\(svabhāva\))." As for "that does not see that at all," why does it not see at all? [Nāgārjuna] clarifies that position by the meaning of the statement which occurs below.\(^{14}\) Why? Because that (\(tat\)) [eye] does not see that (\(tama\)) [own self]. The idea is that that [fact] is common knowledge. The phrase "at all" has the meaning of specification. Here one should see [i.e., understand] that [the eye] does not see at all. Otherwise, one would understand that it does see another [thing, though not itself].\(^{15}\)

\textit{Objection:} In that case, what will you prove? When [you] have said that the eye does not see its own self, then [we] accept that it does see visible form which is different [from its own self].

\textit{Answer:} As for that which you maintain:

When it does not see itself,\(^{16}\) how will that [eye] see others?\(^{17}\) [MMK 3-2cd]

The meaning of the sentence is that the eye lacks the very power (\(mthu\)) of seeing visible form. As to that, the former half of the verse [i.e., MMK 3-2ab] shows the [proving] property, [namely.,] that the eye does not see its own self; and the latter half [i.e., MMK 3-2cd] indicates the property to be proved, [namely.,] that it does not see visible form. Therefore, because a [property]
to be proved and a proving property are adduced, it is considered to be a syllogism:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the eye-organ does not see visible form at all,
[Reason:] because it does not see its own self,
[Example:] like the ear and so on.

Alternatively, the former half [of the verse], having indicated that the eye-organ is just not graspable (grāhya) [by the eye-organ itself], adds the eye-organ's own self as a similar example (sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta). The latter half, by showing that the eye-organ does not see visible form, indicates the property to be proved, [the fact] that visible form is not an object of the eye-organ. Here, according to that [explanation], the syllogism is:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, visible form is not an object of the eye-organ,
[Reason:] because it is a collection [of atoms] (bsags pa, perhaps samcita),
[Example:] like the eye-organ's [own] self.

The reasons in the two preceding syllogisms, namely, the eye-organ's] not seeing its own self and [form's] being a collection, are mentioned [as] a use of words to imply more than is expressed (mtshan nyid kyi sgra'i tshul, perhaps lakṣanā-sabda-naya). Therefore, in both cases, inferences should also be stated [employing] reasons such as "because of having resistance (sapratigha)," "because of being dependent on the elements (bhautika)," "because of being secondary matter (upādāy ārūpa)," and "because of belonging to the aggregate of matter (rūpa-skandha)."

Objection: It is correct that the eye does not see its own self, because it is invisible (anidarśana); but (visible) form [i. e., rūpa-āyatana or rūpa-dhātu] is visible; therefore [the eye] sees that [visible form].

Answer: As to that, [you] have established, by that other reason, the reason and example which we have stated; therefore there is no conflict [with our own position].

Objection: The Ābhidhārmikas say: If [you] say that the
eye, without [further] qualification, does not see visible form at all, that establishes what is [already] established [for us], since [our] position is that an eye which is non-functioning (tatsabhāga)\textsuperscript{24} does not see forms. But if you say that the eye's not seeing visible forms is stated about a functioning (sabhāga)\textsuperscript{25} [eye], in that case there would be a conflict with what [you yourself] accept. For it is said in the Abhidharma,

The functioning (sabhāga) eye sees visible forms; [visual] cognition which is based (āśrita) on that [eye does] not. [AK 1-42ab]

Answer: As to that, because just the functioning (sabhāga) eye is the subject [of our syllogism] (pakṣīkṛta) here, [our argument] does not establish what is [already] established [for you]. Nor is there a conflict with what [we ourselves] accept, since it is said [in the Ārya-bhava-saṃkrānti-sūtra],\textsuperscript{26}

The eye does not see visible form, and the mind (manas) does not know dharman.
That which the world does not penetrate (gāhate) is the highest truth (paramam satyam).

Because [we] do not accept that the eye sees visible form in ultimate reality and because of the extensive inferential argument (anumāna) which has been expounded, that [fact that the functioning eye does not see visible form]\textsuperscript{27} is established. Therefore, [Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the functioning (sabhāga eye does not see visible form,
[Reason:] because it is an eye-organ,
[Example:] like the non-functioning (tatsabhāga) [eye].
Alternatively, [there is no conflict with what we ourselves accept] because [the functioning eye's seeing visible forms] is negated [using the following reason and example:] "because the [eye-]organ is material (rūpin) like the ear."\textsuperscript{28} Nor will there be
a conflict with common knowledge [i.e., that the eye sees visible forms]. [This is so] because that [common knowledge] has not been abandoned since we have stated a qualified thesis, and because [that objection] has been answered [already].

**Objection:** The Kāśmiras say: The eye does indeed see [forms] because it is the agent (kartri) of vision.

**Answer:** That is not [logically] possible, because [the reason] is one part of the meaning of the thesis and because there is no agreement (anvaya) [with a similar example, since no example is given] and because the negation [of the thesis that the eye sees forms] has [already] been stated.

**Alternative Answer:** What the Kāśmiras said is not [logically] possible [for the following reasons:] For those who hold that [all things] are momentary (kṣaṇikavādin), activity is not possible [for the eye] because it is instantaneous. For those who hold that [all things] are not momentary, also, it is not possible for that same [eye which which previously does not see to become] different from that.

**Objection:** The Sautrāntikas say: Since conditioned dharmas are inactive, neither the eye nor anything else sees. What then? In a sūtra, it is said that visual cognition (cakṣurviñjñāna) originates in dependence on the eye and visible forms. Therefore your statement that the eye does not see just establishes what is [already] established [for us].

**Answer:** Just by [our] negation of origination [in the first chapter of the MMK], visual cognition is not possible; therefore [we] do not establish what is [already] established [for you]. [Also,] there is no conflict with what [we ourselves] accept, because we do accept the meaning of [that] sūtra [as being] in accord with conventional truth and because in ultimate reality, there is no reasoning [which establishes] the meaning of [that] sūtra.

Indeed, a difference of that [manner in which the eye sees] is not possible, because we have negated the origination of the āyatanas of eye and visible form and because [we have negated
If the visual organ is its own self, that [eye] does not see that [own self] at all. [MMK 3-2ab]

As before, having indicated that [the fact] that [the eye] does not see its own self is the property of the subject [which proves the thesis], [Nāgārjuna says,]

When it does not see itself, how will that [eye] see others? [MMK 3-2cd]

This sets forth the property to be proved [i. e., that the eye does not see visible forms whether it is in contact with them or not]. Therefore, wishing to refute other conceptual constructions imagined (parikalpita) by others, [I] will state syllogisms.

In that connection, to those who say that the eye grasps [visible forms] with which it is not in contact (aprāpta), [we reply:] [The eye does not grasp visible forms with which it is not in contact. It knows them only indirectly] because "seeing" has the meaning of "knowing" [not "grasping"], just as kings know from [their] agents [things which they themselves do not see]. [This is so] because [the eye] does not see itself. The meaning of [that] reason is that [the eye] does not know itself.

[Therefore we can state syllogisms such as the following:] [Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the eye does not grasp an object with which it is not in contact (aprāpta-viṣaya), [Reason:] because it does not see [i. e., know] its own self, [Example:] like the nose and so on. Likewise,

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, visible form is not graspable (grāhya) by an eye-organ which grasps an object with which it is not
in contact,
[Reason:] because it is dependent on the elements (bhautika),
[Example:] like odor and so on.

[The reasons in the two preceding syllogisms, namely, the eye's] not seeing its own self and [visible form's] being dependent on the elements, are mentioned [as] a use of words to imply more than is expressed (mtshan nyid kyi sgra'i tshul, perhaps laksanā-sabda-naya). Therefore in both cases, inferences should also be given [employing] reasons such as "because of having resistance (sapratīgha);" and appropriate syllogisms should be fully stated.

Alternatively, [one may state the following syllogism:]

[Thesis:] It is not maintained that in ultimate reality, the eye grasps an object with which it is not in contact,
[Reason:] because it has an object of the present [moment] which is [immediately] evident (pratyakṣa),
[Example:] like the nose and the other [physical sense organs].

Objection:

[Thesis:] The eye does [indeed] grasp an object with which it is not in contact,
[First Reason:] because it grasps obstructed visible form and
[Second Reason:] because there is no difference of effort and
[Third Reason:] because there is no difference of time and
[Fourth Reason:] because it grasps an object greater [in size] than itself,
[Example:] like the mind (manas).

Answer: That also is not good, [for the following reasons:] [1] Here "grasping [an object] with which it is not in contact" has the meaning of "grasping visible form which is obstructed;" and the meaning of [the first reason,] "because it grasps visible form which is obstructed," is also just that. Therefore [the meaning of the first reason] is one part of the meaning of the thesis. [2] Also [the second and third reasons,] "because there is no difference of effort and because there is no difference of time," are not established.

Even if the reason[s] were established, no agreement (anvaya)
[with a similar example] is established. [This is so] because in ultimate reality, it is not established that even the mind grasps [an object] with which it is not in contact; [and therefore the example given is invalid]. Alternatively, [the example] also has a contradictory meaning.\(^{54}\)

**Objection:** The Sāmkhyas say: [Your proof] that the eye does not grasp an object with which it is not in contact establishes what is [already] established [for us, since we hold that the eye apprehends an object with which it is in contact].

**Answer:** One should reply: [Just] because [we] have shown that the eye is empty of the property of grasping an object with which it is not in contact, [it does] not [follow that we] have shown [that fact] as a consequence of (yogena) proving that it does grasp an object with which it is in contact. Therefore [you] become encouraged without justification (asthāne).

Moreover,

**[Thesis:]** It is not maintained that the eye grasps an object with which it is in contact (prāpta-viṣaya),

**[Reason:]** because it is a sense organ,

**[Example:]** like the mind (manas).

Nor is [that argument] inconclusive due to the nose and so on, since those [other sense organs] will also be shown below to be just like that [eye].\(^{55}\)

Also, what is the meaning of "grasping [an object] with which it is in contact"? If [you] say, "[The eye] goes out from [its own] location [i. e., the eyeball]\(^{56}\) in the direction of the object and grasps [it]," [then we reply:]

**[Thesis:]** In ultimate reality, the eye's function ('jug pa, probably pravṛtta or vr̲t̲t̲ī) [of grasping its object]\(^{57}\) does not go outward from the location of the "synonym of visual cognition,"\(^{58}\)

**[Reason:]** because it is a function,

**[Example:]** like the function of the nose-organ and so on.\(^{59}\)

Likewise,

**[Thesis:]** In ultimate reality, visible form is not graspable (grāhya)
by an eye-organ which grasps an object with which it is in contact,

[Reason:] because [visible form] has a cause,

[Example:] like sound and so on.

**Objection:** The extensive inferences shown in both cases refute one position by means of the other (phyogs gcig gis gcig bsal ba). Therefore nothing at all has been established.

**Answer:** Because both [ways of grasping a sense object] do not exist, [our] desire not to establish [either position] is fulfilled (mi sgrub par 'dod pa grub po, perhaps asisādhayisa siddhā).

**Objection:** The eye’s rays of light (’od zer) go in the direction of the object and grasp the object.

**Answer:** To those who have [that] opinion, the following should be said:

[Thesis:] One should understand that even conventionally, the eye-organ does not possess rays of light,

[Reason:] because it is a cause of the apprehension (dmigs pa, probably upalambha or upalabdhi) of visible form,

[Example:] like visible form [itself].

**Objection:** The eye-organ does indeed possess light rays,

[Reason:] because it is an eye-organ,

[Example:] like the eyes of nocturnal animals such as mice.

**Answer:** That is not [logically] possible, [1] because the eye-organ is invisible and [2] even if the location of that [eye-organ] possesses light-rays, the example is not established and [3] because [your reason] suffers from [the fault] that it is counterbalanced.

Enough of [this] extensive deliberation! [We] will deal just with the subject at hand.

If the visual organ is its own self, that [eye] does not see that [own self] at all.

When it does not see itself, how will that [eye] see others?

[MMK 3-2]
Here [Buddhapālita]\(^{67}\) says: Here if the intrinsic nature of entities is seen in their own selves, then because they possess that [nature], it will also be apprehended in the selves of others. For example, if wetness is perceived [literally, "seen"] in water, then because it possesses that [wetness], [wetness] will also be apprehended in earth. If heat is perceived in fire, then because it possesses that [heat], [heat] will also be apprehended in water. If a sweet smell is perceived in the jasmine flower, then because it possesses that [sweet smell], [a sweet smell] will also be apprehended in clothing.\(^{68}\) But how will that entity which does not appear in its own self be apprehended in the selves of others? For if a bad smell is not perceived in the jasmine flower, it will not be apprehended in clothing [perfumed by it], either.

[Buddhapālita continues:] Therefore if the visual organ saw its own self, then it would be possible to say, "because it sees visible form, it is the visual organ (rupam pasyatiti darshanam iti);" but the visual organ does not see its own self. Now how will that which does not see its own self see others? Therefore it is not possible to say, "because it sees visible form, it is the visual organ."

[Buddhapālita continues:] ācārya Āryadeva, also, has said,

If the intrinsic nature of all entities is seen first in themselves, Why does the eye not also grasp the eye itself? [Catuh-śataka 13-16]\(^{69}\)

[Other Buddhists' objection to Buddhapālita's argument:]\(^{70}\) As to that, here [our] fellow Buddhists say: If [you] say that just as that vision\(^{71}\) which apprehends visible form does not exist in the eye, so also it does not exist in visible form, then [that merely] establishes what is [already] established [for us]. For even so, it has been said,\(^{72}\)

That [visual cognition?] does not exist in the eye or visible form; nor does it exist between the two.
That [place?] where that [visual cognition?] abides neither exists, nor does it not exist.

[Bhāvaviveka's critique of Buddhapālita's explanation:]

If [you, Buddhapālita] say that [the eye] does not have the power of seeing its own self, [then] jasmine flowers are not suitable as an example of that. [This is so] because sweet smells occur in jasmine flowers by virtue of a group (sāmagn) [of causes and conditions], just as sesame seed oil becomes sweet-smelling through contact with flowers. Also, [this argument is wrong for the following reason:] Since no one accepts that [the eye possesses] the activity (kriyā) of seeing visible form [because it possesses the activity of seeing itself], it is not correct to refute that [position]. But if [you, Buddhapālita] prove that just as [the eye] does not grasp itself, [so] also it does not grasp others, [then] in that case also, [your] example cannot [prove that]. [This is so] because [your examples,] fire and jasmine flowers, do not grasp either their own or others' selves. Therefore that [explanation of yours] is not [logically] possible.

Therefore in that way, since it is not established that the eye sees, origination is also not established; [and] motion is not established, either, since [in both cases, the alleged] example does not exist. Alternatively, the reason is also contradictory.

Objection: Having imputed a [false] meaning to [your own] proof, you say that the eye does not see visible form because it does not see its own self. By saying that, [you] have shown that if that [eye] lacks power over its own self, it also does not have that [power] over the self of another. Even so, [your reason] is inconclusive (anaikāntika), for although fire lacks the power to burn its own self, [nevertheless] it does have the power to burn the self of another.

Answer:

The example of fire is not adequate (paryāpta) for establishing the visual organ. [MMK 3-3ab]
[That is,] to charge that [our] reason is inconclusive [by means of the example of fire, is inadequate] for establishing that meaning, [i.e.,] that the eye has the intrinsic nature of a visual organ (darśana-svabhāva). The idea is that [this is so] because in ultimate reality, it is not established that fire burns and because even conventionally, it is not established that [the eye] has the intrinsic nature of a visual organ.

Alternatively,

The example of fire is not adequate for establishing the visual organ... [MMK 3-3ab]

because of the fault in [your] reason which stated. The idea is that [this is so] because that [notion that] the intrinsic nature of fire is to illuminate [both] its own and others' selves does not exist even for the opponent's position (parapakṣa), and because even conventionally, it is not established that the intrinsic nature of fire is to burn. "Burning," moreover, is a transformation ('gyur ba, probably parināma or viparītāna) of fuel, which is produced by fire; therefore it is not the intrinsic nature of fire.

Moreover,

The example of fire is not adequate for establishing the visual organ.

That [example] has been answered, along with the visual organ [itself], by [the examination of] the traversed (gata), the untraversed (agata), and that which is being traversed (gamyamāna). [MMK 3-3]

"Along with the visual organ" (lta bcas, sadarśanah) [means] "together with the visual organ (lta ba dang bcas pa, saha darśanena?). What [is said to be "along with the visual organ"]? The example of fire. What has been done? [The example of fire, along with the visual organ,] has been answered. By means of what? By means of [the examination of] the traversed, the untra-
versed, and that which is being traversed [in chapter two of the MMK].

Previously, it was explained that in ultimate reality, going does not exist on the traversed, the untraversed, or that which is being traversed. [This is so] because [the traversed] has been traversed [already], because [the untraversed] has not [yet] been traversed, and because that which is being traversed is not cognized apart from the traversed and the untraversed.

In just that way, the [following] syllogisms should be stated successively: In ultimate reality, fire, too, does not burn fuel which has been burned, which has not been burned, or which is being burned. [This is so] because [burned fuel] has been burned [already], because [unburned fuel] has not [yet] been burned, and because [fuel] which is being burned is not cognized apart from the burned and the unburned. And likewise, in ultimate reality, the eye, too, does not see visible forms which have been seen, which have not been seen, or which are being seen. [This is so] because [the seen] has been seen [already], because [the unseen] has not [yet] been seen, and because [visible forms] which are being seen are not cognized apart from the seen and the unseen.

[Buddhapālita's commentary:] Here [Buddhapālita] says:

Objection [according to Buddhapālita]: The visual organ and so on are established in the same way as fire. For example, although fire burns, it just burns others; but it does not burn its own self. Likewise, although the visual organ sees, it just sees others; but it does not see its own self.

Answer:

The example of fire is not adequate for establishing the visual organ.

That [example] has been answered, along with the visual organ [itself], by [the examination of] the traversed, the untraversed, and that which is being traversed. [MMK 3-3]
burn another.\textsuperscript{90}

[Bhāvaviveka's\textsuperscript{91} critique:] That is not [logically] possible, for since the opponent's position (pūrvapakṣa) is quite worthless (aśāra) due to [its being] a mere example, it is not right to refute that [position].\textsuperscript{92}

Objection:
[Thesis:] The eye does indeed possess the activity (kriyā) of seeing,
[Reason:] because it is so taught in the science of grammar (śabda-śāstra).
[Application:] Here, in the science of grammar, [it is taught that] when one uses\textsuperscript{93} a primary suffix (bya ba'i rkyen, kṛt-pratyaya)\textsuperscript{94} in [the sense of] an agent (kārtṛ), [then one says,] "Because it sees, it is the visual organ (ita bar byed pas lta ba zhes bya ba, probably paśyatīti darśanam iti; cf. MMK 3-4c)."

[Similar Example:]\textsuperscript{95} Whatever is taught in that [science] is so, for example, [it is taught that] when one uses a primary suffix in [the sense of] an agent, [then one says,] "Because one understands (thugs su chud par mazad pa, bodhati?) or because one understands [by oneself] (thugs su chud par gyur pa, budh-yate?), [one is called] 'Buddha' (sangs rgyas, buddha)."\textsuperscript{96}

Answer: That proof exists [i.e., is valid] within conventional truth (vyavahāra-satya); but it does not exist in ultimate reality. Why? Because in this very [chapter], the eye's seeing (mig lta ba) has been negated and because [in the first two chapters] the origination of that [vision] has been negated, [the eye] is devoid of vision.\textsuperscript{97}

When it does not see anything, it is not the visual organ.
[MMK 3-4ab]

When it does not see a door-bolt or a stool or anything at all, then it is not the visual organ. Therefore,
How can that [statement] that the visual organ sees be [logically] possible?98 [MMK 3-4cd]

How can that [statement] that the visual organ sees be [logically] possible? The meaning of the sentence is that that is just not possible. Therefore,

The visual organ does not see at all. What is not a visual organ (adarśana) does not see at all. [MMK 3-5ab]

The idea is [that what is not a visual organ does not see]

because it is empty of the power of seeing, like a lump of earth and so on.

Therefore in ultimate reality, the explanation of the word darśana and the word buddha in the science of grammar is simply not correct, because the example [i.e., the Buddha] does not exist. Nor does [the preceding statement] contradict [our] doctrine, because in ultimate reality, the Blessed One, too, is without intrinsic nature and also because below [Nāgārjuna] will say,

That which is the intrinsic nature of the Tathāgata is the intrinsic nature of this world.
The Tathāgata is without intrinsic nature, [and] this world is without intrinsic nature. [MMK 22-16]

Alternatively, [we can] examine [the meaning of MMK 3-4,5ab] differently: Here, when one uses a primary suffix in [the sense of] an agent, in regard to that [eye] which is a visual organ, [one says,] "Because it sees, it is the visual organ." Or else when one uses a primary suffix in [the sense of] an agent in regard to what is not a visual organ, [one says,] "Because it sees, it is the visual organ." What follows from that?99 If it is said in regard to that [eye] which is a visual organ, [then]
When it does not see anything, it is not the visual organ. [MMK 3-4ab]

Well, what [is a visual organ]? Just that which sees\textsuperscript{100} is a visual organ. Therefore an eye in which the activity of seeing has originated sees; [but] in that case, there is that same fault of reason and example.\textsuperscript{101}

\textit{Objection:} Because that [eye] is the agent of the activity of seeing, it is indeed the visual organ.

\textit{Answer:} Then if that [eye] is the visual organ [already], a [second] activity of seeing would just be pointless.\textsuperscript{102} Therefore,

How can that [statement] that the visual organ sees be [logically] possible? [MMK 3-4cd]

The meaning of the sentence is that it is simply not [logically] possible, because [the eye would already] possess the activity of seeing.\textsuperscript{103}

But even if it is said in regard to that [eye] which is not a visual organ,

When it does not see anything, it is not the visual organ. [MMK 3-4ab]

Then if that [eye] does not have the intrinsic nature of a visual organ, it is devoid of the activity of seeing, like a lump of earth and so on. Therefore that which is not a visual organ also does not see at all.

Therefore, because in that way neither possesses the activity of seeing,

The visual organ does not see at all. What is not a visual organ does not see at all. [MMK 3-5ab]

\textit{Objection:} If there is a double negation [as in MMK 3-5b], the
original meaning is understood. Therefore an eye in which the activity of seeing has originated sees.

**Answer:** That is not good, because [here] it has been negated that [an eye for which the activity of seeing] exists or does not exist is the cause [of seeing], like the negation [in MMK 1-6] of a causal condition for an existent or a nonexistent [thing].

**Objection:** Having applied [the quality of] being a visual organ [to the eye] figuratively on account of [the fact that it will see in] the future, that [eye] is the visual organ.

**Answer:** [In that case, the thesis which you] maintain has been lost for the sake of establishing conventional truth.

Alternatively, [one may explain MMK 3-5ab as follows:]

**Objection:**

[Thesis:] One says that an eye for which the activity of seeing has originated sees,

[Reason:] because [that] conventional designation of activity exists.

[Dissimilar Example:] It is not said that that [organ] for which the activity of seeing has not originated sees, as [in the case of] the ear.

[Application:] Because the eye possesses the activity of seeing, one conventionally designates that the eye sees.

**Answer:** The ácārya [Nāgārjuna] replies: In that case, the visual organ does not see at all. [MMK 3-5a]

The idea is that [this is so] because the opponent has not shown that an activity of seeing has originated in ultimate reality for any seer, and because before an activity of seeing has originated in the visual organ, it is not established as a visual organ.

Because it is difficult to show that what was formerly not a visual organ will later possess the activity of seeing,

What is not a visual organ does not see at all. [MMK 3-5b]
Thus the meaning of the reason [in the opponent's last syllogism] is not established, or else it has a contradictory meaning. Therefore the thesis is lost.

Objection: Here the Sāmkhyas and Vaiśeṣikas say: Because one sees by means of this, it is the visual organ ("dis lta bar byed pas lta ba ste, probably anena paśyātti darśanam"). [This is so] because a primary suffix is used in [the sense of] an instrument (karana). That one to whom that instrument [of the activity of seeing] belongs is the seer. That [seer], moreover, sees by means of that [instrument]. For example, a cutter (chettr) cuts (chinnatī) wood to be cut (chedya, etc.) by means of an axe; but the axe itself does not cut. Therefore that [statement of yours] that the eye does not see [merely] establishes what is [already] established [for us].

[Thesis:] Instruments have a [corresponding] agent, [Reason:] because they are instruments, [Example:] as the axe and so on have a cutter [who wields them].

Answer:

One should understand that the seer has been explained by means of the visual organ itself. [MMK 3-5cd]

"One should understand that it has been explained" [means] "one should understand that it has been answered." By means of what? By means of the visual organ itself. [The explanation] of what? Of the seer. The idea is that [this is so] because the refutation of the conceptual construction that there is a seer is also similar.

As there the property of the eye [which proves that it does not see visible forms] is [its] not seeing its own self, so here also the property of the self (ātman) [which proves that it does not see visible forms] is [its] not seeing its own self. [This is so] because it is not possible for the self to see its own self, since acting (jug pa, probably pravṛtti or vṛtti) on its own self [would be] contradictory. For example, that same edge of a sword does not cut that
very sword edge. Thus the inference is:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the self, too, is not a seer,
[Reason:] because it does not see its own self,
[Example:] like the ear.

Nor can the opponent spoil (bslad) [our argument] with the poison of suspicion (āśāṅkā or śāṅkā that the meaning of [our] reason is not established. Wherever it is explained that the self sees the self, there that [statement] is made conventionally, having imposed the word "self" [in the sense of "mind"] because the mind (manas) is beneficial (phan ’dogs pa, perhaps upakārin).

Here [the reason in the preceding syllogism,] "not seeing its own self" is mentioned [as] a use of words to imply more than is expressed (mtshan nyid kyi sgra’i tshul, perhaps lakṣaṇā-sabdānaya). Therefore inferences with reasons and examples such as the reasons "because it is an entity (bhāva or vastu)," "because it is an object of knowledge (jñeya)," or "because it is an object of speech (brjod par bya ba; abhidheya, vaktavya, vācyā, etc.)" and [corresponding] examples such as "like the ear and so on," "like sound and so on," or "like its own self," should also be fully stated.

Thus,

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the self does not see visible form,
[Reason:] because it is an entity,
[Example:] like the ear and so on.

Likewise,

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the self does not see visible form,
[Reason:] because it is an object of knowledge,
[Example:] like sound and so on.

Likewise,

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the self does not see visible form,
[Reason:] because it is an object of speech,
[Example:] like its own self.

[Syllogisms] should likewise be stated appropriately in regard to visible form also.

There are also no faults of the thesis and so on, [1] because
conventional truth is under discussion (dbang du byas pa, adhisākṛta), [2] the self [as] generally accepted\textsuperscript{117} is the subject [of the syllogism] (phyogs su byas pa, paksīkṛta), [3] because a property of that [conventional self] is indicated [as the reason in the syllogism], and [4] because that [conventional self] is also adduced as an example.

Likewise, since an axe and so on are not established in ultimate reality, the example [in the opponent's last syllogism] also does not exist. Therefore [when we show that the eye does not see, we] do not establish what is [already] established [for the opponent].

\textit{Objection:} That very [statement] that the seer does not see nihilistically negates (apa-vatuf) that meaning [i.e., its own meaning].\textsuperscript{118} Therefore there will be a fault in [your] thesis.

\textit{Answer:} Here [that objection] has [already] been answered [in our discussion of the statement], "dependent origination is without origination (pratītyasamutpāda 'nutpādah')."\textsuperscript{119} Therefore it is not necessary to repeat [that answer] again.

Moreover, here that seer either has the intrinsic nature of a seer; or it does not have the intrinsic nature of a seer. In that connection, [let us first suppose that] it has the intrinsic nature of a seer, just as the Sāṅkhyaśyas say that the intrinsic nature of the spirit (puruṣa) is consciousness (caitanya).\textsuperscript{120} As to that, if that seer of that [Sāṅkhya] has the intrinsic nature of a seer, [then] because intrinsic nature is not made [by any causes or conditions], it would be a seer even without a visual organ.\textsuperscript{121}

\textit{Objection:}\textsuperscript{122} If that cutter has no axe, it is not possible [for him] to be a cutter. Likewise, [only] if that [self], too, is not apart from\textsuperscript{123} a visual organ, should one see [i.e., regard] it as a seer.

\textit{Answer:} In that case, the self's being a seer is conventional, because a cutter is conventional.\textsuperscript{124} If [you] suppose so,

A seer who is not apart [from the visual organ] does not exist.\textsuperscript{125} [MMK 3-6a]

"Because that [self] is accepted as a seer [only] if it is not apart
from the visual organ" is the rest of the sentence. Here, before [the seer, i.e., the self] possesses the visual organ and after it has separated from the visual organ, the visual organ does not exist. If the visual organ does not exist, [the activity of] seeing (lta ba) the visible also does not exist. Therefore since it is not possible that [the self] is a seer, the seer does not exist. The meaning is that [the self] does not have the intrinsic nature of a seer.

Nor is that [seer] established like fire, because fire is not established without fuel. 126

Alternatively, [one can interpret MMK 3-6a by saying that] the rest of the sentence is, "Even if [you] say that [the self] is a seer when the visual organ exists, [nevertheless] the seer imagined (parikalpita) by the Sāmkhyas does not exist." Here one infers that [something] is a seer because it apprehends and sees visible forms. But that apprehension of visible form also exists [only] if the eye, visible form, light, space, and attention exist. Therefore the collection (tshogs)127 called "Devadatta" is designated a "seer" [only when he] possesses those [conditions]; but [a seer] other than that does not exist. [This is so] because even if there were some existence [of a seer] imagined to be different from that [collection], the apprehension of visible form does not exist in the mind (rgyud, samtāna or samtati, literally, "series") of a blind person. [Therefore the seer imagined by the Sāmkhyas could not be a seer by intrinsic nature.] 128

Efficient causes (byed pa'i rgyu, kāraka-hetu or kārana-hetu) are conventionally designated as the agent. As in the case of a lamp, it is indeed [logically] possible [to do so, even though they lack the intrinsic nature of an agent]. For example, even though a lamp has no volition (cetanā), it is said to be an illuminator because it is a cause of illumination. Therefore even conventionally, that [seer established by intrinsic nature] does not exist. 129

Objection: [What is called the seer] does not have the intrinsic nature of a seer. As the Vaiśeṣikas say, "When the cognition of visible form has originated from the conjunction (shyor ba, probably samyoga here) of the four [the self (ātman), the mental
organ (manas), the sense organ (indriya), and the object (vishaya)), [the self] sees.\textsuperscript{131}

\textit{Answer:} Even so, there is that same fault [that there is no seer other than the group of factors conventionally called "Devadatta," etc.]. [This is so] because the supposition (brtag pa, kalpanā) that that [seer] is an existence which is not commonly known is not possible.\textsuperscript{132}

\textit{Objection:} Accepting [the self] as the common [seer well known in the world], that [self still] exists [independent of the eye, visible form, and so on].\textsuperscript{133}

\textit{Answer:} Even so, Nāgārjuna says,

\begin{quote}
[A seer] who is apart from the visual organ also [does not exist]. [MMK 3-6b]
\end{quote}

What is [the meaning of MMK 3-6b]? The context is "the seer does not exist" [from MMK 3-6a]. [This follows] because if it is apart from the power of the visual organ, [the self] does not have the intrinsic nature of that [seer].

\textbf{[Thesis:]} In ultimate reality, it is not possible that that [self] sees visible form,

\textbf{[Reason:]} because it is different from the eye,

\textbf{[Example:]} like a jar.

Thus for neither position is it established that there is a seer.\textsuperscript{134}

Alternatively, even if one imagines that [the self] has the intrinsic nature of a seer, [Nāgārjuna replies,]

A seer who is not apart [from the visual organ] does not exist, nor does one who is apart from the visual organ. [MMK 3-6ab]

The idea is that whether it possesses or lacks a visual organ, [the self] does not have the intrinsic nature of a seer.

To begin with, [suppose that] one maintains the following: "When that seer has an eye, he sees." In that case, the estab-
lishment of the apprehension of visible form [by the seer] exists only if the eye exists. Therefore [his] being a seer is conventional, just as burning (bsreg pa nyid) [exists only] if fire exists [and thus is conventional]. [In that case,] one ought to maintain that [the seer] is the eye itself. But if one says, "Even without a visual organ, [the self] is a seer," [then] since the apprehension of visible form does not exist in the mind (rgyud, samtāna or samtati, literally, "series") of a blind person, it is not [logically] possible that that [self] is indeed a seer.135

Objection:
[Thesis:] One should understand that just that which possesses the activity of seeing is the seer,
[Reason:] because that has an instrument (karāṇa) and an object (karman).
[Dissimilar Example:] Here what has no activity has no instrument or object, as a sky-flower [does not].
[Application:] That seer (d ras tr) has an instrument, the visual organ (darsana), and an object, the visible (d ras tavya).
[Conclusion:] Therefore one should understand that just that which possesses the activity of seeing is the seer.

Answer: Because the organ of vision has been completely negated [as existing] in ultimate reality and [because] if the visual organ does not exist, the seer is also not possible, [Nāgārjuna says,]

If the seer does not exist, how will your visible [object] and visual organ exist? [MMK 3-6cd]

The idea is that [this is so] because that which no one sees cannot be a visible [object] and because an instrument [of vision] is also not [logically] possible, since a seer who sees by means of this [instrument] does not exist at all. Therefore the meaning of your reason, "because [its] instrument and object exist," is not established; or else the meaning [of the reason] is contradictory.136

Objection: Some137 among [our] fellow Buddhists say: Con-
cerning conditioned factors,\textsuperscript{138} which are subject to other (\textit{paratantra}) causes and conditions and are immobile,\textsuperscript{139} it is [logically] possible to say that the eye does not see and that a self different from that [eye] does not exist as a seer. But, 

[Thesis:] [We] do not maintain that visible [objects] and visual organs do not exist, 
[Reason:] because their four results, cognition (\textit{vijñāna}) and so on, exist. 

[Dissimilar Example:] That which does not exist does not have the results called "cognition, contact (\textit{sparsa}), feeling (\textit{vedanā}), and craving (\textit{trsna}),"\textsuperscript{140} just as the eye of one blind from birth [does not give rise to cognition and the rest]. 

[Application:] Visible [objects] and visual organs have the four results, cognition and so on. 

[Conclusion:] Therefore visible [objects] and visual organs do exist. 

\textit{Answer:} If it has been shown, by the method which [we] have stated, that visible [objects] and the organ of vision are not established, then\textsuperscript{141} 

Because visible [objects] and the visual organ do not exist, the four, cognition and so on, 

Do not exist. [MMK 3-7ab,c1 (PSP: 3-8ab,c1)]

The idea is that [this is so] because [their] causal conditions do not exist. Therefore if [cognition and so on] are not established because those [i. e., visible objects and the visual organ] are not established, [then] it is also not [logically] possible to establish visible objects and the visual organ [as a consequence of the existence of cognition, etc.] because [your] example also does not exist.\textsuperscript{142} 

\textit{Objection:}\textsuperscript{143} In ultimate reality, cognition and so on do indeed exist, because their results, appropriation (\textit{upādāna}) and so on, exist. 

\textit{Answer:}
How will appropriation and so on exist? [MMK 3-7c2,d (PSP: 3-8c2,d)]

The idea is that [this is so] because those are also not established, like cognition and so on. "Appropriation" (upādāna) [means those things] "which are to be appropriated" (upādeya). They are: [1] sensual pleasure (kāma); [2] the overestimation of moral conduct and ascetic practices (śīla-vrata-parāmarśa); [3] the doctrine of the self (ātma-vāda); and [4] views (drṣṭi). [The phrase] "and so on" (ādīnī) indicates those [items in a list] at the beginning of which [the word preceding ādī stands]. Those, moreover, are samsāric existence (bhava), birth (jāti), and old-age-and-death (jāra-maraṇa). Therefore you have that same fault [in your argument].

At the beginning of the chapter, the opponent adduced the auditory organ, etc., and sound, etc., as examples. Now [Nāgarjuna], wishing to show by the method which has been stated that they are similar [to the visual organ in not existing by intrinsic nature], says,

One should understand that the auditory organ, the olfactory organ, the gustatory organ, the tactile organ, and the mind (manas)

Have been explained, [along with] the hearer (śrotr), audible [sounds] (śrotavya), and so on, by means of the visual organ.

[MMK 3-8 (PSP 3-9)]

One should understand that the auditory organ, the olfactory organ, the gustatory organ, the tactile organ, the mind, the hearer, audible [sounds], and so on have also been rejected (lan ... btab pa, literally, "answered"). By means of what? By means of the visual organ itself. As with the negation of the visual organ, the negation of the auditory organ and so on should also be shown appropriately by means of full inference[s], together with elaboration (prapañcā).
Therefore neither origination nor motion, which [the opponent] conceptually constructs from the outset (ārambha) of the chapter, is established.\textsuperscript{148} As to that, here the meaning of the chapter [is as follows:] The emptiness of the āyatanas has been expounded by means of stating the faults in the proofs offered by opponents.

Therefore [scriptural] statements such as the following are established:\textsuperscript{149} [From the Ārya-brahma-viśeṣa-cintā-paripṛcchā-sūtra?,]\textsuperscript{150}

That which is the internal earth-element (ādhyaṭmika-prthivi-dhātu) and that which is the external (bāhya) earth-element have a nondual meaning (advaya-artha). By means of discernment (prajñā) and wisdom (ye shes, jñāna), the Tathāgata has fully and perfectly realized (abhisambuddha) that that also is nondual, is not divisible into two (gnyis su dbyer med pa), and has a single defining characteristic (eka-laksana), namely, no defining characteristic (alaksana).\textsuperscript{151}

Likewise, [from the Ārya-Manjuśrī-vikāḍita-sūtra,]\textsuperscript{152}

[Maṇjuśrī said,] "Girl, how should one see the elements (dhātu)?"

The girl said, "Maṇjuśrī, [they should be seen] like this, for example: When the three worlds have been consumed by fire [at the end] of the kalpa, there is not even ash [left behind]."\textsuperscript{153}

Likewise, [from the Ārya-bhava-samkrānti-sūtra,]\textsuperscript{154}

The eye does not see visible form, and the mind (manas) does not know dharmas.

That which the world does not penetrate (gāhate) is the highest truth (paramam satyam).

Likewise,\textsuperscript{155}

He does not know, does not see all dharmas. That [bodhisattva?] does not apprehend, does not ponder (cintayati), does not think of (manyate) even the preacher of the Dharma (chos smra ba, dharma-bhānaka).

Likewise, [from the Ārya-Manjuśrī-vikāḍita-sūtra?,]\textsuperscript{156}
Sister (sring mo, bhagini), the eye does not see, does not cognize (vijānātī) visible forms. Enlightenment (bodhi), too, is free from eye and visible form. The ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind (manas) also do not grasp, do not cognize dharmas. Enlightenment, too, is free from mind and dharmas.

Likewise, [from the Bhagavatī-prajñāpāramitā-suvikrāntavikrāmi-sūtra,] 157

Suvikrāntavikrāmin, matter 158 is not the domain (gocara) of matter. Feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition are also not the domain of cognition. Suvikrāntavikrāmin, [what is called] "domain" is [the fact] that matter does not know, does not see matter and [the fact] that feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition do not know, do not see cognition. That which is [the state of] not knowing, not seeing matter and not knowing, not seeing feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition, is the perfection of discernment.

The third chapter, "Examination of the āyatanas," of the Prajñāpradīpa, a commentary on [Nāgārjuna's] Mūlamadhyamaka composed by ācārya Bhavyakara/Bhavyakāra (Legs ldan byed) 159 [is concluded].

Notes to Translation of Chapter Three

1The twelve āyatanas are the six sense organs (the five physical sense organs plus the mind, manas) and the six corresponding sense objects (dharmas in the case of mind). This chapter deals mostly with the first six āyatanas, the sense organs (indriya). Hence in the Sanskrit of the Prasannapadā, chapter three is called caksurādindriya-parīkṣā (PSP 122.8), while in the Tibetan translation of the Prasannapadā, the title is simply dbang po brtag pa, indriyaparīkṣā (May (1959), p. 331.8). The Tibetan translations of the Akutobhayā and Buddhāpālita's commentary have the same title for this chapter as the Tibetan of the Prajñā-pradīpa (Saito (1984), translation, p. 243 n. 1).

2This translation of skye ba mi mthun pa'i phyogs kyi khyad par (utpāda-vipakṣa-viśeṣa?) follows Avalokitavrata's explanation (Ava P2b-3,4; D2a-4,5). The particular instance of origination alleged by the opponent in the following paragraph is the origination of the āyatanas.

3See Ava P5b-6, D3a-1. Note that chapter one of the MMK deals with origination, while chapter two deals with motion.
That is, the six sense organs.

Darśana may mean either "vision" or "the organ of vision." (Note Pāṇini 3.3.115 and 3.3.117.) In his commentary following MMK 3-2ab, Bhāvaviveka glosses it as caksur-indriya; and this seems to be its meaning throughout most of his commentary on this chapter. (The situation is complicated, however, by the fact that the Tibetan word la ba translates both darśana and drṣṭi, as well as some other forms derived from the root drê/paś.) Buddhāpālita has the same interpretation of darśana (Saito (1984), p. 50.11), as does Candrakirti (PSP 113.7, 8). (Jacques May, though, translates darśana as la vision; see May (1959), p. 78 n. 131.)

Similar remarks apply to the terms for the other four physical sense organs (sravana, etc.). Note that the physical sense organs, being made of translucent matter (ṛūpa-prasāda), are not identical with the visible eye, ear, etc.; see May (1959), ibid., AK 1-9, and LVP AK I, p. 15 n. 1.

Rūpa as one of the twelve āyatanas or eighteen dhātus refers to "visible form," i.e., color and shape (varna-samsthāna); see AK 1-10a. Rūpa as the first of the five aggregates (skandha) refers to "matter" in general; see AK 1-9ab and May (1959), p. 79 n. 132.

Compare AK 2-2ab.

See Ava P4-8 to 5a-1, D4b-2,3.

Bsam par bya ba, perhaps mantavya here, corresponding to manas.

*Set of all dissimilar examples* translates vipakṣa here.

See Ava P5a-3,4,5; D4b-5,6,7. In other words, the reason (hetu) in fact proves the opposite of the sādhyya, since the predicate to be proved (sādhyya) is ultimately real origination and the reason applies only to (some) things which are conventional. Such things belong to the vipakṣa because they lack the sādhyya. Note that the phrase "in ultimate reality" (paramārthaḥ) is understood as qualifying the predicate (sādhyya) of the thesis (pratijñā), not as qualifying the subject (dharmin).

Mig, caksus will be translated as "eye," śrotra as "ear," and so on; but one should bear in mind that the five physical sense organs are made of subtle, translucent matter (ṛūpa-prasāda). They are not identical with visible parts of the body such as the eyeball, etc., though they are located on or in them. See note 5 and AK 1-44ab.

The Tibetan of MMK 3-2ab in PP differs from the Sanskrit and Tibetan of PSP. (See PSP 113.10 and 113 n. 5.) See the discussion in Saito (1984), translation, p. 244 n. 5. As Saito points out, the Tibetan of MMK 3-2a in PP corresponds to sva ātmā ceṇ darśanaṁ hi or svātmāni darśane sati.

MMK 3-2cd, according to Avalokitavrata (Ava P5b-2,3; D5a-4,5).

The Sanskrit of MMK 3-2b is tat tam eva na paśyati (PSP 113.10). Bhāvaviveka seems to be saying that one must understand that paśyaty eva is meant (but not written for reasons of meter) rather than tam eva, since Nāgārjuna will deny not only that the eye sees itself but also that it sees other things.

PP has a Tibetan translation of MMK 3-2c slightly different from that of the Akutobhāyā, Bp, and PSP. PP corresponds to yadā plus ātmanam, rather than yad
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The idea behind this argument seems to be something like the following: If it is the intrinsic nature of the eye to see, then its seeing must be independent of anything other than the eye itself. (Intrinsic nature is independent of other conditions by definition; see MMK 15-1,2.) Therefore the eye's seeing cannot depend on the presence of visible forms. But then the only thing left for the eye to see is its own self. Now it is well known that the eye does not see itself. Therefore the eye does not see by intrinsic nature.

Similar to the eye's not seeing visible form; see Ava P6ab-4, D5a-5.

On this and the following sentence, see Ava P7a-4 to 7b-3, D6b-4 to 7a-3.

These four reasons apply both to the eye-organ (in the first syllogism) and to visible form (in the second). They have resistance because they are rūpa, in the sense of "matter," but are not avijñapti (see LVP AK I, pp. 25-27). The terms bhautika and upādāya-rūpa are synonymous and refer to matter dependent on the four great elements (mahābhūta), as distinct from the elements themselves. See May (1959), pp. 91 nn. 195 and 198, 164 n. 505.

Avalokitavrata identifies the objectors only as nikāyāntarīyāḥ, "members of other (Buddhist) schools." He has them cite a scripture which expounds the doctrine of rūpa found in the Abhidharmakośa; see Ava P7b-4 to 8a-3, D7a-3 to 7b-1.

In other words, as far as the Mādhyamikas are concerned, the opponent's statement that the eye does not see itself because it is invisible simply proves the Mādhyamikas' own contention that in ultimate reality, it cannot see form either. See Ava P8a-3 to 6, D7b-2,3,4.

The name "Abhidhārmika" seems not to have referred to a particular school but to mean simply "a specialist in Abhidharma." See LVP AK I p. x and n. 2, p. 39 n. 1, and LVP AK V p. 45 n. 3. Since the objection here ends with a quotation from the AK, presumably the "Abhidhārmikas" are Vaibhāṣikas in this case.

On tat-sabhāga, literally, "similar to that," see LVP AK I pp. 75-78.

See the reference in the preceding note.

Identified by Avalokitavrata, who explains that the Mādhyamikas accept that in superficial reality (samvṛtyā), the functioning eye sees visible forms but that in ultimate reality, it does not. See Ava P8b-6 to 9a-3, D8a-3 to 7. (This verse is also quoted by Bhāvaviveka near the end of this chapter.)

The Sanskrit of this verse is found in PSP 120.4,5, where it is ascribed merely to the Bhagavān. De Jong identifies it as verse 14 of the Bhavasamkṛitinīśtra, ed. N. Aiyaswami Sastri, Adyar, 1938, p. 6. See de Jong (1978), p. 40.

See Ava P9a-4,5; D8b-1.

See Ava P9a-8 to 9b-2, D8b-3,4,5. It seems that one should read gzugs mthong ba bkag pa'i phyir in Ava P9b-1, D8b-4 for gzugs mi mthong ba bkag pa'i phyir.

That is, our thesis is qualified by the phrase "in ultimate reality." Since we accept that according to superficial reality the eye sees forms, while denying that it does so in ultimate reality, we are not in conflict with what is well known in the literature.
world. (Worldly convention makes no such distinction between superficial and ultimate reality.) Moreover, this objection has been answered in the first chapter, where we pointed out that origination exists superficially but not ultimately. See Ava P9b-3,4,5; D8b-6 to 9a-1.

30 The Kāśmīra-Vaiśbhāṣikas, according to Avalokitavrata (Ava P9b-6, D9a-11).

31 kha cig na re, "some say," usually indicates an objection; but according to Avalokitavrata (Ava P9b-8, D9a-3), this is Bhāvaviveka's own view; and the context supports that attribution.

32 That is, to say that the eye sees and to say that it is the agent of vision amount to the same thing. See Ava P10a-1,2,3; D9a-4,5.

33 gzhon dag na re, "others say." Avalokitavrata (Ava P10a-5, D9a-7 and P10b-3, D9b-4) identifies "others" as ācārya Devaśarman, who wrote a commentary on the MMK called dkar po 'char ba. This commentary, which Bhāvaviveka also quoted with approval in chapter one of the Prajñāpradīpa (see Ames (1994), p. 110 and pp. 129-130 n. 105), has not survived. See Kajiyama (1963), pp. 37-38 and Ruegg (1981), p. 49 and n. 128, p. 62 and n. 187.

34 If the eye is momentary, it ceases as soon as it has arisen; and it has no time in which to perform an activity. If it is not momentary, it must persist unchanged. Therefore it cannot change from a former state of not seeing an object to a subsequent state of seeing it; and hence it cannot perform the activity of seeing. See Ava P10a-6 to 10b-3, D9a-7 to 9b-4.

35 Following AK I-42, there is a long discussion in the bhāṣya on the question of whether the eye sees or visual cognition sees; and the positions of various schools are given. (See LVP AK I, pp. 81-86.) The position ascribed there to the Sautrāntikas is identical to that given here.

36 samskārō, in the sense of samskṛt dharmāḥ. See LVP AK I, pp. 11, 28.

37 See, e.g., Samyutta-nikāya II p. 72, IV pp. 32-33.

38 According to Avalokitavrata, "that" refers to a dispute between the Vaiśeṣikas and the Śāmkhyas as to whether the eye perceives an object which it has "reached" (prāpta), i.e., one with which it is in contact (the Śāmkhya position), or one which it has not reached (allegedly the Vaiśeṣika position). See Ava P11b-1 to 6, D10b-1 to 4.

This characterization of the Śāmkhya position is correct; see, e.g., Sinha (1952), pp. 60-61; Frauwallner (1973), Vol. I, p. 309; and Larson and Bhattacharya (1987), p. 340. On the other hand, it is clear that the Vaiśeṣikas did, in fact, hold that the sense organ perceives objects only through contact with them. See, e.g., Sinha (1956), pp. 386-7, 470; Frauwallner (1973), Vol. II, pp. 31-32; and Potter (1977), pp. 161-2.

It is quite surprising that Avalokitavrata would be confused about the position of a major Indian philosophical school on this issue. Perhaps he was misled by the fact that Bhāvaviveka later mentions the Śāmkhyas explicitly in this context and then, in his commentary on MMK 3-6ab, indicates that the Śāmkhyas and Vaiśeṣikas held opposing views on the issue of whether the self is inherently a seer. Thus Avalokitavrata might have assumed that they held different views on
In fact, though, it was the Buddhist Abhidharma schools who maintained that the eye sees objects with which it is not in contact; see AK 1-43cd. It may be that bye brag pa dag, "Vaiśeṣikas," is a mistake (present in both Ava P and D) for bye brag tu smra ba dag, "Vaibhāṣikas." There is an instance in Avalokitavrata's subcommentary on chapter five where Ava P has 'os pa pa dag, "Ārhatas," twice for Ava D's 'ug pa pa dag, "Aulūkyas." See note 69 to my translation of chapter five.

39 See Ava P12a-6,7,8; D11a-4,5.
40 The Vaiśeṣikas, according to Avalokitavrata; see Ava P12b-3, D11b-1 and note 38.
41 See Ava P12b-5,6; D11b-2,3.
42 rtog chen. This translation is conjectural. Avalokitavrata lists rtog chen with bya ma rta, "runner, courier," and ryan rna ba, "spy" (Ava P12b-7, D11b-4). The point is that the eye sees only indirectly by way of other conditions (pratyaya) and not directly. Thus its seeing is only conventional (Ava P12b-7 to 13a-2, D11b-3,4,5).
43 The idea seems to be that conventionally, the eye is said to see visible forms not because it grasps them directly but because it knows them indirectly through other conditions (such as the presence of light, etc.). Even conventionally, however, it does not "see," that is, "know" itself.
44 The nose does not smell odors with which it is not in contact (see AK 1-43cd,44ab); and it does not smell itself.
45 On this and the following sentence, see Ava P13b-3 to 14a-4, D11a-5 to 11b-5.
46 See the similar discussion of the two syllogisms following MMK 3-2cd and note 20.
47 See AK 1-44cd. The objects of the five physical senses are simultaneous with them.
48 According to Avalokitavrata (Ava P14a-8, D13a-1), the objectors are the Vaiśeṣikas; but see note 38.
49 "Obstructed" by space, according to Avalokitavrata (Ava P14b-2, D13a3). In the bhāṣya on AK 1-42, it is pointed out that the eye sees visible forms which are obstructed by transparent objects; see LVP AK I p. 83.
Here "obstructed" translates bar du chod pa. Note that Lokesh Chandra’s Tibetan-Sanskrit Dictionary gives vyavahita for bar du chod pa (s.v.). According to Monier-Williams' A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, vyavahita (s.v.) may mean either "obstructed, concealed" or "separated, placed apart."
50 If the eye had to go out to its object in order to make contact with it, it would take different amounts of time and effort to see objects at different distances. See Ava P14b-2 to 8, D13a-3 to 7.
51 See Ava P15a-4, D13b-3; and compare LVP AK I p. 93.
52 That is, this reason simply restates the thesis in different words and hence is invalid. See Ava P15a-7 to 15b-1, D13b-5,6.
53 Avalokitavrata gives an argument based on the idea that all things are
momentary, so that the process of grasping an object encompasses many different moments of effort and grasping. See Ava P15b-2,3,4; D13b-7 to 14a-2. Bhāvaviveka does not mention the fourth reason here, but Avalokitavrata says that it is refuted simply by MMK 3-2. See Ava P15b-4,5,6; D14a-2,3.

54If the example is said to be established in superficial reality, but not in ultimate reality, then it cannot be used to support a thesis which is held to be true in ultimate reality. See Ava P16a-3,4,5; D14a-6 to 14b-1.

55The opponent might object that although the mind does not grasp an object with which it is in contact, the nose, tongue, and body do. (See AK 1-43cd.) Thus the reason, "because it is a sense organ," is inconclusive. Bhāvaviveka replies that it will be shown (in MMK 3-8) that the other sense organs, just like the eye, grasp neither an object with which they are in contact nor one with which they are not in contact. See Ava P16b-7 to 17a-4, D15a-1 to 5.

56See Ava P17a-5,6; D15a-5,6. The idea is not as ludicrous as it sounds if one recalls that "the eye" is composed of invisible rūpa-prasāda and is not the visible eyeball.

57See Ava P17b-1, D15b-1,2.

58mig gi rnam par shes pa'i rnam grangs, caṇṣṭr-viṇṇā-paryāya, glossed by Avalokitavrata (ibid.) as mig gi 'bras bu, "the eyeball."

59Here Avalokitavrata argues that if the eye had to go out to its object, then when one opened one’s eyes, it would take longer to see the sun or moon that to see the top of a nearby tree. See Ava P17b-2,3,4; D15b-3,4, and note 50.

60The idea may be that since visible form has a cause conventionally, it does not exist in ultimate reality.

61Or "in [regard to] both positions," phyogs gnyi gar. The positions referred to are the view (ascribed by Avalokitavrata to the Vaiṣešikas) that the eye grasps an object with which it is not in contact and the Śāmkhya’s view that it grasps an object with which it is in contact. The opponent charges that since the Mādhymika rejects both positions, he has failed to establish any position of his own. See Ava P18a-3 to 6, D16a-2,3,4.

62The opponents here are the Mīmāṃsikas, according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P18a-8, D16a-6. In fact, the view expressed was also that of the Naiyāyikas and Vaiṣešikas. See Frauwallner (1973), Vol. II, pp. 32-3 and Potter (1977), pp. 117, 119,161.

63Ava P18b-2, D16a-7 has byed rgyu, kārana-hetu for PP’s rgyu, hetu or kārana. Here kārana-hetu is used in the narrower (pradhāna) sense of "productive cause." See LVP AK II p. 247, where the eye and visible form are said to be the kārana-hetus of visual cognition in this sense.

64Again, Avalokitavrata ascribes this objection to the Mīmāṃsikas. See Ava P18b-6, D16b-3. The argument concerning the eyes of nocturnal animals is found in Nyāyasūtra 3-1-44.

65That is, the eyeball. See Ava P19a-3, D16b-8.


67Literally, "some;" identified by Avalokitavrata as "the commentator (vṛtti-

As Saito points out, although the text of the Tibetan translation of MMK 3-2ab in Bp agrees with that of PP, Buddhapālita's commentary seems to reflect the version of MMK 3-2ab found in PSP. Also, Buddhapālita's interpretation of yadātmānam in MMK 3-2c as yadā ātmānam, rather than yadā plus ātmānam, agrees with PSP, not PP. In the latter case, this difference is reflected in the Tibetan text of MMK 3-2c in Bp.

In other words, if water itself is wet, it can moisten earth; if fire itself is hot, it can heat water; if jasmine itself is sweet-smelling, it can impregnate clothing with a sweet smell.

See Lang (1986), pp. 122-3, where the text is slightly different.

See Ava P20a-1, D17b-3.

1La ba, glossed by Avalokitavrata as "visual cognition" (caksur-vijñāna). See Ava P20a-2, D17b-4.

Identified by Avalokitavrata only as coming from "the common doctrine of [our] fellow Buddhists" (rang gi sde pa spyi'i grub pa'i mtha', probably svayyhyasāmānya-siddhānta). See Ava P20a-5, D17b-6.

kha cig na re, literally, "some say." Avalokitavrata identifies "some" as Bhāvaviveka himself and says that the following paragraph is his criticism of Buddhapālita's explanation of MMK 3-2. See Ava P20a-6,7; D17b-7.

Avalokitavrata explains that a sweet smell does not exist in jasmine flowers by its own self but by virtue of causes and conditions like seed, earth, etc. Thus it arises adventitiously (glo bur du, probably akasmāt), just as sesa-me seed oil is not inherently sweet-smelling but becomes so if it comes in contact with flowers. See Ava P20b-3,4,5; D18a-3,4,5.

See Ava P20b-6,7,8; D18a-5,6,7.

dzin pa, root grah. Perhaps a translation other than "grasp" would be better here, since Avalokitavrata explains that in ultimate reality, fire burns neither itself nor others; and jasmine flowers make neither themselves nor others sweet-smelling. See Ava P21a-3,4; D18b-2,3.

This refers to the opponent's first two syllogisms at the beginning of the chapter, in which the fact that the visual organ sees visible forms is used to argue for the existence of origination and motion, respectively. See Ava P21a-5 to 21b-1, D18b-4 to 7.

If one says that the eye does see visible forms conventionally, it is contradictory to use that conventional fact to support a thesis about ultimate reality. See Ava P21b-2, D18-7 to 19a-1.

The objectors are identified by Avalokitavrata only as "proponents of origination" (skyeb bar smra ba dag, probably utpāda- or utpatti-vādina). See Ava P21b-4, D19a-2.

See Ava P21b-5, D19a-3.

Avalokitavrata here glosses "power" as "the power of grasping" (itself or another). See Ava P21b-6, D19a-3,4.
82 See Ava P22a-7 to 22b-1, D19b-3,4,5.
83 The "reason" referred to here is the notion that fire illuminates both itself and another. See Ava P22b-2,3,4; D19b-5,6.
84 Fire does not illuminate itself because there is no darkness in it and hence nothing which needs to be illuminated. See Ava P22b-5,6; D19b-7 to 20a-2.
85 Conventionally, the nature of fire is heat. See Ava P23a-2, D20a-4.
86 Although Bhāvaviveka calls these "syllogisms" (sbhor ba'i tshig, prayogāvākya), they lack examples, which full-fledged syllogisms must have.
87 Compare MMK 10-13cd. Chapter ten of the MMK is devoted to the subject of fire and fuel.
88 gzhan dag, "others," identified by Avalokitavrata (Ava P23b-7, D20b-6).
91 gzhan dag, "others," identified by Avalokitavrata. See Ava P24a-4, D21a-3.
92 The opponent gives only an example without giving a reason; hence it is enough to point out that his argument is deficient. Buddhapālita's refutation (given in full by Avalokitavrata) is not necessary. See Ava P24a-4 to 24b-4, D21a-3 to 21b-2.
93 brjod nas, literally, "having uttered," here and below in the same context. The Sanskrit may be a form of abhi-dhā, but there are a number of other possibilities.
94 The more obvious reconstruction of bya ba'i rkyen would be kriyāpratyaya. As far as I have been able to determine, this term is not used in Sanskrit grammar, whereas both lYT (-ana) and kT (-Ta) are krt-pratyayas. (That is, they are added directly to verbal roots.)
95 For the rather unusual structure of this syllogism, see Ava P24b-6 (where dang sgrub pa'i chos is omitted), D21b-3; P24b-7, D21b-4; and P25a-2, D21b-6.
96 thugs su chud par mdzad pa is transitive. thugs su chud par gyur pa is normally passive, but may represent the Sanskrit middle (ātmanepada) here. The point seems to be that the root budh may be conjugated according to either the first conjugation parasmaipada (bodhati) or the fourth conjugation ātmanepada (budhyate).

Compare Yaśomitra's Sphuṭārthā Vyākhyā on AK 1-1: buddha iti kartari ka-vidhānaṁ| ... karmakartari kaśvādhaṇāṁ ity apare| svayam budhyata iti buddha ity arthaḥ| ... (Shastri edition, Baudhā Bharati Series, Vol. 5, p. 5 - see Bibliographical Abbreviations). Avalokitavrata's subcommentary tends to support the interpretation of thugs su chud par gyur pa as (svayam) budhyate. See Ava P25a-2,3,4; D21b-6 to 22a-1. In this connection, note Pāṇini 3.2.188.
97 See Ava P25a-8 to 25b-1, D22a-3,4.
99 des cir 'gyur, probably tena kim bhavati, literally, "What comes about by means of that?"
100 lta ba nyid, probably paśyamānām; cf. MMK 3-4a.
101 The same fault which Bhāvaviveka found in the opponent's last syllogism,
that is, the fault that the argument is correct conventionally but not in ultimate reality. See Ava P26b-4,5; D23a-4,5,6.

102 This is similar to the argument in chapter two that one who is a goer does not go, because he is (by assumption) already a goer and hence has no need to perform an activity of going. Moreover, there would be two simultaneous activities of going, that due to which the goer is called a "goer" and that activity of going which the goer is said to perform. The point is that "goer" and "going" only exist in relation to each other and cannot be established as independent entities. See especially MMK 2-7 through 11 (translated in Ames (1995)). See also Ava P26b-6,7,8; D23a-6,7.

103 See Ava P26b-8 to 27a-2, D23b-1,2.

104 yod pa dang med pa'i rgyu nyid, probably sad-asad-hetutva. See Ava P27a-8 to 27b-3, D23b-6 to 24a-1. Avalokitavrata makes the point that the opponent assumes that the negations in MMK 3-5ab are implicative negations, whereas in fact they are simple negations.

105 rtog na, "if [you] suppose."

106 phyis 'byung ba'i tshul gyis lta ba nyid du nye bar brtags nas, probably something like bhavisyad-yogena darśanatvopacārāt. (upacārāt should strictly be nye bar brtags nas, but brtags and brtags are often confused in the texts.) The opponent's idea is that the eye at first does not perform a particular activity of seeing and then later performs it. Thus the eye is established prior to and independent of its activity of seeing. At the first stage, the eye does not see and thus is not a visual organ; but it is said to be one figuratively because it will see later. See Ava P27b-4,5; D24a-2,3.

107 Figurative designation may be sufficient to establish conventional truth; but the opponent had wished to prove that the eye sees in ultimate reality, that is, by its intrinsic nature. Since intrinsic nature cannot change, it is impossible for the eye first not to see and then later to see.

108 The reason, "because [that] conventional designation of activity exists," is not established in ultimate reality. If it is asserted as conventional truth, it cannot prove anything about ultimate reality. See Ava P28b-1 to 4, D24b-5,6,7.

109 Avalokitavrata remarks that up to this point, the position of those who maintain that the eye itself is the seer (draśtr) has been refuted. Now Bhāvaviveka is going to deal with the position of those who hold that the self (ātman) sees by means of the eye, so that the self is the seer and the eye is the instrument (karāṇa) of the activity of seeing. See Ava P28b-4,5; D24b-6,7.

110 Avalokitavrata makes it clear that what it is being said here is that the eye is called darśana, "visual organ," not because it is the agent (kartr) of the activity of seeing but because it is the instrument of that activity. The seer (draśtr), the agent who sees, is the self (ātman). The self sees by means of the instrument of seeing, the eye. See Ava P28b-6 to 29a-5, D25a-1 to 6.

111 Avalokitavrata (Ava P29b-4,5; D25b-4,5) glosses "property" (chos, dharma) as lta ba gzugs la lta bar mi byed pa'i sgrub pa'i chos (sgrub pa'i chos = sādhana-dharma, i.e., hetu). See also the following syllogism.

112 The "suspicion" referred to is the suspicion that the self might, after all, be
able to see itself. See the rest of the paragraph and Ava P30a-2 to 5, D26a-2,3,4.

113 See Ava P30a-6,7,8; D26a-5,6,7. Avalokitavrata glosses "wherever" as "in our own and others' systems (siddhānta)." He says that the real meaning of this expression is that the mind sees that the self does not exist.

114 See Ava P30b-2,3,4; D26b-2,3.

115 Avalokitavrata explains that one should show that visible form is not an object of the self as seer, by means of syllogisms using the same reasons and examples. See Ava P30b-8 to 31a-2, D26b-6 to 27a-1.

116 According to Avalokitavrata, an opponent charges that [1] the Mādhyamika's thesis (in the preceding syllogism) is faulty because for the Mādhyamika, conventional designation does not exist in ultimate reality; [2] the subject (pakṣa) of the thesis is not established because the self is not established for the Mādhyamika; [3] since the self, the subject of the thesis, is not established, the ground (gṛhi, probably āśraya) of the reason is not established; and [4] likewise the last example, "like its own self," is not established. Bhāvaviveka answers those four objections in order. See Ava P31a-2 to 5, D27a-1,2.

117 Presumably meaning the conventional self, which the Buddhists also accept on the conventional level.

118 Avalokitavrata explains that, according to the opponent, the statement that the seer does not see is "inconsistent with its own words." He gives as an example of such a self-contradictory sentence, the statement, "I am a childless woman's son." See Ava P31b-2,3,4; D27a-4,5.

The reference here is to the two initial verses of the MMK (MMK 1-A,B). Avalokitavrata explains that in superficial reality, there is dependent origination but that in ultimate reality, there is no origination. Likewise, here what is superficially or conventionally a seer does not see in ultimate reality. See Ava P31b-5,6; D27b-1,2.

120 Note that in Sāmkhyakārikā 19, the puruṣa is said to be a draṣṭa, "seer." See Sinha (1952), pp. 35-6 and Larson and Bhattacharya (1987), pp. 81, 258.

121 In other words, since intrinsic nature is not dependent on anything other than itself, then if one is a seer by intrinsic nature, one will see whether one has eyes or not. See Ava P31b-8 to 32a-4, D27b-4 to 7, and MMK 15-1,2.

122 Avalokitavrata ascribes this objection to the Vaiśeṣikas; see Ava P31b-7, D27b-3. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school holds that the self is not inherently conscious but becomes so only through conjunction with the manas. See, e. g., Sinha (1956), pp. 386-7, 656 and Potter (1977), p. 125.

123 'na spangs na, atiraskṛtya, literally, "not having set aside."

124 Avalokitavrata explains that if the self is a seer only through dependence on the visual organ, and not by intrinsic nature, then its being a seer is purely conventional, not ultimate. See Ava P32a-8 to 32b-1, D28a-2,3.

125 Avalokitavrata explains that whatever depends on something else in order to see is not a seer in ultimate reality or by intrinsic nature. Hence in ultimate reality, no seer exists. See Ava P32b-2,3,4; D28a-4,5.

126 Avalokitavrata says that an opponent might hold that fire is a burner by intrinsic nature but does not burn unless there is fuel. Likewise, the self is a seer
by intrinsic nature but does not see without a visual organ. The answer is simply that intrinsic nature (by definition) cannot depend on the presence of something else. See Ava P32b-7 to 33a-2, D28a-7 to 28b-2.

Glossed by Avalokitavrata as "collection of elements and matter dependent on the elements." See Ava P33b-3, D29a-1,2.

On this paragraph, see Ava P33b-7 to 34a-6, D29a-4 to 29b-2. According to Avalokitavrata, Bhāvaviveka here answers an objection that if a seer does not exist by intrinsic nature, even the conventional designation "seer" would not exist. The reply is that the collection of efficient causes, the eye, visible form, and so on, are designated as the seer; but of course, they do not have the intrinsic nature of a seer.

Avalokitavrata as "collection of elements and matter dependent on the elements." See Ava P34b-2, D29b-5.


See Ava P34b-3 to 8, D29b-6 to 30a-2. Even if one says that there is a seer contingently, and not by intrinsic nature, there is no reason to suppose that it is the ātman postulated by the Vaiśeṣikas, which the Buddhists do not accept. Rather it is the collection of factors conventionally called a "person" or "sentient being," which everyone accepts on the conventional level.

See Ava P34b-8 to 35a-1, D30a-2,3.

That is, neither the Śāṅkhya's position that a purusa who has the intrinsic nature of a seer sees nor the Vaiśeṣika's position that an ātman who does not have the intrinsic nature of a seer sees is established. See Ava P35b-1,2; D30b-1,2.

In other words, if the self can see only by means of the eye, its being a seer is conventional, not intrinsic. If one claims that the self is intrinsically a seer, independent of the eye, that is obviously false since the blind have selves (according to the non-Buddhist schools) but cannot see.

Ultimately, the instrument and object of vision do not exist. On the other hand, it is contradictory to try to use the fact of their purely conventional existence to prove a thesis about ultimate reality. See Ava P36a-8 to 36b-1, D31a-5,6.

Identified by Avalokitavrata as the Sautrāntikas and Vaiśeṣikas. See Ava P36b-1, D31a-6. The position expressed, however, seems to be that of the Sautrāntikas; see LVP AK I, p. 86.

'du byed dag, samskārāḥ, in the sense of samskṛtā dharmāḥ.

gYo ba med pa, that is, "inactive." Because the samskāras are momentary, they have no time in which to perform an activity.

In the twelvefold dependent origination, the six āyatanas constitute the fifth member (ārīga). Contact, feeling and craving are the sixth, seventh, and eighth members. Cognition (or consciousness) is the third member, but the six āyatanas can also be said to give rise to cognition. See MMK 26-3,4.

PSP's verse 3-7 is a quotation from Ratnāvalī 4-55, mistakenly numbered by de La Vallée Poussin as a kārikā of MMK. See de Jong (1978), p. 40. Thus PP's 3-7 corresponds to PSP's 3-8, and PP's 3-8 corresponds to PSP's 3-9.

Reversing the dissimilar example in the opponent's preceding syllogism, we
have as an example a functioning eye which gives rise to cognition and the rest. But we have just shown that cognition, etc., do not exist because their causal conditions, visible objects and the visual organ, do not exist. See Ava P37a-5 to 37b-1, D32a-1 to 5.

143Also from other Buddhists. See Ava P37b-3, D31a-6.

144The four appropriations constitute the ninth member of the twelffefold dependent origination. See MMK 26-6cd and LVP AK III, pp. 86-7.

145Samsāric existence, birth, and old-age-and-death are the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth members of the twelffe fold dependent origination.

146See the opponent's first syllogism in this chapter.

147Avalokitavrata seems to gloss prapañca as "answers to objections." See Ava P39a-1, D33b-1. Avalokitavrata gives arguments for each of the other five senses which parallel the arguments given in the case of vision. See Ava P38b-7 to 39b-5, D33a-7 to 34a-4.

148See the first paragraph of this chapter and the opponent's first two syllogisms. See also Ava P39b-6 to 40a-1, D34a-4,5,6.

149According to Avalokitavrata, sūtra quotations are introduced at this point in reply to those who might charge, "[The emptiness of the āyatanas] has been established by a mere limited treatise of desiccated logic." The MMK establishes the meaning of such scriptural passages (by means of reasoning) and is, in turn, supported by them. See Ava: (1) P40a-4,5, D34b-1,2; (2) P40a-7,8, D34b-4; (3) P40b-6,7,8, D35a-2,3; (4) P41a-1,2, D35a-4,5; (5) P41a-5,6, D35a-7; and (6) P41b-1,2,3, D35b-3,4,5. See also Ames (1994), p. 134 n. 176, and Ames (1995), n. 203.

150Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P40a-5,6; D34b-3. I have not been able to locate this passage in the Sde dge bka' 'gyur edition of the sūtra.

151Avalokitavrata comments that "internal earth-element" refers to the internal āyatanas, i.e., the sense organs, while "external earth-element" refers to the sense objects. They are nondual in that neither exists by intrinsic nature. They cannot be divided into two, because the sense organs lack the quality of being grasping subjects (grahakatva) and the sense objects lack the quality of being graspable objects (grāhyatva). Thus because they are not different by intrinsic nature and cannot be distinguished as subject and object, they have one and the same defining characteristic; but that is no characteristic (since they have no intrinsic nature).

He adds that they are said to have one defining characteristic in order to reject the extreme (anta) of multiplicity (tha dad pa nyid, perhaps nānātva); they are said to have no defining characteristic in order to reject the extreme of oneness (ekatva). The nonapprehension of both extremes is the perfection of discernment (prajñā-pāramitā). See Ava P40a-8 to 40b-5, D34b-4 to 35a-1.

152Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P40b-5, D35a-1. This passage is found in the Sde dge bka' 'gyur, Mdo sde Kha 230b-2, where instead of ... bsregs pa na that ba yang med pa ltar ro, one has ... bsregs par gyur pa de bzhin du'o.

153Avalokitavrata remarks that similarly, the nonapprehension of any internal or external elements is the perfection of discernment. See Ava P40b6,7,8; D35a-2,3.
154 Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P40b-8, D35a-3. This same verse was quoted earlier in this chapter, in the commentary following MMK 3-2cd. See note 26.

155 Identified by Avalokitavrata simply as being "from other sūtrāntas." See Ava P41a-2, D35a-5.

156 Identified by Avalokitavrata only as being "from other Mahāyāna sūtras." See P41a-3, D35a-5,6. This quotation seems to be a rephrasing of a passage from the Mañjuśrī-vikrīditā-sūtra, found in the Sde dge bka' 'gyur, Mdo sde Kha 222a-3,4.

157 Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P41a-6, D35a-7 to 35b-1. Sanskrit text in Hikata (1958), p. 29. The one major difference between the Sanskrit and the Tibetan is that the Sanskrit has agocara iti (29.13) where the Tibetan has spyod yul zhes bya ba ni = gocara iti. Compare the similar quotation preceding MMK 1-9ab. See Ames (1994), p. 113.

158 rūpa as the first of the five aggregates. See note 6.

Translation of *Prajñāpradīpa*, Chapter Four: Examination of the Aggregates (*skandha*)

Now [Nāgārjuna] begins the fourth chapter with the aim of showing that the aggregates have no intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*), by means of refuting a particular counterposition (*vipakṣa*) [which holds] that the āyatanas exist.¹

At the end of the immediately preceding chapter, [Nāgārjuna] said,

One should understand that the auditory organ, the olfactory organ, the gustatory organ, the tactile organ, and the mind (*manas*)

Have been explained, [along with] the hearer, audible [sounds], and so on, by means of the visual organ. [MMK 3-8 (PSP 3-9)]

**Objection:** Therefore [our] fellow Buddhists² say:
[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the āyatanas do indeed exist,
[Reason:] because they are included (*bsdus pa*, probably *sāṃgrhīta*) in the aggregates.
[Dissimilar Example:] Here that which does not exist is not included in the aggregates of matter³ and so on, like a sky-flower.
[Application:] The internal āyatanas⁴ possess inclusion in the aggregates, for the ten material (*rūpin*) āyatanas⁵ are included in the aggregate of matter, while the āyatana of dharma is included in three aggregates and one part of the aggregate of matter,⁶ [and] the āyatana of mind is included in the aggregate of cognition (*vijñāna*).
[Conclusion:] Therefore, by the stated reason, in ultimate reality, the internal āyatanas do indeed exist.

**Answer:** Here, in brief, matter is twofold: elemental matter (*bhūta-rūpa*) and matter dependent on the elements (*bhautikarūpa*).⁷ Bringing all those [kinds of matter], which are different due to
distinctions of time and so on, under one [heading], they are called "the aggregate of matter."

As to that, to begin with, [we] will consider [the five aggregates] starting with matter, because the reason [in] the opponent's [syllogism] is held to be [the fact that the material āyatanas,] the eye and so on, are included [in the aggregate of matter], and because [matter] is easy to explain.

Matter\(^8\) is not apprehended apart from the cause (kāraṇa) of matter. [MMK 4-1ab]

"Matter" is what can be damaged.\(^9\) The cause of that is the cause of matter. What is that [cause]? The four great elements, earth and so on. "Apart from (nirmukta) those" [means] "if those are removed."\(^10\)

"Matter is not apprehended (upalabhyate)" [means that it is not apprehended] in ultimate reality. What then? For purposes of conventional designation, one designates "matter" in dependence on the cause of matter, the four great elements.\(^11\)

Thus this [first half of verse one] has indicated the property of matter which is to be proved, [namely,] that it is a mere combination ('dus pa; saṃghāta, etc.) of earth and so on; and [it has also indicated] the property of matter which proves [that, namely], that the cognition (buddhi) of that [matter] does not exist if [matter's] own cause is not grasped. The examples [are indicated] by virtue of that [property to be proved and proving property]; they are an army, a forest, and so on.\(^12\)

Here the inference is:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, matter does not exist as a real substance (dravya-sat),
[Reason:] because the cognition of that [matter] does not exist if [matter's] own cause is not grasped.
[Similar Example:] Here if the cognition of something does not exist when [that thing's] own cause is not grasped, that [thing] does not exist as a real substance, like an army and so
on.

[Application and Conclusion:] Likewise, since the cognition of matter does not exist if [matter's] own cause, earth and so on, is not grasped, matter also does not exist as a real substance.

Alternatively, there is also another way of formulation (sbyor ba'i lam, probably prayoga-mārga):

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the cognition of matter does not have as its object (viśaya) an entity which exists as a real substance,

[Reason:] because it is a cognition,

[Example:] like the cognition of a forest and so on.

Alternatively, there is still another way of formulation:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, this word "matter" does not have as its object a thing (padārtha) which exists as a real substance,

[Reason:] because it is a word,

[Example:] like the word "army" and so on.

Because cognition (vijñāna) and mental factors (caitta) are also of the same sort (rigs mthun pa, probably sajātiya) as [matter] which is to be established (sādhyā), they are to be negated in the same way. Therefore it is not the case that [our] reason is inconclusive.13

Objection:14

[Thesis:] Matter does exist in ultimate reality,

[Reason:] because the cognition of that [matter] does not cease although that [matter] has ceased.

[Dissimilar Example:] Here if the cognition of something ceases when [that thing] has ceased, that [thing] exists in superficial reality, like a jar.

[Application:] Although blue matter [or "visible form"] and so on have ceased, the cognition of them does not cease in that way.

[Conclusion:] Therefore matter exists as a real substance.

Answer: That is not good, because there is no agreement (anvaya) [with a similar example].15
Thus, to begin with, secondary matter (*upādiya-rūpa*)\(^{16}\) has been examined. Now [Nāgārjuna] will explain the subject of elemental matter.

**Objection:**

[Thesis:] Secondary matter does indeed exist,
[Reason:] because the cause of that [secondary matter] exists.
[Dissimilar Example:] Here no cause can be grasped for that which does not exist, like a sky-flower.
[Application:] Secondary matter has a cause, [namely,] those [elements] earth and so on.
[Conclusion:] Therefore secondary matter does indeed exist.

**Answer:** Therefore [Nāgārjuna] says,

Apart from matter, the cause of matter is also not seen.

[MMK 4-1cd]

Here apart from visible forms, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangibles - which have the defining characteristic of secondary matter - the cause of matter, [the elements] earth and so on, are also not seen and cannot be grasped.\(^{17}\) Here again, [this half of the verse] indicates the property of elemental matter which is to be proved, [namely,] that it is a mere combination of visible form and so on, and the property which proves [that, namely], that if visible form and so on are not seen, those [elements] earth and so on are also not seen. Therefore, by virtue of that [property to proved and proving property], the example is also manifest.

As to that, to begin with, here [I] will state a syllogism regarding earth (*prthivi*). Also, because [we] do not show that [the elements] are mere combinations in ultimate reality, [there is no conflict with our position that the elements are unoriginated in ultimate reality].\(^{18}\) Here the author of [this] treatise [Nāgārjuna], by showing that [the elements] are mere combinations [according to superficial reality], has shown just the negation of [their] existence as real substances [in ultimate reality], because the negation of that is of great importance (*mahārtha*). Why is it of
great importance? Because lack of intrinsic nature is established [in that way], since that which is a dependent designation (upādāya-prajñāpti) conventionally does not exist as a real substance in ultimate reality [and] therefore it [ultimately] has no origination.

As it is said in such [passages] as the following from the Ārya-laṅkāvatāra-sūtra: ¹⁹

Because cognition does not grasp [any] entity, apart from [mere] combinations (samavāya),
Therefore I say that [an entity] is empty and unoriginated and without intrinsic nature. [Laṅkāvatāra 3-88]
Here nothing at all originates or ceases by means of causal conditions.
Origination and cessation are also just mere causal conditions.
[Laṅkāvatāra 2-140 = 10-85]

Here the syllogism is:
[Thesis:] One should understand that in ultimate reality, earth does not exist as a real substance,
[Reason:] because that [earth] is not seen if the cause of that [earth] is not seen.
[Similar Example:] That which is not seen if [its] cause is not seen does not exist in ultimate reality as a real substance, like an army and so on.
Likewise, [syllogisms] should also be stated as appropriate in the cases of the cognition [of earth] and the word ["earth"].

Alternatively, [one shows that] apart from the cause of [secondary] matter, [namely,] those [elements] earth and so on, [secondary] matter which is different from them is not apprehended. The property of [secondary] matter [which proves that] is that it is not grasped if its own cause is not grasped. Here the syllogism is:
[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, [secondary] matter is not different from its own assembled (tshogs pa) parts (yan lag, āṅga or avayava),
[Reason:] because the cognition of that [secondary matter] does not exist if that [assemblage] is not grasped,

[Example:] like the own self of [the elements] earth and so on.

It is not the case that the meaning of [our] reason is unestablished, because here the activity (kriyā) is considered to reside in [its] direct object (karman), so that "not grasping" is a property of cognition.\(^{20}\)

**Objection:** The Sāmkhyas say: Since [we hold that] earth and so on are not different from visible form and so on, that [argument of yours merely] establishes what is [already] established [for us].\(^{21}\)

**Answer:** That is not good, because [our] negation of difference does not show nondifference\(^{22}\) and because [we] do not accept the nondifference maintained by the opponent, either.

**Objection:** The Vaiśeṣikas object that [our] reason is inconclusive, because in the case of a jar, the cognition of that [jar] exists even though a lamp [to illuminate it] is not grasped, provided that a source of illumination] different from that [lamp] exists.\(^{23}\)

**Answer:** That also is not good. [Our reason] is not inconclusive [1] because [we] have specified [as our reason], "because the cognition of that [matter] does not exist at all [if its parts are not apprehended]," and [2] because the proving property [in our syllogism] does not exist in [your] counterexample (vipakṣa), since the cognition of that [jar] exists even without a lamp, if the light of a jewel, a light-ray, a herb, the moon, or the sun is present. Because [we] have specified a qualified thesis, "[matter] is not different from its own assembled parts," a lamp is not a jar's own assembled part[s].\(^{24}\)

Also, [our reason] is not inconclusive because there is [ultimately] no counterexample [to nondifference], since below [Nāgārjuna] will show,

It is not possible for anything which is together with (sārdham) something to be different [from it], [MMK 14-4cd]

and] therefore it is not established that a jar is different from a
Objection: Real substances which have parts, such as an army, are composed [of those parts]. Therefore the example in [your] inferences proving that earth and so on do not exist as real substances, is not established.

Answer:

[Thesis:] The parts of an army do not compose a part-possessing real substance called an "army,"
[Reason:] because they are parts,
[Example:] like the parts of a tree, [its] roots, trunk, branches, twigs, and so on.

Alternatively, it is not the case that [our] example does not exist because

[Thesis:] That which is a part of that [elephant], complete in the elephant, does not compose a chariot or a horse, etc.,
[Reason:] because it does not exist in them,
[Example:] like threads (rgyu spun, literally "warp and weft") and so on.

Likewise,

Apart from matter, the cause of matter is also not seen.

[MMK 4-1cd]

Here also, one should state inferences extensively, employing a [property] to be proved and a property which proves [it] as before.

As [the elements] are not different from visible form and so on, so also earth, etc., are not nondifferent from [i.e., not the same as] visible form and so on. [This is so] because below nondifference will also be negated and because, due to [their] being nondifferent, either milk would just be curds or curds would just be milk; but [that] is not possible. Therefore the following [verse from the Ārya-lāṅkāvatāra-sūtra] is established:

An entity which is nondifferent or different from the group
(kalāpa) [of its causes and conditions][32] nowhere exists
In the way in which the spiritually immature have conceptually
constructed oneness and difference. [Laṅkāvatāra 3-102 =
10-598]

Therefore in that way, the meaning of the [opponent's] reason,
"because they are included in the aggregates," which was stated in
order to establish the āyatanas, is not established; or else [its]
meaning is contradictory.[33]

It is unintelligible that matter exists even apart from the cause
of matter. If [you] nevertheless suppose [so], [Nāgārjuna replies,]

If matter [existed] apart from the cause of matter, it would
follow that
Matter would be without a cause. [MMK 4-2ab,c1]

"The cause of matter" (rūpa-kāraṇa) [means] "the cause of the
existence of matter," because the middle word is not manifest,[34]
just as "the cause of fire" [means "the cause of the existence of
fire"]). "Apart from that (tannirmukte?)" [means] "apart from the
cause of matter (rūpakāranena nirmukte?);" the idea is [that this
means] "without the cause which shows the existence of matter."
"If matter [existed] (rūpe)" [means] "if one maintains that that
[matter] is like that because of a mere assertion (pratijñā-mātra)."
"It would follow that matter would be without a cause" means
'[matter] would not be possible." Since that also is not main-
ained, the stated fault [in your reason] is not avoided.

Objection: Those who hold that [things] have no cause
(ahetuvādin or nirhetuvādin)[35] say: Since [we] accept that all enti-
ties originate from no cause at all, the establishment of matter is
also similar to [the establishment of] those.

Answer: If there were anything of the kind which you have
scribed [i. e., something which originates without a cause], that
origination of matter without a cause] would also be possible; but
There is not any thing (*artha*) without a cause anywhere.  
[MMK 4-2c2,d]

Therefore, since there is no example [of a thing without a cause], that doctrine (*vāda*) is also without proof. Since we refuted those who hold that [things] have no cause at the very beginning [MMK 1-1], also, that [contention of theirs] is pointless.

*Objection:* Those who hope to be learned in the doctrine of the Sāmkhyas say: Since you have said that earth and so on are not different from visible form and so on, [you] have accepted their nondifference. Therefore,

*Thesis:* In ultimate reality, earth and so on can be known to exist as real substances,

*Reason:* because they are not different from visible form and so on,

*Example:* like the own self of visible form and so on.

*Answer:* Because, by the method which has been explained, nondifference is not established, the meaning of [your] reason is not established. [Your] example also does not exist, because the own self of visible form and so on have been rejected.

*Objection:*

*Thesis:* In ultimate reality, earth and so on do indeed exist,

*Reason:* because their results exist.

*Dissimilar Example:* Here that which does not exist has no result which can be grasped, as a sky-flower [has no result].

*Application:* Earth and so on do have results, visible form and so on.

*Conclusion:* Therefore earth and so on do indeed exist.

*Answer:*

If a cause of matter existed apart from matter, it would be a cause (*kārana*) without a result (*kārya*); [but] there is no cause without a result. [MMK 4-3]

For our position, if a cause of [secondary] matter, [that is, the
elements) earth and so on, existed apart from [secondary] matter, it would therefore be a cause without a result, because it would be a cause without a result due to the defining characteristic of the result, visible form and so on. [This is so] because [the cause would be] different [from the result], like rtsi rkyang\textsuperscript{36} and so on.\textsuperscript{37} "There is no cause without an result." The idea is that [this is so] because that [cause] also has the nature (-ātmaka) of a combination of visible form and so on.\textsuperscript{38}

Therefore there is the fault that the meaning of the previously stated reason, "because their result exists," is not established, since the result also, like the cause, is not established. If you state [that] as a reason which is generally common knowledge [in the world], [its] meaning is contradictory.\textsuperscript{39}

There is also another answer criticizing (dūṣaṇa) [the opponent's position]. Here\textsuperscript{40} if one conceptually constructs a cause of matter, it must be conceptually constructed for either existent or nonexistent matter. [Nāgārjuna] explains that [a cause] is possible for neither:

Even if matter existed, a cause of matter would not be possible. [MMK 4-4ab]

[This is so] because [matter already] exists, like a jar and a cloth which exist [already and therefore do not need a cause to produce them].

But even if it does not exist,

Even if matter did not exist, a cause of matter would not be possible. [MMK 4-4cd]

Earth and so on are considered [to be the cause of secondary matter]. The idea is that [a cause of nonexistent secondary matter is not possible] because [secondary matter] does not exist prior to [its] origination, like [something] different from that [secondary matter].\textsuperscript{41} Here the criticism (dūṣaṇa) explained in the chapter on
nonorigination (*anutpāda*) has been repeated; therefore one should understand that [MMK 4-4] is a statement of the [same] criticism [as MMK 1-6].

*Objection:* Those who hold that [things] have no cause say: [Matter] is just without a cause.

*Answer:* To them, [Nāgārjuna] replies,

Matter without a cause is not at all (*naiva naiva*) possible. [MMK 4-5ab]

The idea is that [this is so] because that is not accepted even in superficial reality.

Alternatively, [one may explain MMK 4-5ab as follows:]

*Objection:* The Vaibhāśikas say: Future matter also exists.

*Answer:* To them, [Nāgārjuna] replies,

Matter without a cause is not at all possible. [MMK 4-5ab]

The idea is that [this is so] because it is not established that the future, which has not appropriated a cause of [its] origination, which has not attained its own existence, exists even conventionally.

Because in that way matter having the nature of the elements and [matter having a nature] dependent on the elements are not possible in any way,

Therefore one should not construct any conceptual constructions concerning matter (*rūpa-gata*). [MMK 4-5cd]

[The verse refers to] one who is wise, [who] wishes to comprehend the reality of dharmas [or "the Dharma," *dharma-tattva*], which is quite free from conceptual construction, [and whose] eye of right cognition has fully opened. He or she should not conceptually construct [any of] the many conceptual constructions which have such objects as matter which exists as a real sub-
stance, which is different from [its] cause, or which is not different from [its] cause, or the distinctions of color and shape of those, etc. Those conceptual constructions are like the objects seen in a dream about a son who is not [yet] born, such as the son's [bodily] form and enjoyments, after one has awakened.

Therefore because in that way the cause of matter is not possible, [the reason in the opponent's last syllogism] is not free from the faults which [we] have stated.

Moreover,

**Objection:** Here the result is similar to [its] cause, by the defining characteristic that the qualities of the cause are seen also in the result, due to a continuous process.

**Answer:** To them, [Nāgārjuna] replies,

It is not possible [to say] that the result is similar (sadrśa) to the cause. [MMK 4-6ab]

It is not possible to teach that the result is similar to the cause. The meaning is that that cause is just not the result. Here [the fact] that the alleged cause is not the cause is the property to be proved; and the teaching that [cause and result] are similar is adduced [as] the property which proves [that]. The example [is indicated] by virtue of that [property to be proved and proving property]: "like a [similar] real substance in a different series." Here the syllogism is:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the alleged cause, blue threads, are not the cause of a blue blanket,

[Reason:] because they are similar [to it],

[Example:] just as [they are not the cause of] a blue blanket different from that [blue blanket allegedly caused by these blue threads].

**Objection:** Here the Sāṃkhyaśas say: Since it is not established that the alleged cause of the blue blanket is not also present in a blue blanket different from that, [your] example does not exist.

**Answer:** That is not good. [There is no fault in our example]
because [we] take as [our] example just what is established not to be the entity which is the cause of that [blanket] which occurs now.\textsuperscript{52} Also, there is no fault [in our example] because this negation [in the thesis of our syllogism] has its expressive force (\textit{mithu}, probably \textit{sakti} here) used up by just the negation of the meaning to be expressed [by] that word with which it is connected. [This is so] because that [negation] does not indicate a particular quality (\textit{vi\textashut{es}a}) of that [object of negation], as [in the negation,] "He is not a \textit{br\textashutan{a}}."\textsuperscript{53}

\textit{Objection:} [Our] fellow Buddhists,\textsuperscript{54} who hold that the result may be [either] similar or not similar to [its] cause, say: With regard to a subsequent moment which originates from a previous moment with a similar defining characteristic - as in [the flame of] a lamp, a stream of water, and so on - [the moment of the result] is similar to the moment of the cause; therefore [in this case, cause and result] are similar. With regard to a subsequent moment which originates from a previous moment with a dissimilar defining characteristic - as in [the origination of] ashes and curds [from] wood and milk [respectively], and so on - [the moment of the result] is not similar to the moment of the cause; therefore [in this case, cause and result] are not similar.

\textit{Answer:} In that connection, that result which is similar to [its] cause has been negated by the very inferences which [we] have [already] stated. Concerning that result which is not similar to its cause, [Nāgārjuna] says,

\begin{quote}
It is also not possible [to say] that the result is not similar to the cause. [MMK 4-6cd]
\end{quote}

Here also [the fact] that [the result, such as] a sprout, is not a result of the alleged cause, [such as a seed,] is the property to be proved; and the teaching that [cause and result] are not similar is adduced [as] the property which proves [that]. Therefore the remaining member [of the syllogism] is also manifest as before. Here the inference is:
Thesis: In ultimate reality, a sprout is not a result of its alleged cause,
Reason: because it is not similar to that alleged cause,
Example: like gravel and so on.

Objection:
Thesis: The seed ('bru, dhānya) is indeed the cause of the sprout,
Reasons: because [the sprout] occurs when that [seed] exists or because [the sprout] is conventionally designated by means of that [seed].
Examples: like the sound of a kettledrum or a barley-sprout.

Answer: That is not good. Since the origination of things supposedly possessing origination (utpattimat) has been negated in every way, [your] example is not established. Therefore [your syllogism] has the fault of being an incomplete proof.

Objection: Since the result of the eye, etc., [namely,] visual cognition, etc., is not similar to [the eye], your reason, "because it is not similar," is inconclusive.

Answer: That also is not good. Because visual cognition and so on are also of the same sort (rigs mthun pa, probably sajātiya) as what is to be established, they are likewise to be negated. Therefore since no counterexample (vipaksa) exists, there is no occasion for inconclusiveness [in our reason].

Alternatively, [the argument against the origination of sprouts from seeds or the origination of visual cognition from the eye] is similar to the method which has been stated, [that is,] "Because the alleged cause, earth and so on, are not the cause of secondary matter, visible form is not established. Therefore the meaning of the reason [in your syllogism preceding MMK 4-3], 'because their result exists,' is not established or is contradictory."

Objection: The Vaibhāsikas say: The result may be either similar or not similar to its cause, since we accept that the "nonobstructing cause" (byed pa'i rgyu, kārana-hetu) of a dharma conditioned (samskṛta) by a nonobstructing cause is every dharma other than itself. Therefore [your] example does not exist [since
a seed, for instance, is a nonobstructing cause of gravel].

_Ans wer:_ That is not good, because [we] wish to negate the particular efficacy (sādhana-tva) of the special (asādhāraṇa) cause which produces [something] of the same kind [as itself], etc. 60

Thus that section of the text [i.e., the first six verses of chapter four] has negated elemental matter and matter dependent on the elements; therefore it has been shown that the aggregate of matter is not possible. Now [Nāgārjuna] will show that the negation of [the other aggregates,] feeling and so on, also [proceeds by] the same method as the negation of matter.

For feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and mind (citta), 61

As well as all entities in general (sarvaśaṅk), the method (krama) is just the same as [for] matter. [MMK 4-7]

The idea is that [this is so] because the negation of feeling and so on also [proceeds by] the same method as the negation of matter. [Previously,] it was shown that

**Thesis:** in ultimate reality, matter does not exist as a real substance,

**Reason:** because the cognition (buddhi) of that [matter] does not exist if [matter's] own cause is not grasped,

**Example:** like an army and so on.

Likewise, one should understand in detail that

**Thesis:** in ultimate reality, feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition (vijnāna) also do not exist as real substances,

**Reason:** because if [their] own cause is not grasped, the cognition of them does not exist,

**Example:** like an army and so on.

It should be stated appropriately [in each case] that the causes of feeling and so on are contact (sparśa), the eye, visible form, light, space, attention, and so on. 62

[Previously,] it was shown that in ultimate reality, matter is not
different from its own causes because
[Thesis:] in ultimate reality, [secondary] matter is not different from its own assembled parts,
[Reason:] because the cognition of that [secondary matter] does not exist if that [assemblage] is not grasped,
[Example:] like the own self of [the elements] earth and so on. Likewise, it should be stated here also that in ultimate reality, feeling and so on are not different from their own causes. Here [the opponent's] criticisms and [our] answers to [his] criticisms are also as before.

[Nāgārjuna] mentions "all entities," although there is no conditioned dharma different from the aggregates, because he wishes to state a negation of the varieties of those [aggregates]. [Thus he mentions "all entities"] in order to negate [the idea] that conceptually constructed (parikalpita) [things], such as jars and cloths, exist as real substances and are different [from their causes]. Here also, as before, syllogisms should be stated as appropriate.

Thus because the aggregates are not established, the meaning of the reason [in the opponent's initial syllogism], "[because] they are included in the aggregates," is not established; and [his] example does not exist. Why [does his example not exist]? Because it does not exist [i.e., is not true] that [dharmas] which are included in the aggregates of matter and so on exist in ultimate reality.

Alternatively, the meaning of the reason is also contradictory, because what is included in the aggregates exists just conventionally.

Thus by that reasoning,

For that [opponent] who would give an answer (parīhāra) when [the Mādhyamika] has made a contention (vīgraha) by means of emptiness,
Everything is [in fact] unanswered. It becomes the same as what is to be proved (sādhyā). [MMK 4-8]
As to the defining characteristic of the examination of reality (tattva), if [the Mādhyamika] undertakes the examination of the ultimately real intrinsic nature of some entity, he makes a contention and disputation ('gyed pa, probably vivāda) by means of emptiness. [That is, he does so] following (parigrhya) the proof (parāmāna) that in ultimate reality, the āyatanas are without origination and do not exist as real substances. When [the Mādhyamika thus contends], for that [opponent] who speaks in reply by giving a rebuttal (uttaratarka), all those [contentions] are [in fact] unanswered. [This is so] because [his rebuttal] becomes the same as what is to be proved. The idea is that [the opponent's] rebuttal is not established because the examples and reasons which show that [rebuttal] are equally as unestablished as [the property] which is to be proved.

Likewise,

For that [opponent] who would utter a censure (upālambha) when [the Mādhyamika] has made an explanation (vyākhyāna) by means of emptiness,

Everything is [in fact] uncensured. It becomes the same as what is to be proved. [MMK 4-9]

If [the Mādhyamika] shows that the aggregates, āyatanas, and dhātuṣ have no intrinsic nature, he explains and analyzes the formulation by means of emptiness. When [the Mādhyamika thus explains], one whose intellect is contaminated by false means of knowledge (pramāṇa) utters a censure by [saying], "The aggregates and so on do indeed exist, because they are included in the [Four Noble] Truths and so on," etc. For that [opponent], all those [explanations] are also [in fact] uncensured and uncriticized (adūśita). The remainder of the statement is that [this is so] because it becomes the same as what is to be proved. Why? Since [that criticism] is similar to the object of [the Mādhyamika's] criticism, it is the same in general as the unprovenness of what is to be proved. [Thus ācārya Āryadeva] said,
One who sees one entity is considered to see all [entities].\(^79\)
Just that which is the emptiness of one is the emptiness of all.
\[\text{Catuḥśataka 8-16}\]

As to that, here the meaning of the chapter is that the aggregates have been shown to be without intrinsic nature, by means of stating the faults in the proof adduced [by the opponent] to show that the āyatanas exist.

Therefore those [scriptural] statements such as the following are established.\(^80\) [From the Bhagavatī-prajñāpāramitā-suvikrāntavikrāmi-paripṛcchā-sūtra,]\(^81\)

Suvikrāntavikrāmin, that which is a teaching belonging to [the doctrine of] the production (abhinirvṛtti-paryāpananirdeśa)\(^82\) of the five aggregates is not the perfection of discernment.\(^83\) Suvikrāntavikrāmin, matter is free from (apagata) the intrinsic nature of matter. Likewise, cognition is free from the intrinsic nature of feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition. That which is free from the intrinsic nature of matter, feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition is the perfection of discernment. Suvikrāntavikrāmin, matter lacks the intrinsic nature of matter (rūpaasvabhāva). Likewise, cognition lacks the intrinsic nature of feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition. That which lacks the intrinsic nature of matter, feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition is the perfection of discernment.

Likewise, [from the Ārya-brahma-višeṣa-cintā-paripṛcchāsūtra,]\(^84\)

I taught the aggregates to the world, [and] the world came to dwell on them.\(^85\)
One who is wise does not dwell on them and is not soiled by worldly dharmas.
The world has the defining characteristic of space, and space has no defining characteristic.
Therefore that [wise one], comprehending that, is not soiled by
worldly dharmas.

Likewise, [from the Vajracchedikā-praṇāpāramitā,]⁸⁶
A bodhisattva should not give a gift [while] basing himself (pratiṣṭhita) on visible forms, sounds, odors, tastes, tangibles, and dharmas.

Likewise, [from the Ārya-laṅkāvatāra-sūtra,]⁸⁷

The three spheres of samsāric existence (tribhava)⁸⁸ are mere designation (praṇāptimātra); they do not exist with the intrinsic nature of an entity (vastu-svabhāvataḥ).

Thinkers (tārakkīka) conceptually construct [them] as the nature of an entity [which is in fact mere] designation (praṇāptivastu-bhāvena). [Laṅkāvatāra 3-52 = 10-86]

If one examines [dharmas?] with the intellect, [their] intrinsic nature cannot be ascertained (nāvadhāryate).
Therefore they are taught to be inexpressible and without intrinsic nature. [Laṅkāvatāra 2-175 = 10-167]

The fourth chapter, "Examination of the Aggregates," of the Prajñāpradīpa, a commentary on [Nāgārjuna's] Mūlamadhyamaka composed by ācārya Bhavyakara/Bhavyakāra (legs ldan byed)⁸⁹ [is concluded].

Notes to Translation of Chapter Four

¹See Ava P42a-1, D36a-3,4; read as D.
²Ava P42b-2 has rang gi sde pa dang mdo sde pa bye brag tu smra ba dag; D36b-3 has rang gi sde pa mdo, sde pa dang bye brag tu smra ba dag. Read rang gi sde pa mdo, sde pa dang bye brag tu smra ba dag, "[our] fellow Buddhists, the Sautrāntikas and Vaibhāsikas."
³As pointed out in note 6 to the translation of chapter three, rūpa as the first of the five skandhas is "matter" in general. As one of the twelve āyatanas or eighteen dhātus, rūpa has the more restricted sense of "visible form." See the references in the note mentioned.
⁴The internal (ādhyātmika) āyatanas are the six sense organs, the five physical sense organs plus the mind (manas). The external (bāhya) āyatanas are the corresponding six sense objects (with dharmas as the object of mind). See AK
Oddly enough, the opponent refers here to the internal āyatana and then goes on to speak of all twelve. Samghabhadra mentions a view according to which the sense objects were to be considered as internal in any moment when they serve as conditions for the arising of cognition, and as external in any moment when they do not serve as such conditions. (I would like to thank Collett Cox for this information.)

That is, the five physical sense organs and the five corresponding sense objects.

The three aggregates referred to are feeling (vedanā), perception/conception (samjñā), and mental formations (samskārah). "One part of the aggregate of matter" refers to the avijñapti posited by the Vaibhāsikas. It is considered to be material and thus to belong to the rūpa-skandha; but since it is held to be an object only of the mind and not of the physical senses, it belongs to the dharma-āyatana. See Ava P42b-7, 8; D36b-7 to 37a-1. On avijñapti, see LVP AK I, pp. 21, 25-7, and IV, pp. 3, 14-27.

On the four great elements (mahābhūta), earth, water, fire, and air (understood as solidity, cohesion, heat, and motion), and matter dependent on them, see LVP AK I, pp. 21-24, 64-67 and II, pp. 144-149, 313-315. See also May (1959), pp. 88-89, n. 184.

"Matter" is here taken to mean "matter dependent on the elements" (bhautika). Thus the elements are its cause. See Ava P43b-3, 4; D37b-3.

 gzugs zhes bya ba ni gzugs su rung ba'o, probably either rūpanād rūpa iti or rūpyata iti rūpa. On the various interpretations given to rūpanād/rūpyata, see LVP AK I, pp. 24-25 and notes.

bsal is an alternative spelling of bsa. (In fact, Ava P43b-4, D37b-3 has bsa na for btsal na.) The Sanskrit may be nirākṛta.

According to Avalokitavrata, matter dependent on the elements is designated in dependence on the elements in the same way that a forest is designated in dependence on its constituent trees. See Ava P43b-5, 6, 7; D37b-4, 5.

In other words, the meaning of MMK 4-1ab is the following, according to Bhāaviveka: Matter dependent on the elements does not exist by intrinsic nature because it is a mere combination of the elements. This is so because matter dependent on the elements is not apprehended apart from the elements, just as a forest is not perceived if the trees which make it up are not perceived. See Ava P43b-7 to 44a-2, D37b-6 to 38a-1.

According to Avalokitavrata, this paragraph is a response to an objection of the Ābhidhārmikas, who hold that mind and mental factors exist as real substances. They charge that the Mādhyamika's reason, "because it is a word," is inconclusive. Although the word "army" does not refer to a real substance, the words "mind" and "mental events" do. The Mādhyamika retorts that he also negates the ultimately real existence of mind and mental events. See Ava P44b-4, 5, 6; D38b-2, 3. The phrase "of the same sort as what is to be established" alludes to MMK 4-8 and 4-9.

Avalokitavrata attributes this objection to "fellow Buddhists."
For the Mādhyamikas, nothing exists as a real substance or in ultimate reality. Hence there is no example which the opponent can cite. "upādāya-rūpa, "secondary matter," is synonymous with bhautika-rūpa, "matter dependent on the elements."

This may be a reference to the Vaibhāṣikas' theory that matter can only exist in the form of molecules (samghața-paramāṇu) composed of four atoms (dravya-paramāṇu) of the elements and varying numbers of atoms of secondary matter. Thus the elements are also dependent on secondary matter for their manifestation. See AK 1-35d, AK 2-22, and LVP AK II, pp. 144-149.

The Sanskrit text is in Nanjio (1923). Verse 3-88 is on p. 200; verse 2-140 is on p. 84. In 2-140c, the Tibetan seems to correspond to something like upādaś ca nirdhaś ca, while the Sanskrit has uṭpadyante nirudhyante. In 2-140d, the Tibetan has ‘ba’ zhiģ. kevalāḥ for the Sanskrit’s kalpitāḥ. Note also that Bhāvaviveka quotes only the second two (out of three) lines of 3-88.

According to Avalokitaśrītā, an opponent objects that since "matter" is the subject of Bhāvaviveka's thesis, the "not grasping" mentioned in the reason must be a property (dharma) of matter; but that is absurd because matter is unconscious and cannot grasp (i.e., perceive) anything in any case. Bhāvaviveka replies that an activity (kriyā) resides in both its agent (karti) and its object (karmā). Here the activity is "not grasping:" the agent is cognition (buddhi); and the object is matter. Thus "not grasping" is a property of cognition. See Ava P47b-2 to 48a-4, D41a-4 to 41b-5.

Since the Sāṁkhyaśas hold that everything (except puruṣa) is composed of the three gunas of prakṛiti, for them all entities are nondifferent in any case. See Ava P48a-5, 6; D41b-6, 7 and Larson and Bhattacharya (1987), pp. 65-73.

Avalokitaśrītā points out that the negation here is a simple negation, not an implicative negation. See Ava P48a-8, D42a-1, 2.

The Vaiśeṣikas mean that even if the assemblage of its parts is not apprehended, matter might be apprehended by some other means, just as a jar may be seen by means of various sources of illumination. See Ava P48b-3 to 8, D42a-3 to 42b-1. The Vaiśeṣikas hold that wholes are different entities from the sum of their parts. See Sinha (1956), pp. 596-6; Frauwallner (1973), Vol. II, pp. 117-8; and Potter (1977), pp. 74-79.

Bhāvaviveka replies that he does not argue that matter is not different from its causes in general, but specifically that it is not different from its own assembled parts. Unlike the Vaiśeṣikas' example of a lamp and a jar, the apprehension of matter's assembled parts is a necessary condition for the apprehension of matter, whereas a jar can be illuminated by something other than a lamp. Moreover, it is obvious that a lamp is not a jar's own assembled parts, so the Vaiśeṣika's alleged counterexample is not comparable to Bhāvaviveka's thesis. See especially Ava P49b-2 to 6, D43a-2 to 5.

Literally, they "possess composition" (rtsom pa, arambha). On the Vaiśeṣikas' arambhavāda, another term for asaṅkāryavāda, see Frauwallner (1973),
According to Avalokitavrata, because they are parts according to superficial reality, they do not compose a part-possessing real substance in ultimate reality. See Ava P50b-3,4; D44a-2,3.

That is, according to Avalokitavrata, the property to be proved is that the elements are a mere combination of visible form and so on; and the property which proves that is the fact that if visible form and so on are not seen, the elements are also not seen. See especially Ava P51a-8 to 51b-1, D44b-6.

Avalokitavrata points out that the negations of difference and sameness are simple negations, not implicative negations. See P51b-6 to 52a-1, D45a4,5,6.

If the negation of difference must imply sameness, then because milk and curds are not different (since curds are a transformation of milk), they would have to be identical; but that is absurd. Compare Ava P52a-2,3,4; D45a-7 to 45b-2 and MMK 13-6.

See Ava P52a-6, D45b-3. The Sanskrit text is in Nanjio (1923), pp. 202 and 339. In the first pāda, 3-102a has 'nyonyah while 10-598a has hy anyah. The Tibetan here, gzhan pa ma yin, corresponds to ananyah. Also, both Sanskrit verses have tirthyair in the fourth pāda, while the Tibetan corresponds to bālair.

See Ava P52a-7, D45b-4.

If the reason refers to ultimate reality, it is not established. If it refers to superficial reality, it is contradictory to try to prove a positive thesis about ultimate reality with a reason which is only conventionally valid. Compare Ava P52b-4, D45b-1.

bar gyi tshig mi mngon pa'i phyir, probably madhya-pada-pralopāt.

"Lokāyatas and so on," according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P53a-8, D46b-3.

rtsi rkyang is defined as rtswa zhig, "a [kind of] grass," in Chos kyi grags pa (1957), s. v.

The idea may be that grass is a purely conventional entity and thus is different from the elements if, as the opponent holds, they exist in ultimate reality. Secondary matter, too, only exists conventionally and thus would be ontologically different from its alleged cause. See the following note.

Avalokitavrata's interpretation of this passage is as follows: If you (the opponent) hold that the elements exist in ultimate reality, then it follows that they would have no result. This is so because in ultimate reality, their supposed result, secondary matter, is empty of intrinsic nature. But if you hold that secondary matter exists in superficial reality while the elements exist in ultimate reality, then one cannot be the cause of the other, because of their (ontological) difference. See Ava P55a-3 to 8, D47a-4 to 7.

According to Avalokitavrata, since the elements are a mere combination of secondary matter, visible form and so on, they have no intrinsic nature in ultimate reality. See Ava P55b-1, D48b-1.

Once again, the reason is not established in ultimate reality. While it may be valid conventionally, it cannot prove a positive thesis concerning ultimate reality.
realistically. In ultimate reality, according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P55b-7, D48b-6.

In other words, consider the time at which the cause allegedly produces a result. If the result exists at that time, its production by a cause is superfluous. If it does not exist at that time, one might as well say that the cause produces a sky-flower, since the result is nonexistent. Compare Ava P56a-2,3,4; D49a-2,3. Such an analysis depends on the idea that a seed, for instance, is the cause of a sprout only at the moment when it actually produces it.

See Ava P56a-4 to 7, D49a-4,5,6. Although the title of the first chapter of the MMK is pratyaya-parikṣā in all the commentaries, Bhāvaviveka often refers to it as dealing with anutpāda, as indeed it does.

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A result is said to "appropriate (upā-dō)" its causes; see, for instance, PSP 259.1-5.

That is, the bodhisattva who has attained receptivity to the fact that dharmas do not originate (anutpattika-dharma-ksānti). See Ava P57a-1 to 57b-1, D50a-1 to 50b-1. This attainment is said to occur on the eighth bodhisattva-bhūmi. See Lamotte (1976), pp. 290-1.

That is, the bodhisattva who has attained anutpattika-dharma-ksānti has awakened from the sleep of samsāra and realizes that the objects which he used to conceptually construct have no intrinsic nature. See Ava P57a-4 to 57b-1, D50a-4 to 50b-1.

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In other words, our example is Devadatta's presently existing blanket; and the opponent must admit that the threads presently existing in Yajñadatta's blanket are not the cause of Devadatta's presently existing blanket. See Ava P58b-5 to 8, D51b-2,3,4.

When Bhāvaviveka says that in ultimate reality, threads are not the cause of the blue blanket, it is a simple negation. It does not imply that the threads exist in ultimate reality as a noncause of the blanket. See Ava P59a-1 to 5, D51b-5 to 52a-1.
54 The Ābhidhārmikas, according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P59a-7, D52a-2,3.
55 The eye is material (rūpin), and visual cognition is not. See Ava P60b1,2,3; D53a-4,5.
56 That is, the origination of visual cognition from the eye and the origination of a sprout from a seed are both instances of a result's arising from a dissimilar cause. Thus they are both equally in need of proof. See Ava P60b-3,4,5; D53a-7 to 53b-1.
57 On this line of argument, see MMK 4-8 and 4-9, with Bhāvaviveka's commentary.
58 See Ava P60b-8 to 61b-1, D53b-2 to 54a-3, for an explicit statement of the analogous argument.
59 Every dharma is said to be the kārana-hetu of every conditioned dharma other than itself, in the sense that it does not obstruct its origination (necessarily, since we only consider dharmas which exist at some time or other and thus do originate). See AK 2-50a and LVP AK II, pp. 246-8; see also Ava P61b-2 to 7, D54a-3 to 7. One might expect kārana-hetu to mean something like "productive cause;" and the Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya tells us that this is its primary (pradhāna) meaning (see LVP AK II, p. 247). All dharmas other than the productive cause are also called kārana-hetu, however, in the extended sense of not obstructing origination.
60 That is, we are only concerned with the productive cause and not with kārana-hetu in the broad sense. See Ava P62a-1,2,3; D54b-1,2,3.
61 Here Nāgārjuna uses citta as the name of the fifth skandha, in place of the more usual vijnāna, apparently for metrical reasons.
62 According to Avalokitavrata, contact is mentioned as the special (asādharana) cause of feeling. The eye and the rest are mentioned as the special causes of visual cognition and its conjoined mental factors (samprayukta-caitta; see AK 2-23a,34 and LVP AK II, pp. 177-8). The mental factors belong, variously, to the three aggregates of feeling, perception/conception, and mental formations. See Ava P62b-8 to 63a-6, D55a-7 to 55b-5.
63 Avalokitavrata says that opponents might conceptually construct jars, cloths, etc., and use them as reasons and examples in arguments which attempt to refute the Mādhyamika's arguments concerning the aggregates. Avalokitavrata also adds nondifference [from the cause] as something which the Mādhyamika negates. See Ava P63b-8 to 64a-3, D56a-6 to 56b-1.
64 Avalokitavrata spells out syllogisms for a jar and a cloth parallel to those already given for matter. See Ava P64a-3 to 64b-1, D56b-2 to 7.
65 In his opening syllogism at the beginning of this chapter, the opponent gives a dissimilar example, a sky-flower, which does not exist and is not included in the aggregates. Here Bhāvaviveka is saying that things which are included in the aggregates do not exist in ultimate reality, either. See Ava P64b-3 to 6, D57a-1,2,3.
66 Again, it is contradictory to try to prove a positive thesis about ultimate reality with a reason that holds only conventionally. See Ava P64b-6,7; D57a-3,4.
That is, by the reasoning which has been explicitly formulated here for matter and then extended to all dharmas. See Ava P64a-8 to 65a-1, D57a-5.

The Mādhyamika’s argument that all dharmas are empty of intrinsic nature is called a "contention" because it is directed against those who hold that entities do have intrinsic nature. See Ava P65a-2,3; D57a-6,7. Candrakīrti is more explicit: tatra parakṣadāsanam vīgraḥah, "there vīgraḥa is criticism of another’s position." He glosses vīgrahe ... krtte as sasvabhāvāvāde pratisiddhe, "when the doctrine that [things] have intrinsic nature has been negated." (See PSP 127.5,6.)

Avalokitārvrata gives the following example: An opponent replies to the Mādhyamika’s argument that such-and-such a thing is empty of intrinsic nature by saying that it is not empty because its cause exists. But this is no answer, because the cause is just as empty of intrinsic nature as the thing in question. See Ava P65a-4 to 7, D57a-8 to 57b-3.


don dam pa, paramārtha, glossed by Avalokitārvrata as don dam pa pa, pāramārthika. See Ava P65b-1,2; D57b-5.

The sentence up to this point is paraphrased by Avalokitārvrata as, "If when he examines the defining characteristic of the reality of all dharmas, he then undertakes the examination of the ultimately real intrinsic nature of some external or internal entity..." See Ava P65b-2, D57b-5.

Avalokitārvrata says that the proof of nonorigination is given in chapter one and the proof of not existing as a real substance is given in this chapter. See Ava P65b-3 to 8, D57b-6 to 58a-3. In general, pramāṇa means "valid means of knowledge;" but since the pramāṇa in question here is anumāṇa, "inference," I have translated it as "proof."

Since no dharma originates by intrinsic nature or exists as a real substance, there is no example and no proof which the opponent can successfully adduce. See Ava P66a-7 to 66b-4, D58b-2 to 5.

The eighteen dhātus are the twelve āyatanas (the six sense organs and the six sense objects) plus the six corresponding sense cognitions (e. g., the eye, visible form, and visual cognition).

Byor ba rnam par dbye ba byas te| rnam par bshad pa’i tshe, apparently glossing vyākyāne ... krtte as vyākyāne prayoga/yogā/vidhi-vibhāge krtte. Avalokitārvrata seems to say that it means analyzing the same formulation that the Mādhyamika used when he made a contention by means of emptiness. He may also be referring to the technical sense of yoga-vibhāga. See Ava P67a6,7; D59a-6,7. On the technical sense of yoga-vibhāga, see Ames (1994), p. 133 n. 172 and Ames (1995) n. 74.

See Ava P67b-4, D59b-4.

The entities cited by the opponent in his reason and example are included in the Mādhyamika’s original criticism that all entities are not established by intrinsic nature. Therefore one can state in general that they are just as unestablished as
what the opponent is trying to establish by means of them. See Ava P67b-7 to 68a-3, D59b-7 to 60a-3.

The Sanskrit of this ardha-śloka is bhāvavāiśākṣya yo draṣṭā draṣṭā sarvāya sa smṛtaḥ, "One who is a seer of one entity is considered to be a seer of all" (quoted PSP 128.3,4). See also Lang (1986), pp. 82-3.

See note 149 to the translation of chapter three. Avalokitavrata's remarks here are similar. See Ava P68a-6 to 68b-1, D60a-6,7; P68b-2, D60b-1; P68b-8, D60b-5,6; P69a-5,6, D61a-3; P69a-7,8, D61a-4,5; and P69b-3,4,5, D61a-7 to 61b-2.

Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P68b-1, D60a-7.

Avalokitavrata explains abhinirvṛtti-paryāpatti-nirdeśa as skye bar bsdus pa ston pa, "a teaching summed up in origination." See Ava P68b-2,3; D60b-1,2.

The Sanskrit text of this sentence is found in Hikata (1958), p. 37. The remainder of the passage is found on p. 29 of the same work.

Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P68b-7, D60b-5. See note 100 to the translation of chapter five.

de la ... gnas par gyur. Avalokitavrata glosses gnas par gyur as chags shing lhaṅ par chags par gyur, "became attached and clung." See Ava P68b-8 to 69a-1, D60b-6,7.

Identified by Avalokitavrata as the Ārya-trīśatikā-[prajñāpāramitā]-sūtra, another title of the sūtra; see Ava P69a-4,5; D61a-2. The Sanskrit text is in Conze (1957), p. 29.

Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P69a-6, D61a-4. The Sanskrit text is in Nanjio (1923). Verse 3-52 is on p. 168; verse 2-175 is on p. 116.

The three bhavas are the same as the three dhātuś, i. e., the realms of desire (kāma), form (rūpa), and formlessness (ārūpya).

See note 159 to my translation of chapter three.
Translation of \textit{Prajñāpradīpa}, Chapter Five:  
Examination of the Elements (\textit{dhātu})\textsuperscript{1}

Now [Nāgārjuna] begins the fifth chapter with the aim of showing that the elements have no intrinsic nature by means of negating a particular counterposition (\textit{vipakṣa}) to emptiness.\textsuperscript{2}

\textit{Objection:} Because [Nāgārjuna] stated, in the immediately preceding chapter, that

Apart from matter, the cause of matter is also not seen,  
[MMK 4-1cd]

therefore, to begin with, [our] fellow Buddhists say: Here the Blessed One taught the defining characteristics (\textit{lakṣana}) of the six elements called "earth, water, fire, air, space (\textit{ākāśa}), and cognition (\textit{vijñāna})," by saying, "Great king, these six elements are the person (\textit{purusa})."\textsuperscript{3} [Those characteristics are, respectively,] solidity, cohesion, heat, motion, providing room (\textit{skabs 'byed pa}, perhaps \textit{avakāśa-dāna}), and knowing (\textit{rnam par shes par byed pa}, probably \textit{vijñānanā}). It is not taught that nonexistent [things] like a sky-flower and so on are the cause of a person. Therefore that assertion (\textit{pratijñā}) made by the ācārya [Nāgārjuna], that the cause of matter does not exist even in earth and so on, will conflict with what [he himself] accepts.\textsuperscript{4}

[The Mādhyamika] may reply that there is no fault [in his position] because he accepts that the Tathāgata taught that conventionally, the six elements are the person.

[If so, we respond that] it is not the case that there is no fault [in the Mādhyamika's position], because it is accepted that [that statement] is taught as ultimate reality.

[The Mādhyamika] may reply that since that is not established,\textsuperscript{5} [his alleged fault] is not [logically] possible.

[If so, we respond that] it is not the case that it is not established.
[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the elements, earth and so on, do
indeed exist,
[Reason:] because their defining characteristics exist.
[Dissimilar Example:] Here that of which the Blessed One has
said, "It does not exist in ultimate reality," has no defining
characteristic, like a sky-flower.
[Application:] Earth and so on have the defining characteristics
of solidity and so on.
[Conclusion:] Thus because their defining characteristics exist, the
elements, earth and so on, do indeed exist.

*Answer:* As to that, here it is easy to show that the intrinsic
nature of space is empty; and it is also easy to negate the remain­ing
elements by showing that that [intrinsic nature of space] does
not exist. Therefore, the ācārya [Nāgārjuna] says, with reference
just to the element of space,

There is not any space prior to the defining characteristic of
space. [MMK 5-1ab]

The idea is that [this is so] because they are inseparable (dbyer med
*pa,* perhaps abhedya).

Here, since the Vaibhāsikas teach that space is just nonobstruc­tion (anāvaraṇa), nonobstruction itself is space. But since
[they attempt to] prove also that that [space] exists, that which is
to be proved by the existence of nonobstruction and [the reason]
which proves [it] are [both] not established. For instance, [as in
the fallacious proof,] "Sound is impermanent because it is imper­
manent," likewise, here also it would be said [in effect] that space
exists because it is space.

Alternatively, [one may explain MMK 5-1ab as follows:]

*Objection:* [Fellow Buddhists] who are averse to the doctrine
(naya) of the *Madhyamaka-śāstra* say: [We] do not accept [any]
difference of the thing characterized (laksya) and [its] defining
characteristic (laksana), due to which [difference] that [space]
would not be possible [either] sequentially or simultaneously [with
its defining characteristic. For example, it is not [logically] possible that the great man (*mahāpurusa*) is different from the marks of the great man. Here [we] say that that is a characteristic because it is to be characterized,\(^{10}\) since a primary affix (*bya ba'i rkyen*, probably *krt-pratyaya*) is used in [the sense of] the direct object (*karman*).\(^{11}\)

**Answer:** Even if those [i.e., the characteristic and the thing characterized] are accepted in that way,\(^{12}\) [nevertheless,]

There is not any space prior to the defining characteristic of space. [MMK 5-1ab]

If space itself is [its own] defining characteristic, to use (*nye bar sbyor bar byed pa*) [that] in order to establish that [space] by means of that [space] itself cannot be a [valid] reason, because the meaning [of that reason] is not established. Therefore what would establish what?\(^{13}\)

**Objection:** It is common knowledge that conventionally existent space is nonobstruction.

**Answer:** A reason is not required (*isyate*) in order to show that [well-known conventional existence of space].

**Objection:** Because [the existence of space] in ultimate reality is not common knowledge, one should strive to show [that it is] so.

**Answer:** Even in that [case], there are faults of the reason and example,\(^{14}\) [so that your syllogism] remains a mere assertion.

Alternatively, [one may also explain MMK 5-1ab as follows:]

**Objection:** The *Vaibhāṣikas* and *Vaiśeṣikas* say: Space exists as a substance (*dravya*) and is unconditioned.\(^{15}\)

**Answer:** To them, [Nāgārjuna] says,

There is not any space prior to the defining characteristic of space. [MMK 5-1ab]

[This half-verse] sets forth the thesis, [understood as referring to space] which is a substance. [The fact] that that [space] is unorigi-
nated, which is common knowledge to both sides [the Mādhyamika and the opponent], is the [proving] property. The example, a hare's horn and so on, [is indicated] by virtue of that [property to be proved and proving property]. Here the inference is:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, space does not exist as a substance,
[Reason:] because it is unoriginated,
[Example:] like a hare's horn.
Likewise, reasons such as "because it has no cause," "because it has no result," "because it does not exist," etc., should also be stated.

**Objection:** Space is the defining characteristic of sound.

**Answer:** For those [who hold that position], also, since sound itself is space, the fault in the reason is as before.

**Objection:** If this meaning [which you have explained] were the intention of the author of the treatise [Nāgārjuna], in that case, the author of the treatise would simply have said that

There is not any space which is different from the defining characteristic of space.

**Answer:** [Nāgārjuna] establishes the negation of difference just by showing that priority and posteriority are not possible. Therefore that [objection of yours] does not contradict [my explanation].

**Objection:** The Vaiśeśikas assert that the thing characterized and [its] defining characteristic are different.

**Answer:**

[Thesis:] If those two [i. e., the thing characterized and its defining characteristic] are different, they will also sometimes be antecedent and subsequent,
[Reason:] because they are different,
[Example:] like a jar and a cloth.
Therefore [Nāgārjuna] says,

If [space] were prior to [its] defining characteristic, it would
follow that it would be without a defining characteristic. [MMK 5-1cd]

"Without a defining characteristic" (mtshan nyid med pa, alaksanā) [means] "having no defining characteristic" (mtshan nyid yod pa ma yin pa, perhaps asal-laksāna or avidyamānalaksāna). The meaning is that that [space] would not be something characterized [by the defining characteristic, nonobstruction, as] alleged [by the opponent].

If [space] were prior to [its] defining characteristic: [MMK 5-1c]

This [pāda] indicates that difference of time is the [proving] property of that [subject, space]. Here the inference is:
[Thesis:] Space is not something characterized by [its] alleged defining characteristic,
[Reason:] because it exists at a time earlier than that [alleged defining characteristic],
[Example:] like [something] other that that [space].
Alternatively, [one may explain MMK 5-1cd as follows:]22

It would follow that [space] would not belong to [its alleged] defining characteristic (alaksanā). [MMK 5-1d]

"Not belonging to the defining characteristic" (mtshan nyid la med pa, perhaps laksanasya nāsti) [is the sense of] alaksanā. The meaning is that that [space] would not have [the property of] being something characterized (laksyatva).

If [space] were prior to [its] defining characteristic: [MMK 5-1c]

[Here] "space" is the topic under discussion (skabs). This [pāda] indicates that the difference of the defining characteristic from the
thing characterized is the [proving] property of that [subject, the defining characteristic]. Here the inference is:

[Thesis:] The alleged defining characteristic cannot characterize the thing characterized, space,

[Reason:] because it is different [from space],

[Example:] like [a defining characteristic] different from that [alleged defining characteristic].

If the thing characterized and its defining characteristic are different, it contradicts the opponent's own inference, [since] he does not maintain that the defining characteristic does not belong to the thing characterized and the defining characteristic. Therefore the conceptual construction of difference should also be abandoned.

**Objection:** Because they cannot be turned back [even] with a stick, [our opponents say:] If [we] state a reason pertaining to superficial reality (sāmyrta-hetu), it is not the case that the meaning of [our] reason is not established; but it is difficult to avoid [its] having a contradictory meaning. Therefore it is not established that a defining characteristic is a different thing (artha) [from the thing that it characterizes] or that it is a nondifferent thing. Hence space is [an entity] "without a defining characteristic" (alaksana).

**Answer:** It is also unintelligible that that [space] is an entity without a defining characteristic. For,

There is not any entity anywhere without a defining characteristic. [MMK 5-2ab]

An ultimately real entity [without a defining characteristic] is not established anywhere, [for] the position of others or [for] our own position.

**Objection:** [Thesis:] The thing characterized, space, does indeed exist, [Reason:] because a defining characteristic applies to that.

**Answer:** Specifying that that is also not [logically] possible, [Nāgārjuna says,]
If an entity without a defining characteristic does not exist, to what does the defining characteristic apply (kramatām)? [MMK 5-2cd]

Since there is no basis (gziḥi) [to which the defining characteristic might apply], the [opponent's] reason, like [that] basis, is not established. [That is,] the reason, [the defining characteristic's] applying [to the thing characterized], is not established for a nonexistent object (viśaya). Therefore there will be the fault that the meaning of the reason is not established.

Alternatively, [one may explain MMK 5-2cd as follows:] In the case of nondifference, [that is,] if the thing characterized and the defining characteristic are nondifferent, that [thing] itself cannot characterize that [very thing]. Because a defining characteristic different from that [space] does not exist, space has no defining characteristic.

Also, in the case [where the thing characterized and the defining characteristic] are different,
[Thesis:] The alleged defining characteristic is not the defining characteristic of the thing characterized,
[Reason:] because it is different [from that thing],
[Example:] like [a defining characteristic] different from that [alleged defining characteristic].

Since a defining characteristic does not exist, by that [argument] also, space has no defining characteristic. If an entity without a defining characteristic, called "space," does not exist, to what will the defining characteristic apply? The meaning is that it is just not established that that [defining characteristic] applies [to anything].

Moreover, the meaning of that reason [of yours], "[because the defining characteristic] applies to the thing characterized," [is the following:] Here the thing characterized is known by means of that necessary connection (med na mi 'byung ba, avinābhāva) of this defining characteristic with the properties, existence and so on, of the thing characterized. But when, for our position,
A defining characteristic does not apply \((pravṛtti)\) to [a thing] which has no defining characteristic nor to one which does have a defining characteristic. [MMK 5-3ab]

then the idea is that [this is so] because a defining characteristic is not established for a nonexistent [thing which has no defining characteristic] and because an entity which has a defining characteristic is also not established.

A thing characterized which is different in kind \((vilakṣaṇa)\) from the sort which has been described,\(^{29}\) is also not established. Therefore,

\[\text{[A defining characteristic] also does not apply to something other than [a thing] which has a defining characteristic and [a thing] which has no defining characteristic. [MMK 5-3cd]}\]

Therefore in that way, the meaning of what you maintain is not established in ultimate reality, because it is not established that a defining characteristic applies to a contradictory \((viruddha)\) entity, and because there is no example.\(^{30}\)

Alternatively, [one may explain MMK 5-3 as follows:] Because that defining characteristic does not exist in [things] without a defining characteristic, such as sky-flowers, etc., it does not apply [to them]. That [fact] is common knowledge.

Now, [as for] "nor to one which has a defining characteristic" [MMK 5-3b2], that initial mention \((skabs, \text{probably } prastāva)\) of [the idea] that a defining characteristic does not apply to [a thing] which has a defining characteristic, sets forth the thesis. The [proving] property of that [defining characteristic] is that it is a defining characteristic of [a thing] "which has a defining characteristic" if it is [already] characterized by some defining characteristic. By virtue of that [property to be proved and proving property], the example is defining characteristics other than that [alleged defining characteristic]. Here the inference is:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, nonobstruction is not the defining
characteristic of space,
[Reason:] because it is a defining characteristic,
[Example:] like solidity and so on.

Objection: Those who have a twofold doctrine say: A defining characteristic applies to [a thing] which [both] has a defining characteristic and does not have a defining characteristic, according to the mode (rtam grangs las, probably paryāyena). Therefore there is no fault [in our position].

Answer: In order to refute that [position] also, [Nāgārjuna] says,

[A defining characteristic] also does not apply to something other than [a thing] which has a defining characteristic and [a thing] which has no defining characteristic. [MMK 5-3cd]

That, too, is not [logically] possible [1] because an entity which has the nature of both is not possible and [2] because relational determination (bltos pa'i nges pa) will also be negated below in chapter [ten], "Examination of Fire and Fuel," and [3] because the two faults shown in both cases [separately] will come about.34

[Buddhāpālīta's commentary:] [Buddhāpālīta] says:

A defining characteristic does not apply to [a thing] which has no defining characteristic. [MMK 5-3a,b1]

Here, because in that way there is not any entity without a defining characteristic, therefore if an entity without a defining characteristic does not exist, it is not possible that a defining characteristic applies to a nonexistent basis (gzhi med pa).

Nor to one which has a defining characteristic. [MMK 5-3b2]

Here also, it is not possible that a defining characteristic applies to an entity which has a defining characteristic, either, because it is unnecessary (nisprayojana).
[Bhāvaviveka’s critique:] That is not [logically] possible, [1] because if a defining characteristic exists, it is not possible that it does not exist in [that thing] which possesses it and [2] because the thing characterized likewise exists. Also, in [the case of] an established entity which possesses a defining characteristic, it is not contradictory to apply the defining characteristic to the thing characterized in order to remind the opponent. Therefore that [explanation of Buddhāpālita’s] is not able [to establish that the defining characteristic and the thing characterized have no intrinsic nature].

Therefore, since in that way it is not possible that the defining characteristic applies to the thing characterized,

If the defining characteristic does not apply [to it], the thing characterized is not possible. [MMK 5-4ab]

[Thus Nāgārjuna] concludes [his refutation of the opponent’s initial syllogism] by virtue of the meaning which has been shown.

Objection: Here some who have the conceit of hoping to be learned [and] who cannot bear to reflect upon the faults of their own position [as] stated [by the Mādhyamika] say: When [we] said that space exists because [its] defining characteristic exists, you imputed priority and posteriority to the thing characterized and [its] defining characteristic [in MMK 5-1] and said that the meaning of [our] reason is not established. [That] is like the [following] example: To [someone] who says that sound is impermanent because it is made, [someone else] replies, "If the fact of being made (byas pa nyid, krtatva) exists before sound has originated, [then] since sound has a variable connection (vyabhicāra) [with the fact of being made], [that fact] cannot be a reason [which proves a thesis about sound]. But if the fact of being made does not exist before sound has originated and exists later, then the meaning of the reason is not established [because there is an interval when sound does not have the property of being made]."

[The opponent continues:] That statement of that [latter
person] is not based on valid reasoning (rigs pa dang ma ldan pa, probably ayuktimat), because it states a specious nonestablishment [of the first speaker's reason] (ma grub pa ltar snang ba, probably asiddhy-ābhāsa). Likewise, you wish to criticize [our] stated reason ['"because its defining characteristic exists"] by saying,

There is not any space prior to the defining characteristic of space, etc., [MMK 5-1ab, etc.]

[but as in our example,] that statement [of yours] negating an existent defining characteristic is also not well said.

Answer: The defining characteristic is also included in the thing characterized, due to [its] particular property (viśesa) of being the same or different, etc., but in ultimate reality, [we] have rejected the ultimately real existence of those āyatanas, [which are] the thing characterized. Therefore if the thing characterized is not possible, [its] defining characteristic is also not possible. [Thus we] make no effort in order to negate that [reason of yours, "because its defining characteristic exists"].

Listen also to that which [you yourself] have said, "Having imputed priority and posteriority to the thing characterized and [its] defining characteristic," etc. [We] have indicated a negation of difference [of the thing characterized and its defining characteristic] precisely (eva) by showing that [their] priority and posteriority are not possible. Therefore it is not the case that the nonestablishment [of your reason, "because its defining characteristic exists,"] is specious.

Objection: That [property] which is different [from the property to be established] but is related [to it] by the defining characteristic of necessary connection, is the reason. Therefore [your] statement that the meaning of [our] reason ['"because its defining characteristic exists"] is not established because [the defining characteristic] is different [from the thing characterized], is also a specious nonestablishment.

Answer: That is not good, because in ultimate reality, [both]
difference and relation by the defining characteristic of necessary connection are not established [and] therefore [we] wish to get rid of attachment to them, also. That reason (sādhana) [i.e., that nonobstruction is the defining characteristic of space] shows an entity which belongs to conventional truth; therefore it is in accord with convention [but not ultimate reality].

Enough of [this] digression (zhar la bshad pa, probably prasāṅga)!

Objection:
[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, space does indeed exist,
[Reason:] because it is a defining characteristic.
[Dissimilar Example:] Here whatever does not exist is not considered to be a defining characteristic, as a sky-flower [is not].
[Application:] Space is a defining characteristic, because [in a sūtra] it is said, "Great king, these six elements are the person."

[Conclusion:] Therefore that [space] does indeed exist.

Answer: Because it has been shown that the thing characterized is not possible, therefore,

If the thing characterized is not possible, [its] defining characteristic also does not exist. [MMK 5-4cd]

The idea is that [this is so] [1] because the defining characteristic is also included in the thing characterized [and] therefore it is likewise unestablished, and [2] because there is also no example.

Because the thing characterized and [its] defining characteristic are not possible if they are investigated in that way with discernment, therefore the author of [this] treatise [Nāgārjuna] sums up [by saying],

Therefore the thing characterized does not exist, [and its] defining characteristic does not exist at all. [MMK 5-5ab]

The idea is that [this is so] because there is no inference
showing that [existence] and because there is an inference showing that that does not exist.

**Objection:** The Vaibhāṣikas say:

[Thesis:] Space is an entity,

[Reason:] because [the yogin] abandons desire which wishes (chanda-rāga) for that object (vīṣaya) [when he leaves the meditative sphere of the infinity of space (ākāśa-anantya-āyatana) and enters the meditative sphere of the infinity of cognition (vijñāna)],

[Example:] like matter [desire for which is abandoned when one enters the meditative sphere of the infinity of space].

Alternatively, [space is an entity,]

[Reason:] because it is the object (ālambana) of a meditational attainment,

[Example:] like cognition and so on.

Alternatively, [space is an entity,]

[Reason:] because it is unconditioned,

[Example:] like nirvāṇa.

**Answer:** Here if [you] maintain that that space is an entity in ultimate reality, it must be [either] a thing characterized or a defining characteristic; [but we] have shown previously how those [i.e.,] the thing characterized and [its] defining characteristic, are not possible. Therefore, because for our position,

Apart from something characterized and [its] defining characteristic, an entity also does not exist, [MMK 5-5cd]

therefore without showing an example, there is no establishment of [the property] to be proved. [There is no example of an entity] because it is not established that nirvāṇa or anything else is an entity.

**Objection:** Those who belong to other schools (nikāya-antārīyāh) say:

[Thesis:] Space does indeed exist,

[First Reason:] because it is the boundary (yongs su chad pa, pariccheda) of matter and
[Second Reason:] because it is unconditioned.

Answer: This [half-verse] has also answered [those] proofs (sādhana) by [showing their] faults. One should also state that the meaning of [each of those] reasons is not established.

Objection: The Sautrāntikas say: Space is not an entity. Then what [is it]? For us, that [space] is the mere absence of a substance which possesses resistance (sapratigha-dravya-abhāvamātra).

Answer: Those [reasons given by the Vaibhāṣikas], "because it is the object of a meditational attainment" and "because [the yogin] abandons desire which wishes for that object," exclude [space's having] the intrinsic nature of a nonentity (abhāva). Nevertheless, [Nāgārjuna] wished to state a very clear negation in order to negate those conceptual constructions about space [by] those [Sautrāntikas]; [and he] explained that same [point in a previous verse]:

Matter is not apprehended apart from the cause of matter. [MMK 4-1ab]

Since that [fact that matter is not an entity] has been shown, therefore,

If an entity (bhāva) does not exist, of what will there be an absence (abhāva)? [MMK 5-6ab]

If an entity called "matter which possesses resistance" does not exist, of what will there be that absence which you have designated as "space"? Since there is no inference which shows that [absence], that meaning is not established.

Alternatively, one may examine [the meaning of MMK 5-6ab] differently:

Objection: [We] have not been able to show that point (artha), [namely,] that space is an entity. You have said that since
Apart from something characterized and [its] defining characteristic, an entity also does not exist, [MMK 5-5cd]

therefore] there is no example; and [you have said that] even if an example had been established, [the property] to be proved and the proving [property] would indeed not be established. Therefore we will establish that same [point with the following syllogism]:
[Thesis:] Matter and so on do indeed possess existence (bhāva) [as entities],
[Reason:] because their nonexistence (med pa, perhaps nāstitva) exists in relation (bltos pas, probably apekṣayā) [to their existence].
[Similar Example:] Here that which exists has a [corresponding] absence (abhāva) in relation [to it], like the nonexistence of flavor (ro nyid, rasatva) in [some] matter.
[Dissimilar Example:] That which does not exist has no absence in relation [to it], as [one does not speak of the nonexistence of flavor] in a horse's horn.
[The Vaibhāsika continues:] Nor is the meaning of [our] reason unestablished, for you have said more than once that the aggregates, dhātus, and āyatanas do not exist as [the intrinsic nature of] the aggregates and so on. Therefore because their nonexistence exists in relation [to their existence], [their] existence (bhāva) [as entities] does indeed exist.

Answer: We have simply made a negation of the existence of entities such as matter and so on; but we have not shown that they do not exist. Therefore if an entity called "matter" does not exist, what will be without flavor? Since that [existence of an absence in relation to an existent entity] does not exist, [your] example is not established. Therefore the meaning which [you] maintain is not established.

Objection:66
[Thesis:] Entities and nonentities do indeed exist,
[Reason:] because their cognizer exists.
[Similar Example:] Here that which has a cognizer exists, for ex-
ample, *dharmatā* ("dharmaness," the way the dharmas are).68

*Answer:* That cognizer of entities and nonentities, whom the opponent's fancy (*yid la bsam pa*, probably *manoratha*) constructs, must also be [either] an entity or a nonentity. Since the negation of both of those has also been shown, it is not established that their cognizer exists.

If [you] suppose that there is some other cognizer, different in kind from an entity or a nonentity, that also is not possible. Therefore [Nāgārjuna] says,

Who that is different in kind (*vidharman*) from an entity or a nonentity knows entities and nonentities? [MMK 5-6cd]

The meaning of the sentence is that that [sort of cognizer] simply does not exist.

*Objection:* One who is different in kind from an entity or a nonentity [and] cognizes them [does indeed] exist, [as] supposed by the proponents of the modal point of view.69 Therefore there is no fault [in our position].

*Answer:* That is not [logically] possible. [Nāgārjuna's] idea is that [this is so] [1] because two incompatible (*mi mthun pa*) natures are not possible in one thing and [2] because relativity (*bltos pa*) is not possible [in this case]70 and [3] because there is no inference which shows that.

Because if one investigates in that way, space cannot bear logical analysis,71

Therefore space is not an entity, not a nonentity, not a thing characterized,

Nor a defining characteristic. [MMK 5-7ab,c1]

[Thus Nāgārjuna] has summed up by virtue of having refuted the criticisms, [that is,] the proofs72 which have been stated by opponents, [purporting] to show that [space] is an entity, etc.
[Those] which are the other five elements are also the same as space. [MMK 5-7c2,d]

The meaning of "element" (dhātu) is the meaning of "mine" ('byung khungs, ākara). Like a gold mine, space and the rest are also mines of suffering (duḥkha), unhappiness (daurmanasya), and so on.

Alternatively, the meaning of "element" (dhātu) is the meaning of bearing (dhārana) [its] specific characteristic (svalaksana) without effort. "The five" [are] earth, water, fire, air, and cognition. [They are called] "other" [or "latter"] (apara) because they are to be negated after space. "[Those] which [are the other five elements] are also the same as space" means "those which are the other five elements are also to be negated in the same way as space."

Previously, the negation of space was shown by [the verses] beginning from

There is not any space prior to the defining characteristic of space, [MMK 5-1ab]

up to

Therefore space is not an entity, not a nonentity, not a thing characterized,
Nor a defining characteristic. [MMK 5-7ab,c1]

Likewise, here also one should state in full [the negation of the other elements] beginning from

There is not any earth, etc., prior to the defining characteristic of earth, etc.,

up to
Therefore earth, etc., are not entities, not nonentities, not things characterized, 
Nor defining characteristics.

Because those which are the other five elements, earth and so on, also have the same negation as space, one should show that [they] are similar. 76

The teaching in the Blessed One's discourses (pravacana) that those elements exist in that way, has expounded those [elements]. Through [the Buddha's] compassion (anukampä) for persons to be converted, [what is] common knowledge conventionally (vyavahāra-prasiddha) is included in conventional truth (vyavahāra-satya); but in ultimate reality, the elements do not exist. Because the elements exist [conventionally], there is no conflict with what [we ourselves] accept; but neither are the āyatanas established. 78

Objection: Again, some 79 say: Because you have nihilistically negated (apavādita) all entities in ultimate reality, [you] have [just] repeated the false view (mithyā-drṣṭi) 80 which takes the form (tshul can) of nihilistically negating all entities. With a counterfeit discourse of the Blessed One, [you] have made a proof of what the Lokāyatas maintain. Therefore since this is not the Blessed One's word, it should be abandoned.

Answer: As to that, here the opponents are like those who have an eye disease resulting from an imbalance of the humors 81 [and who try to] remove unreal hairs, flies, mosquitoes, and so on. For when we stated [our] negation of the existence of the āyatanas, we only made a negation of [their] having intrinsic nature; but [we] did not say that they are nonentities. 82 As it is said in the [Lankāvatāra-sūtra], 83

As long as there is the domain (gocara) of the mind (citta), there will also be the two extremes of existence and nonexistence.

When [its] domain has ceased, the mind also ceases com-
And likewise,

One who has not fallen into [a belief in] entities, does not make any dharma into a nonentity by means of a nonentity.

Likewise, the ācārya [Nāgārjuna] himself has also said elsewhere,84

This is a negation of existence; it is not an embracing (pari-graha) of nonexistence,

Just as when one says, "It is not black," one does not express, "It is white."85

Therefore both those kinds [of views, existence and nonexistence,] are indeed bad views (kudrṣṭi), because they are an obstacle to the wise one who desires the bliss (sukha) of the quiescence of all conceptual proliferation. How [are they an obstacle]? Here [suppose that] in ultimate reality, the realms of desire, form, and formlessness (kāma-rūpa-ārūpya-avacara), the supramundane, and the wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral (kusala-akuśala-avyākṛta), [all] had the intrinsic nature of coming into existence (ātma-lābha) in that way in which they are conventionally designated. Therefore,

[Thesis:] Effort for the sake of producing and not producing wholesome and unwholesome dharmas [respectively] would just be pointless,

[Reason:] because they exist [already],

[Example:] like a jar and a cloth which [already] exist.

Therefore those who are happy would have [their] particular happiness undiminished, and those who are suffering would also have [their] particular suffering undiminished. Like pictures painted on a wall, living beings' particular ages (vayas), sizes, and postures (īryā-patha) would not increase or decrease.

But if the three realms [of desire, form, and formlessness], the supramundane, and the wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral
were nonexistent [by] intrinsic nature, in that case also,

[Thesis:] Effort for the sake of producing and not producing wholesome and unwholesome dharmas [respectively] would just be pointless,

[Reason:] because they do not exist,

[Example:] just as effort for the sake of sharpening a hare's horn [is pointless].

Therefore conventional activity would be destroyed (*chad par 'gyur*).

Therefore this [following verse] is stated. Those whose intellectual eye is impaired by the eye disease of bad views, [that is,]

The weak-minded (*alpa-buddhi*) who see the existence and nonexistence of entities,

Do not see the tranquil quiescence of the visible. [MMK 5-8]

The meaning is that just as one with an eye disease, whose sense organ is impaired, sees unreal double moons, etc., [so also] the weak-minded who see the existence and nonexistence of entities do not see the tranquil quiescence of the visible. [That quiescence of the visible] is the very subtle ultimate truth, the domain of the eye of noble discernment (*ārya-prajñā*).

[It is called] "the quiescence of the visible" because here all identifying marks (*nimitta*) of the visible do not appear. [It is called] "tranquil" because it is free from all harm. As it is said in a sūtra,

[When] some [view] establishes the existence of some [entity] by means of causal conditions, there will be nonexistence. [That] bad view, the doctrine of origination, teaches existence and nonexistence.

That wise one whose intellectual eye is faultless because [he or she] possesses the eye ointment of the vision and meditative cultivation of emptiness, [whose] intellectual eye has fully opened,
sees the true state of entities. As the Blessed One said [in the Ārya-Lanḍaṭāra-sūtra].

When one sees the world as neither existent nor nonexistent nor [both] existent and nonexistend,
Then the mind turns back (vyāvartate); and one comprehends absence of self (nairātmya). [Lanḍaṭāra 3-22 = 10-476]

Likewise, as it is said [in the Kāśyapa-parivarta of the Ārya-mahā-ratna-kūta-sūtra,]91
Kāśyapa, this [view,] "It exists, " is one extreme. This [view,] "It does not exist," is also one extreme.
As to that, here the meaning of the chapter [is as follows:] By stating the faults of that reason, "because [their] defining characteristics exist," which was adduced [by the opponent] to show that the elements, earth and so on, exist, [we] have shown that the elements are without intrinsic nature.

Therefore [scriptural] statements such as the following are established: [From the Ārya-brahma-višeṣa-cintā-paripṛcchā-sūtra?,]93
That which is the internal earth-element (ādhyātmika-prthivi-dhātu) and that which is the external (bāhya) earth-element have a nondual meaning (advaya-artha). By means of discernment and wisdom, the Tathāgata has fully and perfectly realized (abhisambuddha) that that also is nondual, is not divisible into two (gnyis su dbyer med pa), and has a single defining characteristic (ekalaksana), namely, no defining characteristic (alaksana).94

Likewise, [from the Ārya-Mañjuśrī-vikrīdita-sūtra.]95
[Mañjuśrī said,] "Girl, how should one see the elements (dhātu)?"

The girl said, "Mañjuśrī, [they should be seen] like this, for example: When the three worlds have been consumed by [fire at the end of] the kalpa, there is not even ash [left behind]."96

Likewise,97
One should not be attached (abhini-viś) to that which is
formless, invisible, and baseless, which does not appear and is not made known (avijñāptika).  

Likewise, [from the Bhagavati-prajñā-pāramitā-suvikrānta-vikrāmi-sūtra,] 

Śāradvatiputra, all dharmas have the defining characteristic of nonattachment (asaṅga-lakṣaṇa). That which is the defining characteristic of some dharma is a noncharacteristic (alakṣaṇa) of that dharma. Therefore no dharma serves (pratīyapasthiita) for the production (abhiniṛvṛtti) of a defining characteristic. 

Likewise, [from the Ārya-brahma-viśeṣa-cintā-paripṛcchā-sūtra,]  

I taught the aggregates to the world, [and] the world came to dwell on them. 

One who is wise does not dwell on them and is not soiled by worldly dharmas. 

The world has the defining characteristic of space, and space has no defining characteristic. Therefore that [wise one], comprehending that, is not soiled by worldly dharmas. 

Likewise, [from the Bhagavati-prajñā-pāramitā-suvikrānta-vikrāmi-sūtra,] 

Śāradvatiputra, [the fact] that all dharmas have no defining characteristic and no perfection (parinispatti) is called "nonattachment."

The fifth chapter, "Examination of the Elements," of the Prajñāpradīpa, a commentary on [Nāgārjuna's] Mūlamadhyamaka composed by ācārya Bhavyakara/Bhavyakāra (legs ldan byed) [is concluded].

Notes to Translation of Chapter Five

1 In this chapter, "element" translates dhātu, in the sense of the six dhātus, earth, water, fire, air, space (ākāśa), and cognition (viṣṇā). In other words, the six dhātus are the four mahābhūtas plus space and cognition. I have also trans-
lated bhūta/mahābhūta in chapter four as "element;" but hopefully this will not cause confusion. On the various senses of the term dhātu, see May (1959), p. 97 n. 222 and Edgerton (1953), pp. 282-4.

2Avalokitavrata explains, "Emptiness is [our] own position. The counterposition to that is the opponent's position, namely, the doctrine (vāda) that the āyatanas and so on do exist by intrinsic nature." The particular form of that counterposition to be refuted in this chapter is the view that the elements exist because their defining characteristics exist. See Ava P69b-8 to 70a-2, D61b4,5.

3On the scriptural sources of this quotation, see LVP AK I, p. 49 n. 2. Majjhima-nikāya III, p. 239, has bhikkhu for mahārāja. Candrakīrti gives a Sanskrit version with mahārāja (PSP 129.3,4). Later, Avalokitavrata tells us that the "great king" being addressed is the Buddha's father, Śuddhodana. See Ava P94a-5, D84a-3.

4abhyupagama-bādha. That is, it will conflict with the Buddha's teaching, which Nāgārjuna, as a Buddhist, must accept. See Ava P70b-1,2; D62a-4,5.

5That is, as far as the Mādhyamika is concerned, it is not established that that teaching refers to ultimate reality. Thus the fault alleged by the opponent does not exist. See Ava P70b-5,6; D62b-1,2.

6nam mkha'i ngo bo nyid stong pa nyid kyis bstan sla ba'i phyir, more literally, "because it is easy to show the intrinsic nature of space as being empty (śūnyatāya or śūnyatvena)." Here, of course, Bhāvaviveka is speaking of the fact that space is (ontologically) empty of intrinsic nature. He is not referring to the physical emptiness of what is commonly called "empty space."

7In fact, the Vaibhāsikas make a distinction between space as one of the three unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) dharmas and space as one of the six dhātus. The former is defined as anāvaraṇa or anāvṛtti (AK 1-5d); the latter is considered to be the visible space between objects, a combination of light and shadow (AK 1-28ab). The Sautrāntikas, on the other hand, make no such distinction. For them, space is simply the absence of anything tangible (sprāstavya-abhāvamātra). See LVP AK I, p. 50 n. 1 and LVP AK II, p. 279.

8The Vaibhāsikas have attempted to show in their preceding syllogism that the six dhātus exist because their defining characteristics exist. For instance, space exists because its defining characteristic, nonobstruction, exists. But the elements are identical with their defining characteristics (see AK 1-12cd). Thus the Vaibhāsikas' reason is no different from their thesis. See Ava P71a-5 to 71b-1, D62b-6 to 63a-3.

9See Ava P71b-2,3; D63a-4.

10mthun par bya ba yin pas mthun nyid, perhaps lakṣyata iti lakṣanam.

11See note 94 to the translation of chapter three. Once again, the kri-pratyaya in question is lyyt (-ana).

The opponent rejects the view that lakṣaṇa refers to the instrument (karana) of the activity of characterizing, while lakṣya refers to the object (karman) of the action. For him, lakṣaṇa also refers to the object and thus is identical with lakṣya. See Ava P71b-5 to 72a-4, D63a-6 to 63b-5.

12de dag gi de ltar khas blangs pa nyid la yang, perhaps tayor evam
abhyyupagatave 'pi.

15Since the reason and the thesis are identical, does the reason establish the thesis or vice versa?

14If the opponent seeks to prove that space exists in ultimate reality, his appeal to convention is contradictory (since a conventionally valid reason cannot prove a positive thesis about ultimate reality). Also, there is no example for the ultimately real existence of space, since no entity exists in ultimate reality. See Ava P73a-2,3,4; D64b-1,2,3.


16Avalokitavrata identifies the opponent here as a Śāmkhya. The Śāmkhyas hold that ākāśa (usually translated "ether" in this context also) arises from the "subtle essence" (tanmātra) of sound; and thus ākāśa is the defining characteristic of sound. See Ava P73b-7,8; D65a-6. For the Śāmkhya account of ether and sound, see Sinha (1952), pp. 19-20; Frauwallner (1973), Vol. I, pp. 279-80; and Larson and Bhattacharya (1987), pp. 50-3.

For the Vaiśeṣikas, the ether (ākāśa) is the substrate, and thus a cause, of sound. See Sinha (1956), pp. 371-4; Frauwallner (1973), Vol. II, pp. 147-8; and Potter (1977), pp. 90-1, 161-2.

17That is, since sound and space, its defining characteristic, are identical, the reason becomes the same as the thesis. See Ava P73b-8 to 74a-2, D65a-6,7.

18According to Avalokitavrata, the opponents here are "Vaiśeṣika commentators." See Ava P74a-3, D65b-1,2.

19In other words, if Bhāvaviveka's interpretation were correct, MMK 5-1a should have anyad ākāśalaksanāt instead of pūrvar ākāśalaksanāt.

20For the Vaiśeṣikas, substance (dravya) and quality (guna) are distinct categories (padārtha). The qualities of a substance (including its defining characteristic) inhere in that substance but are not identical with it. See Sinha (1956), p. 317; Frauwallner (1973), Vol. II, pp. 141, 152-3; and Potter (1977), pp. 49, 84.

21See Ava P75a-2,3; D66a-6,7. "Alleged" translates smra bar 'dod pa, probably vivaksita.

22Avalokitavrata points out that Bhāvaviveka's first explanation of MMK 5-1d leads to a negation of the thing characterized; his second explanation leads to a negation of the defining characteristic. See Ava P75b-7,8; D67a-3,4.

23The Vaiśeṣika, according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P76a-1, D67a-5.

24Avalokitavrata glosses this as "the defining characteristic does not belong to the thing characterized, and the thing characterized does not belong to the defining characteristic." See Ava P76a-1 to 4, D67a-4 to 7. Of course, as far as the Tibetan is concerned, ... la med pa could also be translated as "does not exist in," as well as "does not belong to."

25Like a refractory ox who cannot be turned back with a stick, the opponent may refuse to concede defeat and shamelessly assert that space exists without a defining characteristic. See Ava P76a-6 to 76b-1, D67b-1 to 4.
Conventionally, space does have a defining characteristic; but that fact cannot be used to prove the thesis in the opponent’s initial syllogism, that space exists in ultimate reality.

See Ava P76b-2,3,4; D67b-5,6.

Avalokitavrata identifies the opponents here as “Vaiśeṣikas, etc.” See Ava P76b-4, D67b-6,7.

That is, a thing characterized which neither has nor does not have a defining characteristic. See Ava P78a-3,4; D69a-4,5.

The opponent maintains that a thing characterized, such as space, exists because a defining characteristic applies to it. (“The meaning of what you maintain” translates khyod kyi 'dod pa'i don, literally, “your desired meaning.”) A “contradictory entity” is one which neither has nor does not have a defining characteristic. Since it has been shown that a defining characteristic does not apply to a thing which has one, a thing which does not have one, or a thing which neither has nor does not have one, there is no example of something to which a defining characteristic applies. See Ava P78a-6,7; D69a-6,7.

Nam pa gnyis su smra ba dag, identified by Avalokitavrata as ’os pa pa dag, ārhatāḥ, that is, the Jains. See Ava P79a-1, D70a-1 (P has ’os pa pa dag). On the Jains’ anekāntavāda, see, e. g., Sinha (1952), pp. 197-208; Frauwallner (1973), Vol. II, pp. 199-200; and Sharma (1960), pp. 49-54.

An entity with two mutually incompatible natures, like a bird which is half dead and half alive, is not seen in the world. Therefore an entity which both has and does not have a defining characteristic is not possible. See Ava P79a-5,6; D70a-4,5.

The opponent replies that the example of a bird which is half dead and half alive [reminiscent of Schrödinger’s cat!] is not applicable. Rather it is like the fact that a man is a son in relation to his father and a father in relation to his son. In reply, Avalokitavrata quotes MMK 10-8:

If fire is dependent on fuel and if fuel is dependent on fire, which of the two is established first, in dependence on which there would be fire and fuel?

See Ava P79a-6 to 79b-3, D70a-5 to 70b-2.

That is, to say that a thing both has and does not have a defining characteristic is to incur the faults which have been shown for each alternative separately.

In Bhāvaviveka’s first explanation, MMK 5-3cd refers to an entity which neither has nor does not have a defining characteristic. In his second explanation, it refers to an entity which both has and does not have a defining characteristic.


Here Bhāvaviveka criticizes Buddhapiilita’s commentary on MMK 5-3a,b1 on the grounds that he tacitly assumes that the laksya exists while negating the laksya. See Ava P79b-8 to 80a-4, D70b-6 to 71a-2.

In fact, Nāgārjuna’s own method in chapter five is to reject the ultimately real existence of the laksya in the first three and a half verses and then to negate the
Given his use of simple negation and the prasanga method, it does not seem that he must affirm the existence of the laksana while arguing against the laksya; and the same is true for Buddhapiilita.

Here Bhavaviveka is criticizing Buddhapiilita's commentary on MMK 5-3b2. One can say, "This is the defining characteristic of this thing," in order to remind someone who has forgotten that fact. See Ava P80a-4 to 8, D71a-2 to 5.

It is not clear that this is the sense of "application" (pravrtti) that Nāgārjuna and Buddhapiilita have in mind. They seem to be thinking of a logically necessary relationship between the defining characteristic and the thing characterized, rather than of the use of words to communicate a fact.

Avalokitavrata describes these opponents as Buddhists and others who falsely consider themselves learned in the science of logic (rīgs pa'i bstan bcos, nyāya/yukti-sāstra). See Ava P80b-6,7,8; D71b-3,4.

Avalokitavrata remarks that in superficial reality, the defining characteristic's particular property of being neither the same as nor different from the thing characterized includes it in the thing characterized. See Ava P81b-6,7; D72b-2,3.

Avalokitavrata says that Bhavaviveka's arguments are not comparable to the opponent's example. In the argument, "sound is impermanent because it is made," the words, "because it is made," produce a cognition that sound is impermanent; but the fact that sound is impermanent exists before the reason is uttered. Thus it is incorrect to argue that the reason is not established. On the other hand, Bhavaviveka argues that the thing characterized and its defining characteristic cannot be different by showing that they cannot exist at different times. See Ava P82a-3 to 82b-5, D72b-6 to 73a-7.

The opponents are those who say that the thing characterized and its defining characteristic are different. See Ava P82b-6, D73b-1.

The reason (e. g., "being made," ) must invariably be accompanied by the property to be established (e. g., "being impermanent"). The reverse need not be true.

In his commentary on MMK 5-2cd, Bhavaviveka gave the following syllogism: The alleged defining characteristic is not the defining characteristic of the thing characterized, because it is different [from that thing], like [a defining characteristic] different from that [alleged defining characteristic]. See Ava P82b-6 to 83a-3, D73b-1 to 5. See also Bhavaviveka's second syllogism following MMK 5-1cd.

The Mādhyamikas do not reject the necessary connection of the thing characterized and its defining characteristic on the level of superficial reality, because to do so would contradict perception. See Ava P83a-6,7; D73b-7 to 74a-1 and
51 See note 3.

52 The opponent cannot cite a similar example, that is something which exists (in ultimate reality) and is a defining characteristic. See Ava P84b-2,3,4; D75a-2,3.

53 The Abhidharmakosa-bhasya on AK 2-55cd contains a long debate between the Vaibhāśikas and the Sautrāntikas as to whether the three unconditioned dharmas, especially nirvāṇa, are entities (bhāva) or nonentities (abhāva). See LVP AK II, pp. 278-87. See also the sources translated in La Vallée Poussin (1930).

54 See Ava P85a-3 to 7, D75b-2 to 5. For a discussion of the four formless (ārūpya) meditative spheres, see LVP AK VIII, pp. 133-44 and LVP AK III, p. 21 n. 1. See also Avalokitavrata's long and interesting discussion in Ava P86a-3 to 87b-6, D76b-3 to 78a-2.

55 On this term, see LVP AK VIII, p. 182 n. 4 and Edgerton (1953), pp. 569-70. The samāpatti referred to is again the sphere of the infinity of space, while the example refers to the sphere of the infinity of cognition. Strictly speaking, space and cognition are the objects not of the samāpattis named after them, but of the preparatory exercises for those samāpattis; see AK 8-4ab,1.

56 MMK 5-5cd, according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P88a-4, D78a-6,7.

57 See note 53. I have generally translated the terms bhāva and abhāva as "entity" and "nonentity," respectively. Some contexts, however, require translations like "presence" and "absence" or "existence" and "nonexistence." Thus in the following discussion, abhāva has sometimes been translated as "nonentity" and sometimes as "absence;" and once, bhāva has been translated as "existence." (Note that in still other contexts, bhāva may mean "nature.")

58 See Ava P89a-4,5; P79a-6.

59 See Ava P89a-8 to 89b-1, D78b-2,3.

60 According to Avalokitavrata, the opponent here is a Vaibhāśika. See Ava P89b-3, D79b-4. This identification seems justified by the fact that the opponent here alludes to the arguments advanced earlier by the Vaibhāśikas. The syllogism which follows, however, is reminiscent of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika position. On the latter, see Sinha (1956), pp. 346-53; Frauwallner (1973), Vol. II, pp. 110-1; Sharma (1960), pp. 182-3; and Potter (1977), pp. 53, 110, 141-6.

61 This refers to the Vaibhāśika's three syllogisms following MMK 5-5ab. See Ava P89b-3,4,5; D79b-4,5.

62 See Ava P90a-4,5; D80a-4,5.

63 See Ava P90b-3, D80b-3.

64 Avalokitavrata points out that the negation of bhāva is a simple negation, not an implicative negation. See Ava P90b-8 to 91a-1, D80b-7 to 81a-1.

65 See Ava P91a-2, D81a-1,2.

66 Avalokitavrata attributes this objection to both the Sautrāntikas and the Vaibhāśikas. See Ava P91a-4, D81a-3. In fact, while the Sautrāntikas do hold that both bhāvas and abhāvas can be objects of cognition, the Vaibhāśikas argue that only a bhāva can be an object of cognition. See LVP AK V, p. 62.

67 One would usually translate shes pa as "cognition" (jnāna, etc.); but given
"kaḥ in MMK 5-6d and given Avalokitavrata's subcommentary, it seems to mean "cognizer" (shes pa po; jñātṛ, etc.) here.

As the Buddha, the cognizer of dharma, exists, so the yogin who cognizes entities and nonentities exists. See Ava P91a-5,6; D81a-4,5.

*nam grangs kyi tshul smra ba dag, paryāya-naya-vādinaḥ. On the Jaina doctrine of the modes (paryāya) of a thing and the different points of view (naya) from which it can be considered, see the references in note 31. See also Ames (1995), nn. 82 and 83.

Ava P92a-1,2 and 6 identify the opponents as here as 'os pa pa dag, ārhatāḥ; Ava D81b-7 and 82a-4 have 'ug pa pa dag, aulūkyāḥ, i.e., the Vaiśeṣikas. Since the view described here seems clearly to be that of the Jains, 'os pa pa dag must be the right reading.

Avalokitavrata explains that although a man may be a son in relation to his father and a father in relation to his son, he cannot be said to be alive in relation to death and dead in relation to life. That is, he must be either alive or dead. Likewise, he cannot be an entity from one point of view and a nonentity from another. See Ava P92a-1 to 8, D81b-7 to 82a-6.

One might be inclined to translate "criticisms [and) proofs," but Avalokitarvata says the those proofs themselves are also criticisms against the Mādhyamika. See Ava P92b-5,6,7; D82b-3,4.

See LVP AK I, p. 37.

byed pa med par might also mean "without an instrument" or "without activity." For svalaksana-dhāranād dhātuḥ, see Abhidharmakosā-bhāṣya on AK 3-3, Shastri edition, p. 385; Pradhan edition, p. 112.

Avalokitavrata explains that Nāgārjuna has negated space first because it is generally believed in the world that space is nothing at all (ci yang ma yin pa, perhaps akimcit), whereas earth and so on are considered to be entities, etc. Once space has been negated, it can serve as an example in syllogisms negating the other elements. Thus space is dealt with first, despite the fact that earth comes first in the list given in the sūtras. See Ava P93a-6 to 93b-2, D83a-3 to 6.

Similar in being nothing at all (ci yang ma yin pa), in that they are neither entities nor nonentities nor things characterized nor defining characteristics, according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P94a-3 to 94a-5, D84a-1,2.

The syntax from the beginning of the paragraph to here is not entirely clear. For Avalokitavrata's commentary, see Ava P94a-8 to 94b-3, D84a-5,6,7.

Since the elements exist conventionally, the Mādhyamika need not reject the Buddha's teaching on that subject; rather, the Mādhyamika regards it as conventional truth. On the other hand, since the elements do not exist in ultimate reality, the opponent cannot use the purely conventional existence of the elements to prove that the āyatanas exist in ultimate reality. Compare Ava P95a-1,2; D84b-6.

Avalokitavrata identifies the opponents as "some of our fellow Buddhists, Samghabhadra and so on." See Ava P95a-4,5; D85a-2. Presumably, this refers to the Vaibhāṣika master Samghabhadra who wrote a rebuttal to Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakosābhaṣya. See, e.g., LVP AK I, "Introduction," pp. xxii-xxiii.
Parts of Samghabhadra's work are translated in La Vallée Poussin (1930), (1931-2), and (1936-7).

80 See AK 5-7 and LVP AK V, p. 18.

81 skyon cha ma mnyam pa, probably dosa-visama. Avalokitavrata glosses this as "an imbalance of the three dośas of wind, bile, and phlegm;" see Ava P95a-8, D85a-5.

82 Avalokitavrata explains that the Madhyamika negates the existence of the āyatanas in ultimate reality by means of a simple negation, not an implicative negation. Thus his negation does not entail the affirmation that the āyatanas are non-entities. Hence the Madhyamaka-sāstra is free from the two extremes of the views of permanence and annihilation. See Ava P95b-7, D85b-2,3.

83 Avalokitavrata does not identify the source of this and the following quotation. See Ava P95b-7 to 96a-1, D85b-3,4,5. The Sanskrit text of the Laṅkāvatāra verse is found in Nanjio (1923), p. 147.

84 Identified by Avalokitavrata as "the sāstra called Lokaparīkṣā composed by ācārya Nāgārjuna himself." See Ava P96a-2,3; D85b-6. Only this single verse of this lost work of Nāgārjuna's is known to modern scholarship; see Lindtner (1982), p. 14 n. 27. (Christian Lindtner has informed me that the same verse is quoted, with a variant, in the Tarkajvālā on Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā 4-58.)

85 Avalokitavrata explains that the verse illustrates simple negation. See Ava P96a-3,4; D85b-7 to 86a-1.

86 ngo bo nyid med pa yin par gyur na. One might translate this as "if they were without intrinsic nature," but that translation seems wrong in this context. Also, Avalokitavrata has the gloss kun rdzob tu tshul gang gis tha snyad gdags pa tsam gyi tshul der yang med pa yin par gyur na'o, "if they were nonexistent even in that way in which they are mere conventional designations in superficial reality." See Ava P97b-1, D87a-4.

87 Avalokitavrata comments on this verse, but he does not identify its source. See P98a-6 to 98b-1, D88a-1 to 4.

88 When the existent thing has ceased, there will be nonexistence. See Ava, loc. cit.

89 A reference to the path of vision or seeing (darśana-mārga) and the path of cultivation (bhāvanā-mārga). In the Mahāyāna, these paths coincide with the bodhisattva-bhūmis. Avalokitavrata explains that the vision of emptiness is the "non-seeing" of the existence and nonexistence of entities, which takes place when one comprehends supremely profound dependent origination, which is free from the extremes of permanence and annihilation. See Ava P98b-2 to 5, D88a-5,6,7.

90 Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P98b-5, D88a-7. The Sanskrit text is found in Nanjio (1923), pp. 152-3 and pp. 324-5.

91 Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P98b-8, D88a-2. The Sanskrit text is found in von Stael-Holstein (1926), p. 90.

92 See note 149 to the translation of chapter three. Avalokitavrata's remarks are similar here. See Ava: (1) P99a-4,5, D88b-5,6; (2) P99a-7, D89a-1; (3) P99b-1,2, D89a-3; (4) P99b-3,4, D89a-5; (5) P99b-7,8, D89b-1,2; (6) P100a-2,3, D89b-4; and (7) P100a-8 to 100b-1, to D90a-1,2,3.
93 Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P99a-5, D88a-7. The same passage was quoted by Bhāvaviveka toward the end of chapter three. I have not been able to locate this passage in the 5de dge bka’ ’gyur edition of the sūtra.

94 See note 151 to the translation of chapter three.

95 Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P99a-8, D89a-2. The same passage was quoted by Bhāvaviveka toward the end of chapter three. See note 152 to the translation of chapter three. The quotation here differs from that in chapter three in having bsikal pas for chapter three’s bsikal pa’i mes.

96 See note 153 to the translation of chapter three.

97 Identified by Avalokitavrata only as being "from other sūtrāntas." See Ava P99b-1,2; D89a-4. The passage is very similar to a sentence which occurs three times in the Kāśyapa-parivarta; see von Staël-Holstein (1926), pp. 86-7, 90 (related sentence, p. 144).

98 Avalokitavrata explains the last two phrases by saying that it does not appear as an object [of the six senses] and that it cannot be grasped by the cognition of the eye, etc. The referent is paramārtha-satya. See Ava P99b4,5,6; D89a-5,6,7.

99 Identified by Avalokitavrata only as Bhagavatī-prajñā-pāramitā-sūtra; see Ava P99b-6, D89a-7 to 89b-1. The Sanskrit text is found in Hikata (1958), p. 61.

100 Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P99b-8 to 100a-1, D89b-2. The same two verses were quoted by Bhāvaviveka toward the end of chapter four. The first two padas of the first verse are found in the 5de dge bka’ ’gyur, Mdo sde Ba 36b-3 (with a slightly different Tibetan translation). For the third pada, compare byang chub sms dpa’ mKhas pa der| on 36b-4. The second verse is found on 37a-1,2, with a rather different third pada: de dag de yi’ gro rig nas|. Avalokitavrata remarks that the first two padas of the second verse also occur in the Ārya-sarva-buddha-viṣaya-avatāra-jñāna-āloka-alamkāra-sūtra. See AvaP100a-4, D89b-5,6.

101 Identified by Avalokitavrata only as “that same Bhagavatī-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra.” See Ava P100a-5,6; D89b-7. The Sanskrit is found in Hikata (1958), p. 62.

102 See note 159 to my translation of chapter three.
Sanskrit Text of MMK, Chapters Three, Four, and Five, according to PSP as emended by J. W. de Jong (1978) and further emended by Akira Saito (1985)

Chapter Three

darśanam śravaṇam ghrāṇam rasaṇam sparśanam manah|
indriyāni saḥ eteśām draṣṭavyādāṃ gocarāḥ  
svam ātmānak darśanam hi tat tam eva na paśyati|
na paśyati yad ātmānaḥ katham draṣṭyaḥ tat parān  
nāpaśyamānam bhavati yadā kim cana darśanam|
darśanam paśyatīty evam kathām etat tu yujyate  

paśyati darśanam naiva naiva paśaty adarśanam|
vyākhyāto darśanenaiva draṣṭā cāpy avagamyatām  

draṣṭā nāsty atirākṛtya tirākṛtya ca darśanām|
draṣṭavyām darśanām caiva draṣṭary asati te kutāḥ  

pratītya mātāpitarau yathoktaḥ putrasambhavah|
caṅśūrupe pratītyaivam ukto vijnānasambhavah  

draṣṭavyadarśanābhāvād vijnānādićaturāstaṃ|
nāsty upādānādīni bhaviṣyanti punah kathām  

vyākhyātāṃ śravaṇam ghrāṇam rasaṇam sparśanam manah|
darśanenaiva jānīyāc chrotrṣrotavyakādi ca  

Ames: Bhāvaviveka's Pratīṣṭhāpādīpa 103
Chapter Four

रुपकाराननिर्मुक्तम ना रुपम उपलाभ्याते |  
रुपेनापि ना निर्मुक्तम द्र्ष्याते रुपकारानम | 1

रुपकाराननिर्मुक्ते रुपे रुपम प्रसायाये |  
ाहेतुकम ना कांस्य अर्थाः कासिद अहेतुकाः क्वचि | 2

रुपेना तु विनिर्मुक्तम याद सयाद रुपकारानम |  
अकार्यकम कारानम स्यान नास्ति अकार्यम चा कारानम | 3

रुपे सत्य एवा रुपस्या कारानम नोपापायते |  
रुपे 'सत्य एवा रुपस्या कारानम नोपापायते | 4

निकारानम पुना रुपम नावा नावोपपायते |  
तास्माद रुपपातान काम्स्चिन ना विकल्पान विकाल्पये | 5

ना कारानस्या साद्र्षाम कार्यम इत्य उपपायते |  
ना कारानस्यासाद्र्षाम कार्यम इत्य उपपायते | 6

वेदाण्निकत्सामज्ञानाम सामस्कारानाम का सर्वसाह |  
सर्वसेवाम एवा भावानाम रुपेनाविवा सामाह क्रमाह | 7

विग्रहे याहं परिहारम क्र्ते सून्यात्याया वादेत |  
सर्वम तस्यापरिहर्ताम सामाय साध्येना जायते | 8

व्याक्याये या उपालंभम क्र्ते सून्यात्याया वादेत |  
सर्वम तस्यानुपालंभम सामाय साध्येना जायते | 9

Chapter Five

नाकाशाम विद्याते किम्चि पुर्वम अकाशलक्षानि |  
अलक्षानां प्रसायेता स्यात पुर्वम याद लक्षानि | 1

अलक्षानो ना कासित चा भावां सार्वविद्याते क्वचि |
asaty alakṣāṇe bhāve kramatāṁ kuha laksanāṁ ||

nālakṣāṇe laksanasya pravṛttir na salakṣāṇe |
salakṣāṇālaksanābhvyāṁ nāpy anyatra pravartate ||

laksanāsasampravṛttau ca na lakṣyam upapadyate |
lakṣasyānupapattau ca laksanasyāpy asambhavaḥ ||

tasmān na vidyate lakṣyam laksanāṁ naiva vidyate |
lakṣyalaksanānirmuktō naiva bhāvo 'pi vidyate ||

avidyamāne bhāve ca kasyābhāvo bhavisyati |
bhāvābhāvavidharmā ca bhāvābhāvāv avaiti kāḥ ||

tasmān na bhāvo nābhāvo na lakṣyam nāpi laksanāṁ |
ākāśam ākāśasamā dhātavaḥ pāṇca ye 'pare ||

astitvam ye tu paśyanti nāstitvam ca lāpabuddhayāḥ |
bhāvānāṁ te na paśyanti draṣṭāvyopāsāmāṁ śivaṁ ||
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English</th>
<th>Tibetan</th>
<th>Sanskrit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>about to originate</td>
<td>skye bar 'dod pa</td>
<td>utpitsu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>absence of self</td>
<td>bdag med pa nyid</td>
<td>nairāmāya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>action</td>
<td>las</td>
<td>karman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>activity</td>
<td>bya ba</td>
<td>kriyā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aeon</td>
<td>bskal pa</td>
<td>kalpa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agent</td>
<td>byed pa po</td>
<td>kartr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>affliction</td>
<td>nyon mongs pa</td>
<td>kleśa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>afflictive</td>
<td>kun nas nyon mongs pa</td>
<td>samklesa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aggregate</td>
<td>nyn mongs pa can</td>
<td>klista</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>appropriation</td>
<td>'phung po</td>
<td>skandha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>appropriator</td>
<td>nye bar len pa</td>
<td>upādāna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>assertion</td>
<td>nye bar blang ba</td>
<td>upādātṛ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attachment</td>
<td>dam bcas pa</td>
<td>pratijñā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attention</td>
<td>mngon par zhen pa</td>
<td>abhiniveśa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attention</td>
<td>yid la byed pa</td>
<td>manasikāra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attention</td>
<td>gzhi</td>
<td>āśraya, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>basis</td>
<td>sms can</td>
<td>sattva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) being</td>
<td>bcom ldan 'das</td>
<td>bhagavan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blessed One</td>
<td>rkyen</td>
<td>pratyaya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>causal condition, condition</td>
<td>rgyu</td>
<td>hetu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cause</td>
<td>rgyu</td>
<td>kāraṇa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cause of maturation</td>
<td>rnam par smin pa'i rgyu</td>
<td>vipāka-hetu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cognition</td>
<td>blo</td>
<td>buddhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cause of maturation</td>
<td>rnam par shes pa</td>
<td>vijñāna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cognition</td>
<td>shes pa</td>
<td>jñāna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coming into existence</td>
<td>bdag nyid thob pa</td>
<td>ātma-lābha</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
common knowledge  grags pa  prasiddhi, prasiddha
conceptual construction  rnam par rtog pa  vikalpa
vikalpa
conceptual proliferation  rtog pa  kalpanā
spros pa  prapañca
concomitance  lhan cig nyid, lhan cig gi dngos po sahabhāva
'/dus byas  samskṛta
'/du byed  samskāra
conflict  gnod pa  bādha
gti mug  moha
confusion  mtshung par ldan pa'i samprayukta-
conjoined cause  rgyu  hetu
caitanya
consciousness  shes pa yod pa nyid  vyavahāra
convention, conventional
designation, conventional
activity  tha snyad kyi bden pa vyavahāra-satya
conventional truth  tha snyad du vyavahārataḥ
conventionally  dad pa śraddhā
cravation  'gal ba 'khrul pa med pa viruddha-
conviction  mi mthun pa'i phyogs avyabhicārin
counterbalanced  vipakṣa
counterexample, dissimilar case,  set of all such;
counterposition  mthun pa'i phyogs
craving  sred pa  trṣnā
criticism  sun dbyung ba  dūṣana
defective vision  rab rib  timirā
defining characterist  mtshan nyid  laksāna
dependent designation: brten nas gdags pa
dependent origination: rten cing brei par 'byung ba
desire: 'dod chags 'dod pa
direct object: las
disadvantage: nyes dmigs
discernment: shes rab
doctrine: tshul
domain: mdzad pa'i mtha'
dominant causal condition: grub pa'i mtha'
direct object: spyod yul
domestic: bdag po'i rkyen
adhipati: 'byung ba
khams
(to) emanate: sprul pa
emancipation: byang grol
dngos po
vastu
grub pa
grub pa la sgrub pa
established: rkyen 'di dang ldan pa
establishing what: nyid
fellow Buddhist (more literally, "coreligionist"): tshor ba
founders of non-Buddhist sects: rang gi sde pa
futile rejoinder: mu stegs byed
Buddhist sects: ltag chod

upādāya prajñāpti
pratitya-samutpāda
rāga
kāma
karman
ādīnava
prajñā
naya
kṛtānta
siddhānta
gocara
adhipati/ādhipateya-pratyaya
bhūta
dhātu
nir-mā
apavarga
bhāva
siddha
siddha-sādhana
idampratyayatā
vedanā
svayūthya
āśī ṭīrthakara
jāti
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English</th>
<th>Tibetan</th>
<th>Sanskrit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>hatred</td>
<td>zhe sding</td>
<td>dveṣa</td>
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<tr>
<td>higher realms</td>
<td>mtho ris</td>
<td>svarga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>identifying mark</td>
<td>mtshan ma</td>
<td>nimitta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>immediately</td>
<td>de ma thag pa'i rkyen</td>
<td>(sam)anantara-pratyaya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>preceding causal condition</td>
<td></td>
<td>paryudāsa-pratīṣedha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>implicative</td>
<td>ma yin par dgag pa</td>
<td>samāropa</td>
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<tr>
<td>negation</td>
<td>sgro 'dogs pa</td>
<td>samvṛtyā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>imputation</td>
<td>kun rdzob tu</td>
<td>paramārhataḥ</td>
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<tr>
<td>in superficial reality</td>
<td></td>
<td>anaikāntika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reality</td>
<td></td>
<td>anumāṇa</td>
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<tr>
<td>in ultimate reality</td>
<td></td>
<td>svarūpa</td>
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<tr>
<td>reality</td>
<td></td>
<td>karana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inconclusive</td>
<td>ma nges pa</td>
<td>ādhyātmika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inference</td>
<td>rjes su dpag pa</td>
<td>svabhāva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inherent nature</td>
<td>rang gi ngo bo</td>
<td>svabhāva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>instrument</td>
<td>byed pa</td>
<td>avyabhicārin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>internal</td>
<td>nang gi</td>
<td>āśraya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intrinsic nature</td>
<td>ngo bo nyid</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>invariable</td>
<td>rang bzhin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>locus</td>
<td>'khrul pa med pa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>logical mark</td>
<td>gzhi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[logically]</td>
<td>(as in āśraya-asiddhi)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>possible</td>
<td>rtags</td>
<td>liṅga</td>
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<tr>
<td>manifestation</td>
<td>rigs pa</td>
<td>yukta</td>
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<tr>
<td>material</td>
<td>gsal ba</td>
<td>vyakti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>matter</td>
<td>gzugs can</td>
<td>rūpin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>matter dependent</td>
<td>gzugs</td>
<td>rūpa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on the elements</td>
<td>(as first aggregate)</td>
<td>bhautika-rūpa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>meditation</td>
<td>'byung ba las gyur pa'i</td>
<td>dhyāna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>meditational</td>
<td>gzugs</td>
<td>samāpatti</td>
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<tr>
<td>attainment</td>
<td>bsam gtan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>snyoms par 'jug pa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>Tibetan</td>
<td>Sanskrit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>meditative concentration</td>
<td>ting nge 'dzin</td>
<td>samādhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(in) meditative concentration</td>
<td>mnyam par bzhag pa</td>
<td>samāhita</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>meditative cultivation</td>
<td>bsgom pa</td>
<td>bhāvanā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>meditative sphere</td>
<td>skye mched</td>
<td>āyatana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mental factor</td>
<td>sems las byung ba</td>
<td>caitta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mental formation</td>
<td>'du byed</td>
<td>saṃskāra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(as fourth aggregate)</td>
<td>dam bcas pa tsam</td>
<td>pratijñā-mātra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mere assertion</td>
<td>bsod nams</td>
<td>punya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>merit</td>
<td>sems</td>
<td>citta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mind</td>
<td>yid</td>
<td>manas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>moral conduct</td>
<td>tshul khrims</td>
<td>śīla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>necessary connection</td>
<td>med na mi 'byung ba</td>
<td>avinābhāva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>negation</td>
<td>dgag pa</td>
<td>pratisedha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>neutral</td>
<td>lung du ma bstan pa</td>
<td>avyākṛta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nihilistic negation</td>
<td>skur pa 'debs pa</td>
<td>apavāda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>noble</td>
<td>'phags pa</td>
<td>ārya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nonconceptual wisdom</td>
<td>rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye shes</td>
<td>nirvikalpaka-jñāna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>noncondition</td>
<td>rkyen ma yin pa</td>
<td>apratyaya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nonobstructing cause</td>
<td>byed pa'i rgyu</td>
<td>kārana-hetu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>object</td>
<td>yul</td>
<td>viṣayya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>object, object to be grasped [by a subject]</td>
<td>gzung ba</td>
<td>grāhya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>object of cognition</td>
<td>dmigs pa</td>
<td>ārambāna, ālambana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>object of correct knowledge</td>
<td>gzhal bya</td>
<td>prameya</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
object of knowledge
one who desires
one who hates
original meaning, point under discussion
overextension perception-conception perfection person position positive concomitance potentiality previous position primary matter primordial matter, original nature property of the subject [which proves the thesis]
property to be proved proving property question raised in objection reality reason reasoning refutation result saṃsāric existence

shes bya
chags pa
sdang ba
skabs kyi don
ha cang thal ba
'du shes
pha rol tu phyin pa
gang zag
phyogs
rjes su 'gro ba
nus pa
phyogs snga ma
gtso bo
rang bzhin
phyogs kyi chos
bsgrub par bya ba'i chos
sgrub pa'i chos
brgal zhing brtag pa
de kho na
gtan tshigs
rigs pa
sun dbyung ba
'bras bu
'srid pa
jñeyya
rakta
dviṣṭa
prakṛṭa-artha
atiprasaṅga
saṃjñā
pāramitā
pudgala
pakṣa
anvaya
śakti
pūrvapakṣa
pradhāna
prakṛti
pakṣa-dharma
sādhyā-dharma
sādhanā-dharma
parayanuyoga
tattva
hetu
yukti, nyāya
dūśaṇa
phala
kārya
bhava
scripture  

l lung  
gsung rab  
grgur byas pa'i gzugs  
ddag pa mi s mthun pa  
dbhang po  
tha dad pa  

secondary matter  

set of all similar examples  

similar cause  

similar example  

simple negation  

simultaneously  

arisen cause  

specific  

specification  

specious  

spirit  

spiritually  

immature  

state of existence  

student  

subject [of a thesis]  

subsequent reasoning  

substance, real substance  

superficial reality  

superficial truth  

superficially real  

āgama  

pravacana  

upādāya-rūpa  

tpratiṣedha  

indriya  

prthak, bhinna, vyatirikta, etc.  
sapakṣa  

sabhāga-hetu  

sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta  

pratiniyata  

avadhārāna, nirdhārāna  

-ābhāsa  

puruṣa  

bāla  

gati  

śīṣya  

dharmin  

uttara-tarka  

dravya  

saṃvrṭi  

saṃvrṭi-satya  

sāṃvṛtā
supramundane
syllogism
system
thesis
thing
characterized
tranquil
trace
treatise
true state
ultimate reality
ultimate truth
ultimately real
unconditioned
undesired
consequence
universal cause
unreal
unwholesome
valid means of
knowledge
virtue
visible form
wholesome
wisdom

'jig rten las 'das pa
sbyor ba'i tshig
gzhung lugs
dam bcos pa
mtshan nyid kyi gzhi

lokottara
prayoga-vākya
mata, samaya
pratijñā
lakṣya

śiva
vāsanā
śāstra
yāthātathya (?)

paramārtha
paramārthika
asamāskṛta
prasāṅga

sarvatraga-hetu
abhūta
akuśala
pramāṇa

dharma
rūpa

kusala
jñāna
Bibliographical Abbreviations


Akutobhayā  In *Dbu ma Tsa*: D vol. 1; P vol. 95.

Ava  Avalokitavrata's *Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā*. Chapters one and two in *Dbu ma Wa*: D vol. 4; P vol. 96. Chapters three through sixteen (part) in *Dbu ma Zha*: D vol. 5; P vol. 97; Chapters sixteen (part) through twenty-seven in *Dbu ma Za*: D vol. 6; P vol. 97. Text numbers: Peking no. 5259; Derge no. 3859.


C  Co ne edition of *bstan 'gyur*, *Dbu ma Tsha*. Published on microfiche by the Institute for the Advanced Study of World Religions, Stony Brook, New York, 1974. ("C" without further specification refers to PP C.)


LVP AK  *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu*, tr. Louis de La Vallée Poussin, 6 volumes, Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1923-31
(reprinted 1971-2 as vol. 16 of *Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques*). (Roman numerals following "LVP AK" refer to chapter numbers, not volume numbers.)

**MMK**  Nāgarjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*. Sanskrit in PSP. Tibetan in Dbo ma Tsha: D vol. 1; P vol. 95 and also in *Akutobhaya*, Ava, Bp, PP, and PSP.

**N**  Snar thang edition of the *bstan 'gyur*, Dbo ma Tsha. Photocopy of the blockprint in the Royal Library, Copenhagen. ("N" without further specification refers to PP N.)


**PP**  Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa*. In Dbo ma Tsha: D vol. 2; P vol. 95. Text numbers: Peking no. 5253; Derge no. 3853.

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tional University. (Saito's edition and translation are paginated separately. References are to the edition unless otherwise indicated.)


