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Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa*: A Translation of Chapters Three, Four, and Five, Examining the āyatanas, Aggregates, and Elements

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Introduction

The Madhyamaka school is one of the two major philosophical schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism, along with the Yogācāra school. The Madhyamaka is best known for its doctrine of emptiness (śūnyatā). The idea of emptiness is found in the "perfection of discernment" (*prajñā-pāramitā*) sūtras, some of which are among the earliest Mahāyāna sūtras. While the sūtras expound emptiness in a discursive way, the Mādhyamikas use systematic argument.

Emptiness, for the Madhyamaka school, means that dharmas are empty of intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*). All Buddhists hold that conditioned dharmas arise in dependence on causes and conditions. For the Mādhyamikas, this fact of dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*) implies that dharmas can have no intrinsic, self-sufficient nature of their own. Since dharmas appear when the proper conditions occur and cease when those conditions are absent, the way in which dharmas exist is similar to the way in which mirages and dreams exist. Thus attachment and aversion are undermined, since ultimately, they have no substantial objects and lack any self-sufficient status of their own.

Moreover, the Mādhyamikas argue that if things existed by their own intrinsic nature, they would be changeless; but this contradicts our everyday experience. As Bhāvaviveka says in his commentary on MMK 5-7, "Like pictures painted on a wall, living beings' particular ages, sizes, and postures would not increase or decrease."

The Madhyamaka school was founded by Nāgārjuna (active c. 150-200), the author of the *Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā* (MMK).
The MMK inspired a number of commentaries which not only expounded the meaning of the MMK but also often acted as vehicles for the commentators' own views. The Akutobhayā seems to be the earliest of the extant commentaries. It is of uncertain authorship, although it is sometimes ascribed to Nāgārjuna himself.6

The earliest extant commentary on the MMK by a known author7 is that of Buddhapālita (c. 500). Buddhapālita closely followed Nāgārjuna's own method, which utilized mainly prasaṅga arguments. These are arguments which show that the opponent's position leads to consequences (prasaṅga) unacceptable to the opponent himself, without, however, committing the Mādhyamika to affirming a contrary position.

Bhāvaviveka (c. 500-570) was the next important Mādhyamika philosopher. Besides his commentary on the MMK, the Prajñāpradīpa, he wrote some notable independent works, such as the Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā and its auto commentary, the Tarkajvālā. Bhāvaviveka seems to have been the first to use the formal syllogism of Indian logic in expounding the Madhyamaka; and he strongly criticized Buddhapālita for failing to do so. He felt that the author of a commentary should state independent inferences (svatantra-anumāna) rather than simply giving prasaṅga arguments.8 Bhāvaviveka’s position was later criticized by Candrakīrti, who defended Buddhapālita in his own commentary on the MMK, the Prasannapadā.

Bhāvaviveka’s Prajñāpradīpa is, in the first place, of great interest for its explanation and elaboration of the MMK. In the second place, it is important in the history of the Madhyamaka. Bhāvaviveka’s criticisms of Buddhapālita in the Prajñāpradīpa resulted in the division of the Madhyamaka into two subschools: the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka of Bhāvaviveka and the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka of Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti. (The names of these subschools, derived from svatantra-anumāna and prasaṅga, seem to have originated some centuries after Candrakīrti and are known to us only from Tibetan sources.9)
Moreover, the *Prajñāpradīpa* is the first commentary on the MMK to make use of the formal apparatus of Buddhist logic and the first to discuss non-Buddhist philosophical schools extensively. Bhavaviveka's accounts, in the *Prajñāpradīpa* and elsewhere, of the positions of other Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools give valuable information on the state of Indian philosophy in his day. (These two characteristics, the use of syllogistic reasoning and the statement and refutation of the positions of other schools, are very much in evidence in chapters three, four, and five of the *Prajñāpradīpa*.)

Chapters three, four, and five of the MMK form a closely related set. In chapter three, "Examination of the āyatanas," Nāgārjuna draws on the pattern of analysis developed in chapter two in order to analyze the process of vision. The analysis is then extended to the other sense organs and their respective sense objects. The five physical sense organs plus the mind (manas), together with the six corresponding sense objects, constitute the twelve āyatanas. (Dharmas are the object of mind.)

Nāgārjuna finds the process of perception by the sense organs to be unintelligible if one tries to understand it in terms of entities which possess their own intrinsic nature (svabhāva). As is often the case in the MMK, the word svabhāva is not used and has to be inferred from the context of the work as a whole. Without some qualification such as "by intrinsic nature," a statement such as "... visible [objects] (drāstavya) and the visual organ (darśana) do not exist" (MMK 3-7a; PSP: 3-8a) is difficult to explain or defend.

Chapter four, "Examination of the Aggregates," deals with the five aggregates (skandha). Matter (rūpa), the first aggregate, is examined in terms of the relation of cause (kāraṇa or hetu) and result (kārya). This analysis of causality complements the analysis of causal conditions (pratyaya) in the first chapter of MMK. The discussion of matter is extended to the other aggregates and to all entities (bhāva). The last two verses of chapter four (MMK 4-8,9) concern the way in which the Madhyamaka is expounded.

Chapter five, "Examination of the Elements," discusses the six
elements (dhātu). Space (ākāśa) is discussed by means of an analysis of what is characterized (laksya) and its defining characteristic (laksana). If defining characteristics and the things they characterize are not possible, then entities (bhāva) are not possible; and without an entity, one cannot have its absence, a nonentity (abhava). Thus space cannot be a defining characteristic, a thing characterized, an entity, or a nonentity. The same applies to the other five elements. The concluding verse (MMK 5-8) states that those who see entities and nonentities do not see the quiescence (upaśama) of the visible (draśtavya). This mention of the visible harks back to the subject-matter of chapter three. The phrase, "tranquil quiescence of the visible" (draśtavyopaśamaṁ śivam), also recalls the characterization of dependent origination as "the tranquil quiescence of conceptual proliferation" (prapañcropaśamaṁ śivam) in MMK 1-Bb.

Thus chapters three, four, and five examine three sets of categories, the āyatanas, the skandhas, and the dhātus. These categories are fundamental to the Buddhist analysis of phenomena. (Note that in chapter five of the MMK, dhātu refers to the six elements, not the eighteen dhātus. The latter are the twelve āyatanas plus the six corresponding sense cognitions.) In each chapter, the analysis is made more specific by singling out a particular member of the set for detailed treatment. It is then pointed out that the same analysis applies to the other members of the set as well.

As we have seen, one could also say that chapter three deals with perception, chapter four with causality, and chapter five with the characteristics by which we define and identify the constituents of the world. From this point of view, also, the subjects treated in these three chapters are both important and interrelated.¹²

Aside from a few quotations in the Prasannapadā, the Prajñāpradīpa has been lost in the original Sanskrit. It exists in Tibetan and Chinese translations. The Chinese translation is reportedly rather poor;¹³ but the Tibetan translation, done by Jñānagarbha and Cog ro Klu'i rgyal mtshan in the early ninth century, seems to be
excellent. The same translators also translated Avalokitavrata's massive subcommentary on the Prajñāpradīpa, called the Prajñāpradīpa-tīkā. (Avalokitavrata's work is not extant in Sanskrit, and apparently no Chinese translation was ever made.)

The present English translation was made from the Tibetan. I consulted the Peking, Narthang, Derge, and Cone editions and made my own edition of the text. Most of the variants found in the different Tibetan editions are either obvious scribal errors or else represent different orthographic conventions. Rarely do the variants offer significant alternatives for the meaning of a sentence.

I also made extensive use of the Peking and Derge editions of Avalokitavrata's subcommentary. Since the Prajñāpradīpa is often terse, allusive, or technical, sentences frequently need to be amplified with phrases in square brackets; and explanatory notes sometimes need to be provided. For both purposes, Avalokitavrata's work is invaluable. Also, since the subcommentary quotes the entire Prajñāpradīpa, it is sometimes helpful in establishing the text.

An English-Tibetan-Sanskrit glossary has been provided for important terms. Although we do not have the Sanskrit text of the Prajñāpradīpa, the Tibetan practice of using standardized translation equivalents enables one to infer the Sanskrit original of many terms with a high degree of confidence. Sanskrit terms in the glossary are given in the translation in parentheses at their first occurrence, unless the English translation equivalent is so widely used that this seems unnecessary. Sanskrit and Tibetan words and phrases which are not in the glossary are also sometimes quoted in parentheses, especially when the translation is a bit conjectural.

Notes to Introduction

1 For the convenience of the reader, the introductions to my translations of chapters one and two of the Prajñāpradīpa (Ames (1993) and (1995)) are repeated here, except that material specific to chapters one and two has been replaced by a discussion of chapters three, four, and five largely taken from my dissertation (Ames (1986)). For more details on all the matters discussed in this introduction, see Ames (1986), "Part I: Introduction," and the sources cited therein.
As a general rule, "Madhyamaka" is the name of the school and its philosophy; a follower of the school is called a "Mādhyamika." See Ruegg (1981), p. 1 and n. 3.

3See, e. g., MMK 7-34 and 17-33.

4See, e. g., chapter 23 of the MMK, which is discussed in Ames (1988).

5See MMK 15-8.

6On the Akutobhayā, see Huntington (1986).

7There is also a Chinese translation of a commentary ascribed to Asaṅga which deals only with the dedicatory verses of MMK (MMK I-A,B). See Ruegg (1981), p. 49, and Keenan (1989).

8In this connection, it is interesting to note that in his commentary on MMK 2-19 (see Ames (1995)), Bhāvaviveka admits that Nāgārjuna gives a prasāṅga argument. In his commentary on MMK 1-1 (see Ames (1993), pp. 222-3, 225-6, 234) and elsewhere, Bhāvaviveka criticizes Buddhapiilita's prasāṅga arguments because, among other reasons, they could be converted into syllogisms asserting things which Buddhapiilita does not, in fact, wish to say. For example, Bhāvaviveka claims that Buddhapiilita's prasāṅga argument against things' originating from themselves could be converted into a syllogism showing that things originate from another. In the case of MMK 2-19, however, Bhāvaviveka converts Nāgārjuna's prasāṅga argument against a goer and his or her going's being the same into a syllogism which simply negates sameness without asserting difference. Thus Bhāvaviveka seems inconsistent, if not biased, on this point.


10The translations of chapters three, four, and five presented here are revised versions of those in my dissertation (Ames (1986)).

11See MMK 3-3, which explicitly refers to chapter two.

12David Kalupahana gives an analysis according to which chapter three examines the source of knowledge (exemplified by vision), chapter four examines the object of knowledge (exemplified by matter), and chapter five examines the locus of the object (space). See Kalupahana (1986), p. 148.


14For the Prajñāpradīpa, the Peking edition is text no. 5253; the Derge edition is no. 3853.

15For Avalokitavrata's īkā, the Peking edition is text no. 5259; the Derge edition is no. 3859.
Translation of Prajñāpradīpa, Chapter Three: Examination of the āyatanas

Now [Nāgārjuna] begins the third chapter with the aim of showing that the āyatanas have no intrinsic nature by means of negating a particular [instance of] origination, [which would be] a counterexample (vipākṣa) [to nonorigination]. Alternatively, he begins the third chapter in order to show that the āyatanas are empty by means of negating motion ('gro ba, gati or gamana), [which would be] a counterexample [to nonmotion].

When one examines [the āyatanas] in the first way, then the counterexample is adduced [as follows:]

Objection:
[Thesis:] One should grasp that in ultimate reality (paramārthatah), the internal (ādhyātmika) āyatanas do indeed originate, [Reason:] because the [kind of] object is specific (pratiniyata) [to each kind of organ].

[Application:] The internal āyatanas do have such specific objects; namely, the objects of the visual organ (dārśana), the auditory organ (śravaṇa), the olfactory organ (ghrāṇa), the gustatory organ (rasaṇa), the tactile organ (sparśana), and the mind (manas) are, respectively, visible forms (rūpa), sounds (śabda), odors (gandha), tastes (rāsa), tangibles (sprastavya), and dharmas.

[Conclusion:] Therefore, by means of the stated reason, one should grasp that the internal āyatanas do indeed originate.

When one examines [the āyatanas] in the second way, then because [Nāgārjuna] has said,

Therefore [the activity of] going, the goer, and that which is to be traversed do not exist, [MMK 2-25cd]
[our] opponents reply:

Objection:
[Thesis:] One should understand that going does indeed exist,
[Reason:] because it is the result of activity (kriyā-phala),
[Example:] like seeing visible form and so on.

Answer: In answer to both positions [i.e., the two preceding objections], [Nāgārjuna] says:

The visual organ, the auditory organ, the olfactory organ, the gustatory organ, the tactile organ and the mind (manas) [Are] the six sense organs (indriya). Their domain (gocara) is the visible (draṣṭavya) and so on. [MMK 3-1]

Here it is called "the visual organ" because it sees (lta zhes bya ba ni lta bar byed pa’i phyir ro, paśyatītī darśanam iti?). For the remaining [sense organs] also, [the etymology] is similar. They are called "sense organs" (indriya) because of exercising power (indriyatva) and mastery (bdag po nyid, probably ādhipatyā) over that [particular] group [of sense objects], since they grasp visible form and the rest.7 [As for the word,] "six": The number [of sense organs] is also established by the [preceding] list of [their] individual names; but that [number, six] is specified in order to make it known that even conventionally (vyavahārataḥ), there is no agent who apprehends visible form and so on [and who is] different from those [sense organs].

"Their" (etesāṃ) [means] "of those six sense organs." "Domain" (gocara) [means] "object" (visaya); the meaning is that [the sense organs] have power (mthū) over those [sense objects].8 "The visible and so on" (draṣṭavyādīnī) [refers to] objects of vision (draṣṭavya), objects of hearing, objects of smell, objects of taste, objects of touch, and objects of thought.9

Moreover, that specific relation (pratiniyama) of organ (visayin) and object (visaya) is conventional (vyāvahārika), not ultimate (pāramārthika). Therefore, since the reason exists only in the set of all dissimilar examples,10 [the opponent’s reason] has a
contradictory meaning.  

[Nāgārjuna] will [now] explain this [point, namely] how in ultimate reality, the eye\textsuperscript{12} and so on cannot have the relation of organ and object (\textit{visayi-visaya-bhāva}). To begin with, with regard to the eye-organ (\textit{cakṣur-indriya}) alone, [he says.]

If the visual organ is its own self, that (\textit{tat}) [eye] does not see that (\textit{tam}) [own self] at all.\textsuperscript{13} [MMK 3-2ab]

"The visual organ" [is so called] because it sees (\textit{lta ba zhes bya ba ni lta bar byed pa'i phyir, paśyaṁti darśanam iti?}); [the term means] "the eye-organ." "If it is its own self (\textit{svātman})" [means] "if it has its own intrinsic nature (\textit{svabhāva})." As for "that does not see that at all," why does it not see at all? [Nāgārjuna] clarifies that position by the meaning of the statement which occurs below.\textsuperscript{14} Why? Because that (\textit{tat}) [eye] does not see that (\textit{tam}) [own self]. The idea is that that [fact] is common knowledge. The phrase "at all" has the meaning of specification. Here one should see [i. e., understand] that [the eye] does not see at all. Otherwise, one would understand that it does see another [thing, though not itself].\textsuperscript{15}

\textit{Objection:} In that case, what will you prove? When [you] have said that the eye does not see its own self, then [we] accept that it does see visible form which is different [from its own self].

\textit{Answer:} As for that which you maintain:

When it does not see itself,\textsuperscript{16} how will that [eye] see others?\textsuperscript{17} [MMK 3-2cd]

The meaning of the sentence is that the eye lacks the very power (\textit{mthu}) of seeing visible form. As to that, the former half of the verse [i. e., MMK 3-2ab] shows the [proving] property, [namely,] that the eye does not see its own self; and the latter half [i. e., MMK 3-2cd] indicates the property to be proved, [namely,] that it does not see visible form. Therefore, because a [property]
to be proved and a proving property are adduced, it is considered to be a syllogism:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the eye-organ does not see visible form at all,
[Reason:] because it does not see its own self,
[Example:] like the ear and so on.

Alternatively, the former half [of the verse], having indicated that the eye-organ is just not graspm ble (grāhyā) [by the eye-organ itself], adduces the eye-organ's own self as a similar example (sādharmya-drṣṭānta). The latter half, by showing that the eye-organ does not see visible form, indicates the property to be proved, [the fact] that visible form is not an object of the eye-organ. Here, according to that [explanation], the syllogism is:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, visible form is not an object of the eye-organ,
[Reason:] because it is a collection [of atoms] (bsags pa, perhaps samcitā),
[Example:] like the eye-organ's [own] self.

The reasons in the two preceding syllogisms, namely, the eye-organ's] not seeing its own self and [form's] being a collection, are mentioned [as] a use of words to imply more than is expressed (mtshan nyid kyi sgra'i tshul, perhaps lakṣāna-sabda-naya). Therefore, in both cases, inferences should also be stated [employing] reasons such as "because of having resistance (sapratigha)," "because of being dependent on the elements (bhautika)," "because of being secondary matter (upādāyarūpa)," and "because of belonging to the aggregate of matter (rūpa-skandha)."

Objection: It is correct that the eye does not see its own self, because it is invisible (anidarśana); but (visible) form [i. e., rūpa-āyatana or rūpa-dhātu] is visible; therefore [the eye] sees that [visible form].

Answer: As to that, [you] have established, by that other reason, the reason and example which we have stated; therefore there is no conflict [with our own position].

Objection: The Ābhidhārmikas say: If [you] say that the
eye, without [further] qualification, does not see visible form at all, that establishes what is [already] established [for us], since [our] position is that an eye which is non-functioning (tatsabhāga) does not see forms. But if you say that the eye's not seeing visible forms is stated about a functioning (sabhāga) [eye], in that case there would be a conflict with what [you yourself] accept. For it is said in the Abhidharma,

The functioning (sabhāga) eye sees visible forms; [visual] cognition which is based (āśrita) on that [eye does] not. [AK 1-42ab]

Answer: As to that, because just the functioning (sabhāga) eye is the subject [of our syllogism] (pakṣīkṛta) here, [our argument] does not establish what is [already] established [for you]. Nor is there a conflict with what [we ourselves] accept, since it is said [in the Ārya-bhava-saṃkrānti-sūtra],

The eye does not see visible form, and the mind (manas) does not know dhammas.
That which the world does not penetrate (gāhate) is the highest truth (paramam satyam).

Because [we] do not accept that the eye sees visible form in ultimate reality and because of the extensive inferential argument (anumāna) which has been expounded, that [fact that the functioning eye does not see visible form] is established. Therefore, [Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the functioning (sabhāga eye does not see visible form,

[Reason:] because it is an eye-organ,
[Example:] like the non-functioning (tatsabhāga) [eye].

Alternatively, [there is no conflict with what we ourselves accept] because [the functioning eye's seeing visible forms] is negated [using the following reason and example:] "because the [eye-]organ is material (rupin) like the ear." Nor will there be
a conflict with common knowledge [i.e., that the eye sees visible forms]. [This is so] because that [common knowledge] has not been abandoned since we have stated a qualified thesis, and because [that objection] has been answered [already].

Objection: The Kāśmiras say: The eye does indeed see [forms] because it is the agent (kartri) of vision.

Answer: That is not [logically] possible, because [the reason] is one part of the meaning of the thesis and because there is no agreement (anvaya) [with a similar example, since no example is given] and because the negation [of the thesis that the eye sees forms] has [already] been stated.

Alternative Answer: What the Kāśmiras said is not [logically] possible [for the following reasons:] For those who hold that [all things] are momentary (kṣanikavādin), activity is not possible [for the eye] because it is instantaneous. For those who hold that [all things] are not momentary, also, it is not possible for that same [eye which which previously does not see to become] different from that.

Objection: The Sautrāntikas say: Since conditioned dharmas are inactive, neither the eye nor anything else sees. What then? In a sūtra, it is said that visual cognition (caksurvilāna) originates in dependence on the eye and visible forms. Therefore your statement that the eye does not see just establishes what is [already] established [for us].

Answer: Just by [our] negation of origination [in the first chapter of the MMK], visual cognition is not possible; therefore [we] do not establish what is [already] established [for you]. [Also,] there is no conflict with what [we ourselves] accept, because we do accept the meaning of [that] sūtra [as being] in accord with conventional truth and because in ultimate reality, there is no reasoning [which establishes] the meaning of [that] sūtra.

Indeed, a difference of that [manner in which the eye sees] is not possible, because we have negated the origination of the āyatanas of eye and visible form and because [we] have negated
[the relation of] seer and seen between eye and visible form. Nevertheless, desiring to enlarge the understanding of the listener, [I will give just an indication (phyogs tsam, diñmātra) [of that argument].

If the visual organ is its own self, that [eye] does not see that [own self] at all. [MMK 3-2ab]

As before, having indicated that [the fact] that [the eye] does not see its own self is the property of the subject [which proves the thesis], [Nāgārjuna says,]

When it does not see itself, how will that [eye] see others? [MMK 3-2cd]

This sets forth the property to be proved [i. e., that the eye does not see visible forms whether it is in contact with them or not]. Therefore, wishing to refute other conceptual constructions imagined (parikalpita) by others, [I will state syllogisms.

In that connection, to those who say that the eye grasps [visible forms] with which it is not in contact (aprāpta), [we reply:] [The eye does not grasp visible forms with which it is not in contact. It knows them only indirectly] because "seeing" has the meaning of "knowing" [not "grasping"], just as kings know from [their] agents [things which they themselves do not see]. [This is so] because [the eye] does not see itself. The meaning of [that] reason is that [the eye] does not know itself.

[Therefore we can state syllogisms such as the following:] [Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the eye does not grasp an object with which it is not in contact (aprāpta-visāya), [Reason:] because it does not see [i. e., know] its own self, [Example:] like the nose and so on. Likewise,

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, visible form is not graspable (grāhya) by an eye-organ which grasps an object with which it is not
in contact,
[Reason:] because it is dependent on the elements (*bhautika*),
[Example:] like odor and so on.

[The reasons in the two preceding syllogisms, namely, the eye's] not seeing its own self and [visible form's] being dependent on the elements, are mentioned [as] a use of words to imply more than is expressed (*mtshan nyid kyi sgra'i tshul*), perhaps *laksāna-sabda-naya*).Therefore in both cases, inferences should also be given [employing] reasons such as "because of having resistance (*sapratiṣṭha*)" and appropriate syllogisms should be fully stated.

Alternatively, [one may state the following syllogism:]
[Thesis:] It is not maintained that in ultimate reality, the eye grasps an object with which it is not in contact,
[Reason:] because it has an object of the present [moment] which is [immediately] evident (*pratyakṣa*),
[Example:] like the nose and the other [physical sense organs].

**Objection:**
[Thesis:] The eye does [indeed] grasp an object with which it is not in contact,
[First Reason:] because it grasps obstructed visible form and
[Second Reason:] because there is no difference of effort and
[Third Reason:] because there is no difference of time and
[Fourth Reason:] because it grasps an object greater [in size] than itself,
[Example:] like the mind (*manas*).

**Answer:** That also is not good, [for the following reasons:] [1] Here "grasping [an object] with which it is not in contact" has the meaning of "grasping visible form which is obstructed;" and the meaning of [the first reason,] "because it grasps visible form which is obstructed," is also just that. Therefore [the meaning of the first reason] is one part of the meaning of the thesis. [2] Also [the second and third reasons,] "because there is no difference of effort and because there is no difference of time," are not established.

Even if the reason[s] were established, no agreement (*anvaya*)
[with a similar example] is established. [This is so] because in ultimate reality, it is not established that even the mind grasps [an object] with which it is not in contact; [and therefore the example given is invalid]. Alternatively, [the example] also has a contradictory meaning.54

**Objection:** The Sāmkhyas say: [Your proof] that the eye does not grasp an object with which it is not in contact establishes what is [already] established [for us, since we hold that the eye apprehends an object with which it is in contact].

**Answer:** One should reply: [Just] because [we] have shown that the eye is empty of the property of grasping an object with which it is not in contact, [it does] not [follow that we] have shown [that fact] as a consequence of (yogena) proving that it does grasp an object with which it is in contact. Therefore [you] become encouraged without justification (asthāne).

Moreover,

[Thesis:] It is not maintained that the eye grasps an object with which it is in contact (prāpta-viśaya),

[Reason:] because it is a sense organ,

[Example:] like the mind (manas).

Nor is [that argument] inconclusive due to the nose and so on, since those [other sense organs] will also be shown below to be just like that [eye].55

Also, what is the meaning of "grasping [an object] with which it is in contact"? If [you] say, "[The eye] goes out from [its own] location [i.e., the eyeball]56 in the direction of the object and grasps [it]," [then we reply:]

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the eye's function ('jug pa, probably pravṛtti or vṛtti) [of grasping its object]57 does not go outward from the location of the "synonym of visual cognition,"58

[Reason:] because it is a function,

[Example:] like the function of the nose-organ and so on.59

Likewise,

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, visible form is not graspable (grāhya)
by an eye-organ which grasps an object with which it is in contact,

[Reason:] because [visible form] has a cause,60

[Example:] like sound and so on.

Objection: The extensive inferences shown in both cases61 refute one position by means of the other (phyogs gcig gis gcig bsal ba). Therefore nothing at all has been established.

Answer: Because both [ways of grasping a sense object] do not exist, [our] desire not to establish [either position] is fulfilled (mi sgrub par 'dod pa grub po, perhaps asisādhavaśā siddhā).

Objection:62 The eye's rays of light ('od zer) go in the direction of the object and grasp the object.

Answer: To those who have [that] opinion, the following should be said:

[Thesis:] One should understand that even conventionally, the eye-organ does not possess rays of light,

[Reason:] because it is a cause63 of the apprehension (dmigs pa, probably upalamha or upalabdhi) of visible form,

[Example:] like visible form [itself].

Objection:64

[Thesis:] The eye-organ does indeed possess light rays,

[Reason:] because it is an eye-organ,

[Example:] like the eyes of nocturnal animals such as mice.

Answer: That is not [logically] possible, [1] because the eye-organ is invisible and [2] even if the location65 of that [eye-organ] possesses light-rays, the example is not established and [3] because [your reason] suffers from [the fault] that it is counterbalanced.66

Enough of [this] extensive deliberation! [We] will deal just with the subject at hand.

If the visual organ is its own self, that [eye] does not see that [own self] at all.
When it does not see itself, how will that [eye] see others? [MMK 3-2]
[Buddhapālita’s commentary:] Here [Buddhapālita]\(^{67}\) says: Here if the intrinsic nature of entities is seen in their own selves, [then] because [they] possess that [nature], it will also be apprehended in the selves of others. For example, if wetness is perceived [literally, "seen"] in water, [then] because it possesses that [wetness], [wetness] will also be apprehended in earth. If heat is perceived in fire, [then] because it possesses that [heat], [heat] will also be apprehended in water. If a sweet smell is perceived in the jasmine flower, [then] because it possesses that [sweet smell], [a sweet smell] will also be apprehended in clothing.\(^{68}\) But how will that entity which does not appear in its own self be apprehended in the selves of others? For if a bad smell is not perceived in the jasmine flower, it will not be apprehended in clothing [perfumed by it], either.

[Buddhapālita continues:] Therefore if the visual organ saw its own self, then it would be possible to say, "because it sees visible form, it is the visual organ (rūpatā niṣaṇaṇi darśanam iti);" but the visual organ does not see its own self. Now how will that which does not see its own self see others? Therefore it is not possible to say, "because it sees visible form, it is the visual organ."

[Buddhapālita continues:] ācārya Āryadeva, also, has said,

If the intrinsic nature of all entities is seen first in themselves, Why does the eye not also grasp the eye itself? [Catuh-śataka 13-16]\(^{69}\)

[Other Buddhists’ objection to Buddhapālita’s argument:]\(^{70}\) As to that, here [our] fellow Buddhists say: If [you] say that just as that vision\(^{71}\) which apprehends visible form does not exist in the eye, so also it does not exist in visible form, then [that merely] establishes what is [already] established [for us]. For even so, it has been said,\(^{72}\)

That [visual cognition?] does not exist in the eye or visible form; nor does it exist between the two.
That [place?] where that [visual cognition?] abides neither exists, nor does it not exist.

[Bhāvaviveka's critique of Buddhapālita's explanation:] If [you, Buddhapālita] say that [the eye] does not have the power of seeing its own self, [then] jasmine flowers are not suitable as an example of that. [This is so] because sweet smells occur in jasmine flowers by virtue of a group (sāmagrī) [of causes and conditions], just as sesame seed oil becomes sweet-smelling through contact with flowers. Also, [this argument is wrong for the following reason:] Since no one accepts that [the eye possesses] the activity (kriyā) of seeing visible form [because it possesses the activity of seeing itself], it is not correct to refute that [position].

But if [you, Buddhapālita] prove that just as [the eye] does not grasp itself, [so] also it does not grasp others, [then] in that case also, [your] example cannot [prove that]. [This is so] because [your examples,] fire and jasmine flowers, do not grasp their own or others' selves. Therefore that [explanation of yours] is not [logically] possible.

Therefore in that way, since it is not established that the eye sees, origination is also not established; [and] motion is not established, either, since [in both cases, the alleged] example does not exist. Alternatively, the reason is also contradictory.

Objection: Having imputed a [false] meaning to [your own] proof, you say that the eye does not see visible form because it does not see its own self. By saying that, [you] have shown that if that [eye] lacks power over its own self, it also does not have that [power] over the self of another. Even so, [your reason] is inconclusive (anaikāntika), for although fire lacks the power to burn its own self, [nevertheless] it does have the power to burn the self of another.

Answer:

The example of fire is not adequate (paryāpta) for establishing the visual organ. [MMK 3-3ab]
[That is,] to charge that [our] reason is inconclusive [by means of the example of fire, is inadequate] for establishing that meaning, [i. e.,] that the eye has the intrinsic nature of a visual organ (\(\text{dar}\text{\'}\text{sana-svabhava}\)). The idea is that [this is so] because in ultimate reality, it is not established that fire burns and because even conventionally, it is not established that [the eye] has the intrinsic nature of a visual organ.

Alternatively,

The example of fire is not adequate for establishing the visual organ... [MMK 3-3ab]

because of the fault in [your] reason which [will be] stated. The idea is that [this is so] because that [notion that] the intrinsic nature of fire is to illuminate [both] its own and others' selves does not exist even for the opponent's position (\(\text{parapaksa}\)), and because even conventionally, it is not established that the intrinsic nature of fire is to burn. "Burning," moreover, is a transformation ('\(\text{gyur ba}\), probably \(\text{parin}\)\(\text{\'}\text{ama}\) or \(\text{viparin}\)\(\text{\'}\text{ama}\)) of fuel, which is produced by fire; therefore it is not the intrinsic nature of fire.

Moreover,

The example of fire is not adequate for establishing the visual organ.
That [example] has been answered, along with the visual organ [itself], by [the examination of] the traversed (\(\text{gata}\)), the untraversed (\(\text{agata}\)), and that which is being traversed (\(\text{gamyamana}\)). [MMK 3-3]

"Along with the visual organ" (\(\text{ita bcas, sadar\'sana}\)) [means] "together with the visual organ (\(\text{ita ba dang bcas pa, saha dar\'sana}\))?. What [is said to be "along with the visual organ"]? The example of fire. What has been done? [The example of fire, along with the visual organ,] has been answered. By means of what? By means of [the examination of] the traversed, the untra-
versed, and that which is being traversed [in chapter two of the MMK].

Previously, it was explained that in ultimate reality, going does not exist on the traversed, the untraversed, or that which is being traversed. [This is so] because [the traversed] has been traversed [already], because [the untraversed] has not [yet] been traversed, and because that which is being traversed is not cognized apart from the traversed and the untraversed.

In just that way, the [following] syllogisms should be stated successively: In ultimate reality, fire, too, does not burn fuel which has been burned, which has not been burned, or which is being burned. [This is so] because [burned fuel] has been burned [already], because [unburned fuel] has not [yet] been burned, and because [fuel] which is being burned is not cognized apart from the burned and the unburned. And likewise, in ultimate reality, the eye, too, does not see visible forms which have been seen, which have not been seen, or which are being seen. [This is so] because [the seen] has been seen [already], because [the unseen] has not [yet] been seen, and because [visible forms] which are being seen are not cognized apart from the seen and the unseen.

[Buddhapālita's commentary:] Here [Buddhapālita] says:

Objection [according to Buddhapālita]: The visual organ and so on are established in the same way as fire. For example, although fire burns, it just burns others; but it does not burn its own self. Likewise, although the visual organ sees, it just sees others; but it does not see its own self.

Answer:

The example of fire is not adequate for establishing the visual organ.

That [example] has been answered, along with the visual organ [itself], by [the examination of] the traversed, the untraversed, and that which is being traversed. [MMK 3-3]

[The example is not adequate] because that [fire] also does not
burn another.\textsuperscript{90}

[\textit{Bhāvaviveka's} critique:] That is not [logically] possible, for since the opponent's position (\textit{purvapakṣa}) is quite worthless (\textit{asāra}) due to [its being] a mere example, it is not right to refute that [position].\textsuperscript{92}

\textbf{Objection:}

[Thesis:] The eye does indeed possess the activity (\textit{kriyā}) of seeing,

[Reason:] because it is so taught in the science of grammar (\textit{śabda-śāstra}).

[Application:] Here, in the science of grammar, [it is taught that] when one uses\textsuperscript{93} a primary suffix (\textit{bya ba’i rkyen}, \textit{kṛt-pratyaya})\textsuperscript{94} in [the sense of] an agent (\textit{kartṛ}), [then one says,] "Because it sees, it is the visual organ (\textit{ita bar byed pas lta ba zhes bya ba}, probably \textit{paśyatīti darśanam iti}; cf. MMK 3-4c)."

[Similar Example:]\textsuperscript{95} Whatever is taught in that [science] is so, for example, [it is taught that] when one uses a primary suffix in [the sense of] an agent, [then one says,] "Because one understands (\textit{thugs su chud par māzad pa}, \textit{bodhati?}) or because one understands [by oneself] (\textit{thugs su chud par gyur pa}, \textit{buddhyate?}), [one is called] 'Buddha' (\textit{sangs rgyas}, \textit{buddha})."\textsuperscript{96}

\textbf{Answer:} That proof exists [i. e., is valid] within conventional truth (\textit{vyāvahāra-satya}); but it does not exist in ultimate reality. Why? Because in this very [chapter], the eye's seeing (\textit{mig lta ba}) has been negated and because [in the first two chapters] the origination of that [vision] has been negated, [the eye] is devoid of vision.\textsuperscript{97}

When it does not see anything, it is not the visual organ.

[MMK 3-4ab]

When it does not see a door-bolt or a stool or anything at all, then it is not the visual organ. Therefore,
How can that [statement] that the visual organ sees be [logically] possible? [MMK 3-4cd]

How can that [statement] that the visual organ sees be [logically] possible? The meaning of the sentence is that that is just not possible. Therefore,

The visual organ does not see at all. What is not a visual organ (adarśana) does not see at all. [MMK 3-5ab]

The idea is [that what is not a visual organ does not see] because it is empty of the power of seeing, like a lump of earth and so on.

Therefore in ultimate reality, the explanation of the word darśana and the word buddha in the science of grammar is simply not correct, because the example [i. e., the Buddha] does not exist. Nor does [the preceding statement] contradict [our] doctrine, because in ultimate reality, the Blessed One, too, is without intrinsic nature and also because below [Nāgārjuna] will say,

That which is the intrinsic nature of the Tathāgata is the intrinsic nature of this world.
The Tathāgata is without intrinsic nature, [and] this world is without intrinsic nature. [MMK 22-16]

Alternatively, [we can] examine [the meaning of MMK 3-4,5ab] differently: Here, when one uses a primary suffix in [the sense of] an agent, in regard to that [eye] which is a visual organ, [one says,] "Because it sees, it is the visual organ." Or else when one uses a primary suffix in [the sense of] an agent in regard to what is not a visual organ, [one says,] "Because it sees, it is the visual organ." What follows from that? If it is said in regard to that [eye] which is a visual organ, [then]
When it does not see anything, it is not the visual organ. [MMK 3-4ab]

Well, what [is a visual organ]? Just that which sees\textsuperscript{100} is a visual organ. Therefore an eye in which the activity of seeing has originated sees; [but] in that case, there is that same fault of reason and example.\textsuperscript{101}

\textit{Objection:} Because that [eye] is the agent of the activity of seeing, it is indeed the visual organ.

\textit{Answer:} Then if that [eye] is the visual organ [already], a [second] activity of seeing would just be pointless.\textsuperscript{102} Therefore,

How can that [statement] that the visual organ sees be [logically] possible? [MMK 3-4cd]

The meaning of the sentence is that it is simply not [logically] possible, because [the eye would already] possess the activity of seeing.\textsuperscript{103}

But even if it is said in regard to that [eye] which is not a visual organ,

When it does not see anything, it is not the visual organ. [MMK 3-4ab]

Then if that [eye] does not have the intrinsic nature of a visual organ, it is devoid of the activity of seeing, like a lump of earth and so on. Therefore that which is not a visual organ also does not see at all.

Therefore, because in that way neither possesses the activity of seeing,

The visual organ does not see at all. What is not a visual organ does not see at all. [MMK 3-5ab]

\textit{Objection:} If there is a double negation [as in MMK 3-5b], the
original meaning is understood. Therefore an eye in which the activity of seeing has originated sees.

*Answer:* That is not good, because [here] it has been negated that [an eye for which the activity of seeing] exists or does not exist is the cause [of seeing], like the negation [in MMK 1-6] of a causal condition for an existent or a nonexistent [thing].

*Objection:* Having applied [the quality of] being a visual organ [to the eye] figuratively on account of [the fact that it will see in] the future, that [eye] is the visual organ.

*Answer:* [In that case, the thesis which you] maintain has been lost for the sake of establishing conventional truth.

Alternatively, [one may explain MMK 3-5ab as follows:]

*Objection:*

[Thesis:] One says that an eye for which the activity of seeing has originated sees,
[Reason:] because [that] conventional designation of activity exists.
[Dissimilar Example:] It is not said that that [organ] for which the activity of seeing has not originated sees, as [in the case of] the ear.
[Application:] Because the eye possesses the activity of seeing, one conventionally designates that the eye sees.

*Answer:* The *ācārya* [Nāgārjuna] replies: In that case, the visual organ does not see at all. [MMK 3-5a]

The idea is that [this is so] because the opponent has not shown that an activity of seeing has originated in ultimate reality for any seer, and because before an activity of seeing has originated in the visual organ, it is not established as a visual organ.

Because it is difficult to show that what was formerly not a visual organ will later possess the activity of seeing,

What is not a visual organ does not see at all. [MMK 3-5b]
Thus the meaning of the reason [in the opponent's last syllogism] is not established, or else it has a contradictory meaning. Therefore the thesis is lost.

**Objection:** Here the Sāmkhyas and Vaiśeṣikas say: Because one sees by means of this, it is the visual organ ('dis lta bar byed pas lta ba ste, probably anena paśyātīti darśanam). [This is so] because a primary suffix is used in [the sense of] an instrument (karana). That one to whom that instrument [of the activity of seeing] belongs is the seer. That [seer], moreover, sees by means of that [instrument]. For example, a cutter (chettr) cuts (chinnati) wood to be cut (chedya, etc.) by means of an axe; but the axe itself does not cut. Therefore that [statement of yours] that the eye does not see [merely] establishes what is [already] established [for us].

[Thesis:] Instruments have a [corresponding] agent, [Reason:] because they are instruments, [Example:] as the axe and so on have a cutter [who wields them].

**Answer:**

One should understand that the seer has been explained by means of the visual organ itself. [MMK 3-5cd]

"One should understand that it has been explained" [means] "one should understand that it has been answered." By means of what? By means of the visual organ itself. [The explanation] of what? Of the seer. The idea is that [this is so] because the refutation of the conceptual construction that there is a seer is also similar.

As there the property of the eye [which proves that it does not see visible forms] is [its] not seeing its own self, so here also the property of the self (ātman) [which proves that it does not see visible forms] is [its] not seeing its own self. [This is so] because it is not possible for the self to see its own self, since acting ('jug pa, probably pravṛtti or vṛtti) on its own self [would be] contradictory. For example, that same edge of a sword does not cut that
very sword edge. Thus the inference is:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the self, too, is not a seer,
[Reason:] because it does not see its own self,
[Example:] like the ear.

Nor can the opponent spoil (bslad) [our argument] with the
poison of suspicion (āśāṅkā or śaṅkā that the meaning of [our]
reason is not established.112 Wherever it is explained that the self
sees the self, there that [statement] is made conventionally, having
imposed the word "self" [in the sense of "mind"] because the mind
(manas) is beneficial (phan 'dogs pa, perhaps upakārin).113

Here [the reason in the preceding syllogism,] "not seeing its
own self" is mentioned [as] a use of words to imply more than is
expressed (mtshan nyid kyi sgra'i tshul, perhaps lakṣaṇā-sabdana-
naya).114 Therefore inferences with reasons and examples such as
the reasons "because it is an entity (bhāva or vastu)," "because it
is an object of knowledge (jñeya)," or "because it is an object of
speech (brjod par bya ba; abhidheya, vaktavya, vācyā, etc.)" and
[corresponding] examples such as "like the ear and so on," "like
sound and so on," or "like its own self," should also be fully
stated.

Thus,

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the self does not see visible form,
[Reason:] because it is an entity,
[Example:] like the ear and so on.

Likewise,

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the self does not see visible form,
[Reason:] because it is an object of knowledge,
[Example:] like sound and so on.

Likewise,

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the self does not see visible form,
[Reason:] because it is an object of speech,
[Example:] like its own self.

[Syllogisms] should likewise be stated appropriately in regard
to visible form also.115

There are also no faults of the thesis and so on,116 [1] because
conventional truth is under discussion (*dbang du byas pa, adhi-kṛta*), [2] the self [as] generally accepted\(^{117}\) is the subject [of the syllogism] (*phyogs su byas pa, paksīkṛta*), [3] because a property of that [conventional self] is indicated [as the reason in the syllogism], and [4] because that [conventional self] is also adduced as an example.

Likewise, since an axe and so on are not established in ultimate reality, the example [in the opponent's last syllogism] also does not exist. Therefore [when we show that the eye does not see, we] do not establish what is [already] established [for the opponent].

**Objection:** That very [statement] that the seer does not see nihilistically negates (*apa-vād*) that meaning [i. e., its own meaning].\(^{118}\) Therefore there will be a fault in [your] thesis.

**Answer:** Here [that objection] has [already] been answered [in our discussion of the statement], "dependent origination is without origination (*pratītyasamutpādo 'nuttādaḥ*)."\(^{119}\) Therefore it is not necessary to repeat [that answer] again.

Moreover, here that seer either has the intrinsic nature of a seer; or it does not have the intrinsic nature of a seer. In that connection, [let us first suppose that] it has the intrinsic nature of a seer, just as the Śāmkhyas say that the intrinsic nature of the spirit (*puruṣa*) is consciousness (*caitanya*).\(^{120}\) As to that, if that seer of that [Śāmkhya] has the intrinsic nature of a seer, [then] because intrinsic nature is not made [by any causes or conditions], it would be a seer even without a visual organ.\(^{121}\)

**Objection:**\(^{122}\) If that cutter has no axe, it is not possible [for him] to be a cutter. Likewise, [only] if that [self], too, is not apart from\(^{123}\) a visual organ, should one see [i. e., regard] it as a seer.

**Answer:** In that case, the self's being a seer is conventional, because a cutter is conventional.\(^{124}\) If [you] suppose so,

A seer who is not apart [from the visual organ] does not exist.\(^{125}\) [MMK 3-6a]

"Because that [self] is accepted as a seer [only] if it is not apart
from the visual organ" is the rest of the sentence. Here, before [the seer, i.e., the self] possesses the visual organ and after it has separated from the visual organ, the visual organ does not exist. If the visual organ does not exist, [the activity of] seeing (lta ba) the visible also does not exist. Therefore since it is not possible that [the self] is a seer, the seer does not exist. The meaning is that [the self] does not have the intrinsic nature of a seer.

Nor is that [seer] established like fire, because fire is not established without fuel.126

Alternatively, [one can interpret MMK 3-6a by saying that] the rest of the sentence is, "Even if [you] say that [the self] is a seer when the visual organ exists, [nevertheless] the seer imagined (parikalpita) by the Śāṃkhya does not exist." Here one infers that [something] is a seer because it apprehends and sees visible forms. But that apprehension of visible form also exists [only] if the eye, visible form, light, space, and attention exist. Therefore the collection (tshogs)127 called "Devadatta" is designated a "seer" [only when he] possesses those [conditions]; but [a seer] other than that does not exist. [This is so] because even if there were some existence [of a seer] imagined to be different from that [collection], the apprehension of visible form does not exist in the mind (rgyud, samtāna or samtati, literally, "series") of a blind person. [Therefore the seer imagined by the Śāṃkhya could not be a seer by intrinsic nature.]128

Efficient causes (byed pa'i rgyu, kāraka-hetu or kārana-hetu) are conventionally designated as the agent. As in the case of a lamp, it is indeed [logically] possible [to do so, even though they lack the intrinsic nature of an agent]. For example, even though a lamp has no volition (cetanā), it is said to be an illuminator because it is a cause of illumination. Therefore even conventionally, that [seer established by intrinsic nature] does not exist.129

Objection: [What is called the seer] does not have the intrinsic nature of a seer. As the Vaiśeṣikas say, "When the cognition of visible form has originated from the conjunction (sbyor ba, probably samyoga here) of the four [the self (ātman), the mental
organ (manas), the sense organ (indriya), and the object (viṣaya)), [the self] sees."

**Answer:** Even so, there is that same fault [that there is no seer other than the group of factors conventionally called "Devadatta," etc.]. [This is so] because the supposition (brtag pa, kalpanā) that that [seer] is an existence which is not commonly known is not possible.

**Objection:** Accepting [the self] as the common [seer well known in the world], that [self still] exists [independent of the eye, visible form, and so on].

**Answer:** Even so, Nāgārjuna says,

[A seer] who is apart from the visual organ also [does not exist]. [MMK 3-6b]

What is [the meaning of MMK 3-6b]? The context is "the seer does not exist" [from MMK 3-6a]. [This follows] because if it is apart from the power of the visual organ, [the self] does not have the intrinsic nature of that [seer].

**Thesis:** In ultimate reality, it is not possible that that [self] sees visible form.

**Reason:** because it is different from the eye,

**Example:** like a jar.

Thus for neither position is it established that there is a seer.

Alternatively, even if one imagines that [the self] has the intrinsic nature of a seer, [Nāgārjuna replies,]

A seer who is not apart [from the visual organ] does not exist, nor does one who is apart from the visual organ. [MMK 3-6ab]

The idea is that whether it possesses or lacks a visual organ, [the self] does not have the intrinsic nature of a seer.

To begin with, [suppose that] one maintains the following: "When that seer has an eye, he sees." In that case, the estab-
lishment of the apprehension of visible form [by the seer] exists [only] if the eye exists. Therefore [his] being a seer is conventional, just as burning (bsreg pa nyid) [exists only] if fire exists [and thus is conventional]. [In that case,] one ought to maintain that [the seer] is the eye itself. But if one says, "Even without a visual organ, [the self] is a seer," [then] since the apprehension of visible form does not exist in the mind (rgyud, samtāna or samtati, literally, "series") of a blind person, it is not [logically] possible that that [self] is indeed a seer.135

Objection:
[Thesis:] One should understand that just that which possesses the activity of seeing is the seer,
[Reason:] because that has an instrument (karaṇa) and an object (karman).
[Dissimilar Example:] Here what has no activity has no instrument or object, as a sky-flower [does not].
[Application:] That seer (drastr) has an instrument, the visual organ (darśana), and an object, the visible (drāstavya).
[Conclusion:] Therefore one should understand that just that which possesses the activity of seeing is the seer.

Answer: Because the organ of vision has been completely negated [as existing] in ultimate reality and [because] if the visual organ does not exist, the seer is also not possible, [Nāgārjuna says,]

If the seer does not exist, how will your visible [object] and visual organ exist? [MMK 3-6cd]

The idea is that [this is so] because that which no one sees cannot be a visible [object] and because an instrument [of vision] is also not [logically] possible, since a seer who sees by means of this [instrument] does not exist at all. Therefore the meaning of your reason, "because [its] instrument and object exist," is not established; or else the meaning [of the reason] is contradictory.136

Objection: Some137 among [our] fellow Buddhists say: Con-
cerning conditioned factors,\textsuperscript{138} which are subject to other (paratantra) causes and conditions and are immobile,\textsuperscript{139} it is [logically] possible to say that the eye does not see and that a self different from that [eye] does not exist as a seer. But, [Thesis:] [We] do not maintain that visible [objects] and visual organs do not exist, [Reason:] because their four results, cognition (vijñāna) and so on, exist. [Dissimilar Example:] That which does not exist does not have the results called "cognition, contact (sparśa), feeling (vedanā), and craving (trṣnā),"\textsuperscript{140} just as the eye of one blind from birth [does not give rise to cognition and the rest]. [Application:] Visible [objects] and visual organs have the four results, cognition and so on. [Conclusion:] Therefore visible [objects] and visual organs do exist. 

\textit{Answer:} If it has been shown, by the method which [we] have stated, that visible [objects] and the organ of vision are not established, then\textsuperscript{141}

Because visible [objects] and the visual organ do not exist, the four, cognition and so on, Do not exist. [MMK 3-7ab,c1 (PSP: 3-8ab,c1)]

The idea is that [this is so] because [their] causal conditions do not exist. Therefore if [cognition and so on] are not established because those [i. e., visible objects and the visual organ] are not established, [then] it is also not [logically] possible to establish visible objects and the visual organ [as a consequence of the existence of cognition, etc.] because [your] example also does not exist.\textsuperscript{142}

\textit{Objection:}\textsuperscript{143} In ultimate reality, cognition and so on do indeed exist, because their results, appropriation (upādāna) and so on, exist. 

\textit{Answer:}
How will appropriation and so on exist? [MMK 3-7c2,d (PSP: 3-8c2,d)]

The idea is that [this is so] because those are also not established, like cognition and so on. "Appropriation" (upādāna) [means those things] "which are to be appropriated" (upādeya). They are: [1] sensual pleasure (kāma); [2] the overestimation of moral conduct and ascetic practices (śīla-vrata-parāmarśa); [3] the doctrine of the self (ātma-vāda); and [4] views (drṣṭi).¹⁴⁴ [The phrase] "and so on" (ādīni) indicates those [items in a list] at the beginning of which [the word preceding ādi stands]. Those, moreover, are samsāric existence (bhava), birth (jāti), and old-age-and-death (jāra-maraṇa).¹⁴⁵ Therefore you have that same fault [in your argument].

At the beginning of the chapter, the opponent adduced the auditory organ, etc., and sound, etc., as examples.¹⁴⁶ Now [Nāgārjuna], wishing to show by the method which has been stated that they are similar [to the visual organ in not existing by intrinsic nature], says,

One should understand that the auditory organ, the olfactory organ, the gustatory organ, the tactile organ, and the mind (manas)
Have been explained, [along with] the hearer (śrōtra), audible [sounds] (śrotavya), and so on, by means of the visual organ. [MMK 3-8 (PSP 3-9)]

One should understand that the auditory organ, the olfactory organ, the gustatory organ, the tactile organ, the mind, the hearer, audible [sounds], and so on have also been rejected (lan ... btab pa, literally, "answered"). By means of what? By means of the visual organ itself. As with the negation of the visual organ, the negation of the auditory organ and so on should also be shown appropriately by means of full inference[s], together with elaboration (prapañca).¹⁴⁷
Therefore neither origination nor motion, which [the opponent] conceptually constructs from the outset (ārambha) of the chapter, is established.\textsuperscript{148} As to that, here the meaning of the chapter [is as follows:] The emptiness of the āyatanas has been expounded by means of stating the faults in the proofs offered by opponents.

Therefore [scriptural] statements such as the following are established:\textsuperscript{149} [From the Ārya-brahma-viśeṣa-cintā-paripṛccchā-sūtra?],\textsuperscript{150}

That which is the internal earth-element (ādhyātmika-prthivi-dhātu) and that which is the external (bāhya) earth-element have a nondual meaning (advaya-artha). By means of discernment (prajñā) and wisdom (ye shes, jñāna), the Tathāgata has fully and perfectly realized (abhisambuddha) that that also is nondual, is not divisible into two (gnyis su dbyer med pa), and has a single defining characteristic (eka-laksana), namely, no defining characteristic (alaksana).\textsuperscript{151}

Likewise, [from the Ārya-Maṇjuśrī-vikṛidita-sūtra,]\textsuperscript{152}

Maṇjuśrī said, "Girl, how should one see the elements (dhātu)?"

The girl said, "Maṇjuśrī, [they should be seen] like this, for example: When the three worlds have been consumed by fire [at the end] of the kalpa, there is not even ash [left behind]."\textsuperscript{153}

Likewise, [from the Ārya-bhava-samkrānti-sūtra,]\textsuperscript{154}

The eye does not see visible form, and the mind (manas) does not know dharmas.

That which the world does not penetrate (gāhate) is the highest truth (paramaṃ satyam).

Likewise,\textsuperscript{155}

He does not know, does not see all dharmas. That [bodhisattva?] does not apprehend, does not ponder (cintayati), does not think of (manyate) even the preacher of the Dharma (chos smra ba, dharma-bhānakā).

Likewise, [from the Ārya-Maṇjuśrī-vikṛidita-sūtra?],\textsuperscript{156}
Sister (sring mo, bhagini), the eye does not see, does not cognize (vijānāti) visible forms. Enlightenment (bodhi), too, is free from eye and visible form. The ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind (manas) also do not grasp, do not cognize dharmas. Enlightenment, too, is free from mind and dharmas.

Likewise, [from the Bhagavati-prajñāpāramitā-suvikrāntavikrāmi-sūtra,]157

Suvikrāntavikrāmin, matter158 is not the domain (gocara) of matter. Feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition are also not the domain of cognition. Suvikrāntavikrāmin, [what is called] "domain" is [the fact] that matter does not know, does not see matter and [the fact] that feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition do not know, do not see cognition. That which is [the state of] not knowing, not seeing matter and not knowing, not seeing feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition, is the perfection of discernment.

The third chapter, "Examination of the āyatanas," of the Prajñāpradīpa, a commentary on [Nāgārjuna’s] Mūlamadhyamaka composed by ācārya Bhavyakara/Bhavyakāra (Legs ldan byed)159 [is concluded].

Notes to Translation of Chapter Three

1The twelve āyatanas are the six sense organs (the five physical sense organs plus the mind, manas) and the six corresponding sense objects (dharmas in the case of mind). This chapter deals mostly with the first six āyatanas, the sense organs (indriya). Hence in the Sanskrit of the Prasannapadā, chapter three is called cakṣurādindriya-parīksā (PSP 122.8), while in the Tibetan translation of the Prasannapadā, the title is simply dbang po brtag pa, indriyaparīksā (May (1959), p. 331.8). The Tibetan translations of the Akutobhāyā and Buddhapālīta’s commentary have the same title for this chapter as the Tibetan of the Prajñāpradīpa (Saito (1984), translation, p. 243 n. 1).

2This translation of skye ba mi mthun pa'i phyogs kyi khyad par (upāda-vipakṣa-viśeṣa?) follows Avalokitavrata’s explanation (Ava P2b-3,4; D2a-4,5). The particular instance of origination alleged by the opponent in the following paragraph is the origination of the āyatanas.

3See Ava P5b-6, D3a-1. Note that chapter one of the MMK deals with origination, while chapter two deals with motion.
That is, the six sense organs.

darśana may mean either "vision" or "the organ of vision." (Note Pāṇini 3.3.115 and 3.3.117.) In his commentary following MMK 3-2ab, Bhāvaviveka glosses it as caksur-indriya; and this seems to be its meaning throughout most of his commentary on this chapter. (The situation is complicated, however, by the fact that the Tibetan word la ba translates both darśana and drṣṭi, as well as some other forms derived from the root dré/paś.) Buddhāpālita has the same interpretation of darśana (Saito (1984), p. 50.11), as does Candrakirti (PSP 113.7,8). (Jacques May, though, translates darśana as la vision; see May (1959), p. 78 n. 131.)

Similar remarks apply to the terms for the other four physical sense organs (sravana, etc.). Note that the physical sense organs, being made of translucent matter (rūpa-prasāda), are not identical with the visible eye, ear, etc.; see May (1959), ibid., AK 1-9, and LVP AK I, p. 15 n. 1.

rūpa as one of the twelve āyatanas or eighteen dhātus refers to "visible form," i.e., color and shape (varna- samsthāna); see AK 1-10a. rūpa as the first of the five aggregates (skandha) refers to "matter" in general; see AK 1-9ab and May (1959), p. 79 n. 132.

Compare AK 2-2ab.

See Ava P4-8 to 5a-1, D4b-2,3.

bsam par bya ba, perhaps mantavya here, corresponding to manas.

"Set of all dissimilar examples" translates vipakṣa here.

See Ava P5a-3,4,5; D4b-5,6,7. In other words, the reason (hetu) in fact proves the opposite of the sādhyā, since the predicate to be proved (sādhyā) is ultimately real origination and the reason applies only to (some) things which are conventional. Such things belong to the vipakṣa because they lack the sādhyā. Note that the phrase "in ultimate reality" (paramārthatā) is understood as qualifying the predicate (sādhyā) of the thesis (pratijñā), not as qualifying the subject (dharmin).

mig, caksus will be translated as "eye," śrotra as "ear," and so on; but one should bear in mind that the five physical sense organs are made of subtle, translucent matter (rūpa- prasāda). They are not identical with visible parts of the body such as the eyeball, etc., though they are located on or in them. See note 5 and AK 1-44ab.

The Tibetan of MMK 3-2ab in PP differs from the Sanskrit and Tibetan of PSP. (See PSP 113.10 and 113 n. 5.) See the discussion in Saito (1984), translation, p. 244 n. 5. As Saito points out, the Tibetan of MMK 3-2a in PP corresponds to sva ātmā ced darśanam hi or svātmani darśane sati.

MMK 3-2cd, according to Avalokitavrata (Ava P5b-2,3; D5a-4,5).

The Sanskrit of MMK 3-2b is tat tam eva na paśyati (PSP 113.10). Bhāvaviveka seems to be saying that one must understand that paśyati eva is meant (but not written for reasons of meter) rather than tam eva, since Nāgārjuna will deny not only that the eye sees itself but also that it sees other things.

PP has a Tibetan translation of MMK 3-2c slightly different from that of the Akutobhayā, Bp, and PSP. PP corresponds to yadā plus ātmanam, rather than yad
The idea behind this argument seems to be something like the following: If it is the intrinsic nature of the eye to see, then its seeing must be independent of anything other than the eye itself. (Intrinsic nature is independent of other conditions by definition; see MMK 15-1,2.) Therefore the eye's seeing cannot depend on the presence of visible forms. But then the only thing left for the eye to see is its own self. Now it is well known that the eye does not see itself. Therefore the eye does not see by intrinsic nature.

Similar to the eye's not seeing visible form; see Ava P6ab-4, D5a-5.

On this and the following sentence, see Ava P7a-4 to 7b-3, D6b-4 to 7a-3.

These four reasons apply both to the eye-organ (in the first syllogism) and to visible form (in the second). They have resistance because they are rūpa, in the sense of "matter," but are not avijñāpita (see LVP AK I, pp. 25-27). The terms bhautika and upādāya-rūpa are synonymous and refer to matter dependent on the four great elements (mahābhūta), as distinct from the elements themselves. See May (1959), pp. 91 nn. 195 and 198, 164 n. 505.

Avalokitavrata identifies the objectors only as nikāyāntariyāḥ, "members of other (Buddhist) schools." He has them cite a scripture which expounds the doctrine of rūpa found in the Abhidharmakośa; see Ava P7b-4 to 8a-3, D7a-3 to 7b-1.

In other words, as far as the Mādhyamikas are concerned, the opponent's statement that the eye does not see itself because it is invisible simply proves the Mādhyamikas' own contention that in ultimate reality, it cannot see form either. See Ava P8a-3 to 6, D7b-2,3,4.

The name "Ābhiddhārmika" seems not to have referred to a particular school but to mean simply "a specialist in Abhidharma." See LVP AK I p. x and n. 2, p. 39 n. 1, and LVP AK V p. 45 n. 3. Since the objection here ends with a quotation from the AK, presumably the "Ābhiddhārmikas" are Vaibhāṣikas in this case.

On tat-sabhāga, literally, "similar to that," see LVP AK I pp. 75-78.

See the reference in the preceding note.

Identified by Avalokitavrata, who explains that the Mādhyamikas accept that in superficial reality (saṁvyātā), the functioning eye sees visible forms but that in ultimate reality, it does not. See Ava P8b-6 to 9a-3, D8a-3 to 7. (This verse is also quoted by Bhāvaviveka near the end of this chapter.)

The Sanskrit of this verse is found in PSP 120.4,5, where it is ascribed merely to the Bhagavān. De Jong identifies it as verse 14 of the Bhavasamkṛtāntisūtra, ed. N. Aiyaswami Sastri, Adyar, 1938, p. 6. See de Jong (1978), p. 40.


See Ava P9a-8 to 9b-2, D8b-3,4,5. It seems that one should read gzugs mthong ba bkag pa'i phyir in Ava P9b-1, D8b-4 for gzugs mi mthong ba bkag pa'i phyir.

That is, our thesis is qualified by the phrase "in ultimate reality." Since we accept that according to superficial reality the eye sees forms, while denying that it does so in ultimate reality, we are not in conflict with what is well known in the
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world. (Worldly convention makes no such distinction between superficial and ultimate reality.) Moreover, this objection has been answered in the first chapter, where we pointed out that origination exists superficially but not ultimately. See Ava P9b-3,4,5; D9b-6 to 9a-1.

30 The Kāśmīra-Vaiśhāsikas, according to Avalokitavrata (Ava P9b-6, D9a-11).

31 kha cig na re, "some say," usually indicates an objection; but according to Avalokitavrata (Ava P9b-8, D9a-3), this is Bhāvaviveka's own view; and the context supports that attribution.

32 That is, to say that the eye sees and to say that it is the agent of vision amount to the same thing. See Ava P10a-1,2,3; D9a-4,5.

33 gzhān dag na re, "others say." Avalokitavrata (Ava P10a-5, D9a-7 and P10b-3, D9b-4) identifies "others" as ācārya Devaśarman, who wrote a commentary on the MMK called dkar po 'char ba. This commentary, which Bhāvaviveka also quoted with approval in chapter one of the Prajñāpradīpa (see Ames (1994), p. 110 and pp. 129-130 n. 105), has not survived. See Kajiyama (1963), pp. 37-38 and Ruegg (1981), p. 49 and n. 128, p. 62 and n. 187.

34 If the eye is momentary, it ceases as soon as it has arisen; and it has no time in which to perform an activity. If it is not momentary, it must persist unchanged. Therefore it cannot change from a former state of not seeing an object to a subsequent state of seeing it; and hence it cannot perform the activity of seeing. See Ava P10a-6 to 10b-3, D9a-7 to 9b-4.

35 Following AK I-42, there is a long discussion in the bhāṣya on the question of whether the eye sees or visual cognition sees; and the positions of various schools are given. (See LVP AK I, pp. 81-86.) The position ascribed there to the Sautrāntikas is identical to that given here.

36 samskārāḥ, in the sense of samskṛtā dharmāḥ. See LVP AK I, pp. 11, 28.

37 See, e. g., Samyutta-nikāya II p. 72, IV pp. 32-33.

38 According to Avalokitavrata, "that" refers to a dispute between the Vaiśeṣikas and the Sāmkhyas as to whether the eye perceives an object which it has "reached" (prāptā), i. e., one with which it is in contact (the Sāmkhya position), or one which it has not reached (allegedly the Vaiśeṣika position). See Ava P11b-1 to 6, D10b-1 to 4.

This characterization of the Sāmkhya position is correct; see, e. g., Sinha (1952), pp. 60-61; Frauwallner (1973), Vol. I, p. 309; and Larson and Bhattacharya (1987), p. 340. On the other hand, it is clear that the Vaiśeṣikas did, in fact, hold that the sense organ perceives objects only through contact with them. See, e. g., Sinha (1956), pp. 386-7, 470; Frauwallner (1973), Vol. II, pp. 31-32; and Potter (1977), pp. 161-2.

It is quite surprising that Avalokitavrata would be confused about the position of a major Indian philosophical school on this issue. Perhaps he was misled by the fact that Bhāvaviveka later mentions the Sāmkhyas explicitly in this context and then, in his commentary on MMK 3-6ab, indicates that the Sāmkhyas and Vaiśeṣikas held opposing views on the issue of whether the self is inherently a seer. Thus Avalokitavrata might have assumed that they held different views on
this issue, too.

In fact, though, it was the Buddhist Abhidharma schools who maintained that the eye sees objects with which it is not in contact; see AK 1-43cd. It may be that bye brag pa dag, "Vaiśeṣikas," is a mistake (present in both Ava P and D) for bye brag tu smra ba dag, "Vaiśhāśikas." There is an instance in Avalokitavrata’s subcommentary on chapter five where Ava P has 'os pa pa dag. "Ārhatas," twice for Ava D’s 'ug pa pa dag, "Aulūkyas." See note 69 to my translation of chapter five.

39 See Ava P12a-6,7,8; D11a-4,5.
40 The Vaiśeṣikas, according to Avalokitavrata; see Ava P12b-3, D11b-1 and note 38.
41 See Ava P12b-5,6; D11b-2,3.
42 rto chen. This translation is conjectural. Avalokitavrata lists rto chen with bya ma rta, "runner, courier," and myan ma ba, "spy" (Ava P12b-7, D11b-4). The point is that the eye sees only indirectly by way of other conditions (pratyaya) and not directly. Thus its seeing is only conventional (Ava P12b-7 to 13a-2, D11b-3,4,5).
43 The idea seems to be that conventionally, the eye is said to see visible forms not because it grasps them directly but because it knows them indirectly through other conditions (such as the presence of light, etc.). Even conventionally, however, it does not "see," that is, "know" itself.
44 The nose does not smell odors with which it is not in contact (see AK 1-43cd,44ab); and it does not smell itself.
45 On this and the following sentence, see Ava P13b-3 to 14a-4, D11a-5 to 11b-5.
46 See the similar discussion of the two syllogisms following MMK 3-2cd and note 20.
47 See AK 1-44cd. The objects of the five physical senses are simultaneous with them.
48 According to Avalokitavrata (Ava P14a-8, D13a-l), the objectors are the Vaiśeṣikas; but see note 38.
49 "Obstructed" by space, according to Avalokitavrata (Ava P14b-2, D13a3). In the bhāṣya on AK 1-42, it is pointed out that the eye sees visible forms which are obstructed by transparent objects; see LVP AK I p. 83.

Here "obstructed" translates bar du chod pa. Note that Lokesh Chandra’s Tibetan-Sanskrit Dictionary gives vyavahita for bar du chod pa (s.v.). According to Monier-Williams’ A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, vyavahita (s.v.) may mean either "obstructed, concealed" or "separated, placed apart."
50 If the eye had to go out to its object in order to make contact with it, it would take different amounts of time and effort to see objects at different distances. See Ava P14b-2 to 8, D13a-3 to 7.
51 See Ava P15a-4, D13b-3; and compare LVP AK I p. 93.
52 That is, this reason simply restates the thesis in different words and hence is invalid. See Ava P15a-7 to 15b-1, D13b-5,6.
53 Avalokitavrata gives an argument based on the idea that all things are
momentary, so that the process of grasping an object encompasses many different moments of effort and grasping. See Ava P15b-2,3,4; D13b-7 to 14a-2. Bhāvaviveka does not mention the fourth reason here, but Avalokitavrata says that it is refuted simply by MMK 3-2. See Ava P15b-4,5,6; D14a-2,3.

54 If the example is said to be established in superficial reality, but not in ultimate reality, then it cannot be used to support a thesis which is held to be true in ultimate reality. See Ava P16a-3,4,5; D14a-6 to 14b-1.

55 The opponent might object that although the mind does not grasp an object with which it is in contact, the nose, tongue, and body do. (See AK 1-43cd.) Thus the reason, "because it is a sense organ," is inconclusive. Bhāvaviveka replies that it will be shown (in MMK 3-8) that the other sense organs, just like the eye, grasp neither an object with which they are in contact nor one with which they are not in contact. See Ava P16b-7 to 17a-4, D15a-1 to 5.

56 See Ava P17a-5,6; D15a-5,6. The idea is not as ludicrous as it sounds if one recalls that "the eye" is composed of invisible rūpa-prasāda and is not the visible eyeball.

57 See Ava P17b-1, D15b-1,2.

58 mig gi rnam par shes pa'i rnam grangs, cakṣur-viśṇu-paryāya, glossed by Avalokitavrata (ibid.) as mig gi 'bras bu, "the eyeball."

59 Here Avalokitavrata argues that if the eye had to go out to its object, then when one opened one's eyes, it would take longer to see the sun or moon that to see the top of a nearby tree. See Ava P17b-2,3,4; D15b-3,4, and note 50.

60 The idea may be that since visible form has a cause conventionally, it does not exist in ultimate reality.

61 Or "in [regard to] both positions," phyogs gnyi gar. The positions referred to are the view (ascribed by Avalokitavrata to the Vaiśeṣikas) that the eye grasps an object with which it is not in contact and the Sāṃkhya's view that it grasps an object with which it is in contact. The opponent charges that since the Mādhyamika rejects both positions, he has failed to establish any position of his own. See Ava P18a-3 to 6, D16a-2,3,4.

62 The opponents here are the Mīmāṃsikas, according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P18a-8, D16a-6. In fact, the view expressed was also that of the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas. See Frauwallner (1973), Vol. II, pp. 32-3 and Potter (1977), pp. 117, 119, 161.

63 Ava P18b-2, D16a-7 has byed rgyu, kārana-hetu for PP's rgyu, hetu or kārana. Here kārana-hetu is used in the narrower (pradhāna) sense of "productive cause." See LVP ĀK II p. 247, where the eye and visible form are said to be the kārana-hetus of visual cognition in this sense.

64 Again, Avalokitavrata ascribes this objection to the Mīmāṃsikas. See Ava P18b-6, D16b-3. The argument concerning the eyes of nocturnal animals is found in Nyāyasūtra 3-1-44.

65 That is, the eyeball. See Ava P19a-3, D16b-8.


67 Literally, "some;" identified by Avalokitavrata as "the commentator (vr̥tti-

As Saito points out, although the text of the Tibetan translation of MMK 3-2ab in Bp agrees with that of PP, Buddhāpalita's commentary seems to reflect the version of MMK 3-2ab found in PSP. Also, Buddhāpalita's interpretation of yadāmānam in MMK 3-2c as yadā āmānam, rather than yadā plus āmānam, agrees with PSP, not PP. In the latter case, this difference is reflected in the Tibetan text of MMK 3-2c in Bp.

In other words, if water itself is wet, it can moisten earth; if fire itself is hot, it can heat water; if jasmine itself is sweet-smelling, it can impregnate clothing with a sweet smell.

See Lang (1986), pp. 122-3, where the text is slightly different.

See Ava P20a-1, D17b-3.

Ita ba, glossed by Avalokitavrata as "visual cognition" (caksur-vijñāna). See Ava P20a-2, D17b-4.

Identified by Avalokitavrata only as coming from "the common doctrine of [our] fellow Buddhists" (rang gi sde pa spyi'i grub pa'i mtha', probably svayūhya-sāmānya-siddhānta). See Ava P20a-5, D17b-6.

kha cig na re, literally, "some say." Avalokitavrata identifies "some" as Bhāvaviveka himself and says that the following paragraph is his criticism of Buddhāpalita's explanation of MMK 3-2. See Ava P20a-6,7; D17b-7.

Avalokitavrata explains that a sweet smell does not exist in jasmine flowers by its own self but by virtue of causes and conditions like seed, earth, etc. Thus it arises adventitiously (glo bur du, probably akasmāt), just as sesa-me seed oil is not inherently sweet-smelling but becomes so if it comes in contact with flowers. See Ava P20b-3,4,5; D18a-3,4,5.

See Ava P20b-6,7,8; D18a-5,6,7.

'dzin pa, root grah. Perhaps a translation other than "grasp" would be better here, since Avalokitavrata explains that in ultimate reality, fire burns neither itself nor others; and jasmine flowers make neither themselves nor others sweet-smelling. See Ava P21a-3,4; D18b-2,3.

This refers to the opponent's first two syllogisms at the beginning of the chapter, in which the fact that the visual organ sees visible forms is used to argue for the existence of origination and motion, respectively. See Ava P21a-5 to 21b-1, D18b-4 to 7.

If one says that the eye does see visible forms conventionally, it is contradictory to use that conventional fact to support a thesis about ultimate reality. See Ava P21b-2, D18-7 to 19a-1.

The objectors are identified by Avalokitavrata only as "proponents of origination" (skye bar smra ba dag, probably upāda- or utpatti-vādinaḥ). See Ava P21b-4, D19a-2.

See Ava P21b-5, D19a-3.

Avalokitavrata here glosses "power" as "the power of grasping" (itself or another). See Ava P21b-6, D19a-3,4.
82 See Ava P22a-7 to 22b-1, D19b-3,4,5.
83 The "reason" referred to here is the notion that fire illuminates both itself and another. See Ava P22b-2,3,4; D19b-5,6.
84 Fire does not illuminate itself because there is no darkness in it and hence nothing which needs to be illuminated. See Ava P22b-5,6; D19b-7 to 20a-2.
85 Conventionally, the nature of fire is heat. See Ava P23a-2, D20a-4.
86 Although Bhāvaviveka calls these "syllogisms" (sbor ba'i tshig, prayoga-vākya), they lack examples, which full-fledged syllogisms must have.
87 Compare MMK 10-13cd. Chapter ten of the MMK is devoted to the subject of fire and fuel.
88 gzhan dag, "others," identified by Avalokitavrata (Ava P23b-7, D20b-6).
91 gzhan dag, "others," identified by Avalokitavrata. See Ava P24a-4, D21a-3.
92 The opponent gives only an example without giving a reason; hence it is enough to point out that his argument is deficient. Buddhapālita's refutation (given in full by Avalokitavrata) is not necessary. See Ava P24a-4 to 24b-4, D21a-3 to 21b-2.
93 brjod nas, literally, "having uttered," here and below in the same context. The Sanskrit may be a form of abhi-dhā, but there are a number of other possibilities.
94 The more obvious reconstruction of bya ba'i rkyen would be kriyāpratyaya. As far as I have been able to determine, this term is not used in Sanskrit grammar, whereas both lhyu (-ana) and kta (-ta) are krt-pratyayas. (That is, they are added directly to verbal roots.)
95 For the rather unusual structure of this syllogism, see Ava P24b-6 (where dang sgrub pa'i chos is omitted), D21b-3; P24b-7, D21b-4; and P25a-2, D21b-6.
96 thugs su chud par mdzad pa is transitive. thugs su chud par gyur pa is normally passive, but may represent the Sanskrit middle (ātmanepada) here. The point seems to be that the root budh may be conjugated according to either the first conjugation parasmaipada (bodhati) or the fourth conjugation ātmanepada (budhyate).

Compare Yāsomitra's Sphuṭārthā Vyākhyā on AK 1-1: buddha iti kartari kta-vidhānam| ... karmakartari ktavidhānam ity apare| svayam budhyata iti buddha ity artha| ... (Shastri edition, Baudhā Bharati Series, Vol. 5, p. 5 - see Bibliographical Abbreviations). Avalokitavrata's subcommentary tends to support the interpretation of thugs su chud par gyur pa as (svayam) budhyate. See Ava P25a-2,3,4; D21b-6 to 22a-1. In this connection, note Panini 3.2.188.
97 See Ava P25a-8 to 25b-1, D22a-3,4.
99 des cir 'gyur, probably tesa kim bhavati, literally, "What comes about by means of that?"
100 ita ba nyid, probably paśyamānam; cf. MMK 3-4a.
101 The same fault which Bhāvaviveka found in the opponent's last syllogism,
that is, the fault that the argument is correct conventionally but not in ultimate reality. See Ava P26b-4,5; D23a-4,5,6.

102This is similar to the argument in chapter two that one who is a goer does not go, because he is (by assumption) already a goer and hence has no need to perform an activity of going. Moreover, there would be two simultaneous activities of going, that due to which the goer is called a "goer" and that activity of going which the goer is said to perform. The point is that "goer" and "going" only exist in relation to each other and cannot be established as independent entities. See especially MMK 2-7 through 11 (translated in Ames (1995)). See also Ava P26b-6,7,8; D23a-6,7.

103See Ava P26b-8 to 27a-2, D23b-1,2.

104yod pa dang med pa'i rgyu nyid, probably sad-asad-hetutva. See Ava P27a-8 to 27b-3, D23b-6 to 24a-1. Avalokitavrata makes the point that the opponent assumes that the negations in MMK 3-5ab are implicative negations, whereas in fact they are simple negations.

105rtog na, "if [you] suppose."

106phyis 'byung ba'i tshul gyis lta ba nyid du nye bar brtags nas, probably something like bhavisyad-yogena darśanatvopacārāt. (upacārāt should strictly be nye bar brtags nas, but brtags and brtags are often confused in the texts.) The opponent's idea is that the eye at first does not perform a particular activity of seeing and then later performs it. Thus the eye is established prior to and independent of its activity of seeing. At the first stage, the eye does not see and thus is not a visual organ; but it is said to be one figuratively because it will see later. See Ava P27b-4,5; D24a-2,3.

107Figurative designation may be sufficient to establish conventional truth; but the opponent had wished to prove that the eye sees in ultimate reality, that is, by its intrinsic nature. Since intrinsic nature cannot change, it is impossible for the eye first not to see and then later to see.

108The reason, "because [that] conventional designation of activity exists," is not established in ultimate reality. If it is asserted as conventional truth, it cannot prove anything about ultimate reality. See Ava P28b-1 to 4, D24b-5,6,7.

109Avalokitavrata remarks that up to this point, the position of those who maintain that the eye itself is the seer (drastr) has been refuted. Now Bhāvaviveka is going to deal with the position of those who hold that the self (atman) sees by means of the eye, so that the self is the seer and the eye is the instrument (karana) of the activity of seeing. See Ava P28b-4,5; D24b-6,7.

110Avalokitavrata makes it clear that what it is being said here is that the eye is called darśana, "visual organ," not because it is the agent (kartr) of the activity of seeing but because it is the instrument of that activity. The seer (drastr), the agent who sees, is the self (atman). The self sees by means of the instrument of seeing, the eye. See Ava P28b-6 to 29a-5, D25a-1 to 6.

111Avalokitavrata (Ava P29b-4,5; D25b-4,5) glosses "property" (chos, dharma) as lta ba gzugs la lta bar mi byed pa'i sgrub pa'i chos (sgrub pa'i chos = sādhana-dharma, i. e., hetu). See also the following syllogism.

112The "suspicion" referred to is the suspicion that the self might, after all, be
able to see itself. See the rest of the paragraph and Ava P30a-2 to 5, D26a-2,3,4.

113 See Ava P30a-6,7,8; D26a-5,6,7. Avalokitarata glosses "wherever" as "in our own and others' systems (siddhānta)." He says that the real meaning of this expression is that the mind sees that the self does not exist.

114 See Ava P30b-2,3,4; D26b-2,3.

115 Avalokitarata explains that one should show that visible form is not an object of the self as seer, by means of syllogisms using the same reasons and examples. See Ava P30b-8 to 31a-2, D26b-6 to 27a-1.

116 According to Avalokitarata, an opponent charges that [1] the Mādhyamika's thesis (in the preceding syllogism) is faulty because for the Mādhyamika, conventional designation does not exist in ultimate reality; [2] the subject (pakṣa) of the thesis is not established because the self is not established for the Mādhyamika; [3] since the self, the subject of the thesis, is not established, the ground (gzhi, probably āśraya) of the reason is not established; and [4] likewise the last example, "like its own self," is not established. Bhāvaviveka answers those four objections in order. See Ava P31a-2 to 5, D27a-1,2.

117 Presumably meaning the conventional self, which the Buddhists also accept on the conventional level.

118 Avalokitarata explains that, according to the opponent, the statement that the seer does not see is "inconsistent with its own words." He gives as an example of such a self-contradictory sentence, the statement, "I am a childless woman's son." See Ava P31b-2,3,4; D27a-4,5.

119 The reference here is to the two initial verses of the MMK (MMK 1-A,B). Avalokitarata explains that in superficial reality, there is dependent origination but that in ultimate reality, there is no origination. Likewise, here what is superficially or conventionally a seer does not see in ultimate reality. See Ava P31b-5,6; D27b-1,2.

120 Note that in Sāmkhyakārikā 19, the puruṣa is said to be a drastr, "seer." See Sinha (1952), pp. 35-6 and Larson and Bhattacharya (1987), pp. 81, 258.

121 In other words, since intrinsic nature is not dependent on anything other than itself, then if one is a seer by intrinsic nature, one will see whether one has eyes or not. See Ava P31b-8 to 32a-4, D27b-4 to 7, and MMK 15-1,2.

122 Avalokitarata ascribes this objection to the Vaiśeṣikas; see Ava P31b-7, D27b-3. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school holds that the self is not inherently conscious but becomes so only through conjunction with the manas. See, e. g., Sinha (1956), pp. 386-7, 656 and Potter (1977), p. 125.

123 na spangs na, atiraskṛtya, literally, "not having set aside."

124 Avalokitarata explains that if the self is a seer only through dependence on the visual organ, and not by intrinsic nature, then its being a seer is purely conventional, not ultimate. See Ava P32a-8 to 32b-1, D28a-2,3.

125 Avalokitarata explains that whatever depends on something else in order to see is not a seer in ultimate reality or by intrinsic nature. Hence in ultimate reality, no seer exists. See Ava P32b-2,3,4; D28a-4,5.

126 Avalokitarata says that an opponent might hold that fire is a burner by intrinsic nature but does not burn unless there is fuel. Likewise, the self is a seer
by intrinsic nature but does not see without a visual organ. The answer is simply that intrinsic nature (by definition) cannot depend on the presence of something else. See Ava P32b-7 to 33a-2, D28a-7 to 28b-2.

Glossed by Avalokitavrata as "collection of elements and matter dependent on the elements." See Ava P33b-3, D29a-1,2.

On this paragraph, see Ava P33b-7 to 34a-6, D29a-4 to 29b-2. According to Avalokitavrata, Bhāvaviveka here answers an objection that if a seer does not exist by intrinsic nature, even the conventional designation "seer" would not exist. The reply is that the collection of efficient causes, the eye, visible form, and so on, are designated as the seer; but of course, they do not have the intrinsic nature of a seer.

Glossed by Avalokitavrata, Bhāvaviveka here answers an objection that if a seer does not exist by intrinsic nature, even the conventional designation "seer" would not exist. The reply is that the collection of efficient causes, the eye, visible form, and so on, are designated as the seer; but of course, they do not have the intrinsic nature of a seer.


See Ava P34b-3 to 8, D29b-6 to 30a-2. Even if one says that there is a seer contingently, and not by intrinsic nature, there is no reason to suppose that it is the ātman postulated by the Vaiśeṣikas, which the Buddhists do not accept. Rather it is the collection of factors conventionally called a "person" or "sentient being," which everyone accepts on the conventional level.

That is, neither the Sāmkhya’s position that a purusa who has the intrinsic nature of a seer sees nor the Vaiśeṣika’s position that an ātman who does not have the intrinsic nature of a seer sees is established. See Ava P35b-1,2; D30b-1,2.

In other words, if the self can see only by means of the eye, its being a seer is conventional, not intrinsic. If one claims that the self is intrinsically a seer, independent of the eye, that is obviously false since the blind have selves (according to the non-Buddhist schools) but cannot see.

Ultimately, the instrument and object of vision do not exist. On the other hand, it is contradictory to try to use the fact of their purely conventional existence to prove a thesis about ultimate reality. See Ava P36a-8 to 36b-1, D31a-5,6.

Identified by Avalokitavrata as the Sautrāntikas and Vaibhāsikas. See Ava P36b-1, D31a-6. The position expressed, however, seems to be that of the Sautrāntikas; see LVP AK I, p. 86.

"du byed dag, samskārāḥ, in the sense of samskṛtā dharmāḥ."

"Yo ba med pa, that is, "inactive." Because the samskāras are momentary, they have no time in which to perform an activity.

In the twelvefold dependent origination, the six āyatanaḥ constitute the fifth member (āṇīga). Contact, feeling and craving are the sixth, seventh, and eighth members. Cognition (or consciousness) is the third member, but the six āyatanaḥ can also be said to give rise to cognition. See MMK 26-3,4.

PSP’s verse 3-7 is a quotation from Ratnāvalī 4-55, mistakenly numbered by de La Vallée Poussin as a kārikā of MMK. See de Jong (1978), p. 40. Thus PP’s 3-7 corresponds to PSP’s 3-8, and PP’s 3-8 corresponds to PSP’s 3-9.

Reversing the dissimilar example in the opponent’s preceding syllogism, we
have as an example a functioning eye which gives rise to cognition and the rest. But we have just shown that cognition, etc., do not exist because their causal conditions, visible objects and the visual organ, do not exist. See Ava P37a-5 to 37b-1, D32a-1 to 5.

143 Also from other Buddhists. See Ava P37b-3, D31a-6.

144 The four appropriations constitute the ninth member of the twelfeifold dependent origination. See MMK 26-6cd and LVP AK III, pp. 86-7.

145 Samsāric existence, birth, and old-age-and-death are the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth members of the twelfeifold dependent origination.

146 See the opponent’s first syllogism in this chapter.

147 Avalokitavrata seems to gloss prapañca as "answers to objections." See Ava P39a-1, D33b-1. Avalokitavrata gives arguments for each of the other five senses which parallel the arguments given in the case of vision. See Ava P38b-7 to 39b-5, D33a-7 to 34a-4.

148 See the first paragraph of this chapter and the opponent’s first two syllogisms. See also Ava P39b-6 to 40a-1, D34a-4,5,6.

149 According to Avalokitavrata, sūtra quotations are introduced at this point in reply to those who might charge, "[The emptiness of the āyatana] has been established by a mere limited treatise of desiccated logic." The MMK establishes the meaning of such scriptural passages (by means of reasoning) and is, in turn, supported by them. See Ava: (1) P40a-4,5, D34b-1,2; (2) P40a-7,8, D34b-4; (3) P40b-6,7,8, D35a-2,3; (4) P41a-1,2, D35a-4,5; (5) P41a-5,6, D35a-7; and (6) P41b-1,2,3, D35b-3,4,5. See also Ames (1994), p. 134 n. 176, and Ames (1995), n. 203.

150 Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P40a-5,6, D34b-3. I have not been able to locate this passage in the Sde dge bka’ gyur edition of the sūtra.

151 Avalokitavrata comments that “internal earth-element” refers to the internal āyatana, i.e., the sense organs, while “external earth-element” refers to the sense objects. They are nondual in that neither exists by intrinsic nature. They cannot be divided into two, because the sense organs lack the quality of being grasping subjects (grahakatva) and the sense objects lack the quality of being graspable objects (grāhyatva). Thus because they are not different by intrinsic nature and cannot be distinguished as subject and object, they have one and the same defining characteristic; but that is no characteristic (since they have no intrinsic nature).

He adds that they are said to have one defining characteristic in order to reject the extreme (anta) of multiplicity (tha dad pa nyid, perhaps nānārva); they are said to have no defining characteristic in order to reject the extreme of oneness (ekatva). The nonapprehension of both extremes is the perfection of discernment (prajñā-pāramitā). See Ava P40a-8 to 40b-5, D34b-4 to 35a-1.

152 Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P40b-5, D35a-1. This passage is found in the Sde dge bka’ gyur, Mdo sde Kha 230b-2, where instead of ... bsregs pa na that ba yang med pa ltar ro, one has ... bsregs par gyur pa de bzhin du’o.

153 Avalokitavrata remarks that similarly, the nonapprehension of any internal or external elements is the perfection of discernment. See Ava P40b6,7,8; D35a-2,3.
154 Identified by Avalokītavrata; see Ava P40b-8, D35a-3. This same verse was quoted earlier in this chapter, in the commentary following MMK 3-2cd. See note 26.

155 Identified by Avalokītavrata simply as being "from other sūtrāntas." See Ava P41a-2, D35a-5.

156 Identified by Avalokītavrata only as being "from other Mahāyāna sūtras." See P41a-3, D35a-5,6. This quotation seems to be a rephrasing of a passage from the Mañjuśrī-vikrīḍita-sūtra, found in the Sde dge bka' 'gyur, Mdo sde Kha 222a-3,4.

157 Identified by Avalokītavrata; see Ava P41a-6, D35a-7 to 35b-1. Sanskrit text in Hikata (1958), p. 29. The one major difference between the Sanskrit and the Tibetan is that the Sanskrit has agocara iti (29.13) where the Tibetan has spyod yul zhes bya ba ni = gocara iti. Compare the similar quotation preceding MMK 1-9ab. See Ames (1994), p. 113.

158 rūpa as the first of the five aggregates. See note 6.

Translation of *Prajñāpradīpa*, Chapter Four: Examination of the Aggregates (*skandha*)

Now [Nāgārjuna] begins the fourth chapter with the aim of showing that the aggregates have no intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*), by means of refuting a particular counterposition (*vipakṣa*) [which holds] that the āyatanas exist.¹

At the end of the immediately preceding chapter, [Nāgārjuna] said,

One should understand that the auditory organ, the olfactory organ, the gustatory organ, the tactile organ, and the mind (*manas*) have been explained, [along with] the hearer, audible [sounds], and so on, by means of the visual organ. [MMK 3-8 (PSP 3-9)]

**Objection:** Therefore [our] fellow Buddhists² say:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the āyatanas do indeed exist,

[Reason:] because they are included (*bsdus pa, probably samgrhīta*) in the aggregates.

[Dissimilar Example:] Here that which does not exist is not included in the aggregates of matter³ and so on, like a skyflower.

[Application:] The internal āyatanas⁴ possess inclusion in the aggregates, for the ten material (*rūpin*) āyatanas⁵ are included in the aggregate of matter, while the āyatana of dharmas is included in three aggregates and one part of the aggregate of matter,⁶ [and] the āyatana of mind is included in the aggregate of cognition (*vijnāna*).

[Conclusion:] Therefore, by the stated reason, in ultimate reality, the internal āyatanas do indeed exist.

**Answer:** Here, in brief, matter is twofold: elemental matter (*bhūta-rūpa*) and matter dependent on the elements (*bhautikarūpa*).⁷

Bringing all those [kinds of matter], which are different due to
distinctions of time and so on, under one [heading], they are called "the aggregate of matter."

As to that, to begin with, [we] will consider [the five aggregates] starting with matter, because the reason [in] the opponent's [syllogism] is held to be [the fact that the material āyatanas,] the eye and so on, are included [in the aggregate of matter], and because [matter] is easy to explain.

Matter is not apprehended apart from the cause (kārāṇa) of matter. [MMK 4-1ab]

"Matter" is what can be damaged. The cause of that is the cause of matter. What is that [cause]? The four great elements, earth and so on. "Apart from (nirmukta) those" [means] "if those are removed."10

"Matter is not apprehended (upalabhyate)" [means that it is not apprehended] in ultimate reality. What then? For purposes of conventional designation, one designates "matter" in dependence on the cause of matter, the four great elements.11

Thus this [first half of verse one] has indicated the property of matter which is to be proved, [namely,] that it is a mere combination ('dus pa; saṃghāta, etc.) of earth and so on; and [it has also indicated] the property of matter which proves [that, namely], that the cognition (buddhi) of that [matter] does not exist if [matter's] own cause is not grasped. The examples [are indicated] by virtue of that [property to be proved and proving property]; they are an army, a forest, and so on.12

Here the inference is:
[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, matter does not exist as a real substance (dravya-sat),
[Reason:] because the cognition of that [matter] does not exist if [matter’s] own cause is not grasped.
[Similar Example:] Here if the cognition of something does not exist when [that thing's] own cause is not grasped, that [thing] does not exist as a real substance, like an army and so
on.

[Application and Conclusion:] Likewise, since the cognition of matter does not exist if [matter's] own cause, earth and so on, is not grasped, matter also does not exist as a real substance.

Alternatively, there is also another way of formulation (sbyor ba'i lam, probably prayoga-mārga):

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the cognition of matter does not have as its object (viṣaya) an entity which exists as a real substance,
[Reason:] because it is a cognition,
[Example:] like the cognition of a forest and so on.

Alternatively, there is still another way of formulation:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, this word "matter" does not have as its object a thing (padārtha) which exists as a real substance,
[Reason:] because it is a word,
[Example:] like the word "army" and so on.

Because cognition (vijñāna) and mental factors (caitta) are also of the same sort (rigs mthun pa, probably sajātiya) as [matter] which is to be established (sādhya), they are to be negated in the same way. Therefore it is not the case that [our] reason is inconclusive.13

Objection:14

[Thesis:] Matter does exist in ultimate reality,
[Reason:] because the cognition of that [matter] does not cease although that [matter] has ceased.
[Similar Example:] Here if the cognition of something ceases when [that thing] has ceased, that [thing] exists in superficial reality, like a jar.
[Application:] Although blue matter [or "visible form"] and so on have ceased, the cognition of them does not cease in that way.
[Conclusion:] Therefore matter exists as a real substance.

Answer: That is not good, because there is no agreement (anvaya) [with a similar example].15
Thus, to begin with, secondary matter (upādāya-rūpa)\textsuperscript{16} has been examined. Now [Nāgārjuna] will explain the subject of elemental matter.

\textit{Objection:}

[Thesis:] Secondary matter does indeed exist,
[Reason:] because the cause of that [secondary matter] exists.
[Dissimilar Example:] Here no cause can be grasped for that which does not exist, like a sky-flower.
[Application:] Secondary matter has a cause, [namely,] those [elements] earth and so on.
[Conclusion:] Therefore secondary matter does indeed exist.

\textit{Answer:} Therefore [Nāgārjuna] says,

Apart from matter, the cause of matter is also not seen. [MMK 4-1cd]

Here apart from visible forms, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangibles - which have the defining characteristic of secondary matter - the cause of matter, [the elements] earth and so on, are also not seen and cannot be grasped.\textsuperscript{17} Here again, [this half of the verse] indicates the property of elemental matter which is to be proved, [namely,] that it is a mere combination of visible form and so on, and the property which proves [that, namely], that if visible form and so on are not seen, those [elements] earth and so on are also not seen. Therefore, by virtue of that [property to proved and proving property], the example is also manifest.

As to that, to begin with, here [I] will state a syllogism regarding earth (prthivi). Also, because [we] do not show that [the elements] are mere combinations in ultimate reality, [there is no conflict with our position that the elements are unoriginated in ultimate reality].\textsuperscript{18} Here the author of [this] treatise [Nāgārjuna], by showing that [the elements] are mere combinations [according to superficial reality], has shown just the negation of [their] existence as real substances [in ultimate reality], because the negation of that is of great importance (mahārtha). Why is it of
great importance? Because lack of intrinsic nature is established [in that way], since that which is a dependent designation (upādāya-prajñāpatti) conventionally does not exist as a real substance in ultimate reality [and] therefore it [ultimately] has no origination.

As it is said in such [passages] as the following from the Ārya-laṅkāvatāra-sūtra: 19

Because cognition does not grasp [any] entity, apart from [mere] combinations (samavāya),
Therefore I say that [an entity] is empty and unoriginated and without intrinsic nature. [Laṅkāvatāra 3-88]
Here nothing at all originates or ceases by means of causal conditions.
Origination and cessation are also just mere causal conditions.
[Laṅkāvatāra 2-140 = 10-85]

Here the syllogism is:
[Thesis:] One should understand that in ultimate reality, earth does not exist as a real substance,
[Reason:] because that [earth] is not seen if the cause of that [earth] is not seen.
[Similar Example:] That which is not seen if [its] cause is not seen does not exist in ultimate reality as a real substance, like an army and so on.
Likewise, [syllogisms] should also be stated as appropriate in the cases of the cognition [of earth] and the word ["earth"].

Alternatively, [one shows that] apart from the cause of [secondary] matter, [namely,] those [elements] earth and so on, [secondary] matter which is different from them is not apprehended. The property of [secondary] matter [which proves that] is that it is not grasped if its own cause is not grasped. Here the syllogism is:
[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, [secondary] matter is not different from its own assembled (tshogs pa) parts (yan lag, aṅga or avayava),
[Reason:] because the cognition of that [secondary matter] does not exist if that [assemblage] is not grasped,

[Example:] like the own self of [the elements] earth and so on.

It is not the case that the meaning of [our] reason is unestablished, because here the activity (kriyā) is considered to reside in [its] direct object (karman), so that "not grasping" is a property of cognition. 20

Objection: The Sāmkhyas say: Since [we hold that] earth and so on are not different from visible form and so on, that [argument of yours merely] establishes what is [already] established [for us]. 21

Answer: That is not good, because [our] negation of difference does not show nondifference and because [we] do not accept the nondifference maintained by the opponent, either.

Objection: The Vaiśeṣikas object that [our] reason is inconclusive, because in the case of a jar, the cognition of that [jar] exists even though a lamp [to illuminate it] is not grasped, provided that a source of illumination different from that [lamp] exists. 23

Answer: That also is not good. [Our reason] is not inconclusive [1] because [we] have specified [as our reason], "because the cognition of that [matter] does not exist at all [if its parts are not apprehended]," and [2] because the proving property [in our syllogism] does not exist in [your] counterexample (vipakṣa), since he cognition of that [jar] exists even without a lamp, if the light of a jewel, a light-ray, a herb, the moon, or the sun is present. Because [we] have specified a qualified thesis, "[matter] is not different from its own assembled parts," a lamp is not a jar's own assembled part[s]. 24

Also, [our reason] is not inconclusive because there is [ultimately] no counterexample [to nondifference], since below [Nāgārjuna] will show,

It is not possible for anything which is together with (sārdham) something to be different [from it], [MMK 14-4cd]

and therefore it is not established that a jar is different from a
Objection: Real substances which have parts, such as an army, are composed [of those parts]. Therefore the example in [your] inferences proving that earth and so on do not exist as real substances, is not established.

Answer:
[Thesis:] The parts of an army do not compose a part-possessing real substance called an "army,"
[Reason:] because they are parts,
[Example:] like the parts of a tree, [its] roots, trunk, branches, twigs, and so on.

Alternatively, it is not the case that [our] example does not exist because
[Thesis:] That which is a part of that [elephant], complete in the elephant, does not compose a chariot or a horse, etc.,
[Reason:] because it does not exist in them,
[Example:] like threads (rgyu spun, literally "warp and weft") and so on.

Likewise,

Apart from matter, the cause of matter is also not seen.
[MMK 4-1cd]

Here also, one should state inferences extensively, employing a [property] to be proved and a property which proves [it] as before.

As [the elements] are not different from visible form and so on, so also earth, etc., are not nondifferent from [i.e., not the same as] visible form and so on. [This is so] because below nondifference will also be negated and because, due to [their] being nondifferent, either milk would just be curds or curds would just be milk; but [that] is not possible. Therefore the following [verse from the Ārya-lankāvatāra-sūtra] is established:

An entity which is nondifferent or different from the group
(kalāpa) [of its causes and conditions] nowhere exists
In the way in which the spiritually immature have conceptually
constructed oneness and difference. [Laṅkāvatāra 3-102 =
10-598]

Therefore in that way, the meaning of the [opponent's] reason,
"because they are included in the aggregates," which was stated in
order to establish the āyatanas, is not established; or else [its]
meaning is contradictory.

It is unintelligible that matter exists even apart from the cause
of matter. If [you] nevertheless suppose [so], [Nāgārjuna replies,]

If matter [existed] apart from the cause of matter, it would
follow that
Matter would be without a cause. [MMK 4-2ab,c1]

"The cause of matter" (rūpa-kāraṇa) [means] "the cause of the
existence of matter," because the middle word is not manifest,
just as "the cause of fire" [means "the cause of the existence of
fire"]. "Apart from that (tānirīmukte?)" [means] "apart from the
cause of matter (rūpakāraṇena nīrmukte?);" the idea is [that this
means] "without the cause which shows the existence of matter."
"If matter [existed] (rūpe)" [means] "if one maintains that that
[matter] is like that because of a mere assertion (pratijñā-mātra)."
"It would follow that matter would be without a cause" means
'[matter] would not be possible." Since that also is not main-
ained, the stated fault [in your reason] is not avoided.

Objection: Those who hold that [things] have no cause
(ahetuvādin or nirhetuvādin) say: Since [we] accept that all enti-
ies originate from no cause at all, the establishment of matter is
also similar to [the establishment of] those.

Answer: If there were anything of the kind which you have
scribed [i.e., something which originates without a cause], that
origination of matter without a cause] would also be possible; but
There is not any thing (artha) without a cause anywhere. 
[MMK 4-2c2,d]

Therefore, since there is no example [of a thing without a cause], that doctrine (vāda) is also without proof. Since we refuted those who hold that [things] have no cause at the very beginning [MMK 1-1], also, that [contention of theirs] is pointless.

Object: Those who hope to be learned in the doctrine of the Śāmkhyas say: Since you have said that earth and so on are not different from visible form and so on, [you] have accepted their nondifference. Therefore,

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, earth and so on can be known to exist as real substances,
[Reason:] because they are not different from visible form and so on,
[Example:] like the own self of visible form and so on.

Answer: Because, by the method which has been explained, nondifference is not established, the meaning of [your] reason is not established. [Your] example also does not exist, because the own self of visible form and so on have been rejected.

Object: 
[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, earth and so on do indeed exist,
[Reason:] because their results exist.
[Dissimilar Example:] Here that which does not exist has no result which can be grasped, as a sky-flower [has no result].
[Application:] Earth and so on do have results, visible form and so on.
[Conclusion:] Therefore earth and so on do indeed exist.

Answer:

If a cause of matter existed apart from matter, 
It would be a cause (kārana) without a result (kārya); [but] there is no cause without a result. [MMK 4-3]

For our position, if a cause of [secondary] matter, [that is, the
elements] earth and so on, existed apart from [secondary] matter, it would therefore be a cause without a result, because it would be a cause without a result due to the defining characteristic of the result, visible form and so on. [This is so] because [the cause would be] different [from the result], like rṣi rkyang and so on. "There is no cause without an result." The idea is that [this is so] because that [cause] also has the nature (-ātmaka) of a combination of visible form and so on.

Therefore there is the fault that the meaning of the previously stated reason, "because their result exists," is not established, since the result also, like the cause, is not established. If you state [that] as a reason which is generally common knowledge [in the world], [its] meaning is contradictory.

There is also another answer criticizing (dūṣaṇa) [the opponent's position]. Here if one conceptually constructs a cause of matter, it must be conceptually constructed for either existent or nonexistent matter. [Nāgārjuna] explains that [a cause] is possible for neither:

Even if matter existed, a cause of matter would not be possible. [MMK 4-4ab]

[This is so] because [matter already] exists, like a jar and a cloth which exist [already and therefore do not need a cause to produce them].

But even if it does not exist,

Even if matter did not exist, a cause of matter would not be possible. [MMK 4-4cd]

Earth and so on are considered [to be the cause of secondary matter]. The idea is that [a cause of nonexistent secondary matter is not possible] because [secondary matter] does not exist prior to [its] origination, like [something] different from that [secondary matter]. Here the criticism (dūṣaṇa) explained in the chapter on
nonorigination (*anutpāda*) has been repeated; therefore one should understand that [MMK 4-4] is a statement of the [same] criticism [as MMK 1-6].

*Objection:* Those who hold that [things] have no cause say: [Matter] is just without a cause.

*Answer:* To them, [Nāgārjuna] replies,

Matter without a cause is not at all (*naiva naiva*) possible. [MMK 4-5ab]

The idea is that [this is so] because that is not accepted even in superficial reality.

Alternatively, [one may explain MMK 4-5ab as follows:]

*Objection:* The Vaibhāṣikas say: Future matter also exists.

*Answer:* To them, [Nāgārjuna] replies,

Matter without a cause is not at all possible. [MMK 4-5ab]

The idea is that [this is so] because it is not established that the future, which has not appropriated a cause of [its] origination, which has not attained its own existence, exists even conventionally.

Because in that way matter having the nature of the elements and [matter having a nature] dependent on the elements are not possible in any way,

Therefore one should not construct any conceptual constructions concerning matter (*rūpa-gata*). [MMK 4-5cd]

*[The verse refers to] one who is wise, [who] wishes to comprehend the reality of dharmas [or "the Dharma," *dharma-tattva*], which is quite free from conceptual construction, [and whose] eye of right cognition has fully opened. He or she should not conceptually construct [any of] the many conceptual constructions which have such objects as matter which exists as a real sub-
stance, which is different from [its] cause, or which is not different from [its] cause, or the distinctions of color and shape of those, etc. 46 [Those conceptual constructions] are like the objects seen in a dream about a son who is not [yet] born, such as the son's [bodily] form and enjoyments, after one has awakened. 47

Therefore because in that way the cause of matter is not possible, [the reason in the opponent's last syllogism] is not free from the faults which [we] have stated.

Moreover,

Objection: Here the result is similar to [its] cause, by the defining characteristic that the qualities of the cause are seen also in the result, due to a continuous process. 48

Answer: To them, [Nāgārjuna] replies,

It is not possible [to say] that the result is similar (sadrśa) to the cause. [MMK 4-6ab]

It is not possible to teach that the result is similar to the cause. The meaning is that that cause is just not the result. Here [the fact] that the alleged cause 49 is not the cause is the property to be proved; and the teaching that [cause and result] are similar is adduced [as] the property which proves [that]. The example [is indicated] by virtue of that [property to be proved and proving property]: "like a [similar] real substance in a different series." Here the syllogism is:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the alleged cause, blue threads, are not the cause of a blue blanket,
[Reason:] because they are similar [to it],
[Example:] just as [they are not the cause of] a blue blanket different from that [blue blanket allegedly caused by these blue threads]. 50

Objection: Here the Sāṃkhyaśas say: Since it is not established that the alleged cause of the blue blanket is not also present in a blue blanket different from that, [your] example does not exist. 51

Answer: That is not good. [There is no fault in our example]
because [we] take as [our] example just what is established not to be the entity which is the cause of that [blanket] which occurs now.\textsuperscript{52} Also, there is no fault [in our example] because this negation [in the thesis of our syllogism] has its expressive force (mthu, probably sakti here) used up by just the negation of the meaning to be expressed [by] that word with which it is connected. [This is so] because that [negation] does not indicate a particular quality (viṣeṣa) of that [object of negation], as [in the negation,] "He is not a brāhmaṇa."\textsuperscript{53}

Objection: [Our] fellow Buddhists,\textsuperscript{54} who hold that the result may be [either] similar or not similar to [its] cause, say: With regard to a subsequent moment which originates from a previous moment with a similar defining characteristic - as in [the flame of] a lamp, a stream of water, and so on - [the moment of the result] is similar to the moment of the cause; therefore [in this case, cause and result] are similar. With regard to a subsequent moment which originates from a previous moment with a dissimilar defining characteristic - as in [the origination of] ashes and curds [from] wood and milk [respectively], and so on - [the moment of the result] is not similar to the moment of the cause; therefore [in this case, cause and result] are not similar.

Answer: In that connection, that result which is similar to [its] cause has been negated by the very inferences which [we] have [already] stated. Concerning that result which is not similar to its cause, [Nāgārjuna] says,

It is also not possible [to say] that the result is not similar to the cause. [MMK 4-6cd]

Here also [the fact] that [the result, such as] a sprout, is not a result of the alleged cause, [such as a seed,] is the property to be proved; and the teaching that [cause and result] are not similar is adduced [as] the property which proves [that]. Therefore the remaining member [of the syllogism] is also manifest as before. Here the inference is:
In ultimate reality, a sprout is not a result of its alleged cause,
because it is not similar to that alleged cause,
like gravel and so on.

Objection:
The seed ('bru, dhānya) is indeed the cause of the sprout,
because the sprout occurs when that seed exists or is conventionally designated by means of that seed.
like the sound of a kettledrum or a barley-sprout.

Answer: That is not good. Since the origination of things supposedly possessing origination (upattimati) has been negated in every way, your example is not established. Therefore your syllogism has the fault of being an incomplete proof.

Objection: Since the result of the eye, etc., namely, visual cognition, etc., is not similar to the eye, your reason, "because it is not similar," is inconclusive.

Answer: That also is not good. Because visual cognition and so on are also of the same sort (rigs mthun pa, probably sajānīya) as what is to be established, they are likewise to be negated. Therefore since no counterexample (vipaksa) exists, there is no occasion for inconclusiveness in our reason.

Alternatively, the argument against the origination of sprouts from seeds or the origination of visual cognition from the eye is similar to the method which has been stated, that is, "Because the alleged cause, earth and so on, are not the cause of secondary matter, visible form is not established. Therefore the meaning of the reason in your syllogism preceding MMK 4-3, 'because their result exists,' is not established or is contradictory."

Objection: The Vaibhāsikas say: The result may be either similar or not similar to its cause, since we accept that the "nonobstructing cause" (byed pa'i rgyu, kāraṇa-hetu) of a dharma conditioned (samskṛta) by a nonobstructing cause is every dharma other than itself. Therefore your example does not exist.
a seed, for instance, is a nonobstructing cause of gravel].

**Answer:** That is not good, because [we] wish to negate the particular efficacy (sādhanatva) of the special (asādharana) cause which produces [something] of the same kind [as itself], etc.60

Thus that section of the text [i.e., the first six verses of chapter four] has negated elemental matter and matter dependent on the elements; therefore it has been shown that the aggregate of matter is not possible. Now [Nāgārjuna] will show that the negation of [the other aggregates,] feeling and so on, also [proceeds by] the same method as the negation of matter.

For feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and mind (citta),61

As well as all entities in general (sarvasah), the method (krama) is just the same as [for] matter. [MMK 4-7]

The idea is that [this is so] because the negation of feeling and so on also [proceeds by] the same method as the negation of matter. [Previously,] it was shown that

[Thesis:] in ultimate reality, matter does not exist as a real substance,

[Reason:] because the cognition (buddhi) of that [matter] does not exist if [matter's] own cause is not grasped,

[Example:] like an army and so on.

Likewise, one should understand in detail that

[Thesis:] in ultimate reality, feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition (vijñāna) also do not exist as real substances,

[Reason:] because if [their] own cause is not grasped, the cognition of them does not exist,

[Example:] like an army and so on.

It should be stated appropriately [in each case] that the causes of feeling and so on are contact (sparśa), the eye, visible form, light, space, attention, and so on.62

[Previously,] it was shown that in ultimate reality, matter is not
different from its own causes because

[Thesis:] in ultimate reality, [secondary] matter is not different from its own assembled parts,

[Reason:] because the cognition of that [secondary matter] does not exist if that [assemblage] is not grasped,

[Example:] like the own self of [the elements] earth and so on.

Likewise, it should be stated here also that in ultimate reality, feeling and so on are not different from their own causes. Here [the opponent’s] criticisms and [our] answers to [his] criticisms are also as before.

[Nāgārjuna] mentions "all entities," although there is no conditioned dharma different from the aggregates, because he wishes to state a negation of the varieties of those [aggregates]. [Thus he mentions "all entities"] in order to negate [the idea] that conceptually constructed (parikalpita) [things], such as jars and cloths, exist as real substances and are different [from their causes]. Here also, as before, syllogisms should be stated as appropriate.

Thus because the aggregates are not established, the meaning of the reason [in the opponent's initial syllogism], "[because] they are included in the aggregates," is not established; and [his] example does not exist. Why [does his example not exist]? Because it does not exist [i.e., is not true] that [dharma] which are included in the aggregates of matter and so on exist in ultimate reality.

Alternatively, the meaning of the reason is also contradictory, because what is included in the aggregates exists just conventionally.

Thus by that reasoning,

For that [opponent] who would give an answer (parīhāra) when [the Madhyamika] has made a contention (vigraha) by means of emptiness,

Everything is [in fact] unanswered. It becomes the same as what is to be proved (sādhyā). [MMK 4-8]
As to the defining characteristic of the examination of reality \((tattva)\), if [the Mādhyamika] undertakes the examination of the ultimately real \(^{71}\) intrinsic nature of some entity, \(^{72}\) he makes a contention and disputation ('gyped pa, probably vivāda) by means of emptiness. [That is, he does so] following (parigrhya) the proof (pramāṇa) that in ultimate reality, the āyatanas are without origination and do not exist as real substances. \(^{73}\) When [the Mādhyamika thus contends], for that [opponent] who speaks in reply by giving a rebuttal (uttaratarka), all those [contentions] are [in fact] unanswered. [This is so] because [his rebuttal] becomes the same as what is to be proved. The idea is that [the opponent's] rebuttal is not established because the examples and reasons which show that [rebuttal] are equally as unestablished as [the property] which is to be proved. \(^{74}\)

Likewise,

For that [opponent] who would utter a censure \((upālambha)\) when [the Mādhyamika] has made an explanation \((vyākhyāna)\) by means of emptiness,

Everything is [in fact] uncensured. It becomes the same as what is to be proved. [MMK 4-9]

If [the Mādhyamika] shows that the aggregates, āyatanas, and dhātus \(^{75}\) have no intrinsic nature, he explains and analyzes the formulation \(^{76}\) by means of emptiness. When [the Mādhyamika thus explains], one whose intellect is contaminated by false means of knowledge (pramāṇa) utters a censure by [saying], "The aggregates and so on do indeed exist, because they are included in the [Four Noble] Truths \(^{77}\) and so on," etc. For that [opponent], all those [explanations] are also [in fact] uncensured and uncriticized (aduṣita). The remainder of the statement is that [this is so] because it becomes the same as what is to be proved. Why? Since [that criticism] is similar to the object of [the Mādhyamika's] criticism, it is the same in general as the unprovenness of what is to be proved. \(^{78}\) [Thus ācārya Āryadeva] said,
One who sees one entity is considered to see all [entities].\textsuperscript{79}
Just that which is the emptiness of one is the emptiness of all.
\textit{[Catuḥśataka 8-16]}

As to that, here the meaning of the chapter is that the aggregates have been shown to be without intrinsic nature, by means of stating the faults in the proof adduced [by the opponent] to show that the āyatanas exist.

Therefore those [scriptural] statements such as the following are established.\textsuperscript{80} [From the \textit{Bhagavatī-prajñāpāramitā-suvikrānta-vikrāmi-paripūcchā-sūtra,}]\textsuperscript{81}

Suvikrāntavikrāmin, that which is a teaching belonging to [the doctrine of] the production (\textit{abhiniirvṛtī-paryāpannānirdeśa})\textsuperscript{82} of the five aggregates is not the perfection of discernment.\textsuperscript{83} Suvikrāntavikrāmin, matter is free from (\textit{apagata}) the intrinsic nature of matter. Likewise, cognition is free from the intrinsic nature of feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition. That which is free from the intrinsic nature of matter, feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition is the perfection of discernment. Suvikrāntavikrāmin, matter lacks the intrinsic nature of matter (\textit{rūpaasvabhāva}). Likewise, cognition lacks the intrinsic nature of feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition. That which lacks the intrinsic nature of matter, feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition is the perfection of discernment.

Likewise, [from the \textit{Ārya-brahma-viśeṣa-cintā-paripūcchā-sūtra,}]\textsuperscript{84}

I taught the aggregates to the world, [and] the world came to dwell on them.\textsuperscript{85}
One who is wise does not dwell on them and is not soiled by worldly dharmas.
The world has the defining characteristic of space, and space has no defining characteristic.
Therefore that [wise one], comprehending that, is not soiled by
worldly dharmas.

Likewise, [from the Vajracchedikā-prajñāpāramitā,] 86

A bodhisattva should not give a gift [while] basing himself (pratisthita) on visible forms, sounds, odors, tastes, tangibles, and dharmas.

Likewise, [from the Ārya-laṅkāvatāra-sūtra,] 87

The three spheres of sāṃsāric existence (tribhava) 88 are mere designation (prajñāaptimātra); they do not exist with the intrinsic nature of an entity (vasu-svabhāvataḥ).

Thinkers (tārkika) conceptually construct [them] as the nature of an entity [which is in fact mere] designation (prajñāptivastu-bhāvena). [Laṅkāvatāra 3-52 = 10-86]

If one examines [dharmas?] with the intellect, [their] intrinsic nature cannot be ascertained (nāvadhāryate).

Therefore they are taught to be inexpressible and without intrinsic nature. [Laṅkāvatāra 2-175 = 10-167]

The fourth chapter, "Examination of the Aggregates," of the Prajñāpradīpa, a commentary on [Nāgārjuna's] Mūlamadhyamaka composed by ācārya Bhavyakara/Bhavyakāra (legs ldan byed) 89 [is concluded].

Notes to Translation of Chapter Four

1 See Ava P42a-1, D36a-3,4; read as D.
2 Ava P42b-2 has rang gi sde pa dang mdo sde pa bye brag tu smra ba dag; D36b-3 has rang gi sde pa mdo sde pa dang bye brag tu smra ba dag. Read rang gi sde pa mdo sde pa dang bye brag tu smra ba dag, "[our] fellow Buddhists, the Sautrāntikas and Vaibhāsikas."
3 As pointed out in note 6 to the translation of chapter three, rūpa as the first of the five skandhas is "matter" in general. As one of the twelve āyatanas or eighteen dhātus, rūpa has the more restricted sense of "visible form." See the references in the note mentioned.
4 The internal (ādhyātmika) āyatanas are the six sense organs, the five physical sense organs plus the mind (manas). The external (bāhya) āyatanas are the corresponding six sense objects (with dharmas as the object of mind). See AK
Oddly enough, the opponent refers here to the internal _modifier-1_ayatana-2s and then goes on to speak of all twelve. Samghabhadra mentions a view according to which the sense objects were to be considered as internal in any moment when they serve as conditions for the arising of cognition, and as external in any moment when they do not serve as such conditions. (I would like to thank Collett Cox for this information.)

That is, the five physical sense organs and the five corresponding sense objects.

The three aggregates referred to are feeling (vedana), perception/conception (samjna), and mental formations (samskarah). "One part of the aggregate of matter" refers to the avijñapti posited by the Vaihbhasikas. It is considered to be material and thus to belong to the rupa-skandha; but since it is held to be an object only of the mind and not of the physical senses, it belongs to the dharma-ayatana. See Ava P42b-7,8; D36b-7 to 37a-1. On avijñapti, see LVP AK I, pp. 21, 25-7, and IV, pp. 3, 14-27.

On the four great elements (mahabhuta), earth, water, fire, and air (understood as solidity, cohesion, heat, and motion), and matter dependent on them, see LVP AK I, pp. 21-24, 64-67 and II, pp. 144-149, 313-315. See also May (1959), pp. 88-89, n. 184.

"Matter" is here taken to mean "matter dependent on the elements" (bhautika). Thus the elements are its cause. See Ava P43b-3,4; D37b-3.

The Sanskrit may be niriikrta.

According to Avalokitavrata, matter dependent on the elements is designated in dependence on the elements in the same way that a forest is designated in dependence on its constituent trees. See Ava P43b-5,6,7; D37b-4,5.

In other words, the meaning of MMK 4-1ab is the following, according to Bhavaviveka: Matter dependent on the elements does not exist by intrinsic nature because it is a mere combination of the elements. This is so because matter dependent on the elements is not apprehended apart from the elements, just as a forest is not perceived if the trees which make it up are not perceived. See Ava P43b-7 to 44a-2, D37b-6 to 38a-1.

According to Avalokitavrata, this paragraph is a response to an objection of the Abhiddharmikas, who hold that mind and mental factors exist as real substances. They charge that the Madhyamika's reason, "because it is a word," is inconclusive. Although the word "army" does not refer to a real substance, the words "mind" and "mental events" do. The Madhyamika retorts that he also negates the ultimately real existence of mind and mental events. See Ava P44b-4,5,6; D38b-2,3. The phrase "of the same sort as what is to be established" alludes to MMK 4-8 and 4-9.

Avalokitavrata attributes this objection to "fellow Buddhists." See Ava
For the Mādhyamikas, nothing exists as a real substance or in ultimate reality. Hence there is no example which the opponent can cite.

"upādāya-rūpa," secondary matter," is synonymous with bhautika-rūpa, "matter dependent on the elements."

This may be a reference to the Vaibhāṣikas’ theory that matter can only exist in the form of molecules (samghāta-paramāṇu) composed of four atoms (dravya-paramāṇu) of the elements and varying numbers of atoms of secondary matter. Thus the elements are also dependent on secondary matter for their manifestation. See AK 1-35d, AK 2-22, and LVP AK II, pp. 144-149.

See Ava P46a-2,3,4; D39b-5,6,7.

The Sanskrit text is in Nanjio (1923). Verse 3-88 is on p. 200; verse 2-140 is on p. 84. In 2-140c, the Tibetan seems to correspond to something like upādaś ca nirdohaś ca, while the Sanskrit has upadhyante niruddhyante. In 2-140d, the Tibetan has 'ba' zhig, kevalāḥ for the Sanskrit's kalpitāḥ. Note also that Bhāvaviveka quotes only the second two (out of three) lines of 3-88.

According to Avalokitavrata, an opponent objects that since "matter" is the subject of Bhāvaviveka’s thesis, the "not grasping" mentioned in the reason must be a property (dharma) of matter; but that is absurd because matter is unconscious and cannot grasp (i.e., perceive) anything in any case. Bhāvaviveka replies that an activity (kriyā) resides in both its agent (kārti) and its object (kāryan). Here the activity is "not grasping;" the agent is cognition (buddhi); and the object is matter. Thus "not grasping" is a property of cognition. See Ava P47b-2 to 48a-4, D41a-4 to 41b-5.

Since the Sāṃkhya hold that everything (except puruṣa) is composed of the three guṇas of prakṛti, for them all entities are nondifferent in any case. See Ava P48a-5,6; D41b-6,7 and Larson and Bhattacharya (1987), pp. 65-73.

Avalokitavrata points out that the negation here is a simple negation, not an implicative negation. See Ava P48a-8, D42a-1,2.

The Vaiśeṣikas mean that even if the assemblage of its parts is not apprehended, matter might be apprehended by some other means, just as a jar may be seen by means of various sources of illumination. See Ava P48b-3 to 8, D42a-3 to 42b-1. The Vaiśeṣikas hold that wholes are different entities from the sum of their parts. See Sinha (1956), pp. 596-6; Frauwallner (1973), Vol. II, pp. 117-8; and Potter (1977), pp. 74-79.

Bhāvaviveka replies that he does not argue that matter is not different from its causes in general, but specifically that it is not different from its own assembled parts. Unlike the Vaiśeṣikas’ example of a lamp and a jar, the apprehension of matter’s assembled parts is a necessary condition for the apprehension of matter, whereas a jar can be illuminated by something other than a lamp. Moreover, it is obvious that a lamp is not a jar’s own assembled parts, so the Vaiśeṣika’s alleged counterexample is not comparable to Bhāvaviveka’s thesis. See especially Ava P49b-2 to 6, D43a-2 to 5.

Literally, they "possess composition" (rtsom pa, ārambha)." On the Vaiśeṣikas' ārambhavāda, another term for asaskāryavāda, see Frauwallner (1973),
According to Avalokitavrata, because they are parts according to superficial reality, they do not compose a part-possessing real substance in ultimate reality. See Ava P50b-3, 4; D44a-2, 3.

That is, according to Avalokitavrata, the property to be proved is that the elements are a mere combination of visible form and so on; and the property which proves that is the fact that if visible form and so on are not seen, the elements are also not seen. See especially Ava P51a-8 to 51b-1, D44b-6.

Avalokitavrata points out that the negations of difference and sameness are simple negations, not implicative negations. See P51b-6 to 52a-1, D45a4, 5, 6.

If the negation of difference must imply sameness, then because milk and curds are not different (since curds are a transformation of milk), they would have to be identical; but that is absurd. Compare Ava P52a-2, 3, 4; D45a-7 to 45b-2 and MMK 13-6.

See Ava P52a-6, D45b-3. The Sanskrit text is in Nanjio (1923), pp. 202 and 339. In the first pāda, 3-102a has 'nyonyah while 10-598a has hy anyah. The Tibetan here, gzhan pa ma yin, corresponds to ananyah. Also, both Sanskrit verses have tṛthyair in the fourth pāda, while the Tibetan corresponds to bālair.

See Ava P52a-7, D45b-4.

If the reason refers to ultimate reality, it is not established. If it refers to superficial reality, it is contradictory to try to prove a positive thesis about ultimate reality with a reason which is only conventionally valid. Compare Ava P52b-4, D45b-1.

"Lokāyatās and so on," according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P53a-8, D46b-3.

"Rtsi rkyang" is defined as rtswa zhig, "a [kind of] grass," in Chos kyi grags pa (1957), s. v.

The idea may be that grass is a purely conventional entity and thus is different from the elements if, as the opponent holds, they exist in ultimate reality. Secondary matter, too, only exists conventionally and thus would be ontologically different from its alleged cause. See the following note.

Avalokitavrata's interpretation of this passage is as follows: If you (the opponent) hold that the elements exist in ultimate reality, then it follows that they would have no result. This is so because in ultimate reality, their supposed result, secondary matter, is empty of intrinsic nature. But if you hold that secondary matter exists in superficial reality while the elements exist in ultimate reality, then one cannot be the cause of the other, because of their (ontological) difference. See Ava P55a-3 to 8, D47a-4 to 7.

According to Avalokitavrata, since the elements are a mere combination of secondary matter, visible form and so on, they have no intrinsic nature in ultimate reality. See Ava P55b-1, D48b-1.

Once again, the reason is not established in ultimate reality. While it may be valid conventionally, it cannot prove a positive thesis concerning ultimate...
real world. In ultimate reality, according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P55b-7, D48b-6.

41 In other words, consider the time at which the cause allegedly produces a result. If the result exists at that time, its production by a cause is superfluous. If it does not exist at that time, one might as well say that the cause produces a sky-flower, since the result is nonexistent. Compare Ava P56a-2,3,4; D49a-2,3. Such an analysis depends on the idea that a seed, for instance, is the cause of a sprout only at the moment when it actually produces it.

42 See Ava P56a-4 to 7, D49a-4,5,6. Although the title of the first chapter of the MMK is pratyaya-parikṣā in all the commentaries, Bhavaviveka often refers to it as dealing with anutpāda, as indeed it does.

43 skye ba'i rgyu ma blaṅgs pa, probably anutpāta-utpāda-hetu. A result is said to "appropriate (upā-dō)" its causes; see, for instance, PSP 259.1-5.

44 bdag nyid kyi dngos po ma thob pa, probably alabdha/aprāpta-ātmabhāva. Or "skillful," mkhas pa. According to Avalokitavrata, this refers to the bodhisattva who has attained receptivity to the fact that dharmas do not originate (anutpattika-dharma-ksānti). See Ava P57a-1 to 57b-1, D50a-1 to 50b-1. This attainment is said to occur on the eighth bodhisattva-bhūmi. See Lamotte (1976), pp. 290-1.

45 de dag la sogs pa, that is, matter as conceived of in those and other ways. That is, the bodhisattva who has attained anutpattika-dharma-ksānti has awakened from the sleep of samsāra and realizes that the objects which he used to conceptually construct have no intrinsic nature. See Ava P57a-4 to 57b-1, D50a-4 to 50b-1.

46 snga na yod pa'i rim gyis, perhaps prāg-bhāva-kramena, literally, "by the stage[s] of prior existence."

47 smra bar 'dod pa'i rgyu, probably vivaksita-kāraṇa, "the cause of which [the opponent] wishes to speak," as, for example, the opponent wishes to say that the elements are the cause of secondary matter. See Ava P58a-1,2; D50b-7.

48 In other words, the opponent wishes to say that a blue blanket is caused by the blue threads out of which it is woven, because they have the same color. But the threads also have the same color as other blue blankets, and the opponent does not admit that these particular threads are the cause of those other blankets.

50 After the periodic destruction of the universe, all matter is "recycled;" and on a more mundane level, when Devadatta's blue blanket becomes torn, threads from Yajñadatta's blue blanket may be used to mend it. See Ava P58b-1,2,3; D51a-6,7.

52 In other words, our example is Devadatta's presently existing blanket; and the opponent must admit that the threads presently existing in Yajñadatta's blanket are not the cause of Devadatta's presently existing blanket. See Ava P58b-5 to 8, D51b-2,3,4.

53 When Bhāvaviveka says that in ultimate reality, threads are not the cause of the blue blanket, it is a simple negation. It does not imply that the threads exist in ultimate reality as a noncause of the blanket. See Ava P59a-1 to 5, D51b-5 to 52a-1.
The Ābhidhārmikas, according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P59a-7, D52a-2,3.

The eye is material (rūpin), and visual cognition is not. See Ava P60b1,2,3; D53a-4,5.

That is, the origination of visual cognition from the eye and the origination of a sprout from a seed are both instances of a result's arising from a dissimilar cause. Thus they are both equally in need of proof. See Ava P60b-3,4,5; D53a-7 to 53b-1.

On this line of argument, see MMK 4-8 and 4-9, with Bhāvaviveka's commentary.

See Ava P60b-8 to 61b-1, D53b-2 to 54a-3, for an explicit statement of the analogous argument.

Every dharma is said to be the kārana-hetu of every conditioned dharma other than itself, in the sense that it does not obstruct its origination (necessarily, since we only consider dharmas which exist at some time or other and thus do originate). See AK 2-50a and LVP AK II, pp. 246-8; see also Ava P61b-2 to 7, D54a-3 to 7. One might expect kārana-hetu to mean something like "productive cause;" and the Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya tells us that this is its primary (pradhāna) meaning (see LVP AK II, p. 247). All dharmas other than the productive cause are also called kārana-hetu, however, in the extended sense of not obstructing origination.

That is, we are only concerned with the productive cause and not with kārana-hetu in the broad sense. See Ava P62a-1,2,3; D54b-1,2,3.

Here Nāgārjuna uses citta as the name of the fifth skandha, in place of the more usual vijñāna, apparently for metrical reasons.

According to Avalokitavrata, contact is mentioned as the special (asādharana) cause of feeling. The eye and the rest are mentioned as the special causes of visual cognition and its conjoined mental factors (samprayukta-citta; see AK 2-23a,34 and LVP AK II, pp. 177-8). The mental factors belong, variously, to the three aggregates of feeling, perception/conception, and mental formations. See Ava P62b-8 to 63a-6, D55a-7 to 55b-5.

Avalokitavrata says that opponents might conceptually construct jars, cloths, etc., and use them as reasons and examples in arguments which attempt to refute the Mādhyamika's arguments concerning the aggregates. Avalokitavrata also adds nondifference [from the cause] as something which the Mādhyamika negates. See Ava P63b-8 to 64a-3, D56a-6 to 56b-1.

Avalokitavrata spells out syllogisms for a jar and a cloth parallel to those already given for matter. See Ava P64a-3 to 64b-1, D56b-2 to 7.

In his opening syllogism at the beginning of this chapter, the opponent gives a dissimilar example, a sky-flower, which does not exist and is not included in the aggregates. Here Bhāvaviveka is saying that things which are included in the aggregates do not exist in ultimate reality, either. See Ava P64b-3 to 6, D57a-1,2,3.

Again, it is contradictory to try to prove a positive thesis about ultimate reality with a reason that holds only conventionally. See Ava P64b-6,7; D57a-3,4.
That is, by the reasoning which has been explicitly formulated here for matter and then extended to all dharmas. See Ava P64b-8 to 65a-1, D57a-5.

The Mādhyamika’s argument that all dharmas are empty of intrinsic nature is called a "contention" because it is directed against those who hold that entities do have intrinsic nature. See Ava P65a-2,3; D57a-6,7. Candrakīrti is more explicit: \textit{tatra parapakṣadāsanam vigrahah}, "there vigrahā is criticism of another’s position." He glosses \textit{vigrāhe ...} \textit{krte} as \textit{sasvabhāvavāde pratisiddhe}, "when the doctrine that [things] have intrinsic nature has been negated." (See PSP 127.5,6.)

Avalokitavrata gives the following example: An opponent replies to the Mādhyamika’s argument that such-and-such a thing is empty of intrinsic nature by saying that it is not empty because its cause exists. But this is no answer, because the cause is just as empty of intrinsic nature as the thing in question. See Ava P65a-4 to 7, D57a-8 to 57b-3.


\textit{don dam pa, paramārtha}, glossed by Avalokitavrata as \textit{don dam pa pa, pāramārthika}. See Ava P65b-1,2; D57b-5.

The sentence up to this point is paraphrased by Avalokitavrata as, "If when he examines the defining characteristic of the reality of all dharmas, he then undertakes the examination of the ultimately real intrinsic nature of some external or internal entity..." See Ava P65b-2, D57b-5.

Avalokitavrata says that the proof of nonorigination is given in chapter one and the proof of not existing as a real substance is given in this chapter. See Ava P65b-3 to 8, D57b-6 to 58a-3. In general, \textit{pramāṇa} means "valid means of knowledge;" but since the \textit{pramāṇa} in question here is \textit{anumāna}, "inference," I have translated it as "proof."

Since no dharma originates by intrinsic nature or exists as a real substance, there is no example and no proof which the opponent can successfully adduce. See Ava P66a-7 to 66b-4, D58b-2 to 5.

The eighteen \textit{dhātus} are the twelve \textit{āyatanas} (the six sense organs and the six sense objects) plus the six corresponding sense cognitions (e. g., the eye, visible form, and visual cognition).

\textit{shyor ba rnam par dbye ba byas te| rnam par bshad pa'i tshe}, apparently glossing \textit{vyākhyaṇe ... krte} as \textit{vyākhyaṇe prayoga/yogalidhi-vibhāge krte}. Avalokitavrata seems to say that it means analyzing the same formulation that the Mādhyamika used when he made a contention by means of emptiness. He may also be referring to the technical sense of \textit{yoga-vibhāga}. See Ava P67a6,7; D59a-6,7. On the technical sense of \textit{yoga-vibhāga}, see Ames (1994), p. 133 n. 172 and Ames (1995) n. 74.

The entities cited by the opponent in his reason and example are included in the Mādhyamika's original criticism that all entities are not established by intrinsic nature. Therefore one can state in general that they are just as unestablished as...
what the opponent is trying to establish by means of them. See Ava P67b-7 to 68a-3, D59b-7 to 60a-3.

79 The Sanskrit of this ardhasloka is bhāvasyaikasya yo draṣṭā draṣṭā sarvasya sa smṛtah, "One who is a seer of one entity is considered to be a seer of all" (quoted PSP 128.3,4). See also Lang (1986), pp. 82-3.

80 See note 149 to the translation of chapter three. Avalokitavrata's remarks here are similar. See Ava P68a-6 to 68b-1, D60a-6,7; P68b-2, D60b-1; P68b-8, D60b-5,6; P69a-5,6, D61a-3; P69a-7,8, D61a-4,5; and P69b-3,4,5, D61a-7 to 61b-2.

81 Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P68b-1, D60a-7.

82 Avalokitavrata explains abhinirvṛtī-paryāpana-nīrdeśa as skye bar bsdus pa ston pa, "a teaching summed up in origination." See Ava P68b-2,3; D60b-1,2.

83 The Sanskrit text of this sentence is found in Hikata (1958), p. 37. The remainder of the passage is found on p. 29 of the same work.

84 Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P68a-7, D60b-5. See note 100 to the translation of chapter five.

85 de la ... gnas par gyur. Avalokitavrata glosses gnas par gyur as chags shing lhaṅ par chags par gyur, "became attached and clung." See Ava P68b-8 to 69a-1, D60b-6,7.

86 Identified by Avalokitavrata as the Ārya-trīṣātikā-[prajñāpāramitā]-sūtra, another title of the sūtra; see Ava P69a-4,5; D61a-2. The Sanskrit text is in Conze (1957), p. 29.

87 Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P69a-6, D61a-4. The Sanskrit text is in Nanjio (1923). Verse 3-52 is on p. 168; verse 2-175 is on p. 116.

88 The three bhavas are the same as the three dhātus, i.e., the realms of desire (kāma), form (rūpa), and formlessness (ārūpya).

89 See note 159 to my translation of chapter three.
Translation of *Prajñāpradīpa*, Chapter Five: Examination of the Elements (*dhātu*)

Now [Nāgārjuna] begins the fifth chapter with the aim of showing that the elements have no intrinsic nature by means of negating a particular counterposition (*vipaksā*) to emptiness.²

**Objection:** Because [Nāgārjuna] stated, in the immediately preceding chapter, that

Apart from matter, the cause of matter is also not seen, [MMK 4-1cd]

therefore, to begin with, [our] fellow Buddhists say: Here the Blessed One taught the defining characteristics (*laksana*) of the six elements called "earth, water, fire, air, space (ākāśa), and cognition (vijñāna)," by saying, "Great king, these six elements are the person (*purusa*)."³ [Those characteristics are, respectively,] solidity, cohesion, heat, motion, providing room (*skabs 'byed pa*, perhaps *avakāśa-dāna*), and knowing (*rnam par shes par byed pa*, probably *vijñānanā*). It is not taught that nonexistent [things] like a sky-flower and so on are the cause of a person. Therefore that assertion (*pratijñā*) made by the ācārya [Nāgārjuna], that the cause of matter does not exist even in earth and so on, will conflict with what [he himself] accepts.⁴

[The Mādhyamika] may reply that there is no fault [in his position] because he accepts that the Tathāgata taught that conventionally, the six elements are the person.

[If so, we respond that] it is not the case that there is no fault [in the Mādhyamika's position], because it is accepted that [that statement] is taught as ultimate reality.

[The Mādhyamika] may reply that since that is not established,⁵ [his alleged fault] is not [logically] possible.

[If so, we respond that] it is not the case that it is not established.
[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the elements, earth and so on, do indeed exist,
[Reason:] because their defining characteristics exist.
[Dissimilar Example:] Here that of which the Blessed One has said, "It does not exist in ultimate reality," has no defining characteristic, like a sky-flower.
[Application:] Earth and so on have the defining characteristics of solidity and so on.
[Conclusion:] Thus because their defining characteristics exist, the elements, earth and so on, do indeed exist.

Answer: As to that, here it is easy to show that the intrinsic nature of space is empty; and it is also easy to negate the remaining elements by showing that that [intrinsic nature of space] does not exist. Therefore, the ācārya [Nāgārjuna] says, with reference just to the element of space,

There is not any space prior to the defining characteristic of space. [MMK 5-1ab]

The idea is that [this is so] because they are inseparable (dbyer med pa, perhaps abhedya).

Here, since the Vaibhāsikas teach that space is just nonobstruction (anāvaraṇa), nonobstruction itself is space. But since [they attempt to] prove also that that [space] exists, that which is to be proved by the existence of nonobstruction and [the reason] which proves [it] are [both] not established. For instance, [as in the fallacious proof,] "Sound is impermanent because it is impermanent," likewise, here also it would be said [in effect] that space exists because it is space.

Alternatively, [one may explain MMK 5-1ab as follows:]

Objection: [Fellow Buddhists] who are averse to the doctrine (naya) of the Madhyamaka-sāstra say: [We] do not accept [any] difference of the thing characterized (laksya) and [its] defining characteristic (laksana), due to which [difference] that [space] would not be possible [either] sequentially or simultaneously [with
its defining characteristic]. For example, it is not [logically] possible that the great man (mahāpurusa) is different from the marks of the great man. Here [we] say that that is a characteristic because it is to be characterized, since a primary affix (bya ba'i rkyen, probably kṛt-pratyaya) is used in [the sense of] the direct object (karmān).

**Answer:** Even if those [i.e., the characteristic and the thing characterized] are accepted in that way, [nevertheless,]

There is not any space prior to the defining characteristic of space. [MMK 5-1ab]

If space itself is [its own] defining characteristic, to use (nye bar sbyor bar byed pa) [that] in order to establish that [space] by means of that [space] itself cannot be a [valid] reason, because the meaning [of that reason] is not established. Therefore what would establish what?

**Objection:** It is common knowledge that conventionally existent space is nonobstruction.

**Answer:** A reason is not required (isyate) in order to show that [well-known conventional existence of space].

**Objection:** Because [the existence of space] in ultimate reality is not common knowledge, one should strive to show [that it is] so.

**Answer:** Even in that [case], there are faults of the reason and example, [so that your syllogism] remains a mere assertion.

Alternatively, [one may also explain MMK 5-1ab as follows:]

**Objection:** The Vaibhāṣikas and Vaiśeṣikas say: Space exists as a substance (dravya) and is unconditioned.

**Answer:** To them, [Nāgārjuna] says,

There is not any space prior to the defining characteristic of space. [MMK 5-1ab]

[This half-verse] sets forth the thesis, [understood as referring to space] which is a substance. [The fact] that that [space] is unorigi-
nated, which is common knowledge to both sides [the Mādhyaṃika and the opponent], is the [proving] property. The example, a hare’s horn and so on, [is indicated] by virtue of that [property to be proved and proving property]. Here the inference is:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, space does not exist as a substance,
[Reason:] because it is unoriginated,
[Example:] like a hare's horn.

Likewise, reasons such as "because it has no cause," "because it has no result," "because it does not exist," etc., should also be stated.

**Objection:** Space is the defining characteristic of sound.
**Answer:** For those [who hold that position], also, since sound itself is space, the fault in the reason is as before.

**Objection:** If this meaning [which you have explained] were the intention of the author of the treatise [Nāgārjuna], in that case, the author of the treatise would simply have said that

There is not any space which is different from the defining characteristic of space.

**Answer:** [Nāgārjuna] establishes the negation of difference just by showing that priority and posteriority are not possible. Therefore that [objection of yours] does not contradict [my explanation].

**Objection:** The Vaiśeṣikas assert that the thing characterized and [its] defining characteristic are different.
**Answer:**

[Thesis:] If those two [i. e., the thing characterized and its defining characteristic] are different, they will also sometimes be antecedent and subsequent,
[Reason:] because they are different,
[Example:] like a jar and a cloth.

Therefore [Nāgārjuna] says,

If [space] were prior to [its] defining characteristic, it would
follow that it would be without a defining characteristic. [MMK 5-1cd]

"Without a defining characteristic" (mtshan nyid med pa, alaksāṇa) [means] "having no defining characteristic" (mtshan nyid yod pa ma yin pa, perhaps asal-laksāṇa or avidyamānalaksāṇa). The meaning is that that [space] would not be something characterized [by the defining characteristic, nonobstruction, as] alleged [by the opponent].

If [space] were prior to [its] defining characteristic: [MMK 5-1c]

This [pāda] indicates that difference of time is the [proving] property of that [subject, space]. Here the inference is:
[Thesis:] Space is not something characterized by [its] alleged defining characteristic,
[Reason:] because it exists at a time earlier than that [alleged defining characteristic],
[Example:] like [something] other that that [space].
Alternatively, [one may explain MMK 5-1cd as follows:]22

It would follow that [space] would not belong to [its alleged] defining characteristic (alaksāṇa). [MMK 5-1d]

"Not belonging to the defining characteristic" (mtshan nyid la med pa, perhaps laksāṇasya nāsti) [is the sense of] alaksāṇa. The meaning is that that [space] would not have [the property of] being something characterized (lakṣyatva).

If [space] were prior to [its] defining characteristic: [MMK 5-1c]

[Here] "space" is the topic under discussion (skabs). This [pāda] indicates that the difference of the defining characteristic from the
thing characterized is the [proving] property of that [subject, the defining characteristic]. Here the inference is:

[Thesis:] The alleged defining characteristic cannot characterize the thing characterized, space,

[Reason:] because it is different [from space],
[Example:] like [a defining characteristic] different from that [alleged defining characteristic].

[If the thing characterized and its defining characteristic are different,] it contradicts the opponent's own inference, [since] he does not maintain that the defining characteristic does not belong to the thing characterized and the defining characteristic. Therefore the conceptual construction of difference should also be abandoned.

Objection: Because they cannot be turned back [even] with a stick, [our opponents say:] If [we] state a reason pertaining to superficial reality (sāmyṛta-hetu), it is not the case that the meaning of [our] reason is not established; but it is difficult to avoid [its] having a contradictory meaning. Therefore it is not established that a defining characteristic is a different thing (artha) [from the thing that it characterizes] or that it is a nondifferent thing. Hence space is [an entity] "without a defining characteristic" (alaksana).

Answer: It is also unintelligible that that [space] is an entity without a defining characteristic. For,

There is not any entity anywhere without a defining characteristic. [MMK 5-2ab]

An ultimately real entity [without a defining characteristic] is not established anywhere, [for] the position of others or [for] our own position.

Objection: [Thesis:] The thing characterized, space, does indeed exist, [Reason:] because a defining characteristic applies to that.

Answer: Specifying that that is also not [logically] possible, [Nāgārjuna says,]
If an entity without a defining characteristic does not exist, to what does the defining characteristic apply \((kramatām)\)? [MMK 5-2cd]

Since there is no basis \((gzhī)\) [to which the defining characteristic might apply], the [opponent's] reason, like [that] basis, is not established. [That is,] the reason, [the defining characteristic's] applying [to the thing characterized], is not established for a non-existent object \((viśaya)\). Therefore there will be the fault that the meaning of the reason is not established.

Alternatively, [one may explain MMK 5-2cd as follows:] In the case of nondifference, [that is,] if the thing characterized and the defining characteristic are nondifferent, that [thing] itself cannot characterize that [very thing]. Because a defining characteristic different from that [space] does not exist, space has no defining characteristic.

Also, in the case [where the thing characterized and the defining characteristic] are different,

[Thesis:] The alleged defining characteristic is not the defining characteristic of the thing characterized,

[Reason:] because it is different [from that thing],

[Example:] like [a defining characteristic] different from that [alleged defining characteristic].

Since a defining characteristic does not exist, by that [argument] also, space has no defining characteristic. If an entity without a defining characteristic, called "space," does not exist, to what will the defining characteristic apply? The meaning is that it is just not established that that [defining characteristic] applies [to anything].

Moreover, the meaning of that reason [of yours], "[because the defining characteristic] applies to the thing characterized," [is the following:] Here the thing characterized is known by means of that necessary connection \((med na mi 'byung ba, avinābhāva)\) of this defining characteristic with the properties, existence and so on, of the thing characterized. But when, for our position,
A defining characteristic does not apply \((pravṛtti)\) to [a thing] which has no defining characteristic nor to one which does have a defining characteristic. [MMK 5-3ab]

then the idea is that [this is so] because a defining characteristic is not established for a nonexistent [thing which has no defining characteristic] and because an entity which has a defining characteristic is also not established.

A thing characterized which is different in kind \((vilakṣaṇa)\) from the sort which has been described\(^{29}\) is also not established. Therefore,

[A defining characteristic] also does not apply to something other than [a thing] which has a defining characteristic and [a thing] which has no defining characteristic. [MMK 5-3cd]

Therefore in that way, the meaning of what you maintain is not established in ultimate reality, because it is not established that a defining characteristic applies to a contradictory \((viruddha)\) entity, and because there is no example.\(^{30}\)

Alternatively, [one may explain MMK 5-3 as follows:] Because that defining characteristic does not exist in [things] without a defining characteristic, such as sky-flowers, etc., it does not apply [to them]. That [fact] is common knowledge.

Now, [as for] "nor to one which has a defining characteristic" [MMK 5-3b2], that initial mention \((skabs, \text{ probably } prastāva)\) of [the idea] that a defining characteristic does not apply to [a thing] which has a defining characteristic, sets forth the thesis. The [proving] property of that [defining characteristic] is that it is a defining characteristic of [a thing] "which has a defining characteristic" if it is [already] characterized by some defining characteristic. By virtue of that [property to be proved and proving property], the example is defining characteristics other than that [alleged defining characteristic]. Here the inference is:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, nonobstruction is not the defining
characteristic of space,

[Reason:] because it is a defining characteristic,

[Example:] like solidity and so on.

*Objection:* Those who have a twofold doctrine say: A defining characteristic applies to [a thing] which [both] has a defining characteristic and does not have a defining characteristic, according to the mode (*rnam grangs las*, probably *parāyaṇa*). Therefore there is no fault [in our position].

*Answer:* In order to refute that [position] also, [Nāgārjuna] says,

[A defining characteristic] also does not apply to something other than [a thing] which has a defining characteristic and [a thing] which has no defining characteristic. [MMK 5-3cd]

That, too, is not [logically] possible [1] because an entity which has the nature of both is not possible and [2] because relational determination (*bltos pa’i nges pa*) will also be negated below in chapter [ten], "Examination of Fire and Fuel," and [3] because the two faults shown in both cases [separately] will come about. [Buddhapālita’s commentary:] [Buddhapālita] says:

A defining characteristic does not apply to [a thing] which has no defining characteristic. [MMK 5-3a,b1]

Here, because in that way there is not any entity without a defining characteristic, therefore if an entity without a defining characteristic does not exist, it is not possible that a defining characteristic applies to a nonexistent basis (*gzhi med pa*).

Nor to one which has a defining characteristic. [MMK 5-3b2]

Here also, it is not possible that a defining characteristic applies to an entity which has a defining characteristic, either, because it is unnecessary (*nisprāyojana*).
[Bhāvaviveka's critique:] That is not [logically] possible, [1] because if a defining characteristic exists, it is not possible that it does not exist in [that thing] which possesses it and [2] because the thing characterized likewise exists.\(^3\) Also, in [the case of] an established entity which possesses a defining characteristic, it is not contradictory to apply the defining characteristic to the thing characterized in order to remind the opponent.\(^3\) Therefore that [explanation of Buddhāpālīta's] is not able [to establish that the defining characteristic and the thing characterized have no intrinsic nature].\(^3\)

Therefore, since in that way it is not possible that the defining characteristic applies to the thing characterized,

If the defining characteristic does not apply [to it], the thing characterized is not possible. [MMK 5-4ab]

[Thus Nāgārjuna] concludes [his refutation of the opponent's initial syllogism]\(^3\) by virtue of the meaning which has been shown.

**Objection:** Here some who have the conceit of hoping to be learned\(^4\) [and] who cannot bear to reflect upon\(^4\) the faults of their own position [as] stated [by the Mādhyamika] say: When [we] said that space exists because [its] defining characteristic exists, you imputed priority and posteriority to the thing characterized and [its] defining characteristic [in MMK 5-1] and said that the meaning of [our] reason is not established. [That] is like the [following] example: To [someone] who says that sound is impermanent because it is made, [someone else] replies, "If the fact of being made (byas pa nyid, krtatva) exists before sound has originated, [then] since sound has a variable connection (vyabhicāra) [with the fact of being made], [that fact] cannot be a reason [which proves a thesis about sound]. But if the fact of being made does not exist before sound has originated and exists later, then the meaning of the reason is not established [because there is an interval when sound does not have the property of being made]."

[The opponent continues:] That statement of that [latter
person] is not based on valid reasoning (*rigs pa dang ma ldan pa*, probably *ayuktimat*), because it states a specious nonestablishment [of the first speaker's reason] (*ma grub pa litar snang ba, probably asiddhy-ābhāsa*). Likewise, you wish to criticize [our] stated reason ["because its defining characteristic exists"] by saying,

There is not any space prior to the defining characteristic of space, etc., [MMK 5-1ab, etc.]

[but as in our example,] that statement [of yours] negating an existent defining characteristic is also not well said.

*Answer:* The defining characteristic is also included in the thing characterized, due to [its] particular property (*viśesa*) of being the same or different, etc.; but in ultimate reality, [we] have rejected the ultimately real existence of those āyatanas, [which are] the thing characterized. Therefore if the thing characterized is not possible, [its] defining characteristic is also not possible. [Thus we] make no effort in order to negate that [reason of yours, "because its defining characteristic exists"].

Listen also to that which [you yourself] have said, "Having imputed priority and posteriority to the thing characterized and [its] defining characteristic," etc. [We] have indicated a negation of difference [of the thing characterized and its defining characteristic] precisely (*eva*) by showing that [their] priority and posteriority are not possible. Therefore it is not the case that the nonestablishment [of your reason, "because its defining characteristic exists,"] is specious.

*Objection:* That [property] which is different [from the property to be established] but is related [to it] by the defining characteristic of necessary connection, is the reason. Therefore [your] statement that the meaning of [our] reason ["because its defining characteristic exists"] is not established because [the defining characteristic] is different [from the thing characterized], is also a specious nonestablishment.

*Answer:* That is not good, because in ultimate reality, [both]
difference and relation by the defining characteristic of necessary connection are not established [and] therefore [we] wish to get rid of attachment to them, also. That reason (sādhanā) [i.e., that nonobstruction is the defining characteristic of space] shows an entity which belongs to conventional truth; therefore it is in accord with convention [but not ultimate reality].

Enough of [this] digression (zhār la bshad pa, probably praśāṅga)!

**Objection:**

**Thesis:** In ultimate reality, space does indeed exist,

**Reason:** because it is a defining characteristic.

**Dissimilar Example:** Here whatever does not exist is not considered to be a defining characteristic, as a sky-flower [is not].

**Application:** Space is a defining characteristic, because [in a sūtra] it is said, "Great king, these six elements are the person."

**Conclusion:** Therefore that [space] does indeed exist.

**Answer:** Because it has been shown that the thing characterized is not possible, therefore,

If the thing characterized is not possible, [its] defining characteristic also does not exist. [MMK 5-4cd]

The idea is that [this is so] [1] because the defining characteristic is also included in the thing characterized [and] therefore it is likewise unestablished, and [2] because there is also no example. Because the thing characterized and [its] defining characteristic are not possible if they are investigated in that way with discernment, therefore the author of [this] treatise [Nāgārjuna] sums up [by saying],

Therefore the thing characterized does not exist, [and its] defining characteristic does not exist at all. [MMK 5-5ab]

The idea is that [this is so] because there is no inference
showing that [existence] and because there is an inference showing that that does not exist.

Objection: The Vaibhāsikas say:
[Thesis:] Space is an entity,53
[Reason:] because [the yogin] abandons desire which wishes (chanda-rāga) for that object (visāya) [when he leaves the meditative sphere of the infinity of space (ākāśa-anantya-āyatana) and enters the meditative sphere of the infinity of cognition (vijñāna)],
[Example:] like matter [desire for which is abandoned when one enters the meditative sphere of the infinity of space].54

Alternatively, [space is an entity,]
[Reason:] because it is the object (ālambana) of a meditational attainment,55
[Example:] like cognition and so on.

Alternatively, [space is an entity],
[Reason:] because it is unconditioned,
[Example:] like nirvāṇa.

Answer: Here if [you] maintain that that space is an entity in ultimate reality, it must be [either] a thing characterized or a defining characteristic; [but we] have shown previously how those [i. e.,] the thing characterized and [its] defining characteristic, are not possible. Therefore, because for our position,

Apart from something characterized and [its] defining characteristic, an entity also does not exist, [MMK 5-5cd]

therefore without showing an example, there is no establishment of [the property] to be proved. [There is no example of an entity] because it is not established that nirvāṇa or anything else is an entity.

Objection: Those who belong to other schools (nikāya-antarīyāh) say:
[Thesis:] Space does indeed exist,
[First Reason:] because it is the boundary (yongs su chad pa, pariccheda) of matter and
[Second Reason:] because it is unconditioned.

Answer: This [half-verse]\textsuperscript{56} has also answered [those] proofs (sādhana) by [showing their] faults. One should also state that the meaning of [each of those] reasons is not established.

Objection: The Sautrāntikas\textsuperscript{57} say: Space is not an entity. Then what [is it]? For us, that [space] is the mere absence of a substance which possesses resistance (saprātigha-dravya-abhāvamātra).

Answer: Those [reasons given by the Vaibhāṣikas], "because it is the object of a meditational attainment" and "because [the yogin] abandons desire which wishes for that object," exclude [space's having] the intrinsic nature of a nonentity (abhāva). Nevertheless, [Nāgārjuna] wished to state a very clear negation in order to negate those conceptual constructions about space [by] those [Sautrāntikas]; [and he] explained that same [point in a previous verse]:

Matter is not apprehended apart from the cause of matter.
[MMK 4-1ab]

Since that [fact that matter is not an entity]\textsuperscript{58} has been shown, therefore,

If an entity (bhāva) does not exist, of what will there be an absence (abhāva)? [MMK 5-6ab]

If an entity called "matter which possesses resistance" does not exist, of what will there be that absence which you have designated as "space"? Since there is no inference which shows that [absence], that meaning is not established.

Alternatively, one may examine [the meaning of MMK 5-6ab]\textsuperscript{59} differently:

Objection:\textsuperscript{60} [We] have not been able to show that point (artha), [namely,] that space is an entity.\textsuperscript{61} You have said that since
Apart from something characterized and [its] defining characteristic, an entity also does not exist, [MMK 5-5cd]

[therefore] there is no example; and [you have said that] even if an example had been established, [the property] to be proved and the proving [property] would indeed not be established. Therefore we will establish that same [point with the following syllogism]:

[Thesis:] Matter and so on do indeed possess existence (bhāva) [as entities],

[Reason:] because their nonexistence (med pa, perhaps nāstitva) exists in relation (bltos pas, probably apekṣayā) [to their existence].

[Similar Example:] Here that which exists has a [corresponding] absence (abhāva) in relation [to it], like the nonexistence of flavor (ro nyid, rasatva) in [some] matter.

[Dissimilar Example:] That which does not exist has no absence in relation [to it], as [one does not speak of the nonexistence of flavor]62 in a horse’s horn.

[The Vaibhāṣika continues:] Nor is the meaning of [our] reason unestablished, for you have said more than once that the aggregates, dhātus, and āyatanas do not exist as [the intrinsic nature of] the aggregates and so on. Therefore because their nonexistence exists in relation [to their existence], [their] existence (bhāva) [as entities] does indeed exist.

Answer: We have simply made a negation of the existence of entities such as matter and so on; but we have not shown that they do not exist.64 Therefore if an entity called "matter" does not exist, what will be without flavor? Since that [existence of an absence in relation to an existent entity]65 does not exist, [your] example is not established. Therefore the meaning which [you] maintain is not established.

Objection:66

[Thesis:] Entities and nonentities do indeed exist,
[Reason:] because their cognizer67 exists.
[Similar Example:] Here that which has a cognizer exists, for ex-
ample, dharmatā ("dharmaness," the way the dharmas are). 68

Answer: That cognizer of entities and nonentities, whom the opponent's fancy (yid la bsam pa, probably manoratha) constructs, must also be [either] an entity or a nonentity. Since the negation of both of those has also been shown, it is not established that their cognizer exists.

If [you] suppose that there is some other cognizer, different in kind from an entity or a nonentity, that also is not possible. Therefore [Nāgārjuna] says,

Who that is different in kind (vidharman) from an entity or a nonentity knows entities and nonentities? [MMK 5-6cd]

The meaning of the sentence is that that [sort of cognizer] simply does not exist.

Objection: One who is different in kind from an entity or a nonentity [and] cognizes them [does indeed] exist, [as] supposed by the proponents of the modal point of view. 69 Therefore there is no fault [in our position].

Answer: That is not [logically] possible. [Nāgārjuna's] idea is that [this is so] [1] because two incompatible (mi mthun pa) natures are not possible in one thing and [2] because relativity (btos pa) is not possible [in this case] 70 and [3] because there is no inference which shows that.

Because if one investigates in that way, space cannot bear logical analysis, 71

Therefore space is not an entity, not a nonentity, not a thing characterized,

Nor a defining characteristic. [MMK 5-7ab,c1]

[Thus Nāgārjuna] has summed up by virtue of having refuted the criticisms, [that is,] the proofs 72 which have been stated by opponents, [purporting] to show that [space] is an entity, etc.
[Those] which are the other five elements are also the same as space. [MMK 5-7c2,d]

The meaning of "element" (dhātu) is the meaning of "mine" ('byung khungs, ākara).73 Like a gold mine, space and the rest are also mines of suffering (duḥkha), unhappiness (daurmanasya), and so on.

Alternatively, the meaning of "element" (dhātu) is the meaning of bearing (dhārana) [its] specific characteristic (svalaksana) without effort.74 "The five" [are] earth, water, fire, air, and cognition. [They are called] "other" [or "latter"] (apara) because they are to be negated after space.75 "[Those] which [are the other five elements] are also the same as space" means "those which are the other five elements are also to be negated in the same way as space."

Previously, the negation of space was shown by [the verses] beginning from

There is not any space prior to the defining characteristic of space, [MMK 5-1ab]

up to

Therefore space is not an entity, not a nonentity, not a thing characterized,
Nor a defining characteristic. [MMK 5-7ab,c1]

Likewise, here also one should state in full [the negation of the other elements] beginning from

There is not any earth, etc., prior to the defining characteristic of earth, etc.,

up to
Therefore earth, etc., are not entities, not nonentities, not things characterized, 
Nor defining characteristics.

Because those which are the other five elements, earth and so on, also have the same negation as space, one should show that [they] are similar.76

The teaching in the Blessed One's discourses (pravacana) that those elements exist in that way, has expounded those [elements]. Through [the Buddha's] compassion (anukampā) for persons to be converted, [what is] common knowledge conventionally (vyavahāra-prasiddha) is included in conventional truth (vyavahāra-satya);77 but in ultimate reality, the elements do not exist. Because the elements exist [conventionally], there is no conflict with what [we ourselves] accept; but neither are the āyatanas established.78

Objection: Again, some79 say: Because you have nihilistically negated (apavādita) all entities in ultimate reality, [you] have [just] repeated the false view (mithyā-drṣṭi)80 which takes the form (tshul can) of nihilistically negating all entities. With a counterfeit discourse of the Blessed One, [you] have made a proof of what the Lokāyatas maintain. Therefore since this is not the Blessed One's word, it should be abandoned.

Answer: As to that, here the opponents are like those who have an eye disease resulting from an imbalance of the humors81 [and who try to] remove unreal hairs, flies, mosquitoes, and so on. For when we stated [our] negation of the existence of the āyatanas, we only made a negation of [their] having intrinsic nature; but [we] did not say that they are nonentities.82 As it is said in the [Lankā-vatāra]-sūtra,83

As long as there is the domain (gocara) of the mind (citta), there will also be the two extremes of existence and nonexistence.

When [its] domain has ceased, the mind also ceases com-
And likewise,
One who has not fallen into [a belief in] entities, does not make any dharma into a nonentity by means of a nonentity.
Likewise, the ācārya [Nāgārjuna] himself has also said elsewhere,\textsuperscript{84}

This is a negation of existence; it is not an embracing \textit{(pari-graha)} of nonexistence,
Just as when one says, "It is not black," one does not express, "It is white."\textsuperscript{85}

Therefore both those kinds [of views, existence and nonexistence,] are indeed bad views \textit{(kudrśti)}, because they are an obstacle to the wise one who desires the bliss \textit{(sukha)} of the quiescence of all conceptual proliferation. How [are they an obstacle]? Here [suppose that] in ultimate reality, the realms of desire, form, and formlessness \textit{(kāma-rūpa-ārūpya-avacara)}, the supramundane, and the wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral \textit{(kuśala-akuśala-avyāktra)}, [all] had the intrinsic nature of coming into existence \textit{(ātma-lābha)} in that way in which they are conventionally designated. Therefore,

[\textbf{Thesis:}] Effort for the sake of producing and not producing wholesome and unwholesome dharmas [respectively] would just be pointless,
[\textbf{Reason:}] because they exist [already],
[\textbf{Example:}] like a jar and a cloth which [already] exist.

Therefore those who are happy would have [their] particular happiness undiminished, and those who are suffering would also have [their] particular suffering undiminished. Like pictures painted on a wall, living beings' particular ages \textit{(vayas)}, sizes, and postures \textit{(īrṇā-patha)} would not increase or decrease.

But if the three realms [of desire, form, and formlessness], the supramundane, and the wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral
were nonexistent [by] intrinsic nature,\textsuperscript{86} in that case also,  
[Thesis:] Effort for the sake of producing and not producing  
wholesome and unwholesome dharmas [respectively] would  
just be pointless,  
[Reason:] because they do not exist,  
[Example:] just as effort for the sake of sharpening a hare's horn  
is pointless.  
Therefore conventional activity would be destroyed (chad par 'gyur).  
Therefore this [following verse] is stated. Those whose intellec-  
tual eye is impaired by the eye disease of bad views, [that is,]  
The weak-minded (alpa-buddhi) who see the existence and  
nonexistence of entities,  
Do not see the tranquil quiescence of the visible. [MMK 5-8]  
The meaning is that just as one with an eye disease, whose  
sense organ is impaired, sees unreal double moons, etc., [so also]  
the weak-minded who see the existence and nonexistence of entities  
do not see the tranquil quiescence of the visible. [That quiescence  
of the visible] is the very subtle ultimate truth, the domain of the  
eye of noble discernment (ārya-prajñā).  
[It is called] "the quiescence of the visible" because here all  
identifying marks (nimitta) of the visible do not appear. [It is  
called] "tranquil" because it is free from all harm. As it is said in  
a sūtra,\textsuperscript{87}  
[When] some [view] establishes the existence of some [entity]  
by means of causal conditions, there will be nonexistence.\textsuperscript{88}  
[That] bad view, the doctrine of origination, teaches exist-  
tence and nonexistence.  
That wise one whose intellectual eye is faultless because [he or  
she] possesses the eye ointment of the vision and meditative culti-  
vation of emptiness,\textsuperscript{89} [whose] intellectual eye has fully opened,
sees the true state of entities. As the Blessed One said [in the Ārya-Lan kāvatāra-sūtra], 90

When one sees the world as neither existent nor non-existent nor [both] existent and non-existent, then the mind turns back (vyāvartate); and one comprehends absence of self (nairātmya). [Lan kāvatāra 3-22 = 10-476]

Likewise, as it is said [in the Kāśyapa-parivarta of the Ārya-mahā-ratna-kūta-sūtra], 91

Kāśyapa, this [view,] "It exists," is one extreme. This [view,] "It does not exist," is also one extreme.

As to that, here the meaning of the chapter [is as follows:] By stating the faults of that reason, "because [their] defining characteristics exist," which was adduced [by the opponent] to show that the elements, earth and so on, exist, [we] have shown that the elements are without intrinsic nature.

Therefore [scriptural] statements such as the following are established: 92 [From the Ārya-brahma-višeṣa-cintā-paripṛcchā-sūtra?,] 93

That which is the internal earth-element (ādhyaṭmika-prthivi-dhātu) and that which is the external (bāhya) earth-element have a nondual meaning (advaya-artha). By means of discernment and wisdom, the Tathāgata has fully and perfectly realized (abhīsa~buddha) that that also is nondual, is not divisible into two (gnyis su dbyer med pa), and has a single defining characteristic (ekalaksana), namely, no defining characteristic (alaksana). 94

Likewise, [from the Ārya-Maṇjuśrī-vikrīḍita-sūtra,] 95

[Maṇjuśrī said,] "Girl, how should one see the elements (dhātu)?"

The girl said, "Maṇjuśrī, [they should be seen] like this, for example: When the three worlds have been consumed by [fire at the end of] the kalpa, there is not even ash [left behind]." 96

Likewise, 97

One should not be attached (abhini-vis) to that which is
formless, invisible, and baseless, which does not appear and is not made known (avijnaptika).  

Likewise, [from the Bhagavati-prajñā-pāramitā-suṣvīkrānta-vikrāmi-sūtra,]99  
Śāradvātiputra, all dharmas have the defining characteristic of nonattachment (asaṅga-lakṣaṇa). That which is the defining characteristic of some dharma is a noncharacteristic (alakṣaṇa) of that [dharma]. Therefore no dharma serves (pratyupasthīti) for the production (abhīnīrtti) of a defining characteristic.

Likewise, [from the Ārya-brahma-viṣeṣa-cintā-paripṛcchā-sūtra,]100

I taught the aggregates to the world, [and] the world came to dwell on them.  
One who is wise does not dwell on them and is not soiled by worldly dharmas.  
The world has the defining characteristic of space, and space has no defining characteristic.  
Therefore that [wise one], comprehending that, is not soiled by worldly dharmas.

Likewise, [from the Bhagavati-prajñā-pāramitā-suṣvīkrānta-vikrāmi-sūtra,]101  
Śāradvātiputra, [the fact] that all dharmas have no defining characteristic and no perfection (pariniṣpatti) is called "nonattachment."

The fifth chapter, "Examination of the Elements," of the Prajñāpradīpa, a commentary on [Nāgarjuna's] Mūlamadhyamaka composed by ācārya Bhavyakara/Bhavyakāra (legs ldan byed)102 [is concluded].

Notes to Translation of Chapter Five

1In this chapter, "element" translates dhātu, in the sense of the six dhātus, earth, water, fire, air, space (ākāśa), and cognition (vijñāna). In other words, the six dhātus are the four mahābhūtas plus space and cognition. I have also trans-
lated bhūta/mahābhūta in chapter four as "element;" but hopefully this will not cause confusion. On the various senses of the term dhātu, see May (1959), p. 97 n. 222 and Edgerton (1953), pp. 282-4.

2Avalokitavrata explains, "Emptiness is [our] own position. The counterposition to that is the opponent's position, namely, the doctrine (vāda) that the āyatanas and so on do exist by intrinsic nature." The particular form of that counterposition to be refuted in this chapter is the view that the elements exist because their defining characteristics exist. See Ava P69b-8 to 70a-2, D61b4,5.

3On the scriptural sources of this quotation, see LVP AK I, p. 49 n. 2. Majjhima-nikāya III, p. 239, has bhikkhu for mahārāja. Candrakirti gives a Sanskrit version with mahārāja (PSP 129.3,4). Later, Avalokitavrata tells us that the "great king" being addressed is the Buddha's father, Śuddhodana. See Ava P94a-5, D84a-3.

4abhyupagama-bādha. That is, it will conflict with the Buddha's teaching, which Nāgārjuna, as a Buddhist, must accept. See Ava P70b-1,2; D62a-4,5.

5That is, as far as the Mādhyamika is concerned, it is not established that that teaching refers to ultimate reality. Thus the fault alleged by the opponent does not exist. See Ava P70b-5,6; D62b-1,2.

6nam mkha'i ngo bo nyid stong pa nyid kyis bstan sla ba'i phyir, more literally, "because it is easy to show the intrinsic nature of space as being empty (śūnyatāyā or śūnyatvena)." Here, of course, Bhāvaviveka is speaking of the fact that space is (ontologically) empty of intrinsic nature. He is not referring to the physical emptiness of what is commonly called "empty space."

7In fact, the Vaibhāsikas make a distinction between space as one of the three unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) dharmas and space as one of the six dhātus. The former is defined as anāvaraṇa or anāvṛtti (AK 1-5d); the latter is considered to be the visible space between objects, a combination of light and shadow (AK 1-28ab). The Sautrāntikas, on the other hand, make no such distinction. For them, space is simply the absence of anything tangible (spraṣṭavya-abhāvamātra). See LVP AK I, p. 50 n. 1 and LVP AK II, p. 279.

8The Vaibhāsikas have attempted to show in their preceding syllogism that the six dhātus exist because their defining characteristics exist. For instance, space exists because its defining characteristic, nonobstruction, exists. But the elements are identical with their defining characteristics (see AK 1-12cd). Thus the Vaibhāsikas' reason is no different from their thesis. See Ava P71a-5 to 71b-1, D62b-6 to 63a-3.

9See Ava P71b-2,3; D63a-4.

10mthon par bya ba yin pas mshan nyid, perhaps lakṣyata iti lakṣanam.

11See note 94 to the translation of chapter three. Once again, the kri-pratyaya in question is lyyu (-ana).

The opponent rejects the view that lakṣāna refers to the instrument (karana) of the activity of characterizing, while lakṣya refers to the object (karman) of the action. For him, lakṣāna also refers to the object and thus is identical with lakṣya. See Ava P71b-5 to 72a-4, D63a-6 to 63b-5.

12de dag gi de ltar khas blangs pa nyid la yang, perhaps tayor evam
Since the reason and the thesis are identical, does the reason establish the thesis or vice versa?

If the opponent seeks to prove that space exists in ultimate reality, his appeal to convention is contradictory (since a conventionally valid reason cannot prove a positive thesis about ultimate reality). Also, there is no example for the ultimately real existence of space, since no entity exists in ultimate reality. See Ava P73a-2,3,4; D64b-1,2,3.


Avalokitavrata identifies the opponent here as a Sāṃkhya. The Sāṃkhya hold that ākāśa (usually translated "ether" in this context also) arises from the "subtle essence" (tanmātra) of sound; and thus ākāśa is the defining characteristic of sound. See Ava P73b-7,8; D65a-6. For the Sāṃkhya account of ether and sound, see Sinha (1952), pp. 19-20; Frauwallner (1973), Vol. I, pp. 279-80; and Larson and Bhattacharya (1987), pp. 50-3.

For the Vaiśeṣikas, the ether (ākāśa) is the substrate, and thus a cause, of sound. See Sinha (1956), pp. 371-4; Frauwallner (1973), Vol. II, pp. 147-8; and Potter (1977), pp. 90-1, 161-2.

That is, since sound and space, its defining characteristic, are identical, the reason becomes the same as the thesis. See Ava P73b-8 to 74a-2, D65a-6,7.

According to Avalokitavrata, the opponents here are "Vaiśeṣika commentators." See Ava P74a-3, D65b-1,2.

In other words, if Bhāvaviveka's interpretation were correct, MMK 5-1ab should have anyad ākāśalaksanāt instead of pūrvam ākāśalaksanāt.

For the Vaiśeṣikas, substance (dravya) and quality (guna) are distinct categories (padārtha). The qualities of a substance (including its defining characteristic) inhere in that substance but are not identical with it. See Sinha (1956), p. 317; Frauwallner (1973), Vol. II, pp. 141, 152-3; and Potter (1977), pp. 49, 84.

See Ava P75a-2,3; D66a-6,7. "Alleged" translates smra bar 'dod pa, probably vivaksita.

Avalokitavrata points out that Bhāvaviveka's first explanation of MMK 5-1d leads to a negation of the thing characterized; his second explanation leads to a negation of the defining characteristic. See Ava P75b-7,8; D67a-3,4.

The Vaiśeṣika, according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P76a-1, D67a-5.

Avalokitavrata glosses this as "the defining characteristic does not belong to the thing characterized, and the thing characterized does not belong to the defining characteristic." See Ava P76a-1 to 4, D67a-4 to 7. Of course, as far as the Tibetan is concerned, ... la med pa could also be translated as "does not exist in," as well as "does not belong to."

Like a refractory ox who cannot be turned back with a stick, the opponent may refuse to concede defeat and shamelessly assert that space exists without a defining characteristic. See Ava P76a-6 to 76b-1, D67b-1 to 4.
Conventionally, space does have a defining characteristic; but that fact cannot be used to prove the thesis in the opponent's initial syllogism, that space exists in ultimate reality.

See Ava P76b-2,3,4; D67b-5,6.

Avalokitavrata identifies the opponents here as "Vaišešikas, etc." See Ava P76b-4, D67b-6,7.

That is, a thing characterized which neither has nor does not have a defining characteristic. See Ava P78a-3,4; D69a-4,5.

The opponent maintains that a thing characterized, such as space, exists because a defining characteristic applies to it. ("The meaning of what you maintain" translates khyod kyi 'dod pa'i don, literally, "your desired meaning.") A "contradictory entity" is one which neither has nor does not have a defining characteristic. Since it has been shown that a defining characteristic does not apply to a thing which has one, a thing which does not have one, or a thing which neither has nor does not have one, there is no example of something to which a defining characteristic applies. See Ava P78a-6,7; D69a-6,7.

"nam pa gnyis su smra ba dag," identified by Avalokitavrata as 'os pa pa dag, ārhatāḥ, that is, the Jains. See Ava P79a-1, D70a-1 (P has 'os pa pa dag). On the Jains' ānekāntavāda, see, e. g., Sinha (1952), pp. 197-208; Frauwallner (1973), Vol. II, pp. 199-200; and Sharma (1960), pp. 49-54.

An entity with two mutually incompatible natures, like a bird which is half dead and half alive, is not seen in the world. Therefore an entity which both has and does not have a defining characteristic is not possible. See Ava P79a-5,6; D70a-4,5.

The opponent replies that the example of a bird which is half dead and half alive [reminiscent of Schrödinger's cat!] is not applicable. Rather it is like the fact that a man is a son in relation to his father and a father in relation to his son. In reply, Avalokitavrata quotes MMK 10-8:

If fire is dependent on fuel and if fuel is dependent on fire,

Which of the two is established first, in dependence on which there would be fire and fuel?

See Ava P79a-6 to 79b-3, D70a-5 to 70b-2.

That is, to say that a thing both has and does not have a defining characteristic is to incur the faults which have been shown for each alternative separately.

In Bhāvaviveka's first explanation, MMK 5-3cd refers to an entity which neither has nor does not have a defining characteristic. In his second explanation, it refers to an entity which both has and does not have a defining characteristic.


Here Bhāvaviveka criticizes Buddhapālita's commentary on MMK 5-3a,b1 on the grounds that he tacitly assumes that the laksya exists while negating the laksya. See Ava P79b-8 to 80a-4, D70b-6 to 71a-2.

In fact, Nāgārjuna's own method in chapter five is to reject the ultimately real existence of the laksya in the first three and a half verses and then to negate the
Given his use of simple negation and the prasanga method, it does not seem that he must affirm the existence of the laksana while arguing against the laksya; and the same is true for Buddhapālita.

37Here Bhāvaviveka is criticizing Buddhapālita's commentary on MMK 5-3b2. One can say, "This is the defining characteristic of this thing," in order to remind someone who has forgotten that fact. See Ava P80a-4 to 8, D71a-2 to 5.

38It is not clear that this is the sense of "application" (pravṛtta) that Nāgārjuna and Buddhapālita have in mind. They seem to be thinking of a logically necessary relationship between the defining characteristic and the thing characterized, rather than of the use of words to communicate a fact.

39See Ava P80a-8, D71a-5.

40Avalokitavrata describes these opponents as Buddhists and others who falsely consider themselves learned in the science of logic (rīgs pa'i bstan bcos, nyāya/yuktī-sāstra). See Ava P80b-6,7,8; D71b-3,4.

41brnag pa. See Dass (1902), s. v.

42See Ava P81b-3,4; D72a-7 to 72b-1.

43Avalokitavrata remarks that in superficial reality, the defining characteristic's particular property of being neither the same as nor different from the thing characterized includes it in the thing characterized. See Ava P81b-6,7; D72b-2,3.

44See Ava P81b-8; D72b-4.

45Avalokitavrata says that Bhāvaviveka's arguments are not comparable to the opponent's example. In the argument, "sound is impermanent because it is made," the words, "because it is made," produce a cognition that sound is impermanent; but the fact that sound is impermanent exists before the reason is uttered. Thus it is incorrect to argue that the reason is not established. On the other hand, Bhāvaviveka argues that the thing characterized and its defining characteristic cannot be different by showing that they cannot exist at different times. See Ava P82a-3 to 82b-5, D72b-6 to 73a-7.

46The opponents are those who say that the thing characterized and its defining characteristic are different. See Ava P82b-6, D73b-1.

47The reason (e. g., "being made," ) must invariably be accompanied by the property to be established (e. g., "being impermanent"). The reverse need not be true.

48In his commentary on MMK 5-2cd, Bhāvaviveka gave the following syllogism: The alleged defining characteristic is not the defining characteristic of the thing characterized, because it is different [from that thing], like [a defining characteristic] different from that [alleged defining characteristic]. See Ava P82b-6 to 83a-3, D73b-1 to 5. See also Bhāvaviveka's second syllogism following MMK 5-1cd.

49See Ava P83b-1,2; D74a-3. This probably refers again to the opponent's initial syllogism in this chapter.

50The Mādhyamikas do not reject the necessary connection of the thing characterized and its defining characteristic on the level of superficial reality, because to do so would contradict perception. See Ava P83a-6,7; D73b-7 to 74a-1 and
P83b-1,2; D74a-3,4.
51See note 3.
52The opponent cannot cite a similar example, that is something which exists (in ultimate reality) and is a defining characteristic. See Ava P84b-2,3,4; D75a-2,3.
53The Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya on AK 2-55cd contains a long debate between the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas as to whether the three unconditioned dharmas, especially nirvāṇa, are entities (bhāva) or nonentities (abhaeva). See LVP AK II, pp. 278-87. See also the sources translated in La Vallée Poussin (1930).
54See Ava P85a-3 to 7, D75b-2 to 5. For a discussion of the four formless (ārūpya) meditative spheres, see LVP AK VIII, pp. 133-44 and LVP AK III, p. 21 n. 1. See also Avalokitavrata's long and interesting discussion in Ava P86a-3 to 87b-6, D76b-3 to 78a-2.
55On this term, see LVP AK VIII, p. 182 n. 4 and Edgerton (1953), pp. 569-70. The samāpatti referred to is again the sphere of the infinity of space, while the example refers to the sphere of the infinity of cognition. Strictly speaking, space and cognition are the objects not of the samāpattis named after them, but of the preparatory exercises for those samāpattis; see AK 8-4ab,c1.
56MMK 5-5cd, according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P88a-4, D78a-6,7.
57See note 53. I have generally translated the terms bhāva and abhāva as "entity" and "nonentity," respectively. Some contexts, however, require translations like "presence" and "absence" or "existence" and "nonexistence." Thus in the following discussion, abhāva has sometimes been translated as "nonentity" and sometimes as "absence;" and once, bhāva has been translated as "existence." (Note that in still other contexts, bhāva may mean "nature.")
58See Ava P89a-4,5; P79a-6.
59See Ava P89a-8 to 89b-1, D78b-2,3.
60According to Avalokitavrata, the opponent here is a Vaibhāṣika. See Ava P89b-3, D79b-4. This identification seems justified by the fact that the opponent here alludes to the arguments advanced earlier by the Vaibhāṣikas. The syllogism which follows, however, is reminiscent of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position. On the latter, see Sinha (1956), pp. 346-53; Frauwaller (1973), Vol. II, pp. 110-1; Sharma (1960), pp. 182-3; and Potter (1977), pp. 53, 110, 141-6.
61This refers to the Vaibhāṣika's three syllogisms following MMK 5-5ab. See Ava P89b-3,4,5; D79b-4,5.
62See Ava P90a-4,5; D80a-4,5.
63See Ava P90b-3, D80b-3.
64Avalokitavrata points out that the negation of bhāva is a simple negation, not an implicative negation. See Ava P90b-8 to 91a-1, D80b-7 to 81a-1.
65See Ava P91a-2, D81a-1,2.
66Avalokitavrata attributes this objection to both the Sautrāntikas and the Vaibhāṣikas. See Ava P91a-4, D81a-3. In fact, while the Sautrāntikas do hold that both bhāvas and abhāvas can be objects of cognition, the Vaibhāṣikas argue that only a bhāva can be an object of cognition. See LVP AK V, p. 62.
67One would usually translate shes pa as "cognition" (jñāna, etc.); but given
kaḥ in MMK 5-6d and given Avalokitavrata's subcommentary, it seems to mean "cognizer" (shes pa po; jñātṛ, etc.) here.

As the Buddha, the cognizer of dharmatā, exists, so the yogin who cognizes entities and nonentities exists. See Ava P91a-5,6; D81a-4,5.

69 'tīnam grangs kyi tshul smra ba dag, paryāya-naya-vādinah. On the Jaina doctrine of the modes (paryāya) of a thing and the different points of view (naya) from which it can be considered, see the references in note 31. See also Ames (1995), nn. 82 and 83.

Ava P92a-1,2 and 6 identify the opponents as here as 'os pa pa dag, ārhatāḥ; Ava D81b-7 and 82a-4 have 'ug pa pa dag, aulūkyāḥ, i.e., the Vaiśeṣikas. Since the view described here seems clearly to be that of the Jains, 'os pa pa dag must be the right reading.

Avalokitavrata explains that although a man may be a son in relation to his father and a father in relation to his son, he cannot be said to be alive in relation to death and dead in relation to life. That is, he must be either alive or dead. Likewise, he cannot be an entity from one point of view and a nonentity from another. See Ava P92a-1 to 8, D81b-7 to 82a-6.

Avalokitavrata says the those proofs themselves are also criticisms against the Mādhyamika. See Ava P92b-5,6,7; D82b-3,4.

One might be inclined to translate "criticisms [and] proofs;" but Avalokitavrata says the those proofs themselves are also criticisms against the Mādhyamika. See Ava P92b-5,6,7; D82b-3,4.

AviP93a-6 to 93b-2, 083a-3 to 6.

AviP94a-3 to 94a-5, 084a-1,2.

AviP94a-8 to 94b-3, 084a-5,6,7.

Avalokitavrata identifies the opponents as "some of our fellow Buddhists, Samghabhadra and so on." See Ava P95a-4,5; D85a-2. Presumably, this refers to the Vaibhāṣika master Samghabhadra who wrote a rebuttal to Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośabhāṣya. See, e.g., LVP AK I, "Introduction," pp. xxii-xxiii.
Parts of Samghabhadra's work are translated in La Vallée Poussin (1930), (1931-2), and (1936-7).

80 See AK 5-7 and LVP AK V, p. 18.

81 *skyon cha ma mnyam pa,* probably *dosa- viṣama.* Avalokitavrata glosses this as "an imbalance of the three *doṣas* of wind, bile, and phlegm;" see Ava P95a-8, D85a-5.

82 Avalokitavrata explains that the Madhyamika negates the existence of the *āyatanas* in ultimate reality by means of a simple negation, not an implicative negation. Thus his negation does not entail the affirmation that the *āyatanas* are non-entities. Hence the Madhyamaka-*sāstra* is free from the two extremes of the views of permanence and annihilation. See Ava P95b-7, D85b-2,3.

83 Avalokitavrata does not identify the source of this and the following quotation. See Ava P95b-7 to 96a-1, D85b-3,4,5. The Sanskrit text of the *Laṅkāvatāra* verse is found in Nanjio (1923), p. 147.

84 Identified by Avalokitavrata as "the *sāstra* called Lokapariṣṭā composed by Ācārya Nāgārjuna himself." See Ava P96a-2,3; D85b-6. Only this single verse of this lost work of Nāgārjuna's is known to modern scholarship; see Lindtner (1982), p. 14 n. 27. (Christian Lindtner has informed me that the same verse is quoted, with a variant, in the *Tarkajvālā* on Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā 4-58.)

85 Avalokitavrata explains that the verse illustrates simple negation. See Ava P96a-3,4; D85b-7 to 86a-1.

86 *ngo bo nyid med pa yin par gyur na.* One might translate this as "if they were without intrinsic nature," but that translation seems wrong in this context. Also, Avalokitavrata has the gloss *kun rdzob tu tshul gang gis tha snyad gdags pa tsam gyi tshul der yang med pa yin par gyur na'o,* "if they were nonexistent even in that way in which they are mere conventional designations in superficial reality." See Ava P97b-1, D87a-4.

87 Avalokitavrata comments on this verse, but he does not identify its source. See P98a-6 to 98b-1, D88a-1 to 4.

88 When the existent thing has ceased, there will be nonexistence. See Ava, loc. cit.

89 A reference to the path of vision or seeing (*darśana-mārga*) and the path of cultivation (*bhāvanā-mārga*). In the Mahāyāna, these paths coincide with the *bodhisattva-bhūmis.* Avalokitavrata explains that the vision of emptiness is the "non-seeing" of the existence and nonexistence of entities, which takes place when one comprehends supremely profound dependent origination, which is free from the extremes of permanence and annihilation. See Ava P98b-2 to 5, D88a-5,6,7.

90 Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P98b-5, D88a-7. The Sanskrit text is found in Nanjio (1923), pp. 152-3 and pp. 324-5.

91 Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P98b-8, D88b-2. The Sanskrit text is found in von Staël-Holstein (1926), p. 90.

92 See note 149 to the translation of chapter three. Avalokitavrata's remarks are similar here. See Ava: (1) P99a-4,5, D88b-5,6; (2) P99a-7, D89a-1; (3) P99b-1,2, D89a-3; (4) P99b-3,4, D89a-5; (5) P99b-7,8, D89b-1,2; (6) P100a-2,3, D89b-4; and (7) P100a-8 to 100b-1, to D90a-1,2,3.
93 Identified by Avalokitavratā; see Ava P99a-5, D88a-7. The same passage was quoted by Bhāvaviveka toward the end of chapter three. I have not been able to locate this passage in the Sde dge bka' 'gyur edition of the sūtra.

94 See note 151 to the translation of chapter three.

95 Identified by Avalokitavratā; see Ava P99a-8, D89a-2. The same passage was quoted by Bhāvaviveka toward the end of chapter three. See note 152 to the translation of chapter three. The quotation here differs from that in chapter three in having bskal pas for chapter three's bskal pa'i mes.

96 See note 153 to the translation of chapter three.

97 Identified by Avalokitavratā only as being "from other sūtrāntas." See Ava P99b-1,2; D89a-4. The passage is very similar to a sentence which occurs three times in the Kāśyapa-parivarta; see von Staël-Holstein (1926), pp. 86-7, 90 (related sentence, p. 144).

98 Avalokitavratā explains the last two phrases by saying that it does not appear as an object [of the six senses] and that it cannot be grasped by the cognition of the eye, etc. The referent is paramārtha-satya. See Ava P99b4,5,6; D89a-5,6,7.

99 Identified by Avalokitavratā only as Bhagavatī-prajñā-pāramitā-sūtra; see Ava P99b-6, D89a-7 to 89b-1. The Sanskrit text is found in Hikata (1958), p. 61.

100 Identified by Avalokitavratā; see Ava P99b-8 to 100a-1, D89b-2. The same two verses were quoted by Bhāvaviveka toward the end of chapter four. The first two pādās of the first verse are found in the Sde dge bka' 'gyur, Mdo sde Ba 36b-3 (with a slightly different Tibetan translation). For the third pāda, compare byang chub sems dpa' mkhas pa der] on 36b-4. The second verse is found on 37a-1,2, with a rather different third pāda: de dag de yi 'gro rig nas]. Avalokitavratā remarks that the first two pādās of the second verse also occur in the Ārya-sarva-buddha-visaya-avatāra-jñāna-āloka-alamkāra-sūtra. See Ava P100a-4, D89b-5,6.

101 Identified by Avalokitavratā only as "that same Bhagavatī-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra." See Ava P100a-5,6; D89b-7. The Sanskrit is found in Hikata (1958), p. 62.

102 See note 159 to my translation of chapter three.
Sanskrit Text of MMK, Chapters Three, Four, and Five, according to PSP as emended by J. W. de Jong (1978) and further emended by Akira Saito (1985)

Chapter Three

darśanam śravaṇam ghrāṇam rasanam sparśanam manah
dindriyāni sad eteṣāṁ drāṣṭavyādīṁ gocarāḥ

1

svam ātmānaṁ darśanam hi tat tam eva na paśyati
na paśyati yad ātmānaṁ katham draksyati tat parān

2

na paryāpto 'gniḍrṣtāṇto darśanasya prasiddhaye
sadarśanaḥ sa pratyukto gamyamāṇaṁgamatāgataiḥ

3

nāpaśyāmāṇaṁ bhavati yadā kim cana darśanam
darśanam paśyatīty evam katham etat tu yujyate

4

paśyati darśanam naiva naiva paśyaty adarśanam
vyākhyāto darśanenaiva draṣṭā cāpy avagamyatāṁ

5

draṣṭā nāsty atirakrṣṛtya tirakrṣṛtya ca darśanam
drāṣṭavyaṁ darśanam caiva draṣṭary asati te kutaḥ

6

pratītya mātāpitarau yathoktah putrasambhavah
cakṣurūpe pratītyaiṁ ukto vijñānasambhavah

7

drāṣṭavyadarśanābhāvād vijñānādicitustayam
nāṣṭty upādānādīṁ bhaviṣyanti punaḥ katham

8

vyākhyātam śravaṇam ghrāṇam rasanam sparśanam manah
darśanenaiva jānīyāc chroṭrṣrotavvyakādi ca

9
Chapter Four

rūpakārānanirūmuktaṁ na rūpam upalabhyate
rūpenāpi na nirmuktam drṣyate rūpakāraṇam

rūpakārānanirūmukte rūpe rūpam prasajyate
āhetukam na cāsty arthaḥ kaścid āhetukah kvacit

rūpena tu vinirmuktam yadi syād rūpakāraṇam
akāryakam kāraṇam syān nāsty akāryam ca kāraṇam

rūpe saty eva rūpasya kāraṇam nopapadyate
rūpe 'saty eva rūpasya kāraṇam nopapadyate

niskārānam punā rūpam naiva naivopapadyate
tasmād rūpagatān kāṃścīn na vikalpān vikalpayet

na kāraṇasya sadṛṣam kāryam ity upapadyate
na kāraṇasyāsadrṣam kāryam ity upapadyate

vedanācittasamjñānāṁ samskārānāṁ ca sarvasaḥ
sarvesam eva bhāvānāṁ rūpenāiva samāḥ kramāḥ

vigrāhe yaḥ parīhāraṁ kṛte śūnyatayā vadet
sarvam tasyāpariharatam samāṁ sādhyena jāyate

vyākhyaṇe ya upālambham kṛte śūnyatayā vadet
sarvam tasyānupālabdham samāṁ sādhyena jāyate

Chapter Five

nākāṣaṁ vidyate kimcīt pūrvar ākāśalaksanāt
alakṣaṇām prasajyeta syāt pūrvar yadi laksanāt

alakṣaṇo na kaścīc ca bhāvāḥ sarṇvidyate kvacit
asaty alaksane bhave kramatam kuha lakshanaṃ

nālaksane lakṣanasya pravṛttir na salaksane
salaksanālakṣanābhhyām nāpy anyatra pravartate

lakṣanāsampravṛttau ca na lakṣyam upapadyate
lakṣasyānupapattau ca lakṣanasyāpy asaṃbhavah

tasmān na vidyate lakṣyam lakṣanam naiva vidyate
lakṣyalakṣaṇanirnukto naiva bhāvo 'pi vidyate

avidyamāne bhave ca kasyābhāvo bhavisyati
bhāvabhāvavidharmā ca bhāvābhāvāv avaiti kaḥ

tasmān na bhāvo nābhāvo na lakṣyam nāpi lakṣaṇam
ākāśam ākāśasamā dhātavaḥ pañca ye 'pare

astitvam ye tu paśyanti nāstitvam cālpabuddhayah
bhāvānām te na paśyanti draṣṭavyopāsamaṃ śivam
## Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English</th>
<th>Tibetan</th>
<th>Sanskrit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>about to originate</td>
<td>skye bar 'dod pa</td>
<td>utpitsu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>absence of self</td>
<td>bdag med pa nyid</td>
<td>nairāmeya</td>
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<tr>
<td>action</td>
<td>las</td>
<td>karman</td>
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<tr>
<td>activity</td>
<td>bya ba</td>
<td>kriiyā</td>
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<tr>
<td>aeon</td>
<td>bskal pa</td>
<td>kalpa</td>
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<tr>
<td>agent</td>
<td>byed pa po</td>
<td>karṛt</td>
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<tr>
<td>affliction</td>
<td>nyon mongs pa</td>
<td>klesā</td>
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<td>afflictive</td>
<td>kun nas nyon mongs pa</td>
<td>samklesā</td>
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<td>aggregate</td>
<td>nyon mongs pa can</td>
<td>kliṣṭa</td>
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<td>appropriation</td>
<td>'phung po</td>
<td>skandha</td>
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<td>appropriator</td>
<td>nye bar len pa</td>
<td>upādāna</td>
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<tr>
<td>assertion</td>
<td>nye bar blang ba</td>
<td>upādāṭr</td>
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<td>attachment</td>
<td>dam bcas pa</td>
<td>pratijñā</td>
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<td>attention</td>
<td>mngon par zhen pa</td>
<td>abhiniveśa</td>
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<td>basis</td>
<td>yid la byed pa</td>
<td>manasikāra</td>
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<tr>
<td>(a) being</td>
<td>gzhi</td>
<td>āśraya, etc.</td>
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<td>Blessed One</td>
<td>sems can</td>
<td>sattva</td>
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<tr>
<td>causal condition, condition</td>
<td>bcom ldan 'das</td>
<td>bhagavan</td>
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<tr>
<td>cause</td>
<td>rkyen</td>
<td>pratyaya</td>
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<tr>
<td>cause of maturation</td>
<td>rgyu</td>
<td>hetu</td>
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<td>cognition</td>
<td>rgyu</td>
<td>kāraṇa</td>
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<tr>
<td>coming into existence</td>
<td>rnam par smin pa'i rgyu</td>
<td>vipāka-hetu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>blo</td>
<td>buddhi</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>rnam par shes pa</td>
<td>vijñāna</td>
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<td></td>
<td>shes pa</td>
<td>jñāna</td>
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<td>bdag nyid thob pa</td>
<td>ātma-lābha</td>
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common knowledge  grags pa  prasiddhi, prasiddha
case conceptual construction  rnam par rtog pa vikalpa
conceptual proliferation  rtog pa  kalpanā
case conceptual con-  spros pa prapañća
struction
case concomitance  lhan cig nyid, sahabhāva
case conditioned lhan cig gi dngos po samśkṛta
conditioned factor  'dus byas samśkāra
conflict  'du byed bādha
confusion  gti mug moha
confusion conjoined cause  mtshung par ldan pa'i samprayukta-
argument
conditioned factor  shes pa yod pa nyid caitanya
conditioned 'du byed vyavahāra
conflict conditioned samprayukta-
'du byed hetu
case conventional
conviction  gnod pa samprayukta-
activity  rgyu caitanya
conditioned conflict  sahabhāva
conflict thasnyad vyavahāra-satya
case thasnyad du vyavahāra-\nconviction  snyad kyi bden pa rataḥ
conviction  thasnyad du śraddhā
dad pa
conviction  gal ba 'khrul pa med pa viruddha-
counterbalanced counterexample,  mthun pa'i phyogs avyabhicārin
dissimilar case,  vipakṣa
set of all such;  thasnyad du
counterbalanced craving  sred pa trśnā
criticism  sun dbyung ba duṣṭanā
defective vision  rab rib timira
defining  mtshan nyid laksāṇa
definition
characteristic
dependent designation  brten nas gdags pa  upādāya pra-jñapti
dependent origination  rten cing brel par 'byung ba  pratitya-samutpāda
desire  'dod chags  rāga
direct object  'dod pa  kāma
disadvantage  las  karman
discernment  nyes dmigs  ādīnava
doctrine  shes rab  prajñā
domain  tshul  naya
dominant causal condition  mdzad pa'i mtha'  kṛtānta
element  grub pa'i mtha'  siddhānta
(to) emanate  spyod yul  gocara
established  bdag po'i rkyen  adhipati/ādhipateya-
emancipation  'byung ba  pratyayatī
entity  khams  bhūta
establishing what  sprul pa  dhātu
is [already]  byang grol  nir-mā
established  dngos po  apavarga
fact of having  vastu  bhāva
this as a causal condition  grub pa  siddha
feeling  grub pa la sgrub pa  siddha-sādhana
fellow Buddhist  rkyen 'di dang ldan pa  idampratyayatā
(fore literally, "coreligionist")  nyid  vedanā
founders of non-Buddhist sects  tshor ba  svayūthya
futile rejoinder  rang gi sde pa  tīrthakara
ltag chod  jāti
hatred
higher realms
identifying mark
immediately
preceeding causal condition
implicative
negation
imputation
in superficial reality
in ultimate reality
inconclusive
inference
inherent nature
instrument
internal
intrinsic nature
invariable
locus
logical mark
[logically]
possible
manifestation
material
matter
matter dependent on the elements
meditation
meditational attainment

dveṣa
svarga
nimitta
(sam)anantara-pratyaya
paryudāsā-pratiṣedha
samārāpa
samvṛtyā
paramārthataḥ
anaikāntika
anumāna
svarūpa
karaṇa
ādhyātmika
svabhāva
svabhāva
avyabhicārin
āśraya
liṅga
yukta
vyakti
rūpin
rūpa
bhautika-rūpa
dhyāna
samāpatti
meditative concentration
(meditative concentration
meditative cultivation
meditative sphere
cultivation
mental factor
mental formation
mere assertion
merit
mind
moral conduct
necessary connection
negation
neutral
nihilistic negation
noble
nonconceptual
wisdom
noncondition
nonobstructing cause
object
object, object to be grasped [by a subject]
object of cognition
object of correct knowledge
ting nge 'dzin
mnyam par bzhag pa
bsgom pa
skye mched
sems las byung ba
'du byed
(as fourth aggregate)
dam bcas pa tsam
bsod nams
sems
yid
tshul khrims
med na mi 'byung ba
dgag pa
lung du ma bstan pa
skur pa 'debs pa
'phags pa
rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye shes
rkyen ma yin pa
byed pa'i rgyu
yul
gzung ba
dmigs pa
gzhal bya
samādhi
samāhita
bhāvanā
āyatana
caitta
samskāra
pratiṣṭhā-mātra
punya
citta
manas
śīla
avinābhāva
pratiṣedha
avyākṛta
apavāda
ārya
nirvikalpaka-jñāna
apratyaya
kārana-hetu
viśāya
grāhya
ārāmabhaṇa, ālambana
prameya
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English</th>
<th>Sanskrit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>object of knowledge</td>
<td>jñeya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>one who desires</td>
<td>rakta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>one who hates</td>
<td>dvīśta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>original meaning</td>
<td>prakṛta-artha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>point under discussion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>overextension</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>perception-conception</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>perfection</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>person</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>position</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>positive concomitance</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>potentiality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>previous position</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>primary matter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>primordial matter, original nature</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>property of the subject [which proves the thesis]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>property to be proved</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>proving property</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>question raised in objection</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>reason</td>
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<td>rjes su 'gro ba</td>
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<td>nus pa</td>
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<tr>
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<td>rigs pa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sun dbyung ba</td>
<td></td>
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<td>'bras bu</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>'bras bu</td>
<td></td>
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<td>srid pa</td>
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<td>reasoning</td>
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<td>refutation</td>
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<td>result</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>saṃsāric existence</td>
<td></td>
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scripture
lungr
gsung rab
secondary matter
rgyur byas pa'i gzugs
ddag pa mi mthun pa
dbang po
self-contradiction
tha dad pa
sense organ
set of all similar examples
mthun pa'i phyogs
separate
skal pa mnyam pa'i rgyu
similar cause
chos mthun pa'i dpe
similar example
simple negation
med par dgag pa
simultaneously arisen cause
lhan cig 'byung ba'i rgyu
specific
so sor nges pa
specification
nges par gzung ba
specious
ltar snang ba
spirit
skyes bu
spiritually immature
byis pa
state of existence
'gro ba
student
slob ma
subject [of a thesis]
chos can
subsequent reasoning
rtog ge phyi ma
reasoning
rdzas
substance, real
superficial
rdzas
reality
kun rdzob
superficial truth
kun rdzob kyi bden pa
superficially real
kun rdzob pa
supramundane
syllogism
system
thesis
thing
characterized
tranquil
trace
treatise
true state
ultimate reality
ultimate truth
ultimately real
unconditioned
undesired
consequence
universal cause
unreal
unwholesome
valid means of
knowledge
virtue
visible form
wholesome
wisdom

'jig rten las 'das pa
sbyor ba'i tshig
gzhung lugs
dam bcas pa
mtshan nyid kyi gzhi
lokottara
prayoga-vākya
mata, samaya
pratijñā
laksya
śīva
vāsanā
śāstra
yāthātathya (?)
paramārtha
pāramārthika
asamskrta
prasaṅga
sarvatraga-hetu
abhūta
akusala
pramāṇa
dhārma
ruṇa
kusala
jñāna
Bibliographical Abbreviations


Akutobhayā In Dbu ma Tsa: D vol. 1; P vol. 95.

Ava Avalokitavrata's *Prajñāpradīpikā*. Chapters one and two in Dbu ma Wa: D vol. 4; P vol. 96. Chapters three through sixteen (part) in Dbu ma Zha: D vol. 5; P vol. 97; Chapters sixteen (part) through twenty-seven in Dbu ma Za: D vol. 6; P vol. 97. Text numbers: Peking no. 5259; Derge no. 3859.


C Co ne edition of *bstan 'gyur*, Dbu ma Tsha. Published on microfiche by the Institute for the Advanced Study of World Religions, Stony Brook, New York, 1974. ("C" without further specification refers to PP C.)


LVP AK *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu*, tr. Louis de La Vallée Poussin, 6 volumes, Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1923-31
Ames: Bhāvaviveka's Prajñāpradīpa

(reprinted 1971-2 as vol. 16 of Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques). (Roman numerals following "LVP AK" refer to chapter numbers, not volume numbers.)

MMK Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. Sanskrit in PSP. Tibetan in Dbu ma Tsa: D vol. 1; P vol. 95 and also in Akutobhayā, Ava, Bp, PP, and PSP.

N Snar thang edition of the bstan 'gyur, Dbu ma Tsha. Photocopy of the blockprint in the Royal Library, Copenhagen. ("N" without further specification refers to PP N.)


PP Bhāvaviveka's Prajñāpradīpa. In Dbu ma Tsha: D vol. 2; P vol. 95. Text numbers: Peking no. 5253; Derge no. 3853.

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Ames: Bhāvaviveka's Prajñāpradīpa

tional University. (Saito's edition and translation are paginated separately. References are to the edition unless otherwise indicated.)


The Tale of Mokuren:
A Translation of Mokuren-no-sōshi

Hank Glassman
(Stanford University)

Introduction

Mokuren no sōshi tells the story of Śākyamuni Buddha's disciple famous for his mastery of magical powers, Maudgalyāyana. The legend of Maudgalyāyana (Ch. Mulian, Jp. Mokuren) who, with the help of the Buddha and by virtue of offerings made to the community of monks, saved his dead mother from the fires of hell (or from the privations of life as a hungry ghost) is, of course, one familiar to all students of East Asian Buddhism. It is this tale that forms the narrative core of the most important festival of the ritual calendar and explains the mechanism of the transfer of merit for saving ancestors. The evolution of this legend, its literary development in China, and the history of the late summer Ghost Festival (Ch. Yülan pen, Jp. Ubabon) have been studied in detail by Stephen F. Teiser, so I refer the reader to his excellent work.¹

The festival was celebrated in Japan from quite an early date, merging with the indigenous tama matsuri, a late-summer 'All-Souls' Festival, in which the dead were welcomed back to dwell with the living for a few short days.² The earliest (reliable) recorded occurrence of the Buddhist festival in Japan was in 657. The Nihon shoki traces the celebration of the Ubabon Festival back into

¹ Stephen F. Teiser, The Ghost Festival in Medieval China (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 1988); also see David Johnson, ed., Ritual Opera, Operatic Ritual (Berkeley: Institute for East Asian Studies, 1989) for various perspectives on the place of Mulian opera narratives in Chinese funerary ritual (primarily that of contemporary Fujian [Fukien] and Taiwan); and also Alan Cole, Mothers and Sons in Chinese Buddhism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, forthcoming) on the place of the Mulian narrative in the creation in China of a specifically Buddhist conception of filial piety emphasizing the mother/son relationship.
the early seventh century. State sponsored observation of the ceremony was instituted by Emperor Shōmu in 735. The tenth-century Engi shiki refers to the festival numerous times, and it is also mentioned often in court diaries and 'women's writing' through the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The eleventh-century Eiga monogatari records Fujiwara no Michinaga's observation of the Urabon kō at Hōjōji, and the Genji monogatari also contains an allusion to the story of Mokuren saving his mother. The oldest extant appearance in Japan of the legend related in full can be found in the tenth-century Sanbō ekotoba. Later versions, based on the non-canonical Chinese popular renditions of the story, are included in two Japanese compendiums of Buddhist folk literature, the thirteenth-century Shijū hyaku innen shū and the fifteenth century Sankoku denki. We can surmise, from the antiquity of the practice of the festival and the wide distribution of references to it and its legend in written sources, that the narrative cycle associated with the festival was well known in every corner of Buddhist Japan by the time of the composition of Mokuren no sōshi in the fifteenth or sixteenth century.

Mokuren no sōshi is a work belonging to the very broadly defined genre known as Muromachi period short fiction. Many

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5 See the translation in Kamens, The Three Jewels, pp. 337-341.

6 Iwamoto, p.57, p. 63. These versions include the former name of Raboku 羅卜 (Ch. Lobu, "Turnip") for Mokuren and his mother's name Shōdai 清提 (Ch. Qingti). These names, absent in the canonical versions of the tale, show the influence of Chinese popular literature on these retellings. These names do not appear in Mokuren no sōshi.
texts like this one were used in performances at temple festivals or market days to entertain the gathered crowds as well as educate them regarding, for example, the origins of the temple, and also to cajole them into giving donations. This “vocal literature” of late medieval Japan is rich in Buddhist themes and remains largely unexplored in Western scholarship. Written almost entirely in the Japanese syllabary known as hiragana with hardly any Chinese characters, the text at hand bears little resemblance to the classical story of Mokuren and his mother as it appears in the sūtras and in Chinese popular literature. Much is missing; much is added.

Śākyamuni Buddha appears in Mokuren no sōshi only as a rather shadowy figure in the background, whereas in the usual version he takes an active role, guiding his disciple every step of the way. The festival of Urabon, or Obon as it is popularly known, is an occasion for people to make offerings to the assembly of monks who then transfer the merit generated thereby to save seven generations of ancestors. This event usually forms the denouement of the Mokuren story: Mokuren's mother was finally delivered from suffering when he followed the Buddha's instructions to present offerings to the saṅgha on the last day of the summer retreat. In our story, however, it is the power of the Lotus Sūtra that saves Mokuren's mother, and it is this woman herself, not the Buddha, who instructs Mokuren regarding the means of her salvation.

Perhaps the most striking difference is the detailed description

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8 The term "vocal literature" is Barbara Ruch’s; this literature was usually read aloud from a script and was thus not memorized like oral literature in the strict sense. See Barbara Ruch, "Medieval Jongleurs and the Making of a National Literature" in Japan in the Muromachi Age, ed., John W. Hall and Toyoda Takeshi (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).
of Mokuren's adolescence and his relationship with his mother. Throughout the text, long before the mother dies, the voice of the narrator is primarily concerned with describing the protagonist's experience of longing and his feelings arising from separation and loss. Unlike other versions of the tale, *Mokuren no sōshi* provides a picture of Mokuren before he became a disciple of the Buddha. The particulars of the story of the youth Mokuren and the deep affective bonds between him and his mother are familiar from Japanese popular hagiography. Also, the damning sin Mokuren's mother commits is transformed from one of deed to one of mind. While in the canonical version she is a greedy crone who deceives her son and withholds offerings from Buddhist mendicants, here she is a loving parent who more than anything desires happiness and success for her son. *Mokuren no sōshi* recasts Mokuren's mother as a deeply sympathetic character. Originally a hopelessly wicked and spiteful woman, in this retelling she becomes one who is guilty of that most understandable crime of *kokoro no yami*, excessive love for her child that blinds her judgment. 9

Another fascinating particularity of this version is its focus on Mokuren's robe. Indeed, it could be argued that the story is really about the robe itself. The discussion of Mokuren's precious robe, a keepsake of his mother, and how it came to be scorched by the fires of hell is unique to this text. The lore of the monastic robe is of course widespread in East Asian Buddhism. Here it becomes an ambiguous, if ultimately affirming, symbol of the bonds of family. The corpus of Muromachi period short fiction contains a great many examples of *jisha engi*, texts that explain the miraculous origins of shrines and temples and the deities, relics, or images they house. *Mokuren no sōshi* can be seen at one level as an *engi* text that explains how this wondrous robe, a relic that enables parents and children to be reunited after death, made its way to Japan.

The text closes with explanation of the robe's journey across Asia, and the story it tells can also be understood as the product of

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a similar journey of the imagination. The action of the narrative is explicitly set in ancient India, but the details of description belie a less remote milieu; allusions to Chinese and Japanese classical literature appear throughout. The great significance of the medieval Japanese text translated here lies in the variety and breadth of its influences. Mokuren no sōshi transforms the Urabon legend, woven in China from strands of Indian avādana and vinaya literature, into a story which inhabits the world of the Heian court, the literary and aesthetic places of the Japanese aristocracy of former centuries. Ancient northeast India is transformed into Heian Japan. The Buddhist mythological past becomes the Japanese cultural past.

Notes on the Text and Translation

The only extant copy of the text, dated 1531, is housed at the Tenri Library. A paper tag affixed to the back names an imperial prince, Fushimi no Miya Kunisuke (1513-1563), as the copyist. The prince would have been nineteen at the time the text was copied. While this is of little help in establishing the identity of the author, it does, if a correct attribution, show that the story was read, known, and circulated at the very highest levels of society.

As to the original author, Ichiko Teiji suggests that a great many of the short stories of the Muromachi period were written by Buddhist priests, who became the new intellectual elite after the waning of aristocratic institutions of higher learning. The close familiarity with Buddhist scripture and ritual and the several oblique

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10 So says Iwamoto Yutaka in "Mokuren no sōshi no haikei" in Bungaku vol. 44, no. 9 (1976), p. 88.
12 Ichiko Teiji, Mikan chūsei shōsetsu kaidai (Rakuryo sho, 1943), p. 231.
references to Buddhist scholarly discourse in *Mokuren no soshi* suggest that the author may well have been educated in a monastic setting, if not actually an ordained monk or nun. Any speculation about the profession, class, or identity of the author, however, remains precisely that.

I have relied on the critical edition of the text found in Iwamoto Yutaka, *Jigoku meguri no bungaku* (vol. 4 of *Bukkyō setsuwa kenkyū*, includes *Mokuren densetsu to Urabon*) (Kaimei shoten, 1979), pp. 81-133. I have mentioned Iwamoto where the notes in his edition inform the notes in this translation. I have also indicated the very few places where I disagree with his interpretation of the kana text. Chinese characters have been included in the notes only where they serve to clarify a point of language or are not readily available in standard dictionaries.

Buddhist names and terms remain in Japanese in the text of the translation, with Chinese or Sanskrit equivalents in the notes. This I have done to emphasize the Japanese flavor of the original text. There are however, three exceptions to this general rule: where Shakuson or Shakabutsu appears, I have rendered it as Śākyamuni; Anan, as Ānanda; and the title Rakan I have translated back into Arhat. I thank Prof. Susan Matisoff, Prof. Barbara Ruch, as well as the editor of this journal, Prof. Jan Nattier, for their guidance, encouragement, corrections and comments received in the preparation of this translation. My version also benefited from the comments of two anonymous reviewers. Any errors that remain should be considered my own.
The Tale of Mokuren

The karmic bond of love between parent and child is like no other. This tie cannot be broken, even if the two are separated. This is why the Buddha taught that we must perform ceremonies, offering food to parents and nurturing them in accord with filial piety. As the father of all the living beings in the triple world, Śākyamuni Buddha cares for each one as his own child. We should emulate the example of Prince Jōzō and Prince Jōgen who led their father King Myōshōgon away from his heretical beliefs. Yes, still today as in olden times, what love could be deeper than that shared by parent and child?

Long, long ago, there were sixteen great kingdoms in the land of India. Of all of these, the greatest by far were the four ruled by the beloved sons of King Shishikyō, the wheel-turning monarch. His four princes became King Jōbon, King Kokubon, King Hakubon, and King Kanrobon. The Great Sage Śākyamuni who dwells in his Pure Land on Spirit Mountain was the son of King Jōbon. The Venerable Ānanda, foremost in wisdom among the Buddha's disciples, was the son of King Hakubon. Mokuren, the most adept of all the disciples in the spiritual penetrations due to his insight into the truth of ultimate Emptiness, was the son of King Kanrobon.

Let us look into the circumstances of this Mokuren. Now, as a boy Mokuren was extraordinarily dear to his mother. She was queen of Kushinakoku and consort to King Kanrobon. She loved the boy so deeply that she never let him out of her palace, and in this manner his boyhood years went by. Meanwhile, for forty-two years, his father the King had daily provided one thousand Buddhist monks with various offerings and had them perform ceremonies. News of this traveled, and one day the King was approached by an Arhat sent from Śākyamuni Buddha. Śākyamuni had instructed the Arhat, "When the King asks you, 'Who in all the five regions of India is the most assiduous in Buddhist practice?', tell him, 'Their numbers are to be found in every house and home.'"

Hearing this the King replied, "But how can that be? Surely by virtue of my having thus diligently sponsored Buddhist ceremonies for these forty-two years, I must have accrued a great store of merit!" The Arhat answered, "You see, there are various and sundry Buddhist ceremonies and Dharma festivals, but none of these can surpass the merit produced by leaving one's home and taking the monastic vows. If but one child takes tonsure, seven generations of ancestors will be saved. The moment he arouses the mind of enlightenment, he will become a Buddha in his present body. There are no Buddhist ceremonies or offerings to monks that can approach the good roots generated by sending one's child into the monastic life. If this is so for one, how much greater the merit if several should renounce the world. The merit of this would be hard to measure even with the wisdom of the Buddhas..." Upon hearing this, the Queen exclaimed, "Oh, that I could be guided down that dark road of the hereafter by my only child, my beloved Prince!" The Arhat intoned, "This is auspicious, auspicious indeed! I shall return for the boy when he has reached the age of twelve," and he took his leave.

Springs drifted by; summers came and went. As the days and months slipped by unchecked, the boy turned twelve. When the Arhat appeared at the palace to announce to the Queen that he had come to fetch the Prince, all of the people there were speechless. They could not even manage to sigh, "So soon?" Oh, how painful the parting must have been! The mother and son who had never left one another, even for an instant, day or night, were now to be separated for the first time. It was such a poignant scene that everyone was terribly moved. Even the sleeves of the lowliest servants were darkened with tears.

The Queen knew that in this floating world all must part, none can remain together until the end. Still, she reassured herself that even after this parting she would certainly see him again. Her heart thus pulled to and fro, she left the room sobbing.

Never once, in all his twelve years, had the young Prince left the confines of the palace's jeweled curtains. Never once had he come out from behind his mother's screens. As difficult as it was
for him to leave, he worried that any show of emotion might weaken his mother's resolve. Drawing himself up like a full-grown man, he announced, "Although I shall be far away, in the end I will come back and show myself to you. Since it is my lot in life to follow the Buddhist path of practice, let it be a boon for the world to come!" Everyone admired his exceptional composure.

Hearing that he was about to be seen off, his mother came to the edge of her royal screens and said, "Please hear me, my Prince. Although the pain of parting is hard to bear, weakness of the heart will not do, especially for one undertaking Buddhist training. I, too, have now resigned myself to this separation. Pay close attention. Once you have gone with the Arhat, you must forget about the palace entirely. Throw your heart into your scholarship and accumulate merit through ascetic training. Become a monk; then come back and show yourself to me. Let me see you wearing the robe of liberation and the triple kesa. As it is said, to become a monk in name alone while remaining ignorant and illiterate is sin a most grave! If this is how you end up, never return to this palace again. But, if you apply yourself to your training and attain liberation, come back to the palace to visit your dear mother who will have missed you so. If however you fail, consider us mother and child no more! I say all of this that you may strengthen your ties to the Buddha's teaching." The depth of her maternal compassion as she sobbed her admonitions was moving indeed.

So the Prince went up to the temple deep in the mountain forests. He studied at the feet of the Arhat, diligently applying himself in his scholarship, not taking a moment's rest day or night. From the time he awoke in the morning until he went to sleep at night, he heard his mother's words in his ears. He thought, "To neglect my studies would be unfilial, and would cause trouble in this world and in the next." When the boy grew lonely for the palace, he prayed, "Oh, that I may speedily complete my studies and become a monk..." With such sentiments, he dutifully pursued his scholarship, applying himself equally in each and every subject, disliking none. The other boys there often took leave to go visit their mothers and fathers, and seeing this only made him miss
his mother more. The young Prince was so lonely for the palace! Soaking his sleeves with tears of solitude, he thought, "As in a clear and precious mirror, she is always reflected in my thoughts. . ." 20.

How many springs, how many autumns passed like this, as the days sped by too quickly to be counted! One day, the foothills of the surrounding mountains shrouded themselves in mist and the sky grew dark with unrelenting rains. Hearing the bells of the temple ringing out the hour, the Prince awakened to the truth of that line of scripture, "shogyō mujō -- all conditioned things are impermanent."21 Seeing the flowers that bloomed on the ridge behind the temple buffeted by the storms, he realized the despair of the line, "zesshō meppō -- as they arise, they must also perish." The smell of the plum blossoms suspended above the temple eaves reminded him of the cherry tree in front of the Southern Hall, his home at the palace. "It, too, must be in bloom by now." As a flock of wild geese flew overhead, he envied them their destination, knowing that they were returning to their native place.22 A visit from the chirping cuckoo, drawn from its nest by the light of the dawn moon seeping through the chinks in the dense forest canopy -- this too deepened his feelings of loneliness. It was heartbreaking to see him so distraught.

The Prince's emotions intensified as autumn descended upon him, the dew now mingling with his teardrops to dampen his sleeves. Crickets thronged about his pillow. A deer called plaintively in the evening fog, a fog undisturbed by travelers to his hermitage. All of this added to his melancholy. Without a single word from the palace the boy felt lonelier still, his only visitors from that direction being the gusts of wind whispering outside his door. He reassured himself, though, "So be it, my mother must have her reasons for this too . . ." He saw the autumn grasses and wildflowers blooming according to their season, and with a heart of deep compassion prayed, "The flowers, the trees, and all the things of the Buddha Field are living beings!23 May we all be enlightened and liberated together!" He sat awake on his bed through the silent nights. He rejoiced in the spotlessness of the light emanating from the moon
of innate enlightenment. He marveled at how the flowers and butterflies manage to take shape and to color themselves so brilliantly despite their ignorance of the conventions of painting. Hoping to repay his debt of gratitude to his mother and father, he stayed awake winter nights when leaves blew down in torrents from the frost-nipped crowns of the trees that towered on all sides. He sat up on those winter nights, and, gathering the moonlight reflected in the snow for light, gleaned wisdom from one text after another.

Whatever the reason -- perhaps it was only that he hoped to hasten the arrival of the day he would again see his mother -- Mokuren threw himself into his lessons with all his being. The Arhat was delighted beyond measure, thinking, "I have taught him but a little while, and already he has mastered a hundred thousand points of doctrine. He is able to discern the flavor of the deep and expansive Dharma when he studies the teachings. Indeed, the signless and non-grasping Dharma is different from the finger pointing at the moon! Oh, the incredible liberation he shall awaken to in the future!"

Meanwhile, with the passing of the years, the young Prince, all the while applying himself to his studies unremittingly, had turned fifteen. Autumn wore on and the surrounding mountains swathed themselves in colorful brocades. Seeing this, he thought of the hills of his distant home. Watching the sky, now cloudy, now clear, now rainy, he became deeply saddened at the misfortune of living in a changing and uncertain world. Just then, he heard a voice from the past. It was one of the palace servants. Feeling all the more nostalgic, the boy beckoned the servant to approach his seat. The Prince asked about everything. He wanted all the news of the palace and of his mother and pressed the servant for details. The man replied, "My Lady thinks only of you day and night, the image of your face continually before her eyes. She misses you terribly, lamenting, 'This is indeed the way of the floating world. If I were to die with such feelings of loneliness, surely I would go astray on the dark road of the hereafter. Ah, what to do?' She has been feeling out of sorts lately, and in the past two or three days has become quite ill. She is greatly troubled,
'Oh, if we were to call the prince to come back and he were to see me in such a state! It saddens me to think how painful it would be for him. And yet, I feel that only seeing him can cure my affliction.' With such words as these, she grows weaker day by day." Hearing this news from the servant, the Prince's heart became heavy, and he felt a pain in his breast. As it is often expressed in the holy scriptures: rōshō fujo -- "death can come at any age".29 While we have today, tomorrow is never certain. Our bodies are ephemeral like the dew, carried off with the first gust of wind. Even when the body is healthy, it is not to be depended upon. How much more so when it lies suffering in a sick bed. How lamentable!

The boy wanted more than anything to rush off and see his mother, but he remembered her admonition: "When you come back it will be as a monk . . ." He went to the Arhat to explain the circumstances. The Arhat replied, "All people, even those of the lower classes, must ask their parents' permission before renouncing the world. You must report to the palace before you can take tonsure." The Prince said, "My mother, the Queen, has been stricken with a grave illness. Moreover, she had me promise not to return until I had become a monk, so surely there can be no cause for hesitation." The Arhat assented, "Well, if that is the case. . ." and took him before the main image of the temple to perform the ordination ceremony.

Ruten sangai chū/ onnai funō dan/
 kion nyū mui/ shinjitsu hō'on ja

"In this revolving triple world,
there is no end of loving indebtedness to parents.
To cast away indebtedness and enter the unconditioned,
this is true filiality."30

The formula was chanted three times and then the youth took the five, the eight, and the ten great precepts, vowing to uphold them all. He then donned the triple kesa over his robe of liberation.31 Thus, accruing great merit, the Prince observed all the rites of the
ceremony in full: the administration of the precepts, the Dharma transmission, and the presentation of the robes and begging bowl. The Arhat then bestowed upon him his religious name, the Venerable Mokuren.

He directly took his leave of the Arhat with the words, "I must make haste to the palace!" Had Mokuren remained at the capital, as the prince of King Kanrobon, he would have had the honor of riding in a jeweled palanquin supplied with outriders to clear the way before him. Although he would have had this great good fortune, now the youth was one pursuing training in the Buddhist path. And so he traveled on foot, traversing the precipitous mountains along narrow paths obscured by fallen leaves, craggy cliffs towering on either side. He went striding through the tall grasses, never pausing to wring the dew from his drenched sleeves. He soon arrived at the palace, but things there seemed completely changed from when he had left but three years before. He was saddened to see everyone, high and low, looking so grief-stricken!

Mokuren asked himself apprehensively, "What could the matter be?" He summoned some people entering the Southern Hall and told them to announce to the Queen that Mokuren had arrived. They just burst into tears and could not answer him.

Finally composing herself, one of them replied, "The Queen had considered her affliction merely a passing thing. Thinking that it would be wrong to disturb you over such a trifling matter, she put off calling for you. Then, her condition worsened and she became gravely ill. She weakened progressively, finally departing this world just before dawn one morning, at the Hour of the Tiger.\(^{32}\) We really should have sent word to you at once, but the temple is so far away. We knew we must somehow inform you of the manner of her death and of our arrangements thereafter, but decided to wait until after the first week's memorial service, and quickly took her body away to the far-off funeral ground."\(^{33}\) Before he had even heard the end of this speech, Mokuren collapsed next to the jeweled curtains on the edge of the verandah and sobbed inconsolably, rolling around on the ground, now looking heavenward, now face down.
He had done just as his mother, the Queen, had instructed him, throwing himself body and soul into his studies. Gathering the reflected light of the snow around his bed on the cold and gloomy winter nights, he had piled up merit reading sutras. In the height of the hot and humid summer, he had captured fireflies to hang in his window for light. Mokuren had succeeded in becoming ordained very quickly indeed. Now at last, he had thought, he was to see his mother again. How he had longed to finally come before the mother he had pined for these three long years! How she must have missed him! He grieved, "Whom shall I gladden now with my presence? The way here was most arduous as I climbed the steep paths over the mountains on my long journey. But, knowing that it was all in order to see the Queen again, I persevered, hurrying along toward the palace. Now who will be my staff? What will sustain me as I make my way back to the temple through the dewy underbrush?" It was unbearable even to look at him as he lay on the ground lamenting his loss.

"Here is the robe she sewed with her own hands that the Prince might wear it upon his return."

Now, as this robe was presented, he understood the depth of his mother's love for him. Reflecting on his failure to fulfill the promise to show himself to her wearing the kesa of a monk, what remorse he must have felt. He said, "Let this robe stand as an offering for the repose of her soul. . ." He named it his "keepsake robe" and donned it right away.

He summoned a guide for the road, and, tearfully attempting to collect himself, set out for the funeral ground. As he saw his companion beckoning him to follow, Mokuren reflected that crossing a gloomy field like this in autumn would have inspired feelings of sadness even under ordinary circumstances -- how much more so now. The humming of insects crowded his mind. He could no more control the tears that rained down onto his sleeves than could he stop the irksome dew borne by the wind in the kudzu leaves as it flew into his bereaved face. He arrived at the grave site enveloped in the fragrance of the autumn flowers: bellflower, lemongrass, and the rest. Here then, in the middle of nowhere, in a place
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distinguished only by two or three pine trees, was his mother's final resting place. A grave marker had been erected there in the shade of the pines.  

Standing in this place, Mokuren's voice was choked by tears as he chanted sutras and performed incantations. He lamented, "To think how much sadder she would have been that day I left the palace if she had imagined it was to be our final parting... How pointless! Sorrow is not limited to those living in the world; the monk is not immune to sadness."

He then opened the coffin and, tears streaming down his face, he formed the Sanskrit character "A" on the chest of the deceased.  

Below this he wrote:

Shogyō mujō/ zesshō meppō/ shometsu metsui/ jakumetsu iraku.

"All conditioned things are impermanent/ as they arise, so must they perish/ stillness is the cessation of arising and perishing/ in quiet stillness there is joy."  

He then performed the transfer-of-merit and the proclamation-of-the-vow. He inscribed the wooden sotoba marker and set it up. The sotoba symbolizes the original vow of Dainichi Nyorai, giving form to that which is ungraspable in the triple world. The power of its merit is hard to fathom even with the wisdom of the Buddhas.

As he put the sotoba in place, the spot was protected from above by Bon-ō and Taishaku and from below by Emma and the Ten Kings. It was also protected by all the Buddhas of the triple world.

"I implore that the blessed spirit of the departed may attain enlightenment in this very body, due to the entry of a child into the monastic order...", he chanted as the transfer-of-merit. The grief of the farewell at the burial ground still filling his heart, he traveled back to the capital. There, he performed the memorial services for his mother. He observed all the rites, from the first-
seventh-day through the forty-ninth-day, and also the one-hundredth-day. He diligently carried out his filial duty, nurturing her spirit and repaying his debt to her, never slackening as he busily performed ceremony upon ceremony.

Mokuren continued in these endeavors even after he had returned to the temple. He erected halls and monuments dedicated to her memory and also chanted and copied sutra upon sutra, commentary upon commentary, all in her behalf. He set his heart single-mindedly on scholarship and pursued it with even greater fervor than before, with the wish, "Oh, that my mother could somehow see me from where she lies, beneath the grass of the Queen's Palace grounds..." Eventually coming to feel that not even the temple offered enough solitude, the Venerable One moved out into the deserted mountain forests. He lived on seeds and nuts and made his bed under trees and on top of rocks. There, he awakened to the truth of the signless Dharma.

Eventually, although not yet seventeen years old, he eclipsed his master, the Arhat, and became the abbot of the mountain training center. At twenty, he had surpassed the Five Hundred Arhats, and in his twenty-seventh year he entered the ranks of the Ten Great Disciples. Mokuren attended the sermons of the Buddha on Vulture Peak and obtained the wings of great wisdom and enlightenment. Dwelling in monasteries, he obtained the six spiritual penetrations. He became known as "Mokuren, foremost in the spiritual penetrations", as has been handed down to us in the Buddhist teachings.

When the Venerable One was thirty-seven years of age, he was performing ceremonies in his native city of Kushina. At that moment, purple clouds drifted into the palace while strains of music could be heard resounding in the heavens. Mokuren died suddenly and unexpectedly. A thousand disciples lamented him, rolling about -- now looking skyward, now face down. It was all to no avail. Could it be that not even an Arhat, replete with the spiritual penetrations, can avoid the path of death and rebirth? Verily, although Mokuren had climbed to the rank of Arhat, he too was led off on that journey from which there is no return. None can escape
the maxim: *shōja hitsumetsu* -- "what arises must also perish." What must have been the feeling in his innermost heart as he turned down that dark road of the hereafter?

It is generally held that when people are dying they exhibit fifteen signs. First of all, their eyes cloud over slightly and they only breathe out, no longer inhaling. Even though their eyes are open, they cannot distinguish black from white. They feel all topsy-turvy, as if heaven and earth had changed places. Their eyes spin around like the wheels on a flying chariot. They scramble as if trying not to tumble down into hell. They feel like they are sliding down a great stone slab forty or fifty yards high. The sight is enough to make one regret having been born into this world at all.

Once they have exhausted their strength and can no longer stop themselves from falling, they breathe their last. The text of a certain sutra describes the pain people experience at death: "It is as if one were to flay the hide of a live ox and chase it into a thicket of briars."

On the dark road of the hereafter, there is no light from the sun or moon. In the gloom, it is impossible to discern north, south, east and west. Like a moonless starry night, though a dim glow remains, the color and shape of things are hard to discern. Your feet cannot feel the ground as you stumble along. As you apprehensively wander on alone, there are none familiar from the Shaba world, neither relatives nor retainers, to accompany you now.

How painful such suffering must be! In a certain sutra it is taught: *kangyō kyakujō sokubō* -- "at the extremity of life, past practice is suddenly forgotten." All of this pain redoubles the repentance of the sinners as they plod down the road. On the first-seventh-day at the Hour of the Horse, they come upon the crossroads of the six paths. All of their strength is used up and they long for food. It seems that only on each of the seventh-day memorial services might they find a slight respite from their hunger, receiving a bit of parched rice.

But even trudging such a road, Mokuren was not distraught.
"Thoughts arising from the true nature may be held in the heart but are not to be uttered..." was what he told himself as he strode north across a vast plain. But, indeed, words cannot convey the pathetic sight of the multitudinous sinners wandering along lost. Some distance ahead there stood a red gate, untold yards tall, with living creatures of every type pouring through it.

A strange figure stood before the gate. It was like the shaft of a tall halberd topped by the head of a deity. This creature surveys the lightness and gravity of the sins of all the sentient beings in the greater trichiliocosm. Those who see the head's kindly aspect, welcoming its gaze as if basking in sunlight or moonlight, are the good. But when the sinners look upon the head, they see a fierce and terrifying face that breathes out fire as it speaks; the mouth spews hot iron cables that coil around their bodies. Then they are led away by the hell-warders and taken before the Ten Kings. There is not a thing here that comes before the eyes or falls upon the ears that is not truly pitiful. How envious the sinners must have been of the Venerable One as he strode past this place, not forced into their ranks.

At the end of the road, there are many tall, snow covered mountains. In comparison to the snow of this world, the snow there is more than one hundred million times colder. The snow on these mountains changes to ice, so that they become sword mountains. As the sinners cross these mountains, the swords slice their flesh into tiny pieces. When the good cross, the swords melt away as if it were a balmy summer day. Some people are carried off in the cart of fire, and some lose their way on the mountain road of death.

There is a master of these mountains; he is called the General of the Underworld. There are also five birds. These are known as the Birds of the Five Virtues. Perhaps they correspond to the Five Elements. These birds flock to the mountains that the beings of the triple world must cross. However, they do not nest in the fields nor do they nest in the mountains, but only at people's homes. As they chirp and crow day or night, they announce the passage of time and startle the residents of those houses. With their songs the
birds declare the mutability of the world; they elucidate the
impermanence of this earthly life. People, however, do not realize
this and strive only to climb in rank, the lower classes pursuing the
happiness that cannot be theirs. Because of this, after they die,
their flesh is hacked to bits as they cross the mountains and falls
upon the heads of the chickens below. Indeed, that is why this
mountain path is called the Slope of Heads.\

Flowering shrubs grow in the mountains, and cuckoos nest in
these shrubs. The cuckoo is a bird that nests here in the mountains
of death and is also known as "the field-boss of death." So, even
in this world of the living, if one hears the song of a cuckoo in
some gloomy place, it is a very bad omen. Chickens are also like
this: when some evil is to befall the master of the house, the cocks
crow at night. And if there is an undiscovered corpse lying beneath
the water, one will hear the cry of a crested ibis and can be assured
that there is a dead person somewhere below, even if in a deep,
deep underwater gorge. All of these birds are to be considered
quite different from the ordinary birds of this world.

Also, there is a great river called the Sanzu. It is spanned
by three bridges: one gold, one silver, one bronze. The various
Buddhas and Bodhisattvas traverse the uppermost golden bridge;
good people, the middle silver bridge. Now, the lowest bronze
bridge is quite wide, but when sinners attempt to cross it narrows
to the breadth of a thread. When it breaks off in the middle, the
sinners are plunged into the river and become food for four serpents
called the Shija. If they chance to make it across, they are met at
the foot of the bridge by the ogress called the Sanzu Hag. She
strips the clothes off the bodies of the sinners when they come
near. She hangs the clothes on the tree called the Hiranju. Having
crossed the Sanzu river their ordeal does not end however; it seems
that each will have to undergo sufferings yet more terrible.

It is here that Jizō Bosatsu, whose compassionate vow is
unlike that of any other, leads away those beings who have some
karmic connection with him. Our Mokuren also fell in line
behind Jizō Bosatsu. Thus, from the first seventh day, Mokuren
proceeded in turn past the courts of King Shinkō, King Shōkō,
King Sōtei, and then he came before the fifth seventh day’s King Emma. 84

As the Venerable One looked around him, he saw the hell-warders and the Abō ogres forcing all the many sinners out into the courtyard to come before King Emma’s bench. 85 It was here that the gravity of their various sins was to be judged. Those guilty of certain offenses would be sent off directly to the evil paths. 86 The beings constantly reborn into the five paths are innumerable, flowing through this place in a constant stream. 87 Thus it is difficult indeed to seek any reprieve from the Ten Kings or their henchmen.

The Ten Kings were startled to see Mokuren present and all rose from their thrones to prostrate themselves on the ground before him. All evil spirits and the like sprang from their seats and fled in every direction. King Emma spoke to Mokuren, "I appear here only provisionally, incarnated as a trace-manifestation of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. 88 Attending to the judgment of sins, I see the evil and foolish deeds of the sentient beings increase year by year, as they ignore the rituals for expiating sin. When I think of the karma they generate, I wonder how they will be able to pay for all of their sins. I have asked you here to preach for the first-seventh-day memorial service since you are a Venerable One, worshipped throughout the triple world, one of the disciples who deigns to appear in this Shaba world in order to spread the teachings of our Lord, Śākyamuni." 89 When the time came for the ceremony, King Emma’s court was decorated with flags and banners, while gods and sages alike thronged to the place.

As Mokuren stood upon the preaching platform, his words were true to the Buddha’s own, like a parrot mimicking its master; his voice possessed all the beauty of the song of the Karyūbinka bird. 90 The nature of the Dharma he taught was so deeply mystical and inspirational that it is certainly impossible to describe in mere words. Everyone was moved to tears, from the Ten Kings to the Wondrous Strong-men. 91 Even the sundry demons of hell broke off their cruel horns. Indeed, it seemed as if all the beings from the eight great hells up to the one-hundred thirty-six minor hells might gain liberation.
When this first-seventh-day sermon had ended, the great King ordered seven cartloads of the finest gold to be brought as alms. To this, Mokuren responded, "I have no desire for even one million gold pieces. Instead show me my mother who was taken from me when I was but fifteen years of age!" But when Mokuren said this, the great King became very angry and bellowed, "There are no distinctions drawn between relatives and strangers here! This is a rule of the dark road of the underworld! Though she was the mother of a venerated saint, now that she has fallen into one of the great hells for her sins, we certainly cannot go to the extreme of lightening her punishment!"

"The debt to parents is only life-long. For you to see her again now is completely out of the question!" said the King. Mokuren brought the broad sleeves of his robe together, pressing his palms against one another in supplication, and sobbed, "Of all the sentient beings in the trichiliocosm, are any born without a mother and father? As it is said in the scriptures, 'Even a Buddha must somehow faithfully repay his debt to his parents.' If I can preach for the benefit of strangers, as I have just done, surely I can help my own mother. Am I not even more beholden to her?" As he finished saying this he was choked with tears. King Emma was greatly pained to see the extremity of Mokuren's lamentations and he summoned an underworld official, asking him, "Which hell is Mokuren's mother in?" The hells are: the Kotsuho Hell, the Tōkatsu Hell, the Kokushō Hell, the Shugō Hell, the Kyōkan Hell, the Abi Hell, and the Great Kajū Hell. To the question "Which of these?" the official answered, "She is in the Kokushō Hell."

Although it is a terrible dwelling place, Mokuren was joyful to hear of his mother's whereabouts, thinking he might soon see her once more. So he set off directly, with the official as his guide, toward the hells. As they approached the entrance to the hells, the underworld official announced, "I am on a mission from the King, open the gates!" As a hell-warder went to open the iron door, King Emma's official warned Mokuren, "Venerable One, please stand back. Do not be burned by the flames." Mokuren responded, "Mine is the body of the signless truth-of-thusness; what is there to
The doors flew open and flames shot out, searing everything for five thousand eight hundred leagues. However, Mokuren was unscathed. Only parts of his inner robe, his koromo, were scorched where it was not covered by the kesa.

That it was burned was due to the particular fondness Mokuren had for this robe. It was the one he had called his "keepsake robe", the one the Queen had made for him with her own hands when he was fifteen. He had worn the robe since that day, never parting from it even for an instant. Because of this one shred of attachment the robe was singed, just where it hung away from the kesa. Hearing this, know that the sacred power of the kesa is wondrous and great indeed.

The Venerable One entered the place and looked around him, yet the billowing smoke and leaping flames did not hurt his eyes. Sinners could be seen here and there, rising and sinking in the foam of the seething cauldrons. Oh, how great is Jizō Bosatsu, able to appear in any of the six paths! He does not recoil from such terrible scenes, but descends into the hells, appearing there to undergo pain and suffering in place of the sinners.

Then, Mokuren said, "Show me my mother!" A warder fished a turtle with a honeycomb-patterned shell out of the cauldron. "What is this?" the Venerable One demanded. He was told, "This is the Venerable One's mother. After spending many eons in this hell, she has now been reborn as the turtle you see here." When he heard this, Mokuren felt as if he were dreaming.

Overwhelmed, Mokuren sobbed, "Let me see her now, just once, in her unchanged form." In response to this, the hell-warder pried off the turtle's shell and threw it back into the cauldron. Having been told that this was his mother, how heartsick Mokuren must have felt to see her handled so mercilessly. He felt that he could not hold back a flood of tears.

The hell-warder then grabbed a long lance and stirred about the many sinners in the boiling cauldron, looking for Mokuren's mother and yelling, "This one? This one?" One was indistinguishable from another. At that moment, Mokuren remembered, "I painted the mark of the Sanskrit syllable 'A' on my mother's chest." No
matter how she changes, that emblem should not fade away." Recognizing her by the emblem, the warder impaled her on his lance and lifted her from the cauldron, saying, "See! This must be your mother." She was pitifully blackened like a lump of charcoal. This thing did not look a bit like his mother. Mokuren staggered closer.

The Venerable One sobbed, "Though it is said that the bond between parent and child cannot outlast death, due to the power of wisdom and the spiritual penetrations, I have been able to come and visit you here in this hell. Oh, the happiness of seeing you again!" His mother answered in a thin voice that sounded like the whine of a mosquito, "Usually this hell is reserved for those who have taken other people's lives, those who have killed wild beasts in the mountains and valleys, and those who have made the creatures of the rivers and streams to perish. But, I have fallen into this hell because of you. That is, you were my only child and I loved you to an uncommon degree. After urging you to give up your princely rank, I gathered together treasures from ten million lands, but this still did not satisfy my desires. I prayed from the bottom of my heart that I might give all of these riches to you. Becoming deeply avaricious, I first fell into the realm of hungry ghosts.

"After that, when you had gone away to the temple in the mountain forests and surpassed all the people of the world in scholarship, just imagine how delighted I was. Then, ah my Prince, I hoped for you to become master of the Spirit Mountain Pure Land. I wished that a thousand Arhats, that the Five Hundred Great Arhats might die so that my Prince would stand alone, honored as the greatest teacher in the triple world. I yearned that you be surrounded by the kings of ten thousand countries and by the ten great merchant families, and adored by them. You were nephew to King Jōbon, younger cousin to Śākyamuni, grandson to the wheel-turning King; I thought there was none in all of India who could compare to you. Thus I fell into the sin of arrogance and could not escape the painful torments of the demon world.

"When I prayed for the death of all the Great Arhats, I earned the karma of the gravest of the Five Great Sins. Oh, this hell is
immeasurably tall. Even with the wings of the phoenix, one could not soar to its heights. It is as broad as the void itself. The sound of the molten copper seething in the cauldrons is like one hundred thousand giant stone slabs sliding and tumbling down from a high peak. My son, in this place learn the meaning of genuine suffering." When she finished, Mokuren shed tears and said, "I must find some way of freeing you from this pain." Hearing this, his mother replied:

"Of all of the holy teachings of Śākyamuni Buddha, none is to be dismissed, but it is the *Lotus Sutra*, the One Vehicle, which possesses the truth-of-thusness. Accordingly, you should copy out this *Hōkke-kyō* in the space of one day, character by character, line by line, and make an offering of it. If you do this, perhaps I may find some succor. And also the *Agon-gyō*..."

Before she was able to finish her sentence, the hell-warder came and, impaling her on his lance, pitched her into a cauldron. "In hell there is not a moment's respite," he said. She bobbed up and down for a few moments, shrieking and wailing. Then the only sound was the seething of the cauldron; her voice was heard no more.

All of the Venerable One's painful yearnings were to no avail. "What would she have me do with the *Agon-gyō* -- copy them? Read them?" he wondered. "If only I could have heard her plea to the end. How long our parting has been!" He cried aloud, moaning unabashedly, and yet, as this was to be the end of the repayment of his debt to her, he would never see her again. Then, although things had not turned out as he would have had them, he made his way, sobbing, back to the King's Palace.

Here, Mokuren took his leave of King Emma, and he returned to the Shaba world. He had gone to the underworld on the twenty-fifth day of the third month and was restored to life at the Hour of the Tiger on the first day of the fourth month. The joy of his one thousand disciples was extraordinary.

Although he had died and left this world, his complexion had not grown a bit pallid. And also, though today was to be his first-seventh-day memorial service, his body was still warm. The disciples asked him all about the time he had spent on the dark
road of the underworld and all of the things he had experienced there, beginning with the question of how he had come to scorch his keepsake robe. He related the whole story to them in detail, clearing up any doubts and uncertainties. Then, Mokuren commissioned eight thousand Arhats to come from Mt. Gijakussen to perform rites for the sake of his mother, the Queen, and had agate brought from Badaika as an offering. He copied out the Lotus Sutra, the Glorious Scripture of the Truth-of-Thusness, in one sitting. Then he offered it up with a ceremony, appointing the Venerable Furuna to officiate. At just that moment, purple clouds drifted in low and long, and strains of music could be heard. A voice as beautiful as the Karyūbinka bird's sang out, "Due to the power of these good roots, she shall forthwith be delivered from all suffering and go quickly to a favorable rebirth." As this miraculous voice reverberated in the air, Mokuren appreciated ever more deeply the blessings of this sutra. He could hardly fight back his tears of joy. On the same day, he also copied out the Agon-gyō and offered it up without delay.

After this, Mokuren returned to Kushinakoku and, as stated in the Buddha's teachings, performed ceremonies on the fifteenth day of the seventh month. He built a tall platform and arranged food offerings of one hundred flavors. He held a festival of ten thousand lanterns, calling all the Buddhas of the triple world to the place, and reaching out to seven generations of ancestors. Mokuren brought in monks from the ten directions and had them pray that this Queen might experience shutsuri shōji/tonshō bodai -- "escape from the round of birth and death/ sudden attainment of Buddhahood." Then his dear mother did indeed climb to the highest level of enlightenment.

Thus the essentials of the story were related and laid down in a sutra one fascicle long which was thenceforth spread out into the world. And so, every year on the fifteenth day of the seventh month, the beings of these latter days come together, their hearts one in purpose and, in accord with the teachings, call this festival Urabon. And so, up to the present we still observe this day in order to save seven generations of ancestors and also all other
sentient beings. It all started in India. The custom was then taken up in China, in Korea, and even spread to our own country.  

Mokuren’s scorched robe found its way to Khotan and inspired many people there. Then it went into China and eventually arrived in the Tang capital. There it was widely revered and worshipped. When Kōbō Daishi went to China, he became the disciple of Keikaku Wajo and brought the robe home with him. It became the prized possession of Emperor Saga and then was placed in the treasure storehouse of Mt. Hiei. At the time of Lord Yorimichi, it was moved to the storehouse of the Byōdō-in. Now, when the All Sutras Festival is held at Uji each year on the third day of the third month, the robe is taken out and displayed. As the robe is held aloft, it is proclaimed, "All of you gathered here today, friends, by virtue of this robe, you will be able to meet your parents again." Everyone attends this festival, from the lord of the grandest mansion down to the pauper from the humblest shack.

Our small country is said to be but one in a myriad, an insignificant mote of dust on this earth. And yet, due to the skill-in-means of the Buddhas, priceless treasures like this robe have been transmitted to every place where Buddhism has spread -- even to our remote islands. One must control one’s heart and mind and stave off attachment to the world. Pray for rebirth in the Land of Never-retreating Bliss. I have set this story down for the benefit of the foolish and unlettered. By no means is it offered as a scholarly work. May those who read it carry out their filial obligation to their parents and gain hearts of great compassion.

Junroku 4 (1531), Second Day of the Fifth Month

Wagami yo ni  
nakaran nochi wa aware tomo  
tare ka iwane no  
mizukuki no ato.
When I am in the world
no longer, how very sad,
-- nobody to intone
these scribblings.\textsuperscript{134}
Notes to the Translation

1 jōkō o hedatsuredomo, tsukuru koto nashi. Literally, "Even if there is an end to intimate contact, [the bond] is not exhausted." Iwamoto Yutaka, the text's editor, supplies the characters 商鞍 shōkō" comparison," which would yield, "Try as one might, there is no relationship that can be compared to it." (Literally, "it exhausts the limits of comparison.") In light of the way the theme of separation is developed in the story that follows, I have chosen to instead read it as 慘交 jōkō "intimate contact."

2 Shakuson. Šākyamuni Buddha, the historical Buddha. Here I make an exception to my practice of retaining the Japanese readings of Chinese transliterations of Sanskrit names and terms in this translation. In the text, in addition to being referred to as Shakuson, Šākyamuni also appears as Shaka Butsu.

3 sangai no shujō no chichi to shite. The triple world consists of the world of desire, the kāmadsātu, the realm of pure form, the rūpaśātu, and the realm beyond form, the arūpaśātu. The vision of the Buddha as the father of the sentient beings is very much grounded in the imagery of the Lotus Sūtra, (Jp. Myōhō renge-kyō, Skt. Saddharma-puṇḍarīkasūtra), a text which looms large in the religious world of this story, as will be seen below. It is indeed due to the power of this sūtra that Mokuren's mother is finally saved.

4 Chapter 27 of the Lotus Sūtra tells the story of Jōzō (Vimalagarbha), Jōgen (Vimalanetra) and their father, King Myōshōgon (Śubhavyūha). Note that this chapter has the two sons asking their mother for permission to become monks before she tells them that they must convince their father first. Iwamoto points out that in Japan, the legend is mentioned in medieval Japanese literature, for example: Ryōjin himō (12th C.), "King Myōshōgon quit his old ways and went with Jōzō and Jōgen to hear the preaching of the one true Buddha vehicle" (#165) and, "This is a tale to be emulated when heard. The two sons of King Myōshōgon, Jōzō and Jōgen led their father to set forth upon the path to enlightenment."(#166) and also in the Heian period work of fiction entitled Sagoromo monogatari. Brief allusion to the passage appears as well in the perennially popular thirteenth-century martial tale Soga monogatari. (See Iwamoto Yutaka, Nihon bukkyōgo jiten (Heibonsha, 1988), p. 438).

5 The tenbōrin-ō (Skt. dharmacakra pravartti rājan) is the Cakravartin or "wheel-turning monarch," the ideal Buddhist king.

6 Shishikyō (Śīṃhahanu) and sons Jōbon (Śuddhodana), Kokubon (Dropṇodana), Hakubon (Śuklodana), and Kanrobon (Amṛtodana). Iwamoto notes that there are scattered references to this genealogy in the sūtras and vinaya texts and refers the reader to chart two in Akanuma Chizen's Indo bukkyō koyū meishi jiten (Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1967) for details.

7 The Pure Land of Spirit Mountain refers to the permanent abode of Šākyamuni Buddha on Vulture Peak (Mt. Grīhrakūtā) which appears in Chapter 18 of the
Lotus Sūtra, "The Lifespan of the Thus-Come-One." This mountain was considered the site of the palace-city of King Sirīhahanu. What I have rendered Spirit Mountain, Ryōzen 精山, is in fact an abbreviation for "the mountain of the sacred vulture," Ryōjusen 鳳嶺山. However since Vulture Peak is often rendered in Japanese, and indeed elsewhere in this text, as Washi-no-mine 鷲の峯, I have decided to translate Ryōzen as Spirit Mountain to better capture the semantic slippage that occurs as a result of the abbreviation. The name of the same mountain also appears below in transliteration as Gijakussen.

8 Anan. (Ānanda) This disciple of the Buddha was not in fact known as "foremost in wisdom"; Śāriputra was.
9 Mokuren. (Skt. Maudgalyāyana, Ch. Mulian) This disciple of the Buddha is the hero of the present tale.
10 Kushinakoku. (Kuṣinagara) This is the name of the city where Śākyamuni passed into parinirvāṇa. Here it is conceived of as "the country of Kushina."
11 bunin, kisaki. I have translated Mokuren's mother's usual term of address, kisaki, or "consort," as Queen below to retain the level of respect implied by the term. The social background is an admixture of ancient Indian and classical Japanese, and it is not clear if she is the only consort or even the main consort. What is clear, though, is that her residence is her own and that the relationship she and Mokuren share is much more intimate than the relationship of either to the King, who is essentially absent from the rest of the story.
12 rakan. The word rakan (Ch. lohan) is an abbreviation of arakan, a Sino-Japanese transliteration of arhat. This is another exception to my rule of leaving names and titles in Japanese.
13 shukke. Literally, "leaving home"; rendered "take vows" or "take tonsure" in the translation. This is seen as an act of great merit in Buddhism. In some of the earliest Buddhist literature, the verses composed by monks and nuns of the first renunciant community, the Therāgāthā and the Therīgāthā, the experience of leaving home is described as a joyous one of having "laid one's burden down." The East Asian, and especially the Japanese, view of this event is quite different. To leave the home life and become a monk or nun was regarded as a particularly noble, but devastatingly tragic decision in classical Japanese literature. The sadness of such a retreat from the world is described with great poignancy. This latter model is very influential on our text.
14 sokushin jōbutsu. Literally, "becoming a Buddha in this very body." This is the goal of practitioners of esoteric Buddhism in Japan. The doctrine states that the ultimate goal of Buddhahood is available to the initiated in this lifetime and that the traditional three incalculable eons of practice are not necessary. Through the union of one's body, speech, and mind with Dainichi Nyorai (Vairocana Buddha), it is held, the highest gnosis is attainable "in this very body." It is also possible that this sentence means that once the child arouses the mind of enlightenment (bodhicitta), seven generations of ancestors will gain immediate Buddhahood.
15 zenkon (Skt. kuśala-mūla). Agricultural metaphors are often used to describe
the workings of karma. Actions are the roots that will produce the karmic fruit. "Good roots," wholesome and meritorious action, planted in the present will yield good results in the future.

16 The traditional system of age reckoning in Japan renders a child one year old at birth and two years old after passing the New Year. A year is added each New Year's day. Thus, although the boy is said to be twelve years old, he is actually younger in the Western count by a year or more.

17 tsukihi ni sekimori nakushite. Iwamoto points out that in the Nō play script Matsuyama kagami, there appears the following line: "There is no check-point garrison on the road of months and years; three years had already lapsed since the day she was separated from her mother." This play takes as its theme a mother who has fallen into hell and is saved by her daughter's pious activities. The parallels to our story are clear.

18 The trope of tears on sleeves is, of course, a stock image in classical Japanese literature, common to poetry, fiction, and diaries. It expresses mono no aware, the quality of emotional sensitivity. This depth of feeling, often evoked by the phenomena of the natural world, was a mark of refinement. Here, the parting scene moves even those of coarser sensibilities.

19 kesa, koromo o kakete. Both kesa and koromo can correspond to the Sanskrit kaśāya, or monk's robes, but here and elsewhere in the text koromo designates the simple robe of the novice while kesa denotes any of the three robes worn by a fully ordained monk according to the formality of the occasion. This clothing is of great symbolic importance for monastic and lay Buddhists alike. To donate them is a great act of merit-making, and their transmission plays a key part of legitimating the lineage. See for example Bernard Faure, "Quand l'habit fait le moine: The Symbolism of the Kaśāya in Sōtō Zen" in Cahiers d'Extreme Asie 8 (1995), pp. 335-369. Here Faure explores one aspect of kaśāya symbolism particularly relevant for our story: the correspondence drawn between the robe and the womb or placenta. Also see note 31 below on the robe.

20 omoimasumi no kagami narikeri. There is a pivot, kakekotoba, on omoimasu "to pine for more and more" and masumi no kagami "a perfectly clear mirror." (for examples of these two expressions used in early poetry see the Man'yōshū, 4.595 and 16.3885, respectively). On kakekotoba see Robert Browner and Earl Miner, Japanese Court Poetry (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), pp. 203-208.

21 shogyō mujō, zesshō meppō. Here, and in other places where Buddhist scripture is quoted in the Sino-Japanese of the sutras rather than in the vulgate of Japanese translation, I have reproduced it and then translated it into English to try to preserve the effect of the intrusion of these somewhat liturgical formulae into the native Japanese narration. The reference to the bell and these two lines of scripture appear at the opening of the Heike monogatari, the great military tale of thirteenth-century Japan, and are taken from the thirteenth fascicle of the Nehan-gyō (Nirvāṇasūtra), where the bell is that of the great monastery of the Jetavana Grove (Gion shōsha in Japanese), and the scene is that of the parinirvāṇa of the Buddha.
See note 39 below.

22 As Iwamoto notes, this line and the preceding one allude to the "Suma" chapter of Genji monogatari, where Hikaru Genji, sent into exile in remote Suma, parts with his step-mother and secret lover Fujitsubo and leaves his many other lovers behind. (cf. Edward G. Seidensticker, tr., The Tale of Genji (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976). pp. 243, 244.).

23 somoku kokudo, ujo nari. . . This is an expression of the doctrine of hongaku, "innate enlightenment," which holds that all sentient beings, and even the phenomena of nature are innately and fundamentally enlightened. This philosophy, inherited from Chinese Buddhist exegetes, was extremely influential in Japanese Buddhism, especially in the Tendai thought of the late Heian and early Kamakura period. "Buddha Field" refers to the land presided over by any particular Buddha and its physical features, in this case the Sahā world of Śākyamuni. See Iwamoto's note on page 92 of his edition for a few of the many Chinese and Japanese Buddhist texts that contain similar reference to the enlightenment of inanimates. For a similar passage in Soga monogatari, see Thomas J. Cogan, tr., The Tale of the Soga Brothers (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1987), p. 279.

24 hongaku no tsuki no hikari no suminaki koto. The moon is the primary symbol of the Buddha-nature and of "innate enlightenment," hongaku. The adjective suminaki has a dual meaning here: on one hand it means that the light of the moon is without shadows or impurities, and on the other hand it means that no corner is left dark, nothing unrevealed or unknown.

25 yuki no hikari o atsumetsutsu. As Iwamoto notes, this is based on the story of Sun Kang 孫康 included in the seventh-century Chinese history of the Jin dynasty, the Jin shu (Jp. Shinsho). He was a sensitive boy who loved to study, but his family was so poor they could not afford lamp-oil, so he read by the light of the moon reflected in the snow. Later in his life, as a result of his diligence, he scaled the heights of worldly success.

26 tsuki o sasu yubi. The "finger that points at the moon" symbolizes the corpus of Buddhist teachings and emphasizes their incomplete or provisional nature. The words and letters of the sūtras are not to be confused with the ultimate Dharma behind them or with the experience of enlightenment (i.e. the moon), which is direct, unmediated, knowledge of Dharma.

27 furusato no hazama. "the little valley of his native place" This has a very rustic sound and is redolent with nostalgia; it is used here as a pastoral convention. Let us not forget the young Prince's true origins at the palace in the "capital," Kuṣinagara. (Ironically, the Kuṣinagara described in the Pali Mahāparinibbāna Sutta is an obscure and remote village that was once a bustling center, in the age of a Buddha of the past.)

28 ukiyo no narai nareba. The "floating world," ukiyo, is a Japanese Buddhist term describing the ephemeral and insubstantial nature of life. Here the uki means floating (from the verb uku), it is also homophonous with uki meaning "unpleasant" or "sorrowful" (from the adjective ushi) Thus ukiyo also means "this sorrowful
world”. Paradoxically, in later times the prefix ukiyo, "the floating world" would be applied to literature and art describing intrigues in the pleasure quarters.

29 ōshō fujō. This maxim appears widely in Japanese Buddhist and secular literature. For example, in the Kanjin ryaku yōki attributed to Genshin (942-1017) and in the "Gio" chapter of the Tale of Heike. See Nihon kokugo daijiten (Tokyo: Shōgakkan, 1976), v. 20, p. 534 for more citations.

30 ruten sangai-chū. .. This formula is from the liturgy of the ordination ceremony found in the Sifenlü xingshi chao (Shibunritsu gyōji shō) T. 1804, compiled by Daoxuan (596-667). Iwamoto notes that our text has だん (断) "end" (dan) where the original has 脱 "escape" (datsu).

31 gedatsu no onkoromo no ue ni, san-e no gokesa o kaketamau. The "triple kesa," san-e, refers to the three types of outer robe, kaṣāya, worn over the basic robe. Which of these is worn depends upon the solemnity of the occasion. The most formal robe, the saṅgāti, is worn for the most important ceremonies, such as the recitation of the monastic rules, the Prātimokṣa. Next are the uttarāsāṅgha, and, for everyday use, the antarvāsa. The "robe of liberation," gedatsu no onkoromo, is another word for the kaṣāya; here, though, it refers to the koromo, or under-robe.

32 tora no toki. The Hour of the Tiger is from three to five o’clock A.M.

33 ichi-shichi-nichi nochi koso. For an explanation of the "seventh-day" memorial services, see note 45 below.

34 kore wa onkokorozashi no koromo nareba .. The word kokorozashi carries two meanings here, both "a present to express one’s pleasure or gratitude", and "an offering on behalf of the dead." The presentation of robes to the monastic community is one of the oldest and most widely practiced merit-making activities within Buddhism.

35 katami no koromo. Katami means "keepsake" here, but the phrase resonates with katami meaning a "half-finished (garment)." The term katami came to mean a keepsake in the ordinary sense, but classically it referred to a repository for the soul of the dead. See Gary Ebersole, Ritual Poetry and the Politics of Death in Early Japan (1989), p. 273. Robes as momentos of the dead figure prominently in Soga monogatari (See Cogan, tr., The Tale of the Soga Brothers, pp. 166, 265.)

36 kikkyō, karukaya, and the rest of the "seven autumn grasses."

37 sōgi. Iwamoto supplies the characters 葬城 "funerary castle," but I have been unable to locate this word in any sort of dictionary. Gorai Shigeru discusses the use of temporary burial sites to allow decomposition before final burial in the extreme southwest of Japan and the Ryūkyūan archipelago. These places are called gusuku written with the character 城 "castle." He suggests that the 岩城 iwaki ("crag castles") referred to in the ancient poem collection, Man’yōshū, may be caves for this purpose. (Gorai Shigeru, Sō to kuyō [Osaka: Tōhō Shuppan, 1991], pp. 67–72.) It could simply refer to a grave mound, or perhaps to a small wooden model of a house such as I have seen placed over new graves in Shingon sect graveyards in modern Ibaraki Prefecture. The funeral of the text would, after all, seem to be very much in accord with Shingon ritual and symbolism. On the
relationship between pine trees and graves see Katsuda Itaru, "Sonraku no bosei to kazoku" in Minegishi Sumio, ed., Kazoku to josei (Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1992), pp. 191-192.

38 a-ji. The Sanskrit letter "A" is seen as the foundation of all the letters, and is imbued in esoteric Buddhism with special meaning. As the basis of all sounds, the syllable "A" expresses the deepest and subtlest teachings of Buddhism: it embodies the "originally unborn and undying" principle of the cosmos. (See Richard K. Payne, "Ajikan: Ritual and Meditation in Shingon Tradition" in Richard K. Payne, ed., Re-Visioning "Kamakura" Buddhism [Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, in press].) A meditation practice involving the visualization of the character upon one's chest was widely practiced in Japan from at least the end of the Heian period as is attested to by the Ajigiden, an illustrated text from the Kamakura period (see Mochizuki's Bukkyō daijiten, v.1, p.23). I am unaware of other references to the practice of writing the character on a corpse as we see here, however, the Mikkyō daijiten (Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1968-1970), v. 3, p. 1384 mentions the practice of writing a white a-ji on the coffin.

39 shogyō mujō... The first half of this famous verse from the Nirvāṇa Sutra (T. 375, v. 12, pp. 692a, 693b) appears above. See note 21.

40 ekō, hotsugan shi-tamaite. The transfer-of-merit, ekō (Skt. parināmanā), is chanted after Buddhist ceremonies to transfer the merit accrued by the performers and sponsors to the Buddhas and other powerful deities who can then transform it into the merit of the intended beneficiary of the ritual, here Mokuren's mother. (See Yuichi Kajiyama, "Transfer and Transformation of Merits in Relation to Emptiness" in the collection of Kajiyama's works edited by Kazumi Mimaki, et al., Studies in Buddhist Philosophy (Selected Papers) (Kyoto: Rinsen Book Co., 1989), pp. 1-26.) The proclamation-of-the-vow, hotsugan, states the purpose of the ritual, dedicates it and makes the plea that it be efficacious. Fundamentally it expresses an aspiration (on behalf of the deceased) for enlightenment or birth in the Pure Land. Throughout this section, which describes medieval Japanese funerary ritual, I have retained the Japanese readings of ritual objects, terminology and liturgy.

41 sotoba. This word, often shortened to toba, is derived ultimately (through the Chinese zutapo) from the Sanskrit stūpa, a monument to mark the resting place of a relic or "presence" of the Buddha or some other great personage. Grave stones in Japan were often made in the shape of a five-sectioned "stūpa" (gorin-no-tō), each section representing one of the five elements. (On the history of this practice and on medieval Japanese funerary ritual in general see Suitō Makoto, Chūsei no sōsō, bosei: sekitō o tsukuru koto (Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1991). Here sotoba refers to a tall and narrow wooden slat shaped at the top like a five-sectioned stūpa with Sanskrit letters written on each section. It is also inscribed with the posthumous name of the dead and a prayer for their salvation. These slats are placed at the grave sites of the dead during the funeral and subsequent memorial services and anniversaries.

42 sanze fukatoku no katachi, Dainichi nyorai no sammaya-kei naraba. The sammaya (Skt. samaya) form means that attribute of a deity that serves as the
Glassman: Mokuren no sōshi

iconographic embodiment of him or her. Dainichi ("great-sun," Skt. Vairocana) is the main Buddha of the Shingon sect of Buddhism. As the Dharmakāya ("law-body") of all Buddhas, he is seen as all-encompassing, present in all things and all phenomena. He is represented by a stūpa (usually a three-dimensional stone or metal one, here the slate-style or stake-style wooden sotoba).

43 *ue wa Bon'ō, Taishaku, shita wa Emma-ō, jū-ō.* That is, the Indian Gods Brahma and Indra, and Emma-o (Skt. Yama-raja, Ch. Yan-luo wang) who is himself one of the Ten Kings. King Emma is the chief justice of the tribunal bureaucracy of the hereafter, and each of the other nine kings presides over his own respective court. This vision of the underworld solidified in China during the Tang dynasty and was very much influenced by indigenous Chinese beliefs. On the Ten Kings see Stephen F. Teiser, "'Having Once Died and Returned to Life': Representations of Hell in Medieval China" in *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, vol. 48, no. 2 (Dec. 1988); and Stephen F. Teiser, *The Scripture of the Ten Kings and the Making of Purgatory in Medieval China* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, The Kuroda Institute, 1994).

44 *sokushin jōbutsu.* See note 14 above.

45 The first seven memorial services are held in seven-day increments after the funeral (although there was not a seven-day week in traditional East Asia). In China, this is called "doing sevens." After this initial mourning period of forty-nine days, there is usually a service on the one-hundredth day after the funeral and on the first and third-year anniversaries of the death.

46 *juge sekijō.* This is a standard description of the ascetic life.

47 *chōrō.* "Elder" There are two meanings given in Ōta, *Bukkyō daijiten* (Ōkura shoten, 1928), p. 1202: i) an "elder" disciple of the Buddha, and ii) the abbot of a Zen monastery. Both are in play here since the setting of the story is ancient India while the cultural feel of the text in such details as the funerary ritual or the architecture of the palace is clearly Japanese.

48 *go hyaku rakan.* These are variously described as the first five hundred arhats who gained enlightenment after the passing, or *parinirvāṇa*, of the historical Buddha or as the five hundred scholars (actually four hundred ninety-nine) who attended the council convened by King Kaniśka, the so-called Vaibhāṣika Council.

49 The Ten Great Disciples of the Buddha are, according to East Asian tradition: Sharishi (Śāriputra), first in wisdom; Mokuren (Maudgalyāyana), first in spiritual penetrations; Mahakasho (Mahākāśyapa), first in ascesis; Anaritsu (Aniruddha), first in clairvoyance; Subodai (Subhūti), first in analysis; Furuna (Pūrṇa), first in preaching; Yupari (Upāli), first in observing the precepts; Kasenen (Katāyana), first in debate; Rashora (Rāhula), first in esoteric practice; and Ananda (Anāna), first in hearing and remembering the Buddha's words.

50 *Washi-no-mine.* Grādrakūta, Vulture Peak. This mountain, frequently the site of the Buddha's sermons, appears in the text variously as Washi-no-mine, Gijakussen, and Ryōzen. See note 7.

51 *roku jinzū.* Mokuren was the disciple of the Buddha foremost in the magical
powers of clairvoyance and self-transformation known as the jinzū (Ch. shen tong, Skt abhijñā), or "spiritual penetrations." They are: 1) tengān (heavenly-eye), 2) tenni (heavenly-ear), 3) tashin-zū (penetration of mind-reading), 4) shukuju-zū (penetration of [knowing] past-lives), 5) jin-soku (magical feet -- flying), 6) rōjin-zū (the penetration of the exhaustion of outflows).

Kushinajō. Above the city of Kuşinagara is referred to as Kushinakokō, but here it becomes Kushinajō, its usual appellation in Buddhist literature.

The purple clouds and music signal Amida's "welcoming descent" as he comes to take the dying to his western Pure Land, Sukhāvatī. This image is common in Japanese tale literature and in testimonials to birth in the Pure Land.

tobu kuruma or tōkuruma. The orthography makes either of these possible. Iwamoto takes this to be the latter, "lattice-work carriage." However, the former 飛ぶ車, "flying carriage" seems more likely.

jigoku. Perhaps this, one of the six realms of rebirth in Buddhism, is better rendered as "purgatory" since punishment there is not eternal, just very, very long. I have used the term "hell," though, and have not capitalized it since there are many.

ten or twenty jō. The jō is a unit of length equal to about 3.03 meters.

tatoeba ikitaru ushi . . . I have been unable to locate the source of this vivid imagery.

Shaba-sekai (Skt. Sahāloka). This is the world-system of the historical Buddha Śākyamuni, where we and the people of the story live. Note that the usage here differs greatly from the traditional one where the hells would indeed be the most typical part of Sahā, this impure Buddha field. Here it means "the world of the living."

kangyō kyakujo sokumō. Iwamoto locates a similar formula in the second part of the sixth fascicle of the Miaofa lianhua ching xuanyi (Myōhō renge-kyō gengi, T. 1716, v. 33, pp. 654-681) by Zhiyi (538-597). He takes it to mean that when one grows old and dies as an ordinary person, a prthagjana (Jp. bonbu, Ch. fanfu), one forgets one's personal history. It also indicates that the benefits of religious training are lost. Those more advanced on the path of practice remember their past lives and retain the knowledge gained in those lives.

muma no toki. The Hour of the Horse is from eleven A.M. until one P.M.

rokudō. The six paths, or gati, of rebirth are: i) ten (devas or gods), ii) ashura (asuras or jealous gods), iii) ningai (humans), iv) chikushō (animals), v) gaki (pretas or hungry ghosts), and vi) jigoku (hell-dwellers).

kareii. This is rice pre-cooked and then dried for use while traveling. It forms part of the offerings to the dead.

dōji. This word normally means a child or the boy acolyte of a deity (Skt. kumāra), but it here should be taken to mean a deity or bodhisattva. For this usage see Ōta, Bukkyō daijiten, p. 1282c.

sanzendaisen no sekai. (Skt. trisāhasramahāsāhasra lokadhātu) This is the
"three-thousand, great-thousand-world." Each world consists of one central mountain surrounded by eight rings of mountain ranges and eight seas, four continents, a sun, and a moon. One thousand of these is a "lesser-thousand-world"; one thousand of the latter form one "middle-thousand-world" (i.e. one million worlds); one thousand of these (i.e. one billion worlds) combine to create the greater trichiliocosm. See Randy Kloetzli, *Buddhist Cosmology* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983), pp. 51-90. This cosmology never held sway over the popular imagination in Japan, and is invoked strictly hyperbolically.

65 *goku-sotsu*. These are the cruel henchmen of King Emma who administer the tortures.

66 Iwamoto here amends the text's *tsuranaru* "to line up" to *tsunagaru* "to bind," but the text makes sense as it stands.

67 *tsurugi no yama*. The mountain of swords is standard in the Japanese geography of hell. The idea that they are made of ice is to the best of my knowledge peculiar to this text.

68 *hi no kuruma*. This is a cart enveloped in flames that comes to carry the sinner off to judgment.

69 *shide no yamachi*. Another example of mountain imagery in Japanese conceptions of the place of judgment. Mt. Yoshino in particular was known as *shide no yama*, but as poetic trope the phrase refers to death in general. For the origins of the term and its use in the Heian period, see Gorai Shigeru, *Nihonjin no jigoku to gokuraku* (Kyoto: Jinbun shoin, 1991), pp. 181-189.

70 *Myōkyō taishō*. I have not been able to locate this name in any dictionary, but it almost certainly refers either to King Yama or to the General of Mt. Tai who determines life span. The two were often conflated.

71 *gotoku no tori*. There are multiple lists, but, according to one, the five virtues are: i) awareness of time, ii) truth, iii) benefit, iv) compassion, and v) benevolence. These are the five virtues, but the birds remain obscure.

72 *godairin*. The five elements are: i) earth, ii) water, iii) fire, iv) wind, and v) space.

73 *kashirazaka*. This recalls images of a slope composed entirely of skulls seen in Kamakura period hell pictures. The text here reads "these chickens," but up until now it has been speaking of the five birds.

74 *utsugi*. Deutzia, a large shrub with white flowers that blooms in mid-spring.

75 *shide no taosa*. Iwamoto finds this name for the cuckoo in a poem by Fujiwara no Toshiyuki in the *Kokin wakashū* (poem 1013), and also in the fourth chapter of the Kamakura period collection of Buddhist tales attributed to Saigyō, the *Senshū shō*. According to *Nihon shūkyō jiten* (Tokyo: Sogensha, 1957), p. 283, the name originated in China where it was believed that this bird returned from the land of the dead around planting time in the spring to supervise the work of the living on behalf of the ancestors.

76 *toki o tsukureba*. This phrase means "if a battle cry is raised," and Iwamoto
supplies the character "battle cry" for toki. However, since the subject is birds and water, "battle cry" makes no sense here. I have taken toki to mean the crested ibis and the o tsukureba to be a confusion in the text or a lost play on words.

77 Sanzu tote daika ari. Also called Sōzu no kawa, Shōzu no kawa. Sanzu can be interpreted as "three crossings" or "three paths." It can also refer to the three evil paths of rebirth, i.e. hell, hungry ghosts and animals. Iwamoto cites a very similar description of this crossing to the present one in the seventh chapter of the illustrated Hōkke jū-ō santan e-sho. For extensive discussion of the Sanzu no kawa, see Iwamoto, Jigoku meguri no bungaku, pp. 312-333 and Gorai Shigreu, Nihonjin, no jigoku to gokuraku, pp. 163-180.

78 shija. "The four serpents" The term is actually Buddhist technical language for the four elements: earth, water, fire, and wind. Here, however, the text is clearly referring to snakes.

79 Sanzu no uba. She is also known as Datsueba, "the clothes-stripping hag."

80 Hiranju. Usually this tree is called the Eryaju, "the clothing tree." Its branches bend under the weight of the clothing; the heavier the clothing, the graver the sin.

81 Jizō bosatsu (Ch. Dicang pusa, Skt. Ksitigarbha). This bodhisattva was widely held to be an advocate of the dead undergoing judgment and a savior in the hells. In the Japanese system known as honji sui jaku, a grid of correspondence between deities and their local avatars, he was seen as the "original ground" (honji) of King Emma (who was a sui jaku or "trace manifestation" of the bodhisattva), and thus a very powerful advocate indeed. See Alicia Matsunaga, The Buddhist Philosophy of Assimilation (Tokyo: Sophia University/ Tuttle, 1969), pp. 38, 236.

82 Iwamoto reads the text here as Jiza no hikan, taking it to mean "Jizō's deputy." I prefer to read it higan, "compassionate vow," especially since an alternate appellation for Jizō in esoteric Buddhism is Higan kongō, "Adamantine One of the Compassionate Vow." (see Ōta, Bukkyō daijiten, p. 1460).

83 kechien no shujō. These are beings who have established a karmic relationship with Jizō by praying to an image of him, attending ceremonies dedicated to him, etc.

84 Shinkan-ō, whose honji ("original nature") is Fudō Myō-ō, presides over the first-seventh-day. Shōkō-ō, whose honji is Shaka Nyorai, is in charge of the second-seventh-day's proceedings. Sōtei-ō, whose honji is Monju Bosatsu, is the judge/king of the third-seventh-day (Mochizuki, Bukkyō daijiten [Sekai seiten kankō kyōkai, 1954-1958], p. 2025c, 2831b, and 3092a, respectively). Also see note 81.

85 abō rasetsu. Iwamoto notes that although these demons appear in various sutras of Chinese origin, the original meaning of abō is unclear and there is no known Sanskrit equivalent.

86 akudō (Skt. durgati). These are the three lowest realms of rebirth: animals, hungry ghosts, and hell-dwellers.
"gada tenrin sun< mon0. The Five Paths is an alternate model of the wheel of transmigration. It is the same as the six paths minus that of the *asuras*, or 'titans'. Perhaps it is used here (while elsewhere in the text the six path model is in play) because of the association of the King Godō-tenrin, the last of the Ten Kings, who as his name states, "Turns the Wheel of the Five Paths," determining the next rebirth of the dead.

*butsu-bosatsu no kesshin to shite kari ni suijaku shigen shite.* Here King Emma expresses the concept of *honji suijaku*, the idea that deities have an original ground and also trace manifestations. See notes 81, 84.

Iwamoto amends the text's *shakusen* しゃくせん (釈せん) "explain, preach" to *shūsen* 修せん "perform," but I believe that the original makes good sense in this context. It is not clear for whom this first seventh-day ceremony is being conducted.

Karyūbinka. This is the mythical Kalavinka bird, often praised in the sutras for the uncanny beauty of its song.

*myōrikishi.* These are the hell-warders, the *nirayapāla*.

*embudagon.* (Skt. *jāmbūnada-suvarṇa*). Either platinum or a special grade of gold panned from the Jāmbū River.

*ryō.* An old unit of measurement for gold or silver coins.

*daijigoku.* There are sixteen Great Hells, eight hot and eight cold.

*hōon o itasu.* This is to repay the kindness shown to one by one's parents by nurturing them after death through the family cult of the dead and bring them to the status of ancestor. The source referred to is unclear.

All but the first of these seven hells is standard and identifiable: *Tokatsu* "constantly reviving," *KokushO* "black-rope," *Shugo* "thronging," *Kyokan* (Kyōkatsu in the text) "screaming," and the *Abi* "avici" or "no interval." The last, the *Daikajū jigoku* (here Daikōjū) "great heaps of fire," is part of the *Abi jigoku*. The first, Kotsuho, is not included in the usual lists and its meaning is obscure. The eight hot great hells are the five above plus the *Shōnetsu* -- "burning heat", the *Daishōnetsu* -- "great burning heat" and the *Daikyōkan* -- "great screaming" (see Ōta, Bukkyō daijiten, p. 1216).

*musō shinnyo no tai.* The three qualities of thusness (*shinnyo*, Skt. *tathatā*), are that it is *musō* -- "signless", *mujō* -- "birthless", and *mushō* -- "nature-less."

*ri.* A unit of distance equal to approximately 3.9 kilometers.

*rokudō nōge.* This means that Jizo can appear at will in any of the six realms of transmigration in order to help beings wherever needed.

*zainin no kuken ni kawari.* This describes Jizo in his role as *migawari*, a surrogate who endures the tortures of hell in place of the sinner.

*kō* (Skt. *kalpa*). This is an extremely long time - it has been described as the length of time that it takes to wear away a mountain of granite by passing a piece of gossamer over it once a year. We need not concern ourselves with the paradoxical fact that someone who died a mere twenty years earlier has spent many kalpas in this hell.
a-ji no hoshi. The word hoshi usually means "a star," but here it is used to mean a design or emblem. The association with Hawthorne here is as inevitable as it is unfortunate. Of course, this "A" is no scarlet letter. See note 38 on the syllable "A."

gakidō. This is the realm of the preta, who have stomachs the size of mountains and needle-thin throats. They constantly run after food to satisfy their hunger and water to quench their thirst, but everything turns to fire as soon as it touches their lips. The greedy are reborn here. In most other versions of the story, it is this realm from which Mokuren rescues his mother. In the Chinese versions of the story it is indeed the sin of avarice that lands her in this realm. It seems from what follows below that even as a hungry ghost, Mokuren's mother was able to monitor her former son's activities. This an ironic fulfillment of Mokuren's wish that his mother should be able see him from beyond the grave and take pride in his achievements. It seems that it is her obsessive attachment to his prodigious accomplishments that in fact condemns her to the Avici hell.

Ryōzen jōdo no nushi. This is the Pure Land of Śākyamuni Buddha described in the Lotus Sūtra; it is situated high atop Vulture Peak (Grāhrakūta). How Mokuren could become "master" of this place is unclear, since Śākyamuni fills this role by definition. Perhaps Mokuren's mother imagined her son might eclipse even the Buddha. See note 7.

chishiki (Skt. mitra). This is an abbreviation of the term zenchishiki (Skt. kalyānamitra, "good friend"), a word for teachers and senior practitioners who provide warm encouragement and inspiration to aspirants on the path.

jūnin no chōja. Why there are so few chōja (Skt. grhapati, "men of substance" or "noble families") to so many kings is not clear to me. Perhaps Mokuren's mother is simply referring to the ten chōja of her native Kushinakoku.

tenbōrin-ō. The Cakravartin, or "wheel-turning monarch." This refers to King Shishikyō (Sirihahanu) of page one.

go-gyakuzai. The Five Great Sins are: i) killing one's father, ii) killing one's mother, iii) killing an arhat, iv) shedding the blood of a Buddha, and v) disrupting the harmony of the monastic community. Mokuren's mother of course refers to number three.

hō-ō (Ch. fenghuang). A chimerical bird of Chinese origin.

ichijō shinnyō nari. Iwamoto points out that the second chapter of the Lotus Sūtra, "Skill-in-means," states, "The One Vehicle of the Dharma is not two, not three." This means that there is only one true goal -- that of becoming a Buddha -- the path of the arhat, and of the solitary sage were only posited as liberative devices. The "One Vehicle" (ichijō, skt. ekayāna) thus refers to the teaching of the Lotus Sūtra.

Hokke-kyō. the Lotus Sūtra.

Agon-gyō. the four Āgamas. In other words, the "Hinayāna sūtras."

It is not uncommon in such "hell-tour" stories for the protagonist to return to the
world of the living. Here, however, the return is quite abrupt and unexpected and lacks the usual explanation of why the person was called or what special talent or karmic connection gained them freedom.

114 tora no toki. The hour of the Tiger is from three to five A.M.

115 Gijakussen. Grdhra-kuta, Vulture Peak. Elsewhere in the text this name appears in translation and has been rendered as "Spirit Mountain" for Ryozan and "Vulture Peak" for Washi-no-mine. This time the name is provided in a transliteration of the Sanskrit in the original text. See note 7.

116 Badaiga appears with some frequency in Japanese sources as the name of a river. Ashiduo fadi he, the Chinese transliteration of the name of the Hiranyavati or Ajravati, a river flowing close to the site where Sakyamuni entered parinirvåna, was shortened to Fadi he (Jp. Badaiga). (see Iwamoto, Nihon bukkyôgo jiten, p. 581) Also, Bhadrika (rendered in Japanese as Badairika or Badaika) is the name of one of the five ascetics who became the Buddha's first followers after he preached to them in the Deer Park directly following his enlightenment. Significantly, this Bhadrika was the son of King Kanrobon (Amrtodana), which, according to the genealogy of page two, would make him a brother to our Mokuren. (Ôta, Bukkyô daijiten, p. 1451). Iwamoto takes badaika to be "Bhadrika (Pali, Bhaddiya), a village in Anga province in ancient India." However, he says, this place is not known as a source of agate. In his Nihon bukkyôgo jiten, he also glosses Bhadrika (Bhaddiya) as the name of an evil and miserly man of great wealth who changed his ways under the influence of the teaching of Mokuren and his co-disciples.

117 shinnyô myôten. "The wondrous scripture of the truth-of-thusness," that is, the Lotus Sutra. Tonsha. (Ch. dunsye) means "writing suddenly" and refers to the meritorious practice of copying a sutra, particularly the Lotus, from beginning to end in one day.

118 Furuna sonja (Pûrña). Pûrña was most eloquent in preaching of all the ten great disciples of Sakyamuni Buddha.

119 mandô-e. A ritual offering of light to the buddhas and bodhisattvas aimed at repentance and the expiation of sin. It was first practiced in Japan in 651, and came to be held yearly during the Heian period. Every year on the 15th of the tenth month, lanterns would be lit at the Great Buddha Hall of Nara's Tôdaiji. Other temples and shrines, such as Yakushiji, Kitano Tenmangu, Chûsonji and so on, also began to host the ceremony towards the end of the Heian period. It also came to be a yearly celebration at Mt. Kôya where it is still observed.

120 The ten directions refers to the eight directions of the compass plus the zenith and the nadir. Here it simply means "from everywhere."

121 ichikan no kyô. The word kan 卷, "roll" arises from the Chinese custom of rolling texts into scrolls, it means one 'volume' or one fascicle here. There are two canonical versions of the story (T. no. 685 and 686).

122 matsudai no shujô. The word matsudai means the same thing as mappô no jidai, that is the last of three periods of the history of Buddhism. This is the final period of the Dharma, when living beings are sinful and hard to teach. The
concept is exceedingly important in Japanese Buddhism. Here, however, the sense of the word in context seems less narrowly defined and more inclusive, meaning, perhaps, "in the generations after the demise of the Buddha."

123 Uraban (Skt. Avalambana or Ullambana, Ch. Yu-lan pen), usually called Bon or Obon in modern Japanese. This is the late summer festival for saving ancestors based on the story of Mokuren saving his mother. See Stephen F. Teiser, The Ghost Festival in Medieval China (Princeton University Press: 1988), pp. 21-23 for a summary of scholarly speculation on the etymology of this name.

124 Shintan, Kanchō, honcho ni itaru made. Iwamoto takes Kanchō here to mean Korea, but it is more likely that it means China (the word kan in this second interpretation refers to the Han dynasty, but was used generally to refer to China in any period). Shintan also means China, but the text’s author below refers to Shintan and Daitō ("the great Tang") as two different places when in fact both words refer to China. I have kept Iwamoto’s "Korea," though, since Buddhism was in fact transmitted through Korea and it improves the English text. Perhaps the sense of Shintan as used here is broader, referring to Central Asia as well as China.

125 Kyūshōkoku. In his Mikan chūsei shōsetsu kaidai (Tokyo 1943, p. 228), Ichiko Teiji glossed this place as Kucha, an ancient Buddhist kingdom on the northern rim of the Tarim Basin in what is today eastern China. As an oasis in the Taklamakan Desert, Kucha was important stopping place on the northern Silk Route. Iwamoto, however, disagrees with this, taking the implied characters to be 九相国 and stating that the place referred to is Khotan, another ancient Central Asian kingdom, a stronghold of the Mahāyāna, which was located on the eastern edge of the Tarim Basin.

126 Shintan yori daitō ni wattate. see note 123 above.

127 Kōbō Daishi ("Great Master who Spreads the Law") is the posthumous name of Kūkai (774-835). He went to study esoteric Buddhism in the Tang capital, Changan, in 804 and returned to Japan in 806. His teacher in China was Huiguo (Jp. Keika, 746-805); the text has the name a bit wrong. Wajō (also kashō, washō, or oshō depending on sect, Ch. heshang, Skt. upādhyāya, khoṣa) is a term of respect for monks which originally meant "preceptor" but then came to be applied more generally.

128 Emperor Saga reigned from 810-823.

129 This mountain, situated just northeast of Kyoto, is of great importance in the history of Japanese Buddhism as a training center of the Tendai sect. It was established in the late eighth century by Saichō (Dengyō Daishi, 767-822).

130 Fujiwara no Yorimichi. An aristocrat of the late Heian period, born in 992, son of Fujiwara no Michinaga. Yorimichi held the post of Regent (kampaku), essentially governing the country, from 1025 until his death in 1074. The temple he had build in Uji as his retreat during his later years, the Byōdō-in, still stands today.

131 uji no issai-kyō e, sangatsu mika ni okonawaruru toki. This festival which involved the offering up of the entire Buddhist canon in a ceremony originated at
the Byōdō-in in 1063 and from there spread to other famous temples and shrines in the region. (Sōgo bukkyō daijiten [Hōzōkan, 1987] vol. 1, p. 56). Gorai Shigeru points out that complete sets of the Song canon began being imported to Japan around this time, providing inspiration for the creation of such a ceremony. The *Uji issai-kyō e* (also called the *Byōdō-in issai-kyō e*) was originally held on the twenty-ninth day of the second month, but was later pushed back a week or so to better coincide with the blossoming of the cherries. (See Gorai's entry *Issai-kyō e* in *Nihon-shi daijiten* [Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1992], vol. 1, p. 508) As regards the circumstances of the production of *Mokuren no sōshi*, it is an intriguing to note that the fortunes of the Byōdō-in as an institution were at an all time low during the Muromachi period. (See Kadokawa *Nihon chimei daijiten* [Kadokawa shoten, 1978-1991], v. 26:1, p. 1213) In modern celebrations of the festival, held at numerous temples throughout the Chugoku region and on the island of Shikoku, the entire canon is "read" by flipping accordion-style books through the air from one hand to the other while intoning the titles of the works.

**hotoke no hōben.** *Hōben* (Skt. upāya) refers to the ability of the Buddha and other deities to devise methods of teaching appropriate to the situation and level of understanding of each individual. It also refers to the salvific powers of the Buddhas and bodhisattvas.

**keraku futai no kokudo.** This refers to the Pure Land of Amida Buddha in the West. Rebirth in this land assures quick and easy enlightenment as no obstacles to progress on the path exist there, and no back-sliding as the name implies. In Genshin's *Öjöyōshū*, this is the name of the fifth of ten blisses of the Pure Land.

**mizukuki.** There is word play here around *mizukuki*, "moist stem(s)," a poetic way of referring to the brush. *Iwane no* means "not spoken," but is a homophone with *iwane no* meaning, "on the rock/crag." *Iwane gusa* (literally, rock grass) means bracken fern. *Iwane no mizukuki no ato* thus means "brush strokes (not spoken)" as well as "(traces of) the moist stems clinging to the rock face."
Perfect Enlightenment Bodhisattva: A Translation of Chapter 11 of the *Scripture of Perfect Enlightenment*¹

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The *Scripture of Perfect Enlightenment* (*Yüan-chüeh ching* 圓覺經) is a major, if somewhat problematic, text within the East Asian Buddhist tradition. It was especially important in China. The number of commentaries written on it from the eighth century on bears ample testimony to its continuing influence throughout the course of Chinese Buddhist history. It is still studied today, being one of the texts most frequently chosen as a subject for lectures by modern Chinese masters. Despite its perduring importance, a shadow of controversy has always surrounded the text. Although it purports to have been translated into Chinese by Buddhatrāta (佛陀多羅、覺救) in 693 (長壽二年), modern scholarship has shown that the *Scripture of Perfect Enlightenment* was an apocryphal text composed in China sometime around the end of the seventh or the beginning of the eighth century. Even though it is impossible to determine precisely either where or when the text was first composed, circumstantial evidence indicates that it was current in Ch'an circles in or around Lo-yang during the reign of Empress Wu (690-705). Indeed, the fabrication of apocryphal texts like the *Scripture of Perfect Enlightenment* played a crucial role in legitimating the teachings of the nascent Ch'an movement.

The "Perfect Enlightenment Bodhisattva" (圓覺菩薩) chapter is the penultimate chapter of the sūtra. The fact that the chief interlocutor is named Perfect Enlightenment

¹ Research on this translation was made possible by grants from the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Japan Foundation, and the Chiang-ching Kuo Foundation.
Bodhisattva suggests that the practice it discusses has a special importance within the scripture as a whole. The chapter discusses the conduct of a special retreat to be carried out in a sanctuary separated from the general activities of the monastic community at large during the course of the regular summer retreat. Since this retreat is the exclusive domain of bodhisattvas, it is not governed by the vinaya regulations that determine the conduct of the regular summer retreat. The chapter thus provides scriptural justification for the kind of specialized elite practices that were evolving within the Chinese Buddhist monastic community during the sixth and seventh centuries, such as those found within T'ien-t'ai communities and associated with the practice of the four kinds of samādhi or, perhaps, those found within early Ch'an or proto-Ch'an communities. The noted Ch'an and Hua-yen scholar Kuei-feng Tsung-mi (780-841) took this chapter as the scriptural warrant for the 80- to 120-day retreat detailed in his massive 18-fascicle ritual manual, the Yuan-chueh ch'ing tao-ch'ang hsiu-cheng 観覺經道場修證儀, which incorporates the liturgical recitation of the Scripture of Perfect Enlightenment within an elaborate devotional regime carried out six times a day over the full course of the retreat.

Tsung-mi's various commentaries to this text did much to make the Scripture of Perfect Enlightenment one of the most widely read texts in Chinese Buddhism. All subsequent commentaries to the Scripture of Perfect Enlightenment were written in reference to Tsung-mi's, which have remained the most authoritative

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commentaries down to this day. According to Tsung-mi, the practice described in the Perfect Enlightenment Bodhisattva chapter falls within the domain of the gradual cultivation suited to those of inferior capacities—that is, it occupies the bottom tier in his hierarchically graded system of practice. It is thus especially effective for those people whose karmic obstructions are heavy. Tsung-mi refers to it as "the effortful practice in a sanctuary, the cultivation and realization for those of inferior capacities" (tao-ch'ang chia-hsing hsia-ken hsiu-cheng 道場加行下根修證), which he explains as follows:

The place where the way is realized is called the "sanctuary" (tao-ch'ang 道場; bodhimāṇḍa). That is to say, in this place one determines one's resolve and fixes a period of time to exert effort toward effecting the results of practice in the pursuit of realization—hence it is referred to as "effortful practice" (chia-hsing 加行). "The cultivation and realization for those of inferior capacities" means that even though one has faith in and understanding of the previous teaching [of the marvelous mind of perfect enlightenment], since one's [karmic] obstructions are heavy and one's mind agitated, one must take part in the practice of the sanctuary in order to restrain oneself. When conditions have become strong

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4 See my "Finding a Scriptural Basis for Ch'an Practice: Tsung-mi's Commentaries to the Scripture of Perfect Enlightenment," Yoshizu Yoshihide, ed., Kegongaku ronshū (Festschrift for Professor Kamata Shigeo) (Tokyo, forthcoming).

5 In addition to its meaning of "effortful practice," chia-hsing 加行 carries the further implication of a supplementary or preparatory practice undertaken in order to effect the proper conditions for engaging in whatever is taken as the central practice (see Nakamura, Bukkyōgo daijiten 1.293c-d).

6 Tao-ch'ang 道場 is the Chinese translation of bodhimāṇḍa, the place where the Buddha was seated when he attained enlightenment and, by extension, any place where enlightenment can be attained (as Tsung-mi's explanation notes). In the context of this chapter it refers to a separate ritually-consecrated sanctuary in which a specialized three-month bodhisattva retreat is carried out.
and one's state [of mind] has become optimal, the results of one's efforts will come into effect (TS 194d6-9; LS 571a18-22).

Tsung-mi notes that the chapter falls into two parts. The first deals with the general discussion of the retreat carried out in the sanctuary, and the second deals with the "effortful practice" of the three kinds of contemplation (of šamatha, samāpatti, and dhyāna) practiced during the retreat.

The following translation of the prose section of this chapter is based on the edition of the text found in volume 17 of the Taishō daizōkyō (page numbers are given in brackets at the beginning of each paragraph for easy reference). In preparing my translation, I have relied on the following commentaries by Tsung-mi:

Yüan-chüeh ching ta-shu 圓覺經大疏 (TS), 12 fascicles (823), Hsü tsang ching 14.108a-203b;  
Yüan-chüeh ching ta-shu ch’ao 圓覺經大疏鈔 (TSC), 26 fascicles (823 or 824), Hsü tsang ching 14.204a-15.41b;  
Yüan-chüeh ching lüeh-shu 圓覺經略疏 (LS), 4 fascicles (823 or 824), Taishō daizōkyō 39.523b-578a; Hsü tsang ching 15.57c-88a;  
Yüan-chüeh ching lüeh-shu ch’ao 圓覺經略疏鈔 (LSC), 12 fascicles (823 or 824), Hsü tsang ching 15.90a-227b;  
Yüan-chüeh ching tao-ch’ang hsiu-cheng i 圓覺經道場修證儀 (HCI), 18 fascicles (ca. 828), Hsü tsang ching 128.361a-498c.

Translation

[920c27] Then Perfect Enlightenment Bodhisattva arose from his seat within the great assembly, bowed his head at the feet of the Buddha, circumambulated him three times, knelt before him with clasped hands, and addressed the Buddha, saying, "Great Compassionate, World Honored One, you have
extensively expounded to us the various expedients [for the realization] of pure enlightenment so as to enable beings in the final age to gain great benefit. World Honored One, we here now have gained an enlightened understanding, but how should unenlightened beings in the final age after the Buddha has passed away dwell in retreat and cultivate the pure realm of perfect enlightenment? What [approaches] are foremost in [the practice of] the three kinds of pure contemplation within this [cultivation

7 The term an-chü 安處, here used verbally (or, more precisely, an adverb-verb construction), refers to the traditional rain retreat (vāraṇa), when from early times in India it was customary for Buddhist monks to abandon their itinerant life to gather to pass the period of the monsoon rains together in temporary or fixed lodgings. In China the summer retreat was held from the middle of the fourth lunar month to the middle of the seventh lunar month or from the middle of the fifth lunar month to the middle of the eighth lunar month. An-chü not only refers to the summer retreat, but it is also used in this chapter to refer to a specialized retreat that is conducted within a separate sanctuary (tāo-ch'ăng 道場) during the summer retreat. The summer retreat was governed by the vinaya (and hence in a Chinese context could be seen as Hinayana in its orientation); the specialized retreat that is the focus of this chapter is a Mahāyāna practice exclusively reserved for bodhisattvas, and it therefore does not have to follow the vinaya prescriptions—a point that underlies many of Tsung-mi's subsequent comments. Tsung-mi's comment that this part of Perfect Enlightenment Bodhisattva’s question applies to the sanctuary (tāo-ch’ăng) (TS 195a9; LS 571b15) indicates that an-chü should here be understood in its specialized sense. Throughout this chapter the text plays on the term (which in Chinese literally means "peaceful dwelling"), and it will thus be rendered variously according to context.

8 “Realm” translates ching-chieh 境界, employed here in its common usage as visaya or gocara; see note 23 below.

9 The three contemplations of samatha, samāpatti, and dhyāna were discussed earlier in the Respect Inspiring Bodhisattva (917c15-918a4) and Discriminating Sound Bodhisattva (918b6-919a11) chapters and are explained further in this chapter below. The unorthodox grouping of the three terms together, as well as their unusual treatment individually, is but one of many indications of the Yüan-chüeh ching's apocryphal character. Tsung-mi explains that "although the teaching of the practice of contemplation is the same [as that expounded in earlier chapters], their method of cultivation is different because they were devised in accord with the [different] capacities [of different beings]." According to Tsung-mi's schematic outline of the Yüan-chüeh ching, the two chapters in which the "three contemplations" were previously discussed fall within the domain of the cultivation and realization for those of average capacities (chung-ken hsiu-cheng 中根修證). Tsung-mi goes on to say that this chapter refers
of] perfect enlightenment? Would the Great Compassionate One please confer abundant benefit on the great assembly and beings in the final age [by answering these questions]." Having spoken these words, he prostrated himself fully. He made his request in this way three times in succession.

[921a6] At that time the World Honored One addressed Perfect Enlightenment Bodhisattva, saying, "Excellent! How excellent, son of good family, that you are capable of asking the Tathāgata about such expedients to confer abundant benefit on beings. Now listen carefully to what I shall expound to you." Then Perfect Enlightenment Bodhisattva, delighted [to be able] to receive the teaching, listened silently along with the great assembly.10

[921a10] "Son of good family, when the Buddha dwells in the world, after the Buddha has passed away, or during the final age of the dharma,11 there may be beings who are endowed with the potentiality12 for [realizing] Mahāyāna, who have faith

back to the earlier context in which the terms were discussed when it mentions those who "dwell in a monastery, have taken residence in the community, . . . [and] meditate as much as circumstances permit in accordance with what I have already set forth." "Only after that," he continues, "does [the text] explain the procedures to be carried out in the sanctuary. Thus we know that [the practice of the three contemplations in the sanctuary] is a separate category" (TS 194d9-13; LS 571a22-26). Tsung-mi further notes that Perfect Enlightenment Bodhisattva’s question about the three contemplations applies to effortful practice (chia-hsing 努行) (TS 195a9-10; LS 571b7). See notes 36, 40, and 42 below.

10 This chapter follows the standard opening formula found in all of the ten preceding chapters.

11 Fa-mo-shih 法末時, Tsung-mi and subsequent commentators point out that this refers to mo-fa 末法, the final period in the decline of the dharma according to the standard three-periods scheme. As Tsung-mi notes, the time when the Buddha was alive corresponds to the period of the "true dharma" (cheng-fa 正法), and the time after Buddha died corresponds to the period of the "reflected dharma" (hsiang-fa 象法) (TS 195b5 and TSC 20d8-10; see also LS 571b16-18 and LSC 216b7-9).

12 Hsing 性 (nature). Tsung-mi explains that having the capacity for realizing Mahāyāna refers to someone who has been influenced by having heard Mahāyāna teachings in a previous life. He goes on to point out that the term tu-sheng hsing 大乘
in the mind of great perfect enlightenment, the profound arcanum of the Buddha, and who wish to cultivate its practice. If they dwell in a monastery, have taken residence in the community, and are bound by their responsibilities, they should meditate as much as circumstances permit in accordance with what I have already set forth. If, however, they are free of such involvements, they should set up a sanctuary (tao-ch'ang) and set aside a period of time for abiding in peace and dwelling in purity: 120 days for a long period; 100 days for a middle-length period; and 80

性 (Mahāyāna nature) does not occur within the Fa-hsiang theory of five gotra and that the use of the term hsing here should not be confused with its use in Fa-hsiang theory (TS 195b6 and TSC 20d10-a6; see also LS 571b18-19 and LSC 216b9-c5). The Fa-hsiang theory that there were five utterly discrete spiritual potentialities or gotra went against the teaching of the One Vehicle and the universality of the Buddha-nature, which were fundamental axioms in Hua-yen thought.

13 Ch'ieh-lan 伽蓝, Skt. sangbharāma.

14 T'u-chung 從衆 has the general meaning of "followers," "disciples" (Nakamura, Bukkyōdo dajiten 2.995b; Oda, Bukkyō dajiten, p. 1276c), although its precise sociological denotation here (and elsewhere in this chapter) is not fully clear. The phrase an-ch'u t'u-chung 安處從衆 has already occurred in the Universal Eyes Bodhisattva chapter (914b21), where Tsung-mi explained t'u-chung 従衆 as meaning "people who engage in the same practice and who share the same views" (t'ung-hsing t'ung-chien jen 同行同見人). Their pursuit of a common goal (hsing-yeh chi t'ung 行業既同) provides them occasion to refine one another (bu-hsiang tiao-cho 互相雕琢) and confer with each other (tieh-kung shang-liang 往共商議), thus enhancing the conditions for their realization of the way (wei chang tao yuan 為長道緣) (TS 142b3-5; LS 540a6-12; cf. TSC 339c18-d10). The term occurs twice more in this chapter, where it refers to those who do not take part in, or perhaps are excluded from, the three-month retreat. I take it to be a general reference to the monastic community at large (which in the fictionalized Indian context of the Yūan-chüeh ching would include both Mahāyāna and Hinayāna practitioners).

15 According to Tsung-mi (TS 195b7; LS 571b23), "meditate" (ssu-ch'a 思察) here refers to the three contemplations of samatha, samāpatti, and dhyāna discussed in the Universal Eyes Bodhisattva through the Discriminating Sound Bodhisattva chapters—see note 9 above. The second part of this sentence ("if they dwell in a monastery, . . . ") refers to those residents of the monastic community whose duties prevent them from taking part in the specialized retreat in the separately consecrated sanctuary mentioned in the next sentence.

16 An-chih ching-chü 安置淨居—the text is here playing on an-chü. Once again, the text connects the retreat with the specially consecrated sanctuary (tao-ch'ang).
days for a short period.  

[921a15] "When the Buddha is present in the world, one may truly behold [his form]. After the Buddha has passed on, [however,] one must set up images [of him]; when [his form] is made present in the mind and pictured by the eye, true recollection is produced, and it will thereby be the same as if the Tathāgata were always alive. One should adorn [the altar] with banners and flowers and, for three weeks, prostrate oneself before the Buddhas of the ten directions and [call upon] their names, beseech [their mercy] and confess and repent one's

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17 This passage (921a10-15) provides scriptural authority for Tsung-mi's 120-, 100-, or 80-day Perfect Enlightenment Retreat detailed in his 18-fascicle Yuan-chūeh ching tao-ch'ang hsien-cheng i. Tsung-mi comments that "just as [people's] capacity may be sharp or dull so the designated time periods may be long and short" (TS 195c4; LS 571c9-10). He thus notes: "In terms of the degree of difficulty one has in getting rid of one's obstructions, the long time period is appropriate for those of inferior capacities, the middle-length time period is appropriate for those of average capacities, and the short time period is appropriate for those of superior capacities." He adds that when looked at in terms of the energy one is able to expend during the practice of the retreat, the situation is reversed (TS 195c1-4; LS 571c7-9).

18 Since this entire section deals with "seeing" the Buddha (whether actually seeing him when he was alive, seeing a representation of his likeness in an image after his death, seeing his likeness in an eidetic image visualized in the meditator's mind, or seeing his likeness in a vision), I have chosen to translate as ssu-wei 思惟 as "behold" rather than the more literal "think upon." Tsung-mi and subsequent commentators go on to say that cheng 真 or "true" ssu-wei refers to the understanding that there are no objects outside of the mind (TS 195d1-2; LS 571c15-16).

19 See Edward Schafer's comments on ts'ūn 存 in "The Jade Woman of Greatest Mystery" (History of Religions 17.3-4 [1978]: 387), where he points out that in the context of Taoist meditation ts'ūn has the meaning of "to make sensibly present," "to give existence to"—almost "to materialize."

20 Literally, "it will be the same as the days when the Buddha constantly dwelt in the world" (t'ung ju-lai ch'ang-chu chih jih 同如來常住之日); I have followed the interpretation suggested by Yanagida Seizan, Chūgoku senjutsu kyōten 1: Engakuryō, Bukkyō kyōten sen, vol. 13 (Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 1987), p. 235n.

21 Tsung-mi explains hsien chu fan hua 懸諸幡花 (literally, "hang banners and flowers") as meaning "adorn the altar" (yen-shih t'an-ch'ang 崇飾壇場) (TS 195d5; cf. LS 571c25).

22 Literally, three seven-day periods. These are not Chinese ten-day weeks.
sins [before them]. One may [thereby] receive an auspicious sign, and one's mind will be disburdened and put at ease. Even after the three weeks have passed, one should continue to maintain single-minded concentration.

[921a19] "When the beginning of summer arrives and [it is the time for] the three-month retreat (an-chii), you should stay with pure bodhisattvas, you should be removed from sravakas in your thoughts, and you should not rely on the community at

23 Tsung-mi explains the phrase yu shan ching-chieh 遇善境界 as meaning "receiving a divine response" (kan-ying 感應) such as "perceiving the Buddha's countenance" or "seeing a radiant light" (LS 572b1-2). Han-shan Te-ch'ing 涅山德清 (1546-1623) comments: "Experiencing auspicious signs (te shan ching-chieh 得善境界) as a result of confessing and repenting [one's sins] refers to perceiving light, seeing auspicious omens, receiving confirmatory dreams, and so forth, which are indications that one's sins have been expunged" (Yuan-chueh ching chib-chieh 圓覺經直解, HTC 16.69a1-2). Ching-chieh 境界 is frequently used to translate the Skt. vi.aya and gocara, which, in addition to their usual meaning of "realm" and "sphere," can also refer to the objects of perception. Ching-chieh is occasionally also used to translate the Skt. nimitta (more commonly translated by hsiang 相) (see Nakamura, Bukkyo gyo daijiten, 1.238c), which, in Buddhist meditation theory, refers to the eidetic image visualized in the mind or the confirmatory "sign" that occurs as the result of the successful mastery of various meditative practices—it is in this last sense that the word seems to be used here.

24 This passage (921a15-19) provides scriptural authority for the three-week period of preparatory veneration and repentance (li-ch'an 禱懺) that Tsung-mi specifies should precede the longer Perfect Enlightenment Retreat. Tsung-mi uses his commentary (TS 195d6-197c5) and subcommentary (TSC 22a9-30a9) to this passage to embark on a protracted discussion of the eight components that form the core structure for Chinese Buddhist devotional ritual—i.e., (1) Offering (kung-yang 供養), (2) Exaltation (tsan-t'an 謝懺), (3) Veneration (li-ching 禱敬), (4) Repentance (ch'ian-hui 懺悔), (5) Solicitation (ch'iian-ch'ing 僚懺), (6) Sympathetic Joy (sui-bsi 隨喜), (7) Dedication (hui-hsiang 祈願), and (8) Vows (fa-yuan 發願). These eight—followed by a period of circumambulation, during which the Scripture of Perfect Enlightenment is recited, and a period of seated meditation—comprise the basic ritual cycle performed six times a day throughout the course of Tsung-mi's three-month Perfect Enlightenment Retreat.

25 Srāvakas (sheng-wen 聲聞, i.e., those disciples of the Buddha who, on hearing his voice, were able to attain liberation) refers to Hinayana practitioners. Tsung-mi justifies the separation of Mahayana practitioners from Hinayana practitioners during the retreat by explaining that the observation of the precepts has a different meaning
large. When the day to begin the retreat (an-chu) comes, you should profess as follows before the Buddha:

[921a21] "I—such-and-such a bhikṣu, bhikṣunī, upāsaka, or upāsikā—will mount the bodhisattva vehicle to cultivate the practice of utter tranquility. I will enter into purity together [with the other participants] to abide in true reality. I will take great perfect enlightenment as my monastery so that my body and mind may dwell peacefully in the wisdom of equality.

for the two groups, paraphrasing the Chüeh-ting pi-ni ching 決定毘尼經 (Upālīparipṛcchā) to the effect that "maintaining the śrāvakā precepts is tantamount to violating the bodhisattva precepts, and maintaining the bodhisattva precepts is tantamount to violating the śrāvakā precepts" (TS 197d1-2). He quotes extensively from the Chüeh-ting pi-ni ching passage in question (T 12.39c19-40a) in his subcommentary (TSC 30a18-d6). Tsung-mi's comment on the next section (921a21-27) goes on to specify eight ways in which the practice of a Mahāyāna retreat differs from that of a Hinayāna retreat (TS 198a7-12).

26 Tsung-mi explains pu chia t'u-chung 不仏徒樂 as meaning that it is not necessary to engage the sangha that is harmonious in six ways (pu pi liu-bo) (TS 197d3; LS 572b23). Ch'ing-yüan 清遠 further explains Tsung-mi's comment by saying that the text simply means that the retreat should not involve a large group, adding that in the Mahāyāna that means no more than ten (Yüan-chüeh ching shu-ch'ao sui-wen yao-chieh 圓覺經疏鈔隨文要解, HTC 15.376c9-11). Han-shan explicitly identifies t'u-chung with Hinayāna practitioners (HTC 16.69a12), as is reflected in Lu K'uan Yu's (Charles Luk) translation in Ch'an and Zen Teaching, Third Series (Berkeley: Shambala, 1973), p. 267.

27 True reality renders shih-hsiang 實相.

28 An-chü is being used metaphorically here.

Although the "wisdom of equality" (p'ing-teng hsing chih 平等性智; samatājnāna) does not seem to be used here in any doctrinally-laden sense, it nevertheless occupies an important place in Yogācāra theory, according to which it refers to the state where one no longer differentiates self and others and all things are seen as equal. It thus involves the transformation of the seventh-consciousness, manas, which is the basis of attachment to self (ātmagrabha). Tsung-mi explains it in more technical terms drawn from the Ch'eng wei-shib lun: "Associated with the four delusions [of self-delusion, self-belief, self-conceit, and self-love], [manas] falsely clings to the ālaya [vijñāna] as its inner self and thereby gives rise to differentiated (pu-p'ing-teng 不平等) perception in the midst of the reality of universal equality (p'ing-teng li 平等理). Now since the object clung to [i.e., ālayavijñāna] is, in its nature, tranquil, the seventh consciousness that takes it as its object is itself likewise [tranquil]. Because like natures are always
Nirvāṇa is by its very nature not bound by anything. Therefore I now sincerely request that I [be allowed] not [to] follow [the strictures for] śrāvakas that I may dwell in peace for three months together with the Buddhas of the ten directions and the great bodhisattvas. To cultivate the profound causes and conditions for supreme marvelous enlightenment, I will not be involved in the community at large.”

[921a27] "Son of good family, this is called the retreat of the manifestation of the bodhisattva. When the days of the three periods [set for the retreat] have been completed, [the participants] may go where they will without hindrance. Son of good family, those beings who cultivate [this] practice in the final age and participate in the three periods to pursue the way of the bodhisattva should never grasp after any state that they have not heard about [from the Tathāgata here].

[921b2] "Son of good family, any beings who would cultivate śamatha should first secure utmost stillness and not give rise the same, they are equal (p'ing-teng 平等)." (TS 198a3-5; LS 572c15-18). For the Ch'eng wei-sibh lun's explanation of the wisdom of equality, see T 31.55a16-21, b15-18, and c13-19.

31 In technical contexts "marvelous enlightenment" (miao-chüeh 妙覺) refers to the highest of the fifty-two stages of the bodhisattva.

32 The Kanei (1644) version of LS has "months" (yueh 月) instead of "days" (jih 日), see Ogisu Jundo's 1965 translation, Engakukyō ryakusbo, in vol. 12 of the section on scriptural commentaries (kyōshū) of the Kokuyaku issaikyō, p. 390, n. 43.

33 I.e., 80, 100, or 120 days.

34 Tsung-mi comments: "When the three designated periods for [the retreat in] the sanctuary have been completed, the limits for the summer [retreat] according to the Hinayāna [practice] are not yet over. Because [this special retreat] is not a Hinayāna retreat, it does not prevent them from going where they will without hindrance" (TS 198a17-18; LS 573a2-3).

35 "State" here renders ching-chüeh.

36 In Buddhist meditation theory, śamatha refers to the practice of psycho-physical calming and as such represents one of the major poles of meditative practice, the other being vipaśyanā, the practice of observation or discernment. Whereas śamatha leads to the attainment of states of concentrative absorption, vipaśyanā leads to the attainment of insight. For previous explanations of the practice of śamatha in the
to thoughts. When they are completely still, they will then realize enlightenment.\textsuperscript{37} In this way the first [attainment of] stillness extends from one person throughout one world. Enlightenment is also like this.\textsuperscript{38} Son of good family, when enlightenment pervades an entire world, whenever a being in that world gives rise to a thought, they will always be able to know it thoroughly.\textsuperscript{39} It is also the same for hundreds or thousands of worlds. They should never grasp after any state that they have not heard about [from the Tathāgata here].

[921b8] "Son of good family, any beings who would cultivate samāpatti\textsuperscript{40} should first recollect the Buddhas of the ten directions and all the bodhisattvas in the worlds of the ten directions. Relying on various methods, they should cultivate their practice gradually, strive diligently after samādhi, and extensively make great vows, which perfume themselves to form [wholesome]

\textit{Yūan-chūeh ching}, see Respect Inspiring Bodhisattva chapter (917c15-19) and Discriminating Sound Bodhisattva chapter (918b6-8).

\textsuperscript{37} Tsung-mi identifies stillness (ching 靜) with concentration (ting 定; samādhi), which is the essence (t'i 體), and enlightenment (chūeh 覺) with wisdom (hui 慧; prajñā), which is the function (yung 用) (TS 198b14-15; LS 573a22-23)—that is, to use the well-known formula of Shen-hui and the \textit{Platform Sūtra}, stillness is the essence of enlightenment, and enlightenment is the function of stillness.

\textsuperscript{38} In other words, as Tsung-mi explains, "the first [realization of] enlightenment extends from one person throughout one world" (TS 198b14; LS 573a22-23).

\textsuperscript{39} Tsung-mi comments: "This is to know the thoughts of beings. Since the world is already fully enlightened, beings exist fully within enlightenment. Thus he thoroughly penetrates any thought that arises just as a mirror reflects any image that appears before it without leaving anything out" (TS 198b 2-3; LS 573a26-28).

\textsuperscript{40} In standard Buddhist meditative theory, the samāpattis refer to a set of four advanced states of meditative absorption, which correspond cosmologically with the four "heavens" of the realm of formlessness (ārūpyadhātu). Sometimes a fifth samāpatti (nirūdra-samāpatti) is added. For previous explanations of the practice of samāpatti in the \textit{Yūan-chūeh ching}, see Respect Inspiring Bodhisattva chapter (917c20-26) and Discriminating Sound Bodhisattva chapter (918b9-11). Both chapters associate samāpatti with the discernment of the illusory (huan 虚) character of all things discussed earlier in the Samantabhadra Bodhisattva (913c23ff) and Universal Eyes Bodhisattva (914b5ff) chapters.
seeds. They should never grasp after any state that they have
not heard about [from the Tathāgata here].

[921b11] "Son of good family, any beings who would cultivate
dhyāna should first use the method of counting so as to
become thoroughly aware of the number of the thoughts that
arise, continue, and disappear in their minds. In this way if

41 The perfuming (bsin; vāsana) here refers to the positive influence that the
making of vows and the other practices have in forming the seeds (chung; bija) of
their enlightenment.

42 In its more narrow and technical meaning, "dhyāna" refers to a state of
concentrative absorption, in which sense it typically designates a prescribed set of
four states corresponding cosmologically to the four "heavens" of the realm of form
(rūpadhatu). The "dhyānas" often explicitly or implicitly include the four samāpattis
as well. For previous explanations of the practice of samāpatti in the Yün-chüeh
ching, see Respect Inspiring Bodhisattva chapter (917c27-918a4) and Discriminating
Sound Bodhisattva chapter (918b12-13).

43 Tsung-mi points out that there are two methods of counting (LS 573b20-25).
The first is the practice of counting breaths, which he explains in terms of the first
set of six wonderful methods of meditation in Chih-i’s Liu-miao fa-men 六妙法門
(see T 46.549b4-c18). The second is the practice of becoming aware of the process
by which thoughts arise (sheng 生), continue (chu 住), change (i 異), and disappear
(mieh 謎) in the mind (see note 45).

44 I have followed the explanation of fen-ch’i t’ou-shu 分齊頭數 in Yanagida’s
note on p. 242.

45 Tsung-mi notes that the text has left out the third of the four stages of the
process by which thoughts arise (sheng 生), continue (chu 住), change (i 異), and
disappear (mieh 謎) according to the Awakening of Faith. By following this process
backwards, one reaches the point where the fundamental source whence thoughts
arise can be discerned. Tsung-mi thus notes that awareness of the disappearance of
thoughts corresponds to the stage of the "ten degrees of faith" (shib-bsin 十信),
awareness of the changing of thoughts corresponds to the stage of the "three worthies"
(san-bsien 三賢—i.e., the ten abodes [shib-cbu 十住], ten degrees of practice [shib-bsing
十行], and ten degrees of dedication [shib-hui-bsiang 十迴向]), awareness of the
continuation of thoughts corresponds to the "ten bhūmis" (shib-ti 十地), and awareness of
the arising of thoughts corresponds to the stage where all fifty-two bodhisattva
stages have been completed (wei-man 位滿), when "the movement of thought has
been completely brought to an end and just the one mind is present" (LS 573b28-c3). This
stage is equivalent to what the Awakening of Faith calls "ultimate enlightenment"
(chiu-ching chüeh 究竟覺, which it explains as follows: when one sees the inception of
thoughts, one realizes that the mind has no beginning. One is then far removed from
the subtlest thought and is able to see the nature of the mind, which is eternal
they extend [this practice] in everything [they do], discriminating the number of thoughts in the midst of the four modes of activity, then there will be none that are not known. They will gradually advance more and more until they are aware of everything including even a drop of rain in hundreds and thousands of worlds just as if their eyes were looking at something they had in hand. They should never grasp after any state that they have not heard about [from the Tathāgata here].

[921b16] "These are called the foremost expedients of the three contemplations. If beings thoroughly cultivate these three kinds [of contemplation], diligently practicing and persevering, they will be called Tathāgatas appearing in the world.

[921b18] "If beings of dull capacity in the final age desire in their hearts to pursue the way but cannot succeed in realizing it due to karmic obstructions from the past, they should ardently repent and always keep up their hope. They must first cut off love and hate, envy, and deceitfulness and pursue the superior mind. They may practice any one of these three kinds of pure contemplation. If that contemplation does not succeed, they should then practice another contemplation. They should not become disheartened but should [continue to] pursue realization gradually."

(ch’ang-chu 常住) and without thoughts (wu-nien 無念) (T 32.576b24-27). Tsung-mi goes on to quote from the Awakening of Faith, which says that although the mind has no beginning, "when we speak of knowing the characteristic of beginning that means [knowing that it is] without thoughts (wu-nien 無念) . . . When one understands that it is without thoughts, then one knows the arising, continuing, changing, and disappearance of the characteristics of the mind . . . [The four characteristics lack any basis on which to stand by themselves] and are from the beginning equal and identical with enlightenment" (T 32.576b27-c4).

46 I.e., walking, standing, sitting, and lying.
47 This concludes the answer to the second part of Perfect Enlightenment Bodhisattva’s question, as Tsung-mi notes (TS 220a6; LS 573c24-25).
'The Trials of Yasodharā': The Legend of the Buddha’s Wife in the Bhadrakalpāvadāna

(Joel Tatelman, Toronto, Canada)

From the fourteenth to the seventeenth centuries the Newar Buddhists of the Nepal Valley produced an extensive religious narrative literature in Sanskrit. For many centuries prior to this period, that is, prior to the disappearance of Buddhism as a vital cultural force in the land of its birth, Newar Buddhist tradition had greatly depended upon religious practices and religious literature composed in and transmitted from India.

The Newars did not by any means abandon the rich scriptural tradition they had inherited from India. Indeed, the majority of Sanskrit Buddhist texts on which modern scholars base their studies are in fact manuscripts preserved and copied by generations of Newar scholars and scribes. Nevertheless, the destruction of Buddhism as a living cultural force in North India and Kashmir, a process which was complete by the end of the fifteenth century, had a profound impact on Buddhism in Nepal. No longer could Newar students be sent to India for their education; no longer could Indian scholars and teachers come to Nepal to teach doctrine and ritual; no longer could Newar scholars copy texts from the rich libraries of the Gangetic Plain. Other factors, such as increasing pressure to conform exerted

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by successive Newar Hindu kings⁴, devastating famines which severely depopulated the Valley and at least one extremely destructive Muslim raid which appears to have destroyed thousands of precious manuscripts, forced Newar Buddhists back upon their own devices⁵.

What took shape during this period was a synthesis of traditions inherited from mediaeval India and indigenous, Newar traditions which likely had been evolving for centuries. An expression of what one scholar has characterized as this ‘renaissance’ of Newar Buddhism was the unprecedented literary production to which I have alluded above.

By and large, although these texts were among the first Buddhist manuscripts received in European libraries⁶, Western scholars have taken little notice of them. Although the situation is beginning to change, the fact remains that most of this extensive body of literature remains unpublished and almost none of it has been translated⁷.

The Buddhists of Nepal sought to anchor their literary innovations firmly in the bedrock of the Indian textual tradition they had so carefully preserved. For a variety of reasons which I shall not ad-

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⁶ To cite only one example, a (now lost) manuscript of the BKA was received in Paris by the Société Asiatique as early as 1837 (*Journal Asiatique*, troisième série, tome IV, 1837, p. 297). Another BKA MS. was received at the British College of Fort William in Calcutta in 1832.

⁷ In addition to the published Newar Buddhist Sanskrit works which will be cited below, two others should be noted: Mamiko Okada, ed., *Dvāvimśatavādānakathā: Ein Mittelalterlicher Buddhistischer Text zur Spendenfrömmigkeit* (Indica et Tibetica 24, Bonn, 1993); Leo Both, ed., tr., *Das Kapīśāvadāna und Sein Parallelverson im Pīṇḍapātravādāna* (Monographien zur Indischen Archäologie, Kunst und Philologie Band 10, Berlin: Dietrich Reimer Verlag, 1995).
dress here, the Newars of the fifteenth century and later maintained relatively little interest in the philosophical literature of Indian Buddhism. For them, what remained central was religious practice and the mythological and legendary narrative traditions which explained and enshrined such practice.

Hence we find that these anonymous authors and compilers did not simply compose new works. Instead, they retold the traditional narratives in an idiom and in a literary form suited to the tastes and priorities of their own time and place. Influenced in part by the literary style of the late Hindu Purāṇas and also by the eleventh century Bodhisattvāvadānakalpalatā (BAKL)⁸, itself verse retellings of 108 traditional Buddhist stories (jātakas and avadānas), Newar authors began to compose verse adaptations of a wide range of the narrative literature inherited from Buddhist India.

Perhaps the most fundamental of these texts is the Svayambhucaityabhaṭṭārakoddesa or ‘Teaching Concerning the Holy Shrine of the Self-Created One’, a mythological and legendary account – or rather group of related accounts – of the origins of the Nepal Valley and the Newar people and of the successive stages of their adoption of Buddhist culture and traditions. At least five recensions of this text are extant, ranging from 280 to 4600 verses. To date, however, only the most recent of these recensions, the Brhat-svayambhūpurāṇa (BSvP), has been published⁹.

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Among Newar Buddhists even today one of the most important members of their pantheon is Avalokiteśvara, the Bodhisattva of Compassion. The Kāraṇḍavyūha Sūtra (Kv)\textsuperscript{10}, an Indian scripture of the fifth or sixth century, preserves many traditions concerning this Bodhisattva which later became central to Newar tradition. In the fifteenth or sixteenth century an unknown Newar author retold this earlier prose version in verse, with many additions and interpolations to bring it ‘up to date’. This text, usually called the Guṇa-kāraṇḍavyūha (GKV) remains unpublished\textsuperscript{11}. Similarly, with many additions from other sources, the Newar Mahajjātkamālā (MJM)\textsuperscript{12} recasts in verse another Mahāyāna scripture, the Karuṇāpūndarīka Sūtra\textsuperscript{13}.


In the early centuries of the Common Era, Indian Buddhists produced an extensive hagiographical literature. Among the texts which the Newars preserved are the *Avadānasātaka* (Avś), *Mahāvastu Avadāna* (Mv) and *Divyāvadāna* (Divy). Many of the legends found in the last of these works as well as others are also found in the *Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya*. A whole series of *avadānamālās*, ‘Garlands of [Tales of] Glorious Deeds’ retell these earlier Indian works. Again, most remain unpublished.

One such work is the *Bhadrakalpaivadāna* (BKA), or ‘Glorious History of this Auspicious Era’, from which the following selec-
tion is translated\textsuperscript{20}. An enormous narrative of some ten thousand verses, it was composed/compiled by an unknown Newar author (or authors), probably in the sixteenth or early seventeenth century, and probably in the Nepalese city of Lalitpur. In the broad lineaments of its narrative, it retells, in a style reminiscent of the late Hindu Purāṇas, and with many modifications and interpolations, the story of the Buddha’s visit to Kapilavastu, his natal city, as presented in the earlier Indian \textit{Mahāvastu}, which itself was compiled around the beginning of the Common Era from still earlier traditions.

My research has been particularly concerned with Chapters 2-9, a discrete sub-narrative within the \textit{Bhadra-kalpāvadāna} which recounts the trials and tribulations of Yaśodhārā\textsuperscript{21}, the pregnant wife whom Siddhārtha abandoned when he left home to realize his des-

\textsuperscript{20} In his monograph, \textit{Buddhiyskiye legendy: Chast’ pervaya [Buddhist Legends: Part I]} (Saint Petersburg: Imperial Academy of Sciences, 1894), S. Oldenburg includes summaries of all 38 chapters. Possibly because this study is available only in Russian, it has attracted little scholarly attention. Much more recently, \textit{Bhadra-kalpāvadāna XXXII} and XIV have been published: Ratna Handurukande, \textit{Supriyasārthavāhajātaka} (Indica et Tibetica 15, Bonn, 1988) and T.R. Chopra, “BHS triyantara and Hindi temtara: Notes on a Folk-Belief in the Mahāvastu and Some Other Buddhist Sanskrit Texts”, ed. H. Eimer, \textit{Frank-Richard Hamm Memorial Volume} (Indica et Tibetica 21, Bonn, 1990), pp. 28-46.

tiny of becoming a Buddha, an Awakened One\textsuperscript{22}. These chapters portray Yaśodharā’s anguish at her abandonment and chronicle her karmically-prolonged, six-year pregnancy, the efforts of the Buddha’s evil cousin Devadatta first to seduce and then put Yaśodharā to death on trumped-up charges of adultery and witchcraft, her elevation to semi-divine status almost on a par to that of her husband, and the birth of her hideously deformed son. Extensive as it is, this drama is further developed in Chapters 25-27 and only brought to a resolution in Chapters 35-38. In the intervening chapters, Yaśodharā does not appear at all. Chapters 10-24, which remain much closer to the \textit{Mahāvastu} narrative than those which concern Yaśodharā, recount the Buddha’s activities on his journey back to Kapilavastu; Chapters 28-34 are \textit{jātakas}, stories of the Buddha’s previous births, a number of them taken, sometimes \textit{verbatim}, from the works of such classical poets as Āryasūra, Gopadatta\textsuperscript{23} and Kṣemendra.

In making Yaśodharā the protagonist and spiritual heroine of her own independent narrative, the \textit{Bhadraśālīpadāda} extends and elaborates trends which were already well under way in such earlier texts as the \textit{Mahāvastu}, the *Śākyamunibuddhacarita (ŚBc)\textsuperscript{24} and the \textit{Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya}\textsuperscript{25}. At the same time, much more ex-

\textsuperscript{22} For a detailed synopsis of these chapters, with numerous quotations from the manuscripts, see my article, “The Trials of Yaśodharā and the Birth of Rāhula”, \textit{Buddhist Studies Review} 15, no.2, 1998, pp. 1-40.


\textsuperscript{24} Extant only as the Chinese \textit{Fo pén hsing chi ching} (T 190); abridged translation by Samuel Beal, \textit{The Romantic Legend of Śākya Buddha} (London: Trübner, 1875; repr. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1985).

\textsuperscript{25} The complete text of this Vinaya is only available in Tibetan. There is also a slightly abridged Chinese translation. On these, see Charles Prebish, \textit{A Survey of Vinaya Literature} (Taipei: Jin Luen Publishing House, 1994), pp. 84-95. However, significant portions of the Sanskrit text are also available. See N. Dutt, ed., \textit{Gilgit Manuscripts}, Vol. III, Parts 1-4 (Srinagar and Calcutta, 1942-50); R. Gnoli, ed., \textit{The Gilgit Manuscript of the Śayanāsānavastu and the Adhikaranāvastu} (Serie Orientale Roma L, Roma, 1978);
plicitly than in these earlier Indian works, our author articulates one of the great themes of epic literature: the beautiful and virtuous princess pines for her absent husband. He, the prince, is far off in a distant land on a dangerous and important heroic quest. While he is away ‘saving the world’, the princess undergoes her own series of trials. These typically include the testing of her personal loyalty and sexual fidelity. Through all trials and despite all odds, the princess remains steadfast and the hero triumphs. The hero then returns home to vindicate his mate and to usher in a new golden age. Thus in Homer’s Odyssey we have Penelope and Odysseus; in Virgil’s Aeniad, Dido and Aeneus; in Vālmīki’s Rāmāyaṇa and Tulsidas’s Rāmacaritramānasā, Sītā and Rāma.

While worthy of investigation in their own right, these, in the present discussion, are peripheral issues. A principal project of the ‘Glorious History’ is to validate Yasodhara as the Buddha’s female counterpart and true consort, not only prior to his Awakening, but after it as well. The portrait developed of Yasodhara is that of a Newar Buddhist version of the ideal Indian wife. Much more so than in earlier biographies of the Buddha like the Buddhacarita (Bc), Mahāvastu, and Lalitavistara (LV), in our story Yasodhara is at all times utterly subservient to her husband. Though in later chapters she is likened – and rather passionately – to the Supreme Goddess (parameśvari), it is also clear that she derives her spiritual power from her husband, in particular from her devotion to him and from


the religious Observance ([u]poṣadhavrata, aṣṭamīvrata) the practice of which he enjoins upon her prior to his departure. The Bhadrakalpāvadāna may be unique in Buddhist literature in the prominence, the narrative space, it accords Yaṣodharā, but it most definitely does not make of her a truly independent heroine. Indeed, it can hardly be accidental that her character and actions conform to the standards set forth as normative for women in traditional Hindu legal literature (dharmaśāstra).

There is anecdotal evidence that a Newārī version of the BKA continues to be recited in certain liturgical contexts. At least one version of the Newar Buddhist Dialogue mentions Yaṣodharā’s marriage to Siddhārtha as paradigmatic for all Buddhists. Whether there exists other textual or anthropological evidence to support this remains to be seen. This in turn raises the whole question of whether Yaṣodharā was held out as the feminine ideal to Newar Buddhist women as, for example, Sītā has been to Hindu women.

In all this, however, we are getting rather ahead of ourselves. In the first instance these initial chapters of the ‘Trials of Yaṣodharā’ are best read as a story, as a late mediaeval Newar revisioning of earlier Indian narrative traditions concerning the Buddha’s wife. On-

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27 This observance, much as described in the BKA (IV.1-12) and in other Newar Buddhist texts (e.g., Aṣokāvadānamālā XXIV.101-114, ed. Y. Iwamoto, Bukkyō setsuwa kenkyū josełsu, Tokyo, 1978, p. 226) remains to this day the most popular optional religious observance among Newar Buddhists, particularly among women. See J. Locke, Karunāmaya, pp. 183-204; "The Uposadha Vrata of Amoghapāśa Lokeśvara in Nepal," L’Ethnographie 83 (100-1), pp. 159-189; Gellner, Monk, Householder, Tantric Priest, pp. 220-224. For a discussion of a range of religious observances in contemporary Newar Buddhism, see Todd T. Lewis, "Mahāyāna Vratas in Newar Buddhism," Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 12, no. 1, 1989, pp. 109-138.

28 On this topic, see I. Julia Leslie, The Perfect Wife: The Orthodox Hindu Woman according to the Strīdharmapaddhati of Tryambakayājvan (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989).

29 Personal communication of Dr. Gregory Sharkey, S.J., who taught in Nepal for several years during the 1980s and 1990s. On the Newārī version of the BKA, see K.P. Malla, Classical Newārī Literature (Kathmandu: Educational Enterprises, 1982), p. 56.
ly when all the relevant material has been published can the work of interpretation proceed apace.

A NOTE ON THE EDITION OF THE SANSKRIT TEXT

The present translation is based on my critical edition of Bhadrakalpāvadāna, Chapters 1.1-22 and 2-3, copies of which may be ordered from the Buddhist Literature Editorial Office. The edition is based on a study of the ten extant BKA manuscripts. All of these are Nepalese (Newar) paper manuscripts; eight are in Newārī script, two in ordinary Nāgārī. Four of the ten are dated: the oldest was copied in Nepal Samvat 910 (1790 C.E.), the most recent in N.S. 1025 (1905 C.E.). Detailed descriptions of the manuscripts and their stemmatic relationships are included with the critical edition. The thesis from which both editions and translations were adopted also includes editions and translations of Chapters 4 and 5. These, I hope, will eventually be published, together with the other eleven chapters (6-9, 25-27, 35-38) which constitute the ‘legend of the Buddha’s wife in the Bhadrakalpāvadāna’.

A NOTE ON THE LANGUAGE OF THE Bhadrakalpāvadāna

The BKA is composed in a particular variety or dialect of Sanskrit, but not, it must be emphasized, in Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit, the ‘Sanskritized Prakrit’ familiar from the Mahāvastu or the verse portions of such Mahāyāna sūtras as the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka or Saṃādhirāja. Without attempting to be exhaustive, I list below the principal departures from ‘classical’ or ‘standard’ Sanskrit found in the 1200 verses (Chs. 2-5) of which I have made a close study. Readers familiar with the peculiarities of Buddhist Sanskrit and of other varieties of non-standard Sanskrit will find few surprises here.

(1) hiatus between and within ślokapādas; (2) second and third syllables of ślokapāda both short; (3) syncopation in the last six syllables of even ślokapādas; (4) resolution of two short syllables into one long and vice versa; (5) hypermetrical and hypometrical pādas; (6) short vowels scanned as long and vice versa; (7) double saṃdhi;
(8) use of samdhi-consonants or ‘hiatus-bridgers’; (9) application of samdhi after a vocative or vocative particle; (10) pleonastic strengthening of internal vowels (svārthikavrddhi), often metri causa; (11) changes of gender in noun declension; (12) stem-form of noun for nominative or accusative, usually metri causa; (13) enclitic form of pronoun used for instrumental case; (14) thematisation of consonant-stem nouns and athematic verbal stems; (15) parasmaipada for ātmmanepada and vice versa; (16) causatives used in the sense of the simple verb (svārthe nic) and, less often, vice versa; (17) passive participle of a transitive root used in the sense of the active verb; (18) formation of present-system verbs from the root drs and gerundives from the present stem paś-; (19) simple gerunds in -ya and compound gerunds in -tvā; (20) verbs conjugated in the perfect tense without reduplication; (21) simple present of causatives and Class X verbs used as passives; (22) agent in the instrumental case used with an active verb (not always readily distinguishable from preceding); (23) mā used without finite verb.

It should be mentioned, however, that current scholarship is beginning to demonstrate how much of the non-standard syntax (as opposed to morphology) of Newar Buddhist Sanskrit is due to the influence of Newārī, which operates on very some different principles than Sanskrit or Prakrit.30 Examining the language of the BKA in light of Newārī remains a desideratum. The first task, however, is to prepare editions of additional chapters in order to have a sufficiently large linguistic sample from which to work.

30 See, B. Kölver, “Newārī into Sanskrit: On the Language of the Svayam- bhūpurāṇa”, ed. M. Schetelich, Festschrift Manfred Taube (Bonn: Indica et Tibetica Verlag, in press). My thanks to Prof. Dr. Kölver for providing me with a pre-publication copy of his article.
Abbreviations

BST : Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, Darbhanga, Bihar: Mithila Institute.


PTS : Pali Text Society.


**The Extraordinary History of Our Auspicious Era**

**Chapter I: Praise by Brahmā and the other Gods; [the Buddha] Sets Out to Return to his Natal City**

Om! Reverence to the Three Jewels!

1. Having venerated the glorious Triple Gem, benefactor of the three worlds and everyone’s sole true companion, which, by overcoming both the defilements and the Māras, imparts the path of purity, the sole route to the felicity of liberation,

   I shall relate the story, [itself] a beautiful source of liberation, of the glorious Śākya king’s return to his natal city. Men of discernment, who seek the four aims of life, harken to the Extraordinary History of Our Auspicious Era (*Bhadrakalpāvādāna*)!  

2. Jayaśrī arose again from concentration: in order to expound the Doctrine of the Glorious One, he was staying at the Bodhimanḍapa [Monastery] together with members of the Order.

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1. *bhadralapa* (Pāli, *bhaddakappa*; adj. *kalpika*), name of a cosmic period or aeon, like the present one, in which five Buddhas appear. For the present Bhadrakalpa these are: Krakutsanda (or Krakucchanda), Kanakamuni, Kāśyapa, Śākyamuni (the historical Buddha), and Maitreya (the next Buddha, presently dwelling in the Tusiita heaven). The *Svayambhumārāṇa* narrates the mythological history in Nepal in terms of the activities of these Buddhas (plus the Bodhisattva Manjuśrī). In successive chapters adapted from the *Karunapundarikasūtra*, MJM XXV.6-8; XXVI.6-8; XXVII.7-15; XXVIII.5-6, 42-43, records the Tathāgata Ratnagarbha’s prediction that four of his disciples will become the four aforementioned Buddhas of the present Bhadrakalpa. In a later passage (XXIX.33-34), he identifies the five Buddhas of a future Bhadrakalpa. Additional references and discussion: Mv i.248, 336, 337; Avś i.237, 250; Divy 344, 346, 440, 447; Gv 2295-8, 2775-6; DN ii.2-4, tr. 199-200; AbhidhK (tr.) iii.192-193. Cf. I.18 n. The *Bhadralpikasūtra* (T 425; Tohoku 94; SS 82), a more elaborated tradition, contains accounts of 1000 Buddhas. Mv iii.330 (tr. iii.321 & n. 7), conflates the two traditions.

2. See also I.4, 7.

3. *sraighana dharma* (for v.11. see edition), adjectival form from *sṛighana*. If we may trust the Tibetan translation (*dpal stug*), as an epithet of the Buddha, *sṛighana*, ‘mass (or cloud) of glory’, occurs as early as the 1st cent. BC
3. At that, people of all four classes who had come to the Bodhimaṇḍapa [Monastery] to hear [the Dharma], bowed before and venerated the Teacher and gradually assembled there [before him].

4. Then, Jinaśrī, the disciples' leader, stood before him, removed the upper garment [from his right shoulder] and, raising his joined palms in reverence, said:

5. "[We have] heard the Śrīlalitavyūha⁵, O Teacher, by your gracious favour: now [we] long to hear the true story of the Lord of the Śākyas' homecoming.

6. "They long to listen, the members of this assembly; they have come, thirsting for the nectar of that narrative: O tiger among monks, do let them imbibe it."

7. Thus petitioned by Jinaśrī, Jayaśrī delightedly declared: "Listen, O disciples! I shall tell the tale as it has been taught by the masters [before me]...."

8. "[The Emperor] Aśoka,⁶ preceded by music in homage, and attended by ministers and citizens, proceeded to the Rooster Park [Monastery]⁷ to once again imbibe the nectar of the Dharma.

(XXII.15, XXVI.6). Frequent in BKA: I.21a, 88a, 89a, 144c, 150d, 154b, 160c, 191d, 236a, 249a; X.8a, 48a; XI.5d, 21b; XXVI.66a, 88a, 155b, 169c, 253b, 297b, 314c; XXXVI.87d, 178a; XXXVII.86b, 105c. So also in the avadānāmalā literature generally: see Avś II xxvi; Index to Ratnamālāvadāna (ed. K. Takahata, Tokyo 1954); Aśokāvadānāmalā I.1c, 3a (R. Mitra, The Sanskrit Buddhist Literature of Nepal, Calcutta 1882, p. 16), XXIV.12c (ed. Y. Iwamoto, Bukkyō setsurwa kenkyū josetsu, Tokyo 1978, p. 218). The Pāli equivalent, sirighana, occurs in the Dīpavamsa (ed.-tr. H. Oldenberg, London 1879), pp. 14, 118.

⁴ bodhimaṇḍapa = manifold (= Pāli id.; Tibetan: byan chub kyi sīniṅ po). The name of a monastery, either the one in Bodhgayā, founded in the sixth century, or another, modelled after or at least inspired by it, founded a thousand years later in the Nepal Valley. It may, however, also refer to the spot in Bodhgayā under the Bodhi Tree, quite near the first-mentioned monastery, where, according to all sources, Siddhārtha attained Awakening and so became the Buddha.

⁵ Presumably our Lalitavistara (LV); at I.10b, also called Vistara. This recounts, with much literary embellishment, the Buddha's career from his penultimate birth in the Tuṣita heaven to his Awakening and the first sermon in the Deer Park at Rṣipatana near Vārānasi.

⁶ On Aśoka (reigned circa 273-232 B.C.E.) in history and in connection with Buddhist piety and narrative traditions: É. Lamotte, History of Indian
9. “There, the king honoured, circumambulated and venerated Upagupta, who was surrounded by a vast multitude of monks. Then, folded hands raised in reverence, he said to him who was endowed with self-knowledge and who was seated on the Throne of Dharma:

Buddhism (Louvain-la-Neuve: Institut Orientaliste, 1988), pp. 223-258; J.S. Strong, The Legend of King Aśoka (Princeton, 1983); J.S. Walters, “Stūpa, Story, and Empire: Constructions of the Buddha Biography in Early Post-Aśokan India”, ed. J. Schober, Sacred Biography in the Buddhist Traditions of South and Southeast Asia (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1997), pp. 160-194; J.S. Strong, “Images of Aśoka: Some Indian and Sri Lankan Legends and their Development”, ed. A. Seneviratna, King Aśoka and Buddhism: Historical and Literary Studies (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1994), pp. 99-125. For the extant Sanskrit text of the Aśokāvadāna, see the Introduction, fn. 17. In his La légende de l’empereur Açoka dans les textes indiens et chinois (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1923), J. Przyluski has translated the Chinese sources. One of these, the Aśokarājasūtra (A yu wang ching, T 2043: vol. 50, pp. 131b-170a) is now available in English: R. Li, tr., The Biographical Scripture of King Aśoka (BDK English Tripitaka 76-II, Berkeley: Numata Center, 1993). The Aśokāvadānamāla (mostly unpublished: see Mitra, Sanskrit Literature of Nepal, pp. 6-11; MJM, ‘Einleitung’, p. 17) adapts the earlier legends about Aśoka somewhat as BKA does those concerning the Buddha and his family. The BKA is one of several mediaeval Newar verse narratives which are presented as a dialogue between Jinaśrī and Jayaśrī which itself ‘frames’ a dialogue between Aśoka and Upagupta, the latter of which then tells the story as he heard it from teachers before him, ostensibly passed down from the time of the Buddha.

7 kukkuṭārāma (= Pāli id. = kurkuṭa = kukkuṭāgāra). Name of Upagupta’s monastery in Pātaliputra (Aśoka’s capital): see Avś ii.2031; Divy 3757, 38112, 38428, 40620, 42311, 42422-23, 43014-24, 43120-21, 4345 (all from Aśokāvadāna); Aśokarājasūtra (tr. Li) 14, 21, 54, 64, 82-85, 88, 181, 182. The ‘colloquies’ between Aśoka and Upagupta which form the inner narrative frame in BKA and related texts are typically set in the Kukkuṭārāma: see BSvP 198; MJM I.32; GKV (Tucci, “La redazione poetica del Kāranda-vīyāha”, pp. 608-609); Lakṣaçaityasamutpatti (ed.-tr. T. Rajapatirana, Suvarṇāvarṇāvadāna and Lakṣaçaityasamutpatti, 3 vols., Ph.D. thesis, Canberra: Australian National University, 1974), vol. I, p. 1309; Aśokāvadānamālā (R. Mitra, Sanskrit Buddhist Literature, p. 6); Vicītrakārnikāvadānamālā (Y. Iwamoto, Bukkyō setsuwa kenkyū josetsu, Tokyo 1978, p. 19214).

8 aṣṭādaśa laksānām, ‘eighteen lakhs’ (18 x 100,000).

9 dharmāsana: in Buddhist monasteries, an elevated seat from which monks give instruction.
10. "The exquisite series of Birth-Stories, the ambrosial tale called \textit{Vistara}^10 \textendash these extinguishers of sin did [I] imbibe from your honour's lotus-mouth.

11. "Now [I] thirst for that pure ambrosia, [your account of] the Buddha's return to his own city. What \textit{was} it that happened in the city called Kapila[vastu], filled with the pain of separation?

12. "How was it for Yasodhara\textsuperscript{11}, pregnant and grieved by separation [from her husband]? [How was it] for Gautami\textsuperscript{12} and the eighty-four thousand other women who [also] loved him?

\textsuperscript{10} A reference to LV; cf. \textit{Śrīlalitavyūha}, I.5 above.

\textsuperscript{11} In BKA, the Buddha has one wife, called throughout both Yasodharā (occasionally Yaśodevi, Śridevi, Śrīdharā) and Gopā (occasionally Gopikā). In \textit{Mv} (i.128\textsuperscript{13}, ii.25\textsuperscript{12}, 487, 692 ff., 72\textsuperscript{18} ff., 73\textsuperscript{5}, 135\textsuperscript{13}, iii.102\textsuperscript{4} ff., 116\textsuperscript{12} ff, etc.), Yasodharā is her only name, as also at Divy 253\textsuperscript{26} and Bc II.26. On Yasodharā in Pāli literature, DPPN II 741-744, s.v. Rāhulamātā. To this may be added a translation and new edition of the \textit{Yasodharā theri-apaṭḍhāna}: S. Mellick, \textit{A Critical Edition, with Translation, of Selected Portions of the Pāli Apadāna}, D.Phil. thesis, Oxford University, 1993, vol. II, pp. 527-590. In LV, the Buddha's wife is called Gopā (142\textsuperscript{8} ff., 157\textsuperscript{4} ff., 194\textsuperscript{7} ff., 230\textsuperscript{3} ff.), or Gopikā (235\textsuperscript{21}, 237\textsuperscript{13}). According to Mpps (T 1509: 182b, tr. II 1003-1004), he had two wives, Yaśodharā and Gopā. In SBV (i.62, 64-65, 78) he has three \textendash Yaśodharā, Gopikā and Mrgajā \textendash which tradition is also followed in BAKL (XXIV.56, 62, 113). Three wives are also specified at ŚBC 101. Where the Bodhisattva marries more than one woman, it is always Yaśodharā who is identified as Rāhula's mother. For a bibliography of primary sources concerning the Buddha's wife, see Mpps tr. II 1001-1009. A. Bareau ("Un personnage bien mystérieux", pp. 52-59) concludes all traditions relating to the Buddha's wife are entirely legendary.

13. “How was it that Śuddhodana and all the rest were made to forget about the Master? How did he ordain the monks and protect the people? And after how many years did father and son meet?

14. “Therefore, O Teacher, by the offering of this ambrosial tale, quell the flames of grief, kindled by the pain of separation, which blaze in my heart.”

15. Thus requested by the king, Upagupta replied, “Listen well, Aśoka; I shall speak briefly.

16. “In that city, on account of [Sarvārthaśiddha’s] absence, she who was called Gopa suffered intensely; Gautamī became blind; the king’s heart was divided.

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13 All our sources identify Śuddhodana (Pāli, Su) as the Buddha’s father and king of the Śākyas of Kapilavastu: see DPPN and ED. A. Bareau, demonstrating this is not so in certain early canonical texts, concludes both attributions are legendary (“Le retour du Buddha à Kapilavastu dans les textes canoniques”, ed. G. Gnoli & L. Lanciotti, Orientalia Iosephi Tucci Memo-riae Dicata, Roma, 1986, pp. 41-56, esp. 53 ff.).

14 The ‘pain of separation’ refers to Aśoka, having lived long after the passing of the Buddha, being unable to actually meet the object of his devotion. In this Aśoka may be said to resemble his guru, Upagupta, who, in the Aśokāvadāna (ed. Mukhopadhyaya 2310-12, tr. Strong 192), in order to satisfy his devotional longings, forces Māra to take on the form of the Buddha, for having been ordained ‘one hundred years after the Blessed One entered parinirvāna’, he has ‘seen the Dharma-body, but...not the physical body of the Lord of the Triple World.’

15 The term ‘briefly’ is of course a relative one: by comparison to, say, the 100,000-verse Mahābhārata, the 10,000-verse BKA is brief indeed. On the other hand, it is comparable in length to many Purāṇas.

16 The Buddha’s personal name and the usual one in BKA. Mv, LV and BKA use both Sarvārthaśiddha and the synonymous Siddhārtha. At SBV i.4725, 4811-13, 4820-22 and BAKL XXIV.23, 38-39, he is given at birth three names: Sarvārthaśiddha, Śākyamuni and Devātideva: most often, however, SBV calls him, simply, ‘the Bodhisattva’. The Pāli tradition appears to know only Siddhattha.

17 See note on Yaśodhara, I.12 above.

18 Part of the legend is that Gautamī loses her eyesight through constant weeping at the loss of her son. Later, when the Buddha returns to Kapilavastu and displays his psychic powers by causing fire to stream from one side of his body and water from another, Yaśodhārā restores her mother-in-law’s sight by bathing her eyes with the water. See Mv iii.1167-17, tr. iii. 116; ŚBc 366. At BKA VIII.101 (Ce 72a7), Śuddhodana warns Gautami
17. “Chandaka” and Udāyin grieved, but Devadatta rejoiced; some of the people were distraught, but others sided with Devadatta.

that, blinded by incessant weeping, she will be unable to see her son when he does return (evam aśrūṣu mukteṣu netraṁśo bhavisyati / prayāgatasya putrasya kathām drṣye tada mukham //). At IX.142 (Ce 78a3-4), her grief both consumes her flesh and destroys her eyesight (athāsau gautami rājī śokādhikāryāṅgikā / vilapitvāniśaṁ netraviṇāśam akarot tada //). Finally, at XXV.484-486 (Ce 204a5-6), upon his return, twelve years after his original departure, the Buddha provides, and Yasodharā applies, the remedy: ‘Then the Lord of Sages, seeing that Prajāpati was blind, emitted from his uṣṇīṣa the essence of ambrosia. Taking that ambrosia, Yasodharā rose and with it bathed Prajāpati’s eyes. Then, purified by that ambrosia, her heart and sensory organs fully cleansed, her eyes like lotuses in full bloom, Gautamī beheld that Lord of Sages’ (tataḥ paṣyan munindras tām andhībhūtām prajāpatim / svaṃśiṣaṁ amṛtam sāraṁ samutsṛjyāṁśaryat // tad amṛtam samādāya samutthāya yaśodharā / tena mātuḥ prajāpatyā akṣini abhyamarjayat // tamamṛtanvishuddhā sā sunirmalendriyāśrayā / vibuddhapundarikākṣa tām munindram samaiksata //).

19 Name of Sarvārthasiddha’s squire and childhood friend. According to Mv (ii.15913-1609), when, in the dead of night, the Prince orders him to bring his horse that he may flee Kapilavastu to take up the religious life, Chandaka cries out to warn the king and people, but devas render the populace insensible. Later that night, the Bodhisattva sends Chandaka back to the city with his jewellery, his horse Kanthaka and with greetings for all his relatives except for Yasodharā (Mv ii.16611-14). Cf. SBV i.84-92, Bc VI.25-41 and BAKL XXIV.147 ff. Years later, Chandaka and Udāyin are sent to Rājagṛha by the King to convince the Buddha to return home that his kinsmen might benefit from his teaching (Mv ii.23310-16, iii.90-93; ŚBc 349). The two men join the Sangha and eventually accompany the Buddha back to Kapilavastu (Mv iii.94-101, ŚBc 346-349). BKA XXV.35-197 (Ce 189a1-194a7) closely follows the tradition represented by these last two.

20 Son of Śuddhodana’s family priest and another childhood friend of the Buddha. See also preceeding note.

21 The Buddha’s cousin and ‘Judas’ of the Buddhist tradition, infamous for inciting Prince Ajātaśatrū to parricide (Vin ii.190, tr. BD V 266; Divy 28018, SBV ii.70-71, 135-136, 155-159), for attempting to replace the Buddha as head of the Order (Vin ii.188, tr. BD V 264; SBV ii.732 ff., 74′ ff.; A. Bareau, “Les agissements de Devadatta selon les chapitres relatifs au schisme dans les divers Vinayapiṭakā”, Bulletin de l’École Française d’Extremé-Orient 78, 1991, pp. 93, 95, 115-118), and to murder the Buddha (Vin ii.191-195, tr. BD V 266-274; SBV ii.166-168, 187-189, 260-262; Ekottarāgama [T 125], p. 803b-c; Bareau, “Les agissements de Devadatta”, pp. 94-104, 119-120). Other traditions state that the Buddha refused to ordain Devadatta (Mv iii.1813-4, tr. iii.177; Ekottarāgama [T 125], p.
18. "Although the Glorious Lord had by then occupied the Fourth Seat,\(^{22}\) his heart's desire fulfilled, he retained a desire to return to his own city.

19. "Then, on the thirteenth day of \(\text{āśādha}^{23}\), full of joy, Vidhi\(^{24}\), Acyuta\(^{25}\) and Mṛda\(^{26}\), together with Indra, the Lokapālas and other gods, [all] born from the body of Avalokita\(^{27}\),

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\(^{22}\) I.e., had become the fourth Buddha of the present Auspicious Aeon (Bhadra kesala): Krakucchanda, Kanakamuni and Kāśyapa (ED, s.vv.) are his three legendary predecessors: so glossed Ce 2a. Maitreya is to be the fifth. Cf. Mv i.3185 ff.: the Buddha, staying in Venu dinga in Kosala, when asked by Ananda the reason for his smile, points out the hermitages, huts, walking-halls and personal seats of these three of his predecessors. For canonical accounts of these previous Buddhas, see Mahāvadānasūtra (ed.-tr. E. Waldschmidt, 2 vols., Berlin, 1952-56) and Mahāpadānasūtta (DN ii.1-54, tr. 199-221). A late Pāli account is found at Buddhavaṅga XXIII-XXVI (ed. N.A. Jayawickrama, Buddhavānga and Cariyāpiṭaka, London 1974; tr. I.B. Horner, Minor Anthologies of the Pāli Canon, Part III, London 1975).

\(^{23}\) Cf. Mv iii.34016 (tr. iii.335), which, in its fifth rendition of the event, places the Buddha’s first public discourse (dharma cakrapravartana) ‘on the twelfth day of the second fortnight of the month āśādha [June-July] after the midday meal’ (atha khalu bhagavāṁ āśādhamāsasya uttarapakṣe dvādaśiyam paścābhaktah). NK 8121-26 (tr. 109), concurs as to the month (Pāli: Āsālhi), but specifies that the Buddha did not meet up with the five ascetics to whom he first preached the doctrine until the evening of the fourteenth, i.e., full-moon, day. ŚBc 261 agrees with Mv as to the time of day, but gives the date as ‘the fifteenth day of the month of Vaishya’ (Vaiśākha [April-May]?). LV (3461-3, tr. Bays II 628) mentions no day or month but concurs with NK insofar as it describes the Buddha discoursing only in the second and third watches of the night.

\(^{24}\) ‘Performer, creator’: epithet of Brahmaca.
20. "Accompanied by the Four Great Kings and a host of other deities, each one attended by his own retinue, appeared at that spot, overjoyed.

21. "They bowed before and worshipped the Buddha, circumambulated him, and after gazing into the face of the Lord, assembled according to rank.

22. "Then the Glorious Lord said to the Auspicious Company of Five: 

"Listen to the incomparable Dharma! I will explain all in brief."

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25 'Not fallen, imperishable': epithet of Viṣṇu-Kṛṣṇa (Bhagavadgītā 1.21).
26 'Gracious, compassionate': epithet of Śiva.
27 Although SP 25129-25216, tr. 410-412 lists various forms in which Avalokiteśvara expounds the Dharma, including those of Brahmā, Īśvara and Maheśvara, here the reference is to the 'cosmic' Avalokiteśvara, who creates the world and the gods. While this myth is depicted in Kv (26428-26510), the allusion here is specifically to GKV, the Newar verse version which adapts it. On this, see GKV III, Maheśvarādidevasamutpādana (A 30a4 ff., B 23a7 ff.); É. Burnouf, Introduction à l'histoire du Buddhism indien, pp. 197-198.
28 paścaka bhadra-vargika. This refers to the group of five ascetics, the Buddha's former disciples (present though not hitherto mentioned), who had previously abandoned him when he forsook self-mortification. After attaining Awakening, he realized that his former teachers, Udraka Rāmaputra and Arāḍa Kālāma, had already died and sought out the five in the Deer Park near Benares. In Sanskrit sources the names of the five are usually given as Ājñāta Kaundinya, Aśvajit (in Mv and BKA, Aśvakin), BhadraKā, Vāśpa and Mahānāma. See Mv tr. iii.31 n. 2 and ED, s.vv. paścaka, bhadra-vargiya for other references. In Pāli texts the five are referred to as the paścavaggaṇī bhikkhū (Vin i.8, MN i.171). The Pāli term bhaddavaggiya refers to a group of thirty men, converted by the Buddha somewhat later (BKA X; Mv iii.375-376; Vin i.23; A. Barea, Recherches sur la biographie du Buddha dans les Sūtrapitaka et les Vinayapitaka anciens I, Paris 1963, pp. 253-256).
What follows is our author’s version, reduced to a mere eight verses (1.23-30) of the Buddha’s first public discourse, the famous Dharma­
cakrapravartana Sūtra, or ‘Setting in Motion the Wheel of the
Doctrine’29. Here the Buddha explains to the five monks that the
five constituents of the human person (pañcaskandha) are imperman­
ent (anitya), insubstantial (anātman) and therefore characterised by
suffering (dukkha). Then the god Brahmā interjects with a hymn of
praise (stotra) and a request for the Buddha to expound the Dharma
in greater detail. As its title suggests, this sets the tone for most of the
remainder of the chapter, which consists of a series of exchanges
between the Buddha and the deities in his audience: Brahmā (31­
59), Viṣṇu (60-100), Śiva (101-141) Śakra ([Indra]142-160), the
Nine Planets (navagraha; 161-189) and, finally, Sanatkumāra (190­
240), here described as the ‘physician of heaven’ (svarvaidya). The
Buddha admonishes and encourages each in turn: he takes each one
to task for failing to properly carry out the cosmological, religious
and ethical duties which Avalokiteśvara (Lokeśvara) had assigned to
each at the time he generated them out of his own body; then, hold­
ing out the promise of Nirvāṇa, the Buddha encourages each to re­
double his efforts. Each deity responds with a hymn of praise (sto­
tra, stuti) and a promise to mend his ways and to do better in the
future. What emerges is a picture of the Hindu gods as well-meaning,
if rather bumbling, Buddhist lay-disciples. Only in the last dozen
verses of the chapter (241-252 [Ce 11a7-b6]) does the Buddha again
turn his attention to the five monks, and to his avowed mission to re­
turn to Kapilavastu. These twelve verses, which immediately pre­
cede the long account of Yaśodharā’s trials in Kapilavastu, are as
follows:]

29 For accounts of the First Discourse, see: Mv iii.33017-34117, tr. iii.322­
337; LV 3461-34711, tr. Bays II 628-632; ŚBc 251-256; SBV i.13411-13917;
Bc XV.14-58; NK 8117-8219, tr. 109-110; SN iii.66-68, v.420-423; Vin i.
10-14, tr. BD IV 14-21; Bareau, Recherches sur la biographie du Buddha I,
pp. 190-196.
241. Then the Glorious Lord addressed the Auspicious Company of Five: "Listen, monks. You have accumulated good [deeds] from previous [births].

242. "In [this] time of the fivefold degeneration\(^{30}\), people are difficult to tame and unreceptive to instruction; they commit the ten evil deeds\(^{31}\) and revile teachers of the True Doctrine.

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\(^{30}\) The 'time of the five degenerations' (\(\text{pañcakaśāyika kāla;}\) in LV & SP: \(\text{o kaśaya kāla or o kaśāyakaśāla}\)) refers to a Buddhist version of the pan-Indian belief that we have not so much 'evolved' as 'devolved' from our distant ancestors. Specifically, there has come about degeneration in life-span (\(\text{āyuh-kaśāya}\)), in doctrinal or philosophical understanding (\(\text{drṣṭi-}\)), in extent of moral failings and cognitive limitations (\(\text{klesi-}\)), of the overall 'quality' of living beings (\(\text{sattva-}\)) and indeed of the age as a whole (\(\text{kalpa-}\)). Both LV (207\(^{11-13}, 214\text{-}^2,\) tr. Bays II 379, 390) and SP (43\(^{3-5},\) tr. 58-59) refer to the difficulty of the Buddha’s task in such a degenerate age.

\(^{31}\) The ten are listed at BKA XXXII.464-467 (ed.-tr. R. Handurukande, “Daśakuśalakarmapatha: The Path of Ten Good Actions”, Sri Lanka Journal of the Humanities 12, 1986, p. 42): ‘Bodily evil is three-fold; that arising from speech four-fold; and that of mind three-fold. The ten evils are known as being of that manner. Injury to life, theft and improper behaviour relating to the senses arise out of one’s body, (their ill-effects being) shortness of life, poverty, not having a wife, and birth in an evil state in the end. False speech, slander, harsh (words) and loose talk are (the evils) of speech, (their consequences being) a leprous body, dumbness, being reviled and being shunned by others. Desire, malice towards others and false views are (the evils) of the mind. Being subject to the aversion and hostility of all and defectiveness of limb, are known to be their results’ (\(\text{śaṭīrām trividhaṃ pāpam vānibhavam caturvidham / trayāṃ mānasikām tadvad daśākuśalikāṃ smṛtam / sādaṭṭādānahimśā ca kāmamithyā śārīra-jām / dinasvalpyaśau vāmāhānim ane ca durgātih / mrṣāvādaś ca paśunyām raudram bhinnam ca vācikam / kuṣṭhakāya ca mūrkhaś ca bharīyamāno janojjhitaḥ / abhī̄dhya ca paraśrodham mithyādṛśī ca mānasam / sarvāpiyavadrohotvam hīnāṅgam tatphalam viduḥ // ). Cf. Mv i.107\(^{13-15},\) tr. i.85; ii.99\(^{5-15},\) tr. ii.96; Divy 301\(^{22-25},\) 302\text{-}10; BAKL VI.173-176; R. Handurukande, “Daśākuśalakarmaphala”, Kalyāṇi: Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of the University of Kelaniya 5-6, 1986-1987, pp. 43-48. In the Newar Upośadha Observance, the officiating priest enjoins the participants to ‘abandon the ten kinds of sin’ and describes the karmic consequences of each (Locke, “Upośadha Vrata”, p. 174: Gellner, Monk, Householder, Tantric Priest, pp. 117-118).
243. “It is to deliver them all from Samsāra that I have come to this Earth. Therefore, in order to awaken [them from the sleep of ignorance], I must travel to every region and country.
244. “Should I not, people will never hear the Discourse of Truth. Therefore, heeding Brahmā’s words, I have set in motion the wheel [of the Doctrine].
245. “And were I now to remain here in this grove, my vow could not be fulfilled – nor should [you] monks remain here.
246. “Therefore I shall leave this grove and return to my own country, expounding Dharma and delivering people from Samsāra along the way.
247. “Some I shall ordain as monks. Accompanied by them, I shall publicise my spiritual authority and return to the city of Kapilavastu.
248. “There, while in residence in the Banyan Grove, I shall ordain innumerable monks. For this reason – in order to deliver [people from Samsāra] – I must leave this place.”
249. “Having spoken thus, the Glorious One (srighana) further said to that auspicious company: “You are fortunate to have sown seeds in the True Doctrine in previous births,
250. “As a result of which you are now monks imbibing its nectar: The [karmic] bases for this I shall explain when I am in residence at the Banyan Grove.”
251. After listening to what their teacher had said, the company of five addressed the Glorious One: “Let us go! Let us go quickly!”
252. And so, on the following day, the first of the dark half of the month of Aindra [Jyeṣṭha], the Glorious One, accompanied by the five, set out from that grove.

32 This refers to the stories of previous births which the Buddha relates in Chs. 27-34.
33 I have not yet critically edited this particular passage. The text, as collated from Ce and two other MSS., is as follows: sribhagavān āha pañcakān bhadraṅgikān / śrūdhvaṃ bhikṣavo yūyaṃ pūrvāropitakauśalāḥ // 241 // pañcakāṣṭhyike kāle dūrdantā duranubodhakāḥ / daśākausalikā lokāḥ sad-dharmagurunindakāḥ // 242 // tān uddhārayitum sarvāṃ āgato ‘ṣmi mahiṭale / tasmāt sarvatra gantavyam śthāne đeśe prabodhitum // 243 // vināṃsadm-gamnanāl lokāḥ śroṣyantī naiva sākṣathāṃ / brahmavākyam iti śrūtvā mayā cakrāṃ pravartitam // 244 // pratijñā na tu pūryeta sthitvātraivādhuṇā vane
Chapter II: Yaśodharā, with Child

1. Then Upagupta said to Aśoka and the members of the assembly, "Let this entire company harken to the story of Kapilavastu.

2. "Of the suffering of Yaśodharā and Gautamī I shall tell. At that time, the wife of the Glorious Lord, as if she were a widow, undertook an ascetic observance."

34 BKA continues the widespread tradition that Yaśodharā emulated her husband's austerities. MV (ii.233.4 - 9, tr. ii.220) thus describes Yaśodharā’s reaction to reports of Siddhartha's ascetic practices: ‘It is not right or fitting that, while my noble husband is suffering, living a hard life, lying on a couch of grass and subsisting on coarse fare, I should be eating royal food in the royal palace, drinking royal drinks, wearing royal clothes and having royal beds made for me. Let me now then live on scanty fare, wear common clothes, and have my bed made of straw.’ So she ate scanty fare, wore common clothes and had her bed made of straw’ (na etam mama sādhu bhaveya na pratirūpam yam aham āryaputreṇa duṣkhitaṃ duskaram caraṃtena trnasamstaraṇakaṃ lūḥāhārena aham iha rājakule rājārāṇi bhohanāni bhunjeyam rājārāṇi pānāni pibeyam rājārāṇi vastrāṇi dhārayeyam rājārāṇī saavyāsanāni kalpayeyam/ yam niṇāham pi lūkham ca āhāram āhāreyaṃ prākṛtāni ca vastrāṇi dhārayeyam trnasamstare pi sayyām kalpayeyam/ sā dāni lūkham ca āhāram āhāresi prākṛtāni pi vastrāṇi dhārayesi trnasamstare pi sayyām kalpayesi/). Reprised in verse, ii.234.8 - 10, tr. ii. 221. Cf. ŚBc 346: “Then Yaśodharā, the Śākya princess, having heard of the privations and sufferings endured by her Lord, immediately laid aside her jewels and fine clothing, and used none but the commonest food, for she said, ‘How shall I enjoy the luxuries of a royal residence, and partake of delicate food, whilst my lord is thus enduring affliction and want. I will even share..."
3. “Putting off her colourful garments of fine silk, wearing plain white cloth, the faithful wife went without jewelry and renounced [the use of] garlands, flowers, sandal paste and the like.

4. “She eschewed all bodily adornment as well as oils and other unguents. The grieving woman never slept on a bed [or sat] on a cushioned seat.

5. “Subsisting on roots and fruits, the pious lady practised the Poṣadha Observance. She contented herself with the five pure foods, [but] occasionally took milk-rice porridge.

6. “In this way, with no desire for flesh-food, she lived as an ascetic, [thinking], ‘Is there a woman who partakes of such suffering as I who has been abandoned by such a husband [as Sarvārthasiddha]?’

his self-privatlon and suffer the same pain’. Cf. LV 18917-20, tr. I 344: ‘I will drink neither mead nor spirits; I will sleep on the ground and wear the tangled hair of ascetics; I will refrain from bathing and will take up a vow of asceticism — until I see the Bodhisattva, that repository of virtues’. (na pāṣyi pāṇam na ca madhu na pramādaṁ bhūmau śaviṣyate jaṭamakūṭam dharisy / snānam jahitvā vratata pa acarisyā vāvan na drakṣye gudhaharva bodhisattvam //). Cf. SBV i.10614-19: ‘When, together with the other palace women, Princess Yaśodhāra learned of her lord’s condition, grief overwhelmed her: her face streamed tears; she removed her garlands and ornaments and, despondent, practised harsh austerities. For meals she took one sesame seed, one grain of rice, one jujube fruit, a single lentil, a single bean; she made her bed from straw. And her unborn child stopped growing.’ (sārdham antahpurenā yaśodhārā devī bhartus tadavasthāṁ pra­ti­srutya bhartṣokābhibhūtā bāspārdravadanā vinirmuktābhāṇānā vi­śannā duṣkaraṁ carati; ekam ilam āhāram āhārati; ekam tadulam, ekam kolam, ekam kulattham, ekam mudgam; tṛnasamstare ca śayyāṁ kalpayati; tasyāḥ sa garbho layam gataḥ). Cf. NK (9031-916, tr. 122) where, after the Buddha’s return, Suddhodana informs him of the austerities his wife had practised in his absence. Bc VIII.70-80 eloquently portrays Yaśodhāra’s grief and anger at her husband forsaking her, but makes no suggestion that she emulated his austerities.

Poṣadha vrata (= upoṣadha vrata), II.184d, IV.16.

Paṇcāmrta, ‘the five nectars’, viz., a mixture of milk, curds, ghee, honey and sugar, used all over India from pre-Buddhist times for a variety of blessings and offerings; may also be consumed as sanctified food (prasāda) by the worshipper. For the ‘five nectars’ in Newar Buddhist ritual, see Locke, Karunāmaya, pp. 74-75; Locke, “Upoṣadha Vrata”, p. 166.

Exactly these foods are permitted to participants in the Newar Poṣadha Observance (upoṣadhavratā, aṣṭāmiḥvratā). References in preceding note.
7. "'Now what am I to do? Ill-fated am I in every way.' Thus burdened with cares, Gopā [nevertheless] practised the Observance for his sake.

8. "'Born with a body of surpassing, divine beauty into a distinguished family, I am daughter-in-law to the universal monarch\(^{38}\), King Suddhodana.

9-10. "'My husband is the world’s guardian,\(^ {39} \) yet greatly do I suffer. Ah! Alas! What actions of mine in previous births led my husband to abandon such happiness now to live homeless in the forest? By remaining in this kingdom, sick with grief at separation from my husband, what happiness [can there be for me]?

11. "'Yet where can I go, now that I am with child? Until my son is born, my only refuge is here.

12. "'And for his sake, in order to protect [him], I must unflinchingly maintain my Observance. When I am delivered of a son, then will I go to him!

13-14. "'[Either] by constantly worshipping him I shall train for Awakening, or let my husband return quickly, his heart’s desire fulfilled. Then, by imbibing the ambrosia of his words, I shall attain final emancipation." Thus did Yaśodhāra quell the flames of grief with the waters of understanding.

15. "'May his wish be speedily fulfilled! May he return quickly to my sight!' So thinking, Gopā practised her Observance.

16. "'As the days passed, the pious Yaśodhāra, being in that condition which deranges the appetite, grew haggard and pale.

17. "'She remained satisfied with her scanty diet, but gradually, due to the ascetic practice and the strain of pregnancy, her body and limbs wasted away as the child in her womb grew.

18. "'[Although] she was oppressed by hunger and thirst, her breasts swelled, appearing as lovely as twin lotus-blossoms on each of which perches a black bee.

19. "'As she gradually grew emaciated, even her radiant complexion dimmed, and Princess Yaśodhāra became pale as burnished silver.

\(^{38}\) See II.41 n.

\(^{39}\) bhartā mama jagadbhartā: a play on words here, as bhartr (MW, s.v.) is both a general term for ‘supporter, lord, master’ and a word for ‘husband’.
20. "So it was that, pregnant and sick with the pain of separation, day by day that truth-speaking woman grew ever more oppressed by the burden of the child in her womb.

21. "Gautami, [herelf] a mother afflicted by her son’s absence, saw that Yasodharā was pregnant, and experienced a degree of joy:

22. "'That ambrosia, a grandson’s lotus-face, shall quell that fire of grief, the separation from my son, which blazes in my heart. How fitting!'\(^{40}\)

23. "'Now that she is pregnant, Gopa will at long last bear a son for my husband, Śuddhodana, and his subjects, as well as for me.

24. "'He will dispel an enormous grief as well as preserve the family.' So she reasoned, and in her heart was a little joy.

25. "[Gautami] served Yasodharā with wholesome foods every day; as for King Śuddhodana, she told him the news.

26. "And when he heard about Gopa’s happiness, he was overjoyed, declaring, 'Just as my son is strong and courageous, so will be his.

27-28b. "'Whatever good took place at my [son’s] birth, may the same come to pass at the birth of this [grandson]! But let two things not be the same: [namely], the mother dying on the seventh day after giving birth\(^{41}\) and the son abandoning both kingdom and family for the life of an ascetic\(^{42}\).

\(^{40}\) I.e., how fitting that, having lost Sarvārthasiddha to the religious life, Gautami will gain a grandson, her husband an heir and, after his passing, the kingdom a new ruler of royal blood.

\(^{41}\) Although explanations vary, our sources concur that Queen Māyā died seven days after giving birth to the Bodhisattva: Mv i.1993-4 (tr. i.157), ii.31 (tr. ii.3); ŚBc 63; LV 771-2 (tr. I 147); SBV i.5119-21; Bc II.18; BAKL XXIV.37cd; NK 4925-29 (tr. 66). See also: A. Foucher, *La vie du Bouddha d’après les textes et les monuments de l’Inde* (Paris: Maisonneuve, 1949), pp. 65-69; A. Bareau, "La jeunesse du Buddha dans les Śūtrapitaka et les Vinayapitaka anciens," *Bulletin de l’École Francaise d’Extrême-Orient* 61, 1974, pp. 208-209, 217. However, Bareau (ibid., p. 250) notes that the early canonical accounts of the Bodhisattva’s flight from Kapilavastu depict him leaving behind only his weeping mother and father. In two passages, Mv (ii.6820-692, 11718-1181) itself preserves this tradition.

\(^{42}\) This is the Great Renunciation (*mahābhīhīṃskramaṇa*): Mv ii.11715-1181, 1402-16614 (tr. ii.114, 134-161); ŚBc 129-140; SBV i.84-92; LV 163-196.
28c-29. "[This grandchild] is a great ocean for the fire of my grief, a medicinal herb for the illness of separation! [He is] a great raincloud for [this] withered bamboo! May he be born at full term and without mishap, that he may quell the flames of grief and swell the stream of joy!

30-31. "When I imbibe the nectar that is his face, I shall be made to live happily, and after giving him the chowrie and the parasol, installing him upon the glorious lion-throne, and setting aside the kingdom in its entirety, I shall live as an ascetic in the forest, while he shall swell that ocean, the Sakya lineage, with righteous men.

32. "He shall cleave to the life of a householder and inaugurate a dynasty. May this blessed lady in due course bear such a son, and without travail.

(tr. I 301-353); BAKL XXIV.145-181; Bc V.39-87; NK 60-65 (tr. 81-87). Bareau ("La jeunesse du Buddha, pp. 246-260) evaluates the early canonical sources.

43 suskavamśa here also means 'depleted lineage', referring to the king being without an heir after Sarvarthasiddha adopts the life of a religious mendicant.

44 Suddhodana does indeed retire to a forest hermitage (as does the Bodhisattva in many jātakas), but not quite in the way he anticipates here. The final chapter, XXXVIII, begins with the Buddha announcing that it is time for him to move on. Suddhodana implores his son to make Kapilavastu his permanent base. The Buddha explains he must expound Dharma everywhere, counsels the king to build and worship at a caitya, describes the soteriological benefits of so doing and gives some of his hair and fingernails to be deposited in the caityagarbha (1-85 [376b5-379b2]). Suddhodana has one caitya built in the city and assists the Buddha at his great-grandson’s consecration (93-104 [Ce 379b5-380a3]). Finally, the Buddha, promising to visit again in the future, departs for Svarabhū in Nepal and Suddhodana retires to the forest. There he builds a second caitya and passes his time worshipping and practising the Paramitas (114-122 [380b1-7]). In Bc (XIX.41), Suddhodana does not retire to the forest, but turns over the kingdom to his brother and lives in the palace as a ‘royal seer’. In NK (9018-20, tr. 122), he remains king, does not go to the forest, and attains arhatship on his deathbed. We may also note the curious tradition recorded in the Mahāsākā Vinaya (T 1421: 185b; tr. Bareau, "Le retour du Buddha à Kapilavastu", p. 44), where, at his first encounter with the Buddha after the latter’s return to Kapilavastu, Suddhodana requests (and is refused) ordination.
33. "The blessed, dutiful Gopa is my very best daughter-in-law: when she gives birth, this blindness, the grief of separation, my grandson's eyes will dispel.

34. "My other daughters-in-law, by comparison, fan the flames of grief: they cast spells with wealth, silken garments, ornaments and such; they are deceitful and bereft of good qualities.\(^{45}\)

35. "For women there are three virtues: hospitality to guests, fidelity to their husbands, and bearing sons\(^{46}\). It is these on which a family depends. [And] although not one of these [is to be found] among my other daughters-in-law, Gopa possesses them [all].

36. "As was my joy at the birth of Sarvarthasiddha so, O Gautami, is my joy now at hearing the news you have brought, [for] surely Yasodharā will give birth to a son like him!

37. "Also, my omniscient son, when the dear boy was abandoning me, said, "A son like me will be born to your daughter-in-law; therefore, grieve not."

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\(^{45}\) Presumably these other 'daughters-in-law' (concubines, we would say) are the 84,000 women mentioned in I.12, the very ones whose distressing corporeality is the final inspiration for Sarvārthasiddha to leave home, as portrayed in the famous 'harem-scene' (e.g., Mv ii.1593-10; LV 168\(^{16}\)-170\(^{15}\), tr. I 310-314; SBV i.81-82).

\(^{46}\) Cf. the following verse from the Newar Buddhist Wedding Dialogue (Gellner, Monk, Householder, Tantric Priest, p. 230): 'Women have innumerable faults, but only three virtues: carrying on family life, bearing sons and accompanying their husbands at death' (strīnāṃ dosasahasrāṇi triṇi gumāni eva ca / kulacārā sutotpatti marane patinā saha /). The parents of the bridegroom cite this verse to point out how important it is for a woman to marry. What appears to be the allusion to the practice of the widow joining her dead husband on the funeral pyre (sati) is so far as I know only a Hindu custom. Did Newar Buddhists at one time practise sati? Gellner does not comment. The Wedding Dialogue makes Siddhārtha's marriage to Yasodharā the model to be emulated (ibid., p. 229): "The following is said by the bride's side: 'In this world it is only humans who practise ten types of sacramental religious duty (samskāra dharma), from conception (garbhādhāna [sic]) up to marriage. A man cannot fulfil his sacramental religious duty without going through the Ten Sacraments. In accordance with this rule the prince Siddhārtha [the future Buddha] first married Yasodharā and only then did he renounce the homely life and go forth to obtain complete enlightenment.'"
38. "'Soon then, we shall show [to the world] our grandson’s face, and he who [now] dwells in the womb will, as did his father, bestow great joy.

39-40. "Upon beholding her son’s moon-face, the fortunate Yaśodhārā, Daṇḍapāṇi’s beloved daughter⁴⁷, who is endowed with the thirty-two marks,⁴⁸ devoted to her husband and to her ascetic practice, will dispel the darkness that is her grief.' And having thus praised Gopā, Suddhodana again spoke to Gautāmī:

41. "'My dear, you mustn’t grieve, for the birth of a grandson is imminent, a universal monarch who will care for us and maintain the lineage.

42. "'Therefore abandon this grief and take care of Yaśodhārā, [for] if you are sorrowful, Gopā will be tormented that much more by separation.

⁴⁷ In making Daṇḍapāṇi Rāhulamātr’s father, BKA here follows the tradition adopted by LV (110²¹, 111⁵, etc., tr. I 217 ff.) and SBV (1.6²¹-²). In Mv (ii.4⁸⁷, 7³⁴ ff.), ŠBc (8⁰) and the Kuo ch'ū hsien tsai yin kuo ching (T 1⁸⁹, tr. 4³⁵-4⁴³ C.E.; Péri, “Les femmes de Śākyamuni”, pp. 1₄-1₅), he is called Mahānāma(n). Another tradition identifies her father as Suprabuddha (Pāli: Suppabuddha): see Hsiu hsing pên ch’i ching (T 1₈⁴, tr. 1⁹⁷ C.E.; Péri, pp. 1₁-1₃) and DhpA iii.4₄-4₅, tr. ii.2⁹₁-2⁹₂. The Pāli tradition identifies Daṇḍapāṇi as the Buddha’s maternal uncle (DPPN).

⁴⁸ dvātrīṃśalakṣana. Attributed to Yaśodhārā also at II.1⁰₆; III.5⁵, 1₂⁵; IV.1⁷₁, 2⁷², 4₁₃, 4⁶₅. I am in some perplexity about this term. It appears that our author, in his efforts to depict Yaśodhārā as a consort worthy of the Buddha, has decided to attribute to her the feminine equivalent of the ‘thirty-two marks of a great man’ (dvātrīṃśan mahāpuruṣalakṣaṇāni). These ‘marks’ are the distinguishing physical characteristics of one destined to become a ruler (cakravartin) or saviour (buddha) of the world, on which see Mv i.2²₂⁶ []; tr. i.1₈₀-1₈₂; ii.2⁹¹⁷-3⁰₆, tr. ii.2⁵-2₆; LV 8₁₆₅-8₂₆, tr. I 1₅₅-1₅₆; LV 3⁵₄⁹-3⁵₆₁₈, tr. II 6⁴₇-6₅₃ (includes karmic basis for each); SBV i.₄⁹²³-₅₁¹⁷; ŠBc 5₄-₅₅; DN iii.1₄₂-1₄₆, tr. 4₄¹-4₄² (followed by karmic explanations); Mpps tr. 2₇₁-2₇₈ (scholastic disquisition). Tibetan sources attribute possession of the ‘thirty-two marks’ to the 1₂ᵗʰ-century female Tantric teacher, Siddharājñī (Miranda Shaw, Passionate Enlightenment: Women in Tantric Buddhism, Princeton: The University Press, 1₉₉₄, p. 1₁₉). Cf. the quite different ‘thirty-two good qualities’ (dvātrīṃśad guṇāḥ) which, according to LV (1₈²¹-₁₉², tr. I 4₂-4₃) and ŠBc (3₂), are required of the Bodhisattva’s mother.
43. "'She may become unable to sustain life, due to her fasting: therefore be happy yourself that you may encourage her to be happy.

44. "Dissuade her from her grief, from her ascetic observance, and from her unwholesome diet. How can a pregnant woman endure such an observance?

45. "Hence, my dear, she is at all times to be nourished with the finest wholesome foods.' After this conversation with Gautami, the king was very pleased.

46. "Whatever meals or other foods she wishes to eat, she is to be given; if she is embarrassed and will not speak, you must correctly divine [what she wants].

47-48b. "[Gopā is] sick with grief at being separated from her husband. On no account treat her disrespectfully.' Heeding her husband’s words, Gautami cared for the pregnant Gopā with wholesome foods as she wished.

48c-49. "On one occasion Gautami said to her, gaunt and suffering due to her ascetic observances: 'Gopā, you are constantly oppressed by the burden of your unborn child; you have become pale, emaciated and weak from lack of food;

50. "'How, then, can you continue your Observance, pious lady? Because of it, and your diet of [roots and] fruits, you are wasting away, my daughter.

51. "'Therefore, while you are pregnant, live in the confinement pavilion, meditate constantly on the Triple Gem and occupy yourself with nurturing your unborn child.

52. "'Give up [roots and] fruits and the rest of it! Apply scented oils [and cosmetics]! Enjoy hearty, nourishing foods! Beautify yourself!

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49 tathā samyag vicāraya. Following ED, s.v. vicārayati.
50 mādapa vāsikā. Cf. Pāli māla, māla, māda, maṇḍapa (PED, s.vv.); Skt. maṇḍapa, maṇḍapa (MW, s.vv.); BHS māda, mandalamāda, mandalamāla, maṇḍalavāta (ED, s.vv.). All these terms denote some kind of pavilion, hall, building or marked-out space, often used for ecclesiastical ceremonies or as a place where people assemble to celebrate festivals or attend spectacles. In the present context, mādapa appears to be equivalent to sūtikāgrha or sūtikāgāra, ‘lying-in chamber’, a special room or building set aside for women about to give birth.
53. "'Why behave as if you were a widow? Your husband is alive, Yaśodharā. Abandon your grief, then, and from now on eat whatever you like.

54. "'Conduct yourself in such a way that the baby will be protected! [Indeed], although delighted, your father-in-law, who is very fond of you, says:

55. "'My daughter-in-law Yaśodharā is to be nourished with whatever wholesome foods she desires, for she will bear a jewel of a son who will illuminate our benighted family.'

56. "'Therefore, do not worry – describe your favourite food.' On hearing these words of her mother-in-law, Yaśodharā replied to her.

57. "Sighing deeply, tears in her eyes, voice tremulous, the devout woman [said] faintly, 'How can I forsake my Observance, Mother? How can I eat what I please?

58. "'Will my father-in-law force me to suffer a sorrow more terrible than grief? A miserable, ill-fated woman am I, who have heaped up sins in previous births.

59. "'Pregnant and deserted by my husband – what [further] suffering must I endure? In any case, where can I go, bound [as I am] by the cord of my deeds?'

60. "'You alone are my refuge, Mother, my only chance. You are my last resort! What can I eat, Mother? I have no desire for 'wholesome' food.

61. "'Only through [religious] observances and a diet of roots and fruits [and the like] is my happiness promoted: when I have attained my heart's desire, then will I ask for wholesome food.'

62. "'Having thus edified her, Gopā continued her Observance just as before. Again Gautamī spoke to her: 'What! You are still practising asceticism!'

63. "'[You] disregard the sacred duty to protect your unborn child as well as the instructions of your mother and father: overwhelmed by grief, you are wilful and without regard for your own self!

51 karmasūtreṇa bandhitā. A formulaic expression, which Yaśodharā regularly repeats, affirming that evil or unwholesome actions ineluctably produce like results. A major theme in the avadāna literature.

52 To be reunited with her husband.
64. “‘And from this grief and this Observance, what great felicity will you gain? Is your husband any more likely to return with his heart’s desire unfulfilled?

65. “‘Your body is certainly wasting away; therefore renounce both grief and asceticism. Forget old sorrows by remembering the child in your womb.

66. “‘So that [in future] he can care for you, his mother, now you must care for him. And forget about your husband, who has caused [you] such grief and suffering.

67. “‘Even were you not pregnant, everyone would be grieving [at how you care carrying on]. What is unbearable for us, dearest Gopa, is your interminable suffering.

68. “‘Remember the child in your womb and forget all [else] – out of hope. For hope is the greatest thing in the world: it embraces all creatures.

69. “‘Honouring hope as their goddess, those who come and go [in Samsāra] will travel on [to new rebirths]. Therefore, honour Hope! Forego grief, out of hope for your child’s happiness.

70. “‘Enjoy the foods for which you long; fully nourish your bodily strength. How, if you are ill-nourished, can the child in your womb be well-nourished?

71. “‘[And] without such foods, how can your body be well-nourished? Therefore, [I ask], what do you wish to eat? Tell me now.

72-73. “‘Even if difficult to obtain in the three worlds, your father-in-law will supply [it].’ Questioned repeatedly in this way by Gautami, Yaśodharā, sighing deeply and with tears in her eyes, recalled her husband’s words. Faintly, the virtuous, grieving woman, her voice trembling, replied to her mother-in-law:

74. “‘How can I abandon my Observance, Mother? How can I eat what I please? A miserable, ill-fated woman am I, who have heaped up sins in previous births.

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53 Cf. II.90, 124, 144, 154. This refers to Sarvārthasiddha’s prediction, revealed later in this chapter (II.185-186), that Yaśodharā will endure terrible suffering by fire and other causes, that the king will treat her most cruelly and that her pregnancy will extend over six years.
75. "With child and abandoned by my husband – what else must I endure? In any case, where can I go, bound [as I am] by the cord of my deeds?

76. "You alone are my refuge, Mother, my only chance; you are my last resort. Were I to eat as I wished, afterwards I would suffer for it.

77. "For this reason my mind is not on eating, for me, to be made to eat is only suffering. When I did enjoy fine foods, my karma produced only suffering.

78. "Even were I to eat fine food, what [of its] essence would I retain? Even if my father-in-law forced me to eat, [it would be] the ill-omened food of suffering.

79. "Would he have [a woman] eat fine food who is fit only for the food of suffering? I long for every kind of food, but the suffering [would be] unbearable.

80. "Every food I have desired [I have received] from the divine tree of your favour, but I entreat you – if I am [truly] your beloved daughter-in-law –

81. "If ever I am induced by someone to eat that by which I am attracted, then you, remembering this request of mine, must restrain me.'

82. "So Yaśodhara spoke, full of anxiety over the suffering to come. Listening to this, Gautami’s heart was sorely troubled.

83. "After listening with divided feelings and with increasing astonishment, she replied to Gopā:

84. "Why, oh why, do you speak this way, Gopā? You are ill with that poison, separation from your husband, and are enraged at his cruelty. Are you a young woman, beautiful in your expectant motherhood, or a madwoman thus deranged by love’s passion?

85. "Your father-in-law, who is a king and a father, is in his compassion for you the very picture of devotion: every day he dedicates himself to caring for you. The fine foods for which you long he has

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54 bhojyā duḥkham eva me II.77b. A curious construction. No emendation, or any other likely meaning, occurs to me.

55 I.e., grief over the past and anxiety about the future have impaired her digestion.
offered and intends to provide, rare in the three worlds though they may be.

86. "'How can a daughter-in-law act so perversely toward such a fine father-in-law? Nevertheless, at the tears in your eyes my heart is sorely troubled.

87. "'Tell me, dear foolish girl, tell me, where is this 'food of suffering' of yours? Banish this fear from your heart. Take courage! Regain your health! My heart is [both] fearful, overwhelmed by your hurtful speech, and joyful, knowing that a son has entered your womb.

88. "'Therefore, abandon your fear and your perverse attitude as well, then quickly explain everything about the sole source for this 'food of suffering'."

89. "After hearing her out, Yaśodharā replied to Gautamī: 'I am neither perverse, Mother, nor to be found fault with by the king.

90. "'However, since listening to my husband's words, I declare that suffering arises from [one's] actions. What [more] can I say now? I am suffering as a result of my own actions!'

91. "So saying, sick with grief, she cried out, 'Ah, husband! Woe is me, a sinful woman! What [further] misery must I endure?', and fainted.

92. "Seeing her prostrate on the ground, paralyzed by that poison, separation, the astonished Gautamī quickly raised Yaśodharā from the ground.

93. "Looking closely at Gopa's companions, she said, smiling, 'Now what sort of daughter-in-law is this? Even to one who speaks sincerely she is evasive!

94. "'Is she bereaved and love-sick? Or ashamed? Or furious? Now what am I to do? Certainly I will say no more to her!

95. "'I am casting [Yaśodharā] into an inferno of grief, to which my words add fuel. And what can I say to a woman in her plight? For she will grieve even more!

56 See II.73 n.
96. "'If I am moved to speak again as I have, she will think of him anew. Although [for now] she has forgotten [him], she will surely once again fall into grief's inferno.

97. "[And] while her speech is perverse, [it comes] from a heart overwhelmed by the pain of separation. How shall I diplomatically explain this to the king?

98. "'How can one be rid of the trickery of lovely, beguiling women?'' Reviling us in this way, the king will blame and ridicule [us]. You must all keep this a secret, [if] you do not wish to be ridiculed.'

99. "And having thus advised Yasodharā's companions, Gautamī, her heart divided between anger and compassion, set out for home, [saying to Gopā],

100. "'Yasodharā, dear daughter-in-law, you must do always just as you like. Henceforth I shall not be induced to speak. Eat whatever you wish.'

101. "After this declaration, the angry Gautamī remained in her own apartments in the company of her attendants, thinking about Yasodharā and smiling ruefully.

102. "[As for] Gopā, she composed herself, put Gautamī's words out of mind, and, pregnant, miserable and in pain, continued to practise the supreme Observance.

103. "After listening to what had been said, Yasodharā's servants, her companions, filled with anxiety and grief, spoke among themselves:

104. "'Now Gopā, who is free from faults and defilements, has been angered. Afflicted by separation [from her husband], no longer trusted – how can the good woman dispel her fears?"

105. "'Why did she speak thus to Gautamī and then faint? Is she deranged or simply bereaved, afflicted by separation?"

106. "'Could even she, whose husband is the Glorious Lord, speak falsely? [And] how could she be mad, a lovely young woman who is endowed with the thirty-two marks?"
107. "‘Or perhaps [now] she will understand suffering, she whose husband dispels all suffering. Truly she is ill with the poison of separation, for she says so herself.’

108. "‘We should question her, for we are her beloved servants.’ So saying, they all assembled, and entreated her at length:

109. "‘Your Ladyship! You must forgive the transgressions of all, Yaśodhara. Heed this one request! Be not angry, fair lady. We are all of us your trustworthy servants, good Gopikā.

110. “‘An afflicted and suffering woman [am I].” So you repeatedly declare. [But] we know not your meaning. Do now explain this one thing.

111. “‘That we are your ladyship’s servants is due to virtuous deeds performed in previous births: we have acquired material benefits rare for others; most fortunate and truly happy are we.

112. “‘That we are fortunate in our fine clothes and ornaments is due to knowing your kindness – you to whom, through our service, we all bring comfort.

113. “‘How is it, then, your ladyship, that you are suffering? Why do you speak [so] sorrowfully? Is it grief or pregnancy, that, in your bereavement, makes you speak [so]?

114. “‘Be gracious, O queen! Do not grieve. Guard your health. [For] although all share in this joy, it is you who must nurture it.

115. “‘On learning that you were pregnant, king and subjects rejoiced as one, thinking, “There will be an heir to the throne!”

116. “‘Since you will give birth to that creator of joy, the crown prince, how can you grieve? Therefore enjoy your comforts!

117. “‘If you are not enjoying yourself, how can we enjoy ourselves? Therefore take pity on us – do not practise your widow’s observance.

118. “‘In any case, you are certainly not bereft of a husband. How, then, can you behave in such an inauspicious manner? For you are by no means the only royal lady whose husband travelled abroad.

119. “‘And how many princesses whose husbands are abroad have freed themselves from grief and increased their bodily strength by undertaking a vow of asceticism in their lord’s name? In this con-
nection, think about them, [and] cease cultivating wretchedness and misery!

120. “After listening to this speech, the compassionate Yaśodharā, her heart wavering, replied to her ladies-in-waiting, despite her grief, with a smile:

121. “‘Dear friends! Grieve not on my behalf, blessed ladies. Such words [as yours] ought never to be spoken”.

122. “‘It is due to your own karma that you enjoy such comfort [as you do]. For so long as life endures, may you enjoy every happiness! May you never end up, as I have, miserable and pregnant.

123. “‘What can I tell you of my own suffering? Certainly an ill-fated, miserable woman am I, suffering for my sins.

124. “‘It was in once again recalling my husband’s words that I fainted: not from grief, nor due to a pregnancy-craving, nor from anger do I speak as I do.

125. “‘But, [since] I must inevitably partake of the unbearable food of suffering, in order that I may endure, I have been inuring myself to it.

126. “‘Were I to enjoy comfort and happiness now, how could I endure the suffering to come? To that end do I scorch myself with painful asceticism — in order to withstand the consuming fire of the pain [to come].

127. “‘In order to endure the asceticism of starvation, I devote myself to the asceticism of a scanty diet; thus I suffer [both] on account of my pregnancy and due to the culpability of my own [previous] actions.

128. “‘Why do I speak? Surely it is obvious to you [all]. When one can see with one’s own eyes, what need is there to listen? Nevertheless, you must not grieve. Take courage! Stand firm!

129. “‘It is my past actions which cause me to suffer. May your virtuous deeds ever bring you happiness!

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58 For stylistic reasons I have not translated subhāgyikāh in 121d.
59 See II.73 n.
60 Albeit banal, this imagery foreshadows Sarvārthasiddha’s prediction, at II.185, of the events of Ch. VI, ‘Gopā is Cast into the Fire’ (Gopāgnipātana): see Tatelman, “The Trials of Yaśodharā and the Birth of Rāhula”.
130. "'Therefore, enjoy good food, wear fine clothes and jewellery, adorn your limbs, but [also] cultivate the lotus of righteousness.'

131. "After listening to what Yasodharā had said, her companions, astonished, wondered: 'Has she gone mad? In her grief she speaks as if in a dream!"

132. "'Is she lying? Or afflicted with the illness of separation, or besmeared with the poison of grief? Or has she spoken the truth?''

133. "So thinking, none of Gopā’s retinue were able to respond, but could only stare in silence at her lotus-face.

134. "As before, Gopā continued to practise her observance every day. She extracted grief's dart from her heart by offering herself the following counsel:61

135. "'Ought I to reflect upon the great suffering [to come]? Yet what can be destroyed merely by thinking about it? O mind! Since dwelling upon it only intensifies it, not think about it!'

136. "'For who can thwart what will inevitably come about due to karma? It is inevitable that living beings experience the consequences of their own actions.

137. "'Therefore what use is despair? Take courage! Worship the Three Jewels,62 through the power of which you will assuredly be freed from suffering and attain final emancipation.63

138. "'Furthermore, when liberation is attained, how will such suffering exist? Therefore, be not unsteady, O mind, be ever composed and at ease.

139. "For when you were scorched with grief, your subjects, the five senses, repeatedly burnt by the flames of unconsciousness, became lifeless.

61 manahprabodham kṛtveti, 'having advised her mind thus'. II.135-141 represents internal monologue by having Yasodharā address her mind (manas) as if it were another person.

62 In mainstream sources triratna or ratnāraya refers to the Buddha, the Truth or Doctrine he expounded (Dharma) and the religious Order he founded (Saṃgha). In BKA I-IX it refers equally to the deities of the Buddha, Dharma and Saṃgha maṇḍalas: see Tatelman, Trials, pt. II, pp. xxxi-xxxii.

63 apavarga, 'release'; a synonym for mokṣa, 'liberation' (from samsāra, the cycle of birth-and-death) as at II.138, 141. So also LV 20812, tr. II 381, although there the context is non-Buddhist.
140. "‘You must maintain composure: then while the five sense-faculties [continue to] see, hear, smell, taste [and register tactile impressions and while the body continues to move, they will become] your [obedient] servants."

141. "‘Let them at all times worship the Three Jewels and seek the True Dharma. First and foremost, then, concentrate upon the Three Jewels, not on painful circumstances, and in doing so you will be led to liberation, O anxious one.’

142. "With her mind thus clarified, Gopā kept secret what had happened, for the sake of her maidservants, acting as if free from grief.

143. "Then, some days later, in the middle of the night, Yaśodharā rose from bed, sobbing quietly.

144. "Recalling her husband’s words, tormented by unbearable pangs, she rested her cheek in one hand, while slapping herself repeatedly with the other.

145. "Alone on her bed of earth she wept quietly; then, reproachfully, with poignant words she addressed her [absent] husband:

146. "‘Pitiless man! Having abandoned me, where will you go, O Lord of the World? Remember me in my misery and return, O Mighty One!

147. "‘The son sprung from your seed — who will protect him? Remember the child in my womb, and return, you whose [very] essence is compassion!

148. "‘Your words, [which were] so painful to hear, again make my heart contract. Over and over again I question how they could be either true or false.

149. "‘How can the words of the best of truth-speakers be false? [Yet] if they are true, how can I endure such unendurable suffering [as they foretell]?

64 The Sanskrit here is not so much elliptical as poorly constructed: the main point is that Yaśodharā, fearing the worst, is trying to calm herself, in accordance with the pan-Indian view that the agitated mind is at the mercy of sense-impressions (i.e., experiences), whereas the mind calmed by meditation is their master.

65 See II.73 n.
150. "'Best of all-knowing ones! Knowing me to be such a sinful woman, why place in me the seed [born of] your gaze, so difficult to bear?
151. "'Why do you abandon me, showing all the signs of pregnancy, and wander in the forest? As long as I am with child am I not to be made to dwell in your house?
152. "'If I was to be abandoned, why did you not abandon me before? Why did you make love to me? And now, unsightly am I, sallow of skin and gaunt of limb.
153. "'Thinking, "She is unlovely, her body is without [beauty]!"; you went away, pitiless man. O Protector, guardian of all though you may be, to me alone you bring sorrow!
154. "'When, as you predicted, I do experience truly unendurable suffering, then it will be for your sake that my son and I will go to Yama's realm.
155. "'Even there, will I [not] suffer torments generated by my past actions? Even there will you not grant [me] protection, you who extricate men from the infernal regions?
156. "'Since he in no way protects me in this world, how will he do so in the next? Ah! Wretched is life in this cycle of birth-and-death! I have no one at all to protect me!'
157. "'Yaśodharā continued to lament in this way and to reflect on her unbearable suffering. 'How can I endure the unendurable?’, she thought, and collapsed on the ground in a swoon.

66 drṣṭibija. Later (II.181-183), Gopā reveals that her child was not conceived through sexual intercourse.
67 In the first chapter of the Wei-ts'eng-yu yin-yüan ching (T 754; Péri, "Les femmes de Śākyamuni", p. 21), when Maudgalyāyana solicits Yaśodharā’s support for Rāhula's ordination, she positively reviles the Buddha, declaring, among other things, that he abandoned her less than three years after marrying her, that in order to marry him, she had rejected offers from eight different princes and that had he known he would leave her, he should not have married her at all.
68 See II.73 n.
69 bhavannāmnā, lit., 'in your name'.

Buddhist Literature
158. "Now her friend, who was called Manodharā, seeing that Gopā had collapsed on the ground, embraced her, raised her to her feet, and respectfully said:

159. "My lady! You lost self-control and fainted! What were you thinking? Why do you weep, Gopā, you, a courageous and venerable lady?

160. "What troubles you, whose servant one such as I am so fortunate to be? How did it happen? From what cause did it arise?

161. "Do not weep, my lady, do not grieve; compose yourself. [For] when you grieve, Gopā, how can we, [your servants], maintain our composure?

162. "How can she who dispels the suffering of others [herself] be suffering, she due to whose compassion we have all uprooted the tree of sorrow?

163. "Those whose vital powers are well-nourished, by partaking of the fruit of the tree of happiness, are thereby invigorated. Why be emaciated?

164. "Therefore look upon my face and dwell not on your husband, author of your sorrow! Even now no one treats you dishonourably, O you whose husband is alive.

70 ‘Manodharā’, ‘mind-bearer’, I am inclined to gloss as ‘guardian of the mind’ or ‘whose mind is controlled’, and to regard her as a personification of the Buddhist virtue of ‘mindfulness’ or ‘calm awareness’ (smṛti). In a sense, Manodharā is a hypostasis of Yaśodharā’s potential for such ‘awareness’. It is as if the manas to whom she has addressed herself above (II.135-141) has responded to her pleas and in order better to assist her, has assumed independent, human form. See II.159-173. As to Manodharā’s origins, according to SBc (101), the second of Sarvārthasiddha’s three wives was called Manodharā and according to Péri (“Les femmes de Śākyamuni”, p. 17), Jānāgupta, the Gandhāran translator of T 190, comments: “Regarding the princess Manodharā, the Masters state that only her name is known and nothing of her life or previous births.” It would seem that our author was acquainted with some variant of this tradition.

71 gartiśā, ‘venerable, proud’, can also mean ‘pregnant’.

72 Manodharā’s assurance takes on quite a different tone in light of Devadatta’s pernicious activities which commence in Ch. III and which do not entirely exhaust themselves until Ch. XXXVI.
165. "'As for your parents-in-law, they esteem [you] as highly as could be wished. Therefore, so long as your husband has not returned, take refuge in them.

166. "'When he has fulfilled his heart’s desire, he will certainly return. Then we will [all] imbibe the nectar of the Dharma and attain the bliss of Nirvāṇa.

167. "'And when that bliss is attained, such separation [you now endure] will be no more. Therefore, that you may imbibe the True Dharma, you must at all times care for your body;

168. "'[That] in which reside the mind and the five other senses, through the power of which, one hears and imbibes Dharma and beholds the Tathāgata.

169. "'Therefore abandon your misery and grief: preserve that pond, the body, lest it dry up in grief’s torrid summer.

170. "'In that pond bloom those lotuses, the senses. Let it be swelled with the waters of joy, for where, in a dried-up pond, [will] lotuses [grow]?

171. "'Without those lotuses, how can the True Dharma be attained? And without that messenger, the True Dharma, how can one reach the City of Liberation?

172-173. "'In the absence of Liberation [you] will continue [to endure] such suffering as arises from separation. Therefore, in order to destroy the suffering which arises from separation and every other cause, and to attain perfect felicity, maintain your composure and guard your health, O princess, in hope of that. I am called Manodhara – 'she whose mind is controlled' – heed my words and be so too.'

174. "'After imparting this instruction, Manodhara spoke again: 'If I respectfully say more to you, be not distressed.

175. "'Why, Gopa, are you constantly saying, 'Sorrow upon sorrow do I suffer!'? Although we\textsuperscript{73} have often asked, you say nothing of its cause. What did your husband say to you, which, in recollecting, you faint repeatedly?

\textsuperscript{73} Manodharā and Yāsodharā's other attendants.
176. "To me, the trustworthy Manodharā, you, who are an intelligent woman, should explain this, Yaśodharā, even if it is all to be kept secret."

177. "Questioned in this way, Gopā revealed even what had to be carefully concealed: 'Listen, Manodharā, to the reason [for my sorrow]. Even what must remain a closely-guarded secret, I shall tell you.

178. "More than very dear to me are you who are called Manodharā, 'she of controlled mind'; hence the medicine of your words allays the fever of my grief. [You], who bear a truly meaningful name, have restored composure to my mind.'

179. "Having thus composed herself, Gopā said to Manodharā: "What is a truly miserable [woman] to say? Listen, then, Manodharā..."

180. "By dwelling upon that which, on the one hand, should be concealed, and on the other, revealed, I have repeatedly fallen, dear friend, into the fiery abyss of unconsciousness.

181. "On only one night did my lord choose to embrace me: with unblinking gaze he feasted his eyes upon me."

182. "On that very night, in that way, I conceived. How [could that have happened], dear friend, as the result of a moment's passionate glance?

183. "By what path could the seed have entered my womb? How? Without seed, how can a sprout be produced? This is my perplexity!

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74II.181-183 (cf. II.192-193) make it clear that Yaśodharā becomes pregnant through 'visual sex' (dṛṣṭihogyā): Sarvārhasiddha stares at her and she conceives. At BKA IX.9c (Ce 73a7), the narrator calls Rāhula Yaśodharā’s 'mind-made son' (cintāmayasuta). Cf. Gv 26219-20, tr. 1362, which describes the Buddha’s mother Māyā as having 'taken the spontaneously-born prince in her lap' (yaya sa upapādukoḥ kumāra utsaṅge pratigrīhitah). This 'visual intercourse' is exactly that practised by the deities residing in the Tuṣita heaven (L.-K. Lin, L'aide-mémoire de la vraie loi [Saddharmasrtyaupasthāna-Sūtra], Paris 1949, p. 55), the very deva-realm from which both the Buddha (Mv i.41-2, ii.11-2; LV 71, 112; SBV i.36-9, 416-7; NK 4721, 4818) and Rāhula (Mv i.15314-15, ii.1591) take their final rebirth. Manodharā (II.216-223) classifies this mode of conception as aupapāduka, 'spontaneously-generated'.
184. "Then my lord said to me, "Listen, Gopa, and be not distressed: [now] that you are with child, maintain the Upoṣadha Observation."

185. "You will endure unbearable suffering arising from the action of raging fire and other causes. Due to past actions the consequences of which you have not yet experienced, for six years you will carry this child in your womb."

75 kuru vratam upoṣadham. See note on poṣadha vrata, II.5b


77 pūrvakarmāvaseṇa, 'because of the remains of previous karma'.

78 Many sources narrate Yaśodharā's six-year pregnancy. In BKA (IV.203-212), the prolonged gestation enables Devadatta to convince the king that Yaśodharā is an adulteress and to induce him to cede control of the kingdom for 21 days, which in turn permits him to launch a campaign to murder Yaśodharā. Mv (iii.1725-7, tr. iii.167) mentions the six-year pregnancy, but offers no details. At ŚBc 348 (cf. 360), the Buddha explains that in previous births Yaśodharā experienced so much sorrow on his account that she carried Rāhula in her womb for six years, until the joy of learning of his Buddhahood enabled her bring forth her son. SBV (i.10614 ff., ii.3024 ff.) offers a 'naturalistic' explanation: Yaśodharā's emulation of her husband's asceticism retards the growth of the foetus. When she learns through Śuddhodana's messengers that Siddhiirtha has given up self-mortification, she resumes a normal diet and the foetus develops normally. She gives birth on the same night her husband attains Awakening. The six-year pregnancy also features in the Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya (T 1425: 365c), T 185 (Péri, "Les femmes de Śākyamuni", p. 14), T 189 (Péri, p. 15) and T 191 (Péri, p. 20). Numerous sources include variants of the "Story of Candra and Sūrya", which explains Rāhula's six year gestation: BKA XXVII.32-189 (Ce 220a4-225b2); Mv iii.172-175, tr. iii.167-170; ŚBc 360-363; SBV ii.432-4416; BAKL LXXXIII.9-29; Mpps tr. II 1005-1006. Fewer tell the story of the two milkmaids, which explains the misdeed which led to Yaśodharā carrying her child for six years: BKA XXVII.1-31 (Ce 219a3-220a4); ŚBc 363 (T 190: 908a); SBV ii.425-29; BAKL LXXXIII.30-35; Satpāramitāsamgraha (tr. E. Chavannes, Cinq cents contes et apologues extraits du Tripitaka chinois, 4 vols., Paris 1910-35, I 197-201). Additional references, Mpps II 1006 n. 1; discussion, É. Lamotte, History of Indian Buddhism (Louvain-la-Neuve 1988), pp. 662-665. Cf. Sivali Thera (AA i.136 ff.; Ap ii.492-495 [esp. vv. 26-31]; Jā i.407-408; DhpA iv.192-194, tr. iii.307-308) and Sthavira (Avś ii.133-146, tr. 374-381; Kalpadrumāvadānāmbālā [summary, Avś tr. 381-383]), whose gestations lasted for seven and seventy years respectively. Sivali's misdeed in a previous birth was blockading a city for seven days; Sthavira's was injuring a respectable monk.
186. "As for him, he will remain in your womb [for that long] as a result of deeds he himself committed [in previous births]. After his birth, my father, the king, will cause you great suffering."


188-189. "In order to extricate the world [from suffering], I am departing to practise asceticism in the forest: for six years I will perform the most painful austerities; then, sheltering under the Tree of Awakening by [the River] Nairaṇjanā, I will attain Awakening, and [finally], I will return. Do not grieve on my account, since for neither of us can it be otherwise."

190. "So saying, the lord of the world tied [around my neck] this protective thread and imparted [to me] the protective formula called ‘All-Encompassing Fire-Garland’.

In earlier sources, it is indeed Śuddhodana and/or the Śākyas collectively who seek to punish Yaśodharā for adultery: My iii.1531-5, SBV i.12010-21, ii.311-15, ŚBc (T 190: 888c: not in Beal), Kṣudrakapitaka (T 203: 496c-497a; tr. C. Willemen, Storehouse of Sundry Valuables, Berkeley, 1993, pp. 242-243). In BKA, Śuddhodana is duped by Devadatta (IV.75-212): when he learns of the enormities the latter has committed in his name, only Yaśodharā’s pleas prevent him from putting Devadatta to death (VIII.10-84 [Ce 69b1-71b7]).

In LV (18911, tr. I 343), Gopa acknowledges that Sarvārthasiddha had told her he would leave (aho subhāṣam mama puri nāyakenā). I have not identified a passage where he explicitly does so, but the way in which he interprets her dreams (15711-1616, tr. I 293-296) leaves little room for doubt. In SBV (i.82-83), by contrast, the Bodhisattva seeks to reassure Yaśodharā by offering patently unconvincing interpretations of her obviously prescient dreams. Clearly realising that he is about to leave, she implores him to take her wherever he may go. Thinking that Nirvāṇa is his ultimate destination, he promises to do so (see Strong, “A Family Quest”, pp. 115-116).


samantajvālamālākhyā dhāraṇī. Later, at Lumbini, her husband’s birth-
191. "Then, leaving me and my child without a protector, he went off into the forest. My friend, it is on recalling his words that I have repeatedly fainted.

192. "Ah! How did I, [already] ill-fated, my youth wasted, become pregnant by a single moment’s passionate glance?

193. "What use was that single, unbearable act of visual love-making to me, [greatest] fool among ill-fated women, unable even to attain my highest goal?

194. "Merely because of that single encounter, for six years I must carry this child! Ah, my friend! How will I endure such prolonged suffering?

195. "On this Plane of Desire, what woman does not make love with her husband? Among all women, was the plight of any [ever] so wretched as mine?

196. "Women who are pregnant for ten months experience discomfort, dear friend. But pregnant for six years, what torments will I endure?

197. "O Manodharā, how can I, sick with grief over separation from my husband, endure any one of the torments, such as burning by fire, [foretold for me]?

198. "[Yet] could my all-knowing husband speak falsely; he, supreme lord among speakers, who always expounds Truth?"
199. “Or can it be that the wife and son of a man who protects all
who wander in Samsāra’s six realms must endure [such] suffering?

200. “With my mind thus in doubt\(^\text{86}\), I became as a madwoman:
both joyously and grieving, steadfast and unflagging, I have ob-
served my vow.

201. “Nevertheless, I speak [of this] to no one, but you are certain-
ly trustworthy, well-known as, and for being, Manodhara, ‘She
Whose Mind is Firm’.

202. “You, too, must keep this secret, [yet] what use to speak a-
bout it? Even after hearing [of my plight], who would feel pity and
protect me, who am without a protector?” After listening to Gopā,
Manodhara, smiling, said to her:

203. “Be steadfast and calm, my lady. Do not grieve. Listen to my
advice. Accept this injury. O daughter-in-law of the king, by all
means will I keep your secret, but in your dearest and kindest friend
you should always confide.

204. “But what can I suggest to you, I who am enveloped in the
darkness of ignorance? Since you are wife to the Omniscient One,
you yourself must likewise be omniscient\(^\text{87}\).

205-206. “However, since you are wretched with grief, I must
speak, for when, although omniscient, you vacillate in distinguish-
ing beneficial from harmful, your mind will become unsteady, and
when the mind is thus unsteady, a woman will certainly go mad.

207. “Therefore, I, Manodhara, of well-restrained mind, will enli-
ghten you, O daughter of Daṇḍapāṇi, who are vacillating, by means
of a discourse which I shall succinctly relate to you:

208. “Mutual enjoyment by telepathy occurs, like that in the three
worlds. Listen, my lady, with complete concentration; my explana-
tion will be concise.

\(^{86}\) Cf. II.148-149.

\(^{87}\) tvayi...sarvajñāyām api. This hardly seems descriptive of Yaśodharā as
she is portrayed in this text. Like endowing her with the ‘thirty-two marks’
(II.40, 106, 205; III.55, 125; IV.171, 271, 290, 465), this seems part of the
author’s effort to represent her a worthy consort for, and in some sense a
female equivalent of, the Buddha.
209. "I have learned, your ladyship, that in existence there are six forms of rebirth: demons, hungry ghosts, animals, gods, titans, and humans.

210. "Moreover, within these, there are four modes of rebirth due to differences in karma, [beings may be] hatched from an egg, produced from moisture, spontaneously-generated, or born from a womb.

211. "Those hatched from eggs are known as 'oviparous'; those produced from sweat [or moisture], 'moisture-born'.

212. "Those born from a foetus are called 'viviparous', and those born from heavenly lotus-flowers, 'spontaneously-generated'.

213. "As a consequence of their own actions, everyone is born in [one of] these four ways: in this world, where Karma is supreme, one's realm [and mode] of rebirth cannot be a matter of free choice.

214. "People desire [re]birth by spontaneous generation. Are they thereby led to that realm by a series of actions of a different sort? [No, they are not.]

215. "Duly caught in [his] snare, one is led away by the Karma's henchman, to make one's dwelling according to his dictates.

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88 Here daiya is used for the more usual asura.
89 These are the catvāro yonayah. Manodharā's discussion of them follows. Cf. Dvāv 413-54; Mv i.21116, 2126-7; ii.1515-16, 16321; iii.32414-15; Divy 62717; SP 20521, tr. 329; DN iii.231, tr. 493; MN i.173, AbhidhK (ed.) iii.401-404, (tr.) iii.26-31.
90 māmsapesi; literally 'lump of flesh'.
91 Cf. Sukhāvatīvyūha 2495-6: "Lord, what is the cause, what is the reason that some [bodhisattvas] dwell in the womb, while others, spontaneously generated, appear [seated] cross-legged on lotuses?" (tat ko 'tra bhagavan hetuḥ kaḥ pratayogaḥ anye garbhāvasam prativasanti, anye punar aupa-pādukaḥ padmesu paryākaiti prādurbhavanti?). Cf. SP 2573-6: 'No women are born there [in Sukhāvatī] and sexual intercourse is unknown; Bodhisattvas appear there by spontaneous generation, seated in the calyxes of lotuses, free from impurity' (na ca istrīna tatra sambhavo nāpi ca maithuna-dharma sarvasāḥ / upapāduka te jinorasāḥ padmagarbhesu niśaṇṇa nirmanalāḥ //).
92 This seems to mean no more than that one is not born by spontaneous generation by wishing it, but only in accordance with one's karma.
216. "Now even on earth certain [people] are born by spontaneous generation due to their karma.\textsuperscript{93} [Such a one], rare in the three worlds, was Padmāvati.\textsuperscript{94}

217. "The spiritual daughter\textsuperscript{95} of Bhavabhūti, she was born from a lotus in a lake. In her case, where was the mother, where the seed? As a result of her own [virtuous] deeds [in previous births], she was born by spontaneous generation.

\textsuperscript{93} In general, cakravartins and bodhisattvas. \textit{Mv} (i.153\textsuperscript{15}-154\textsuperscript{3}, tr. i.121-122) lists twenty universal monarchs described as \textit{aupapāduka}. It also states (i.145\textsuperscript{4-5}, cf. tr. i.114-115) that "bodhisattvas are not born from [the intercourse of] a father and mother, but due to their own merits they are born by spontaneous generation" (\textit{na khalu...bodhisattvā mātāpitnirvṛttā bhavanti / atha khalu svagunanirvṛttā upapādukā bhavanti}). Elsewhere (ii.8\textsuperscript{17-18}, tr. ii.8) we are told that the Bodhisatta "entered [Māyā's] body in the form of a noble elephant, light of step, flawless of limb, gleaming like snow or silver, with six tusks, a gracefully waving trunk and a crimson head" (\textit{hima-rajatanibho se śadvisāno sucaraṇacārubhujō suraktaśīrṣō / udaram upagato gajapradhāno laititagāthān anavadyagātrasandhiṇī ///}). \textit{LV} (469-12, tr. I 96) has an almost identical verse; it also reports Siddhārtha's birth from Māyā's right side (\textit{mātuh daksinapārśvān niśkramati smā 66\textsuperscript{11};} cf. Bc I.10-11. In \textit{LV} (697-16, tr. I 135), the Buddha even inveighs against those who, in future, will deny the miraculous nature of his birth.

\textsuperscript{94} Name of the Bodhisatta's wife in the \textit{Maniścīriṇavadiṇa}. In some versions also called Padmajā, she is born from a lotus in a lake and discovered there by the sage Bhavabhūti, who raises her as his daughter. Later she becomes the wife of Prince Maniścīra. Just as Maniścīra is the Buddha in a previous birth, so Padmavati is Yaśodharā. The Maniścīra legend is available in several versions: R. Handurukande, \textit{Maniścīrīṇavadāna and Lokānanda} (London: PTS, 1967); M. Hahn, \textit{Candragominś Lokānandanātaka} (Asiatische Forschungen 39, Wiesbaden 1974); M. Hahn, \textit{Joy for the World} (Berkeley: Dharma Publishing, 1983 [English tr. of preceding]); R. Handurukande, "The Maniścīra Study", \textit{Bukkyō kenkyū} 5, 1976, pp. 168-309; S. Lienhard, \textit{Maniścīrīṇavadinodddhrtā} (Stockholm Oriental Series 4, Stockholm 1963); BAKL III; MJM XLIX. Padmāvati, daughter of Bhavabhūti and wife of Maniścīra, is not to be confused with Padumāvati (also Yaśodharā in a previous birth), daughter of the sage Māṇḍavya and wife of Brahmadatta, whose story is found at \textit{Mv} iii.153-172, tr. iii.148-167. This Padumāvati, though not \textit{aupapāduka}, is also miraculously-born: a doe conceives her after drinking urine containing traces of Māṇḍavya's semen.

\textsuperscript{95} dharmaputri, i.e., Bhavabhūti nurtured and educated Padmāvati, but was in no way connected with her conception and birth.
218. "Similarly, the beings who dwell in the Heaven of Streaming Radiance\textsuperscript{96} are known as 'Those Who Enjoy by Telepathy'. Their bodies blaze like a thousand suns! How could they have male or female organ[s]?

219. "Men and women\textsuperscript{97} enjoy each other, purely by telepathy, and in this way the woman is impregnated.

220. "Similarly, tradition reports that in ancient times humans enjoyed [each other] visually. The first king who reigned over the earth was called 'Mahāsammata.'\textsuperscript{98} He was born through [such] 'visual enjoyment'. Are there not marvels in this universe!

221. "A certain King Viravikrama was born from the head.\textsuperscript{99} How could [sexual] enjoyment involve the head? How and from where could the seed be emitted?

\textsuperscript{96} abhāsvaralokasthāh. A Buddhist myth traces human origins to a class of beings which, after one of the periodic dissolutions of the world, is reborn in this heaven. At first and for a long time these beings are made of mind, self-luminous, genderless and nourish themselves on bliss. Through greed they gradually devolve into recognizably human beings. Sexual differentiation and sexual intercourse are among the early signs of this degeneration. See Mv i.338-348, tr. i.285-293; SBV i.7\textsuperscript{13}-16\textsuperscript{16}; DN iii.84-93, tr. 409-413; BAKL XXVI.4-10. Here Manodharā refers to their original, pristine state.

\textsuperscript{97} I take tayā and striyā as functionally plural, as Manodharā here is making a general statement about how a certain class of divine beings reproduces.

\textsuperscript{98} In the *Agrajñasūtra myth (n. 96 above), when the originally pure beings of Ābhāsvara have devolved to the point where hoarding, theft, falsehood and violence have made an appearance, they elect the best among them to adjudicate disputes and mete out punishment. This is Mahāsammata, 'The Great Elect', first king and kṣatriya. Mv (i.347-356, tr. i.292-301), SBV (i.15-36), BAKL (XXVI.10-22) and the Pāli chronicles (see DPPN) identify him as the ultimate ancestor of the Śākyan clan. While these sources do not state that Mahāsammata was 'born through visual intercourse' (drṣṭi-bhogyaprajāta), it is clear from AbhidhK (tr. iii.204-206) that he was aupapādūka.

\textsuperscript{99} I have been unable to trace this personnage. However, the mythical ca-kraṃvartin Māndhātṛ, identified as aupapādūka at Mv i.154\textsuperscript{1}, was born from an excrescence on the head of his father, Upoṣadha (Bc I.10, Divy 210\textsuperscript{13}-\textsuperscript{20}). ŠBc 49 mentions several ancient kings born from their father’s head, hand, stomach and arm.
222. "'Thus the cries of shame and pain from any woman who carries the seed and then gives birth from her womb to a child produced by sexual intercourse.

223. "'And so, some people are born from semen, while others are born without it. Some are born from the womb, others from the limbs of the body. The lowly are reborn according to their own karma; the exalted, according to their resolve."

224. "'Therefore do not grieve and despond over such a birth. Or rather, Gopa, it is going to be so. And why is the situation like that?

225. "'Why does the compassionate lord of the world neglect a suffering [woman], let alone one like this [child in your womb], seed of the Protector, the Sugata?

226. "'Rather, [this situation] must have come about through your karmic faults. [Yet] why grieve about it? Can grief undo deeds already done?

227. "'As for your father-in-law, the king, what suffering does he cause you? And what your husband, Sarvasiddha, said, that was in amorous jest.

228. "'Does a person longing for love-play understand what they hear? And on that basis, ought one to renounce present happiness because of future suffering?

229. "'Therefore, by meditating on the Triple Gem, be free from doubt and live joyfully, [for] what is conceived by a mind poisoned

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100 The Bodhisattva is the obvious paradigm for self-chosen rebirth. LV specifies elaborate criteria: while still residing in Tuṣita, the Bodhisattva examines the appropriate time (kāla), continent (dvīpa), country (deśa) and class (kula; here = varna) into which he shall be reborn (1424-1518, tr. I 36-37). Sixty-four 'indicators' (catuṣṣaṣṭyākārāḥ) determine his choice of family (1719-1820, tr. I 40-42) and thirty-two personal qualities (dvāṭrīṃśad gūṇāḥ) his choice of mother (1821-192, tr. I 42-43). Due weight is also given to astrological considerations (193-5, tr. I 43). Cf. Mv ii.1-9, tr. ii.1-9; SBc 26-33; NK 48-49, tr. 64-66.

101 tāḍrśa bhava. That is, Yaśodhara is not to grieve over the prospect of bearing a child conceived through 'visual intercourse' (drṣṭihogyā).

102 Cf. II.186-187 above; indeed, such is Yaśodhara's refrain for the next 2000 verses.

103 = Sarvārthasiddha.

104 In this, Manodharā shall be proven wrong.
by doubt [is mere imagination], and nothing else. Therefore abandon doubt, for who is not corrupted by it?

230. “Now if at any time your father-in-law should cause you suffering, then I shall instruct him and transform him into a dispenser of happiness.”

231. “‘You, a woman whose servant is known as ‘Manodharā’ because she enlightens the minds of all [people] – how can you be plagued by doubt?’

232. “In this way Manodharā aptly instructed her anxious mistress. As for Gopa, she heeded Manodharā’s words and, free from doubt, lived happily.

233. “Every day that pious woman provided the members of her retinue with ornaments and fine silk garments; she also served them her own meals.

234. “Taking to heart her husband’s instructions, each day the zealous Gopa distributed alms with Manodharā and practised her Observance.

235. “Joyfully, she recited the protective formula, practised recollection of the Three Jewels, subsisted on roots and fruits, and served her parents-in-law.

236. “Clad in white, lovely without ornaments, making the earth her bed, the pregnant Yaśodharā continued to maintain her Observance.

237. “Learning that she was living in this way, the king, the citizenry, the [entire] nation, rejoiced, thinking, ‘There will be an heir to the throne!’”

The Extraordinary History of Our Auspicious Era
Chapter III: Devadatta, Maddened by Lust and Greed

1. Then Upagupta addressed Aśoka and the members of the assembly: “Aśoka and all members of the assembly! Listen and I shall continue.
2. "Now [Sarvārthasiddha had] a cousin\(^{105}\) called Devadatta\(^{106}\), who was malevolent and deceitful: 'At the death of Śuddhodana, I shall become king!' Such was his gleeful thought.

3. "On hearing that Gopa was with child, the self-centred [fellow] thought, 'My enemy, that idiot, Sarvārthasiddha, suffers misfortune:

4. "'Wandering as a forest ascetic, he must make meals from food he has begged; he has renounced the power and glory of a universal monarch, so difficult to attain in the three worlds;

5. "'He has deliberately forsaken honour and liberality, given up the royal revenues\(^{107}\) and fled his own city, a wretched mendicant despised by others.

6. "'Even if put under pressure, who will honour him as a "Tathāgata, [one who] has attained Awakening and [who is] committed to the path to liberation"?"

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\(^{105}\) Taking paitryya as equivalent to pitryaputra (MW), ‘a father’s brother’s son, cousin’. LV (11724-25, tr. I 229) identifies Devadatta only as a Śākya prince (śāka kumāra). Mv (i.352\(^{13,-14}\), tr. i.298) states that Sarvārthasidda’s father, Śuddhodana, had three brothers, Dhautodana, Śuklodana and Amṛtodana, and that (iii.176\(^{14-15}\), tr. iii.172) Śuklodana had three sons, Ānanda, Upadhāna and Devadatta. ŚBc 23 mentions Simhahanu’s four sons, but not their offspring. In SBV (i.31\(^{21-23}\)), and BAKL (XXVI.21-25b), Śuddhodana’s three brothers are Śuklodana, Droṇodana and Amṛtodana, this last having only two sons, Devadatta and Ānanda. In Mpps (I 226), Devadatta and Ānanda are also brothers, but Droṇodana is their father. In the Mahāvamsa (II.19-21), Devadatta is the son of Suppabuddha, there the Buddha’s maternal uncle. Comparable information from Chinese sources, Mpps II 869 n. 1. BKA XXXVII.213-214 (Ce 375b5-6) depicts Śuklodana begging the Buddha to spare his son after Devadatta has attempted to poison the entire Sangha.

\(^{106}\) See I.17 n.

\(^{107}\) sadamśakam, ‘a one-sixth share’, referring to a king’s right to one-sixth of the produce from the domains under his suzerainty. In Mv (i.348\(^{3}\), tr. i.293), for example, the people give to Mahāsaṃmata, the first king and primordial ancestor of the Śākyas, one-sixth of the rice from their fields (svakasvakesu sālikṣetresu satthame sālibhāgam dadāma). In the corresponding Pāli passage (DN iii.93, tr. 413), the proportion is not specified. Cf. Mānavadharmaśāstra (ed. L. Sternbach, Varanasi: All-India Kashiraj Trust, 1974; tr. W. Doniger, The Laws of Manu, London: Penguin, 1991) VII.130-132, VIII.304-305.
7. "'He is in every sense a pariah, an outcaste, committed to the life of a religious mendicant; he has lost kingdom and caste - to my good fortune this is due.

8. "'As long as Sarvarthasiddha remained in the kingdom, there could be no happiness for me, [but] when he went forth into the forest, I experienced [such joy as] is rare even in heaven.

9. "'Now that wife of his, whose [sight is obstructed] by the cataract of ignorance, is with child - or so they say, be it true or false.

10. "'She is the one who rejected me, accomplished and foremost among the manly and heroic, [and then], owing to her unhappy destiny, chose such a husband as that wretched monk. 108

11. "'If she bears my enemy’s son, how will I become king? Certainly the king will bequeath the kingdom to his grandson.

12. "'In that event, where would I go? Without royal power, what happiness can there be [for me]? Given these circumstances, desire for kingship had better inspire countermeasures.'

13-15b. "With this in mind, Devadatta thought hard and came up with a plan: 'I will inform Dañḍapāṇi [of my intentions], offer him ornaments and jewels of great value, and ask for Yaśodharā in marriage.

108 LV (1117-1214, tr. I 219-235), narrates at length Sarvārthasiddha’s triumphs in the ‘exhibition of the worldly arts’ (śilpasamdarśana) which Dañḍapāṇi insists be held to determine which Śākyya youth is worthy of his daughter’s hand. Gopā does not actually reject Devadatta or any of the other suitors: the prince simply bests all comers. Nevertheless, at least one passage (11724-1183, tr. I 229-230) makes clear both Devadatta’s arrogant over-confidence and his subsequent humiliation at his cousin’s hands. In the corresponding passage in Mv (ii.735-7616, tr. ii.70-74), there is even less suggestion that Devadatta felt especially rejected. SBV and BAKL are silent on this matter. However, in ŚBc (96-99), Devadatta does propose marriage and Dañḍapāṇi’s daughter – here called Gotami! – does reject him. This episode occurs after the prince triumphs in the aforementioned contest and marries Yaśodharā – Nanda and Devadatta having placed, respectively, second and third in the tourney. The fathers of Siddhartha and Nanda send messages to Dañḍapāṇi, requesting Gotami as wife for their sons. Devadatta sends his own, similar message, but threatens reprisal if Dañḍapāṇi does not comply. Gotami takes matters in her own hands and arranges a svayamvara, at which she chooses Sarvārthasiddha. The Hsiu hsing pên ch’i ching (T 184, tr. 197 C.E.; Péri, “Les Femmes de Śākyamuni”, pp. 11-13) contains a comparable account, but calls the father Suprabuddha and his daughter Gopi.
riage.¹⁰⁹ [Then] he will certainly be pleased to give me his daughter, blooming with the freshness of youth,¹¹⁰ thinking, “[Otherwise] my daughter’s youth and beauty will be wasted.”

15c-16. “‘And Gopa, when I ask for her [in marriage], will burn with the fire of sexual passion! Longing to drink the nectar from my lips, she will accept me without hesitation, for she has long desired me, who am endowed with [all the] qualities [sought for] in a husband¹¹¹.

¹⁰⁹ A few sources report that Devadatta sought to marry or seduce Yaśodhara. Mv (ii.68²⁰-69⁵, tr. ii.66) mentions only the fact, and Yaśodhara’s refusal; its few sentences serve only to introduce the Vyāghrijātaka (ii.69⁵-72¹⁵, tr. ii.66-69). SBV, by contrast, offers two detailed accounts. After failing in his attempts to kill the Buddha, Devadatta, already a monk, returns to Kapilavastu planning to harass and dishonour his wives. He proposes Yaśodhara, who on her co-wife Gopikā’s advice, invites him to the palace with the promise that if he can hold her hand, she’ll accept his invitation. Gopikā intercepts Devadatta, squeezes his hands until they bleed and flings him into a pond. Devadatta ignominiously escapes from the enraged Śākyas through a drain (ii.25⁹²³-2⁶⁰¹⁴). On another occasion, Devadatta meets with the Śākyas and demands to be made king. They tell him that if the Bodhisattva’s women accept him, they will grant him kingship. Devadatta claims to Yaśodhara that he is to be king and offers to make her his consort in exchange for sex. As did Gopikā, she squeezes his hands until they bleed, then castigates him for his temerity. He flees the palace in shame (ii.2⁶⁰¹⁸-2⁶¹²⁵). A version of the first of these episodes is found in the Karmaśataka (Tohoku 3⁴⁰; tr. L. Feer, Journal Asiatique 9e série, tome XVII, 1901, pp. 86-88), the karmic antecedents of which it explains by a jātaka which corresponds to Mv i.1²⁸¹²-1³¹⁴, tr. i.1⁰¹-1⁰³.

¹¹⁰ navayauvani. This epithet, which could just as well be translated as ‘nubile’, seems hardly to accord with the tradition that Sarvārthasiddha and Yaśodhara were the same age (Mv ii.2⁵¹¹-¹², tr. ii.2²; NK 5⁴, tr. 7¹), married at the age of sixteen (NK 5⁸, tr. 7⁷-7⁸) and that the prince left home at the age of twenty-nine (NK 5⁵, 6⁷, tr. 7³, 9⁰). However, since Mv, LV, ŚBc and BAKL are silent regarding Yaśodhara’s and the Buddha’s ages at these stages in their lives, it may be that, like the great female lay disciple Visākhā (DhpA i.4⁰⁸, tr. ii.7⁶), our heroine is assumed to have maintained all her life the appearance of a teenager.

¹¹¹ varalaksana, can also be translated as ‘best qualities’, depending upon whether vara is understood as an adjective (‘best’) or a noun (‘suitor, lover, husband”).
17. “Nevertheless, on account of the king’s anger, she chose my enemy, [although] Danḍapāṇi, too, delighted with me, was eager to give her to me.

18. “[But] terrified of being punished by the king, he gave [her] to [one] she did not want.” Therefore when I ask for her, Danḍapāṇi, delighted, will hand her over with alacrity.

19. “Yaśodharā is scorched by the flames of grief and desire, and although modest and of good family, she will come to me as certainly as does a woman tormented by thirst to a [cool] pond.”

20. “Then a universal monarch shall I be and she my queen and leading lady, whose son will be king — what other great happiness can there be for her?”

21. “I shall despatch a messenger to Danḍapāṇi.” So thinking, Devadatta became nervous and excited.

22. “Then, summoning his confidant, a man named Dharmadatta, the evil-hearted Devadatta, impatient with desire for Gopā, spoke to him in private.

23. “My friend, listen to this good advice, which, since it has not yet been carried out, must be kept secret. Listen well to what I say, then carry it out at once!

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112 Cf. ŚBc 96, where it is Devadatta who threatens Danḍapāṇi should he fail to give him his daughter in marriage.

113 Devadatta’s confidence in this matter is, of course, based entirely on his own fantasy.

114 Again Devadatta’s reasoning is fallacious, for as we saw at II.26-32, Śuddhodana is only too eager for Yaśodharā’s child to be a boy and to place him on the throne.

115 udvignamānasā. (MW, s.v.) usually has a decidedly negative sense: ‘agitated, frightened, depressed, anxious, distressed, sorrowful’; here it appears to be almost a synonym for utṣukamanā in the next verse, which denotes anxiety or excitement, whether positive or negative.

116 Neither ED nor DPPN include this name, nor am I familiar with it from Buddhist canonical sources. Wright’s History of Nepal (pp. 89-93, 98, 106, 117, 124, 125, 150) tells of a Rāja Dharmadatta, from Kānci near Madras, who, during the Dvāpara Yuga, wrested the control of Nepal from the Kār-ti king, Saṅku, founded the city of ‘Bisālnagara’, built the temple of Paśupati and erected a caitya which he named after himself, but this legend hardly seems relevant here.

117 kudhiḥ, more literally, ‘evil-minded’
24. "If, at Śuddhodana's death, I [were to become] king, you would be my chief minister. Therefore do as I say. Do not delay!

25. "Of Daṇḍapāṇi make the following request, accompanying it with [this gift of] jewelry: "Grant Devadatta the impassioned Yasodhara [in marriage]!

26. "A blooming young woman, how can your daughter endure such intolerable pains as the scorching flames of sexual desire?

27. "That ill-fated Sarvārthasiddha has now departed secular life, having renounced the illusion of love [and] with it the felicity of a universal monarch.

28. "He is religious mendicant of reprehensible character; He'll not return to this realm; [rather], in cremation grounds, mountains and forests, he will wander like a madman.

29. "Therefore abandon [your] affection for an ignoramus who has no desires, and give [Yasodharā] to Devadatta, who is skilled in the sixty-four arts.

30. "When, at Śuddhodana’s death he shall become king, your daughter will become First Lady, mistress of all.

31. "In such circumstances, no man alive will be so happy, so fortunate as you; therefore, knowing the time to be right, quickly bestow [Yasodharā] upon the wise [Devadatta]."

32. "Deliver this request and the jewels in private. And then, Dharmadatta, bring Yasodharā back as my betrothed!"

33. "If you solicit him in just this way, the grieving father will certainly — and gladly — give away her who is afflicted with the illness of separation."

34. "So saying, Dattaka, eagerly expectant, gave Dharmadatta a jewel of great value and a string of pearls [set in] gold.

35. "Go to her. Go to her with all haste!" said he, over and over again. "This [plan] can certainly be carried out by a friend acting on my behalf!"

118 tatpradattā Yasodharā, 'Yasodharā, given away [in marriage] by him'.

119 Yasodharā has been described in these terms throughout Ch. II, but here, continuing in his fantasy, Devadatta believes it is himself, rather than Sarvārthasiddha, for whom she longs.

120 = Devadatta. Cf. Datta, II.31d above. Here the suffix is pejorative.
36. “After Devadatta had spoken in this way, his friend covered his ears: hearing such immoral talk put him in fear of the torments of hell.

37. “Tears trickling down his cheeks,121 joined palms raised in supplication, he said to the prince: ‘How can you say what should not be said, much less heeded, O best of those who know proper conduct?’

38. “With this entreaty, he fell at Devadatta’s feet, and, fearing the sin of listening to evil, [proceeded to] distinguish the beneficial from the harmful.

39. “‘You must listen, Devadatta, to the good counsel I offer: one among hundreds is heroic, one among thousands, learned;

40. “‘One among hundreds of thousands is a philanthropist; an eloquent man will be still more rare.122 [Nevertheless], do not quarrel with me: your heart is overwhelmed by lust and greed.

41. “‘Since I am your dear friend, in that I distinguish between what is beneficial and what harmful, I wish to speak to you who, blinded by lust, have resorted to a pernicious course [of action].

42. “‘Just as the omniscient Sarvārthasiddha’s companion Udāyin, always acting for [his master’s] benefit, would discuss proper and improper [conduct],

43. “‘In the same way, as your friend who helps you to do what ought to be done and to refrain from what ought not, I always restrain you from harmful [actions] and imitate you in beneficial [ones].

44. “‘When, on a pleasure-outing, the glorious prince saw an old man, a sick man, and a dead man, did Udāyika, lie [to him about them], out of fear of punishment by the king?124 [Certainly not!]

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121 mukhah, ‘face’.
122 vaktā bhavati vā na vā, literally, ‘there may be an eloquent man or not’.
123 pratīvirudhyasya. Cf. pratīviruddha, pratīvirdha (ED, s.vv.), where Edgerton infers from these forms and on the basis of the Pāli pratīvirujjhati (PED, s.v.), a BHS *pratīvirudhyate, *ti, which had ‘not been recorded’ in the material available to him.
124 An allusion to the ‘four sights’ (only the first three mentioned here). On successive outings in Kapilavastu, Sarvārthasiddha comes upon an old man, a sick man, a corpse and, finally, an ascetic. The majority of sources cited below specify that Suddhodana, fearing any experience that will incline his
45. "'Should I therefore fail to instruct you, fearing some action from the king's ministers? In any case, listen or not, what I tell you is for your own benefit.

46. "'Restraint from evil, compliance in good and loyalty in adversity: these are the three characteristics of the virtuous [retainer]."

47. "'What kind of friend speaks not to his master of vice and virtue? What kind of master heeds not good counsel, [but] acts as he pleases?

48. "'Therefore, listen to what must be said because it is beneficial! Do not disdain me! These are not words to be withheld or ignored any longer, my lord.

49. "'Sexual intimacy with a forbidden woman is condemnable, as is listening to or [even] looking [at one]. Indeed, these are the

son to the religious vocation already predicted for him, has kept him so sequestered that he is ignorant of disease, old age and death as well as of religieux. Seeing these four 'omens' and discussing them with Chandaka fills the prince with sorrow at life's inherent transitoriness and fragility and inspires him take up the life of a religious mendicant. For various accounts of the 'four sights', see: Mv ii.1501-15715, tr. ii.145-152; LV 15220-1573, tr. I 284-291; SBV i.65-75; BAKL XXIV.67-90; Bc III.26-62, V.16-21; ŠBc 109-111, 115-121; DN ii.21-29, tr. 207-210; NK i.5831-5932, tr. 78-79. Bareau ("La jeunesse du Buddha", pp. 237-246, 264-265) studies the canonical sources. In the present passage, Dharmadatta's point is that although Udāyin (not Chandaka as in the sources cited) was charged by the king to guard against any disturbing experiences which might lead the prince to prefer the life of an ascetic to that of a king, he answers with strict truthfulness the prince's questions about illness, old age, death, and renunciation.

125 This verse is almost identical to that addressed by Udāyin to Siddhārtha at Bc IV.64, where he exhorts the prince not to spurn the affections of the palace women. ŠBc 125 contains a verse which is strikingly similar even at two removes of translation: "I will recount in brief the marks of a friend: When doing wrong, to warn; when doing well, to exhort to perseverance; When in difficulty or danger, to assist, relieve, and deliver. Such a man is indeed a true and illustrious friend." Indeed, setting aside Asvaghosa's allusions to Brahmanical heroes, so closely does ŠBc 1253-12614 correspond to Bc IV.64-89, we must assume that the former depends directly on the latter. This scene not in Mv, LV, SBV, NK, or BAKL.

126 agamyāgamana, ‘approaching she who is not to be approached’; i.e., sexual intercourse with a woman deemed 'off-limits' by traditional law, e.g., another's wife or betrothed, a girl under a certain age, etc.
roots of the tree of sin: it is known this has been stated by the Buddhas.

50. “By your speaking [as you have] and by my listening [to it], we both become vessels of evil. We should perfect that Dharma by which evil is destroyed!

51. “How can your behavior err so? And how can you speak like [such] a fool? How can you deviate so completely from Dharma, failing to discriminate between women who are sexually available and those who are not?

52. “How can you fear neither public condemnation, nor sin, nor punishment by the king, nor the torments of hell?

53. “Are you liberated? Is your life [so] long? Have you made an end to old age and death? One liberated does not commit evil, for that would cause [him] to fall [from his exalted state].

54. “Blinded by desire, you lust after such a one, a pious woman who upholds Dharma, is devoted to her husband and who is dedicated to the care of her people.

55. “Truly, the auspicious Yasodharā bears the thirty-two marks, is free from [any thought of] ‘I’ or ‘mine’, from illusion and from the afflictions of passion.

56-57. “Moreover, she who became the victory penant [in the Exhibition] of the Sixty-Four Arts, who wrote on a golden tablet all the masculine virtues, and who, desiring a man of such qualities,
thought, "I shall choose as husband one who is endowed with them"—how could she be yours?

58. "For she herself is a matron who has conquered desire, who is free from sensual passion, while you, blinded by both, discriminate not between moral and immoral courses [of action].

59. "A man eminent among the nobility would certainly [not] be so greedy and shameless as to give to the likes of you his modest, virtuous [daughter].

60. "And you have called Sarvāthasiddha mad! It is you, blinded by lust for sexual pleasure and political power, who are the madman now;

61. "While he, seeking Awakening for the benefit of all, has proceeded to Gayā. Did you not hear about, or did you forget, what Chandaka brought back?"

tr. ii.70 and ŚBc 84. Consonant with her starring role in BKA, the present verse, by contrast, describes Gopa as having set out her own requirements.

In speech or recitation, intonation would provide the required ironic tone; for the translation, I have supplied a negative.

At III.3d, Devadatta describes the prince as mūdhadhiḥ, more 'fool', 'blockhead' or 'deluded' than unmatta (III.60b), 'mad' or 'deranged', but this appears to be the allusion. The alternative, to accept the reading of the archetype, abruvam, 'I have stated', making Dharmadatta attribute this statement to himself, makes little narrative sense.

According to Mv (ii.117-123, tr. ii.114-119), after leaving home, Sarvāthasiddha travels first to Vaiśāli, where he studies with Ārāda Kālāma, thence to Rājagṛha, where he studies with Udraka Rāmaputra, and then to Gayā. On Mount Gayāśīrṣa, overlooking Gayā, there occurs to him the 'three similitudes' by which he explains his understanding of the proper attitude for cultivating detachment. Later on, Mv (ii.198-200, tr. ii.189-191) reprises the same events but inserts, before the training under Udraka, the Bodhisattva's conversation with Śreniya Bimbisāra, king of Magadhā. Cf. LV 197-207, tr. I 361-378; SBV i.92-99; Bc VII.1-XII.90; ŚBc 152-185. These last three contain much additional material, such as the prince's interrogation of the forest ascetics and the journey of two palace officials to convince the prince to return. NK (65-67, tr. 87-89) is closer to Mv but does not mention Gayā, instead having the prince proceed directly from Udraka (Udaka) to Uruvilvā (Uruvelā). Bareau studies the canonical sources (Recherches sur la biographie du Buddha I, pp. 28-54; idem, "Le Buddha et Uruvilvā", ed. H. Durt, Indianisme et Bouddhisme: mélanges offerts à Mgr.É Lamotte, Louvain-la-Neuve 1980, pp. 1-18).

This refers to both physical objects and information. In Mv (ii.164-19-
62. “Sarvārthasiddha will most certainly return in order to bring to salvation all his subjects; we shall serve him then, that this evil [of yours] may be quelled.

63. “Better it is to forfeit [one’s] life than to commit an evil deed! So I shall not go to the house of Daṇḍapāṇi with a request for Gopā [on your behalf] (tadarthi)!

64. “But, by your hand, your people are made to go to hell! You, who have been educated in standards of conduct, must distinguish between good and bad counsel.

65. “Therefore, my lord, heed my good counsel: renounce this scheme! What value has power, which does not last, or wealth and passion, [similarly transient]?

66. “They pass away, unable to return; they give rise to trouble and strife; any evil committed for their sake follows you automatically.

67. “Wherever pain and suffering are most horrible, there [you] will be propelled. Can this be prevented by the acquisition of riches, regal power and the rest?

68. “Mighty are the forces of evil, those of regal power so very weak. How could you conceive this [plan], after seeing your elder brother’s virtuous deeds?

69. “With universal salvation as his goal, he renounced kingdom and family, thinking, “All this is impermanent”, and, for the sake of Dharma, went to the forest.

70. “You think, “I shall seize the wife and kingdom even of such an elder brother.” An evil man are you! Alas, [yet you imagine yourself] a mighty hero.”

1653, tr. ii.160), Sarvārthasiddha instructs his squire Chandaka (see I.17 n.), who had accompanied him on his flight from Kapilavastu, to return with his horse Kaṇṭhaka, his jewels and his sunshade and with the following message: “When I have done what I must do and have set rolling the noble Wheel of Dharma, I shall return.” (kṛtaṃ kṛtya āgamavyām pravṛttavaramacakraḥ). Hence Dharmadatta’s confidence in the next verse. Cf. LV 1907-14, tr. I 344; ŚBc 1443-9; SBV i.8925-905. At SBV i.9024-25 and Bc VI.52, the prince states he will succeed in his efforts and quickly return or die trying. In NK (64-65, tr. 86-87), he turns over his ornaments and the horse but only tells Channa to say that he is well.
71. "After speaking thus, repeatedly castigating Devadatta, addressing him with reproachful words, Dharmadatta, sick with that poison, fear of sin, [cried out],
72. ‘Ah! The evil words I have heard! Will there be yet more?’, and, greatly distressed, stood, head hanging down, as if stupefied.
73. "The wicked Devadatta did not imbibe the nectar of Dharmadatta’s words; rather, fearing his plan would be delayed, at night returned home.
74. ‘Since no one is acting, and there is a delay, I’ll go myself. What shame is there in that?
75. ‘In the matter of acquiring precious gems, one may act without shame, [and] she in whom the seven gems reside is indeed a jewel beyond price.’
76. "So thinking, alone and sequestered, he schemed happily. [Indeed], what man, blinded by the passions, particularly by greed, travels the path of true virtue?
77. "What evil will he not commit and what good [counsel] will he heed? And so, blinded by the passions, Devadatta went to the house and to Dañdapāṇi raised his joined palms in greeting.
78. "Proffering the jewellry, he made his request: ‘Father-in-law! Dañdapāṇi! Unashamed, I come to your house.
79. ‘Therefore, in your compassion, fulfill my one request. [Since] at the death of King Šuddhodana I will certainly become king, 80-81b. ‘Therefore give Yaśodharā to me and become ruler of half the kingdom! Why waste the rare blooming youth of a woman burning with the fire of passion who is enamoured of my handsome self? 81c-82. ‘Her companion Manodhara often tells me, “Come to her, Devadatta, at night, in secret! Her limbs burn with the fire of pas-

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135 Devadatta here refers somewhat figuratively to the fact that marriage to Yaśodharā is the means whereby he plans to become a ‘universal monarch’ (cakravartin). A Cakravartin possesses, through his great virtue, seven ‘treasures’ (saptaratna): wheel, elephant, horse, gem, woman, householder, minister, each the best of its kind in the world (on which see Mv i.491-4, tr. i.41; i.1084-10917, tr. i.85-86; iii.1073-6, tr. iii.106; LV 1112-146, tr. I 30-34; SBV i.494-9; cf. DN i.88-89, tr. 112; ii.16, tr. 205; iii.59, tr. 395; iii. 142, tr. 441). For Devadatta, possessing one, the woman (strīratna), is the key to possessing all.
sion! Rescue Yaśodharā, whose nubile youth is being wasted, with the gift of your lips’ ambrosia!”

83. "Having been thus entreated by Manodharā, I come before you to ask for the well-born, modest, youthful Yaśodharā.

84. "Take pity on her, poisoned by Love’s arrows, and bestow your favour on me by making proper arrangements for our union."  

85. "Thus concluding his request, Devadatta adorned and honoured Dānapāni’s feet with the finest gems, and stood before him, unashamed, a smile on his face.

86. "Now Dānapāni, although furious, smiled pityingly, and kicking aside the jewels that Devadatta had offered, replied with contempt, his lower lip quivering:

87. "What! You have gone mad due to the sin of killing the elephant! Before long you shall undoubtedly end up stark naked, eating anything!

88. "Fie on your birth in this cycle of birth-and-death! You are malevolent and bereft of goodness, a frost blighting the lotus blossom of the Śākya lineage!

89. "The auspicious Sarvārthasiddha possesses a purified intelligence; a knower of the three times, he understands [human] fail-

136 Translating kṛtvā twice, once with dayām, once with anugrahat.

137 samgama can also mean ‘meeting, encounter’ or ‘sexual intercourse’.

138 See LV 1123-23; tr. I 219-20. As he is leaving Kapilavastu, on his way to compete in the contest of the manly arts, with Gopa’s hand as the prize, Devadatta sees a white elephant, a gift for the Bodhisattva, being led into the city. Envious and wishing to show off his prowess, Devadatta kills the animal with one blow. Later, Sundarananda demonstrates a more virtuous use of strength by dragging the elephant outside the city gate. Finally, the Bodhisattva comes by, condemns Devadatta’s deed and commends Sundarananda’s, and with a flick of his toe, catapults the elephant far beyond the city, the impact of the animal’s fall creating a large indentation, known thereafter as the ‘Ditch of the Elephant’ (hastigartā). Cf. Mv ii.7411-7517, tr. ii.71-72; ŚBc 91-92; SBV i.5827-606; BAKL XXIV.52-53.

139 It would seem that public nudity and the abrogation of caste rules regarding ritual purity of food are two cardinal signs of insanity. It may also be observed that it is precisely these two practices which are binding upon certain types of ascetics.

140 sārahinasya, ‘bereft of [what is] essential, best, most important’; in this context, very close to ‘bereft of common decency’.
ings and [the workings of] karma, is a speaker of truth, and is beloved by all the people.

90. "'According to that wise one, "Devadatta killed my elephant," who had done nothing wrong. He will surely suffer the consequences.

91. "'Wherever he goes, he will act shamefully; again and again will he wither that thriving stalk, the Śākya lineage."

92. "'And so, just as [Sarvārtha]siddha said, O madman, so it is seen: you are suffering the consequences of that sin; you have gone insane!

93. "'Now that you have fallen into such a state, what else will befall you? Ah! Strange, the cycle of birth-and-death! Ah! Great, the consequences of evil!

94. "'A deed done in this very life definitely has had its result in this very life: such a man, though a prince, has suddenly gone mad!

95. "'Seeing this, [it is clear that] an elephant should absolutely not be killed, by anyone. What! Do you smile? Fool! What [catastrophe] will not befall [you], if you laugh?

96. "'You were smiling when you killed the elephant, as you are even now. 'Laughing Lunatic' will become your name, no doubt of that."

97. "After thus reviling the villain, the enraged Dāṇḍapāṇi summoned his people, saying, "Come quickly!"

98. "Then he told them, 'Proceed to the royal palace. Deliver the following message to King Śuddhodana:

99. "'Your nephew Devadatta, in a state of dementia, has come to my home. His prattle is appalling and he is on the verge of disrobing."
100. "You should therefore place the deranged fellow in custody. Should he be allowed out in public, this naked, shameless fellow?"

101. "Were he to leave my house, naked and his mind wandering, it would be to your shame, O king, for he is the son of your own younger brother."

102. "Therefore, as soon as you have placed him in prison and bound him with ropes, prepare a remedy of medicinal herbs and the like.

103. "Therefore speedily despatch the chamberlain and other officers. Either detain Devadatta yourself or issue instructions regarding him.

104. "What the villain said was unspeakable! He’s a prating madman now!" Deliver this communique and quickly return.

105. "Since [Devadatta] is his nephew, I am reporting this to the king, in accordance with whose instructions we will act promptly.'

106-107. "Confounded by fear and rage at what Dāṇḍapāṇi had said, Devadatta, silent, [but] shaking his fist, departed for home, with a menacing Dāṇḍapāṇi calling after him, ‘Madman! Where are you going? On no account go to any one else’s house or disturb the king!"

108. "Furious at Dāṇḍapāṇi, Devadatta, his own poisonous thoughts banishing sleep, passed the night sunk in evil’s well.

109. "Assuredly I will take to wife the daughter bestowed by Dāṇḍapāṇi, whether by enticing her with jewelry, or by making [her] understand through force.

110. "Then he thought, smiling, castigating himself to himself, ‘What a fool I’ve been, exposing myself to ridicule! What feeblemindedness I’ve displayed!"

111. "A shameless fool intoxicated by passion – how could I have gone to solicit the father of a daughter [already] married?

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145 Inferring interrogative tone.
146 See III.2 n.
147 tarjānim darśayams tasya, ‘displaying to him a threatening forefinger’.
148 śākyā, i.e., ‘The Śākya’, the King.
149 dhig dhīn mām, ‘fie on me’.
150 dhig dhīn me mandabuddhītām, ‘fie on my feeblemindedness’.
112. “‘Even for an unmarried girl one should normally send a messenger. But in this situation, when I went myself, how could he not ridicule me?

113. “‘In that case, could he say, without ridicule, “I give [her to you]!” It was not Daṇḍapāṇi who was at fault, but I alone.

114. “‘Moreover, that I am called mad is for me a blessing: if the plan succeeds, the result will be bliss; if it doesn’t, [well], what [can be expected] of a madman?

115. “‘In this way, I’ll not be blamed, since I’ll appear to be mad, and so long as I have not won Yaśodharā, I shall continue in the guise of a madman. What can the king do, if he then understands me to be insane?

116-117. “‘Now, ‘trained’ by Daṇḍapāṇi as a ‘prating madman’, I shall meet with her esteemed friend, Manodharā, and then at night go to Yaśodharā myself, bearing costly jewels and resplendently adorned with garlands and ornaments.

118-119. “‘For the sake of the kingdom, I will both act immorally and play\textsuperscript{151} the madman, that kingdom in which are found righteousness, wealth, pleasure and liberation. Always will I practise virtue, once, being king, I have acquired the kingdom. And now, I will fulfill my heartfelt desire, which confers happiness.’

120. “Thus oppressed by his thoughts, longing for night\textsuperscript{-fall}, sunk in the mire of greed, he passed that day as if it were a year.

121. “When night did come, his mind disordered by desire, drawn by the cord of [his own] greed, Devadatta went to [see] Śrīdharā.\textsuperscript{152}

122. “One blinded by greed as well as a lecher will go on a bad path and think faults virtues, even if laughed at by others.

123. “There sat Yaśodharā, attended by Manodharā: she had concluded her religious observances and was talking about her husband.

124. “Seated on her bed, the earth, Gopā was gaunt [but] ravishing; without ornaments, but beautifully adorned with auspicious [bodily] marks.

\textsuperscript{151} Translating \textit{karisyāmi} 119a twice – as ‘act’ and ‘play’.

\textsuperscript{152} = Yaśodharā (\textit{śrī} and \textit{yaśas} both mean ‘fame, glory’).
125. “Endowed with the thirty-two marks, bright as the moon without its hare, virtuous and chaste, she was radiant, her eyes like lotuses unattended by bees.

126. “Like the Sarasvati River with its subterranean waters, she had restrained her senses, [but] oppressed by the burden of her unborn child, joy and grief confounded her.

127. “Glowing like a lamp-flame at dawn, like the moon at daybreak, with a body to be loved by no other [than her husband], her beauty was more than ravishing!

128. “She spoke in a voice like a cuckoo’s; she was free from sensual desires, delighted in giving and was full of loving-kindness; her heart was cleansed by the waters of forbearance.

129. “Zealous in virtue and in giving, adept in meditation on the Three Jewels, sagacious, auspicious and greatly blessed, she was a partial emanation of [the goddess] Perfect Wisdom.

130. “Regularly she urged her friend Manodhara: ‘O companion-in-training, tomorrow morning, arise and quickly perform your ablutions.

See II.39-40 n.

These first two similes describe Yaśodharā’s beauty both as diminished by fasting and, for all its glory, as less effulgent than that of her husband.

Cf. the beginning of Upagupta’s narrative to Aśoka at GKV I.34 (A 2b7, B 3b2): ‘In the beginning he arose, his form that of the Dharmadhātu, born from a portion of each of the Five Buddhas, the Lord of the World, the Tathāgata’ (tadyathādisamudbhūto dharmadhātusvarūpakah / pañcabuddhāmsasamjātotagadiṣas tathāgataḥ //). On this, see Burnouf, Introduction à l’histoire du Buddhisme indien, p. 197; A.M. Ghatage & S.D. Joshi, ed., Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Sanskrit on Historical Principles (Poona: Deccan College), s.v. amśaja, ‘born of a portion, a partial incarnation’.

prajñāpāramitā. In the Newar Upoṣadha Observance she is worshipped as the principal deity of the Dharma Maṇḍala (Locke, “Upoṣadha Vrata of Amoghapāśa Lokeśvara”, p. 168; Gellner, Monk, Householder, and Tantric Priest, p. 222). Cf. MJM I.128-130: ‘She who is Mother of the Buddhas, the goddess Perfect Wisdom, the Beneficent One – let her whom the Buddhas call the Jewel of the Dharma be honoured! The Protectress of the Three Worlds, the goddess Perfect Wisdom, the Beneficent One, Mother of the Buddhas – with devotion and concentration worship her always! (yā buddha jjanani devī prajñāpāramitā śīvā / sā dharmaratnam ākhyaṭām budhārthi iti pramanyatām // trijugatpālinīṁ devīm prajñāpāramitāṁ śivām / sambuddhajjananīṁ bhaktyā bhaja nityam samāhitah //).
131. "On the eighth day [of the fortnight], why not practise the Supreme Eightfold Observance of the Holy One? Do so, beginning tomorrow, that you may fulfill life's four aims.

132. "Alone, dear friend, how can I practise? I am unable to endure the obligations and prohibitions, oppressed by the burden of my unborn child, enfeebled, restricted to a diet of fruit.

133. "Dear companion, in the cycle of birth-and-death, what value is there in possessing youth and beauty? Therefore, while you are hale and hearty, practise the Dharma.

134. "When you are old and feeble, dear friend, will you be capable of those observances through the power of which you can be rid of fear and rapidly attain Nirvāṇa?

135. "Therefore, abandon delight in desire, which is like nectar on a razor's edge. This Observance is the causeway to saving the world! Practice [it] with complete concentration!

136. "At all times, joyfully practise generosity to virtuous suppliants, adorn yourself with pure moral discipline; energetically practise meditation and cleanse your heart with the waters of forebearance.

137. "Renounce the ten evil deeds! Practise the Observance Supreme! Cultivate (puraskṛtya) the ten virtuous actions with an earnest desire to fulfill life's four aims.

138. "In those sources of suffering, desires, which are insatiable, take no pleasure: why be greedy to drink brine, Manodharā?

139. "Therefore, imbibe that nectar, the Dharma, the supreme draught which makes an end to hunger and thirst. [Then], liberated from the four fears, strive for liberation [from Saṃsāra].

\[\text{References}\]

157 saiksāli (my emendation; MSS. śeṣvāli, śeṣāli). See ED, s.vv., śaisya (LV 208\(^2-25\)), śaiksā, 'disciple in training'.

158 āryāśatānga vratottama = posadhā vrata (II.5); 'holy one' refers to Amoghapāsa Lokeṣa, to whom the observance is dedicated (IV.2, 6).

159 caturbhaya. Buddhist sources contain many lists of objects causing fear (see AbhidhK tr. iv.248; PED s.v. bhaya). Here the allusion is most likely to those of birth (janma, jāti, janu), disease (vyādhi, roga, rujah), old age (jarā) and death (mrtyu, marana, vipad). At BKA I.31cd (Ce2b3), the Buddha speaks to Brahmā about 'destroying birth, disease, old age and death' (janmarogajarāmrtyunāsā); at I.235c (Ce11a4) Sanatkumāra praises the Buddha as 'destroyer of the fear of birth, old age, disease and death'
140. “‘If you are not ready to so strive, [at least] devote yourself to serving me who am a lay-disciple. In any case, you must follow the dictates of your own heart. Tomorrow is the eighth. Therefore let us go to bed because we must soon be up.’

141. “When the attendants of the two [women] who had been talking together had gone to sleep, the deluded [and] deranged [Devadatta], came to Yaśodharā’s private chamber.

142. “Standing before her, trembling with fear and desire, in a faint, stammering voice the wretch said what should not have been spoken:

143. ‘Daṇḍapāni has sent me, Yaśodharā. You, who are scorched by passion’s flames, I have come to rescue with the nectar of my lips.

144. ‘So choose me as your rightful husband and become pre-eminent, the First Lady! Verily, by looking upon my moon-face, become free of the scorching of desire!

145. ‘Look upon my moon-face, Yaśodharā, and choose me as a bed of [night-blooming] lotuses, closed under the sun of separation, joyfully chooses the moon!’

146. “The moment [Deva]datta had spoken, Yaśodharā quickly covered her ears, saying, ‘Reverence to the Buddha, Reverence to the Dharma and the Samgha! Reverence!’

147. “The innately pure woman rushed into her chamber, gasping, unable to bear such suffering.

148. ‘Ah! Ah! Alas! The evil wrought! Ah! Ah! What kind of talk do I hear? Alas! What sort of evil younger brother have I? Fie! Fie on this life with its evil!’

149. “As if poisoned by what is unfit to be heard, for a moment Yaśodharā lost consciousness; [then], in a faint, tremulous voice, she spoke to Manodharā:

(janurjarāvyādhivipadbhayāntaka). ‘Fearing birth, old age and disease’ (bhiṭo janmajarāruṇah IV.136b) and ‘destroyer of old age and death’ (mṛtyujarāntaka IV.252b) are abbreviated forms.

160 Devadatta is of course lying.

161 The sameness of virtue: Dharmadatta’s response (III.36) is identical.

162 muḥur niśvāsatatpārā, ‘repeatedly overcome with deep sighs’.
150. "'Ah, Manodhara! What has happened today – hearing those evil words – is even more terrible for me whom my own husband has forsaken!

151. "'Ah! With the flames of suffering that malevolent man has scorched me! Never have I been afflicted by sexual desire, but now he has [truly] hurt me.

152. "That brother-in-law [of mine], O Manodhara, will surely go to the netherworld\textsuperscript{163} called Atala,\textsuperscript{164} drawn by the evil cord of his unspeakable words.

\textsuperscript{163} bhuvas talam, 'underpart [or level] of the earth'. See next note.
\textsuperscript{164} Cf. Viśnupurāṇa II.5.1-12 (tr. H.H. Wilson, London 1840; repr. Calcutta: Punthi Pustak, 1972) and Śivapurāṇa, Umāsāmhitā XV.1-33 (ed. K. Pushpendra, Śiva Mahāpurāṇa, NP Series 48, Delhi: Nag Publishers, 1981; tr. A. Kunst & J.L. Shastri, Śiva Purāṇa, Ancient Indian Tradition and Mythology Series 1-4, Delhi 1969-70): Atala, 'Bottomless', is the first of seven netherworlds (collectively called pātālas), not hells but subterranean paradises, inhabited by Nāgas, Asuras, Rākṣasas and other semi-divine beings inimical to the gods. In order of increasing distance from the earth's surface, the seven are Atala, Vitala, Sutala, Rasātala, Tala, Talātala and Pātāla. In accordance with his lustful, ambitious and brutal character, Yāsodhara expects Devadatta to be reborn in Atala. This accords well with the descriptions of Atala and of Bala, its ruler, as given, for example, at Devībhāgavatapurāṇa V.24.16, VIII.19.1-7 (ed. R. Pandeya, Śrīmaddevībhāgavatam Mahāpurāṇam, Kāśi: Pāṇḍita Pustakālaya, 1956; tr. Swami Vijnānānāda [H.P. Chatterji], Śrīmaddevībhāgavatam, Sacred Books of the Hindus XXVI, 1-4, Allahabad: Panini Office, 1921-23). Bala is the son of Maya, ruler of the three cities destroyed by Śiva, now restored to power by that god as reward for his devotion. Maya, ruler of Talātala, is preceptor of all evil magicians; horrific demons propitiate him that they may succeed in their enterprises (VIII.20.1-3). The 24th adhyāya also describes the asuras who dwell in the other pātālas. Cf. BSvP 211\textsuperscript{19}, where Upagupta describes the Buddha as ‘best [of all those who dwell] in the netherworld, heaven and on earth’ (pātālasvargamart<\textgreater esu śresthah) and BSvP 319\textsuperscript{3}, where Śākyamuni describes his predecessor, the Buddha Kanakamuni, as ‘rescuer of [those] sinful beings [who dwell] in the netherworlds’ (pātālesu ca pāpi-nām rakṣakah). Similar statements at 484\textsuperscript{17}-18, 485\textsuperscript{2}, where Svayambhū is described as being ceaselessly worshipped by gods, mortals and those born in pātāla. While the Atala of the BKA is more like a cold hell than a subterranean paradise, the character of the Purānic Bala matches that of Devadatta rather well.
153. "'What suffering will my brother-in-law experience on my account? How will he endure that suffering – the intense cold and the darkness?

154. "'To the highest world, the Akaniṣṭha heaven, we will assuredly go, [but] how will he go, alone, from one netherworld to the next [and finally to] Atala?

155. "'Indeed, through my husband’s power, some blessed and glorious people will reach heaven while others will achieve liberation, so difficult to attain.

156. "'Although a scion of the Śākya lineage and grandson to Simhahanu, how will Devadatta endure, alone and abandoned there by his kinsmen?

157. "'Will the Protector of the World be able to enlighten this most evil of men, for he is sunk in the unfathomable well of sin?

158. "'What happiness can there be for me? I have endured ridicule and defamation, and my brother [-in-law], born into the same lineage, is a servant of hell.

159. "'Even my husband, when he has returned, will condemn me, saying, "It is your fault my brother that [will be] reborn in a state of woe."

160. "'Ah! Fie on my life in Samsāra! What evil did I do in a previous birth? For certainly it is because of me that Devadatta is blinded by lust and resorting to evil.

161. "'Oh Death, will you carry me off, an ill-fated woman abandoned by her husband, a sinful woman in the grip of unendurable torment?


163. "'Begone, O [my] life! Leave my body! Tarry not! O sharer of [my] suffering, can you remain forever longing for happiness?

164. "'Why do I possess such voluptuous beauty? For it [only leads] to sin for those like Devadatta. Leave me, O beauty! Go quickly to his wife!
165. "‘Why do you remain with me? I am a forsaken wife, practising an ascetic observance! It is because of you this man is deranged, deceitful and is committing sin.

166. ‘Alas! What shall I do, where shall I go, with child [as I am]? Forsaken by my husband, the protector of the world, who will protect me in my suffering?’

167. ‘Thus quietly lamenting to her friend, Yaśodharā, seated in the bedchamber, continued, anxious about the suffering [in store] for Devadatta:

168. ‘Instruct and awaken this declaimer of slander, Manodharā. Devise some means whereby he will not go to hell.

169. ‘For his sake I wish to dwell in hell. Is this possible? Or rather, let whatever evil he has done come to maturity in me.

170. ‘You must induce him to honour the Dharma. Make every effort, dear friend, that the sin arising from his evil speech may be destroyed.

171. ‘How can we both practise the True Dharma so that the evil of hearing sinful talk will be destroyed, and so that, without suffering infernal [torments], we will be certain to attain liberation?

172. ‘Only you, Manodharā, have the power to concentrate my mind. I am tormented by [Devadatta’s] unbearable sin. Instruct me with your ambrosial words!’

173. ‘At that, Manodharā, apprehensive, replied: “Listen, my lady. Why are you troubled on his behalf? Calm yourself! I shall explain.

174. ‘That villain, [would-be] destroyer of the Śākya clan, will inevitably go to Atala! Because there is no other level [below it], it is known as ‘Bottomless’.

175. ‘[But] through His power, we two will be freed from fear and go to Akaniṣṭha. Because all [other] worlds are lower, it is [called] ‘Highest’.\(^{166}\)

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\(^{165}\) avācyavākpravaktr, ‘speaker of speech that should not be spoken’.

\(^{166}\) yena lokāḥ kaniṣṭhās te tenābhūd akaniṣṭham. Cf. AbhidhK (ed.) iii.527\(^{10}\) (tr. iii.168): “Beyond Akaniṣṭha there is no higher plane. For this reason – because they have the highest place – [the deities dwelling there] are called A-kaniṣṭha, ‘opposite of the lowest’” (tasmād [scil. akaniṣṭhād] ūrdhvam na punah sthānam asti. ata eva āyeyathabhūtvād akaniṣṭhā ucyante).
176. " "What your husband said on the field of contest for [your hand in] marriage: I remember it all, my lady, being still of the same substance as my youth.

177. " 'It was then your husband, adept in the worldly arts, overcame with his [bare] hands that great fool, who was armed with a sword, and flung him into the air. 167

178. " 'It was then the cruel-hearted villain remained alive due to your husband's compassion and the jeering crowd reviled him with many a skilful curse. 168

179. " 'It was then that Sarvārthasiddha, while carrying Simhahanu's bow, with great force broke his (Devadatta's) bow into three, though Devadatta could not [even bend it]. 169

180. " 'It was then the gods, rejoicing at seeing you awarded to Siddhārtha, reviled and ridiculed Devadatta, who nevertheless exhibited no shame. 170

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167 I have noted this scene only in LV (11724-1183, cf. tr. I 230-231). Sarvārthasiddha defeats Nanda, Ananda and then Devadatta in wrestling. "Then the conceited and arrogant Prince Devadatta, full of vanity at being a Śākya and proud of his strength, challenged the Bodhisattva: he circled, posturing, all around the arena, then rushed at him. Without effort or haste the Bodhisattva playfully seized Prince Devadatta in his right hand. Out of kindness, without any intention to harm him, but only to humble his pride, three times he spun Devadatta around in the air, then set him down again on the ground. And Devadatta's body was unharmed" (tadanantarāma devadattasaṃ bhuja vaśya ca mānī ca balavān eva tabdhah śākyamānena ca tabdho bodhisattvam sārdham visp ardhamānānām sarvāvantiṃ rangamandalam pradaśiṃkṛtya vikriḍāmānān bodhisattvam abhipatati sma. atha bodhisattvo saṃbhārānta evatvaram dakṣiṇena pāninā salilam devadattaṃ kumāram grhitvā irī gaganatali parivartya mānanigrahāraṃ avihimsābuddhāyā maîtreṇa cittenā dharaṇītāle nikṣipati sma. <na> cāsya kāyaṃ vyābādhathe śma). Either our author has added the detail about the sword or he is referring to a version of the episode not known to me.

168 Manodhara seems to imply that, but for Siddhārtha's intervention, the angry crowd would have killed Devadatta. No hint of this in LV.

An allusion to the archery contest in which the untrained Siddhārtha bests all comers: LV 11824-12015, tr. I 231-234; Mv ii.7520-7613, tr. ii.73; ŠBc 88-90 (three consecutive contests); SBV i.607-27; NK 58, tr. 78; not in Bc. LV 1196-7 and ŠBc 89 mention that he broke one or more bows before trying Simhahanu's.

170 LV 11921-26, 1208-15, Mv ii.7610-13 and ŠBc 89-90 describe the gods'
181. ‘Incompetent in the sixty-four arts [yet] blustering in his pride and arrogance, it was then, on account of the public condemnation, that he conceived the desire to go to Atala.

182. ‘Since then that evil-minded one has longed to go to Atala, but, lacking assistance, and not knowing [how], he is unable.

183. ‘With what companion will I be able to reach Atala?’ So thinking, and seeking a companion, that villain this day has found one.

184. ‘Accompanied by that powerful one, he himself is powerful, having acquired an advantage from us so as to consolidate [his position] through his own deeds.

185. ‘Can those who are weak below be strong above? Can the roofs of houses without pillars be strong?

186. ‘Likewise, without companions it is impossible to reach and remain in a distant region which is inaccessible, dark and intensely cold.

187. ‘Now, through strenuous effort and destiny, he has acquired two companions: when he killed the elephant, there was one; now there is another.

188. ‘Then, by bodily [misdeed], now by [one] of speech, he has acquired [a companion]. But even with two companions, he cannot reach Atala (tatra).

189. ‘So long as he has not similarly acquired ten [such] companions, he will lack the full means and it will be impossible.

praise; none state they reviled Devadatta.

171 a-karmasahāyatva. Cf. karmasacīva, karmasārathi, ‘assistant’ (MW, s.v. karma).

172 na jānataḥ. Cf. ED, s.vv. jāna, jānaka, ‘knowing, wise’.

173 That is, the two women provide the occasion for Devadatta to commit further evil deeds, which will aid him in reaching Atala.

174 Inferring sahāya, as in the previous verse.

175 In Manodharā’s little allegory, Devadatta’s first ‘companion’ on the road to Atala is taking life (prānātipāta), in his case, elephanticide (gajagnātāna); the second is the slander (pāśunya, avācya) implied in propositions his cousin’s wife.

176 To be wicked enough to reach Atala, Devadatta must commit the other eight of the ‘ten evil deeds’ (III.137 n.). Cf. III.218.
190. "But he is anxious for the arrival of others, and should he acquire ten followers, with them showing him the way, he will certainly reach Atala (tatra).

191. "Wherever [those] friends abide, there he will find refuge, enjoy the pleasures offered him and be respected as their guest.

192. "Unless they abandon him, he will remain there enjoying himself and those friends he has made will honour him to the utmost of their ability. 177

193. "In this way he will enjoy those companions and the pleasures they offer him; then, angrily abandoning one after the other, he will reach Atala.

194. "There, perfectly still, unfeeling as a post, in the cold and utter darkness he will remain, and it will never release him.

195. "What you have said, my lady – "Let his karma ripen in me; for his sake I will dwell in Atala (tatra)" – that will not come to pass." 178

196. "What one sows oneself, one reaps oneself; what is sown by others is similarly [reaped by them alone]: it is not they, his true friends, by whom he will be led to Atala (tatra).

197. "Devadatta is a member of my own family." So you have pointed out. Nevertheless, no fault accrues to us or to the family.

198. "After all, the [cosmic] poison, which destroys [life] and the nectar [of immortality], which preserves [it], were both produced from that jewel-mine, the ocean, for nature is unalterable. 179

177 gamisyati 190d and samäpnuyät 193d show that 191-92 are also future.

178 Referring to Yaśodharā’s statement in III.169. That is, even with the best will in the world, no one can experience the consequences of another’s deeds (this, of course, is somewhat belied by the popular practice of ‘transfer of merit’).

179 This alludes to a myth found in both Sanskrit epics and several Purāṇas (see V.M. Bedakar, “The Legend of the Churning of the Ocean in the Epics and Purāṇas”, Purāṇa IX, no. 1, pp. 7-61): the gods churn the ocean of milk in order to obtain the nectar of immortality (amṛta), but also unwittingly turn up the cosmic poison (hālāhala), which threatens to incinerate heaven and earth. Śiva preserves the cosmos by drinking the poison, which burns his throat and earns him the epithet ‘Black Throat’ (nilakanṭha). In the dhāraṇi of the 1000-eyed, 1000-armed Avalokiteśvara, still part of daily liturgy in many East Asian monasteries, this physical feature has been assi-
199. "'Now your alarm is that in listening to this evil you have committed sin. In this matter, forego your anxieties, for in no wise did you listen of your own accord.

200. "'Neither did you conceive it in your own mind nor speak it in your own voice. [To be sure], the malevolent one arrived when [we] were discussing Dharma.

201. "'Now because this deranged man is evil, even in the present situation there is no fault on your part: killing the elephant precipitated Devadatta's plunge into the deep well of sin.\textsuperscript{180}

202. "'Thus, so long as he has not reached Atala, he shall wander from one netherworld to another: if his companions are unable to abandon him, he will go.

203. "'Therefore, my lady, be not anxious! Meditate on the glorious Triple Gem through the power of which sin is dissolved, like salt in water.

204. "'Devadatta! You had better consider carefully whether what I have said is true. Begone! Go home at once! How can your mind be [so] disordered?

205. "'Did your friend Dharmadatta not say something to you [in this regard]? In your deranged condition did you come here contrary to his advice?

206. "'Repeat all I have said to your friend Dharmadatta. An intelligent man, he will understand, as will Udāyin, the chaplain.\textsuperscript{181}

207. "'Do not disregard what he says, O man of ill-will! Rather, I counsel you to heed him, O man of disordered mind!

208. "'Ah, Prince Devadatta! Are you devoted to evil because you are blinded by lust and greed? [Is that] also why your mind is disordered?

209-210b. "'Born into a blemishless family, will you besmirch yourself? Do you act out of [sheer] perverseness, thinking in your heart, "My elder brother was born a saviour; I shall be a destroyer!"?

\textsuperscript{180} III.87, 95-96, 187.

\textsuperscript{181} See notes on Chandaka and Udāyin, I.17.
210c-211. “He who rightly seeks Awakening gave up eighty-four thousand consorts! You are that wise man’s younger brother. How then, my lord, can you propose intimacy with another man’s wife?
212. “Even if one might carry off another’s wife, how could one carry off such a one [as Gopā]? She is auspicious, a mother to her people, a holy woman who strives for the welfare of her subjects;
213. “A superlative woman, devoted to her husband, the Omniscient One, and who is carrying his child\(^\text{182}\); greatly esteemed by the people and like a mother in working for their welfare.
214. “King Śuddhodana’s beloved daughter-in-law deserves your esteem! For such a woman, who should be honoured, how can your passions be aroused?
215. “One cannot imagine, even in a dream, how one could diminish the true religion or happiness of that woman, who is with child, and whose lotus-feet deserve our veneration.
216. “Toward her how could you ever develop lustful thoughts? Fall not into false views, O scion of the Śākya lineage!
217. “Do not inflict distress upon your own true family, [now] newly invigorated\(^\text{183}\), nor strive for long stay in Atala, which would be unendurable.
218. “[Rather], strive, along with the people, to attain liberation, the supreme joy, so difficult to attain. With the passions as your companions, you will never reach it, but will only wander below, from one netherworld to the next, and thence down to Atala.
219. “What value, then, royal power, which must be relinquished? What value the intoxication of youth and transient pleasures whose only issue is sin?
220. “For these very reasons your brother voluntarily gave up the riches of his station: he became a wandering mendicant and undertook ascetic practice out of a desire for the riches of liberation.
221. “Follow his example! With liberation as your goal, take up the religious life yourself! It is possible [for you] to save the world! Do not extricate yourself alone!

\(^{182}\) A secondary meaning for sarvājñabijadhārīnī (213b) might be ‘carrying the seeds of omniscience’, if we gloss sarvājna as sarvājñatā.

\(^{183}\) Referring to Yaśodhārā’s pregnancy.
222. "'If you cannot manage that, cultivate at all times the True Dharma, that is, the [Poṣadha] Observance and the other practices! Destroy the evil that has arisen from taking life and from slanderous speech."

223 "'How can [you] not fear the torments [of the hells] and the king’s punishment? Being blinded by depravity has led to all this: do not make it worse!'

224. "On hearing this advice to take up the religious life, the foolish Devadatta’s face reddened with anger, his limbs trembled with hatred and he gnashed his teeth repeatedly:

225. "'Madwoman! Aren’t you heroic, wise and discerning, you, an ill-fated slave woman! Pah! What sort of prattle is this? [Then to Gopā:]

226. "'You, who daily forsake your lord to sleep with a paramour, would not remain in Atala (tatra)! You would leave for the City of Liberation!"

227. "'Slut! What are you talking about, imagining [yourself] beautiful? If you were not dwelling in the palace, I’d chop off your head! [To Manodharā:]

228. "'Clever lady, by way of the lake I’ll send you and Gopa hurtling from one netherworld to the next, [but only] after I’ve cut out your wagging tongues and lopped off your noses!

229. "'I shall certainly become lord of this realm after Śuddhodana’s death: then I may listen to your advice, which should be heeded like so many tall tales.

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184 vratādika. The Ten Skilful/Virtuous Actions (III.137 n.), the Six Perfections (III.129 n.), the Four Sublime States, etc.

185 That is, from killing the elephant and propositioning Yaśodharā.

186 See III.218 n.

187 On the analogy of his own fiction that Yaśodharā forsook her husband to rut with another man, Devadatta rejects her declaration (III.169, 195) that she wishes to go to Atala in his stead, i.e., to take the consequences of his evil upon herself.

188 III.165-66.

189 bhaviṣyasi śiraśchidā, ‘you’d be a woman with a severed head.’
230. "'Will it then be I who goes to Atala, or the pair of you? Or perhaps that Dharma which is cultivated through ascetical observances will protect you.

231. "'Then neither the 'True Dharma', nor that [so-called] omniscient beggar, nor the king will protect you from me!'\(^{190}\)

232. "'Nor, indeed, will even all of them [together]! Destruction at my hands thus awaits you both! May all this, O you two who shall be worth seeing, be witnessed by me, lion among kings!

233. "'Because of her ambitions for the child in her womb, Yasodharā has repeatedly insulted me, who merit respect [thinking], "The birth of a daughter is worth [only] one thousandth part of the birth of a single son."

234. "'Should [this child] be born, can he [really] be supreme lord of the realm, or a fortunate [fellow] like me? For what is begotten from a wretched beggar's seed can only be a sorry fruit!

235. "'Bah! You are expert at perversity: you have done something perverted to me, you practise vice as virtue and present falsehood as truth!

236. "'Miserable woman, both you and Gopa I regarded with a pitying eye – I came to your rescue, but you revile me, abuse me [and treat me] with contempt!

237. "'Abandoned by her husband in her prime, in the bloom of her youth, constantly scorched by flames of lust, Gopa, like a widow, is without protection!

238. "'Oppressed by the burden of her unborn child, she relishes wholesome foods, longing to taste their divers flavours and desirous of the nectar of my lips.

239. "'In the past she longed only for me – handsome as a god, desirable in my mastery of the sixty-four arts\(^{191}\), blessed, her own age, without peer!

240. "'But], fearful of punishment by the king, she chose as husband one not to her own liking; she was given in marriage out of fear [by a father] terrified of royal chastisement.\(^{192}\)

\(^{190}\) Here and in the first half of the next verse I have translated Devadatta's rhetorical interrogative as an exclamatory negative.

\(^{191}\) Cf. Manodharā's testimony, III.181.
241. “‘She is going to choose me, Devadatta, as her husband, she who is now so fortunate and blessed as to be sought in marriage by me, who am so desirable.

242. “‘In order to protect the bashful Gopa, you dishonour me, who am righteous and have come out of compassion, with the unendurable barbs of calumny. Fie!

243. “‘All this I shall endure for now – so long as I am not king. You are glib and adulterous and Suddhodana is under the sway of your magic power.

244. “‘By virtue of this precedence over all, you are first lady, a snare for the king. In this kingdom you are the authority, for the king dances to your tune."

245. “‘You possess supreme power; you can force me to become a monk. We are all of us subject to you – from the royal family to the lowest of the people.

246. “‘If you have the power, despatch me to Atala (tatra) right this moment, or send me from house to house, a monk [begging] for almsfood.

247. “‘If not, I will despatch you, headless and bound tightly with ropes, to Akaniśṭha, endowed with the merit from your mendicant’s vows.

248. “‘It is you who are the fool, though you have called me one! It is you who are incapable of spiritual cultivation! It is you who are irreligious and stupid!

249. “‘Forsaken by Sarvārthasiddha, Gopa, too, is a fool, for since her husband abandoned her, she has sunk into a state of morbid indifference.

250. “‘And thus hurt by her husband, defenceless, and suffering terribly, even then, she did not consider, ‘What will become [of me]?’

251. “‘Nor did [you, Manodhara, consider], “I am the servant of a defenceless woman whose lord has forsaken her. Now I am without a master. Who will protect me?”

192 Devadatta reiterates his fantasy of III.17-18.
193 vacanatale ‘sty asau, ‘he is on the surface of [your] words.’
252. “‘Being thus incapable of forethought, you are the fool, for just as you said, slut, youth does not last!
253. “‘As in due course youth fades, beauty is lost and your hair turns gray,’ remorse will indeed consume you.
254. “‘When you are old, arrogant woman, a young man, looking upon you, will intensify your grief, mocking your ugliness with great cries of derision.
255. “‘Then, heart stricken by remorse, face covered in tears and hands folded in supplication, you will make your entreaty to me, who [by then] will have become king:
256. “‘Then I will surely do as I have now vowed. I will not tolerate your talk, then, slut! Now, however, I am powerless.’
257. “So saying, the enraged Devadatta, repeatedly shaking his fist at Manodharā, stood, hesitating, on the verge of departing.
258. “Manodharā then replied to him, unafraid and with a smile on her face: ‘Yaśodharā, aided by my friendship, abides at all times in equanimity (upekṣā).
259. “‘Devadatta, when you become king, make what you say something I shall have to heed, since toward me you are the embodiment of kindness.
260. “Tonight – right now! – chop off my head: giving in secret is great giving, just as sinning is secret is great sin.
261. “‘Without making a gift of my head, how can I, a woman, attain liberation? And without cutting off someone’s head, how can you reach Atala?
262. “‘And how can one reach Akanistha or Atala, [except] with a friend?’ So did [your] elder brother concisely put it and so did I hear it.
263. “‘Hence, for Yaśodharā and me, you are a spiritual friend (kal-yāṇamitra), for you grant Release (apavarga): he who severs the guiltless head liberates from sin.

194 dehe palitasamvyāpte, ‘when your body [is] covered with gray’.
195 Here Manodharā indulges in a little sarcasm at Devadatta’s expense.
264. "‘When will I give the gift of my head? Such is my heart’s true desire. Through you alone can this resolution, made for the sake of liberation, be fulfilled.
265. ‘Headless' you must make me without delay!’ So saying, Manodhara flung herself on the ground before him, overjoyed, her resolution made.
266. ‘Send me to Sukhavati — chop off my head!’ Although she [meant to] shame Devadatta by urging him in this way, he, unashamed, [retorted]:
267. ‘In due course I’ll despatch you [hence] — on that account harbour no doubts!’ So saying, body hot with rage, he returned home.
268. ‘When the lust-tormented Devadatta had gone, Yasodharā and Manodhara talked for a time, then, feeling [rather] apprehensive, went to sleep.
269. “[As for Devadatta], consumed with hatred for Sarvārthasa[iddha] and immersed in a well of anxious thought, he broke out in a fever of rage and passed a sleepless night.
270. ‘After that, Devadatta sought ways to get at the two women, for one blinded by desire pays no heed to shame or whether he does right or wrong.

196 niśkaṇṭha, ‘neckless’, which amounts to the same thing.
197 ‘Realm of Bliss’, ‘Pure Land’, ‘Western Paradise’: the world presided over by the Buddha Amitābha/Amitāyus, a paradise where conditions are ideal for rapid attainment of full Buddhahood. The two recensions of the Sukhāvatīvyūha describe in detail meditative visualisation of Sukhāvatī but also teach that all those with faith in Amitābha can be reborn there as advanced Bodhisattvas. So Kalpadrumāvadānamālā X.487 (ed. Speyer, Avś II, p. xci): ye maitribhāvadharmam kalimatharanam tat subhūtes caritram śrṅvanti śrṅvayanti tribhuvanasukhadam sāmnipātya janaughān / te lokā maitracittās tribhuvanasukhadāh ksāntisaurabhyyuktā yātāh saukhāvatim te ’py amitarucimuner dharmam ārādhayanti // At BSvP 2224, the Buddha Krakuchanda promises his newly ordained monks that devotion to the Three Jewels and practise of the Ten Virtuous Deeds will enable them to reach Sukhāvatī. Also, in MJM XIII, Prince Animiṣa vows to be reborn in Sukhāvatī, the Buddhafield of Amitāyus, whereupon the Tathāgata Ratnagarbha foretells that he will be reborn as the Bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara.
The Way of the Translators:
Three Recent Translations of Śāntideva’s
*Bodhicaryāvatāra*

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It is possible that translation is like the flight of the bumblebee: unlikely in principle but a fact nonetheless. (Hensey, 1982).

1.0. Introductory.
As in other bodies of literature, a few Buddhist works have gained special favor among modern scholars and readers. Some have achieved the exalted status of membership in the modern canon of Buddhist texts. Śāntideva’s *Bodhicaryāvatāra* can claim to be among these select few. Without question it is the most translated among Indian Buddhist works of the *śāstra* genre. Although it is difficult to keep up to date with, or keep an accurate census of, the many modern language renderings of classical Buddhist texts that appear in contemporary libraries and bookstores, I would venture to say that the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* most likely now occupies the third position among the most frequently translated Indian Buddhist texts, after the

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1All references within the main body of the text and in the notes are to the last name of the author or translator as listed in the Bibliography at the end of this review; the date of publication is added only when necessary to distinguish two works by the same author or authors. Abbreviations are noted on their first occurrence and are also listed at the end of the article.

2The common title, *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, is abbreviated as Bca. in the footnotes and in textual references in the main body of the paper, and in the comments that follow some of the entries in the Bibliography. The alternative title *Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra* is not used in this essay, essentially in order to avoid the entering into a discussion of its sources.
Dhammapada and the "Heart Sutra."  

It held a privileged position in Tibetan territory, where it seems to have been translated at least twice. The Bodhicaryāvatāra most likely was greatly esteemed in the Indian subcontinent, and perhaps for a short time among the élites of Buddhist Indonesia. In other parts of Asia it failed to make much of an impression. It was clumsily translated into Chinese only once and it was virtually unknown in East Asia until Western Buddhist Studies brought the text to the attention of scholars in China and Japan. A good portion of the text is preserved in fragmentary manuscripts from Dunhuang in a Tibetan translation that differs significantly from both the Tanjur version and the extant Nepalese Sanskrit version).

3In the case of the latter, it is hard to tell what should count as a separate or distinct translation—furthermore, its Indian origin has been called into question (see Nattier, 1992). I will not attempt a comparison with Buddhist texts composed or preserved in Chinese or Tibetan, or works in Japanese, several of which also have sometimes a semi-canonical status. They include the Lotus Sutra, the Platform Sutra, the ShoBōgenzō, and the Bodhipathapradīpa.

4This is counting the two extant and clearly distinct versions: the Tanjur (or "canonical") version and the Dunhuang version. But the canonical version was most likely revised extensively from an earlier prototype of the 9th century. This version is listed in the Bibliography under the name of Sarvajñadeva as main translator. The Dunhuang version has been studied extensively by Saitō.

5This statement is, of course, primarily impressionistic. There is no basis for a stronger statement, like that of Wallace and Wallace (p. 7) claiming that the Bca. "has been the most widely read, cited, and practiced text in the whole of the Indo-Tibetan Buddhist tradition." The suggested connection with Indonesia is only based on the existence of two compendia or abridgements of Bca. by Atiśa's teacher Dharmakirti (Eimer, 1981), who was known by the name of his land of origin, Gser-gling-pa, that is, Suvarṇadvipa (Chattopadhyaya & Lama Chimpa).

6The Chinese text has never been translated into a Western language. It was "translated" once into Japanese in the style of paraphrase known as kokuyaku (Byōdō, 1931).

The Dunhuang text, moreover, is attributed to a different author by the name of Aksayamati. It is preserved in four manuscripts: Stein 628, 629, 630, and Pelliot 729. Henceforth references and allusions to "the Tibetan" or
But among contemporary believers in the West and among scholars in contemporary Japan, Europe, and North America, the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* continues to hold a special fascination. It has seen a number of translations, mostly from the Sanskrit, but some from the Tibetan text in the Tanjur. We have three translations into French. It has been available, until recently, in two complete and one partial English renditions (not counting assorted fragments in anthologies). It has been translated into several other European languages: Danish, Dutch, German, and Spanish and Japanese—and into a number of modern Asian languages: Chinese, Hindi, Japanese, and Newari. It is also available in one partial translation into Italian.

Three English renditions have appeared in the last two

“Tib.” will be to the Tanjur version of *Bca.*, unless it is specified otherwise. This version is among the earliest texts translated into Tibetan (ca. first half of the 9th century C.E.). The translators were *Sarvajñadeva* and *Dpal-brtsegs*—it is No. 5272 (vol. 99, pp. 243-262) in the Peking edition (Otani Reprint). It was revised by three scholars generally dated in the 9th century (*Dharmasrībhadrā, Rin-chen-bzang-po, and Sākya-blo-gros*), but was then revised much later by scholars dated in the early and late 11th century (*Sumati-kirti* and *Blo-Idan-shes-rab—1059-1109 C.E.*). The Mongolian versions, including the late translation of *Chos-kyi ’od-zer* also have some interesting variants (see Poppe, 1954, Ruegg, 1967, Lokesh Chandra, 1976, and Rachewiltz, 1996).

An exploration of the reasons for this fascination would yield interesting insights into the Orientalist frame of mind. One of our graduate students at the University of Michigan, Mr. Kaoru Ohnishi, is at present engaged in such an investigation. I myself am of two views. As a hold-out in the “canon wars,” I would argue that the work is a classic and deserves the attention it has received; but as a child of post-modernity, I also recognize that much of the attraction is the result of a mirror effect that seems to allow the Western scholar and practitioner to recognize in *Bca.* a Western ascetic subconscious. This mirror allows us the fantasy of a “spirituality” with all the glory, but none of the gore, of classical ascetic traditions. Needless to say, the *Bca.* satisfies neither the requirement of a pure spirituality nor the expectation of tame asceticism.

Full references for all of the translations mentioned in the following paragraphs will be found in the Bibliography.
years, bringing the number of complete English translations to five. First, a version from the Sanskrit by Crosby and Skilton was published by Oxford University Press in 1996 (abbreviated CS). This was followed in 1997 by a translation from the canonical Tibetan version by Wulstan Fletcher, of the Padmakara Translation Group (abbreviated PG). Soon thereafter, we saw the publication of still another English rendering, this time by Vesna A. Wallace and B. Alan Wallace, based on the edited Sanskrit versions, with copious extracts translated from the canonical Tibetan version (abbreviated WW). These three most recent English translations bring the total of contemporary translations to at least twenty-seven.

1.1. Indian Document or World Classic?

Although the translation of Buddhist śāstras presents special problems, the difficulties, methods, and assumptions we

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10 When the abbreviations used for the new Bca. translations are used to mean the book or the work, the abbreviation is construed as the singular (e.g., CS = Crosby and Skilton’s translation). When the abbreviation stands for the translators, it is construed as a plural (e.g., CS = Crosby and Skilton).

11 In a self-effacing gesture, the book is published as the work of the Padmakara Translation Group, but the introduction strongly suggests to me that the translation is primarily the work of Fletcher. Nevertheless, in deference to their wish, I refer to this version as “the Padmakara translation.”

12 My count is based on the translations I have been able to examine, or for which I have found reliable references. I am not always comfortable listing as more or less independent translations some of these texts, even some of the ones I have examined. I also have little confidence in my list of the translations into contemporary Indian languages. Pezzali, for instance, lists others, but her references are at times obscure, and often unreliable. I have also not attempted to count fragmentary or partial translations in anthologies (some of which are slightly edited excerpts from the complete translations—see, e.g., Conze, Nyanaponika). A good example of an anthologized excerpt, translated with care, is Winternitz, 1930. In all, I have been able to obtain and examine 19 complete or close to complete translations into modern languages (counting LVP’s efforts as only one translation), another 8 have not been accessible to me. Versions in modern languages that are known to me are listed in the Bibliography. Those I have been able to examine are listed under “Modern Translations Examined by the Reviewer” the others under “Modern Translations Not Examined by the Reviewer.”
find in translations of Buddhist scholastic treatises have much in common with those encountered in any other body of translated literature. This is especially true of a text like the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, which combines elements of several genres in a manner that must be characterized as unique in Indian literature.\(^\text{13}\) Furthermore, šāstras are sometimes read as if they had some sort of universal or timeless appeal, yet they are also assumed to be highly technical, if not scientific treatises. Modern interpreters seldom acknowledge the tension between these two characterizations.

Yet, the relative popularity of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* in the West may be due to the fact that it has come to be considered primarily as a timeless expression of universal human longings. Since the days of Auguste Barth (1893), it has been considered as equal to the greatest works of Christian “spirituality,” and therefore (as if one proposition followed necessarily from the other) as a work of universal value and appeal.

The translation by Crosby and Skilton (CS) is part of a collection called “World’s Classics.” Steinkellner, in the Introduction to his German translation (1981, p. 7) speaks of the “religious inspiration,” wisdom, and literary beauty that in combination make the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* “a document of world literature.” With such expectations, the translator’s task becomes much more difficult than it would be if the work were assumed to be a technical text, or a culture-bound literary production.\(^\text{14}\)

Since its modern re-discovery at the end of the nineteenth

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\(^{13}\) This does not imply necessarily the originality of a single author. I am not sure we can confidently eliminate the possibility that Bca. is a composite text formed by agglutination. The existence of the Dunhuang recension at the very least suggests this alternative hypothesis.

\(^{14}\) One could argue that šāstric texts are so bound to their cultural context or to the scholastic jargon of their creators as to be untranslatable, or as to render their translation a pointless effort (Griffiths). I think this is an extreme position, but nevertheless an exaggeration that captures in a few words the difficulties encountered by the translator of such works.
century, the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* has been regarded as an expression of the universal longings presumed to underlie "mysticism" or "spirituality" (La Vallée Poussin & Thomas, 1925, Pezzali, 1968, etc.). It has often been held as an ideal, if not an accurate account of Indian Mahāyāna practice (see, e.g., La Vallée Poussin, 1910 & 1925). And it is sometimes regarded as a practical manual, or even a "meditation manual"—which would entail still another shift in the goals and expectations of audience and translator. Still other scholars and believers see the work as primarily philosophical (Ruegg, 1981, also 1995), although classical literature as well as modern use confirms its importance as a ritual and devotional text. Less common are appreciations of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* as a document of Buddhist monasticism (Ishida, 1988, 1993a, 1993b). Also, for all our expressed admiration for the poetical beauty of Bca., we do no have to date any detailed explorations of the literary characteristics and merits of the work.16

Allusions and references to Śāntideva and his *Bodhicaryāvatāra* are legion, yet surprisingly, until recently it had not been the object of any major published monograph—although one must mention a number of Ph.D. dissertations in America and Japan (e.g., Sweet, 1976), and a fascinating paper on the psychology of meditation published in a major journal of clinical psychology (Sweet & Johnson, 1990).17 In spite of this

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15 Respectively, Kajihara (1991), and Paul Williams in his General Introduction to CS (p. xxvii). But the notion that Bca. is a manual comes from the title (*avatāra* understood as "practical introduction") and is already found in LVP and Brt. Kajihara suggests that the Bca. was a "ritual" manual of sorts. I think neither characterization is acceptable for the whole book—not even for Chapters III-V, and VIII, which admittedly contain much practical advice or instruction.

16 For one way of looking at Bca. as rhetoric, see Gómez, 1994. Also of interest is the remark of Frauwallner (1956, p. 254) that Śāntideva is more important as poet than as philosopher.

17 I had not received my copy of the only published monograph (Williams, 1998) at the time the typescript of this review was sent to the editors. Hedinger, 1984, is a respectable study of certain themes in Śāntideva’s
dearth of critical studies, the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* is often read in the original in university graduate courses and in translated excerpts in undergraduate courses. It is also the object of study in many Western Buddhist centers, and not too long ago was the object of a commentary—published in English—by H. H. the Dalai Lama (who is extremely fond of this text). 18

The *Bodhicaryāvatāra* is therefore a work of many meanings, amenable to a wide variety of readings. If that makes it into a “classic,” then a true classic it is. The point is not whether it is “a true classic” or not, or whether or not there are true classics. Rather, the point is that such a protean work deserves and requires many translations—and that comparing translations becomes all the more complicated, since the value of a translation is linked to its intended use and audience.

One should also note that a translation, if well done, can serve as a kind of critical study, a commentary of sorts. In that sense the recent spate of English translations not only increases the number of English renderings twofold, it also adds something to our scholarship on Śāntideva and the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*. To boot, one of these translations (CS) adds a study of some size if one combines the preface, the main introduction, all the separate chapter introductions and the notes.

The value of a translation is not determined exclusively by a “goodness of fit” between audience and translated text, or between preferred interpretation and preferred renditions. The other work, the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*.

18 *A flash of lightning in the dark of night* (1994). This is a commentary of selected stanzas from all ten chapters. There is, however a more detailed commentary to the ninth chapter also by H. H. the Dalai Lama, published as *Transcendent Wisdom, A commentary on the ninth chapter of Shantideva’s Guide to the bodhisattva way of life* (1988). I should note also that my undergraduate students are very fond of the first of these two commentaries by H. H. the Dalai Lama—an important observation in light of my own judgement regarding the source for the Bca. excerpts used in that commentary: namely, the Padmakara version.
value of translations is also measured in terms of grammatical and idiomatic constraints, by rhetorical and cultural parameters, and by the limitations of cultural context and language usage. Furthermore, translations are not only commentaries and useful tools for the scholar who is struggling with a text, they are also meant to do something else: somehow make the text accessible in a different idiom—and make it accessible especially to those unfamiliar with the source language and culture. One must therefore ask, not only if a new translation offers new insights or an interesting new perspective, but also the degree to which it is able to stand alone as a work of literature (in this case presumably religious literature) accessible to a moderately educated reader in the target language (in this case contemporary standard English). One must also judge the degree to which this accessibility is balanced by signals (conventions and turns of language) reminding readers in the target-language that the text is the work of (a different) culture or of a human being who did not always think the way the readers think (or believe they do).

1.2. From “Old” to “New” Translations

When a work has been translated many times before, one must also ask if new translations advance our knowledge of the text, use language that is more accessible to contemporary readers than the one found in the older versions, or improve on the accuracy and elegance of the translations. Of course, ideally we would want new translations to accomplish all four of these goals, but we should be more than pleased if some progress is made in any of these fronts.

At the outset I will say that the new translations under review do make some progress (each in different proportions and in their particular style). The next, middle part of this review will make specific judgements, exemplifying some problems and specific areas and degrees of progress. Given the intended purposes of this journal, in the final section of the review I will allow myself to speak more generally on the craft
and science of the translator. I will then discuss the areas that are still in need of improvement in the available translations of the Bodhicaryāvatāra, and will present some recommendations for those readers interested in knowing which of these translations might be more useful.

But, in order to describe progress, one must first consider a rapid survey of the major earlier translations. The first Western rendition was an incomplete French translation by Louis de La Vallée Poussin of Chapters I, II, III, IV, and X (1892), followed a few years later by Chapter V (1896). The same translator then started anew beginning with Chapter I, retranslating the text systematically, but this time excluding chapter X (1905-1906). This version (henceforth LVP) was published independently as an offprint in 1907 (still minus Chapter X). This renditions are overall reliable, but the second set of translations (the one consulted by most readers) tends to read like a gloss, sometimes sliding into commentary form (this was less true of the earlier fragmentary drafts).

Soon thereafter (1909), Barnett published a partial English version, that excluded most of Chapter IX, and passages considered redundant ("prolix") by the translator (abbreviated Brt.).19 Barnett recognized his debt to La Vallée Poussin’s 1907 rendition; but for the most part he improved on the French. Barnett’s is an excellent, unappreciated, rendition. Unfortunately it is clouded by an occasional Christian theological twist in word choice and by archaic or quaint English. The introduction to the translation is dated and is often misleading. Still I would argue this version remains to date the best English rendition in terms of accuracy, clarity, and elegance.

Barnett’s was followed by Finot’s French rendering

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19 Brt. in fact omits several key stanzas (e.g., VIII.107). I do not believe it is proper for a translator to make this sort of decision for the reader. I feel the same way regarding LVP’s decision to omit Chapter X, without omitting other passages that have been questioned by the tradition. More on this below.
(1920), which also made good use of La Vallée Poussin’s insights, but superseded its predecessor in elegance and accessibility. Finot’s translation was followed by a rendition that remains, to this day, the best understanding of the Sanskrit version of Bca. in a modern Language, the German version of Schmidt (1923—abbreviated Schm.). This is a work that must be consulted by anyone attempting to understand Śāntideva’s deceptively simple language.

After these four pioneering works, many translations from the Sanskrit have been by necessity derivative—sometimes in the best sense of the term. Some translations, however, in attempting fresh renderings have not benefited from the experience and spadework of the pioneer translators.²⁰

Tucci’s Italian (1925) is derivative—he recognizes his debt to La Vallée Poussin, Finot, and Schmidt but seems not have consulted Barnett. Tucci’s renderings, however, make some advances by breaking here and there a particularly knotty crux. A long hiatus separates this work from another respectable translation: the Japanese version of Kanakura Enshō (1958). Kanakura dearly owes much to the French translations, but tends to miss many subtleties that had been grasped by previous translators.

Nevertheless, Kanakura’s rendering is superior to the English version of Matics (1971), which is unfortunately a good example of why it is sometimes better to write a derivative translation than to attempt an original (Matics was reviewed by Gómez, 1974). Except for the occasional useful footnote or reference, Matics’s version is extremely problematic and misleading. Also of very limited use is a more recent English version by Sharma (1990). The English prose of both the Matics and Sharma translations is often hard to follow.

The second German rendition, by Steinkellner (1981—

²⁰ In fact, as I will argue presently, attempts to avoid the shortcomings of derivative translation by ignoring earlier translations often result in the recurrence of translation errors.
abbreviated Stn.), owes much to Schmidt, sometimes following the early rendering verbatim. Yet, although this is obviously a derivative product, it is has been done with extreme care, and a solid command of Sanskrit and of the cultural and doctrinal contexts of the original. This is a model of how one can use previous translations to avoid repeating mistakes or wasting the hard work of one's predecessors. Steinkellner's translation also contains what is by far the most reliable and accessible rendition of Chapter IX, often improving on Schmidt in this section of the work.

Neither WW not CS have superseded the French or the German renditions in terms of accuracy. These translations, especially CS, sometimes tend to translate Sanskrit as code, missing idioms that Barnett had translated correctly and clearly. CS sometimes feels stilted; WW is generally more accessible and transparent. My guess (and a guess it must be) is that WW put the Tibetan version to good use by reading it not like a crib for the Sanskrit but as model of possible solutions to problems in the Sanskrit. This produced, I surmise, the smoother translation. Both WW and CS have come a long way from the Matics rendering, and add materials omitted in Barnett.

Modern interpreters have also used the Tibetan version as an alternative route to understanding the text. The first such attempt appears to be that of Kawaguchi. I have never seen Kawaguchi's work, and hence must rely on Kanakura's all too brief remark that Kawaguchi's Japanese rendering is "not infrequently" hard to follow (Kanakura, 1958, p. 245). Much the same can be said of Batchelor's rendering from the Tibetan (abbreviated Batch.), which is an example of reading Tibetan as code—a practice that leads to inaccurate and awkward translations. As in the case of Matics, at times Batchelor's English is not readily intelligible. There is no doubt in my mind that PG and WW have superseded Batchelor. Additionally, as will be noted below in a detailed analysis of selected stanzas, PG is in general the best of the three new
translations, and can be used confidently in spite of the fact that it is based on the Tibetan and not the Sanskrit text.

2.0. Three Translations and the Craft of Translation.

On the surface, many of the problems with modern renderings of Indian texts from either Indian or Tibetan versions may be described as a failure to understand the source language as a natural language (reading Sanskrit as a "scientific" code, or even worse, trying to read Tibetan as Sanskrit, or Sanskrit through Tibetan, often without a good command of the presumed underlying Sanskrit). This is one way of explaining the problem, excessive use of wooden, pseudo-technical English jargon ("Buddhist Hybrid English"—Griffiths).

Overall, the new English translations (in contrast to Matics or Batch.) have outgrown these problems (with notable, but infrequent, exceptions in CS, some of which are examined below). But, at a deeper theoretical level, these efforts may reflect two problems that will be highlighted below: a theoretical belief in the literal and the true, an inability to separate the peculiarities of the Sanskrit idiom from the peculiarities of Buddhist jargon, and a difficulty crossing over from a technical understanding of the text to a viable translation. In the following pages I will attempt to formulate such judgements with regard to the three "new" English renderings of the Bodhicaryāvatāra.

Naturally, the consideration of any particular work of translation is an occasion for possible reflection on the art of translating and its many rewards and frustrations. To translate, as already noted, is to interpret, or, better yet, to give public shape in the target language to the world of words, ideas, events, and objects that one has understood in a text in the source language. The end product is sometimes the only evidence we have of our own understanding of the original, and it embodies both the joys of understanding and the pain of knowing that one has not understood.
2.1. Three Translations.

The three books under review embody these joys and frustrations. To be fair to the translators one must remember that the source text is a difficult combination of literary forms—code of conduct, poetry, idealized ritual, philosophical argument, to name the most obvious. It is also a work (in spite of what these translators seems to believe) whose audience is no more. As far as we can tell, the work was written in a setting that is no more.

In the case of a work like the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, the task of the translator is complicated by problems of both “lower” and “higher” text criticism. It is a disjointed text, and we have no way of knowing for certain how much of that fragmentation is due to historical accident. Much that is characteristic of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*’s genre does not meet our expectations of unity, development, and cohesion. The text is allusive, relying on echoes and indirect references; it abounds in literary conceits that may strike the modern reader as mixed metaphors or obscure puns that combine imagery and scholastic jargon.

Perhaps more than in other genres, here the translator’s success cannot be measured except by counting near misses and occasional bull’s-eyes. And even then there is much room for disagreement among intelligent people regarding what is a near miss and what is completely off center. There is also some room for variant approaches to the historical audience and the present audience. This does not mean however that there are

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21 Translators and scholars ceaselessly repeat as incontrovertible fact the authorship of Śāntideva and his affiliation with Nālandā, and assume that every single word they read in Bca. somehow represents Śāntideva. All of this is open to question (see, for instance, Saitō’s discussion of the Dunhuang text—Saitō, 1986a, 1986b, 1993, 1994). What is more, we should ask ourselves what it is that we really know about life in Nālandā in the 7th century—assuming that we can place the author of Bca. in that location at that time, and, furthermore, exactly what do our claims about authorship mean?

22 Whoever invented this distinction never understood how inseparable the two are, and how difficult and sophisticated lower criticism can be.
no constraints on translation, or that an argument cannot be
made to prefer one translation over another. As I expect to
show in the following pages, the fact that intelligent people
disagree is also not a good reason for ignoring the contributions
of past translators and commentators.

2.2. A Close Look at Three Translations

In the restricted space of a review it is not possible to
discuss these three translations line by line, or do justice to the
complexities of the craft of translations generally. I can only
hope to clarify some of the pitfalls specific to the translation of
Buddhist Sanskrit texts, exploring some of the strategies for
solving these problems. Furthermore, I can only look at and see
the end product, whereas a discussion of the process is essential
to understand why I may agree or disagree with the translators.
Translators, reviewer, and readers are therefore at a
disadvantage, because in this review we can only guess at what
the underlying processes may have been.

One way to look at the problems of translation is to
conceptualize them as technical problems. My analysis will
begin with such an approach. This perspective has two
advantages and one great disadvantage. On the one hand, it
gives us a more or less common language of rational discourse
(and disagreement), namely, grammar and lexicography. On the
other hand, it creates the false impression that grammar is
language, and leads to the bad habit of grammatical carbon
copies that turn out to be perhaps grammatical, but definitively
unidiomatic in the target language.

On the one hand, the assumption of a technique allows for
an easy pedagogical transmission of certain tools of translation.
On the other hand, it creates the false impression that the
memorization of certain rules will guarantee understanding of
the language (this is part of the myth of Sanskrit as a scientific
code).

In the following paragraphs, I will begin with a sampling
of problems that appear on the surface to be only technical
(grammatical or lexicographic), yet under closer examination reveal themselves to be problems of context and idiom. Given the limitations of space imposed by the review genre (and the natural limits of my readers' patience), I will make a detailed analysis of only a few stanzas. But I trust these will be enough to show how complex the relations between grammatical signs and idiomatic meaning are, how different they are in Sanskrit and in English, and how problematic are the contexts we are trying to transfer across language and culture when we attempt to translate a text like the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*.

2.2.1. Mechanical Translation. The problems involved in turning a mechanical (so-called “literal”) translation into an idiomatic translation can be illustrated by the following stanza. This is a passage that is grammatically so simple that it could be used as an exercise in a first semester of Sanskrit. Naturally, this only means that the passage is deceptively simple, and hence it reminds us that grammar is only the very first of many keys needed to enter the Kafkaesque palace of textual interpretation. The passage in question is Chapter VI, stanza 3, part of a long passage explaining the ravages of hatred (the opposite of the virtue exalted in Chapter VI: patient acceptance or *ksānti*):

VI.3.  manah samaṁ na grīṁ̄ti na prīti-sukham aśnute
na nidrām na dhṛtim yāti dveṣa-sālye hr̥di sthite

This can be rendered *mechanically* as:

VI.3.  The mind does not hold calm, does not obtain joy-happiness, does not [attain] sleep, does not gain stability/security, if the dart/thorn of hatred has settled in the heart.

This stanza illustrates plainly the problems faced by the hypothesis of the literal translation. First, a mechanical translation often slides into unintelligibility. Second, even the “literal” translation is a compromise in many ways. Consider, for instance, the verbs translated as “gain,” “obtain,” and “attain,” “gain” and “is.” On the basis of a rigid etymological analysis, they could be rendered, respectively, as “grasp,”
“enjoy” (or “consume”), “go to,” “go to” (a single verb in the original must be translated twice in English), and “stands, stays, remains.” So much for elementary Sanskrit and literal translations.

Here the three translations under review struggle to find a simple idiomatic rendering—one that will retain the simplicity of the original, yet work as intelligible English. The result is mixed: sometimes very successful, sometimes disappointing. Transformed into idiomatic English, this passage appears in CS as a straightforward statement:

VI.3. One’s mind finds no peace, neither enjoys pleasure or delight, nor goes to sleep, nor feels secure while the dart of hatred is stuck in the heart.

Compare this with WW:23

VI.3. The mind does not find peace, nor does it enjoy pleasure and joy, nor does it find sleep or fortitude when the thorn of hatred dwells in the heart.

The solutions “finds” and “does not find” are certainly more elegant than the “does not grasp” and “hold” of the mechanical translation. The English phrases “finds no peace” (CS) and “does not find peace” (WW) come close to what the Sanskrit seems to convey (namely, “never manages to get a firm hold on peace”), yet are also idiomatic in English. These are successful transformations of the Sanskrit. The same can be said of “enjoy,” which actually represents a good compromise for Sanskrit aṣnute, because it means “get,” “reach,” “gain possession,” “possess,” but also is historically the same root as aṣnāti (“to consume, to eat”).24 In fact, the rendering “enjoy” is attested (or “proposed”) in the dictionaries (BR, MW) for both

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23 Notice, parenthetically, that Tib. differs from Skt., yet WW offer no rendition of the Tib. of this passage.

24 This is not only an argument from etymology. The association of eating with enjoying is, if I may say so, natural. We see it also in the family of roots represented by the two doublets of bhaj- and bhuj-. And one could make a psychoanalytic argument as well.
Parenthetically, WW’s “enjoy... joy” is an example of a different sort of problem: renderings that may sound awkward in the target language simply due to cacophony. This is often unavoidable.

The solutions in CS and WW for the next verb are not as successful. The verb literally means “to go,” but is here essentially an auxiliary of sorts (what some would call a modal, others a dummy or empty verb): it indicates movement towards, approach, but the exact meaning of this movement is supplied by the object of the verb not by the verb itself. To render it as “goes to sleep” (CS) is not only unnecessarily literal, it gives the wrong impression to the English reader (simply ask yourself what it would mean to say “my mind went to sleep”—it is either something one would never say or something meant ironically or as an infelicitous metaphor). “Find sleep” (WW) is also a bit unidiomatic, but at least not misleading.

The last verb can also serve as a modal or empty verb: the subject remains in a position or continues in an action that is only revealed by context or by another verb form. Here we are told that a dart or thorn “is,” “remains,” and will not leave the heart. “Stuck in the heart” seems like an acceptable, if unpoetical rendering; but “dwells in the heart” is not so successful, for it fails to convey the fact that the thorn or dart is painful and hard to remove (compare: “my grief is like a dart dwelling in my heart” with “my grief is like a dart piercing my heart”).

Subtleties of this sort, the commentaries seldom solve for us. Prajñākaramita’s Paññīkā (abbreviated Pk.), for instance, only offers a few platitudes. Commentaries have usually very little to say on such subtleties precisely because such passages appear on

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25 The aside “proposed” is meant to remind the reader that dictionaries are compressed and indexed compilations of translation. They give us a range of meanings in the target language, from which we are to make a reasonable choice for our own renditions. The testimony of dictionaries is therefore somewhere between the raw data of usage and the uncertain art of translation.
the surface to be so easy, and because they are subtleties that become apparent mostly when one attempts to cross over language barriers. Tibetan translations are not always helpful, as they tend to engage in one of the problematic habits outlined before (assuming that there is something sacred and code-like in the Sanskrit language). Nevertheless, they often offer subtle hints about the way the Sanskrit was interpreted by ancient translators and editors. Consider Tib. for VI.3:

VI.3. \textit{zhe s}dang zug \textit{r}ngu'i \textit{s}ems 'chang na \textit{y}id ni zhi ba nyams mi myong \textit{d}ga' dang bde ba 'ang mi 'thob la \textit{g}nyid mi 'ong zhing \textit{b}rtna\textit{m}ed 'gyur\textit{l}l\textit{l}

This can be rendered as follows:

VI.3. As long as one clings to a mind tormented by hatred, the mind will not experience tranquil thoughts. One will not enjoy pleasure or happiness, nor be able to sleep, and will become insecure.

PG is, technically speaking, not accurate, yet it captures much of the spirit of the original in simple, readable English:\footnote{26}

VI.3. Those tormented by the pain of anger
Will never know tranquility of mind—
Strangers they will be to every pleasure;
Sleep departs them, they can never rest.

Although PG in general translates very freely, the above rendering reflects Tib., which in this case helps us understand that the Sanskrit metaphor of the “dart” is meant to indicate that hatred is a torment and something that is difficult to dislodge. Tibetan also suggests that the peace in question is here “peace of mind,” and hence, that we may not need to transfer the metonymical subject “mind.” Thus PG suggests to

\footnotetext{26}{Coincidentally, here and in many other passages, PG is successful not only as a rendering of Tib., but as a free and graceful rendering of the Sanskrit. Attempts to translate as English blank verse, however, sometimes produce expressions that may not be so felicitous—for instance the phrase “sleep departs them” above.}
me that although the Sanskrit subject is the mind, the referent is the whole person. Lastly, Tib. suggests, I believe correctly, that Skt. *dhyāti* is thematically closely related to *nīdrā*, and should not be taken to mean fortitude—it must mean rest and contentment.

This simple passage is not exactly a crux, but a quick look at the “old” Western translations, shows major disagreements, and considerable stumbling over the simple but ambiguous verbs. Yet the best among them (Brt., LVP, Schm., Stn.) agree that *prīti-sukha* cannot be translated as “joy and happiness” (or the corresponding variants in CS and WW), but should be understood instead as “the pleasure of joyful feelings”—technically: it is a dependent compound (*tatpurusā*), not a copulative compound (*dvandva*).\(^{27}\) The compound therefore means the happiness that accompanies or follows feelings of love (liking something or someone), in contrast to the pain that accompanies hatred (loathing something or someone).

In light of all of the above, I would prefer to translate as follows:

VI.3. As long as the thorn of hatred is lodged in the heart, the mind will find no peace, it will not know the pleasure of joyful feelings, it will never find rest or contentment.

The above passage begins to suggest some major principles. First, the need to understand the mechanics of language has as much to do with understanding the nuances and semantic functions of words, as it has to do with

\(^{27}\) This makes sense intuitively, but is further corroborated by the use of *aprītidukha* in V.78—which I take to be the antecedent or allusion behind VI.3. In turn, VI.3 “foreshadows” VI.76 and 95, where Śāntideva puns on this compound and on the ambiguities of *prīti*, which can mean everything from the joy of mental calm, to liking, pleasure, enthusiasm, delight, friendliness, conciliation, and love. In other words, the problems involved in translating this word in the present context are further complicated by the fact that Śāntideva does not use it only in its technical, Buddhist, sense. For instance, at VIII.173 *ātma-prīti* must mean “love of oneself.”
understanding morphology. Second, even if one could conceive of the source language as a learned, scientific language of the literate (which still does not imply that it is an unnatural language), a mechanical translation does not produce a readable or understandable translation in the target language. And, third, the need to work out "literal meanings" is a preliminary to reconstructing concrete circumstances (linguistic and material) not a final stage of fixing "true equivalents."

2.2.2. Basic Problems of Syntax. In many cases, however, annotation and difficult puns are not the only problems confronted by the translator. The translator's own "intuition" or "learned habits" may stand in the way of understanding and interpretation. Among English speaking scholars an "intuitive grasp" is likely to be mistaken, because English and Sanskrit have radically different syntactical rules. But, syntactical turns and usage can be obscured also by an excessive focus on morphology and etymological lexicography, which are habits learned in the first years of rote-memory Sanskrit drilling.

Take for instance VIII.88-89. The first of these two stanzas is in fact straightforward and has been rendered accurately in several of the older translations. Consider for instance, Stn., who here, by the way, improves somewhat on Schm.:


svacchanda-cārya-nilayāḥ pratibaddho na kasyacit I
yat samtoṣa-sukham buṅkte tad indrasyāpi durlabham II

This I translate mechanically from the Sanskrit to assist readers unfamiliar with German:

VIII.88. Even Indra finds it hard to (cannot) attain this joy of contentment that is savored by he who wanders and finds shelter at will
and is not bound to anyone.

The temptation for the English speaker here is to invert the position of the relative and correlative clauses, producing an intuitive (and mistaken) rendering: “bound to none, one enjoys that happiness... which even for a king is hard to find” (CS). But the text is actually saying: “even Indra cannot obtain the happiness, which the person bound to none, enjoys.”

Of course, German has certain advantages over English in translating Sanskrit; the relative clause is clearly marked in German, making its inversion more natural, or at least tolerable (Stn.)—Schm. translates accurately, but changes the order of the clauses for clarity’s sake. But it is not only a matter of German vs. English: Brt. also mapped out the Sanskrit elegantly and accurately (albeit quaintly) on to his English rendering. On the other hand, LVP and Finot were less successful here. Tucci demonstrates his independence here by reading correctly: “Quella beatitudine fatta.... questa dallo stesso Indra....”

Among the new English translations, WW also misses the proper relative and correlative. CS and WW also choose not to read indra as the name of the god. WW reads more naturally than CS, but is still inaccurate:

VIII.88. Living as one wishes, homeless, and not tied down by anyone, one savors the joy of

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28 Parenthetically, “etymology” aside, durlabha can also mean “impossible to obtain”—no need to translate dur- mechanically if the context justifies another interpretation.

29 Notice that Tucci’s literate Italian also has clear markers for the relative and correlative clauses. Additionally, languages with clear gender and number agreements have a certain advantage over English—or, at least, make it easier on the translator.

30 WW and CS choice of “king” for indra is not supported by either the Tibetan or the Chinese translations. CS do tell us in a note (p. 176) that they are using the word “king” to translate “indra, which is also the name given to the chief of all the gods....” But the comparison between human and heavenly pleasures, and the advantages of being human over being a god are common tropes—in this case confirmed by Pk.
contentment, which is difficult even for a king to find.

In the end, here too PG offers the most eloquent translation (from Tibetan). The translators take certain liberties that make a judgement regarding accuracy a bit more difficult, but their rendering conveys the situational meaning effectively. Thus PG reads:

VIII.88. To have such liberty unmarred by craving,
And loosed from every bond and tie—
A life of such contentment and such bliss,
The gods like Indra would be pressed to find!

Notice the original treatment of the first line in WW and PG. This contrasts sharply with CS’s slightly off-center rendering: “[o]ne’s conduct and dwelling are one’s own choice.” The reading of the compound as a copulative sentence (“are one’s own choice”) is not only a mistake in grammar, it could have been easily avoided with a quick consultation of, say, Brt.—to say nothing of the French and German versions—or by carefully reading down the columns in BR or MW (under svacchanda).

The rendering “conduct” is not felicitous in this context. CS must analyzed the compound as svacchanda-cārya-nilaya (as in Stn.). But the pairing of cārya (wandering) with nilaya (settling down), would suggest the interpretation adopted in Stn., Schm., etc.: that the compound refers to the freedom of the homeless wandering ascetic and the hermit, who wander and choose dwellings freely.

However, the compound can be scanned differently: svacchanda-cārī-ani/aya (that is, svacchandacārī + ani/aya). This is one of the readings adopted by Pk., and is followed in LVP, Brt., Schm., Kanakura, and WW—e.g., Brt.: “who wanders

31 Also elegantly done in WW’s rendering of Tib.: “Living freely, without attachment,...”
homeless at his own free will.”  

In the end I would settle for a compromise that focuses on the situational meaning, sacrificing some of the grace of Śāntideva’s proleptic construction (which placed the most important player, the ascetic, before the less important figure, Indra):

VIII.88. Even Indra cannot enjoy the happiness of perfect satisfaction savored by those who wander free and homeless, tied to nothing and no one.

The stanza immediately following (VIII.89) is grammatically and technically more complicated. In this case I first offer an analytical (mechanical and wooden) rendering to highlight the stanza’s structure:

VIII.89. When one has stilled distracting-thoughts by bringing to mind the advantages of solitude in [all their] aspects, beginning thus [= as was done in the above passages], one should then cultivate the thought of awakening.

\[ evam-\ddot{a}dibhir \ddot{a}k\ddot{a}rair viveka-guna-bh\ddot{a}van\ddot{a}t \]
\[ upa\ddot{s\ddot{a}nta-vitarkah san bodhicittam tu bh\ddot{a}vayet \]

This is one case where we can learn much from Pk., because it offers a detailed gloss:

“Thus,” means “as stated above.” With the word “beginning” are implied other similar aspects of this practice. “By bringing to mind the advantages of solitude”—both physical and mental solitude. For, one becomes a person whose distracting discursive thought (unreal conceptualization) is stilled by repeatedly bringing before the mind’s attention this solitude, which is the cause of total happiness and [spiritual] success. The

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32 Tucci: “abituato ad andare dove piú gli agrada.” is based on a second interpretation suggested in Pk.: svacchandacārya-nilaya, understanding nilaya as nilīna: “inclined to, used to.” This seems to me a bit forced.
person who has attained this state [of freedom from distraction] should then cultivate the thought of awakening. The word “then” is meant to indicate the distinguishing characteristic [of this thought:] namely, that the thought of awakening that is cultivated once the mind is thus purified reaches a level superior [to the previous meditation].

Of course, this still does not tell us how we are to produce a reasonable English rendering, although a gloss of this sort is a first step in the process of transformation and metaphrasing. Before one attempts an English rendering, several unanswered questions must be addressed. First, what are the viveka-guna objectively and contextually, and what is the reader being told to do with them? Second, the same question, mutatis mutandis, with reference to vitarka. Third, what is the order of events described or prescribed in this passage?

With regard to the word viveka, we should note that its broad semantic field does not allow for a satisfactory “equivalent.” The problem is not only that English does not have a single equivalent (a language seldom has simple equivalents for words in another language), but that the family of possible equivalents diverges considerably in denotation, connotation, valuation, and register. This can be easily demonstrated by simply listing the renderings found in the available translations of Bca. (premodern Chinese and Tibetan, and modern), and some of the entries in MW and PTSD. These renderings cluster into two groups that seem to have as their common theme “division” and “separation.” I use these two categories as an axis to separate the list into two groups:

true knowledge, correct judgement, understanding
close examination, investigation
discernment, distinction

\textit{division} ||

\textit{separation}
withdrawal, isolation
solitude, seclusion (being sequestered), loneliness.

English "solitude" simply does not overlap with investigation and knowledge. Furthermore, in normal English usage solitude generally has positive associations, whereas withdrawal has generally negative associations. Additionally, viveka also implies a withdrawal into calm, a serene detachment that extends somewhat beyond similar connotations in English "solitude." The word viveka is therefore an excellent example of the semantic phenomenon of convergence and divergence—a fine example showing why one cannot work on the assumption that there are "equivalent" terms, much less the perfect or correct equivalent.

In the Bodhicaryāvatāra, the "understanding" pole of the semantic field appears perhaps in X.43 & 52. The "solitude" and "seclusion" end of the spectrum is found in II.3 and in VIII.2, 85 & 89. In the Eighth Chapter, however, viveka (Tib. dben-pa) is used also in a specifically Buddhist technical sense to mean withdrawal of the person from the secular world into an eremitical setting (kāya-viveka) and withdrawal of attention from distracting thoughts and passions (citta-viveka).

A long passage covering approximately the first half of Chapter VIII (stanzas 4-88) is an exhortation to practice this sort of viveka. It is a description of the virtues (advantages) of a life of solitude and the meditation practices that reduce attachment and hankering after the objects of sensual pleasure.

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33 Some traces of a similar association occur in technical uses of "recollection" in the literature on monasticism. In Spanish the association is stronger in the terms recogimiento, recogido and recolecto (all etymologically related), which refer to withdrawal from the world into sequestered or isolated quarters in order to withdraw the senses and the mind and recollect (concentrate) them in the contemplation of God.

34 I bracket the question of the authorship of this chapter.

35 This is the technical sense that approaches the Spanish semantic cluster mentioned in the note above. On this use of the Sanskrit term, see Pk. to VIII.2, and references in PTSD under viveka.
(including the so-called meditation "on the corpse" or "in the charnel ground"). The passage is at the same time a description of such practices and a panegyric of, and an exhortation to, the life of the hermit or wandering ascetic. Stanza VIII.89 refers back to this long passage that has described the virtues of solitude—that is, the advantages, merits and positive qualities of solitude and detachment in the specific setting of an eremitical life.

There are two possible interpretations for the first line of VIII.89, and there is no way to tell which one is the correct reading, in part because the passage, and the tradition, probably mean both. This line tells the readers what they should have done with VIIIA-88: apply those teaching so as to gain the advantages of solitude and detachment, or reflect on the merits of solitude and detachment in order to overcome the distraction and hesitation that keeps us from cultivating and developing our determination to seek supreme awakening (bodhicitta, implying both the determination to seek awakening and various degrees of awakening, culminating in full awakening).

The second alternative is followed by PG, WW and most of the older translations (Kanakura is the exception). Among the new translations only CS seems to adopt the first interpretation: "By developing the virtues of solitude in such forms as these" (CS). Unfortunately this is at best awkward (I am not sure most English speakers would readily understand this phrase), but it is also possibly misleading, since one is not "developing," but "making present in the mind" or "considering" (two very common meanings of the causative forms of bhū-), or, perhaps, "internalizing and practicing."36

One strong argument could be adduced in favor of understanding bhāvana (in viveka-guṇa-bhāvanāt) as a sort of

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36 Non technical, as well as alternative technical uses of the causative forms of bhū- are well attested—see BR and MW. Unfortunately our Buddhist tools focus only on a specific technical use, so that it is difficult to tell to what extent we encounter non-technical uses in Buddhist literature.
formal meditation: this chapter is about meditation as the groundwork for insight or wisdom (prajñā) as it is presented in the next chapter. One would therefore expect the author to talk about the practice, the actual cultivation of these states of mind. However, one can conceive of this cultivation in a variety of ways, and I would be inclined to take the passage under consideration as an example of cultivation as “consideration,” that is, as mental review. Furthermore, the tone of VIII.4-88, especially with respect to the eremitical life, suggests to me that this is something to be contemplated or reviewed in the mind, not necessarily something that can be practiced fully in its ideal (or idealizes?) forms.

Hence, I find that WW and PG are more readable and accurate than CS: “After meditating on the advantages of solitude in this and other ways” (WW), and “Reflecting in such ways as these upon the excellence of solitude” (PG) [in contrast to CS: “By developing the virtues of solitude in such forms as these”].

Such reflections, we are told, lead to the stilling of vitarka—Tib. rnam (par) rtog. But what is this vitarka? The Pk. to Bca. VIII.2 has told us that it is the cause of mental distraction (or dispersion)—cittavikṣepabetu. The word vitarka is one term that needs annotation, because its technical use is far from clear—it appears to be an act of attention or mental focusing directed at an object that is unreal or that is distorted by passion (e.g., the beauty of an object of desire), and thus vitarka shares part of the semantic fields of samkalpa and vikalpa (Pk. glosses vitarka as asan-manasikāro). We can then surmise that vitarka is a precondition for, or the proximate cause of, distraction.

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37 We bring many preconceptions to our understanding of Buddhist meditation. I would argue that in theory and practice “Buddhist meditation” covers the full range from repetition and recitation, through mental consideration and review, and all the way to silent or contentless meditation.

38 See also the entries for vitakka and kāma-vitakka in PTSD.
PG and WW offer an instructive range of imaginative options: “mental wandering” (PG, VIII.2), “discursiveness” (PG, VIII.89), “discursive thoughts” (WW, VIII.2 & 89, Skt.), and “ideation” (WW, VIII.89, Tib). Most of the older translations, including Schm. and Kanakura (similarly CS at VIII.2) are less careful and translate “distraction,” possibly following LVP. From the point of view of the target language, there is no reason for not using “distraction” metonymically to mean “distracting thoughts” (thoughts that lead the mind away from its intended object or goal). However, since this is a technical term, I rather retain some of its technical nuances in the English rendering, opting for a compromise similar to the one adopted by CS at VIII.89 (“distracted thoughts”); but this seems to me still too much a reference to the effect, not the cause. I prefer “distracting thoughts” (Stn.’s “distracting deliberations”: “zerstreuenden Überlegungen”).

With this preliminary survey of some of the stanza’s component parts, we are ready to consider the hierarchy or temporal sequence of the events of reference. Is one to cultivate the thought of awakening (bodhicitta) after distracting thoughts have been eliminated completed, or as one continues to eliminate them? The present participle in upaśānta-vitarkah san serves a grammatical, almost pleonastic, function. It indicates that the person will continue (present participle) in a completed state or state attained (past passive participle), and hence continues to have the necessary preconditions for the cultivation of the bodhicitta. One may gloss this as follows (following Pk.’s gloss): “when he has stilled distracting thoughts, then in that condition, he....” (or more “literally”:

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39 I take vitarka to be, as suggested in BR and MW, part of the process of fantasy and will. I prefer to think of it as the ideational component (as in WW’s rendering) of fantasies, of desire and animosity, not the mental movement or discourse of fantasy. But this preference is only based on the problematic distinction between vitarka and vicāra—see discussion in PTSD.

40 Tucci takes even greater liberties: VIII.2, “distrazione,” against VIII.89, “dubbi.”
“while he is in the state of having completely stilled”). 41 This gloss is still stilted and artificial; one could rephrase: “once one has stilled distracting thoughts, one should then cultivate.” The fact that everything down to “stilled distracting thoughts” is one unit, and that it contrasts (Skt. tu) with the final phrase is crucial; yet it is not clearly brought out in any of the newer translations. In some cases (CS and WW) the translator seems aware of this, but the final rendition is muddled by the attempt to use the stilted -ing form for the ablative or for the present participle. 42

PG also fails to account for the contrast between the two parts of the stanza and uses an ambiguous -ing clause in a translation that is otherwise satisfactory:

VIII.89 Reflecting in such ways as these,
Upon the excellence of solitude,
Pacify completely all discursiveness
And cultivate the mind of bodhicitta. 43

Granted that “discursiveness” and “the mind of bodhicitta” are a bit awkward, this is still an improvement on many of the older translations. WW uses the awkward English construction “having” plus participle presumably as an analytical rendering of the possessive compound: “having one’s discursive thoughts calmed, one should cultivate the Spirit of Awakening.” CS appear to have overlooked the fact that the compound upāsāntavitarkaḥ has to be possessive, which makes

41 The notions of calming, suppressing, stopping, and eliminating which in English form discrete semantic fields, tend to converge in Skt. notions of “calming, allaying, etc.” The translator is therefore also faced with the difficult decision of choosing between English fields, and every choice will sacrifice some dimension of Skt.

42 Also commonly abused by Sanskrit students and scholars in the translation of gerunds, this “solution” is only a way to defer difficult decisions of metaphrasing.

43 PG translates the first verb correctly as an injunction (imperative or optative)—Tib. zhi ba dang... bsgom bar bya. In Sanskrit too the mood, tense and aspect of a finite verb can be extended backwards to present participles in the clause.
their use of the -ing form even more awkward: “distracted thoughts being calmed.” Nevertheless, CS highlights the contrast between the two parts of the sentence by stating “one should now cultivate.”

The grammar of this passage is best glossed, awkwardly, but accurately, as “One should still distracting thoughts by considering the above, and similar, circumstances—which show the advantages of detachment. Then, when one is a person in whom such thoughts have been extinguished [when one has extinguished them, and they are completely extinguished], one should (can / may) cultivate the thought of awakening with the meditations that follow: namely,...” This combines a draft grammatical (analytical) translation and a gloss of the underlying situational meaning. This draft can be transformed into more natural English as:

VIII.89 One should still distracting thoughts by reflecting, in this and other ways, on the advantages of solitude and detachment. With distracting thoughts stilled, one should then cultivate the thought of awakening:

VIII.90 One should first cultivate intently the identity of self and others....

It is, of course, impossible to translate to anyone’s satisfaction the term bodhicitta. I prefer the simple rendering “thought of awakening,” leaving it to context to clarify its many nuances. A full discussion of my argument for this choice would take too much space. Suffice it to say that when we come to terms such as these, there is even more room for honest, intelligent disagreement.

2.2.3. Word Choice and Lexicon. As the above discussion suggests, the perusal of almost any translation of a Sanskrit text betrays the weaknesses in common assumptions regarding the nature of Sanskrit and Buddhist discourse, and by extension the weaknesses in our teaching of Sanskrit—especially Buddhist
Sanskrit. It reveals the problematic models created by the notion of literal and scientific equivalents. The translator often assumes that Sanskrit is a code, a scientific or mathematical code, not a language. The sort of difficult choice faced by the receptor, interpreter, and translator of any living language are often overlooked or ignored, or the choice is reduced to a choice between equivalents. This I call “the curse of the Mahāvyutpatti fallacy”: if you know the equivalent, you understand the concept.

Problems of understanding and word choice are indeed often problems of simple lexicography. However, lexicography is seldom simple. Some of the most common problems in the translation of Buddhist texts in Sanskrit texts may be attributed to two unspoken lexicographic assumptions. First is the privileging of philosophy and doctrine: the assumption that Buddhist usage can always be clarified by reference to simple tables of doctrinal truth and classification. Second is the privileging of etymology: the assumption that “the root” gives a “primary” and preponderant meaning accessible to the translator whenever the latter is in doubt as to what a word might mean. These two assumptions can only be countered by familiarity with the literature (including non-Buddhist texts, of course), and by frequent consultation of a variety of lexicons—classical Sanskrit dictionaries as well as PTSD and EdgD.

I will not enter into the question of what sort of language Sanskrit is supposed to be. As a literate, and to a certain degree artificial, language it presents special problems. But, modeled on a living language, and written by persons influenced by their own living languages, Sanskrit requires strategies very similar to those used when interpreting other literate languages. I would also argue that the peculiarities of the source language do not exempt the translator from the necessity of thinking of the target language as a natural and living language. In other words, even if Sanskrit were some sort of code, its translation into English would require an analytical transformation of the code into natural language.

As a rule of thumb, I give my students the following golden rules about the Sanskrit dictionary (most of these rules also apply to dictionaries generally). (1) A dictionary is not an exhaustive list of equivalent synonyms. It
Additionally, one can learn much by reading old translations patiently and critically.46

Cases in which doctrinal readings can be misleading have been discussed above. I would now like to consider one case in which some assumptions about etymology may have played a major role. In Bca. VII.3, the reader is given a list of common proximate causes of sloth, lassitude, apathy, or moral indolence.47 The list includes one word that has presented problems to some translators: apārāya.

I translate the passage as follows (italics indicating the portion of the English text representing the aforementioned Sanskrit word):

VIll.3 Sloth is motivated by an apathy towards the misery of transmigration that is sustained by inactivity, by the pleasures of comfort, and by a strong

is a partial list of possible transformations—a list that is neither exhaustive nor hierarchical. (2) It was compiled by human beings—bear in mind at one and the same time that they were smart and fallible. Try to be in doubt most of the time. (3) Always consult dictionaries in related languages or glossaries of specialized usage (especially Pāli and Buddhist Sanskrit, and concordances). (4a) Be prepared for those times when the dictionary is of no help, (4b) but don’t put too much faith on “the root” or etymology as a way to supplement the dictionary. (5) And, more relevant to the issue discussed above: When in doubt prefer the nontechnical over the technical equivalent.

I say “patiently,” but I should also say “humbly.” I suspect one reason why Brt. is not appreciated (and hence, why we refuse to learn from his translation) is the assumption that because his views on Buddhist doctrine seem to us today so biased and quaint, then his understanding of Sanskrit must have been equally “mistaken.” A patient reading of his work would prove us wrong.47 The Skt. term, ālasya, is taken to be the defining antonym of vīrya, another difficult term, which is variously translated. I do not believe there is a single correct translation for either one of these terms. For vīrya, I prefer “vigor” (British “vigour” in CS), “zeal” (in WW), “fortitude,” or “perseverance” (PG’s “heroic perseverance” may be overdoing it)—any one of these seem to me preferable to the common rendering “energy,” (or Stn. Stärke) which seems to me too neutral, if not weak, to qualify as one of the perfect virtues of the bodhisattva.
attachment to sleep and idleness.

A number of words and phrases in this passage could be translated differently, but there is no significant disagreement among translators regarding the general tenor of the stanza. The word \textit{apāsraya}, however, seems to have caused much unnecessary confusion. Tucci and CS follow what in my view is a false etymology—e.g., CS, “the longing to lean [on others]” (I add the brackets to isolate and mark the words added by CS and Tucci). The assumption is that the root (\textit{fri-}) means “to lean on,” in the sense of “seeking support” (Matics even opts for “protection” or “refuge”). But “leaning” can mean many things. A quick consultation of MW shows that Skt. \textit{apāsraya} means “the upper portion of a bed or couch on which the head rests,” and \textit{apafraya} means “bolster” (which actually represents in English a semantic range similar to that of \textit{apa-[ā]-śraya}). Similar meanings will be found in PTSD (e.g., \textit{apassaya}, “bed bolster, mattress,” \textit{apassayika}, “reclining”). These meanings perhaps do not sound as doctrinally correct or profound as “depending on others,” but they fit the context well.

As is often the case, LVP and Brt. had it right a long time ago: “le désir de l’oreiller,” and “eagerness for repose.” The text should probably be interpreted as a common Sanskrit trope (enumeration): craving for sleeping, lounging, reclining.... or, “attachment to bed and cushion.”

Of the new translations, PG is acceptable, but a bit off center and not as elegant as elsewhere: “repose” (essentially the same as Schm./Stn.: “Halt”). On the other hand, WW is as close to perfect as it gets: “lounging around.” This translates correctly and also conveys imagery that is essential both for the trope in the stanza and for the role of this stanza in the general argument of the chapter.

In essence, my argument is that context must take precedence over etymology. But one must also keep in mind that the analysis of roots in terms of “basic meanings” is not the same thing as etymology or semantics. In the above case the
lexicons give us the clues we need to understand the word. However, sometimes word choice has to be determined contextually, and neither etymology nor lexicon solves the problem. Consider for instance the mixed metaphor in the following stanza:

VII.4 Pursued by hunters—the afflictions—you have walked into their snare—rebirth.

Why is it that even now you do not realize that you have fallen into the jaws of death?

kleśa-vāgurika-praviśtojanma-vāgurām
kim adyāpi na jānāsi mṛtyor vadanam āgataḥ

Are vāgurika hunters or fishermen? Bca. translators are divided almost evenly between rendering the word as “fishermen” and translating it with “hunters.” The word, related to vāgura, “net” or “snare,” means simply (as explained in Pk.: mātsyādīvabhikā jālīkā) one who kills animals or fish by trapping them with a net (perhaps PG’s: “trapper” is an attempt to catch the ambiguity, but the English word, whatever its etymology, means a kind of hunter).

The word āghrāta, which seems to be etymologically related to ghrā-, “to smell,” could mean “smelled out,” “scented out” (WW: “scented out by the hunters”); but, Minayeff has the reading āghāta. And, as already noted in BR (and partly supported by Pk.), āghrāta may have a different (perhaps Middle Indic) etymology (from ākrānta), and could mean “assailed,” “pursued,” “rounded up.” I am not too sure I can imagine the afflictions (kleśa—PG: “defiled emotion”) smelling

48 Furthermore, a root is not a monad: the semantic range of a Sanskrit (like an English, Latin, or German) root is strongly affected by preverbal particles.

49 BR’s analysis and exemplification (under āghrāta), and their discussion under ākrānta, are reproduced in abbreviated form in MW. See also both sources under āghāta. Schm. chooses the scent metaphor: “Von den Jägern aufgespiért”—Stm. does practically the same, but follows his penchant for more complex syntax: “Von ... den Jägern... bist du aufgespiért worden.” See also the footnote to this passage in Schm., where he justifies his choices.
us out, but I can imagine myself pursued by these afflicting and afflicted thoughts and emotions. I imagine them more like Indian hunters or fishermen beating, respectively, bushes or water, forcing us into their snares. I also hesitate, because in Bca. VI.89 the afflictions are fishermen (in the latter passage CS, I believe correctly, prefers "anglers," since, in that case they use hooks). However, in the end, I conclude that "hunters" is the better choice because most contemporary readers do not think of fishing as an active and patently hostile pursuit, which is an important component of the image in this passage.

2.2.4. When Jargon is the Idiomatic Choice. In the above examples one gets glimpses of an unspoken cultural and situational background situated beyond grammar and etymology. How much of this background will be conveyed to the reader and in what way are perhaps the most difficult decisions facing the translator.

Religious and scholastic discourse is especially problematic because discourse is multilayered, and the referents of many passages are not concrete events, persons, or objects (like fishermen angling for fish with hook and bait). In doctrinal or philosophical passages often the situational background is and intertextual relationship, or other philosophical arguments and polemics (as is the case when one substitutes general vague notions of self with a technical notion of a the stream of phenomena serving as the substratum for the vague notions of self). The background may sometimes be a terminological relationship—sets of scholastic shorthands and dogmatic lists. Often the doctrinal presuppositions are such that a single line will encapsulate centuries of debate and scholastic tradition. This makes for terse prose with rich meanings in the original; but it does not help us much to celebrate its richness or to assume that because it is rich it is profound or relevant. It remains for the translator to convey at least part of the richness, and perhaps some of the depth and relevance—and, if at all possible, retain some of the terseness. Furthermore, if the
passage is open to being interpreted as sophistical, fallacious, or obscure, the translator must provide the reader with some hints of these possible readings. But, if the reader of the translation is to make such judgements, the translation must reveal at least the most important layers of doctrinal and polemic discourse. This is not easy to do—in the end perhaps it is impossible to do.

In this genre of literature sometimes a jargony or periphrastic translation is the best choice; and sometimes notes and headings are necessary. This is the case in passages that express philosophical argument. This sort of passage occurs in Bca., especially in Chapters VI and VIII, but above all in Chapter IX.

The problem with these passages in the Bca. is that they are, for the most part, summaries of very specific scholastic polemics. Many of the arguments are barely intelligible if one does not understand the viewpoint of the real or imagined opponents against whom the passage is directed. This means that, for instance, a critique of "the self" may be directed at a notion of the self that is not very relevant to us today (whichever notion of self we prefer from among the scores that circulate among amateur and professional philosophers in our culture)—or at the very least, that we cannot know whether it is relevant until we have understood the opponents point of view.

Various solutions are possible. LVP opts for wordy paraphrases with a generous use of brackets; Stn. uses headings and short notes very effectively. WW and PG have opted for a minimum of everything, sacrificing historical accuracy in the interest of making these passages (including Chapter IX) as accessible as the rest of the text.

I understand the last of these solutions. And I find it difficult to object to it after spending so much ink arguing for accessibility. But I am not sure that Chapter IX can be made easy—it is difficult, it was written by a scholastic for other scholastics. Among the new translations CS is the most
conscientious about the scholastic background, but in what appears to be an effort to make the arguments universal or relevant, the translators often miss the exact purport of the polemic.

Let us examine briefly one passage from Chapter IX—stanzas 68-71. It is one of the arguments against “the” notion (actually, against “one” notion) of self.

I will focus mostly on CS to discuss this passage, because among the newer translations it is the translation that makes the best effort at following the technical terminology faithfully and unraveling the various voices in the passage. PG is particularly and surprisingly weak in most of this Chapter. WW is often more idiomatic than CS, but it is less reliable in its identification of the opposing voices in the arguments.

CS renders the first part of the passage as follows:

IX.68. That which is not conscious is not ‘I’ because it lacks consciousness like an object such as a cloth. If it is a conscious thing because it possesses consciousness it follows that when it stops being conscious of something it perishes.

IX.69. If the Self is in fact unchanged, what is achieved by its having consciousness? It is agreed that the nature of something that is unconscious and does not partake in any activity in this way is the same as space.

The reader is left wondering why the passage changes “I” to “Self” midstream, or why “self” is capitalized. One is misled into thinking that “I” and “Self” mean the same thing, and that they mean what the average reader means by these words (one assumes the passage is “about the self generally”). The reader is likely to be led to these conclusions, because the reader has not

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50 Following, for convenience’s sake, the numbering in CS, PG, & WW. Because some interpolations and truncated stanzas intervene, the numbering of these stanzas vary according to the translator’s choice of edition. Others number the stanzas 69-72.
be cued in to the fact that this is a critique of Nyāya views of the self, and because the deceptive simplicity of the first argument does not give any hint that it is only a critique of a specific (and to us rather foreign) notion of self.

If we add a few essentials to this passage, we can transform it into a more cogent argument (perhaps no easier, though). First, we need a heading: “Against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Notion of the ‘I’.” Next we need either an introductory paragraph (my preference, as in Stn.), or a note indicating that the following two stanzas criticize the idea that the “I” can be a non-conscious, unchanging soul, and still be somehow associated with cognition (or consciousness). Lastly, we need a few additions to signal within the translated text itself the specific context and presumed audience behind the argument. This can be done along the following lines:

IX.68. Now, an unconscious [self, such as the pure “soul” you posit,] cannot be an “I,” because it is unconscious like a rag or some other [insentient object]. If on the other hand [you propose] that [this soul] cognizes because of its close connection to consciousness, [then] it would follow that when it is not cognizing it is dead.51

\[\text{acetana} ca naivaham acaitanyāt paṭādivat]  
\[\text{atha jña} cetanāyogād ajña naṣṭaḥ prasajyate \]

IX.69. If on the other hand the self is something that does not change at all, then what can consciousness do for it? [If it were as you propose,] then one could likewise think that empty space, which is unconscious and inactive, has what it takes to be a self.

\[\text{athāvīkṛta evātmā caitanyenaśya kim krtam]  
\[\text{ajñaśya nīskriyasyaivam ākāśasyātmatā mataḥ } \]

The break between the above two stanzas and the next

51 This obscure, and in my view sophistical, argument, presupposes a continuous association of soul and cognition during a lifetime.
two, is not marked in any clear way in any of the new translations. The next two stanzas address a different issue, and should be marked accordingly to signal to the reader a new argument, although it is still part of the critique of Nyāya. The stanzas can be translated as follows:

**IX.70.** If [you argue that] without a self the connection between action and its fruits would not be possible, then who possesses the fruit if [the doer] dies after he carries out the action?

\[\text{na karma-phala-sambandho yuktaś ced ātmanā vinā} \]
\[\text{karma kṛtvā vinaṣṭe hi phalam kasya bhavisyati} \]

IX.71. Moreover, we both agree that action and fruit have separate locations, and you think that the self is inactive. Is this polemic then not pointless?

\[\text{dvayor apy āvayoh siddhe bhinn[a]-ādhāre kriyā-phale} \]
\[\text{nirvivāpāras ca tatn[a] ātm[a] ity atra vādo vrthā nanu} \]

This is a more or less smooth reading. One could also fill out the translation with a modicum of scholastic bracketed readings. For instance:

**IX.70.** If [the opponent argues that] without a self the connection between action and its fruits would not be possible, [we say this is not the case] because who would possess [then] the fruit if [the doer] dies after he has carried out the action?

\[\text{Parenthetically, this raises another important issue: what are the arguments for or against the introduction of paragraph breaks and headings in translating Bca. As it is probably already clear to the reader, I favor the use of both devices as a way to avoid inserting too much interpretive material in brackets.}\]

\[\text{The point of 71 is this: if the opponent agrees that when the actor dies the fruit is not enjoyed by the person that performed it (the person the actor was when he or she was alive), then there is agreement between the author and the opponent that the actor as doer and the actor as enjoyer are in two different places—therefore doing and enjoying occur in different realms, and (the Buddhist would add by a sleigh of hand) in different persons. The stanza also implies that a self that is non-active is tantamount to a self that is non-existent—hence, opponent and Buddhist “agree” on this point as well.}\]
2.2.5. Context and the Unexpected. Sometimes the problem is not so much in the specificity of the contexts of discourse, but in a novel (to us) way of thinking or speaking. Then our translations might slip because we read our expectations into the text—a mistake that is often reinforced by grammar that is not readily transparent in the original. For instance, in VI. 114cd and 115ab the confusion is both grammar (the antecedent is not clear) and conceptual (a novel idea is offered, perhaps taking the modern reader by surprise).

The core passage—or rather, the apparent crux—can be rendered as follows:
VI.114. The greatness of an intention does not come from the intention itself, but rather from its fruits. Therefore, the greatness of sentient beings is the same [as that of a buddha], and they [= the sentient beings] are the same as the [Buddha].

\[
\text{āśayasya ca māhātmyam na svataḥ kim tu kāryataḥ}  \\
\text{saṁam ca tena māhātmyam sattvānāṁ tena te samāḥ}
\]

The key to the stanza is to be found in the preceding and the following stanzas (VI.113 & 115). Consider first the stanza that follows the above passage in Bca.:

VI.115 The greatness of sentient beings is nothing but that the persons whose intentions are benevolent deserve to be revered [because of that benevolence]; the greatness of buddhas is nothing but the merit [one will gain] from devout trust in those buddhas.

\[
\text{maitry-āśayaś ca yat pājyāḥ sattva-māhātmyam eva tat}  \\
\text{buddha-prasādād yat punyam buddha-māhātmyam eva tat}
\]

In other words, sentient beings derive their value from the fact that those who deserve our honor deserve it because of their love for sentient beings, and buddhas derive their greatness from the fact that the faith sentient beings place in them generates merit in those sentient beings. In my view, the argument is sophisticated, subtle, and beautiful—albeit not quite syllogistic, and initially seemingly counterintuitive.

Both CS and PG translate accurately and transfer into their translation more of the suggested paradox than I have done above: “It is greatness on the part of beings that someone with a kindly disposition is honourable” (CS), “Offerings made to one who loves / Reveals the eminence of living beings” (PG). WW obscures the logic of the paradox and offers a weak “friendly disposition” for the bodhisattva’s great benevolence: “A friendly disposition, which is honorable, is the very
greatness of sentient beings.”

The logic of the paradox is clarified further by the first (VI.113) of the three stanzas (113,114,115):

VI.113. If one can attain the attributes of a buddha equally through sentient beings and through the conquerors, then what [sort of] distinction keeps people from rendering unto sentient beings the same veneration they show to the conquerors?

sattebhyāś ca jinebhyāś ca buddha-dharm(a) -āgame same |
 jineśu gauravāṇa ya’dvan na sa inquire iti kah kramaḥ ||

Here WW offers us the most elegant (albeit rather free) rendering:

VI.113. As the attainment of the Buddha’s qualities is equally due to sentient beings and to the Jinas, how is it that I do not respect sentient being as I do the Jinas?

WW take some liberties that I would be reluctant to take. But I see that as a matter of personal preference, and still regard their translation of this stanza as an excellent translation.

PG and CS, on the other hand, stumble. For instance, CS takes āgama (here: “attaining”) as a technical term meaning “transmission,” and interprets krama as “logic” (the term I translated freely as “distinction,” and which means “ranking,” “precedence,” “relative position”—French translations “differ­ence,” Schm. “Unterschied,” Stn. “die Abstufung”). The latter term is translated in PG as “tradition” (Tib. tshul). These choices blur the rest of the stanza.

Having said all of this, one must add that most of the old translations understood the passage correctly. Except for some rough edges in LVP, the old renderings were also clear and accessible.

2.2.6. Some Pitfalls of the Idiomatic Translation. Sometimes the unexpected is an apparently technical usage in the midst of a poetical passage. Confronted by this situation,
the translators feel like they have only two choices: jargon or an idiomatic rendering that leaves out some profound or pivotal point of doctrine. Not only the şastra genre, but many other forms of Buddhist literature present this type of impediment to the ideal of a fully idiomatic translations. Consider for instance the following fragment (first quoted from CS):

VIII.107. Those... to whom the suffering of others is as important as the things they themselves hold dear, plunge down into Avīci hell as geese into a cluster of lotus blossoms.

And, from PG’s rendering of Tib.:

VIII.107. Those... whose happiness it is to soothe the pain of others, will venture in the hell of unremitting agony, as swans sweep down upon a lotus lake.

These renderings seem straightforward enough; and the central figures of speech seem to have travelled well across the

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54 PG’s phrase “hell of unremitting agony” is an attempt to translate mnar-med-pa by way of an assumed, but opaque folk etymology. WW translate avīci, which implies that they made the wiser choice of taking the Tib. phrase as a name (or untranslatable label) corresponding to Skt. avīci. CS, with LVP and Schm. also take the word as a name, not so Stn. and Finot. Stn. and Batch. apparently risk translating according to the most likely etymology: “the deepest” or “lowest.”

55 Ultimately, the difference between “geese” (CS) and “swans” (WW) is of minor consequence, but was at one time a favorite pet peeve of Sanskritists. The Skt. word, hamsa, has been translated as “swan” since the early days of Western Sanskrit studies, but strictly speaking a hamsa is a kind of wild goose, not a swan. This great Western goose debate is reflected in the shift from Schmidt’s “swans” to Steinkellner’s “geese.” Yet, although wild geese in Asia and North America are (at least in my opinion) more imposing and graceful than the domestic variety, the truth is that in English geese represent lack of grace, and that the approximate poetical or situational English equivalent of hamsa is “swan.” [Tib. ngang-pa also refers to the wild goose—PG: “swans,” and WW “a swan.”] I cannot resist translating “wild geese” (showing both my philological and ornithological biases), but I consider “swan” a perfectly acceptable rendering. Batch., by the way, chooses “wild goose.”
language divide. But the omitted portion (bhāvita-samtaṇāḥ) is not easily rendered idiomatically, and is often translated as jargon—partly because it is a technical usage and seems to reflect important doctrinal notions. Broadly speaking, and simplifying very complex ideas, it seems like bhāvita refers here to the practice of meditation and its higher fruits; samtaṇā seems to allude here (as elsewhere) to the notion that that which we call self or person is nothing but a cause-effect chain, a “series” or “continuum” (samtaṇā) of momentary psychic and bodily events. This background explains the more technical renderings among Bodhicaryāvatāra translations:

CS: Those who have developed the continuum of their mind

WW: whose mind streams are cultivated in meditation

Stn.: deren geistiges Kontinuum voll entwickelt ist
Schm.: die sich die Kontinuität... vorstellen

These I rank in inverse order of success, although I am truly not happy with any of them.

But one could argue that in this stanza the technical jargon serves no purpose (it is only a metrical convenience). But, on what grounds are we to argue in this manner? Yet, on the other hand, if it is in fact meant to be technical, how should it be translated?

The dangers of not taking the technical register seriously become obvious when we examine the following progression:

Finot: Ayant ainsi cultivé leurs pensées
PG: whose minds are practiced in this way
Tucci: Avendo così disciplinato il proprio io
Batch. whose mind is attuned in this way

56WW’s rendering of Tib., “whose mind stream is accustomed to meditation” seems to me unnatural, if not misleading in English (compare “accustomed to insight” or “accustomed to generosity”). It may be an attempt to render literally goms gyur pa, but goms is here serving as the passive perfect of sgom. These are common variants that may be merely graphic or may reflect differences in transitivity.
LVP: dont l'âme est fortifiée
Matics: having transformed their mentalities

These are, again, ranked inversely according to my judgement of success.

The phrase is undoubtedly technical in the sense that the passage bridges two types of meditation, making the first type a precondition for the second: the bodhisattva's stream of thoughts now flows naturally or effortlessly as a result of the meditation that preceded (the identification of self and other, paràtmasamatà), and this effortless flow is possible because the mind (and the whole person) have been nurtures and transformed by this meditation.57

The past passive participle bhāvita appears to be a perfective in this passage: once the mind, or the person, has been fully cultivated.58 Technically this implies that the process of meditation has culminated in an internalization of the object of meditation. However, bhāvita is still related semantically to the causative family of bhāvanā, and therefore implies first, non-technically, a careful consideration and second, technically, bringing to mind so that the object becomes real (in the mind). One must convey this somehow in the translation; but that does not mean that the translator necessarily must render samtāna with a cognate etymology (e.g., “continuum”) and bhāvita with a vague reference to bhāvanā as meditational technique. Such “literal” renderings are only deceptively faithful because the resultant English is not intelligible without extensive annotation. I prefer paraphrasing—for instance, “practice meditation on this topic until your whole person is one with the topic,” etc. (see the proposed translation below).

But difficulties do not end there. Sanskrit generally,
including poetical Sanskrit, has a penchant for the obscure or convoluted phrase—the metaphorical riddle, we could say. Thus, a close examination reveals a lectio difficilior in the possessive compound paraduhkha-sama-priya: “they hold what is dear to themselves to be the same as the suffering of others,” or, perhaps more free, “what they hold dear is nothing but the suffering of others.” Read without further comment this seems to say either that they are indifferent to the suffering of others or that they actually enjoy it. Some of the older translators (Finot, Tucci, Brt.) gave up on this and followed Tib.: “they find pleasure in calming the pain of others.” There is no need to do this. Again, this is a technical allusion to the meditation that preceded this stanza, which leads to the perception of self and other as identical. Schm. and LVP gloss the general sense of the compound; only Kanakura and Stn. among the older translators translate the compound without explaining the paradox. Among the newer translations, CS has the best rendering, combining a grammatical translation with an unobtrusive gloss: “to whom the suffering of others is as important as the things they themselves hold dear.”

As translators we are trapped, however, because the explanation disarms the metaphor, which involves of course a paradox (hence, the apparent lectio difficilior): the bodhisattva cherishes the suffering of others. This is a metaphorical way of saying that they regard concern for others in the same way that others see attachment, craving, personal preferences, etc. This intended meaning (artha) is explained in Pk.: “even their own pleasure is nothing but suffering for the bodhisattvas in the face of the suffering of others.” The paradox is meant to lead into the image of the bodhisattvas descending into hell found in the

59 The Tib. rendering, “gzhan gyi sdug bsngal zhi dga’ bas,” unfortunately suggests an awkward paraduhkha-sama-priya. A lectio difficilior is not proof of the authenticity of a reading, it simply suggests a greater likelihood that the lectio facilior is a misguided attempt to correct the text. In this case, the correction itself is not all that convincing, supporting even more the lectio difficilior (which is, by the way, also supported by Pk.).
second line of the stanza. We can gloss the logic of the metaphor as “the pain of hell (the intended referent of paradubkha) is dear to the bodhisattvas, hence they dive into the hells like swans in a lotus pond, looking for that pain in order to take it upon themselves.”

Here, as in so many other passages, we can rely on context to convey part of the technical meaning and part of the metaphor, as well as the meaning of the complex possessive compound. Much has to be left behind in crossing over into English; but let us remember that the original Sanskrit also needed annotation to be fully understood by many, if not most readers. I propose a compromise between jargon and idiom, settle for a periphrastic rendering of what is very concise in the original, and accept the sacrifice of terseness and paradox. The compromise would be as follows (leaving in the brackets to signal major paraphrases and glosses):

VIII.107. Those who have practiced in this manner [this meditation until] their whole person [comes to] experience [effortlessly the identity of self and others] gladly seek to assume the suffering of others. They plunge into [the depths of] the Avīci hell as wild geese dive into a cluster of lotus blossoms.

This is a compromise, and cannot convey all of the nuances of the stanza. A short note must explain the transitional role of the stanza (between parātmasamātā and parātmaparivartana), the allusion to the internalization of the object of meditation, the peculiar use of sāmātā, and the paradoxical implication that the bodhisattva values the suffering of others. This is still better than a jargony rendering or one that speaks of souls and mental discipline.

Often it is not possible to bring out in the translation everything expressed or insinuated in the source text. The danger then is avoiding two extremes: wooden translations (the tendency in group one above) or one that is artificially
idiomatic (and inaccurate) or presents an unsuccessful or misleading figure of speech in the target language (the tendency in group two above).

But, in the śāstra literature jargon and metaphor mix, and then the choice is often between the metaphor and the technical meaning. Consider another deceptively simple stanza (first translated as mechanically as allowed by English syntax):

IV.11. As he is rocked back and forth in transmigration by the force of his transgressions and the force of the thought of awakening, he is delayed in reaching solid ground.

evam āpattibalato bodhicittabalenā ca 1
dolayamānaḥ samsāre bhūmi-prāptau cirāyate 11

The figure of speech is, from our point of view, partly a pun, partly a comparison with a concrete physical act. Hence our difficulty with it: our English instincts tell us it is a forced or mixed metaphor. In fact the metaphor can also be read in a way that would sound farcical to the Western ear: a bodhisattva pushed back and forth on a swing or in a palanquin, desperately trying to stand on solid ground. The subject, who is clearly the aspiring bodhisattva,\textsuperscript{60} is literally swung back and forth: transgressions to the vows and precepts pull away from the goal, the bodhicitta pushes towards the goal, and the bodhisattva is suspended in midair, unable to step on solid ground. As long as he is, as it were, suspended between both forces, he will not be able to stand on the solid ground (bhūmi) that is the first stage (bhūmi) of bodhisattvahood (the pun). The problem is that in English the image of someone swinging back and forth seems to require a concrete situation that seems undignified to most of us (sitting on a swing or in a palanquin, hanging from a rope, suspended at the edge of a precipice, holding on to a tree branch).

\textsuperscript{60}The present participle is masculine singular (“he”). There is no reason to translate with the neuter “it” as in CS—it is not clear to me what the antecedent of this “it” would be.
This cultural difference is aggravated by the fact that “the process of transmigration” is represented by the word *samsāra*, which, as metaphors go, is usually associated with images of water (flood, ocean), although the word *samsāra* itself is in shastric literature essentially an abstract technical term. One could, of course choose to translate *dolāyamāna* as “rocked” [by waves] (as I eventually do); but the goal, *bhūmi*, is not dry land, but the surface of the ground or the surface of the floor in a building (*sthala* would be the preferred word for dry-land), and there too we have to change the image suggested by a literal rendering in order to meet our own metaphoric expectations: waves and dry land.

The word *bhūmi* is of course required for doctrinal and not for poetical reasons. The word play is therefore somewhat forced. Schm. hints at the pun with “Ankunft auf Erden,” Stn. clarifies, “Ankunft auf den [Bodhisattva-]Erden.” But the truth is that “Bodhisattva-Erden” makes no more sense in German than English “bodhisattva grounds.” CS venture more, and are the only ones who struggle with the imagery:

IV. 11. Swinging back and forth like this in cyclic existence, now under the sway of errors, now under the sway of the awakening mind, it take a long time to gain ground.

CS perhaps realized that the possibility “dry-land” did not fit *bhūmi* well, but I find the compromise, “gain ground” a bit ambiguous (gaining ground, that is advancing in the path—or did they mean “gaining the ground on which to stand”?).

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61 Parenthetically, the translations “ground, earth,” etc. for *bhūmi* may be examples of Buddhist Hybrid English (I am not sure “the first bodhisattva ground” makes much sense). The Skt. word means essentially the surface of the earth, any habitable surface, or one on which one can stand, hence it also means the floor of a house or building, hence, “story” (as in British “storey”) or “level,” and then, metaphorically as in English, “stage” or “ranking.” I realize that saying that a bodhisattva progresses through ten levels or stages does not sound very poetical, but going through “ten grounds” is not poetical either.
Nevertheless, I read their rendering as an alternative pun (CS substitute an English pun for a Sanskritic word play that would make little sense in English), and find their willingness to put imagery and elegance above technical jargon refreshing. In spite of my misgivings about “gain ground” in CS, I find the rendering of the other translators inelegant and misleading: “Bodhisattva grounds” (PG & WW).

There is, additionally a pun on āpatti, “moral transgression or failure,” which of course also means “a fall.” Hence, the stanza also suggests wavering, stumbling, falling (again bhūmi representing firm ground). Parenthetically, this word āpatti also seems to create a lot of unnecessary grief among modern translators, some of whom are terrified by the possibility that Indian Buddhists may have had notions of sin and guilt. Although the three new translations are generally more amenable to the notion of sin in Buddhism, their translations of āpatti still feels to me to be rather forced—CS’s “errors,” PG’s “faults,” and the weakest of all, WW’s “downfalls.”

The word and the underlying concepts are difficult and translators cannot be faulted for not knowing what to do with it. I confess to not knowing what to do with it myself. But I think there are certain things you just cannot do with it, and

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62 Similar issues arise around the words pāpa (“sin, evil”) and dosa (“fault, flaw, vice”)—e.g., at Bca. II. 31, 64. I was pleased to see that the new translations did not shy away from using the word “sin” where the context warranted it. I did detect some hesitation, however, in WW in their inconsistent us of “sin” for pāpa, which was also at times translated, “vice.” CS, on the other hand, puts to good use the different nuances of “sin” and “evil” in rendering pāpa. I find questionable the rendering of pāpam… prajñapti-āvadyayam with “what is wrong by convention” in CS: “what is wrong” is weak compared with āvadya (“blameworthy”), and “by convention” (pace EdgD) assumes that prajñapti has the epistemological or ontological sense it has in other contexts. The latter term (prajñapti) must refer to the more general meanings (from the causative prañnapayati, prañnapayati) of public declaration or instruction. WW and PG correctly interpret this as a reference to the morality of vows and monastic prohibitions—confirmed by Pk.
one of them is to try to empty the word of any connotations of fault and moral failing, or perhaps (in Śāntideva at least) of guilt and fear. I will grant that in certain circles in North America, and now across the Río Grande, the Atlantic and the Caribbean a moral failing is just an honest mistake, and I will grant that some intelligent people have good arguments for conceiving the psychology of ethics in such terms (although I strongly disagree with these intelligent persons). What seems to me impossible to argue is that Indian Buddhists, especially Śāntideva, shared this perspective. A monk’s or a bodhisattva’s āpatti is a transgression to the rules or precepts solemnly adopted by that person. It is a serious fault, not a simple mistake. Such transgressions have as a consequence the tortures of hell—hardly what one expects as a result of an “error.”

My preference for the whole passage would be something like this:

IV.11. Rocked back and forth in the flood of transmigration, now under the sway of his transgressions, now moved by the force of his determination to seek awakening, it will be long before he can regain a firm foothold on dry land.

The pun, and the stanza, regrettably, cannot stand alone without annotation.

2.2.7. Accessibility versus Accuracy. Another way of looking at the above discussion (2.2.6) is to consider the tension that exists between an analytical understanding and a readable

63 CS use the word “transgression” in their note to Bca. V.104, where they summarize the passage on the mūlāpatti from the Ākāśagarbha-sūtra (as quoted in Ṣikṣāsamuccaya, Bendall and Rouse, pp. 61-70). That list shows clearly that, theological arguments aside, āpatti cannot mean simply “sin” as suggested by EdgD. The PTSD translates “ecclesiastical offence,” which is accurate only if the reader can be reminded that the traditional Buddhist distinction between “natural” and “monastic” law (Bca. II.64, and Pk.) does not apply in this case: one can commit āpatti against either or both of these (furthermore, in practice, “natural” moral rules, such as the injunction against murder, are part of monastic law).
translation, or, as some might prefer to express it, the difference between accuracy and accessibility. By focusing too much on making the text intelligible in the target language (and culture) one runs certain risks that increase the more one relies on the untutored intuition brought to the study of Sanskrit by most modern speakers of European languages (and especially speakers of English). Without a systematic and careful check of the source text, one is liable to make mistakes of syntax and agreement that can be easily avoided. Some of these are illustrated by the following comparison of the translations of VI.134.64

PG's translation reads:

VI.134. For patience in saṁsāra brings such things
       As beauty, health, and good renown.
       Its fruit is great longevity,
       The vast contentment of a universal king.

This rendering is deceptively smooth and clear, but a close reading shows that it is not wholly clear and may be misleading, if not inaccurate. The original may be rendered mechanically:

VI.134. One who is patient obtains in abundance, as he wanders about [in transmigration],
       beauty, health, joy, long life, [and] the happiness of a wheel-turning [emperor].

prāśādikatvam ārogyām prāmodyām ciraṇīvītam
   cakravarti-sukham śphītam kṣamī prāpnoti saṁsaran

Or, from Tibetan:

VI.134. The person who is patient obtains, even as he turns [in the cycle of transmigration],
       beauty and other good qualities, health, renown, a long life, and the great bliss of a
       wheel turning [emperor].

'khor tse bzod pas mdzes sogs dang || nad med pa dang grags

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64 This stanza actually continues the thought begun in VI.133: “Do you not see that....?” However, to shorten this review, I treat here VI.134 as an independent passage.
Some of the nuances are preserved in CS, who, as usual, try to follow the Sanskrit syntax, here with much success:

VI. 134. Serenity, freedom from disease, joy and long life, the happiness of an emperor, prosperity: these the patient person receives while continuing in cyclic existence.

This rendering makes it clear that all of the good attainments are due to patience, and that the agent is the patient person, not patience itself. The prolepsis places, as in Sanskrit, the central topic first (patience is the obvious theme of this chapter, but its rewards are the new information provided by the stanza). CS also detect correctly the syntactical (and doctrinal) function of saṃsaran: that the patient person receives (actually, “obtains”) these things while he or she is still transmigrating. This both limits the sphere of the reward (the abhyudaya) and exalts the advantages of patience, indicating that the patient person, even while still in saṃsāra, can have all of these good things.

The translation of WW not only reflects accurately these features of the Sanskrit, it additionally reminds us that the term prāsādikatva here does not mean serenity or calm as rendered by the other two new translators, but an aspect of “personality”: a physical appearance and a demeanor that is pleasing, one that gains the favor of others. Thus, WW:

VI. 134. While transmigrating a patient person attains beauty, health, charisma, long life, and the abundant joy of a Cakravartī.

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65 Additionally, one should note that saṃsāra is not “cyclic” existence. The term means either wandering about or moving on without interruption, like a river current. The cycle part is not part of the etymology or the denotation of the word, but part of certain interpretations that have been preferred on account of own preconceptions about what “Orientals” should believe.
I don’t know about WW’s “charisma” (PG’s “renown”) and CS’s “prosperity” (taking *sphita* as noun?). I also feel that “while transmigrating” suggests in colloquial English a certain casualness that seems to me inappropriate. So, in spite of some success, I still regard CS superior to WW in this passage.

Nevertheless, this is one stanza where most of the earlier Western translators stumbled, and the newer translations show a better grasp of the text. Most of these older translations, like the three new ones would have benefited from a quick check of Schm., who had already solved some of these problems. But even Schm. here failed to bring out clearly the proper position of *samsaran*, which is done successfully in CS.

A translation incorporating all of these insights would read:

VI.134. {Do you not see that} one who is patient obtains in abundance {even in this world,} as he wanders about [in transmigration,] charming beauty, health, joy, long life, and the happiness of a wheel-turning [emperor].

The portions in curly brackets are from the preceding stanza, VI.133. In a normal translation, in which VI.133 & 134 probably should be written as a single paragraph, if not one sentence, these insertions would not be necessary. I also generally prefer to omit the square brackets that most translators of Sanskrit consider essential.

### 3.0 Towards a Conclusion

The above remarks, may be taken as technical reflections—exemplification of some of the concrete problems faced by the translators of texts like the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*. However, these reflections and passages also exemplify many of the generalizations that follow in the next few pages: generalizations about the three new translations of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* and generalizations about the craft of the translator.

Speaking as generally as possible, three points stands out.
First, the process of mechanical analysis, followed by metaphrasing and re-redaction, as well as sidetracks into the field of tools and methods, reveal something about the art of translation: the claims of translation are always problematic, contested, and, perhaps, negotiable. Second, there are nevertheless more or less cogent arguments for or against particular renderings. Third, as a corollary to the first two principles, a productive use of previous translations is absolutely necessary, because translation is, ultimately about a public voice, and hence a collective effort. Fourth, no single translator can solve all the problems: the process is fluid, the outcome a compromise to be judged, to a certain extent, by the goals of the translation.

3.1 In General: The Claims of Translation

Before I conclude with some generalization about the three new translations, I wish to review some of the imperatives of translating and interpreting ancient Buddhist texts that I believe are implicit in the above discussion of technical details. I invite my readers to read my comments with the knowledge that I think such imperatives—like most of the fruits of the craft of the translator—are not only contested and contestable, but also not the product of some necessary or definitive rational deduction.

The “genre” to which one may assign the Bodhicaryāvatāra of course presents special problems of interpretation and translation. Beyond the already complex algorithms of grammar, beyond the intricacies of classical discourse, one is faced with the task of translating segments of discourse whose cultural frame is no longer existing. We are talking of translating works that are preserved in a peculiar combination of poetical conventions and technical jargon from a very learned form of Classical Sanskrit (or a Tibetan or Chinese rendering of this subtype of a literary and artificial language), written originally for a small elite group of technical specialists, a privileged social and intellectual class that is no more. I will
try to frame my remarks mostly in the context of translating this specific genre, which may be called “the shastric genre.”

And yet, notwithstanding all of these qualifications, there is the expectation that one could (perhaps should) render these texts into some form of the contemporary idiom of the scholar or the translator. There is the expectation that, at least some, if not most, of these texts are worth translating, and amenable to translation. In fact, there is the assumption that these texts contain something meaningful beyond the circumscribed or limited circle of the social and intellectual classes that produced them.

These last remarks capture the gist of the paradox. We feel compelled to assume that there is something in common between the author(s) of the Bodhicaryāvatāra, and some, if not all of us, today in the heterogeneous world of English speakers, when English is in fact a common medium for more than one culture. What we have in common, we assume, includes a common world—of solid objects, of mental and affective states, and psychological expectations. And we assume, against the obvious linguistic and cultural and material differences, that language somehow mediated Śāntideva’s world in more or less the same way that it mediates ours—and, needless to say, we also assume that we really understand how language does this. These assumptions eventually meet the aporias of translations, yet we cannot exist without such assumptions. Perhaps we could go on with our lives without ever translating Śāntideva, but we cannot live without some degree of confidence in translatability.

These apparently innocent, albeit problematic, assumptions imply others that are far more problematic. Even the most sophisticated philologists at some time has had three dreams: acquiring or restoring a true and perfect “original,” rendering this complete, self-contained, and unambiguous “work” into an equally unambiguous, and “accurate,” version in the target language, and thereby producing the definitive
faithful translation of the original. These fantasies do not die easily, although they begin to collapse the moment one engages in the task of the translator—even in the most seemingly inane situations like interpreting from one living language to another in a purely practical and colloquial context. In the realm of the colloquial the aporias of translation appear all too obvious as one moves from the use of language to satisfy the most basic practical needs to the use of language in the negotiation, proverb, the metaphor, or the joke.

The fantasy of a complete source and a complete target collapse because any act of translation eventually confronts the complexities of language and culture—of what is language, especially when it is used beyond the simple function of reference across similar cultural contexts. I will not attempt to explore in depth these, more abstract and theoretical issues, which continue to be debated in several forums of the academy. But the above explorations of the text and its possible translations have already shown that as we read the Bodhicaryavatāra we are in fact reading more than one text.

3.1.1. Fictions and Paradoxes. The task of the translator needs the presumption that there is a clearly circumscribed object “the original” and that there is a clearly circumscribed single goal and target (person, purpose, and thoughts generated in that person’s mind). These assumptions are part of a pervasive system of practices of hermeneutics that may be called “hermeneutical fictions.” These include the fictions of translation and exegesis and consist in the belief that there is an originator of a message, that the message arises in this person’s individual mind, preceded by an intention and followed by a

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66 The Bibliography lists some useful texts that debate these issues. In general, I prefer works like Torre (1983), Malone (1988), or Nida & Taber, which address practical issues with actual examples of translation problems. Nonetheless, works like Schulte or Schulte & Biguenet can help create a greater awareness of the issues lurking behind the deceptively grammatical issues faced by the translator when engaged in her craft.
complete expression of that intention, that the expression in language of that original idea in fact contains the whole idea, that the idea can be recovered in its entirety or at least in a meaningful whole from that linguistic vehicle or medium, and that this is done in the mind of a receptor, who is able to understand “the thoughts” expressed in the words.

The detailed discussions that form the middle part of this review, presuppose these hermeneutical fictions. We know that we cannot be completely sure as to the authorship of this work, its original constitution, and which parts are due to a single author. We are less sure about the motivations of the presumed author, and much less about his location in time and space (geographical and social). Yet, we read the text as if it were a single voice. We cannot do the same with every text, and as our understanding of the significance of the Dunhuang recension increases, we may not be able to do it that easily with the Bodhicaryāvatāra. However, the existence of a textus receptus, in Sanskrit and in Tibetan, and the fact that the latter has had and still has recognizable contexts and audiences, allow us to continue to assume certain linguistic and doctrinal constants (the practical correlates of the hermeneutical fictions).

I take these to be necessary fictions. We need to believe in them if we are going to communicate effectively and with ease; yet we must disbelieve them if we intend to be critical about our own communication. Every great communicator, whether he or she is a benevolent advisor or parent or a malevolent demagogue knows that language means many things in many ways at different times or all at the same time, and that our own thoughts are barely formed when we begin to express them. An effective communicator also knows that both transmitter and receptor very seldom understands fully what we believe we are in fact thinking or communicating.

Now if these fictions are necessary, yet untrue, what is left for the translator to do? I trust I have already shown how the texts begins to dissolve in front of us as we translate, and how
we simply must put it back together again by a series of compromises. I take the recognition of the hermeneutical fictions to be primarily an ethical imperative, secondarily a practical model. This awareness has implications for practice insofar as it forces us to reconsider the text in context, and forces us to continue reconsidering the text and its contexts. In theory it is simpler than it seems, in practice it is as convoluted as some of the technical remarks in the main body of this review.

In theory it is a matter of the balance between belief and disbelief, in practice it is the paradoxical work of pretending to be certain while remaining skeptical—which can be summarized in practical terms as follows:

(a) There is no single text—yet, it has to be imagined—whatever I imagine as the single original will become a provisional single original. Our multiple readers, and his translator’s notes, introduction and bibliography will insure the provisionality of this unity. Or, even better, whatever my reader reads in my translation is, temporarily the source original, which becomes many as the community of readers receives and rehearses the text. Ethically, however, another, more concrete single text has to be defined explicitly, and must serve as the first court of appeal: e.g., if one is translating the Nepalese recension, one works under the fiction that it is a single text, using its grammatical constraints as a constant check on the new text the translator and the reader are creating.

(b) The text is far from unambiguous—yet the translator is committed to clarity, so, what I produce must seem clear to me and to my readers. 67

67 As I have argued above, sometimes it is necessary and possible to translate obscurity and ambiguity as such, but generally the translator strives to create clarity—perhaps because translating usually needs an initial understanding at the metalinguistic level before it can produce a new surface structure and meaning in the target language. This means, that one is often trapped between the danger of confusing one’s limited abilities with obscurity in the original and the danger of attributing more clarity to the original than it
(c) One must engage in conflation, confabulation and imaginary contexts and dialogues—yet conflation must be controlled, questioned, and justified, confabulation must be documented, and the imagined contexts must be shown to be the most likely, probable or plausible.

(d) One must imagine a single voice or a set of discrete voices—yet I cannot claim to know the mind of the author himself, and I know that even a single author can have more than one mind, and I also know that conflicting voices are seldom discrete.68

Moreover we are very eager to talk about the “difficulty” or the “elegance” of a given solution, but difficulties always imply doubts and multiple possibilities. In other words, if the process of translation were a “technique” (it is certainly not “a science”) then it would be perfectly predictable, and therefore would not be difficult or debatable, but it is both difficult and conflictive, which already tells us it is not a simple technique. And yet, there are technical limitations to translations—things that one cannot say, and things that maybe can be said. Translation involves both the desire to have freedom and the desire to constrain freedom. Insofar as it involves freedom it means choice, fear, doubt, and misreading as well as creation and imagination. Insofar as it involves constraint, it is a form of control, and is likely to be resisted by the translator himself or herself—intuition and preference struggling with an imperfect and shifting understanding of the surface structures and meanings of the text.

3.1.2. Uses of a Text. The Bodhicaryāvatāra has been the object of number of commentaries in Tibetan, classical and

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68 I do not wish to burden the reader with a bibliography on this issue. However, I do include in the bibliography a reference to a paper on the psychoanalytic narrative by Kristeva in which she argues for the necessity of the fiction of intentionality.
contemporary.\textsuperscript{69} Editions and commentaries have appeared in India and Europe. A work that is so popular presents the reviewer with a special challenge. The normal, general constraints and problems of the review (as well as the translation) are magnified a thousandfold by the plurality of uses that a work so widely disseminated acquires by virtue of its multiple audiences and multiple expectations and multiple meanings. By virtue of its many uses and representations, the text also becomes many texts.

These various uses of text and translation fall into four broad categories: philological, doctrinal, historical, and pedagogical. The work, or its various versions, translations, interpretations and incarnations can be used according to different criteria depending on which one of these uses is the goal of a reworking of the text. For a long time philological uses were privileged. Perhaps this should not be; yet, without the philological control we lose all control. I would argue, therefore, that this use is a precondition for other uses. To repeat myself: the model for this particular approach to the text remains Schm., and then later Steinkellner.

Doctrinal uses also tended to dominate the field during an earlier period in the study of Buddhism and are now being displaced by other concerns (especially the historical concern understood broadly). But doctrinal concerns remain outside academia. If one’s interest is in understanding the \textit{Bodhicaryāvatāra} in its contexts (not necessarily only its “original” context, but the way in which it has worked in a variety of contexts), then it is important that doctrinal analysis be derived from the philological understanding of the text. And, once more, at the risk of repeating myself too many times Schmidt and Steinkellner remain paramount, with La Vallée

\textsuperscript{69} The bibliography lists some of the many contemporary commentaries—many of which are modeled on traditional Tibetan commentaries. Hayashiyama, Takasaki, et al. list the extant Indian commentaries.
Poussin as a strong third.

If we understand history in the broadest sense, of the word, then a historical study of the text would involve its placement in time and space, and its placement in society. Of course, all translators provide some sort of preface or introduction; but, for the most part those attached to translations of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* have been too short to provide for the possibility of examining the translators’ historical understanding of the text. So far, only CS has made any serious attempt to do this in a manner that is elaborate enough to allow for criticisms, reactions, etc. But much more needs to be done. Serious problems remain, because the location of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* is so uncertain, and its textual history is barely understood.

The “pedagogical” functions of translations include use in the classroom (presumably to exemplify particular cultural or literary forms) or in some other instructional setting, including the edification of Buddhist practitioners and believers. If the purpose of the education is to open the text to a modern reader, as a first opening to India or classical Mahāyāna Buddhism, then the goal is fulfilled variously by accessibility and clarity, and by a modicum of historical explanation. As I have said before, for this purpose, PG now enters the arena as a strong competitor. Still, the introductory materials in CS are now the most complete in English.

Religious texts (especially though not exclusively religious texts), can also serve, as it were, an end outside of themselves that is somehow different from the social end already mentioned under the historical function. This other end is as part of various “technologies of the self.” In this last use, the text justifies, guides, or models particular forms of relating to the presumed object of reference of the text (namely: patterns of religious and ethical behavior, ideals of what one can become). Because these ideals are usually embodied in objects that are revered or worshiped, and because it is commonly
assumed that worship is a matter of “emotion,” this approach is sometimes called vaguely the “devotional” use of the text. For this use also, I would recommend PG over the other two translations, with WW as a strong second, and CS as of some help through its many notes and introductory materials.

Needless to say, these distinctions of “function” are merely a matter of convenience. From the point of view of a critical analysis of what goes into the reading and transmission of texts generally, one could argue that a philological translation is a variant of a historical analysis, or that both of these approaches are in fact types of technologies. But I still would argue that the distinction is useful, because it allows us to clarify the different methods, constraints and criteria with a sense of their goal, and separate from the notion of a true text with a single message that must all be true or false, good or bad, etc. Additionally this approach avoids the pitfalls of imagining a single value for literary judgement.

In its present form, specifically in the form it has in the Nepalese Sanskrit recension (sometimes called “vulgate”), the Bodhicaryāvatāra is a complex work that resists any simple characterization. It does not fit easily into any Indian pattern or genre, although it has elements of a variety of genres. This is true also from a Western perspective: is this a historical document, a document on monastic demeanor, a philosophical critique, a devotional poem, a ritual manual, or a devotional manual in the spirituality style? It is all and none of these.70

One can compare different sections, layers, or aspects of the Bodhicaryāvatāra to a variety of texts. It has elements of the Indian “epistle” (seen in the presumably contemporaneous Siṣyalekha, and in older models, such as Ratnāvalī). These

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70 At times scholars put too much value in labeling a text’s genre. But this is more than a compulsion, since it involves a polemic regarding the function and value of the text. Thus, Kajihara’s (1991) unequivocal assertion that the Bca is not a philosophical text is an exaggeration in the direction of truth meant to counter the excessive emphasis on Chapter IX that pervades much of the literature on Bca.
epistles sometimes included nuggets of rituals that correspond in tone and style to various "rituals of the vows," and "rituals of confession" (some of which are attributed to classical authors, like Äryaśūra). The Bodhicaryāvatāra also overlaps with other works devoted to an examination of the bodhisattva path—notably another work also attributed to, the Subhāṣita-ratnakarandaka-kathā (also attributed to Äryaśūra, Zimmermann, 1975). In its expanded discussion of philosophical debates, however, the Bodhicaryāvatāra may also be compared to Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra.

The translator is therefore faced with an impossible challenge: to translate effectively several voices and registers in a single work, to preserve the protean or amorphous character of the original while making key decisions to make the text accessible to readers accostumed to other conventions of genre and literary unity. At the same time the translator also has to incorporate or account for the voices of the present—including the voices of other translators. And at the same time he or she must find a way to respond to the various uses of the text.

Furthermore, the Bodhicaryāvatāra is not an easy text. At times, sentence structure and vocabulary approach the most basic levels of Sanskrit grammar (see the first passage discussed in the review), but structure and grammar can also be extremely subtle, if not obscure and difficult (see the discussion of Bca. IX.68-71 above). Overall, the Bodhicaryāvatāra is not representative of the most difficult passages in shastric literature, but its apparent accessibility is deceptive for three reasons. First, most of the text is constructed around complex tropes, allusions and literary conceits that can be easily misinterpreted or missed. The text is, in my view, beautiful and poetical. Part of its beauty is in its rhetorical complexity.

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71 Zimmermann’s edition and translation raises important questions regarding the translation of Buddhist texts, specifically regarding the proper and improper use of Tibetan translations of Indian works.

72 Perhaps the most complex section, rhetorically speaking, is the
Second, because of its beauty and intense rhetoric the text beckons and invites and deceives us by making us confuse our awe and fascination with understanding. Third the text has been translated, read, and commented so many times that one's understanding is bound to be biased, both by conscious knowledge and by the background narrative we must bring to any understanding of the text.

3.2. Concluding Observations.

The arguments and examples presented in this review, cursory as they are, suggest to me the following. First, translation, like systematic scholarship generally, is a collective, cumulative effort. Second, it does not progress in a straight line—new solutions may be found, but old mistakes may be repeated. Third, in judging progress and value one can think in terms of detail or in terms of wholes. A work as a whole may not represent a significant improvement on past work, yet it may add something of value to our knowledge in its treatment of specific passages. Conversely, a translation may not make major contribution in the resolution of difficult passages, but it may find new ways to present the text as a whole. Fourth, value also depends on context, audience, and purpose.

With these lessons in mind, we can look back at the three new translations and the older translations that preceded them, and make the following generalizations.

We are not at a point in the study of Śāntideva where we can dispense with the older translations. CS, in spite of everything that it offers, has too many problematic points that could have been easily remedied by consulting the older translations. The WW and PG translations are less problematic, but less scholarly. Needless to say, they were not meant to be works for consultation.

parātmāparivartana section of Chapter VIII, where the play of shifting points of view, gazes, and voices defies translation.
I am not a believer in definitive anything, but we do have monuments of scholarship that must be consulted decades after they were produced. I think this is true of some of the older Western translations—especially Schmidt and Barnett for grammar, Steinkellner for philosophical discourse, La Vallée Poussin for a bit of both, Finot for choice of words.

As far as accessibility is concerned, I think the best pedagogical tool is, ironically, in the version that appears otherwise not to have any scholarly pretenses: the Padmakara Translation Group version. This is the one that I would recommend both for classroom use and for use by groups interested in practice and devotion. For teaching students who cannot read Sanskrit, I would recommend PG—or, if the text is to be used in an elementary course, the Dalai Lama's commentary: *A flash of lightning in the dark of night.* Although PG is from the Tibetan translation and not from the Sanskrit, it is a great improvement upon Batchelor, and the most readable of the newer translations. In fact, it often illuminates the Sanskrit and Western renderings of the Sanskrit.

One can still learn much from other versions. Although PG is the best rendering in English, the French and German translations have much to teach us. Among the English rendering CS offers a useful and acceptable introduction in the classical style of doctrinal studies of Buddhology. WW rendering, in spite of some problems, offers a good check with the translation of the Tibetan text. In spite of the objections I have raised above, I still think CS and WW are worth consulting. I am not too sure, however, that CS can stand alone—especially in classroom use or for use in discussion groups.

In teaching graduate students or intermediate-advanced Sanskrit students, I would have the students consult CS. The

73 Either PG or *Flash of lightning* may be the best choices for those not concerned with the subtle (albeit crucial) differences between Tibetan readings and possible uses of Bca. in India.
notes in CS are often helpful and trace some allusions not traced elsewhere. But as a translation I would use it with advanced students only by default: regrettably, many graduate students in North America are unfamiliar with other Western languages and unable to consult Schmidt or Steinkellner. The instructor should consult the old translators and make his or her students aware of the contribution of these scholars. They still offer us the best philological versions, and they also give us the best renderings of the philosophical passages.

This means instructors teaching with any one of the newer translations should have on hand at least Steinkellner and Barnett (both of which are still more or less accessible), unless they feel so confident of their Sanskrit skill and training that a quick glance at the Sanskrit version will give them a reliable critical control over any weaknesses in the Tibetan and in Padmakara.

As far as studies are concerned, CS is at this point our only source in English that addresses issues of textual history and literature—unfortunately the translators’ remarks are not placed explicitly in any contemporary critical context (e.g., of style, authorship, theory of manuscript interpretation). Pezzali’s study may supplement this, but it has many shortcomings (noted already by de Jong). CS does the best job in attempting the difficult and unforgiving task of communicating cultural distance. It is also the only one of the newer versions (and for that matter most of the old) that struggles with the questions of ethics, ritual and ascetic practices—all questions that trouble our Western readers.

However, over all the newer translations are weak in critical distance, and in conveying to the reader the cultural gap that often separate us from the Bodhicaryāvatāra and its author(s). They also appear to have failed to benefit from earlier Western translations. I wonder if we do not need to reflect more on a century of Buddhist Studies in the West and on the historical and philological tools that our predecessors left
for us. Of course some of my observations and judgements are bound to be due to personal differences that could be qualified (with equal generosity) as either differences in philosophical outlook or differences of character and personality. Nevertheless, even accounting for such differences, it is fair to say that there is still much room for greater critical dialogue and reflection on the science of reading Buddhist texts and the art of translating them.

3.3. A Parting Thought

My conclusion that the Padmakara Translation Group version (PG) is the most successful of the three new translations is based on the analysis of the translation as I have read it in the privacy of my study. I have no privileged knowledge regarding the way in which the Padmakara Group works. All three translations are collective works in one way or another. It would be good to know if differences in the process account for differences in the outcome. My conclusions makes me ponder some of our assumptions about the institutional and rhetorical trappings of scholarship—about working alone and about the audience we imagine when we translate. Perhaps this tells us something about the limitations of scholarship, but I think it is really telling us something more about the limitations of some scholarly models, especially the Sanskrit model. Here we have an unpretentious translation, one that does not claim to use the Sanskrit literature exhaustively or to even have considered the Sanskrit text of the Bodhicaryāvatāra, a translation that offers no accompanying scholarly apparatus... and it appears to be very successful at crossing over into the English idiom. I cannot avoid feeling that this teaches us something about the teaching of Sanskrit and Buddhism, as well as something about the art of translating.

Abbreviations and Bibliography
Abbreviations

Bca. = *Bodhicaryāvatāra*.
BR = Böhtlingk & Roth.
C. E. = the Common Era (of the modern Western calendar).
CS = Crosby & Skilton, 1996.
ed./eds. = editor(s), edition(s).
EdgD = Edgerton, *Dictionary*.
Eng. = English.
MW = Monier-Williams.
Pk. = Prajñākaramati’s Pañjikā, in the ed. of LVP.
PTSD = Rhys Davids & Steed.
repr. = reprint, reprinted.
Skt. = Sanskrit.
Tib. = Tibetan.
trs. = translation.
LVP = Louis de La Vallée Poussin, 1907.
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Bston-dzin Rgya-mtsho. See Tenzin Gyatso.


Dalai Lama. See Tenzin Gyatso.

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Sarvajñadeva, et al. (Trs.). *Byang-chub-sems-dpa’i spyod-la ’jug-pa (Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra)*. Tib. trs. of Bca by Sarvajñadeva and Dpal-brtsegs. Revised by Dharmaśrībhadra, Rin- chen-bzang-po, Šākya-blo-gros, Sumatikirti, and Blo- ldan-shes-rab. Peking Ōtani Reprint, No. 5272 (vol. 99, pp. 243-261: Mdo-’grel, Dbu-ma, La, folia 1-45a); Derge Tōhoku No. 3871 and Taiwan Ed. No. 3876 (vol. 36, pp. 1-12 of the Taiwanese reprint: Mdo-’grel, Dbu-ma, La, folia 1-40a). [Pre-modern Tibetan translation of Bca preserved in the Tanjur. The work is attributed to Śāntideva. On the translators, see de Jong, 1972. The text used by the reviewer was the Derge at the University of Tokyo, reprinted photographically in Hayashima, et al., 1978, Dbu Ma 10, pp. 1-20.]

Sastri, Haraprasad [Śāstri, Haraprasād]. (Ed.). (1894). *Bodhicaryāvatāram*. *Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of India*, 2(1), 1-16, 2(2), 17-32. [This edition is called a “reprint” of Minayeff’s in spite of the attribution to Sastri. I have not examined this edition, but it seems to me unlikely that this includes the complete text.]

Buddhavihara, buddhabda 2499 <i.e. 1955> [Hindi trs. from Skt].


Seyfort Ruegg. See Ruegg.


Sumatikirti, et al. (Trs.). *Byang-chub-kyi spyod-pa-la 'jug-pa'i dka'-'grel*. Tib. trs. of the Pañjikā by Sumatikirti and


Taiwan Reprint. See Barber, A. W.


Tōhoku. See Ui, Hakuju.


Tucci, Giuseppe. (1925). In cammino verso la luce. Traduzione del Bodhicaryavatara del Śāntideva, capitolo I-VIII. Turin, Milan, etc.: G. B. Paravia. [Italian trs. of Chapters 1-8— from Skt. This book is no longer readily available. I failed to find a copy in spite of many attempts—a visit to the
National Library in Rome, searches through international booksellers, and walking (pleasurably) the bookstores of Rome and Florence. But I was able to receive a xerography of the copy at the National Library in Turin (Biblioteca Nazionale di Torino), thanks to the kindness of Ramón Prats (Himalayan and Inner Asian Resource Center, Trace Foundation).


Villalba, Dokusho. (Trs.). (1993). Santideva. La marcha hacia la luz. Libros de los Malos Tiempos. Madrid: Miraguano Ediciones. [In the Introduction (a separate, 15 pp. booklet, inserted into the book, but not bound with it) the translator states that his work is “based on” Finot’s translation, without mentioning a source language. Judging from the wording and the notes, the translator’s remark appears to mean that he has translated Finot’s French.]


Yon-tan Rgya-mtsho. See Sumatkīrti, et al.