

**Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa*: A Translation of Chapter Six,
Examination of Desire and the One Who Desires, and Chapter Seven,
Examination of Origination, Duration, and Cessation**

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Introduction¹

The Madhyamaka² school is one of the two major philosophical schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism, along with the Yogācāra school. The Madhyamaka is best known for its doctrine of emptiness (*śūnyatā*). The idea of emptiness is found in the "perfection of discernment" (*prajñā-pāramitā*) sūtras, some of which are among the earliest Mahāyāna sūtras. While the sūtras expound emptiness in a discursive way, the Mādhyamikas use systematic argument.

Emptiness, for the Madhyamaka school, means that dharmas are empty of intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*). All Buddhists hold that conditioned dharmas arise in dependence on causes and conditions. For the Mādhyamikas, this fact of dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*) implies that dharmas can have no intrinsic, self-sufficient nature of their own. Since dharmas appear when the proper conditions occur and cease when those conditions are absent, the way in which dharmas exist is similar to the way in which mirages and dreams exist.³ Thus attachment and aversion are undermined, since ultimately, they have no substantial objects and lack any self-sufficient status of their own.⁴ Moreover, the Mādhyamikas argue that if things existed by their own intrinsic nature, they would be changeless;⁵ but this contradicts our everyday experience.

The Madhyamaka school was founded by Nāgārjuna (active c. 150-200), the author of the *Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā* (MMK). The MMK inspired a number of commentaries which not only expounded the meaning of the MMK but also often acted as vehicles for the commentators' own views. The *Akutoḥbhayā* seems to be the earliest of the extant commentaries. It is of uncertain authorship, although it is sometimes ascribed to Nāgārjuna himself.⁶

The earliest extant commentary on the MMK by a known author⁷ is that of Buddhapālita (c. 500). Buddhapālita closely followed Nāgārjuna's own method, which utilized mainly *prasaṅga* arguments. These are arguments which show that the opponent's position leads to consequences (*prasaṅga*) unacceptable to the opponent himself, without, however, committing the Mādhyamika to affirming a contrary position.

Bhāvaviveka (c. 500-570) was the next important Mādhyamika philosopher. Besides his commentary on the MMK, the *Prajñāpradīpa*, he wrote some notable independent works, such as the *Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā* and its autocommentary, the *Tarkajvālā*. Bhāvaviveka seems to have been the first to use the formal syllogism of Indian logic in expounding the Madhyamaka; and he strongly criticized Buddhapālita for failing to do so. He felt that the author of a commentary should state independent inferences (*svatantra-anumāna*) rather than simply giving *prasaṅga* arguments.⁸ Bhāvaviveka's position was later criticized by Candrakīrti, who defended Buddhapālita in his own commentary on the MMK, the *Prasannapadā*.

Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa* is, in the first place, of great interest for its explanation and elaboration of the MMK. In the second place, it is important in the history of the Madhyamaka. Bhāvaviveka's criticisms of Buddhapālita in the *Prajñāpradīpa* resulted in the division of the Madhyamaka into two subschools: the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka of Bhāvaviveka and the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka of Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti. (The names of these subschools, derived from *svatantra-anumāna* and *prasaṅga*, seem to have originated some centuries after Candrakīrti and are known to us only from Tibetan sources.⁹)

Moreover, the *Prajñāpradīpa* is the first commentary on the MMK to make use of the formal apparatus of Buddhist logic and the first to discuss non-Buddhist philosophical schools extensively. Bhāvaviveka's accounts, in the *Prajñāpradīpa* and elsewhere, of the positions of other Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools give valuable information on the state of Indian philosophy in his day.

As mentioned above, Candrakīrti, in his *Prasannapadā*, criticized Bhāvaviveka's interpretation of the MMK; and in some cases, he quotes from the *Prajñāpradīpa* when he does so. Some of the passages quoted by Candrakīrti occur in chapter one of the *Prajñāpradīpa*.¹⁰ Chapter six contains another such passage.¹¹ In it, Bhāvaviveka defends Nāgārjuna against the criticism that he has failed to state complete syllogisms. Bhāvaviveka argues that the words of a learned teacher (*ācārya*) such as Nāgārjuna must be understood as condensed, aphoristic statements (*artha-vākya*) pregnant with meaning (*mahārtha*), so that many syllogisms are implicit in them. In the *Prasannapadā*, Candrakīrti turns this argument against Bhāvaviveka, asking why, in that case, he criticizes the *ācārya* Buddhapālita for not stating syllogisms.

Chapter six is called "Examination of *rāga* and *rakta*." *Rāga* is a noun derived from the verbal root *rañj* or *raj*, meaning "to be dyed or colored, to become red, to glow; to be affected or moved, be excited or

glad, be charmed or delighted, be attracted by or enamored of, fall in love with."¹² Thus *rāga* means, among other things, "the act of coloring or dyeing; color, hue, tint, dye, (esp.) red color, redness; any feeling or passion, (esp.) love, affection, or sympathy for, vehement desire of, interest or joy or delight in." In Buddhist usage, *rāga* is often mentioned as one of a triad of "afflictions" (*kleśa*), along with *dveṣa*, "hatred," and *moha*, "confusion." Hence it is less broad than "any feeling or passion," and I have followed the common practice of translating it as "desire."

Rakta is the past passive participle of the same verb and so means, among other things, "colored, dyed, painted; reddened, red; excited, affected with passion or love, impassioned, enamored, charmed with, attached or devoted to, fond of." In this chapter, *rakta* is used as a grammatically masculine noun meaning "one who is ... (the various meanings cited)." I have translated it, a little freely, as "the one who desires." It could also be translated as "the desirous" or "the impassioned."

In the case of both *rāga* and *rakta*, one can see how dyeing, especially with red dye, became a metaphor for passion or desire, just as we speak of someone's being "inflamed with desire." Moreover, just as dye soaks into a piece of cloth and changes its color, so desire colors all the mental processes of one affected by it.

The argument in chapter six can be seen as an extension of the argument in chapter five regarding defining characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) and the things they characterize (*lakṣya*). A defining characteristic cannot exist without characterizing something, and a thing cannot be what it is without its defining characteristic. Likewise, desire cannot exist if there is no one who desires; and one cannot be "one who desires" without desire. Since desire and the one who desires are mutually dependent and, indeed, mutually defining, they cannot be established as independent entities.

In both chapters, arguments are made that two mutually dependent entities (defining characteristic and the thing it characterizes in chapter five, desire and the one who desires in chapter six) cannot arise consecutively. Since neither can exist without the other, neither can arise first. In chapter six, Nāgārjuna goes farther and asserts (MMK 6-3) that they cannot arise simultaneously either, since they would then be unrelated. Bhāvaviveka explains that they cannot be causally related if they arise simultaneously, since a cause must precede its result.

A Vaibhāṣika opponent points out that there is another kind of relation, "dependence on a particular expression" (*brjod pa khyad par can brten pa*). For example, the two horns of a cow, which originate simultaneously, are dependent on the particular expression, "This is the left [horn];

this is the right." The meaning of this argument is not entirely clear to me, but it seems to be connected with the fact that left and right are logically related (like long and short) rather than being related as cause and effect.

Bhāvaviveka replies that the two horns of a cow are not established in ultimate reality. Presumably he is conceding that conventionally, desire and the one who desires can be said to arise simultaneously with a mutual relationship of logical dependence. This very relationship, however, precludes either one's being established by its own intrinsic nature and thus having ultimate reality. As Nāgārjuna will say in the next chapter, "That which arises dependently is tranquil by intrinsic nature" (MMK 7-16ab); that is, it has no intrinsic nature and does not arise by or with intrinsic nature.

Chapter seven is called "Examination of Origination, Duration, and Cessation" (*utpāda, sthiti, and bhaṅga or nirodha*). These three, to which a fourth, "ageing" (*jarā*), is sometimes added, are the "defining characteristics of the conditioned" (*saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇa*) which all conditioned dharmas possess. While these characteristics are mentioned in the sūtras, they are much more elaborated and discussed in the Abhidharma.¹³

Chapter seven has more verses than any other chapter in the MMK, with the exception of chapter twenty-four. While this is partly because Nāgārjuna had three characteristics to deal with, it also suggests that he regarded it as particularly important to show that the defining characteristics of the conditioned do not exist in ultimate reality and so do not establish conditioned things as being ultimately real. As he says in MMK 7-33, "Because origination, duration, and cessation are not established, the conditioned does not exist. Since the conditioned has not been established, how will one establish the unconditioned?" Since all dharmas are either conditioned or unconditioned, this verse implies that by showing that the three characteristics of the conditioned are not established, Nāgārjuna has been able to show that neither saṃsāra nor nirvāṇa is established.

Lest one think that this means that nothing exists in any sense, Nāgārjuna goes on in the next verse (MMK 7-34) to compare origination, duration, and cessation to dreams, magical illusions, and cities of the *gandharvas*. Although these lack the intrinsic nature they seem to have, they do appear to perception. In this connection, it is worth citing again MMK 7-16ab, "That which arises dependently is tranquil by intrinsic nature." In his commentary, Bhāvaviveka explains that in superficial reality, things do originate in dependence on causes and conditions, but that in ultimate reality, they are unoriginated since they do not originate by intrinsic nature; thus they are like magical illusions.¹⁴

Nāgārjuna gives many arguments in the course of refuting the ultimate

reality of the defining characteristics of the conditioned. Some revolve around the question of whether the characteristics are themselves conditioned or unconditioned and the difficulties that flow from both positions. Other arguments are concerned with showing that origination, duration, and cessation cannot take place either simultaneously or sequentially. Taking another line of attack, MMK 7-14 explicitly cites the pattern of argument used in chapter two and applies it to origination, while 7-22 applies the same pattern to duration. MMK 7-26 and 7-27 take arguments from MMK 2-1 and 2-17b and apply them to cessation.

In MMK 7-8, an opponent uses the example of a lamp's illuminating both itself and others to show that origination can produce both itself and the thing which is originating. Nāgārjuna rejects the opponent's example in MMK 7-9 through 7-12. He argues that illumination is the destruction of darkness and that since light and darkness cannot exist in the same place, a lamp's light cannot reach darkness in order to destroy it. Nāgārjuna makes essentially the same argument in *Vigrahavyāvartanī* 34-39, where it is stated in terms of illumination by fire rather than by a lamp. (MMK 3-3 and chapter ten reject a different use of the example of fire, where fire's property of burning is in question rather than its property of illuminating.)

Bhāvaviveka's commentary contains a number of interesting passages. Following MMK 7-2c2,d, we find one of a number of instances in the *Prajñāpradīpa* where he states a Sautrāntika objection and answers it by saying (or implying) that their position is acceptable conventionally, while rejecting it as ultimate truth. Such passages support the Tibetan doxographical classification of Bhāvaviveka as a Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika or Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika, that is, one who accepts the Sautrāntika position as conventional truth, while maintaining a Mādhyamika's view of ultimate truth.

Contrary to some later doxographical classifications, the *Prajñāpradīpa* gives no indication, at least in the chapters I have read, that Bhāvaviveka considered the Buddhist logicians to be Sautrāntikas. Bhāvaviveka was strongly influenced by the work of Dignāga and made extensive use of the machinery of formal Indian logic. But whenever the *Prajñāpradīpa* describes a position as being "Sautrāntika," that position is never one which expresses Dignāga's views on logic and epistemology. Instead, all such passages show that Bhāvaviveka considered the Sautrāntikas to be an Abhidharma school very much like the Sautrāntikas described in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*.

In chapter seven, there is additional evidence that Bhāvaviveka did not consider the Buddhist logicians to be Sautrāntikas. In his commentary

following MMK 7-30cd, Bhāvaviveka has an opponent state Dignāga's doctrine of *apoha*. Bhāvaviveka introduces the objection in question merely with "Some say"; but Avalokitavrata identifies the opponents as *gzhan sel bar smra dag*, *anyāpohavādins*, not as Sautrāntikas. It is also significant that Bhāvaviveka appears to reject the opponent's position conventionally and not just ultimately. This fact suggests that Bhāvaviveka either did not consider the logicians' *apoha* doctrine to be a Sautrāntika view or that, if he did, he rejected some Sautrāntika doctrines even on the level of conventional truth.¹⁵

Another passage relevant to a doxographical issue occurs near the end of Bhāvaviveka's commentary on chapter seven where he quotes from and criticizes Buddhapālita's commentary. Buddhapālita implies that even in the Śrāvakayāna, "without self" (*anātman*) means "without intrinsic nature." Bhāvaviveka argues that in the Śrāvakayāna, *ātman* simply means "self" in the ordinary sense. In the Tibetan doxographical literature, this came to be considered another point of dispute between the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka subschool, represented by Bhāvaviveka, and the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka, represented by Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti. Thus it is curious that Candrakīrti does not attempt to refute Bhāvaviveka's view in his own commentary on MMK 7-34,¹⁶ though he does so elsewhere in his writings.¹⁷

Aside from a few quotations in the *Prasannapadā*, the *Prajñāpradīpa* has been lost in the original Sanskrit. It exists in Tibetan and Chinese translations. The Chinese translation is reportedly rather poor;¹⁸ but the Tibetan translation, done by Jñānagarbha and Cog ro Klu'i rgyal mtshan in the early ninth century, seems to be excellent. The same translators also translated Avalokitavrata's massive subcommentary on the *Prajñāpradīpa*, called the *Prajñāpradīpa-tīkā*. (Avalokitavrata's work is not extant in Sanskrit, and apparently no Chinese translation was ever made.)

The present English translation was made from the Tibetan. I consulted the Peking, Derge, and Cone editions¹⁹ and made my own edition of the text. Most of the variants found in the different Tibetan editions are either obvious scribal errors or else represent different orthographic conventions. Rarely do the variants offer significant alternatives for the meaning of a sentence.

I also made extensive use of the Peking and Derge editions²⁰ of Avalokitavrata's subcommentary. Since the *Prajñāpradīpa* is often terse, allusive, or technical, sentences frequently need to be amplified with phrases in square brackets; and explanatory notes sometimes need to be provided. For both purposes, Avalokitavrata's work is invaluable. Also, since the subcommentary quotes the entire *Prajñāpradīpa*, it is sometimes helpful in

establishing the text.

An English-Tibetan-Sanskrit glossary has been provided for important terms. Although we do not have the Sanskrit text of the *Prajñāpradīpa*, the Tibetan practice of using standardized translation equivalents enables one to infer the Sanskrit original of many terms with a high degree of confidence. Sanskrit terms in the glossary are given in the translation in parentheses at their first occurrence, unless the English translation equivalent is so widely used that this seems unnecessary. Sanskrit and Tibetan words and phrases which are not in the glossary are also sometimes quoted in parentheses, especially when the translation is a bit conjectural.

Notes to Introduction

¹For the convenience of the reader, the introductions to my translations of chapters one and two of the *Prajñāpradīpa* (Ames (1993) and (1995)) and chapters three, four, and five (Ames (1999)) are repeated here, except that material specific to those chapters has been replaced by a discussion of chapters six and seven. For more details on all the matters discussed in this introduction, see Ames (1986), "Part I: Introduction," and the sources cited therein.

²As a general rule, "Madhyamaka" is the name of the school and its philosophy; a follower of the school is called a "Mādhyamika." See Ruegg (1981), p. 1 and n. 3.

³See, e. g., MMK 7-34 and 17-33.

⁴See, e. g., chapter 23 of the MMK, which is discussed in Ames (1988a).

⁵See MMK 15-8.

⁶On the *Akutohaya*, see Huntington (1986).

⁷There is also a Chinese translation of a commentary ascribed to Asaṅga which deals only with the dedicatory verses of MMK (MMK 1-A,B). See Ruegg (1981), p. 49, and Keenan (1989).

⁸In this connection, it is interesting to note that in his commentary on MMK 2-19 (see Ames (1995)), Bhāvaviveka admits that Nāgārjuna gives a *prasaṅga* argument. In his commentary on MMK 1-1 (see Ames (1993), pp. 222-3, 225-6, 234) and elsewhere, Bhāvaviveka criticizes Buddhapālita's *prasaṅga* arguments because, among other reasons, they could be converted into syllogisms asserting things which Buddhapālita does not, in fact, wish to say. For example, Bhāvaviveka claims that Buddhapālita's *prasaṅga* argument against things' originating from themselves could be converted into a syllogism showing that things originate from another. In the case of MMK 2-19, however, Bhāvaviveka converts Nāgārjuna's *prasaṅga* argument against a goer and his or her going's being the same into a syllogism which simply negates sameness without asserting difference. Thus Bhāvaviveka seems inconsistent, if not biased, on this point.

⁹See Ruegg (1981), p. 58.

¹⁰See Ames (1993), p. 237 nn. 30, 32, 36; p. 242 n. 89; p. 243 nn. 96, 101;

p. 244 nn. 102, 103, 114; p. 246 nn. 133, 135; p. 250 nn. 197, 199; and also Ames (1994), p. 129 nn. 98, 102.

¹¹See Bhāvaviveka's commentary following MMK 6-4b and n. 42 to my translation.

¹²All the meanings cited in this discussion of *rāga* and *rakta* are taken from Monier-Williams (1899), pp. 861, 872.

¹³See the references cited in note 1 to my translation of chapter seven.

¹⁴The connection with magical illusions is made in the commentary immediately following 7-16cd and the last part of the commentary following 7-17d.

¹⁵The question of Bhāvaviveka and the Sautrāntikas is discussed more extensively in Ames (1988b).

¹⁶See PSP 177.

¹⁷For a much more extensive discussion of these issues, see Lopez (1988).

¹⁸See Kajiyama (1963), p. 39.

¹⁹For the *Prajñāpradīpa*, the Peking edition is text no. 5253; the Derge edition is no. 3853.

²⁰For Avalokitavrata's *ūṭkā*, the Peking edition is text no. 5259; the Derge edition is no. 3859.

Translation of *Prajñāpradīpa*, Chapter Six:
Examination of Desire (*rāga*) and the One Who Desires (*rakta*)

Now [Nāgārjuna] begins the sixth chapter with the aim of showing that desire, the one who desires, hatred (*dveṣa*), the one who hates (*dvīṣta*), and so on have no intrinsic nature, by means of negating a particular counterposition¹ (*vipakṣa*) to emptiness.

*Objection.*²

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the aggregates, elements (*dhātu*), and *āyatana*s do indeed exist,

[Reason:] because the Blessed One has taught affliction (*saṃkleśa*) and [its] disadvantages (*ādinava*) based on those [aggregates, elements, and *āyatana*s].

[Dissimilar Example:] Here, as for that which does not exist, the Blessed One has not taught affliction and [its] disadvantages based on that. For example, [he has not taught affliction and its disadvantages based on] the hairs of a tortoise.

[Application:] The Blessed One *has* taught affliction and [its] disadvantages based on the aggregates, etc.:

One who desires does not know dharmas; one who desires does not see dharmas.

[When] a person adheres to desire, then [his or her] darkness becomes deep darkness.

One who hates does not know dharmas; one who hates does not see dharmas.

[When] a person adheres to hatred, then [his or her] darkness becomes deep darkness.

One who is confused does not know dharmas; one who is confused does not see dharmas.

[When] a person adheres to confusion, then [his or her] darkness becomes deep darkness.³

[Conclusion:] Therefore, by the evidence (*upapatti*) of the stated reason, the aggregates, elements, and *āyatana*s do indeed exist.

Answer: Desire and so on and the faults of their disadvantages are taught based on a collection of conditioned factors in which the function of desire and so on is predominant. Those [afflictions and their disadvantages] are like magical illusions, mirages, dreams, and cities of the *gandharvas*. They exist conventionally but not in ultimate reality. Therefore [we] will

examine those very [afflictions].

Here, do you maintain that the one who desires [exists] prior to desire or subsequent [to desire] or that desire and the one who desires exist together? [Do you maintain that] desire [exists] prior to the one who desires or subsequently or that desire and the one who desires exist together? As to that, to begin with, [Nāgārjuna says,]

If prior to desire, one who desires existed without desire ... [MMK 6-1ab]

The rest of the phrase is, "If prior to desire, someone who who desires existed without desire ..."⁴ "Desire" (*rāga*), "attachment,"⁵ and "clinging" (*adhyavasāna*) are synonyms. [The meaning of 6-1b] is, "If without that [desire] and apart [from it], someone [who desires] existed without relation to desire." Without ripening, it is not possible that there is a ripened fruit; [but] it is not the case that one who desires is likewise not possible [without desire].⁶

What results from this hypothesis [that one who desires exists prior to desire]?

Desire would exist in dependence on that [one who desires]. [MMK 6-1c]

Desire would exist in dependence on that one who desires; one could say, "This is the desire of this one who desires."

Well, in that case, although there was no desire, that [person without desire] would just be one who desires.⁷ [But, in fact,]

If one who desires existed, desire would [necessarily] exist.⁸ [MMK 6-1d]

If [that person] were [already] one who desires, the origination of desire would just be pointless for him [or her].⁹ Therefore that [hypothesis] is not maintained.

Thus because here [in MMK 6-1] there is a *prasaṅga*-argument,¹⁰ by reversing the original meaning [one has the following] inference:

[Thesis:] One who desires is characterized by (*tshul can*) necessary connection with desire,

[Reason:] because he [or she] is related [to desire],

[Example:] like desire's own self.

Objection: In the Abhidharma definition (*lakṣaṇa*), it is said,

[The cause] called "universal" (*sarvatraga*) is [a cause] of afflictive (*kliṣṭa*) [dharma]s belonging to [its] own stage (*bhūmi*).¹¹ [It consists of] previous universal [dharma]s.¹² [AK 2-54ab]

Hence the very one who desires is the cause of desire; therefore there is no fault [in our position].¹³

Answer:

Even if one who desires exists,¹⁴ how will desire exist? [MMK 6-2ab]

[This is so] because here when desire arises in one who does not [yet] desire, [his or her becoming one who desires] depends on [desire as] a causal condition for [his or her] being called "one who desires." But that [pre-existing one who desires] has [already] become "one who desires" by means of that very [propensity for] desire by which one who has become one who desires is called "one who desires." For [that person who is already one who desires], the origination of desire is pointless.¹⁵ [This is so also] because there is no inference showing that [i. e., that there is one who desires even before desire exists].¹⁶ "How will [desire] exist?" [means] that it is not possible. The idea is,

Even if one who desires exists, how will desire exist?¹⁷ [MMK 6-2ab]

Alternatively, [one can explain MMK 6-2ab as follows:]

[Thesis:] Devadatta who [already] desires is not an immediate cause (*mngon sum gyi rgyu*) of that desire which originates in Devadatta's series,
[Reason:] because he is [already] one who desires,
[Example:] like Yajñadatta who desires.

Objection: That is not possible. If [your] position is that one who desires is not a cause of desire in a series separate [from his or her own, that] establishes what is [already] established [for us]. [If your position is that one who desires is not a cause of desire in a series] which is not separate [from his or her own, that position] has a contradictory meaning.¹⁸

Answer: That is not good. Since [our] position is that one who desires is not a cause of desire in [his or her own] series, which is not separate, [we] do not establish what is [already] established [for you]. [We] negate [any alleged] counterexamples in the same way as [the negation] to be established, because [those alleged counterexamples] are of the same kind as

what is to be established. Therefore [our position] also does not have a contradictory meaning.¹⁹

Objection: [Your] example does not exist [1] because it is accepted that by offering [Devadatta things] which give rise to desire, Yajñadatta who desires is a cause of the origination of desire in Devadatta's series and [2] because one who desires, belonging to one series, is also a cause of the origination of desire in another series, by means of [being] a nonobstructing cause.²⁰

Answer: That, too, is not [logically] possible. That [objection of yours] is a specious refutation [1] because [we] negate [the proposition] that [Devadatta who desires] is a special (*asādhāraṇa*) cause [of the desire which originates in his own series], [2] because [things] which give rise to desire, such as flowers and ointments, are causes of the conceptual construction of desire,²¹ and [3] because there is a particular [property] to be proved [in our syllogism].²²

But if [you] maintain that desire exists prior to the one who desires, even so,

The same method also [applies] to the one who desires, whether desire [already] exists or not. [MMK 6-2cd]

The meaning is that the method of negation will be stated below. How? To explain just that, [one can interchange "desire" and "one who desires" in MMK 6-1,2:]

If prior to one who desires, desire existed without one who desires ... [Compare MMK 6-1ab]

If prior to one who desires, some desire existed without one who desires, one who desires would not [then] exist.

Moreover,

One who desires would exist in dependence on that [desire]. [Compare MMK 6-1c]

One who desires would exist in dependence on that desire [which first exists] without one who desires; one could say, "This one is impassioned²³ by this desire." If so, there would be this fault: Here one establishes the activity expressed by a verb (*bhāva*) [according to the rule,] "Because it impassions, it is desire;"²⁴ but since the activity expressed by a verb is dependent on a

basis, [that activity] does not exist prior to [its] basis.²⁵ For example, cooking does not exist before the rice gruel [which is cooked].

If [you] maintain that desire exists without relation to one who desires, [we reply that, on the contrary,]

If desire existed, one who desires would [necessarily] exist. [Compare MMK 6-1d]

That is not maintained, just as it is not possible that [the activity of] cooking originates without relation to the cooked [food] itself.

Here also, because there is a *prasaṅga*-argument,²⁶ by reversing the original meaning, [one has the following] inference:

[Thesis:] Desire is characterized by (*tshul can*) necessary connection with one who desires,

[Reason:] because it is related [to one who desires],

[Example:] like one who desires' own self.

Objection: It is possible that a son and so on exist even without [i. e., in the absence of] a father. Therefore [the reason in your syllogism] is inconclusive.²⁷

Answer: For just that reason, that also has been negated. Therefore that [objection of yours] does no harm [to our position].²⁸

Objection: [We] accept that the very moment of desire [which is] characterized by (*tshul can*) occurring previously - [that is, when] the moment of the one who desires which is about to originate is [still] nonexistent - is the cause of the later moment of the one who desires which is about to originate. Therefore there is no fault [in our position].²⁹

Answer:

Even if desire exists, how will one who desires exist? [Compare MMK 6-2ab]

[That is, he or she] will simply (*eva*) not exist. [This is so] because it is not established that a moment of desire which just [exists] at a different time causes a moment of the one who desires which will occur later to be affected by desire.³⁰ For example, it is not possible that one [activity of] cooking makes another [i. e., quite separate thing] cooked.³¹ The idea is that it is not possible for a past moment of desire to cause one to be affected by desire³² now. Therefore [your position] will conflict with inference.

How will it conflict with that? [It will conflict with the following inference:]

[Thesis:] Devadatta's desire is not the cause of Devadatta's being one who desires,

[Reason:] because it is desire,

[Example:] like desire in a series separate [from Devadatta's].

The same method also [applies] to desire, whether one who desires [already] exists or not. [Compare MMK 6-2cd]

Here there is no occasion for censure of [our] examination of [desire and the one who desires as being] former and later, because [we] have not shown a specious reason.

But if, in order to avoid that fault [i. e., that desire and the one who desires cannot be established as being successive in time], [you] maintain that desire and the one who desires originate just together, in that case, too, listen!

It is not [logically] possible that desire and the one who desires originate just together (*sahaiva*). [MMK 6-3ab]

Why? On that hypothesis, [one would have the following undesired consequence:]

For desire and the one who desires would be mutually unrelated. [MMK 6-3cd]

There would not be a relation [such that one could say,] "This is the desire of this one who desires. This desire impassions this one." Therefore that is not maintained. [Rather,] it is maintained that those two are indeed related. Here by virtue of the property of the subject [which proves the thesis], the inference is:

[Thesis:] There is no concomitance³³ of desire and the one who desires,

[Reason:] because they are related,

[Example:] like seed and sprout.

Objection: Here the Vaibhāṣikas say: What is the meaning of that reason [of yours]? [Does it mean] "because they are related as to origination" or "because they are related as to dependence on a particular expression"? If [your reason means] "because they are related as to origination," it is inconclusive. [This is so] [1] because mind and the companions of mind,³⁴ which arise simultaneously, are also causes [of each other] through [being] simultaneously arisen causes³⁵ and [2] because a lamp and [its] light

also arise simultaneously.³⁶

[The Vaibhāṣikas continue:] If [your reason means] "because they are related as to dependence on a particular expression," in that case, too, [your reason] is inconclusive. [This is so] because again it is seen that the two horns of a cow, which arise simultaneously, are also dependent on a particular expression, [that is,] "This is the left [horn]; this is the right."³⁷

Answer: The fault [in our reason] which [you] have stated does not exist. [This is so] because mind and the companions of mind and a lamp with [its] light arise just by virtue of [their] group [of causes and conditions]; therefore, even conventionally, concomitance [of things which are related as cause and effect] is not accepted.³⁸ [It is so] also because the two horns of a cow are not established in ultimate reality.

Moreover, [if desire and the one who desires are supposed to exist together,] either concomitance is supposed in the case where desire and the one who desires are identical (*ekatva*) or else concomitance is supposed in the case where they are separate (*prthaktva*). As to that, to begin with, if concomitance is supposed in the case where they are identical, [Nāgārjuna says,]

In the case where they are identical, there is no concomitance. [MMK 6-4a]

That [*pāda*] sets forth the thesis.

That [does] not [exist] together with that very [thing]. [MMK 6-4b]

The idea is that [this is so] because there is concomitance for two [things, not for a single thing].³⁹ Therefore that [second *pāda*] is also a statement of a similar example. Here the inference is:

[Thesis:] Desire does not originate together with the one who desires,

[Reason:] because they are identical,

[Example:] like that very desire's own self.⁴⁰

Therefore there will be conflict with [your] own inference.

Objection: The *ācārya* [Nāgārjuna] has not stated the members [of a syllogism] completely; therefore [his argument] has the fault of being an incomplete proof.

Answer: That is not good. [This is so] [1] because the statements of an *ācārya* are [highly] meaningful statements (*artha-vākya*)⁴¹ and [2] because [highly] meaningful statements give rise to great meanings (*mahārtha*); [thus] although [those statements] have few words, many syllogisms are established

[by them].⁴² Moreover, the syllogisms [which I have stated as Nāgārjuna's commentator]⁴³ are not defective. Alternatively, [those syllogisms] would not be [defective even if not all the members were explicitly stated], provided that even in that case, something is commonly known to someone from [the context of] the chapter or the doctrine [in question].⁴⁴

But if concomitance is supposed in the case where [desire and the one who desires] are separate, even so, when there is no concomitance in the noncontradictory case where they are identical,⁴⁵ [Nāgārjuna asks,]

But if they are separate, how will they be concomitant? [MMK 6-4cd]

Concomitance simply does not exist in the case where [desire and the one who desires] are separate. The idea is that [this is so] [1] because there would be conflict with inference and [2] because there is no inference showing that concomitance exists in the case where they are separate.⁴⁶

Here also [in MMK 6-4cd], a thesis has been set forth. The property of the subject [which proves the thesis] is separateness. [This follows] from an examination of the thesis because [the thesis is that] concomitance does not exist in the case where [desire and the one who desires] are separate.⁴⁷ For example, it is like [the argument that] if [something] is made, it is impermanent.⁴⁸ Here, because it shows the meaning which one wishes to state (*vivakṣita-artha*), the inference is:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, desire and the one who desires are not concomitant,

[Reason:] because they are separate,

[Example:] like desire and one who is free from desire.

Therefore [the opponent's position] will be in conflict with the inference [just stated].

Moreover,

If there were concomitance in the case of identity, that [concomitance] would exist even without [there being] a companion.⁴⁹ [MMK 6-5ab]

The context [of MMK 6-5ab] is "[in the case where] desire and the one who desires [originate] just together."⁵⁰ It is not maintained that desire and the one who desires are concomitant without a companion. This [half-verse] has also shown that [their] being related is the [disproving] property of the concomitance of desire and the one who desires, which is to be negated.⁵¹ Therefore the inference is:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the identity of desire and the one who desires

is not concomitance,

[Reason:] because they are related,

[Example:] like desire's own self.

[*Buddhapālita's commentary*.] Here [Buddhapālita]⁵² says: To begin with, if desire and the one who desires were concomitant even though they are identical, in that case, there would be concomitance even without a companion. How? Here "identical" (*gcig*, *eka*, literally, "one") refers to a single [thing] (*gcig pu*). Then the identity (*ekatva*) of "one cow and one horse" both refers to the cow and refers to the horse. Therefore it would follow that wherever identity exists, there concomitance [also] exists, and that even without a companion, concomitance would exist in just a single cow or just a single horse. Thus it would be pointless to suppose that [desire and the one who desires] are concomitant.

[*Bhāvaviveka's critique*.] That [explanation] is not [logically] possible, [1] because an undesired consequence⁵³ belongs to neither proof (*sādhana*) nor refutation (*dūṣaṇa*) and [2] because, since one wishes to state those [i. e., proof of one's own position and refutation of the opponent's position], just those must be expressed; but they are not expressed [by Buddhapālita].

Likewise,

If there were concomitance in the case of separateness, that [concomitance] would exist even without [there being] a companion. [MMK 6-5cd]

The context [of MMK 6-5cd] is "[in the case where] desire and the one who desires [originate] just together." It is not maintained that desire or the one who desires is concomitant without a companion. This [half-verse], too, has also shown that [their] being related is the [disproving] property of the concomitance of desire and the one who desires, which is to be negated.⁵⁴ Therefore the inference is:

[Thesis:] It is not maintained that in ultimate reality, concomitance exists in the case where desire and the one who desires are separate,

[Reason:] because they are related,

[Example:] like cause and result.⁵⁵

[*Buddhapālita's commentary*.] Here also [Buddhapālita]⁵⁶ says: But even if [desire and the one who desires] were concomitant even though they are separate, in that case, too, there would be concomitance even without a companion. How? Here a horse is separate from a cow, and a cow is also separate from a horse. Therefore it would follow that wherever separateness exists, there concomitance [also] exists, and that even without a companion,

concomitance would exist just in a separate cow or just in a separate horse. In that case, also, it would be pointless to suppose that [desire and the one who desires] are concomitant.

[*Bhāvaviveka's critique:*] That also is not [logically] possible, just as [Buddhapālita's commentary on MMK 6-5ab] was answered before.

Moreover,

If there were concomitance in the case of separateness, what is the use [of concomitance] to desire and the one who desires? [MMK 6-6ab]

"Of concomitance" [is implied].⁵⁷ That has been shown [already]:⁵⁸
[Thesis:] Those [i. e., desire and the one who desires] have no concomitance,

[Reason:] because they are separate,

[Example:] like desire and one who is free from desire.

Therefore [the opponent's position] will conflict with [this] inference.

Again [Nāgārjuna] says,

If separateness (*prthakprthagbhāva*) is established ... [MMK 6-6c]

"Separate" (*prthakprthak*) means "mutually unrelated." "-ness" (*bhāva*) [means] "coming into existence" (*ātmalābha*).

Then those two would be concomitant.⁵⁹ [MMK 6-6d]

[If] in your opinion, [the separateness of desire and the one who desires is established, Nāgārjuna replies,]

If the separateness of desire and the one who desires is established,
For what purpose (*kim artham*) do you imagine the concomitance of those two?⁶⁰ [MMK 6-7]

"Those two" refers to desire and the one who desires.

Objection: [Concomitance] has the purpose⁶¹ of [establishing] the defining characteristic of relationship: "This is the desire of this one who desires. This one is impassioned by this desire."

Answer: That [argument of yours] has shown the reason which [in fact] negates the separateness of desire and the one who desires, [namely,] "because they are related."⁶² [Therefore,] even with a hostile mind, [you] cannot suppose that the meaning in that [reason] is unestablished.⁶³

Moreover, we have shown that separateness is not possible for desire and the one who desires, by means of [the argument] beginning with

If prior to desire, one who desires existed without desire ... [MMK 6-1ab]

And [so] you rely on the concomitance of those two in order to establish desire and the one who desires. In that case, too, we have negated [concomitance] by means of [the argument] beginning with

It is not [logically] possible that desire and the one who desires originate just together ... [MMK 6-3ab]

That concomitance is also not maintained, because [desire and the one who desires] are related.⁶⁴ [We] have [also] negated concomitance because it is identity,⁶⁵ by means of [the half-verse,]

In the case where they are identical, there is no concomitance. That [does] not [exist] together with that very [thing]. [MMK 6-4ab]

And [so] again you accept separateness in order to establish that [concomitance]! Hence [Nāgārjuna asks,]

Since [desire and the one who desires] are not established separately, do you therefore maintain⁶⁶ that they are concomitant?

In order to establish concomitance, do you again maintain that they are separate?⁶⁷ [MMK 6-8]

When [it is the case that]

Since separateness is not established, concomitance is not established, [MMK 6-9ab]

Then, venerable one,

In regard to what separateness do you maintain concomitance? [MMK 6-9cd]

Just tell [us] that! [In other words,] do you maintain [that there is] concomitance for [two] separate [things] which originate successively or for

[two] separate [things] which originate together (*sahaja*)? As to that, if [you] say that [there is concomitance] for [two] separate [things] which originate successively, [that sort of concomitance] is not possible. That has been shown before:

[Thesis: In ultimate reality, desire and the one who desires are not concomitant,]

[Reason:] because they are separate,

[Example:] like desire and one who is free from desire.⁶⁸

But if [you] say that [there is concomitance] for [two] separate [things] which originate together, [that sort of concomitance is also not possible]. That, too, has been shown before:

[Thesis: There is no concomitance of desire and the one who desires,]

[Reason:] because they are related,

[Example:] like seed and sprout.⁶⁹

Because, in that way, desire and the one who desires are not established as concomitant or nonconcomitant, therefore

[Nāgārjuna] sums up,

Thus desire is not established together or not together with one who desires. [MMK 6-10ab]

One should understand [that this implies] "according to the investigation which has been shown previously." [MMK 6-10ab] is the conclusion [of the argument concerning desire and the one who desires].

One should specify that, according to the method which has been shown, all dharmas are also not established as concomitant or nonconcomitant. In order to show that [the case] is similar, [Nāgārjuna says,]

Like desire, all dharmas are not established⁷⁰ together or not together.
[MMK 6-10cd]

Like desire, all external and internal dharmas, such as hatred, confusion, and so on, are also not established as concomitant or nonconcomitant.

Therefore, since in that way desire and so on are not established in ultimate reality, the meaning of that reason stated by opponents at the beginning of [this] chapter - "because [the Blessed One] has taught affliction and [its] disadvantages based on those [aggregates, elements, and *āyatanas*]"⁷¹ - is not established. If [that] reason is stated according to superficial reality, [its] meaning is contradictory.⁷²

In that connection, here the meaning of the chapter is [as follows:] By

describing the fault in the reason stated by the opponent, it has been shown that desire, the one who desires, and so on have no intrinsic nature.

Therefore [scriptural] statements such as the following are established:⁷³

Mañjuśrī, desire does not exist; the designation of desire⁷⁴ does not exist. Hatred does not exist; the designation of hatred does not exist. Confusion does not exist; the designation of confusion does not exist. Desire is enlightenment (*bodhi*). Hatred is enlightenment. Confusion is enlightenment. How does one rightly proceed (*yang dag par zhugs pa*)? When one does not proceed in order to put an end to desire, [when] one does not proceed in order to put an end to hatred, [when] one does not proceed in order to put an end to confusion, then one proceeds rightly. The past mind (*citta*) does not desire, because it has [already] passed; the future mind does not desire, because it has not [yet] come. The present mind, too, does not desire, because the present has no duration (*gnas pa med pa*).⁷⁵

Likewise, [from the *Bhagavatī-prajñā-pāramitā-suvikrāntavikrāmi-sūtra*,]⁷⁶

Suvikrāntavikrāmin, matter does not have the property of desire (*rāgaḍharmin*) or the property of being free from desire (*virāgaḍharmin*). Feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition also do not have the property of desire or the property of being free from desire. The fact that matter does not have the property of desire or the property of being free from desire⁷⁷ is the perfection of discernment. The fact that feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition do not have the property of desire or the property of being free from desire is the perfection of discernment.

Matter does not have the property of hatred or the property of being free from hatred. Feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition also do not have the property of hatred or the property of being free from hatred. The fact that matter does not have the property of hatred or the property of being free from hatred is the perfection of discernment. The fact that feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition do not have the property of hatred or the property of being free from hatred is the perfection of discernment.

Matter does not have the property of confusion or the property of being free from confusion. Feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition also do not have the property of confusion or the property of being free from confusion. The fact that matter does not have the property of confusion or the property of being free from confusion is the perfection of discernment. The fact that feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition do not have the property of confusion or the property

of being free from confusion is the perfection of discernment.

Suvikrāntavikrāmin, matter does not become afflicted or purified (*na ... samkliṣyate vā vyavadāyate vā*). Feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition also do not become afflicted or purified. The fact that matter does not become afflicted or purified (*asamkleśatā-avyavadānatā*) is the perfection of discernment. The fact that feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition do not become afflicted or purified is the perfection of discernment.

The sixth chapter, "Examination of Desire and the one who Desires," of the *Prajñāpradīpa*, a commentary on [Nāgārjuna's] *Mūlamadhyamaka* composed by ācārya Bhavyakara/Bhavyakāra⁷⁸ (*legs ldan byed*) [is concluded].

Notes to Translation of Chapter Six

¹Avalokitavrata explains, "Emptiness is [our] own position. The counterposition to that is the opponent's position." See Ava P 100b-7, D90a-7 to 90b-1.

²Avalokitavrata attributes this objection to "fellow Buddhists." See Ava P101b-3,4; D91a-3,4.

³Avalokitavrata does not give the source of this quotation. Similar verses occur in the *Iti-vuttaka* (p. 84) and are quoted with variants in the *Mahāniddesa* (pp. 15-16). (Page references are to the Pali Text Society editions.)

⁴Although the Tibetan of the commentary contains a few more morphemes than the Tibetan of the verse, it is not clear what the commentary adds to the sense of the verse. Avalokitavrata explains that the idea here is that the one who desires exists first and that desire later arises in dependence on that pre-existing one who desires. See Ava P103a-8 to 103b-5, D92b-7 to 93a-4.

⁵Here *chags pa* probably translates *saṅga* or *sakti*. Compare PSP 138.6

⁶This sentence expresses the opponent's reason for holding that one who desires exists prior to desire. See Ava P104a-1 to 6, D93b-1 to 5.

⁷Because, according to this hypothesis, one who desires exists prior to desire, in the absence of desire. Thus even someone free from desire would be "one who desires." See Ava P104b-2,3,4; D94a-2,3,4.

⁸The point being made in MMK 6-1d seems to be the following: The opponent here holds that one who desires exists prior to desire. In fact, that is impossible, because such a view leads to the absurd consequences (*prasaṅga*) pointed out in the commentary. Thus one who desires is necessarily connected with desire. (Compare the syllogism which follows.)

⁹Being already "one who desires" by intrinsic nature, even in the absence of desire, the origination of desire would make no difference to him or her. See Ava P104b-6,7; D94a-6.

¹⁰*glags yod pa'i tshig*. See Ames (1993), p. 244 n. 102.

¹¹Here the nine *bhūmis* are the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*), the four *dhyānas* of the realm of form (*rūpadhātu*), and the four *ārūpyas* of the formless realm

(*ārūpyadhātu*). See LVP AK II, p. 256.

¹²That is, every universal (*sarvatraga*) dharma is a universal (*sarvatraga*) cause of every future afflictive dharma belonging to its own stage. The universal dharmas are eleven of the fifty-eight *anuśayas* ("negative propensities" or "latent afflictions;" see LVP AK V, pp. 6-7) and the dharmas coexisting with those eleven *anuśayas* (except for the *prāptis*). See LVP AK II, pp. 268-9; AK 5-12, 13 with the *bhāṣya* (LVP AK V, pp. 31-4); and Ava P105b-4 to 106a-6, D95a-3 to 95b-4.

¹³Avalokitavratā explains that in all ordinary persons (*prthag-jana*), the unmanifest propensities for the afflictions exist. Thus, since they have the propensity for desire, all ordinary persons can be called "one who desires." When the right conditions are present, that latent desire becomes manifested; and then one says that desire has originated. Thus the one who desires (in the sense of possessing the propensity for desire) is a cause of (manifest) desire. See Ava P106a-2 to 6, D95b-1 to 4; note that he quotes AK 5-34.

¹⁴Here the Sanskrit of PSP has *rakte 'sati punā*, corresponding to *chags pa med par gyur na yang*, "even if one who desires did not exist." The Tibetan of PSP, however, agrees with the other commentaries in having *yod* rather than *med*. See PSP 138.11 and p. 139 n. 1 and Saito (1984), translation, p. 250 n. 3.

¹⁵Avalokitavratā explains that according to worldly convention, one who does not desire becomes one who desires when he or she is conjoined with desire; thus his or her becoming "one who desires" depends on desire as a causal condition. On the other hand, the origination of desire is pointless if one is already one who desires simply by virtue of having the propensity for desire. See Ava P106b-1, 2, 3; D95b-7 to 96a-1.

¹⁶See Ava P106b-3, 4, 5; D96a-1, 2, 3.

¹⁷The Tibetan of this gloss is identical with the Tibetan of the verse. According to Avalokitavratā, the gloss means that even if the one who desires pre-exists, he or she could not be the cause of desire. See Ava P106b-5, 6; D96a-3, 4.

¹⁸If you hold that Devadatta who desires is not a cause of the origination of desire in Yājñadatta's series, that is also established for us. But if you hold that Devadatta who desires is not a cause of the origination of desire in his own series, that is contradictory. In particular, your example contradicts your thesis, since Yājñadatta who desires *is* a cause of the origination of desire in his own series. See Ava P107a-2 to 8, D96a-7 to 96b-6.

¹⁹Our argument proves that, like Devadatta who desires, Yājñadatta who desires is also not an immediate cause of the desire which originates in his own series. Thus there is no counterexample. See Ava P107b-4 to 7, D97a-2 to 5; and compare MMK 4-8, 9.

²⁰Every dharma is a nonobstructing cause of every conditioned dharma, except itself. See AK 2-50a and LVP AK II, pp. 246-8.

²¹'*dod pa*, not '*dod chags*; perhaps *kāma* in the sense of "object of desire"? Glossed by Avalokitavratā as *dga' ba*, "joy" (*prīti*, *rati*, etc.). See Ava P108b-5, D98a-2.

²²That is, our thesis is that Devadatta who desires is not the *immediate* cause

(*mngon sum gyi rgyu*, perhaps *sāksāt-kāraṇa*) of desire which originates in his own series. We do not say that he is not a cause of it at all. See Ava P108b-8 to 109a-2, D98a-4,5,6.

²³*chags so*, probably *rajyate*.

²⁴*chags par byed pas 'dod chags so*, probably *rañjayatīti rāgaḥ*.

²⁵That is, desire which impassions no one is not desire; desire cannot exist without someone who desires. Here the "basis" (*gzhi*, probably *ādhāra*) referred to is the direct object of desire's activity of impassioning, that is, the one who desires. See Ava P110a-4,5,6; D99a-7 to 99b-1.

²⁶See note 10.

²⁷The opponent's idea is that although father and son are mutually related, the son may still exist when the father is dead or absent. See Ava P111a-8 to 111b-2, D100b-2 to 5.

²⁸Just as we have refuted the idea that desire and the one who desires have a relation such that one comes first and the other later, so also we have (implicitly) refuted the idea that father and son have such a relation. See Ava P111b-3,4; D100b-5,6.

²⁹According to Avalokitavratā, the opponent holds that desire pre-exists in a latent state (i. e., as an *anuśaya*). When it encounters the right causal conditions, it becomes manifest as actual desire; and then it impassions the one who desires. Therefore it is not the case that desire's activity of impassioning exists without a basis, i. e., a direct object. See Ava P111b-7 to 112a-3, D101a-2 to 5.

³⁰Literally, "a moment of desire ... makes a moment of the one who desires ... into one who desires," *'dod chags kyi skad cig ma ... kyis chags pa'i skad cig ma ... chags pa nyid du byed par ...*

Avalokitavratā remarks that the conventional designation, "one who desires," is said according to mere superficial reality but does not exist in ultimate reality. See Ava P112b-1 to 4, D101b-3,4,5.

³¹When Devadatta cooks at home, his activity of cooking does not cook rice gruel in Yajñadatta's house. Likewise, an earlier moment of desire does not impassion a later moment of one who desires. See Ava P112b-4 to 8, D101b-5 to 102a-2.

³²*... chags pa nyid du byed par ...*

³³*lhan cig gi dngos po, sahabhāva*; see MMK 6-9. (For the most part, the Tibetan translation of *sahabhāva* in this chapter is *lhan cig nyid*.) Since *sahabhāva* (literally, "existence together") implies both simultaneity in time and proximity in space, I have translated it as "concomitance." In this chapter, the emphasis is on *sahabhāva* as simultaneity, as opposed to successive existence in time.

³⁴The companions of [a moment of] mind (*citta-anuvartin*) are listed in AK 2-51.

³⁵See AK 2-50cd.

³⁶A lamp and its light are related and also originate together. The same is true of mind and its companion dharmas. See Ava P114b-8 to 115b-1, D103b-6 to 104a-6.

³⁷Thus the two horns of a cow are related and also originate together.

³⁸Mind and its companion dharmas do not originate because of each other but because of their shared group of causes and conditions. Thus their cause-and-effect relationship is with those causes and conditions, not with each other; and they do not exist at the same time as (and thus are not concomitant with) those causes and conditions. The same can be said of a lamp and its light. See Ava P115b-8 to 116a-8, D104b-5 to 105a-3; and compare the position of the Sautrāntikas in LVP AK II, pp. 253-5.

³⁹A single cow is identical with itself; but one does not say that a single cow exists together (i.e., is concomitant) with that same single cow. See Ava P116b-7 to 117a-2, D105b-2,3,4.

⁴⁰One does not say that desire exists together with its own self. See Ava P117a-5,6,7; D105b-7 to 106a-1.

⁴¹Avalokitavrata says that the *ācārya* is an author of aphorisms (*sūtra-kāra*) and that aphorisms are merely [condensed] statements of the meaning (*don smos pa tsam*, perhaps *artha-grahaṇa-mātra*). See Ava P117b-1,2; D106a-3,4.

⁴²Candrakīrti seems almost to quote this sentence in PSP 25.3. The Tibetan translation of the *Prajñāpradīpa* has: ... *slob dpon gyi tshig dag ni don gyi tshig dag* (P om. *dag*) *yin pa'i phyir dang | don gyi tshig dag gis ni don chen po dag skyed par byed de | tshig nyung ngu nyid yin yang sbyor ba'i tshig du ma dag 'grub pa'i phyir ro ||* (P119a-4,5; D98a-2; C98a-1,2). The Sanskrit of the *Prasannapadā* reads: *athārthavākyatvād ācāryavākyānām mahārthatve saty anekaprayoganispatihetutvam parikalpyate ...* (PSP 25.3,4). See also PSP 23.1.

⁴³See Ava P117b-2 to 6, D106a-4 to 7.

⁴⁴That is, if some member of the syllogism is obvious to both proponent and opponent, either from the context of the discussion or from their knowledge of the doctrine being discussed, it need not be stated explicitly. See Ava P117b-7 to 118a-1, D106a-7 to 106b-1.

⁴⁵According to Avalokitavrata, in the opinion of the world, identity and concomitance are not incompatible; but when one examines the matter, concomitance is not possible in the case of identity. If even in that case, concomitance is not possible, how will it be possible that two separate things are concomitant? For concomitance and separateness are opposites. See Ava P118a-2 to 5, D106b-3,4,5.

⁴⁶The Mādhyamika has an inference showing that concomitance does not exist in the case where they are separate, and the opponent has no inference showing the opposite. See Ava P118a-6,7; D106b-6,7.

⁴⁷See Ava P118b-1,2; D107a-1,2,3. Here "thesis" translates *phyogs*, *pakṣa*, glossed by Avalokitavrata as *dam bca' ba'i phyogs*, *pratijñā-pakṣa*.

⁴⁸That is, if the thesis is that what is made is impermanent, then from an examination of that thesis, one sees that the proving property is the fact of being made. Likewise, here the thesis is that what is separate is not concomitant; and the proving property is separateness. See Ava P118b-2,3,4; D107a-3,4.

⁴⁹This translation follows the Sanskrit. The Tibetan of MMK 6-5a translates as, "If a single [thing] were concomitant ..." The idea is that if desire and the one who desires were identical, they would be one single thing. But one single thing

is not said to be concomitant with itself.

⁵⁰Compare MMK 6-3ab.

⁵¹That is, in the following syllogism, the fact that desire and the one who desires are related is the reason which proves that if they are identical, they are *not* concomitant. Compare the syllogism following MMK 6-3cd and also the syllogism following MMK 6-4b.

⁵²Literally, "others;" identified by Avalokitavrata. See Ava P119b-2, D108a-2. Tibetan text in Saito (1984), p. 78.14-21.

⁵³*glags yod pa, prasaṅga*. See Ames (1993), p. 244 n. 102.

⁵⁴That is, in the following syllogism, the fact that desire and the one who desires are related is the reason which proves that if they are separate, they are *not* concomitant.

⁵⁵Due to their causal relationship, cause and result cannot exist at the same time (the cause must precede the result); and thus they are not concomitant. Compare the syllogism following MMK 6-3cd.

⁵⁶Literally, "others;" identified by Avalokitavrata. See Ava P120b-2, D108b-7. Tibetan text in Saito (1984), pp. 78.22-79.5.

⁵⁷According to Avalokitavrata, this is a reply to an opponent who says that separateness does not exist only in desire or only in the one who desires but instead is a general result of their originating together. Thus it exists in the two of them when they have originated together. According to Bhāvaviveka, Nāgārjuna's reply means that it has already been shown that two things which are separate cannot be concomitant. See Ava P120b-5 to 8, D109a-3,4,5.

⁵⁸See the syllogism following MMK 6-4cd.

⁵⁹According to Avalokitavrata, MMK 6-6cd means that if, as the opponent holds, separateness exists in the two when they have originated together, it follows that separateness is established first and then concomitance. Nāgārjuna refutes this position in MMK 6-7. See Ava P121a-1,2,3; D109a-7 to 109b-1.

⁶⁰Avalokitavrata points out that concomitance is contrary (*mi mthun pa*) to separateness. See Ava P121a-5,6; D109b-2,3.

⁶¹*dgos pa*, probably *prayojana*.

⁶²Compare the syllogism following MMK 6-1d.

⁶³In other words, the opponent contradicts himself by asserting that desire and the one who desires are both separate and related.

⁶⁴See the syllogism following MMK 6-3cd.

⁶⁵Apparently, the idea is that since separateness has been eliminated as a possibility, the only remaining alternative is identity.

⁶⁶*vikāṅkṣasi*, translated by 'dod byed.

⁶⁷Here MMK 6-8ab and 6-8cd are translated as two rhetorical questions, as the Tibetan takes them. In the Sanskrit, they seem to be two statements.

⁶⁸See the syllogism following MMK 6-4cd.

⁶⁹See the syllogism following MMK 6-3cd.

⁷⁰PDC have 'gyur, as does N107a-2, while Ava P122b-2, D110b-5 have 'grub in MMK 6-10d. The Sanskrit (as given in PSP 142.10) corresponds to 'grub. My translation follows the Sanskrit and Ava.

⁷¹See the opponent's initial syllogism at the beginning of this chapter.

⁷²It is contradictory to try to prove a thesis about ultimate reality using a reason which is valid only in superficial reality.

⁷³See Ames (1999), p. 45 n. 149; Avalokitavrata's remarks are similar here. See Ava: (1) P123a-3,4,5, D111a-5,6; (2) P123b-1, D111b-2,3; and (3) P124a-5 to 8, D112a-6 to 112b-2.

⁷⁴*'dod chags su gdags pa*, probably *rāga-prajñapti*.

⁷⁵Identified by Avalokitavrata only as "from the whole [corpus of] Mahāyāna sūtras (*theg pa chen po'i mdo sde mtha' dag las*).\" See Ava P123a-5, D111a-6,7.

⁷⁶Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P123b-1,2; D111b-3. The Sanskrit of the first three paragraphs is found in Hikata (1958), p. 32; the Sanskrit of the last paragraph is in *ibid.*, p. 30.

⁷⁷... *rūpavedanāsamjñāsamskāravijñānānām na rāgadharmaṭā nāpi virāga-dharmaṭā* ... Note that the Sanskrit (Hikata (1958), p. 32) condenses this and the following sentence into one sentence. It does the same with the corresponding sentences concerning hatred, confusion, and affliction and purification (*ibid.*, pp. 32, 30).

⁷⁸See Ames (1999), p. 46 n. 159.

Translation of *Prajñāpradīpa*, Chapter Seven: Examination of Origination, Duration, and Cessation¹

Now [Nāgārjuna] begins the seventh chapter with the aim of showing that the aggregates and so on have no intrinsic nature, by means of negating a particular counterposition² (*vipakṣa*) to emptiness.

*Objection:*³

[Thesis:] One should grasp that conditioned [dharmas], the aggregates, elements, and *āyatanas*, do indeed have the intrinsic nature of conditioned [dharmas],

[Reason:] because they possess origination, etc., the defining characteristics of the conditioned.

[Dissimilar Example:] Here that which does not exist is not grasped as possessing the defining characteristics of the conditioned; for example, a hare's horn [does not possess those characteristics].

[Application:] The aggregates and so on do possess origination, etc., the defining characteristics of the conditioned.

[Conclusion:] Therefore, by virtue of the stated reason, [we] who possess trained minds⁴ say that conditioned [dharmas], the aggregates and so on, do indeed have the intrinsic nature of conditioned [dharmas].

Answer: In this [context],⁵ are those [characteristics,] origination and so on—which [you] maintain are defining characteristics of the conditioned—[themselves] conditioned; or are they unconditioned? If [you] say that those [characteristics] are conditioned, in that case, to begin with, [Nāgārjuna] says in regard to origination:

If origination is conditioned, that [origination] will possess the three characteristics (*tatra yuktā trilakṣaṇī*). [MMK 7-1ab]

"[That origination] will possess the three characteristics" [means] "the three characteristics will come together [in that]," just as [one says,] "possessing the three staves."⁶ Therefore,

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, [if] origination and so on [are] themselves conditioned, [then they] are not maintained to be defining characteristics of the conditioned,

[Reason:] because they are conditioned,

[Example:] like the thing which they characterize (*lakṣya*).

Objection: A thing characterized [may] also be a defining characteristic which characterizes another thing characterized. Therefore [the example in your syllogism] is inconclusive.

Answer: A thing characterized does not characterize another thing characterized as being conditioned. Therefore, since there is no counterexample, [our example] is not inconclusive.

Objection: Even if origination and so on are themselves conditioned, [nevertheless] since they [respectively] cause [the thing which they characterize] to originate, to endure, and to cease, they are indeed defining characteristics of the conditioned.

Answer: Since there is no positive concomitance [with a similar example], [your argument] is a mere assertion.

[Conventionally,] [the activity of] originating [is called] "origination;" [the activity of] enduring [is called] "duration;" and [the activity of] ceasing [is called] "cessation."⁷ But [you] have nihilistically negated [the fact] that origination and so on are activities because [you] have accepted that they are agents. Even conventionally, if [origination] is the agent [which causes a conditioned thing to originate],

[Thesis:] Origination is not a defining characteristic of the conditioned,

[Reason:] because it causes [conditioned things] to originate,

[Example:] just as a father [begets his son and so] is not a defining characteristic of [his] son.

Likewise,

[Thesis:] Duration, too, is not a defining characteristic of the conditioned,

[Reason:] because [according to you,] it causes [conditioned things] to endure,

[First Example:] just as food causes the body to endure and so is not a defining characteristic of the body,

[Second Example:] or just as a female servant who carries a jar (*bum thogs ma*) sets the jar [in place] and so is not a defining characteristic of the jar.

Likewise,

[Thesis:] Cessation, too, is not a defining characteristic of the conditioned,

[Reason:] because [according to you,] it causes conditioned things to cease,

[Example:] just as a hammer destroys [a jar] and so is not a defining characteristic of the jar.

Therefore in that way, since it is not established that origination and so on are defining characteristics of the conditioned, the meaning of the reason [in the opponent's syllogism] is not established; or else it has a contradictory meaning.⁸ Therefore since one wishes to get rid of the fault stated [in MMK 7-1ab], one should not understand [the matter] in that way, [that is,] that origination is [itself] conditioned. Thus to begin with, [we] have pointed out the fault that if origination is conditioned, it is not possible that it is a

defining characteristic of the conditioned.

If, out of a desire to be rid of the stated fault, [you] maintain [that origination is unconditioned], [Nāgārjuna replies,]

But if origination is unconditioned, how [can it be] a defining characteristic of the conditioned? [MMK 7-1cd]

[That is,] origination is not a defining characteristic of the conditioned. The idea is that [this is so] because the unconditioned does not itself exist.

Alternatively, [one can explain MMK 7-1cd as follows:] The property of the unconditioned [which proves the thesis] is [the fact] that it is unconditioned. Hence [we have the following syllogism:]

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, an unconditioned origination cannot be a defining characteristic of the conditioned,

[Reason:] because it is unconditioned,

[Example:] like space.

Therefore [to say that origination is unconditioned] conflicts with [your] own inference.⁹

Because "origination" is used [in] the manner of a word which implies more than its literal meaning,¹⁰ both duration and cessation are also included [implicitly], since [the opponent] alleges that they are defining characteristics of the conditioned. Since those two [characteristics] are also negated in that [same] way, it is not necessary to express the negation of those two also.¹¹

Moreover, here if these [characteristics,] origination and so on, are supposed to be defining characteristics of the conditioned, it must be supposed that they [are defining characteristics] either separately or in combination. As to that, to begin with, [Nāgārjuna says,]

The three, origination and so on, are not adequate separately for the function of characterizing the conditioned. [MMK 7-2ab,c1]

The three, origination and so on, are not adequate separately for the function of characterizing the conditioned. The idea is that [this is so] because the combined defining characteristics [of an ox], a dewlap, etc., are able to characterize the thing which they characterize [but they are not able to do so separately].

Even if [you] accept that origination and so on occur successively, an entity which has not [yet] originated does not have origination, duration, and cessation. Therefore [origination and so on] lack the power to function as defining characteristics of the conditioned [in the case of a conditioned entity

which has not yet originated]. Also, in the case of [an entity] which has [already] ceased, because the thing characterized does not exist, [its] origination, duration, and cessation do not exist. Therefore they lack the power of functioning as defining characteristics of the conditioned [in the case of a conditioned entity which has already ceased].

In the case of [an entity] which has [already] originated [but which has not yet ceased], origination does not exist; therefore [duration and cessation also do not exist].¹² For [an entity] which [presently] endures, cessation is not possible; therefore [origination and duration also do not exist].¹³ [An entity] which [presently] endures is connected with impermanence; therefore [even duration is not a defining characteristic of a presently existing conditioned entity].¹⁴ Thus also [Āryadeva]¹⁵ says:

Without duration, how could an entity exist? Since it is impermanent, how could it endure?

If at first it endures, it will not finally grow old. [*Catuhśataka* 11-17]

If it is always impermanent, it will never endure.

Alternatively, after having been permanent, it would later become impermanent.¹⁶ [*Catuhśataka* 11-23]

If an entity had duration together with impermanence,

Either [its] impermanence would be false, or [its] duration would be untrue.¹⁷ [*Catuhśataka* 11-24]

But if [you] maintain that origination, etc., in combination are defining characteristics of the conditioned, even so, [Nāgārjuna replies,]

Even if they are combined, how could they exist in one [thing] at one time? [MMK 7-2c2,d]

The meaning of the sentence is that those combined do not exist in one conditioned entity at one time.

Objection: How is that ascertained?

Answer: [It is so] because it is not [logically] possible for those who are sane¹⁸ to suppose that the originated, the enduring, and the ceased - which are quite incompatible [with each other] - occur in any entity at one time.

Objection: The Sautrāntikas¹⁹ say: In [a particular] series which has arisen from the power of specific causes and conditions, at one and the same time [four defining characteristics of the conditioned exist as follows:] Origination is that which is the arising of an entity which is about to originate, which has not arisen [previously]. Duration is continuation by

means of the series of successive preceding moments. Ageing is [the fact] that [each moment] has a defining characteristic unlike [that of] the previous moment. Cessation is disappearance [after] having arisen [previously]. Thus, by a definite relation, the combined defining characteristics, origination and so on, [do indeed] exist in one moment at one time. Therefore that argument [of yours] does not harm to our [position].

Answer: Even if you imagine so, because the series does not exist as a substance²⁰ and because [you] conceptually construct origination, duration, etc., by means of the relationship [between successive moments of the series],²¹ the three defining characteristics [of the conditioned] are conventional; but they are not ultimately real. Also, at the time when [an entity] endures, [its] cessation, which is incompatible with that [duration], does not exist. Therefore that [position of yours] also does not escape the fault which [we] showed previously.²²

Objection: The Vaibhāṣikas say: The coming into existence (*ātmalābha*) of an entity which has not arisen previously is origination. The continuing [to exist] of what has originated is duration. The growing old of what has endured is ageing. The ceasing [to exist] of what has aged is cessation. The successive occurrence of origination, etc., is invariable (*avyabhicārin*) in that which is conditioned. Therefore those are established as defining characteristics [of the conditioned]. Hence what [Nāgārjuna] has said,

The three, origination and so on, are not adequate separately for the function of characterizing the conditioned, [MMK 7-2ab,c1]

is not [logically] possible.

Answer: That [argument of yours] is [itself] not [logically] possible. [This is so] because [what is called] a "defining characteristic" is never absent (*vyabhi-car*) from the thing which it characterizes. For example, solidity is not [ever] absent from earth; and the marks of a great man (*mahāpuruṣa*) are not [ever] absent from a great man.²³

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, origination and so on cannot be entities' defining characteristic of the conditioned,

[Reason:] because they occur successively.

[Example:] For example, the particular stages of [unformed] clay, a lump [of clay], the compressed (?) (*smyad pa*), the flattened (*glebs pa*), and the contracted (*bcum pa*)²⁴ are not a jar's defining characteristics of the conditioned.

Objection: Origination and so on are invariable [in the conditioned],

because those [defining characteristics] do not exist in the unconditioned.

Answer: They are metaphorically designated (*upa-car*) [as defining characteristics of the conditioned], but they do not exist in ultimate reality.²⁵ [This is so] because origination has been negated and because what has not originated has no duration and cessation. [Also, this is so] because [an entity,] even at the time when it originates, [has] a nature without duration and without cessation [and so] does not have the nature of those; hence it does not possess those.

Even if [you] suppose that [an originating entity] has the nature of those [i. e., duration and cessation] on account of [their] occurring later, [that] is mere convention. Hence the fault which [we] have shown is not avoided. Therefore, in that way, it is not established that origination and so on, separately or in combination, are defining characteristics of the conditioned. Therefore that very fault in the reason [in the opponent's initial syllogism at the beginning of this chapter] has not been removed.

Moreover,

If origination, duration, and cessation (*bhaṅga*) have [in turn] another defining characteristic of the conditioned,
There is an infinite regress. [MMK 7-3abc]

There would be an infinite regress, [namely,] that [additional defining characteristic of the conditioned] would also have another [defining characteristic of the conditioned]; and that [in turn] would also have another. Hence that is not maintained. One should not maintain that origination and so on possess origination and so on.

But if [you] say, "Very well, let it be so,"²⁶ in that case, too, that same [refutation] will be repeated:²⁷

If they do not have [another defining characteristic of the conditioned],
those [defining characteristics of the conditioned] are not [themselves] conditioned. [MMK 7-3d]

Objection: [We] maintain that origination and so on are indeed conditioned, but there will also be no infinite regress. [Because] origination and so on characterize [a conditioned thing] as being conditioned, [they are called] "defining characteristics of the conditioned." For example, auspicious and inauspicious marks [characterize other things as being auspicious or inauspicious; and they are also themselves auspicious or inauspicious, without needing further marks to characterize them as such.]²⁸ Likewise,

since there are no other defining characteristics of the conditioned, there will also be no infinite regress²⁹ [in this case].

Answer: It has been shown previously³⁰ how

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, [if] origination and so on [are] themselves conditioned, [then they] are not maintained to be defining characteristics of the conditioned,

[Reason:] because they are conditioned,

[Example:] like the thing they characterize.

Likewise, origination and so on are also like that.³¹ Therefore one should not maintain that in ultimate reality, origination and so on are conditioned.

Even if origination and so on are not conditioned, they cannot be defining characteristics of the conditioned, for the answer to that [alternative] has also [already] been given here:

If they do not have [another defining characteristic of the conditioned], those [defining characteristics of the conditioned] are not [themselves] conditioned. [MMK 7-3d]

Therefore, again, the fault which [we] have shown [in the reason in the opponent's initial syllogism at the beginning of this chapter] has not been avoided.

Objection: Here the Vātsīputrīyas say:³² Origination, duration, and cessation are indeed conditioned; but an infinite regress will not follow, either. How? Because here a dharma originates with fifteen [dharmas] including itself.³³ There originate: [1] that dharma [itself]; [2] the origination of that [dharma]; [3] the duration of that [dharma]; [4] the cessation of that [dharma]; [5] the possession (*samanvāgama*)³⁴ of that [dharma]; [6] the change from duration (*sthiti-anyathātva*) [that is, the ageing] of that [dharma]; [7] here, [a] if that dharma is "white," the true liberation (*samyag-vimukti*) of that [dharma]; or [b] if it is "black,"³⁵ [its] false liberation (*mithyā-vimukti*); and [8] [a] if that dharma is conducive to deliverance (*nairyānika*), the being conducive to deliverance of that [dharma]; or [b] if it is not conducive to deliverance, [its] not being conducive to deliverance. Those [i. e., 2-8] are [called] the "retinue" (*parivāra*) [of that dharma].

[The Vātsīputrīyas continue:] There also originate: [9] the origination of origination; [10] the duration of duration; [11] the cessation of cessation; [12] the possession of possession; [13] the change from duration of change from duration; [14] [a] the true liberation of true liberation or [b] the false liberation of false liberation; and [15] [a] the being conducive to deliverance

of being conducive to deliverance or [b] the not being conducive to deliverance of not being conducive to deliverance. Those [i. e., 9-15] are [called] the "retinue of the retinue" [of that dharma]. Thus a dharma originates with fifteen [dharmas] including itself.

[The Vātsīputrīyas continue:] As to that, the principal (*maula*) origination produces fourteen dharmas, not including itself. The origination of origination produces only that principal origination. Duration and so on are also like that;³⁶ hence an infinite regress will not follow.

[The following] verse [states] that previous position [of the Vātsīputrīyas]:

The origination of origination produces only the principal origination.³⁷
The principal origination produces the origination of origination. [MMK 7-4]

The origination of origination produces only the principal origination, but does not produce [any] other [dharma]. The principal origination produces the origination of origination.

Answer: That [theory of yours] is both extensive and various, but that [theory] is not so.

If your origination of origination produces the principal origination,³⁸
How will that [origination of origination] produce that [principal origination when the origination of origination] has not [yet] been produced by your principal [origination]? [MMK 7-5]

If your origination of origination produces the principal origination, how will that origination of origination produce that principal origination [when the origination of origination] has not [yet] been produced by your principal origination? The idea is:

[Thesis:] [The origination of origination] indeed does not produce [the principal origination],

[Reason:] because [the origination of origination] has not [yet] originated,

[Example:] as before.³⁹

Objection: The origination of origination produces the principal origination [when the origination of origination] has just (*eva*) been produced by the principal origination.

Answer:

If that [origination of origination] produces the principal [origination

when the origination of origination] *has* been produced by your principal [origination],

How does that principal [origination] produce that [origination of origination when the principal origination] has not [yet] been produced by that [origination of origination]? [MMK 7-6]

If that origination of origination produces that principal origination [when the origination of origination] has been produced by your principal origination, how does that principal origination produce that origination of origination [when the principal origination] has not [yet] been produced by that origination of origination? The idea is:

[Thesis:] [The principal origination] indeed does not produce [the origination of origination],

[Reason:] because [the principal origination] has not [yet] originated,

[Example:] as before.⁴⁰

Objection: Because the principal origination and the origination of origination perform their own functions when they are [in the process of] originating (*utpādyamāna*), there is no fault [in our position].

Answer:

Granted that (*kāmam*) that [principal origination or origination of origination] of yours, [when] it is originating, would produce that [origination of origination or principal origination],

If that, [when] it has not [yet] originated, could produce that. [MMK 7-7]

Granted that that principal origination or origination of origination of yours, [when] it is originating, would produce that origination of origination or principal origination, if that [principal origination or origination of origination], [when] it itself has not [yet] originated, could produce that origination of origination or principal origination. The idea is:

[Thesis:] That principal origination or origination of origination, [when] it is originating [or when] it itself has not [yet] originated, cannot produce that origination of origination or principal origination,

[First Reason:] because it has not [yet] originated,

[First Example:] as before;⁴¹ or

[Second Reason:] because it is [in the process of] originating,

[Second Example:] like an entity which is about to originate.⁴²

Objection: That which is [in the process of] originating also has the power to produce by means of [its being] a simultaneously arisen cause.⁴³

Therefore the meaning of [each] reason [in your syllogism], "because it has not [yet] originated," or "because it is [in the process of] originating," is inconclusive. [This is so] because of [the fact that the principal origination and the origination of origination are] simultaneously arisen [causes of each other, whether they are considered as] unoriginated or [as in the process of] originating.⁴⁴

Answer: That argument [of yours] is not able to show that [our reasons] are inconclusive. [This is so] [1] because simultaneously arisen [causes] have also been negated in the context of negating the concomitant origination of desire and the one who desires [i. e., in chapter six of the MMK] and [2] because the nonobstructing cause has also been negated.⁴⁵ Hence [you] have not avoided the undesired consequence of an infinite regress.

Objection: In order to avoid [that] undesired consequence, an infinite regress, others⁴⁶ say:

Just as a lamp illuminates itself and others (*svaparātmanau*),

So origination, too, would produce both itself and others. [MMK 7-8]

Therefore an infinite regress will not follow.

Comment: Here the meaning [of the opponent's position] is easy to understand; and that which has been explained [already] should not be explained [again], for fear of prolixity and because [expending] effort on a point which is common knowledge or on a point which has been explained [already] is pointless.

[Nevertheless,] here an inference will be stated [in order to put the opponent's position into syllogistic form:]

Objection:

[Thesis:] Origination performs [its] function on itself and others as [its] spheres of action (*viśaya*),

[Reason:] because it has that intrinsic nature.

[Example:] For example, a lamp, because it has the intrinsic nature of illumination, illuminates itself and others.

Answer: What is to be proved is that in ultimate reality, origination indeed has the intrinsic nature of producing; [but your] reason, "because it has that intrinsic nature," itself states [something which is] unestablished, like what is to be proved. Also, [your reason] is one part of the meaning of [your] thesis. Therefore, that [argument of yours] is not [logically] possible, like [the fallacious argument,] "Sound is impermanent because it is impermanent."

Moreover, here [if one accepts your example,] it has to be said that in

ultimate reality, a lamp illuminates because it removes the darkness which obstructs the apprehension of itself and others. But here that argument [just] stated [i. e., that a lamp illuminates because it removes darkness] is not possible. How? Therefore [Nāgārjuna] explains,

Darkness does not exist in a lamp or [in a place] where that [lamp] is located.

What [then] does the lamp illuminate? [MMK 7-9abc]

The meaning of the sentence is that it does not illuminate anything. Thus here [in MMK 7-9abc] it has been shown that the property to be proved is that a lamp does not illuminate and the proving property is [the fact] that darkness does not exist in a lamp itself or [in] other [things in the vicinity of the lamp].

Therefore here the inference is:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, a lamp does not illuminate [that] lamp itself and others,

[Reason:] because darkness does not exist [there],

[Example:] just as [there is no darkness in] the light of the sun, which possesses clear and harmonious ('*jebs pa*) light rays [and so the sun cannot be illuminated by a lamp].⁴⁷

Alternatively, [one may explain MMK 7-9ab as follows:]

Darkness does not exist in a lamp or [in a place] where that [lamp] is located, [MMK 7-9ab]

because [the lamp] illuminates. This [half-verse] has shown that the [proving] property of a lamp is that it illuminates. Therefore here the inference is:

[Thesis:] One should understand that in ultimate reality, a lamp does not illuminate [that] lamp itself and others [in the vicinity of the lamp],

[Reason:] because it illuminates,

[Example:] like the sun [which illuminates and thus is not illuminated by a lamp].⁴⁸

Likewise, one should also state [syllogisms showing that] a lamp does not illuminate, [using] reasons such as "because it is an element" [i. e., fire], "because it must be assisted" [by other causal conditions?], "because it is made," "because [lamps] are various due to [their having] distinct causal conditions," etc., and [using] examples such as earth [and the other elements].⁴⁹ Therefore, since the example [in the opponent's syllogism pre-

ceding MMK 7-9abc] does not exist, [that syllogism] has the fault of being an incomplete proof.

Objection:

Illumination is the destruction of darkness. [MMK 7-9d]

A lamp which is [in the process of] originating dispels darkness. Because, by means of that [lamp], darkness does not exist in the entity to be illuminated and [because the lamp] illuminates, [the lamp] is illumination. Therefore it is said that illumination is the destruction of darkness. Therefore that [reason] which was stated [in Bhāvaviveka's first syllogism following MMK 7-9abc], "because darkness does not exist [there]," is not established. Hence the meaning of the reason [in that syllogism] is not established. It is also not the case that the example [in our own syllogism] does not exist, because the object to be illuminated by a lamp is [in fact] apprehended.

Answer:

How [could] darkness be dispelled by a lamp which is [in the process of] originating? [MMK 7-10ab]

"How" (*katham*) implies (*snyegs*) impossibility. "How [could] it be dispelled?" The meaning of the sentence is, "It indeed [could] not be dispelled." This [phrase], "by a lamp which is [in the process of] originating," shows that the [proving] property of what is [in the process of] originating is [the fact] that it is originating. That [half-verse] sets forth the [property] to be proved and the proving property.

When a lamp which is [in the process of] originating does not come in contact with darkness. [MMK 7-10cd]

[MMK 7-10cd] sets forth a similar example. It is like saying, "How [could] a sound which is made be permanent? [It is impermanent] just as a jar which is made is impermanent." As to that, here the inference is: [Thesis:] In ultimate reality, a lamp does not dispel [its] opposite [i. e., darkness],

[Reason:] because it is [in the process of] originating,
[Example:] just as darkness [does not obscure] the lamp.⁵⁰

Objection: [Your reason] is inconclusive because of [the case of] knowledge and ignorance.⁵¹

Answer: Because [knowledge and ignorance] are included in what is to be established, they are negated in the same way. Therefore [our reason] is not inconclusive.⁵²

Alternatively, [one can say that] what is [in the process of] originating has not been brought about.⁵³ [Thus one has the following syllogism:]

[Thesis:] A lamp does not illuminate,

[Reason:] because it has not been brought about,

[Example:] just as an unborn son cannot [perform] an activity.

Alternatively, [one can explain MMK 7-10 as follows:]

How [could] darkness be dispelled by a lamp which is [in the process of] originating? [MMK 7-10ab]

Because it is stated in the example [given in MMK 7-10cd] that [a lamp which is in the process of originating] does not come in contact [with darkness], it has been shown that the [proving] property of a lamp is that it does not come in contact [with darkness].

When a lamp which is [in the process of] originating does not come in contact with darkness. [MMK 7-10cd]

[This] is a statement of a similar example. Here the inference is:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, a lamp which is [in the process of] originating does not dispel darkness,

[Reason:] because it does not come in contact [with darkness],

[Example:] just as the lightless darkness of the spaces between the worlds (*lokāntarikā*) [does not come in contact with a lamp and so does not obscure it].⁵⁴

Alternatively, [one can state the following syllogism:]

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, a lamp does not dispel darkness,

[Reason:] because it does not come in contact with [its] opposite [i. e., darkness],

[Example:] just as darkness [does not].

Objection: Just as a ritual of "black magic"⁵⁵ [kills one's enemy even without coming in contact with him or her],⁵⁶ [so also] light dispels darkness even without coming in contact [with it]. Therefore [the reason in the preceding syllogism] is inconclusive.

Answer: In that case, too, [our reason] is not inconclusive. [This is so] [1] because the ritual does not illuminate [and so is not comparable to a lamp] and [2] because, since the ritual is performed against an enemy, the

gods of the spell⁵⁷ harm [that enemy] precisely (*eva*) by means of coming in contact [with him or her].

But [your] eye may be closed by attachment to [your] own position, [and] so [you] may say:

Objection: One sees that a lamp illuminates without contact [with darkness], but one does not see that darkness illuminates without contact.

Answer: That [objection of yours] does no harm [to our position] because it establishes the example [in our last syllogism], [Moreover,] that very [point] should be examined. Is that observed [illumination by a lamp] as it is seen to be, or is it otherwise? [In fact,] the observation that a lamp illuminates without contact [with darkness] is not so. But if [you] maintain that a lamp dispels darkness even without contact [with it], [then] accept this [following undesired consequence] also!

If a lamp dispels darkness even without contact [with it],
That [lamp] located here will dispel [all] the darkness which exists in the
whole world. [MMK 7-11]

[You] do not maintain that. Therefore do not maintain, either, that a lamp dispels darkness without contact [with it].

Moreover, since according to what you maintain, [a lamp] dispels darkness, [therefore:]

If a lamp illuminates itself and others,
Darkness, too, will undoubtedly obscure both itself and others. [MMK
7-12]

[You] do not maintain that; [rather, you] maintain that [darkness] does not obscure itself and others.⁵⁸ Therefore that [verse] is a statement of a similar example. Here the inference is:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, a lamp does not dispel [its] opposite [i. e., darkness] existing in itself and others,

[Reason:] because it has an opposite,⁵⁹

[Example:] like darkness.

Alternatively, [one can state the following syllogism:]

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, a lamp does not dispel darkness,

[Reason:] because it has an opposite,

[Example:] like a shadow.

Therefore, in that way, [we] have rejected [the supposition that] a lamp illuminates itself and others. Hence the example [in the opponent's

syllogism following MMK 7-8] does not exist. Therefore that which the opponent has said - "Like a lamp, origination, too, produces itself and others; hence an infinite regress will not follow" - just remains like that.⁶⁰

Moreover, in what way do [you] maintain that origination produces its own self? Does it produce [itself when] it has [already] originated or [when] it has not [yet] originated? The point is this: If [you] say that [it produces itself when] it has not [yet] originated, [Nāgārjuna asks,]

How could this origination produce its own self [when] it has not [yet] originated? [MMK 7-13ab]

The idea is:

[Thesis:] Origination indeed does not produce its own self [when] it has not [yet] originated,

[Reason:] because it does not [then] exist,

[Example:] as before.⁶¹

But if [you] say that [it produces itself when] it has [already] originated, [Nāgārjuna asks,]

But if it produces [itself when] it has [already] originated, what more is produced if it has originated [already]? [MMK 7-13cd]

The idea is that [this is so] because the activity of originating would just be pointless for what has [already] originated. Therefore, if one examines in that way, it is not possible that origination produces its own self. Hence there is no avoiding the consequence of an infinite regress.⁶²

Even if origination and so on are just unconditioned, [then] because they are unconditioned, that [statement,] "Those are not conditioned," likewise stands.⁶³ Hence there is the fault that the meaning of the reason [in the opponent's initial syllogism at the beginning of the chapter] - "because they possess the defining characteristics of the conditioned, origination, etc." - is not established.

Moreover, the proponents of origination should be asked, "Does origination produce [something] originated or unoriginated or [in the process of] originating or what?"⁶⁴ Having in mind that it is not [logically] possible in any way, [Nāgārjuna] says,

The originated, the unoriginated, and that which is [in the process of] originating are not produced in any way. [MMK 7-14ab]

How [is that so]?

That has been explained by means of the traversed, the untraversed, and that which is being traversed.⁶⁵ [MMK 7-14cd]

Just as inferences were shown extensively in that [context, i. e., chapter two of the MMK], they should be stated here also.

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, what is [in the process of] originating is not produced,

[Reason:] because [its] intrinsic nature is not ascertained,⁶⁶

[Example:] like that which is [in the process of] ceasing.

Alternatively, [one can state the following syllogism:]

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, that which is [in the process of] originating is unproduced,

[Reason:] because it is about to pass over into another time,⁶⁷

[Example:] like that which is [in the process of] ceasing.

Objection: That which is said to be "[in the process of] originating" is partly originated [and] partly unoriginated.

Answer: Even so, whatever [part] of that has [already] originated is not produced, because the origination of that [again] would be pointless. [As for the other part,]

[Thesis:] Whatever [part] of that has not [yet] originated is also not produced,

[Reason:] because it is empty of origination,

[Example:] like the future.

Objection: What is "[in the process of] originating" is about to originate (*utpāda-abhimukha*).

Answer: The question raised in objection is the same: What is that? Is it originated, or is it unoriginated? [Our] answer [to your reply to that question] is also the same: The originated is not produced, because the origination of that [again] would be pointless. The unoriginated is also not produced, because it is empty of origination, like the future.

Objection: What is the meaning of that reason [in the first syllogism following MMK 7-14cd], "because [its] intrinsic nature is not ascertained"? [Does it mean] "because [its] intrinsic nature is not ascertained by perception," or [does it mean] "because [its] intrinsic nature is not ascertained by inference?" As to that, according to the former supposition, [your reason] is inconclusive. [This is so] because [being in the process of] originating exists even for an entity whose intrinsic nature is not ascertained by perception. According to the latter supposition, that [reason] is not

established. [This is so] because [an entity] originates in dependence on origination; and by means of origination, that which is originating is inferred.⁶⁸

Answer: For the proponents of the absence of intrinsic nature [in] the original nature of all entities,⁶⁹ there is no existence of an entity apprehended by perception or inference. Hence, because there is no counterexample, [our reason] is not inconclusive. It is also not the case that the meaning [of our reason] is not established. How [is that so]?

When it is not the case that this which is [in the process of] originating proceeds (*kramate*) because origination exists ...⁷⁰ [MMK 7-15ab]

You have said, "[An entity] originates in dependence on origination; and by means of origination, that which is originating is inferred." That very [statement of yours] will be examined here. [The entity which originates] must be either existent or nonexistent or both existent and nonexistent; but the negation of [all] those [alternatives] has also been shown at length.⁷¹ Hence [Nāgārjuna asks,]

How [can] it be said that what is [in the process of] originating [is produced] in dependence on origination? [MMK 7-15cd]

Then how [can] it be said that what is [in the process of] originating is produced in dependence on origination? Therefore there is no inference [showing that what is in the process of origination exists]. Hence it is not the case that the meaning of [our] reason - "because [its] intrinsic nature is not ascertained" - is unestablished.

Objection: For example, suppose an ignorant [person], skilled in swordplay, kills [his] mother and [thus] practices the behavior of the wicked. Likewise, you also, being skilled in logic (*tarka*), refute the doctrine of dependent origination expounded by the best of sages [i. e., the Buddha], [a doctrine which is] the generatrix (*skyed ma*) of the *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas*; and [you thus] practice the behavior of the unspiritual (*anārya*). Therefore [you] will be in conflict with what [you] previously accepted [i. e., dependent origination].

Answer: [Some] persons to be trained (*vineya*) possess the bad view which nihilistically negates cause and result [and] uproots what is wholesome (*kuśala-pakṣa*). In order to cleanse the stain of [that] bad view, [the Buddha] spoke as follows: "When this exists, that arises; because this has originated, that originates. Namely, karmic formations (*saṃskāra*) [originate] with ig-

norance (*avidyā*) as [their] causal condition,"⁷² etc. [We] accept that that was taught as superficial reality, but it was not taught as ultimate reality. Therefore [we] are not in conflict with what [we ourselves] accept.

Moreover, this has been shown [before]. If [you] ask, "Where was what shown?" [We answer that] that [point] was shown in this [previous negation of the dominant causal condition:]

Because there is no existence (*sattā*) of entities which lack intrinsic nature,

This [statement,] "When this exists, that arises," is not possible. [MMK 1-10]

Here [Nāgārjuna] also says:

That which arises dependently is tranquil [or "extinct," *śānta*] by intrinsic nature (*svabhāvataḥ*). [MMK 7-16ab]

That entity which has originated dependently is, in ultimate reality, tranquil [or "extinct"] by intrinsic nature. The meaning is that it is without origination (*anutpāda*). As the Blessed One has said [in the *Ārya-nāga-rāja-anavatapta-pariprocchā-sūtra*],⁷³

That which originates by means of causal conditions is unoriginated. It has no origination by intrinsic nature.

That which is subject to causal conditions is called "empty."

One who knows emptiness is careful (*apramatta*).

And likewise,⁷⁴

Those [things] which originate dependently do not have any intrinsic nature.

Those [things] which have no intrinsic nature do not arise anywhere.

Likewise, [from the *Ārya-laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*],⁷⁵ "Mahāmati, [I] have said that all dharmas are without intrinsic nature, meaning that they are unoriginated by intrinsic nature."

Therefore, in that way, what [our] opponents have done in setting forth a refutation with hostile intentions, is like throwing a handful of ashes in order to stain the stainless disk of the moon.

Therefore what is [in the process of] originating and origination, too, are tranquil [or "extinct," *śānta*]. [MMK 7-16cd]

Thus when one examines correctly, what arises dependently has no origination and is like a magical illusion. Therefore what is [in the process of] originating and origination, too, are tranquil [or "extinct"].⁷⁶ As to that, what the opponent has said—"What is [in the process of] originating should be inferred [as existing] in ultimate reality in dependence on origination"—is incorrect.

Objection: One sees the origination of a jar and the origination of a cloth in dependence on various causes and conditions. Since there is no means of knowledge superior to seeing, that which [Nāgārjuna] has said,

The originated, the unoriginated, and that which is [in the process of] originating are not produced in any way, [MMK 7-14ab]

is not [logically] possible.

Answer: Who [would] contradict the seeing [of things] which are conducive (*rjes su mthun pa*) to the accumulation [of merit], moral conduct and so on? Those are conventional, but they are not ultimately real. Therefore [Nāgārjuna] composed [this] treatise out of a desire to get rid of attachment to such [things] as those;⁷⁷ hence the fault [which you have alleged] does not exist.

Objection: How is it ascertained that those [statements], "A jar originates" and "A cloth originates," are conventional but are not ultimate reality?

Answer: Listen to that [argument]! Here, if it has originated, it is a jar or a cloth; but if it has not originated, it is not. There is no origination again of what has [already] originated; therefore that [claim of yours,] "A jar and a cloth originate," is not possible.

On the other hand, one might bear in mind [the idea of] a jar, although no [jar] has [yet] originated, and [then], imputing the name ["jar"], say, "A jar originates." That [however,] is a mere conventional designation. [This is so] because there is no origination of the jar which is borne in mind.

Objection: The Vaibhāṣikas suppose that matter and so on and a jar and so on, because of passing [into the present] time [from the future], originate only after having existed [and not after having first been nonexistent].⁷⁸

Answer: That, too, is not [logically] possible.

If any unoriginated entity existed anywhere ... [MMK 7-17ab]

If any unoriginated entity such as a jar, a cloth, etc., existed in [its] causal conditions or in the collection of those [conditions] or elsewhere ...

Why would that originate at that [time]? [MMK 7-17c]

Why would that which [already] exists originate at that time? The idea is that [this is so] because the origination of the existent would just be pointless.

Therefore [Nāgārjuna] says,

If it existed [already], it would not originate.⁷⁹ [MMK 7-17d]

Thus this [verse] has shown that [the thesis] of the proponents of existence⁸⁰ has the fault of being in conflict with their own inference. [This is so] because the thesis of those who say that an unoriginated entity exists prior to [its] origination, excludes origination because [such an entity] possesses nonorigination, since they infer that it exists [already].

The proponents of passing in time⁸¹ also have that same fault [i. e., that their thesis is in conflict with their own inference]. [This is so] because [their thesis] excludes [a future entity's] passing into the present time because [a future entity] has no passing into present time, since [they] infer that it exists [already, even when it is in the future].⁸² This [argument] has also answered [the proponents] of [1] [difference of] nature (*bhāva*), [2] [difference of] characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*), [3] [difference of] state (*avasthā*), and [4] relative difference (*anyonyāthātva*).⁸³

Objection: The Sāṃkhyas say: Because [we hold that] an entity which indeed exists [already] is made manifest, there is no fault [in our position].⁸⁴

Answer: That is not [logically] possible, because manifestation (*vyakti*) has been negated [in our commentary on MMK 1-1]. [Besides,] how could one know that what has not originated exists?

Objection: The Sāṃkhyas and Vaibhāṣikas say:
[Thesis:] One can know that what has not originated indeed exists,
[Reason:] because it is included in time,⁸⁵
[Example:] like a present entity.

Answer: In ultimate reality, it is not established that a present entity, either, exists by intrinsic nature; hence [your] example does not exist. Therefore the point which [you] maintain is not established.

One should understand that this [preceding refutation] has also answered [any] faults [alleged] in the proof that matter and so on do not exist before [their origination] and do not exist after they have ceased. Nor will [we] be

in conflict with conventional truth.⁸⁶ [This is so] [1] because [we] accept that entities such as present matter and so on do exist like magical illusions, etc., and [2] because [we] accept that conventionally, matter and so on do exist as conceptually constructed entities.⁸⁷

Enough of this incidental discussion! The original subject will be summarized here. As to that, to begin with, [we] have explained that [half-verse],

The originated, the unoriginated, and that which is [in the process of] originating are not produced in any way. [MMK 7-14ab]

Also, [Nāgārjuna] says,

If that origination produces what is [in the process of] originating ... [MMK 7-18ab]

If, as you maintain, that origination produces that which is [in the process of] originating, well then,

That origination is what produces.⁸⁸ [MMK 7-18c]

[But, in fact,]

[Thesis:] What produces [something] is not [that thing's] origination,

[Reason:] because it is the producer [of that thing],

[Example:] just as a father is not the birth of [his] son.

Thus [Nāgārjuna asks,]

But what is origination? [MMK 7-18d]

The meaning is that origination lacks the intrinsic nature of origination. So, too, the thesis of a disputant who says, "Origination produces," has the fault that it excludes the intrinsic nature of the subject [of the thesis, i. e., origination].⁸⁹

It also cannot be said that another [origination] produces that [origination]. If one says so, the following [undesired consequence] will occur:

If another origination produces that [origination], there will be an infinite regress. [MMK 7-19ab]

Alternatively, in order to get rid of the undesired consequence of an

infinite regress, one might maintain that origination has no [other origination] which produces [it]. If [you] say, "So it will be," to that [Nāgārjuna] replies,

But if [origination] has originated without [another] origination [which produces it],⁹⁰ everything would originate in that way. [MMK 7-19cd]

That is not maintained; therefore do not conceptually construct origination.

Moreover, the origination of [things] which possess origination must be either the origination [of things] which exist or [of things] which do not exist or [of things] which are both existent and nonexistent. As to that,

To begin with, the origination of existent [things] and also [the origination] of nonexistent [things] are not [logically] possible.

Nor [is the origination of things] which are both existent and nonexistent [logically possible]. [This] was indeed shown previously. [MMK 7-20]

It has indeed been shown in the chapter on nonorigination [i. e., the first chapter of the MMK] that

Neither for a nonexistent nor for an existent thing, is a causal condition [logically] possible. [MMK 1-6ab]

and

When neither an existent nor a nonexistent nor an existent-nonexistent dharma is brought about ... [MMK 1-7ab]

Therefore it is not necessary that [we] again make an effort [to demonstrate that].

Moreover,

The origination of an entity which is [in the process of] ceasing is not possible, [MMK 7-21ab]

[Reason:] because it is [in the process of] ceasing,

[Example:] just as one who is dying [is not then being born].

Objection: What is *not* [in the process of] ceasing originates. Hence

there is no fault [in our position].

Answer:

It is not possible that what is not [in the process of] ceasing is an entity.
[MMK 7-21cd]

The idea is that [this is so]

[Reason:] because it does not possess the defining characteristic of an entity,
[Example:] as a sky-flower [does not].

Objection: [Your reason] is inconclusive, due to the fact that what endures [is an entity but is not in the process of ceasing].

Answer: Because even that [which endures] is connected with impermanence, it is not established that it is not [in the process of] ceasing. Hence there is no fault [in our reason]. The extensive [explanation] is as before.⁹¹

Objection:

[Thesis:] Origination does indeed exist,

[Reason:] because a dharma exists which occurs [only] if that [origination] exists.

[Dissimilar Example:] Here, as for that which does not exist, there is no dharma which occurs when that [nonexistent thing] exists. For example, in the case of tortoise hair, which does not exist, a coat [made] of that [tortoise hair] does not occur.

[Application:] In the case of origination, which does exist, there exists a dharma which occurs [when origination exists, namely,] the defining characteristic of duration.

[Conclusion:] Therefore, by the evidence (*upapatti*) of the stated reason, origination does indeed exist.

Answer: Since origination simply (*eva*) does not exist, that [duration] is not established. Nevertheless, having accepted the origination which is common knowledge conventionally, [we] will examine duration as to [its] ultimate reality. Here, in ultimate reality, that entity [which allegedly endures] must endure either [when] it has [already] endured (*sthita*), or [when] it has not [yet] endured (*asthita*), or [when] it is [in the process of] enduring (*tisthamāna*). In that connection,

An entity which has [already] endured does not [now] endure, [MMK 7-22a]

[Reason:] because it is not possible for both present and past time to come together in one [thing],

[Example:] just as [one cannot be] dead and born [simultaneously].⁹²

Alternatively, [an entity which has already endured] does not [now] endure because duration would be pointless [for it].

An entity which has not [yet] endured does not [now] endure, [MMK 7-22b]

[Reason:] because it has not [yet] endured [and thus lacks the activity of enduring],⁹³

[Example:] like cessation.

[An entity] which is [in the process of] enduring does not [now] endure. [MMK 7-22c]

[This is so] because that [sort of entity] is not possible apart from [an entity] which has [already] endured and one which has not [yet] endured, as [has been shown] at length [in similar cases] before.

When the origination of all entities has been excluded by means of showing that in ultimate reality, no entity exists, then

What unoriginated [entity] endures? [MMK 7-22d]

The idea is that no entity endures, whether origination is accepted or not accepted. Therefore the meaning of the reason [in the opponent's syllogism preceding MMK 7-22a] - "because a dharma exists which occurs [only] if that [origination] exists" - is not established; or else it has a contradictory meaning.⁹⁴

Moreover,

Duration is not possible for an entity which is [in the process of] ceasing. [MMK 7-23ab]

The idea is that [this is so:]

[Reason:] because [duration and cessation] are incompatible.

[Example:] That which is incompatible with something does not occur if that [second thing] exists, as with clear appearance and darkness.

Objection: Since what is *not* [in the process of] ceasing endures, there is no fault [in our position].

Answer:

It is not possible that what is not [in the process of] ceasing is an entity.⁹⁵ [MMK 7-23cd]

The idea is that [this is so] because all conditioned [dharma]s are connected with impermanence. Alternatively, the idea is that [Thesis:] that [which is not in the process of ceasing] is not an entity, [Reason:] because it is not [in the process of] ceasing, [Example:] like a sky-flower.

Objection: Subsequent to origination, the activity of duration is predominant. Therefore [a thing] is not [then in the process of] ceasing; but it *is* an entity. It is also not permanent, since ageing and impermanence occur after duration.

Answer: That, too, is not [logically] possible. If impermanence did not exist at the moment [when] these entities, matter and so on, endure, they would also not possess that [impermanence] later. [This is so] because they [would] arise without that [impermanence]. For example, since fire is characterized by (*tshul can*) arising even without water, [fire] will never become the entity, water.⁹⁶

Objection: Because [the cessation of entities] is seen, it cannot be negated.

Answer: Therefore that very [seeing] should be examined. Is that seeing of cessation seen in the case of [an entity] which is connected with that [cessation], or in the case of one which lacks that [cessation]? As to that, on the first supposition, duration is not established. On the second supposition, it is not established that the entity [in question] is not [in the process of] ceasing. Therefore, in both of those [cases], the meaning which [the opponent] maintains is lost.

Objection: Some who hope to be learned⁹⁷ say: For example, even one previously without Buddhahood will attain Buddhahood later. Likewise, even [an entity] previously without cessation will attain cessation later.

Answer: Even conventionally, that argument does no harm [to our position], because it is not accepted that that moment of cognition which lacks Buddhahood will attain Buddhahood later. For the word "Buddhahood" should be used in regard to a moment of cognition which has abandoned the obscurations of the afflictions and [the obscuration of] the object of cognition (*kleśa-jñeya-āvaraṇa*), but that [earlier moment?] has no necessary connection with Buddhahood. Hence that [argument of yours] is worthless. Likewise, [a similar proof] should also be applied in the case of ageing.⁹⁸

Because, in that way, the existence of an entity without ageing and death

cannot be proved,⁹⁹ therefore the *ācārya* [Nāgārjuna] says,

Since all entities at all times have the properties of ageing and death,
What entities are there which endure without ageing and death? [MMK
7-24]

It is seen that if origination exists, duration occurs; but origination is not established.¹⁰⁰ Therefore [the fault that] the meaning [of the opponent's reason] is not established, is unimpaired; or else [the fault that] it has a contradictory meaning is unimpaired.¹⁰¹

Moreover, here you maintain that duration also has duration. In that case, too, [you] must maintain that that duration endures either by means of another duration or else by means of that [duration] itself. Neither of those [two alternatives] is [logically] possible. Therefore [Nāgārjuna] says,

The duration of duration is not [logically] possible, [either] by means of another duration or by means of that [duration] itself. [MMK 7-25ab]

How [is that so]?

Just as the origination of origination [is not logically possible] by means of [that origination] itself or by means of another [origination].
[MMK 7-25cd]

How is it not [logically] possible that origination is produced by itself?
Because the following [argument] has been stated:

How could this origination produce its own self [when] it has not [yet] originated?

But if it produces [itself when] it has [already] originated, what more is produced, if it has originated [already]? [MMK 7-13]

How is it not [logically] possible that origination is produced by another [origination]? Because the following [argument] has been stated:

If another origination produces that [origination], there will be an infinite regress.

But if [origination] has originated without [another] origination [which produces it], everything would originate in that way. [MMK 7-19]

Likewise here also,

How could this duration cause its own self to endure [when] it has not [yet] endured?

But if it causes [itself] to endure [when] it has [already] endured, what more is made to endure, if it has endured [already]?

[That] explanatory verse (*vyākhyāna-kārikā*) follows the refutation of the production of origination by its own self. By means of [that verse], one should also state a refutation of [the corresponding position that] duration is caused to endure by its own self.

If another duration causes that [duration] to endure, there will be an infinite regress.

But if [duration] has endured without [another] duration [which causes it to endure], everything would endure in that way.

[That] explanatory verse follows the refutation of the production of origination by another [origination]. Here, too, by means of [that verse], one should also state a refutation of [the corresponding position that] duration is caused to endure by another [duration].

Therefore, in that way, duration does not exist. Hence it is difficult [for the opponent] to answer [our charge] that the meaning of the reason [in his syllogism preceding MMK 7-22a] - "Origination does indeed exist, because a dharma exists which occurs [only] if that [origination] exists" - is not established.

Objection:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the origination and duration of entities do indeed exist,

[Reason:] because a dharma exists which invariably accompanies (*sahacārin*) those.

[Dissimilar Example:] Here that which does not exist has no dharma which invariably accompanies it. For example, a horse's horn has no cessation.

[Application:] Origination and duration do have a dharma which invariably accompanies [them, namely,] cessation.

[Conclusion:] Therefore, by virtue of the stated reason, in ultimate reality, origination and duration do indeed exist.

Answer: The cessation of an entity, too, must be the cessation either of [an entity] which has [already] ceased (*niruddha*), or of one which has not

[yet] ceased (*aniruddha*), or of one which is [in the process of] ceasing (*nirudhyamāna*); [but] that [cessation] is not possible in any way. Therefore [Nāgārjuna] says,

What has [already] ceased does not [now] cease. [MMK 7-26a]

[This is so] because one who is dead cannot die again.

What has not [yet] ceased does not [now] cease. [MMK 7-26b]

[Thesis:] [What has not yet ceased, being] empty of cessation, does not cease,

[Reason:] because it is without cessation,

[Example:] like duration.

And that which is [in the process of] ceasing likewise ... [MMK 7-26c]

does not cease. [This is so] [1] because apart from what has [already] ceased and what has not [yet] ceased, what is [in the process of] ceasing is not possible and [2] because there would be both faults.¹⁰²

Alternatively, [one can explain MMK 7-26c as follows:]

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, what is [in the process of] ceasing does not cease,

[Reason:] because it is about to pass in time (*kāla-samkrānty-abhimukha*),

[First Example:] like what is about to originate (*utpīṣu*) or

[Second Example:] like the present.

Alternatively,¹⁰³ because the origination of all entities has been negated,

What unoriginated [entity] ceases? [MMK 7-26d]

[Thesis:] Cessation is not possible for the unoriginated,

[Reason:] because it is unoriginated,

[Example:] like a childless woman's son.

Therefore, in that way, whether origination is accepted or not accepted, cessation is not established in any way.

Moreover, here cessation must be supposed either for [an entity] which has [already] endured or for one which has not [yet] endured; but that [cessation] is not possible in either of those [cases]. As to that,

To begin with, cessation is not possible for an entity which has [already]

endured. [MMK 7-27ab]

Cessation, which is incompatible with duration, is not possible for [an entity for which] the activity of enduring has originated. [This is so] because [that entity] endures.¹⁰⁴ That is common knowledge.

Objection: There is cessation for [an entity] which has not [yet] endured. Hence there is no fault [in our position].

Answer:

Cessation is also not possible for an entity which has not [yet] endured.
[MMK 7-27cd]

The idea is that [this is so]

[Reason:] because it has not [yet] endured [and thus lacks the activity of enduring],

[Example:] just as what has ceased [lacks the activity of enduring].

Moreover, here does this stage (*avasthā*)¹⁰⁵ cease [while it] endures by means of that same stage; or does it cease [at one stage and] endure by means of a different stage?¹⁰⁶ The point is this:

What endures by means of that stage does not indeed cease by means of that [same stage].¹⁰⁷ [MMK 7-28ab]

[Thesis:] [An entity] does not indeed cease by means of that stage by which it was formerly characterized (*upalakṣita*),

[Reason:] because it does not abandon [its] former intrinsic nature.

[Example:] For instance, milk does not indeed cease by means of that very stage of milk.¹⁰⁸

Nor does what endures by means of one stage indeed cease by means of a different [stage].¹⁰⁹ [MMK 7-28cd]

The word "indeed" has the sense of specification. Here one should understand [MMK 7-28d as meaning,] "It does not indeed cease by means of a different stage." Otherwise, [the meaning] would be, "It ceases by means of a nondifferent [stage]."¹¹⁰

That [half-verse, MMK 7-28cd] sets forth the thesis. Because of the difference [of the stages of duration and cessation],¹¹¹ the [proving] property, [that is,] the reason, is difference. Here the inference is:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, milk does not cease by means of the stage of

curds,

[Reason:] because [curds] are different from that [milk],

[Example:] like a pot and so on, which are different from that [milk].

Objection: [Our] opponents say:

[Thesis:] Cessation does indeed exist,

[Reason:] because it depends on an entity,

[Example:] just as [the activity of] cooking [depends on the food which is cooked].¹¹²

Answer: To that, [Nāgārjuna] replies,

When the origination of all dharmas is not possible,

Then the cessation of all dharmas is not possible. [MMK 7-29]

When, by the method which has been shown, the origination of all dharmas is not possible, then [their] cessation is also not possible. The idea is that [this is so] because the example [in the opponent's syllogism] does not exist, since [the food] which is to be cooked and [the activity of] cooking are not established.

Moreover, here cessation must be supposed to be either of an existent entity or of a nonexistent one. As to that, [Nāgārjuna says,]

To begin with, the cessation of an existent entity is not possible. [MMK 7-30ab]

The idea is that [this is so]

[Reason:] because [an existent entity and cessation] are incompatible,

[Example:] like fire and coldness.

Therefore [Nāgārjuna] says,

If there is identity, both an entity and a nonentity are not possible.¹¹³
[MMK 7-30cd]

Objection: [After] an entity has existed [previously], when that same [entity] is absent (*bral ba*), it is called a "nonentity."

Answer: Well, by that same [argument], in ultimate reality, external and internal entities have no intrinsic nature. As [in the case of] magical illusions and so on, [their] lack of intrinsic nature is clearly shown by [their] becoming nonentities [after] having been entities.

But if [the cessation] of a nonentity is supposed, [the opponent's argument and the Mādhyamika's answer are as follows:]

Objection: Some¹¹⁴ say:

[Thesis:] The cognition of visible form has as [its] object the absence of [anything] different from [visible form] itself,

[Reason:] because if that [absence] is seen, the cognition of that [visible form] originates.

[Similar Example:] Here that cognition which originates if some [thing] is seen, has that [thing] as [its] object. For example, if a dewlap and so on - [from which] the nature [of anything] different [from an ox, such as] a horse, etc., is absent - are seen, the cognition of an ox originates.

[Application:] Likewise, if visible form—[from which] the nature [of anything] different [from visible form, such as] taste, etc., is absent—is seen, the cognition of visible form originates.

[Conclusion:] Therefore, the cognition of visible form has as [its] object the absence of [anything] different from [visible form] itself.

Answer: That is not [logically] possible. [This is so] [1] because that reason [in the opponent's syllogism] is not proved by that [reason] itself¹¹⁵ and [2] because there is the fault that the example lacks the property to be proved.¹¹⁶

Also, [Nāgārjuna] says,

The cessation of a nonexistent entity is also not possible, [MMK 7-31ab]

because [a nonexistent entity] does not exist,

Just as there is no cutting off of a [nonexistent] second head. [MMK 7-31cd]

This [verse, MMK 7-31] has shown [the following:] Since [the opponent] infers that [what ceases] is nonexistent, [it must also] lack cessation. Therefore, the thesis of those who say that there is cessation of a nonexistent entity, has the fault that it excludes the intrinsic nature of the possessor of the property [to be proved].¹¹⁷

Moreover, if that which you call "cessation of cessation" existed in ultimate reality, [cessation] would have to cease either by means of itself or by means of another. In that connection, [Nāgārjuna says,]

The cessation of cessation is not [logically] possible, [either] by means of another cessation or by means of that very [cessation].¹¹⁸ [MMK

7-32ab]

How [is that so]?

Just as the origination of origination [is not logically possible] by means of [that origination] itself or by means of another [origination].
[MMK 7-32cd]

How is it not [logically] possible that origination is produced by itself?
Because the following [argument] has been stated:

How could this origination produce its own self [when] it has not [yet] originated?

But if it produces [itself when] it has [already] originated, what more is produced, if it has originated [already]? [MMK 7-13]

How is it not [logically] possible that origination is produced by another [origination]? Because the following [argument] has been stated:

If another origination produces that [origination], there will be an infinite regress.

But if [origination] has originated without [another] origination [which produces it], everything would originate in that way. [MMK 7-19]

Likewise here also,

How could this cessation cause its own self to cease [when] it has not [yet] ceased?

But if it causes [itself] to cease [when] it has [already] ceased, what more is made to cease, if it has ceased [already]?

[That] explanatory verse follows the refutation of the production of origination by its own self. By means of [that verse], one should also state a refutation of [the corresponding position that] cessation is caused to cease by its own self.

If another cessation causes that [cessation] to cease, there will be an infinite regress.

But if [cessation] has ceased without [another] cessation [which causes it to cease], everything would cease in that way.

[That] explanatory verse follows the refutation of the production of origination by another [origination]. Here, too, by means of [that verse], one should also state a refutation of [the corresponding position that] cessation is caused to cease by another [cessation].

*Objection:*¹¹⁹ [Things] which are perishable cease by means of [some] cause of cessation.¹²⁰

Answer: To those [who hold that position], the following should be said: [Thesis:] That which is ascertained to be the cause of the cessation of some

[thing] is not [in fact] the cause of the cessation of that [thing],

[Reason:] because it is different from that [cessation],

[Example:] like [things] other than that [alleged cause of cessation].¹²¹

Therefore in that way, by the arguments which have been shown at length, [we] have rejected origination, duration and cessation. Hence in ultimate reality, the reason stated by the opponent at the beginning of [this] chapter has a meaning which is unestablished; and [the opponent's] example is nonexistent. If [the opponent] states [the same] reason and example as superficial reality, they have a contradictory meaning.¹²²

In order to summarize [this examination of origination, duration, and cessation] according to the result of the method which has been shown, [Nāgārjuna says,]

Because origination, duration, and cessation (*bhaṅga*) are not established, the conditioned does not exist. [MMK 7-33ab]

As to that, the opponent has said [in his initial syllogism at the beginning of this chapter], "One should grasp that conditioned [dharmas], the aggregates, elements, and *āyatana*s, do indeed have the intrinsic nature of conditioned [dharmas], because they possess origination, etc., the defining characteristics of the conditioned." That [statement] is not established.

*Objection:*¹²³ In ultimate reality, conditioned [things], such as an ox and so on, do indeed exist, because their defining characteristics, such as a dewlap and so on, exist.

Answer: Also to those who state [such an argument], one should likewise¹²⁴ raise a question in objection: Do those defining characteristics, such as a dewlap and so on, [themselves] have defining characteristics? Or are they without defining characteristics? As to that, if they have defining characteristics, in that case,

[Thesis:] Those [alleged defining characteristics of an ox,] a dewlap and so on, do not characterize either the "oxness" or the conditionedness of an ox,

[Reason:] because [a dewlap and so on] possess defining characteristics,
 [Example:] like [the thing characterized,] the substance of an ox.

But if they are without defining characteristics, [then] because they are without defining characteristics, they themselves are not established. Hence they are not able to characterize the thing characterized. Thus one applies [such arguments] at length as before. One should also say that if those [defining characteristics] have other defining characteristics, an infinite regress will follow; but if they have no other defining characteristics, it will indeed follow that the thing characterized also [has no defining characteristics];¹²⁵ and so on.

*Objection:*¹²⁶

[Thesis:] One should understand that in ultimate reality, the conditioned does indeed exist,

[Reason:] because it has an opposite (*pratipakṣa*).

[Dissimilar Example:] Here what is known not to exist does not have an opposite, just as a childless woman's son [has no opposite].¹²⁷

[Application:] The conditioned does have an opposite, [namely,] the unconditioned.

[Conclusion:] Therefore by virtue of the stated reason, one should understand that in ultimate reality, the conditioned does indeed exist.

Hence the inferences which [you] have previously stated are in conflict with [our] counterbalancing¹²⁸ [inference]; and the aggregates and so on also established.

Answer: Here, if the conditioned had been established, [then] by removing that, it would also be possible to say that some substance called "the unconditioned" exists. But if that conditioned is examined, [one finds that] it does not exist. Therefore, [Nāgārjuna says,]

Since the conditioned has not been established, how will one establish the unconditioned? [MMK 7-33cd]

The idea is that even conventionally, [the unconditioned] is unoriginated like a hare's horn. Hence [the unconditioned] is not commonly known as a substance. Therefore those [members of the opponent's syllogism,] the reason and so on, are not possible.

*Objection:*¹²⁹ If [you] show that in ultimate reality, origination and so on are not defining characteristics, [then] in that way, [you] have established that their being defining characteristics of the conditioned is excluded. Hence [your syllogisms] will have the fault that [their] subject (*pakṣa*), reason, what is exemplified¹³⁰ [by the example], and so on are not

established.

Answer: In ultimate reality, they do not exist. But there is no fault, because [we] accept that they exist conventionally,

Like a dream, like a magical illusion, like a city of the *gandharvas*.
[MMK 7-34ab]

Dreams have as [their] causes [1] the memory of experiencing what was conceptually constructed [in the waking state],¹³¹ [2] virtue (*dharma*), [3] nonvirtue (*adharma*),¹³² and [4] the controlling power (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of a god. [Dreams] have as [their] result the perception (*nye bar dmigs pa*) that one is encountering desired and undesired objects. If one examines [them], [dreams] have no intrinsic nature; but conventionally, they become objects [of cognition] (*viṣaya*) by being causes of the cognition of existence and so on.¹³³

Magical illusions become perceptible to the senses¹³⁴ [and] arise as the intrinsic nature of elephants, bulls, women, places, and so on, because of the particular powers of magicians and spells and herbs. Although they have no intrinsic nature, they are said to exist because they are causes of mistaken (*bhrānta*) cognition. Cities of the *gandharvas* are causes for the arising of the cognition of cities which have wide moats; gates; turrets; white, joyous, shining towers;¹³⁵ pavilions [ornamented] with moons;¹³⁶ windows; and penthouses (*kuṭāgāra*).

So origination, so duration, so cessation (*bhaṅga*) are spoken of.
[MMK 7-34cd]

To sages (*ṛṣi*) [for whom] the eye which sees reality has fully opened, [the Buddha] has spoken of [origination, duration, and cessation] in order to cause (*rgyu nyid du*) the arising of the cognition of the origination and so on of the conditioned.¹³⁷ [The teaching of origination and so on] causes the ignorant, whose intellectual eye is closed, to produce the conceit that [as a matter of] real fact (*bhūtārtha*), entities originate, endure, [and] cease - just as [in] a dream and so on [one imagines that the objects one sees are real].¹³⁸ Therefore, in that way, [we] accept that origination and so on exist according to the conventional usage of the wise and the unwise. Hence [our syllogisms] do not have the fault that [their] subject (*pakṣa*), reason, what is exemplified [by the example], and so on are not established.

*Objection:*¹³⁹ [Nāgārjuna's] three examples, a dream and so on, are shown in order to point out the three conceptual constructions, which are

different from that cause of the functioning of the afflictions [which the proponents of the existence of the object suppose, namely, an external object.]¹⁴⁰

*Answer:*¹⁴¹ The three examples, a dream and so on, are stated in [that] order for the purpose of showing that these [three reasons] stated by an opponent [in the following syllogism] are inconclusive:

[Opponent's Thesis:] Origination and so on do indeed exist,

[Opponent's First Reason:] because they are objects (*grāhya*) of perceptual cognition (*pratyakṣa-buddhi*),

[Opponent's Second Reason:] because [they] have a maker (*kartr*),¹⁴² and

[Opponent's Third Reason:] because a nondifferent series grasps [them],¹⁴³

[Opponent's Example:] as in the case of matter.¹⁴⁴

In the Śrāvakayāna, although the intrinsic nature of a self and what belongs to a self (*ātma-ātmīya*) does not exist, it appears so. Therefore the Blessed One has also stated [the following] as an antidote to the obscuration [consisting of] the afflictions (*kleśa-āvaraṇa*):¹⁴⁵

Matter is like a mass of foam; feeling is like a bubble;

Perception/conception is like a mirage; mental formations are like a [pithless] plantain tree;

Cognition is like a magical illusion: so the seer of reality has said.¹⁴⁶

In the Mahāyāna, too, although the intrinsic nature of the conditioned does not exist, it appears so; and it is so taught.¹⁴⁷ Therefore [the Blessed One] has stated [the following] as an antidote to the obscuration [consisting of] the afflictions and [the obscuration which obscures] objects of knowledge (*kleśa-jñeya-āvaraṇa*):

Like stars, faulty vision, lamps, magical illusions, dew, bubbles,

Dreams, lightning, and clouds, so should one see the conditioned.¹⁴⁸

Therefore here there is no occasion for fear. The intelligent, having examined [this scripture and reasoning], should be receptive [to it].¹⁴⁹

[*Buddhapālita's commentary:*] [Buddhapālita]¹⁵⁰ says: As examples of the absence of self in conditioned factors, the Blessed One pointed out magical illusions, echoes, reflections, mirages, dreams, masses of foam, bubbles in water, and trunks of plantain trees. He also said, "Here there is not any thusness or nonfalsity (*avitathātā*). Rather, these are conceptual proliferation; and these are also false."¹⁵¹ In the statement, "All dharmas are without self," "without self" has the meaning of "without intrinsic nature," be-

cause the word "self" is a term for intrinsic nature.

[*Bhāvaivēka's critique:*] As to that, here [in the Śrāvākayāna], the appearance of a self is falsity; and also the word "self" is a term for self. Therefore there is no self in those [aggregates] which is different [from them]; nor are [the aggregates] themselves a self, just as *anīśvara* [means both "having no lord different [from oneself]" and "not being a lord"].¹⁵² That [scriptural] source [which Buddhapālita has quoted] cannot teach the absence of self in dharmas (*dharma-nairātmya*). [This is so] because in the Śrāvākayāna, the meaning of the phrase ["absence of self"] must be explained etymologically as "absence of self in persons (*pudgala-nairātmya*)." If [Śrāvākayāna scriptures] could [teach the absence of self in dharmas], it would be pointless to embrace another vehicle (*yāna*) [i. e., the Mahāyāna].¹⁵³

As to that, here the meaning of the chapter [is as follows:] By explaining the faults in the proof stated by the opponent at the beginning of the chapter, it has been shown that conditioned [dharmas] have no intrinsic nature.

Therefore [scriptural] statements such as the following are established:¹⁵⁴
[From the *Bhagavatī-prajñā-pāramitā-sūtra*,]¹⁵⁵

Subhūti, however much is conditioned, that much is false.

Likewise, [from that same *Prajñā-pāramitā*,]¹⁵⁶

One who does not practice the conditioned and does not practice the unconditioned, practices the perfection of discernment.

Likewise, [from other Mahāyāna sūtras,]¹⁵⁷

All dharmas remain in thusness. In that which is thusness, there is neither conditioned nor unconditioned. Where there is neither conditioned nor unconditioned, there is no functioning of duality (*gnyis su 'jug pa*). Where there is no functioning of duality, that is thusness.

Likewise, [from the *Ārya-brahma-viśeṣa-cintā-paripṛcchā-sūtra*,]¹⁵⁸

[Mañjuśrī said,] "Brahma, what difference¹⁵⁹ is there between conditioned and unconditioned dharmas?"

[Brahma] said, "Mañjuśrī, the difference between conditioned and unconditioned dharmas is mere conventional designation. A bodhisattva who holds this *dhāraṇī* does not vainly imagine, does not apprehend conditioned and unconditioned dharmas."

Likewise, [from the *Bhagavatī-prajñā-pāramitā-suvikrāntavikrāmi-paripṛcchā-sūtra*,]¹⁶⁰

Suvikrāntavikrāmin, matter, feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition are neither conditioned nor unconditioned. [The fact] that matter, feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and

cognition are neither conditioned nor unconditioned, is the perfection of discernment. Matter, feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition do not have the property of originating (*utpāda-dharmin*) or the property of ceasing (*vyaya-dharmin*). [The fact] that matter, feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition do not have the property of originating or the property of ceasing, is the perfection of discernment. Apart from conceptual construction, the conditioned and the unconditioned do not exist. Confused, spiritually immature [people] grasp "the conditioned and the unconditioned," [which are unreal] like a son seen in a childless woman's dream.

The seventh chapter, "Examination of Origination, Duration, and Cessation," of the *Prajñāpradīpa*, a commentary on [Nāgārjuna's] *Mūlamadhyamaka* composed by *ācārya* Bhavyakara/Bhavyakāra (*legs ldan byed*)¹⁶¹ [is concluded].

Notes to Translation of Chapter Seven

¹In the *Prasannapadā*, chapter seven is called "Examination of the Conditioned" (*samskṛta-parīkṣā*, see PSP 179.9). The *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya* on AK 2-45cd,46 contains a lengthy discussion of Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika views on the three (or four) defining characteristics of the conditioned. See LVP AK II, pp. 222-38. For further references, see May (1959), p. 106 nn. 255, 256. See also Cox (1995), pp. 146-151.

²The "particular counterposition" is the opponent's objection which immediately follows. See Ava P124b-2 to 125a-4, D112b-3 to 113a-3.

³Avalokitavrata ascribes this objection to "fellow Buddhists ... Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas." See Ava P125a-4,5 and 125b-3; D113a-3,4 and 113b-1.

⁴*blo gros kyi 'du byed skyed pa dag*, perhaps *utpādita-mati-samskārah*.

⁵*'di la*, "here," glossed by Avalokitavrata as "in the third [*piṭaka*], the *Abhidharma-piṭaka*," *chos mngon pa'i sde snod gsum po 'di la*. See Ava P125b-5, D113b-2,3.

⁶The point here is probably to explain the feminine *dvigu* compound *trilakṣaṇī*, "the three characteristics." The example given, *chad pa gsum dang ldan pa*, "possessing the three staves," may translate *tridaṇḍī yuktā*.

⁷See Ava P127a-7 to 127b-2, D114b-7 to 115a-2.

⁸It is not established in ultimate reality; and it is contradictory to try to prove a positive thesis about ultimate reality with a reason which is valid only conventionally. See Ava P128a-5, D115b-3,4.

⁹That is, if origination is unconditioned, it cannot be a defining characteristic of the conditioned; but this contradicts the reason in the opponent's syllogism at the beginning of the chapter.

¹⁰*skye ba ni mtshan nyid kyi sgra'i tshul nye bar bzung ba'i phyir*, where *mtshan nyid*, *lakṣaṇa* or *lakṣaṇā*, is probably used in the sense of "indirect

expression."

¹¹In other words, although the argument in MMK 7-1 is stated in terms of origination, it applies to the other two alleged defining characteristics of the conditioned as well. See Ava P129a-1,2,3; D116a-5,6,7.

¹²See Ava P129b-6,7; D116b-7 to 117a-1.

¹³See Ava P129b-8 to 130a-1, D117a-1,2.

¹⁴See Ava P130a-1,2,3; D117a-2,3,4.

¹⁵Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P130a-3,4; D117a-4. The same three verses are quoted by Buddhapālita in his commentary on MMK 7-2. See Saito (1984), 87.8-19.

¹⁶This alternative is rejected as absurd. See Ava P130a-7 to 130b-1, D117a-7 to 117b-1.

¹⁷Duration and impermanence are incompatible. If a single entity seems to possess both simultaneously, one or the other must be an illusory appearance.

¹⁸*sems bde bar gnas pa dag*, contrasted by Avalokitavrata with those who are insane or possessed by a demon. See Ava P130b-6, D117b-5.

¹⁹Compare LVP AK II, pp. 226ff.

²⁰Avalokitavrata points out that because the Sautrāntikas are proponents of momentariness (*kṣaṇikavādin*), they themselves do not hold that the series of moments is a real substance. (Only the individual moments are ultimately real.) See Ava P131a-3,4,5; D118a-2,3.

²¹According to Avalokitavrata, origination is conceptually constructed in relation to the stage of origination (*skye ba'i gnas skabs*), duration in relation to the originated (*skyes pa*), and cessation in relation to duration (or "what has endured") (*gnas pa*). See Ava P131a-7,8; D118a-4,5.

²²That is, the fault that the three defining characteristics of the conditioned cannot all exist in the same locus at the same time. See Ava P131b-1,2,3; D118a-6,7.

²³If origination and so on occur successively, they are not always present in the conditioned thing which they characterize. See Ava P131b-8 to 132a-2, D118b-4,5.

²⁴From the context and Avalokitavrata's explanation, *smyad pa*, *glebs pa*, and *bcum pa* are apparently stages in the shaping of clay to make a jar. See Ava P132a-5,6,7; D118b-7 to 119a-2.

²⁵One can metaphorically designate origination, etc., as defining characteristics of the conditioned because they do not occur in the unconditioned. Nevertheless, the fact remains that all three do not occur in the series of one entity at the same time. Hence, since they are not invariably present in the conditioned, they are not, in fact, defining characteristics of the conditioned. See Ava P132b-5,6,7; D119a-6 to 119b-1.

²⁶That is, let it be the case that origination and so on do not themselves possess origination and so on. See Ava P133b-1,2; D120a-2.

²⁷Compare 7-1cd.

²⁸See Ava P133b-4,5,6; D120a-4,5.

²⁹*thug pa dang | gnas pa dang | mu thug ste |* (Ava P133b-3, D120a-4: *de*) *med*

par yang mi 'gyur ro. Apparently, *gnas pa med pa* (*aniketa*) and *mu thug med pa* (*amaryāda*) are used here as synonyms of *thug pa med pa*, *anavasthā*.

³⁰See the first syllogism following MMK 7-1ab.

³¹That is, if you say that origination and so on also characterize themselves as conditioned, then they are defining characteristics and also are the things characterized; and the same argument applies.

³²Compare Buddhapālita's account in Saito (1984), 90.17- 91.23 and Saito (1984), translation, pp. 90-1. Candrakīrti ascribes this position to the Sāmmittīyas; see PSP 148.1-149.2 and May (1959), pp. 111-2 and p. 111 nn. 278, 279.

According to Avalokitavrata, the origin of the name "Vātsīputrīya" is as follows: A wandering ascetic (*parivrājaka*) named *Vatsa (*gnas pa*) became a Buddhist monk. He taught his disciples a doctrine of *pudgala-vāda* which was similar to *ātma-vāda*. Because his disciples considered him to be like a mother, they were called "Vātsīputrīyas" (*gnas ma bu'i sde pa dag*), "those who are [like] sons of Vatsī [feminine ending]." See Ava P134a-5,6,7; D120b-4,5.

³³All fifteen dharmas originate at the same moment. They are: (1) the principal dharma itself; (2-8) its "retinue" (*parivāra*); and (9-15) the "retinue of the retinue." See Ava P134b-5,6; D121a-2,3.

³⁴See May (1959), p. 111 n. 279. *Samanvāgama* is very similar in meaning to the more familiar Abhidharma term, *prāpti*.

³⁵"White" dharmas are wholesome dharmas; "black" dharmas are afflictive dharmas. See May (1959), p. 111 and AK 4-59cd,60.

³⁶That is, the principal duration causes the other fourteen (out of the fifteen) dharmas to endure. The duration of duration causes only the principal duration to endure. Parallel statements apply to the remaining five members of the retinue and the corresponding five members of the retinue of the retinue. See Ava P134b-8 to 135a-8, D121a-5 to 121b-4.

³⁷This translation follows the Tibetan. A literal translation of the Sanskrit of MMK 7-4ab is, "The origination of origination is the origination of the principal origination alone."

³⁸Again, this translation follows the Tibetan. A literal translation of the Sanskrit of MMK 7-5ab is, "If your origination of origination is the origination of the principal origination ..."

³⁹That is, prior to the time when it allegedly produces the principal origination, the origination of origination has not originated and so does not produce anything. But it has also not originated at the time when it allegedly produces the principal origination, because it has not yet been produced by that principal origination. See Ava P135b-8 to 136a-2, D122a-3,4.

⁴⁰The remarks in the previous note apply here, interchanging "origination of origination" and "principal origination." See Ava P136a-6,7; D122a-7 to 122b-1.

⁴¹See note 39.

⁴²The idea seems to be this: The opponent has proposed that the principal origination and the origination of origination produce each other when both are in the process of originating. Nāgārjuna replies that this would be possible only if they could produce each other when they have not yet originated.

On Bhāvaviveka's syllogism, see Ava P136b-4,5,6; D122b-4,5,6. It is not quite clear whether Bhāvaviveka is actually equating "in the process of originating" and "unoriginated."

⁴³See AK 2-50cd,51 and the *bhāṣya*, especially LVP AK II, pp. 253-5.

⁴⁴See Ava P136b-7 to 137a-8, D122b-7 to 123a-6.

⁴⁵The opponent might hold that the principal origination and the origination of origination are nonobstructing causes of each other when both are in the process of originating. Nonobstructing causes, however, have already been negated. (See, for instance, MMK 1-10.) See Ava P137b-3,4,5; D123b-1,2.

⁴⁶Identified by Avalokitavrata only as "members of other [Buddhist] schools (*nikāyāntarīya*). See Ava P137b-7, D123b-4.

On the example of a lamp and its light, see May (1959), pp. 113-4 n. 284. Compare the discussion of fire's illuminating both itself and others in *Vigraha-vyāvartanī* 34-39; see Bhattacharya, Johnston, and Kunst (1978), pp. 27-9.

⁴⁷See Ava P139a-2,3; D124b-3,4.

⁴⁸See Ava P139b-1,2; D125a-1,2.

⁴⁹See Ava P139b-3 to 7, D125a-3 to 6.

⁵⁰According to Avalokitavrata, darkness does not come in contact with a lamp; and because [the darkness] is in the process of originating, it does not obscure the lamp. See Ava P141a1,2,3; D126a-4,5.

⁵¹The opponent charges that the reason in the Mādhyamika's last syllogism, "because it is [in the process of] originating," is inconclusive, since knowledge (*sheṣ pa*) which is in the process of originating removes ignorance. See Ava P141a-3 to 6, D126a-6 to 126b-1.

⁵²Just as in ultimate reality, a lamp does not dispel darkness, so also in ultimate reality, knowledge does not remove ignorance. Hence there is no counterexample. See Ava P141a-6,7; D126b-1,2.

⁵³*mngon par ma grub pa*, probably *anabhinirvartita*.

⁵⁴See Ava P141b-7,8; D126b-7 to 127a-1.

⁵⁵*mngon spyod kyi las*, probably *abhicāra-karman*.

⁵⁶See Ava P142a-3,4,5; D127a-3,4,5.

⁵⁷*rig sngags kyi lha dag*, probably *vidyā-devāh*.

⁵⁸If darkness obscured itself, it would never be perceived; and objects would always be visible. See Ava P142b-8 to 143a-3; D127b-6,7.

⁵⁹That is, darkness *does* exist, contrary to the undesired consequences adduced in MMK 7-11 and 7-12. (See the preceding note.)

⁶⁰That is, since the example of a lamp fails, the opponent's theory that origination produces itself and others likewise fails.

⁶¹That is, before the time when it originates, it does not produce itself, because it does not then exist. Likewise, it will not produce itself even at the time when it supposedly originates, if it has not yet originated then. Compare Ava P143b-7,8; D128b-2,3.

⁶²If origination does not produce itself, it would require another origination to produce it; but that origination would need a third origination; and so on *ad infinitum*. Compare MMK 7-3abc.

⁶³The opponent may say that since origination is not produced by itself or by another origination, it is just unproduced and unconditioned. But if it is unconditioned, how can it be a defining characteristic of the conditioned? See MMK 7-1cd,3d and Ava P144a-3,4,5; D128b-5,6.

⁶⁴If origination produces something other than itself, is that other thing something which has already originated or something which has not yet originated or something which is in the process of originating? See Ava P144a-8 to 144b-1, D129a-1,2.

⁶⁵Just as one does not traverse a path already traversed, a path not yet traversed, or a path which is in the process of being traversed, so one does not produce what has already originated, what has not yet originated, or what is in the process of originating. Compare MMK 2-1; and see Ava P144b-3,4,5; D129a-3,4.

⁶⁶*nges par ma zin pa*, probably *anīrdhārīta*, glossed by Avalokitavrata as *med pa*, "nonexistent." See Ava P144b-7,8; D129a5,6.

⁶⁷*dus gzhan du 'pho ba la mngon par phyogs pa*, perhaps *kālāntara-saṃkrānti-abhimukha*. The idea seems to be that the phase of "being in the process of originating" lasts only for an instant. See Ava P145a-1 to 4, D129a-6 to 129b-2.

⁶⁸According to Avalokitavrata, "origination" here means "causal conditions." For example, in dependence on causal conditions such as the eye, visible form, and so on, visual cognition originates. By means of that origination, one infers that the visual cognition which is in the process of originating exists. See Ava P146a-8 to 146b-2, D130b-3,4.

⁶⁹*ngos po thams cad kyi rang bzhin ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du smra ba rnams la*. Since *ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du smra ba* corresponds to *niḥsvabhāva-vādin*, *rang bzhin* may stand for *prakṛti*, "original nature," here.

⁷⁰The Sanskrit of MMK 7-15ab is *utpadyamānam utpattāṃ idam na kramate yadā*. This may be an allusion to the formula *asmin satīdam bhavati*, or in this case, *utpattāṃ asyām satyām utpadyamānam idam bhavati*.

⁷¹Avalokitavrata quotes MMK 1-7, which negates the *hetupratyaya*. See Ava P146b-8 to 147a-1, D131a-1,2.

⁷²Compare *Majjhima-nikāya* I, pp. 262.37-263.2.

⁷³Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P147b-5, D131b-4. The Sanskrit is quoted several times by Candrakīrti; see PSP, pp. 239, 491, 500, 504.

⁷⁴Identified by Avalokitavrata only as being "from other *sūtrāntas*." See Ava P147b-6, D131b-5.

⁷⁵Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P147b-7, D131b-5. The Sanskrit is quoted in PSP, p. 262 (with *anutpanna* for *niḥsvabhāva*) and p. 504 (with *śūnya* for *niḥsvabhāva*). See also Nanjio (1923), p. 76, which has *anutpattim saṃdhāya Mahāmate niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvasvabhāvāḥ* (Tibetan: *sarvabhāvāḥ*).

⁷⁶Avalokitavrata comments, "[This] teaches dependent origination as it is in ultimate reality (*pāramārthika-pratītyasamutpāda*). Thus both that which is 'dependent' (*pratītya*) and that which is 'origination' (*samutpāda*) are tranquil/extinct by intrinsic nature and are without origination. Therefore, for the

proponents of dependent origination, both what is [in the process of] originating and origination are tranquil/extinct by intrinsic nature and are without origination." See Ava P148a-4,5,6; D132a-2,3,4.

⁷⁷That is, according to Avalokitavrata, Nāgārjuna composed the MMK in order to get rid of the opponent's attachment to conventional things as being ultimately real. See Ava P148b-5,6; D132b-2.

⁷⁸According to Avalokitavrata, "The Vaibhāsika-Sarvāstivādins suppose that the entities of the three times, [past, present, and future,] pass from future time into present time only after having [first] existed [in the future], and also pass from present time into past time. Therefore, since those originate only after having [first] existed, the principal origination, in dependence on that origination, produces what is [in the process of] originating. Here those [Vaibhāsika-Sarvāstivādins] say, 'An entity does not originate after having [first] been nonexistent. Rather, that jar, [for example,] existing in future time with the intrinsic nature of visible form, taste, odor, and the tangible, passes into present time [as] the intrinsic nature of a jar and [thus] originates. Likewise, it also passes from present time into past time according to circumstances and [so] originates [as past?]. Therefore, depending on that origination, the principal origination produces what is [in the process of] originating.'" See Ava P149a-3 to 7, D132b-6 to 133a-1.

On the controversy between the Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas over the issue of time, see LVP AK V, pp. 50-65.

⁷⁹PP's Tibetan translation of MMK 7-17d (which I have translated here) differs from the Sanskrit and the Tibetan translation in the *Prasannapadā*, which has *bhāva utpadyate 'sati*. See Saito (1984), translation, p. 257 n. 53.

⁸⁰Glossed by Avalokitavrata as "those who say that entities originate only after having [first] existed." See Ava P149b-7,8; D133b-1,2.

⁸¹Glossed by Avalokitavrata as "those who say that entities pass from future time into present time and [then] pass from present time into past time." See Ava P150a-3,4; D133b-4.

⁸²See Ava P150a-1,2,3; D133b-2,3,4.

⁸³If past and future entities exist, what differentiates them from present entities? Bhāvaviveka refers here to four answers to this question, given in the *Mahāvibhāṣa* and associated with four different teachers: [1] Bhadanta Dharmatrāta; [2] Bhadanta Ghōṣaka; [3] Bhadanta Vasumitra; and [4] Bhadanta Buddhadeva, respectively. In the *Mahāvibhāṣa* and the AK, it is said that Vasumitra's theory, difference of state (*avasthā-anyathātva*), is the best. For details, see LVP AK V, pp. 52-4 and Ava P150a-4 to 152a-3, D133b-5 to 135a-6.

⁸⁴According to Avalokitavrata, the Sāmkhyas hold that an entity existing in future time with the nature of potentiality (*śakti*) is made manifest in present time by causal conditions. See Ava P152a-4,5; D135a-6,7 and also Larson and Bhattacharya (1987), pp. 100-1.

⁸⁵An unoriginated entity, i. e., an entity which has not yet originated, is included in future time. See Ava P152a-8, D135b-2,3.

⁸⁶By saying that a present entity does not exist by intrinsic nature. See Ava

P152b-6,7; D135b-7 to 136a-1.

⁸⁷*bṛtags pa'i dngos po yod pa nyid du*. This is the reading of DC. P omits *bṛtags pa'i*, "conceptually constructed," while Ava P152b-8, D136a-2 has *btags pa'i yod pa nyid du, prajñaptisat(tā/tva)*, "existence as designations."

⁸⁸PP's Tibetan translation of MMK 7-18c, which I have translated here, corresponds to a Sanskrit text different from that in the *Prasannapadā*, which has *utpādayet tam utpādam*. See Saito (1984), translation, pp. 257-8, n. 54.

⁸⁹By saying that origination produces, one contradicts the nature of origination.

⁹⁰Origination (*utpāda*) is glossed by Avalokitavratā as *skyed par byed pa gzhan*, "another producer." See Ava P154a-4,5; D137a-2,3.

⁹¹Avalokitavratā refers to Bhāvaviveka's quotation from the *Catuhśataka* which follows MMK 7-2ab,c1. See Ava P155a-6 to 155b-1, D138a-2,3,4.

⁹²The idea may be that a particular moment of enduring cannot take place after it has already occurred.

⁹³See Ava P156a-7,8; D139a-1,2.

⁹⁴The opponent's reason is not established in ultimate reality, and it is contradictory to state a reason which is valid only conventionally in order to prove a positive thesis about ultimate reality. See Ava P157b-4, D140a-2.

⁹⁵MMK 7-23cd is identical with MMK 7-21cd.

⁹⁶In other words, intrinsic nature is unchanging. Hence if things exist by intrinsic nature, what does not cease at one instant will not change its nature and cease at a later instant.

⁹⁷According to Avalokitavratā, some opponents who think, "If I say this, others will consider me learned in the Buddha's word and the science of grammar." See Ava P158b-4,5; D140b-7.

⁹⁸It has been shown that what lacks cessation at first will not cease later, either. By a parallel argument, one can show that what at first lacks ageing will not age later. See Ava P159a-3,4; D141a-5,6.

⁹⁹*mi 'thad pa dang ldan pa*, probably *anupapattimat*.

¹⁰⁰More literally, "Origination - in regard to which it is seen that if origination exists, duration occurs - is not established."

¹⁰¹The reason referred to is that in the opponent's syllogism preceding MMK 7-22a, "because a dharma exists which occurs only if that [origination] exists." Earlier (before MMK 7-23ab; see note 94) Bhāvaviveka pointed out two alternative faults in this reason. Here he is saying that these faults remain, despite the opponent's attempts to remove them. See Ava P159a-7,8; D141b-1,2.

¹⁰²That is, if what is in the process of ceasing has partly ceased and partly not ceased, neither of those two parts could cease, for the reasons already stated.

¹⁰³According to Avalokitavratā, MMK 7-26abc show that even if origination is accepted, cessation is not possible. MMK 7-26d applies to the case where origination is not accepted. See Ava P161b-3,4; D143a-7.

¹⁰⁴MMK 7-22a (7-22b in the Sanskrit) says, "An entity which has [already] endured does not [now] endure" (*sthito bhāvo na tiṣṭhati*). This appears to contradict Bhāvaviveka's explanation of *sthita* here as referring to something

which is still enduring. It is probably significant that MMK 7-22 uses the pattern *sthita-asthita-tiṣṭhamāna*, whereas 7-27 mentions only *sthita* and *asthita*. With an intransitive verb like *sthā*, the "past passive participle" often has a present sense; and in 7-27 there is no contrast between *sthita* and the present middle participle *tiṣṭhamāna*. Also, in 7-22 the argument requires a distinction between past and present moments of enduring (cf. n. 92 above), whereas in 7-27 the contrast is between an entity which is now enduring (whether it began to endure earlier or not) and one which has not yet endured.

¹⁰⁵Here "stage" (*avasthā*) apparently refers to the successive states of a thing which is undergoing change. In what follows, Bhāvaviveka uses the example of milk changing into curds.

¹⁰⁶See Ava P162a-4,5; D143b-6,7.

¹⁰⁷In MMK 7-28ab and also 7-28cd, PP's Tibetan translation (which I have translated here) seems to be based on a Sanskrit version slightly different from that of PSP 169.1,2. See Saito (1984), translation, pp. 259-60 n. 76.

¹⁰⁸Consider the case of milk changing into curds. Milk does not cease to be milk and become curds at that stage at which it is still milk.

¹⁰⁹See note 107.

¹¹⁰MMK 7-28d reads *na cānyaiva nirudhyate* in PSP 169.2, *nānyayaiva nirudhyate* in Saito's reconstruction. (See note 107.) Bhāvaviveka is saying that despite the word order, *eva* has to be understood with *na*. (Compare PSP 169.7.) Otherwise, one would be affirming that it does cease at the same stage (implicative negation), rather than merely denying that it ceases at a different stage (simple negation).

¹¹¹See Ava P162b-4,5; D144a-5.

¹¹²See Ava P163a-1,2; D144b-2,3.

¹¹³That is, one and the same thing cannot be both existent and nonexistent.

¹¹⁴Avalokitavrata ascribes this objection to *gzhan sel bar smra ba dag*, *anyāpohavādins* (in other words, Dignāga and his school). See Ava P163b-4,5 and 7, D145a-3,4 and 5,6.

The relevance of the opponent's objection in this context is as follows: Suppose that, as Dignāga *et al.* hold, the cognition of something has as its object the absence of anything different from that thing. Then the cessation of that thing is equivalent to the cessation of that absence. Thus an absence, that is, a nonentity, is what ceases. See Ava P164a-3 to 8, D145b-1 to 5.

¹¹⁵Avalokitavrata gives a long argument supporting this first reason of Bhāvaviveka's. Suppose that the opponent's reason means that if visible form is seen, the cognition of visible form originates. Then the cognition of visible form has as its object the presence of visible form, not the absence of anything different from visible form. On the other hand, suppose that the reason means that if the absence of anything is seen, then the cognition of that absence originates. Then it is not the case that the cognition of visible form originates, but rather the cognition of an absence, i. e., of nothing at all. See Ava P164b-7 to 165b-1, D146a-3 to 146b-2.

¹¹⁶The cognition of an ox has as its object the presence of an ox, not the

absence of anything different from an ox. See Ava P165b-1 to 6, D146b-3 to 6.

¹¹⁷In other words, the thesis is self-contradictory because it is impossible for an entity which is already nonexistent to cease.

¹¹⁸PP's Tibetan translation of MMK 7-32ab, which I have translated here, is a little different from the Sanskrit and Tibetan of the *Prasannapadā*. PSP's version can be translated as, "Cessation by means of itself does not exist; cessation by means of another [does not exist]." See PSP 171.6 and 171 n. 4.

PP's Tibetan translation seems to be influenced by the fact that MMK 7-32cd is identical to MMK 7-25cd. See Saito (1984), translation, p, 260 n. 82.

¹¹⁹Avalokitavrata identifies the opponents here as "those who maintain that cessation ('*jig pa*') has a cause." See Ava P166b-3,4; D147b-2.

¹²⁰'*jig pa*', probably *bhaṅga* here. Compare MMK 7-33a.

¹²¹See Ava P166b-5,6,7; D147b-3,4. Note that Ava P166b-6 omits Ava D147b-4's *da* (read *de*) *yang 'jig pa* after *nges par shes pa*.

¹²²It is contradictory to adduce a reason which is valid only conventionally in order to prove a positive thesis about ultimate reality.

¹²³Concerning this objection, Avalokitavrata says, "The negation of the general characteristics (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) of the conditioned, origination, duration, and cessation, has been shown previously. Now [Bhāvaviveka] shows the negation of the supposition by the Vaiśeṣikas, etc., that there are specific individual characteristics (*svalakṣaṇa*) of each conditioned [thing]." See Ava P167a-4,5; D148a-1,2.

¹²⁴Compare MMK 7-1.

¹²⁵Compare MMK 7-3.

¹²⁶Avalokitavrata ascribes this objection to "fellow Buddhists." See Ava P168a-6,7; D149a-1.

¹²⁷Another meaning of *pratipaksa* is "adversary."

¹²⁸See Ames (1995), p. 348 n. 126.

¹²⁹Avalokitavrata also ascribes this objection to "fellow Buddhists." See Ava P168b-6, D149a-7.

¹³⁰*dpe'i gzhi*, perhaps *upameya*.

¹³¹According to Avalokitavrata, "In the waking state, although the identifying marks of the object do not exist externally, [they] are experienced, [being] conceptually constructed by the mind." See Ava P169a-3,4; D149b-3,4.

¹³²According to Avalokitavrata, much practice of virtuous actions in waking life produces good dreams, while nonvirtuous actions produce bad dreams. See Ava P169a-4, D149b-4,5.

¹³³According to Avalokitavrata, in the dreaming state, they are causes of the cognition of existence, whereas in the waking state, they are causes of the cognition of nonexistence. See Ava P169a-7,8; D149b-7 to 150a-1.

¹³⁴*dbang po'i spyod yul du gyur pa*, *indriya-gocara-bhūta*.

¹³⁵*yang thog dkar po dga' ba 'tsher bag can*.

¹³⁶*khyams zla ba can*.

¹³⁷According to Avalokitavrata, the Buddha taught origination and so on to the sages in order to establish the superficial truth and produce the cognition of the

defining characteristics and thing characterized of the conditioned. See Ava P169b-4 to 7, D150a-4,5,6.

¹³⁸According to Avalokitavratā, the ignorant, hearing the Buddha speak of origination, etc., imagine that in ultimate reality [and not merely in conventional reality], conditioned dharmas originate, endure, and cease - just as one takes objects in a dream to be real or believes that magical illusions or cities of the *gandharvas* are real things. See Ava P169b-7 to 170a-2, D150a-6 to 150b-1.

¹³⁹Literally, "some say;" glossed by Avalokitavratā as "some proponents of cognition only (*rnam par shes pa tsam smra ba dag, vijñāna-mātra-vādinah*) say." See Ava P170a-8, D150b-5.

¹⁴⁰The phrase in square brackets comes from Avalokitavratā's gloss; see Ava P170a-8 to 170b-2, D150b-5,6,7. "The three conceptual constructions (*rnam par rtog pa, vikalpa*)" are glossed by Avalokitavratā (*ibid.*) as "the imagined (*parikalpita*), the dependent (*paratantra*), and the perfect (*pariniṣpanna*)," better known as the three natures (*svabhāva*). Avalokitavratā also explains at length how the opponent applies Nāgārjuna's three examples in MMK 7-34ab to the three "conceptual constructions." See Ava P170b-2 to 171a-4, D150b-7 to 151a-7.

¹⁴¹Literally, "others say;" identified by Avalokitavratā as Bhāvaviveka himself. See Ava P171a-6,7; D151b-2. Avalokitavratā also states that Bhāvaviveka intends here not only to refute the preceding objection, but also to explain the meaning of the verse in a different way; see Ava P171a-4, D151a-7.

¹⁴²According to Avalokitavratā, the "maker" of origination, etc., which the opponent has in mind is [the group of] causes and conditions which are conventionally designated as an agent or maker. see Ava P171b-2, D151b-5.

¹⁴³*rgyud tha mi dad pas 'dzin pa'i phyir*, glossed by Avalokitavratā as *sems can rnam kyī rgyud tha mi dad pas spyi mthun du 'dzin pa yin pa'i phyir*. See Ava P171b-2,3; D151b-5,6. The idea seems to be that all beings who have similar sense organs, who are in the same vicinity at the same time, etc., perceive them. Compare the following note, where it is pointed out that a city of the *gandharvas*, i. e., a Fata Morgana, is also seen by everyone who is in the right place at the right time. For a discussion of this type of mirage, see Fraser and Mach (1976) and Tape (1985), especially pp. 127-129.

¹⁴⁴According to Avalokitavratā, the example of a dream shows that the opponent's first reason is inconclusive, because a dream is an object of mental, etc., perceptual cognition. The example of a magical illusion shows that the opponent's second reason is inconclusive, because a magical illusion has a maker, namely, a magician and various causes and conditions. The example of a city of the *gandharvas* shows that the opponent's third reason is inconclusive, because a city of the *gandharvas* is seen by [beings with] nondifferent series. See Ava P171b-4 to 172a-4, D151b-7 to 152a-5.

¹⁴⁵Avalokitavratā amplifies this as follows: "For the Śrāvākayāna, in ultimate reality, all dharmas lack the intrinsic nature of a person's (*pudgala*) self and what belongs to it. But in superficial reality, the image/aspect (*rnam pa*) of the intrinsic nature of a self and what belongs to a self appears like that. Therefore attachment to that [self and what belongs to a self] becomes the obscuration [consisting of] the

afflictions." See Ava P172a-7 to 172b-1, D152a-7 to 152b-2.

This paragraph and the rest of Bhāvaviveka's commentary through his critique of Buddhapālita's commentary on MMK 7-34 are translated and discussed in Lopez (1988).

¹⁴⁶This verse occurs, with a variant, *Samyutta-nikāya* III 142.29-31. A Sanskrit version is quoted in PSP 41.9-11 and 549.2-4. Also, see references in May (1959), p. 257 n. 924.

Avalokitavrata explains these similes as follows: Matter will not bear examination; feeling, having arisen, ceases and becomes nonexistent; perception/conception is a false imputation; mental formations have no essence (*snying po*) that can be apprehended; cognition has no intrinsic nature that can be apprehended. See Ava P172b-1 to 4, D152b-2,3,4.

¹⁴⁷According to Avalokitavrata, it is taught in the Mahāyāna that although in ultimate reality, all dharmas are without intrinsic nature, nevertheless in superficial reality, they appear as just [having] the intrinsic nature of magical illusions and so on. See Ava P172b-6,7; D152b-6.

¹⁴⁸This verse is from the *Vajracchedikā*; see Conze (1957), p. 62.

Avalokitavrata explains these similes as follows: (1) Just as stars appear at night but not in the daytime, so the conditioned appears when the darkness of ignorance exists but not when the sun of wisdom has risen. (2) Conditioned things appear due to attachment to the view that persons and dharmas exist, even though there are no such objects [just as someone with faulty vision sees nonexistent objects]. (3) The defining characteristic of cognition "burns," having arisen in dependence on the wick of action and the oil of craving (Ava D153a-4: *sred pa*; Ava P173a-5 has *srid pa*).

(4) Like a magical illusion, the conditioned appears as a false image (*nor ba'i rnam pa*). (5) The conditioned is impermanent like dew. (6) The conditioned has the nature of suffering, broadly understood as the three types of suffering. The simile of a bubble is used because feeling is like a bubble (see the previous note), and all feelings have the nature of one of the three types of suffering.

(7) Past conditioned (dharmas) are like a dream. (8) Present conditioned (dharmas), like lightning, cannot be grasped. (9) Their seeds produce a future result like a cloud in the sky of the mind. See Ava P172b-8 to 173b-6, D152b-7 to 153b-3.

¹⁴⁹According to Avalokitavrata, there is no occasion to fear that all entities are nonexistent even in superficial reality. In superficial reality, they exist as conventional designations, like dreams and so on. In ultimate reality, they have no intrinsic nature. See Ava P174a-2 to 5, D153b-6 to 154a-1. ("Should be receptive" translates "bzod pa bskyed par bya.")

¹⁵⁰Literally, "others;" identified by Avalokitavrata. See Ava P174b-1, D154a-4. Tibetan text in Saito (1984), 118.20-119.4.

¹⁵¹A very similar passage is quoted in PSP 41.6,7; see PSP 41 nn. 5, 6, 7. See also PSP 237.12-238.1.

¹⁵²*dbang phyug ma yin pa*. For the gloss in square brackets, see Ava D154b-4; there is an omission in Ava P175a-2. The point is that *anātman* is to

be understood as meaning both "not having a self" and "not being a self."

¹⁵³For Avalokitavrata's subcommentary on this paragraph, see Ava P174b-4 to 175a-7, D154a-6 to 154b-7. Avalokitavrata sums up Bhāvaviveka's position as follows: "Magical illusions, echoes, and so on, which were used by the Blessed One as examples of the absence of self in conditioned factors, were stated as examples of *pudgala-nairātmya*. The statement [in Śrāvakayāna scriptures], 'All dharmas are without self,' is also stated in the sense of *pudgala-nairātmya*, not in the sense of absence of intrinsic nature in dharmas. The word 'self' is a term for 'person,' not 'the intrinsic nature of a dharma.'" (Ava P175a-4,5,6; D154b5,6,7.)

Hence, in Bhāvaviveka's interpretation, the "self" referred to in the phrase, "the absence of a self in persons (*pudgalanairātmya*)," is a person, a personal self. The "self" referred to in the phrase, "absence of a self in dharmas (*dharma-nairātmya*)," is the intrinsic nature of a dharma. See Lopez (1988).

Moreover, given this interpretation, one can speak of *pudgala-nairātmya* in relation to all dharmas. Thus if one were to translate strictly in accordance with Bhāvaviveka's interpretation, one should translate *pudgala-nairātmya* as "absence of a self which is a person" and *dharma-nairātmya* as "absence of a self which is [the intrinsic nature of] a dharma."

¹⁵⁴See Ames (1999), p. 45 n. 149; Avalokitavrata's remarks are similar here. See Ava P175b-2,3,4; D155a-3,4 and P176a-7 to 176b-2, D155b-5,6,7.

¹⁵⁵Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P175b-4, D155a-4.

¹⁵⁶Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P175b-5, D155a-5.

¹⁵⁷Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P175b-6, D155a-5,6.

¹⁵⁸Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P175b-8, D155a-7.

¹⁵⁹*tha dad du bya ba*, probably *nānākaraṇa*.

¹⁶⁰Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P176a-2, D155b-1,2. The Sanskrit of the first two sentences is found in Hikata (1958), p. 36; the second two sentences are on p. 31 of the same work. I have not been able to locate the Sanskrit of the last two sentences.

¹⁶¹See Ames (1999), p. 46 n. 159.

Sanskrit Text of MMK, Chapters Six and Seven, according to PSP as emended by J. W. de Jong (1978) and further emended by Akira Saito (1985)

Chapter Six

- rāgād yadi bhavet pūrvam rakto rāgātiraskṛtaḥ |
taṃ pratītya bhaved rāgo rakte rāgo bhavet sati | | 1
- rakte 'sati punā rāgaḥ kuta eva bhaviṣyati |
sati vāsati vā rāge rakte 'py eṣa samaḥ kramaḥ | | 2
- sahaiva punar udbhūtir na yuktā rāgaraktayoḥ |
bhavetām rāgaraktau hi nirapekṣau parasparam | | 3
- naikatve sahabhāvo 'sti na tenaiva hi tat saha |
prthaktve sahabhāvo 'tha kuta eva bhaviṣyati | | 4
- ekatve sahabhāvaś cet syāt sahāyam vināpi saḥ |
prthaktve sahabhāvaś cet syāt sahāyam vināpi saḥ | | 5
- prthaktve sahabhāvaś ca yadi kiṃ rāgaraktayoḥ |
siddhaḥ prthakprthagbhāvaḥ sahabhāvas tatas tayoh | | 6
- siddhaḥ prthakprthagbhāvo yadi vā rāgaraktayoḥ |
sahabhāvaṃ kim arthaṃ tu parikalpayase tayoh | | 7
- prthag na sidhyatīty evaṃ sahabhāvaṃ vikāṅkṣasi |
sahabhāvaprasiddhyartham prthaktvaṃ bhūya icchasi | | 8
- prthagbhāvāprasiddheś ca sahabhāvo na sidhyati |
kātamasmīn prthagbhāve sahabhāvaṃ satīcchasi | | 9
- evaṃ raktena rāgasya siddhir na saha nāsaha |
rāgavat sarvadharmāṇām siddhir na saha nāsaha | | 10

Chapter Seven

- yadi saṃskṛta utpādas tatra yuktā trilakṣaṇī |
athāsaṃskṛta utpādaḥ katham saṃskṛtalakṣaṇam | | 1

- utpādādyās trayo vyastā nālaṃ lakṣaṇakarmaṇi |
saṃskṛtasya samastāḥ syur ekatra katham ekadā | | 2
- utpādashitbhaṅgānām anyat saṃskṛtalakṣaṇam |
asti ced anavasthaivaṃ nāsti cet te na saṃskṛtāḥ | | 3
- utpādotpāda utpādo mūlotpādasya kevalam |
utpādotpādam utpādo mauḷo janayate punaḥ | | 4
- utpādotpāda utpādo mūlotpādasya te yadi |
maulenājanitas taṃ te sa katham janayiṣyati | | 5
- sa te maulena janito mauḷam janayate yadi |
maulaḥ sa tenājanitas tam utpādayate katham | | 6
- ayam utpadyamānas te kāmam utpādayed imaṃ |
yadīmam utpādayitum ajātaḥ śaknuyād ayaṃ | | 7
- pradīpaḥ svaparātmānau saṃprakāśayate yathā |
utpādaḥ svaparātmānāv ubhāv utpādayet tathā | | 8
- pradīpe nāndhakāro 'sti yatra cāsau pratiṣṭhitaḥ |
kiṃ prakāśayate dīpaḥ prakāśo hi tamovadhah | | 9
- katham utpadyamānena pradīpena tamo hatam |
notpadyamāno hi tamaḥ pradīpaḥ prāpnute yadā | | 10
- aprāpyaiva pradīpena yadi vā nihataṃ tamaḥ |
ihasthaḥ sarvalokastham sa tamo nihaṇiṣyati | | 11
- pradīpaḥ svaparātmānau saṃprakāśayate yadi |
tamo 'pi svaparātmānau chādayiṣyaty asaṃśayaṃ | | 12
- anutpanno 'yam utpādaḥ svātmānam janayet katham |
athotpanno janayate jāte kiṃ janyate punaḥ | | 13
- notpadyamānam notpannam nānutpannam kathamcana |
utpadyate tad ākhyātaṃ gamyamānagatāgataiḥ | | 14
- utpadyamānam utpattāv idaṃ na kramate yadā |

katham utpadyamānaṃ tu pratītyotpattim ucyate | | 15

pratītya yad yad bhavati tat tac chāntaṃ svabhāvataḥ |
tasmād utpadyamānaṃ ca śāntaṃ utpattir eva ca | | 16

yadi kaścid anutpanno bhāvaḥ saṃvidyate kvacit |
utpadyeta sa kiṃ tasmin bhāva utpadyate 'sati | | 17

utpadyamānaṃ utpādo yadi cotpādayaty ayaṃ |
utpādayet tam utpādaṃ utpādaḥ katamaḥ punaḥ | | 18

anya utpādayaty enaṃ yady utpādo 'navasthitiḥ |
athānutpāda utpannaḥ sarvaṃ utpadyatāṃ tathā | | 19

sataś ca tāvad utpattir asataś ca na yuhyate |
na sataś cāsataś ceti pūrvam evopapāditaṃ | | 20

nirudhyamānasyotpattir na bhāvasyopapadyate |
yaś cānirudhyamānaḥ tu sa bhāvo nopapadyate | | 21

nāsthitas tiṣṭhate bhāvaḥ sthito bhāvo na tiṣṭhati |
na tiṣṭhate tiṣṭhamānaḥ ko 'nutpannaś ca tiṣṭhati | | 22

sthitir nirudhyamānasya na bhāvasyopapadyate |
yaś cānirudhyamānaḥ tu sa bhāvo nopapadyate | | 23

jarāmarañadharmeṣu sarvabhāveṣu sarvadā |
tiṣṭhanti katame bhāvā ye jarāmarānaṃ vinā | | 24

sthiyānyayā sthiteḥ sthānaṃ tayaiva ca na yuhyate |
utpādasya yathotpādo nātmanā na parātmanā | | 25

nirudhyate nāniruddhaṃ na niruddhaṃ nirudhyate |
tathā nirudhyamānaṃ ca kim ajātaṃ nirudhyate | | 26

sthitasya tāvad bhāvasya nirodho nopapadyate |
nāsthitasyāpi bhāvasya nirodha upapadyate | | 27

tayaivāvasthayāvasthā na hi saiva nirudhyate |
anyavāvasthayāvasthā na cānyaiva nirudhyate | | 28

- yadaiva sarvadharmāṇāṃ utpādo nopapadyate |
tadaivam sarvadharmāṇāṃ nirodho nopapadyate | | 29
- sataś ca tāvad bhāvasya nirodho nopapadyate |
ekatve na hi bhāvaś ca nābhāvaś copapadyate | | 30
- asato 'pi na bhāvasya nirodha upapadyate |
na dvitīyasya śīrasaś chedanam vidyate yathā | | 31
- na svātmanā nirodho 'sti nirodho na parātmanā |
utpādasya yathotpādo nātmanā na parātmanā | | 32
- utpādasthitibhaṅgānāṃ asiddher nāsti saṃskṛtaṃ |
saṃskṛtasyāprasiddhau ca katham setsyaty asaṃskṛtaṃ | | 33
- yathā māyā yathā swapno gandharvanagaram yathā |
tathotpādas tathā sthānam tathā bhaṅga udāhṛtaṃ | | 34

Glossary

English	Tibetan	Sanskrit
about to originate	skye bar 'dod pa	utpitsu
absence of self	bdag med pa nyid	nairātmya
action	las	karman
activity	bya ba	kriyā
aeon	bskal pa	kalpa
agent	byed pa po	karṭṛ
affliction	nyon mongs pa	kleśa
	kun nas nyon mongs pa	saṃkleśa
afflictive	nyon mongs pa can	kliṣṭa
aggregate	'phung po	skandha
appropriation	nye bar len pa	upādāna
	nye bar blang ba	
appropriator	nye bar len pa po	upādātṛ
assertion	dam bcas pa	pratijñā
attachment	mngon par zhen pa	abhiniveśa
attention	yid la byed pa	manasikāra
basis	gzhi	āśraya, etc.
(a) being	sems can	sattva
Blessed One	bcom ldan 'das	bhagavan
causal condition, condition	rkyen	pratyaya
cause	rgyu	hetu
	rgyu	kāraṇa
cause of maturation	rnam par smin pa'i rgyu	vipāka-hetu
cognition	blo	buddhi
	rnam par shes pa	viññāna
	shes pa	jñāna
coming into existence	bdag nyid thob pa	ātma-lābha
common knowledge	grags pa	prasiddhi, prasiddha
conceptual con- struction	rnam par rtog pa	vikalpa
	rtog pa	kalpanā

conceptual proliferation	spros pa	prapañca
concomitance	lhan cig nyid, lhan cig gi dngos po	sahabhāva
conditioned	'dus byas	saṃskṛta
conditioned factor	'du byed	saṃskāra
conflict	gnod pa	bādha
confusion	gti mug	moha
conjoined cause	mtshung par ldan pa'i rgyu	saṃprayukta- hetu
consciousness	shes pa yod pa nyid	caitanya
convention, conventional designation, conventional activity	tha snyad	vyavahāra
conventional truth	tha snyad kyi bden pa	vyavahāra-satya
conventionally	tha snyad du	vyavahārataḥ
conviction	dad pa	śraddhā
counterbalanced	'gal ba 'khrul pa med pa	viruddha- avyabhicārin
counterexample, dissimilar case, set of all such; counterposition	mi mthun pa'i phyogs	vipakṣa
craving	sred pa	trṣṇā
criticism	sun dbyung ba	dūṣaṇa
defective vision	rab rib	timira
defining characteristic	mtshan nyid	lakṣaṇa
dependent designation	brten nas gdags pa	upādāya pra- jñapti
dependent origination	rten cing brel par 'byung ba	pratītya- samutpāda
desire	'dod chags 'dod pa	rāga kāma
direct object	las	karman
disadvantage	nyes dmigs	ādinava
discernment	shes rab	prajñā

doctrine	tshul mdzad pa'i mtha' grub pa'i mtha'	naya kṛtānta siddhānta
domain	spyod yul	gocara
dominant causal condition	bdag po'i rkyen	adhipati/ādhipateya- pratyaya
element	'byung ba khams	bhūta dhātu
(to) emanate	sprul pa	nir-mā
emancipation	byang grol	apavarga
entity	dngos po	bhāva vastu
established	grub pa	siddha
establishing what is [already] established	grub pa la sgrub pa	siddha-sādhana
fact of having this as a causal condition	rkyen 'di dang ldan pa nyid	idaṃpratyayatā
feeling	tshor ba	vedanā
fellow Buddhist (more literally, "coreligionist")	rang gi sde pa	svayūthya
founders of non- Buddhist sects	mu stegs byed	tīrthakara
futile rejoinder	ltag chod	jāti
hatred	zhe sdang	dveṣa
higher realms	mtho ris	svarga
identifying mark	mtshan ma	nimitta
immediately preceding causal condition	de ma thag pa'i rkyen	(sam)anantara- pratyaya
implicative negation	ma yin par dgag pa	paryudāsa- pratiṣedha
imputation	sgro 'dogs pa	samārōpa
in superficial reality	kun rdzob tu	saṃvṛtyā
in ultimate reality	don dam par	paramārthataḥ
inconclusive	ma nges pa	anaikāntika

inference	rjes su dpag pa	anumāna
inherent nature	rang gi ngo bo	svarūpa
instrument	byed pa	karaṇa
internal	nang gi	ādhyātmika
intrinsic nature	ngo bo nyid	svabhāva
	rang bzhin	svabhāva
invariable	'khrul pa med pa	avyabhicārin
locus	gzhi	āśraya
	(as in āśraya-asiddhi)	
logical mark	rtags	liṅga
[logically]	rigs pa	yukta
possible		
manifestation	gsal ba	vyakti
material	gzugs can	rūpin
matter	gzugs	rūpa
	(as first aggregate)	
matter dependent	'byung ba las gyur pa'i	bhautika-rūpa
on the elements	gzugs	
meditation	bsam gtan	dhyāna
meditational	snyoms par 'jug pa	samāpatti
attainment		
meditative	ting nge 'dzin	samādhi
concentration		
(in) meditative	mnyam par bzhag pa	samāhita
concentration		
meditative	bsgom pa	bhāvanā
cultivation		
meditative sphere	skye mched	āyatana
mental factor	sems las byung ba	caitta
mental formation	'du byed	saṃskāra
	(as fourth aggregate)	
mere assertion	dam bcas pa tsam	pratijñā-mātra
merit	bsod nams	puṇya
mind	sems	citta
	yid	manas
moral conduct	tshul khirms	śīla
necessary	med na mi 'byung ba	avinābhāva
connection		
negation	dgag pa	pratiṣedha
neutral	lung du ma bstan pa	avyākṛta

nihilistic	skur pa 'debs pa	apavāda
negation		
noble	'phags pa	ārya
nonconceptual	rnam par mi rtog pa'i	nirvikalpaka-
wisdom	ye shes	jñāna
noncondition	rkyen ma yin pa	apratyaya
nonobstructing	byed pa'i rgyu	kāraṇa-hetu
cause		
object	yul	viśaya
object, object to	gzung ba	grāhya
be grasped [by		
a subject]		
object of	dmigs pa	ārambana,
cognition		ālambana
object of correct	gzhal bya	prameya
knowledge		
object of	shes bya	jñeya
knowledge		
one who desires	chags pa	rakta
one who hates	sdang ba	dviṣṭa
original meaning,	skabs kyi don	prakṛta-artha
point under		
discussion		
overextension	ha cang thal ba	atiprasaṅga
perception-	'du shes	saṃjñā
conception		
perfection	pha rol tu phyin pa	pāramitā
person	gang zag	pudgala
position	phyogs	pakṣa
positive	rjes su 'gro ba	anvaya
concomitance		
potentiality	nus pa	śakti
previous position	phyogs snga ma	pūrvapakṣa
primary matter	gtso bo	pradhāna
primordial matter,	rang bzhin	prakṛti
original nature		
property of the	phyogs kyi chos	pakṣa-dharma
subject [which		
proves the thesis]		

property to be proved	bsgrub par bya ba'i chos	sādhya-dharma
proving property	sgrub pa'i chos	sādhana-dharma
question raised in objection	brgal zhing brtag pa	paryanuyoga
reality	de kho na	tattva
reason	gtan tshigs	hetu
reasoning	rigs pa	yukti, nyāya
refutation	sun dbyung ba	dūṣaṇa
result	'bras bu	phalā
	'bras bu	kārya
samsāric existence	srid pa	bhava
scripture	lung	āgama
	gsung rab	pravacana
secondary matter	rgyur byas pa'i gzugs	upādāya-rūpa
self-contradiction	dgag pa mi mthun pa	vipratīṣedha
sense organ	dbang po	indriya
separate	tha dad pa	prṭhak, bhinna, vyatirikta, etc.
set of all similar examples	mthun pa'i phyogs	sapakṣa
similar cause	skal pa mnyam pa'i rgyu	sabhāga-hetu
similar example	chos mthun pa'i dpe	sādharmya- dr̥ṣṭānta
simple negation	med par dgag pa	prasajya- pratīṣedha
simultaneously arisen cause	lhan cig 'byung ba'i rgyu	sahabhū-hetu
specific	so sor nges pa	pratiniyata
specification	nges par gzung ba	avadhāraṇa, nirdhāraṇa
specious	ltar snang ba	-ābhāsa
spirit	skyes bu	puruṣa
spiritually	byis pa	bāla
immature		
state of existence	'gro ba	gati
student	slob ma	śiṣya
subject [of a thesis]	chos can	dharmin

subsequent reasoning	rtog ge phyi ma	uttara-tarka
substance, real substance	rdzas	dravya
superficial reality	kun rdzob	saṃvṛti
superficial truth	kun rdzob kyi bden pa	saṃvṛti-satya
superficially real	kun rdzob pa	sāṃvṛta
supramundane	'jig rten las 'das pa	lokottara
syllogism	sbyor ba'i tshig	prayoga-vākya
system	gzhung lugs	mata, samaya
thesis	dam bcas pa	pratijñā
thing	mtshan nyid kyi gzhi	lakṣya
characterized		
tranquil	zhi ba	śiva
trace	bag chags	vāsanā
treatise	bstan bcos	śāstra
true state	yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin nyid	yāthātathya (?)
ultimate reality	don dam pa	paramārtha
ultimate truth	don dam pa'i bden pa	paramārtha-satya
ultimately real	don dam pa pa	pāramārthika
unconditioned	'dus ma byas	asaṃskṛta
undesired	thal ba	prasaṅga
consequence		
universal cause	kun tu 'gro ba'i rgyu	sarvatraga-hetu
unreal	yang dag pa ma yin pa	abhūta
unwholesome	mi dge ba	akuśala
valid means of knowledge	tshad ma	pramāṇa
virtue	chos	dharma
visible form	gzugs (as an āyatana)	rūpa
wholesome	dge ba	kuśala
wisdom	ye shes	jñāna

Bibliographical Abbreviations

- AK The *Abhidharmakośa* and *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* of Vasubandhu - See *Abhidharmakośa and Bhāṣya of Ācārya Vasubandhu with Sphuṭārtha Commentary of Ācārya Yaśomitra*, ed. Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, Bauddha Bharati Series, vols. 5, 6, 7, and 9, Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973 and *The Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣyam of Vasubandhu*, ed. Prahlad Pradhan, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, vol. 8, Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1975 (2nd rev. ed.).
- Akutobhayā In Dbu ma Tsa: D vol. 1; P vol. 95.
- Ava Avalokitavrata's *Prajñāpradīpatīkā*. Chapters one and two in Dbu ma Wa: D vol. 4; P vol. 96. Chapters three through sixteen (part) in Dbu ma Zha: D vol. 5; P vol. 97; Chapters sixteen (part) through twenty-seven in Dbu ma Za: D vol. 6; P vol. 97. Text numbers: Peking no. 5259; Derge no. 3859.
- Bp Buddhapālita's *Buddhapālita-Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti*. In Dbu ma Tsa: D vol. 1; P vol. 95 and in Saito (1984).
- C Co ne edition of *bstan 'gyur*, Dbu ma Tsha. Published on microfiche by the Institute for the Advanced Study of World Religions, Stony Brook, New York, 1974. ("C" without further specification refers to PP C.)
- D *Sde Dge Tibetan Tripitaka Bstan Hgyur, Dbu Ma*, eds. K. Hayashima, J. Takasaki, Z. Yamaguchi, and Y. Ejima, 17 volumes and index, Tokyo: Sekai Seiten Kanko Kyokai, 1977. ("D" without further specification refers to PP D.)
- LVP AK *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu*, tr. Louis de La Vallée Poussin, 6 volumes, Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1923-31 (reprinted 1971-2 as vol. 16 of *Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques*). (Roman numerals following "LVP AK" refer to chapter numbers, not volume numbers.)
- MMK Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*. Sanskrit in PSP. Tibetan in Dbu ma Tsa: D vol. 1; P vol. 95 and also in *Akutobhayā*, Ava, Bp, PP, and PSP.

- N Snar thang edition of the *bstan 'gyur*, Dbu ma Tsha. Microfilm of the blockprint in the Royal Library, Copenhagen. ("N" without further specification refers to PP N.)
- P *The Tibetan Tripiṭaka, Peking Edition*, ed. D. T. Suzuki, 168 volumes, Tokyo-Kyoto: Tibetan Tripiṭaka Research Institute, 1957-61. ("P" without further specification refers to PP P.)
- PP Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa*. In Dbu ma Tsha: D vol. 2; P vol. 95. Text numbers: Peking no. 5253; Derge no. 3853.
- PSP Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā*. Sanskrit in *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā, Commentaire de Candrakīrti*, ed. Louis de La Vallée Poussin, Bibliotheca Buddhica, vol. 4, St. Pétersbourg: Académie Impériale des Sciences, 1913. Tibetan in Dbu ma 'a: D vol. 7; P vol. 98.

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