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Bhāvaviveka's Prajñāpradīpa: A Translation of Chapter Six, Examination of Desire and the One Who Desires, and Chapter Seven, Examination of Origination, Duration, and Cessation

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Introduction

The Madhyamaka school is one of the two major philosophical schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism, along with the Yogācāra school. The Madhyamaka is best known for its doctrine of emptiness (śūnyatā). The idea of emptiness is found in the "perfection of discernment" (prajñā-pāramitā) sūtras, some of which are among the earliest Mahāyāna sūtras. While the sūtras expound emptiness in a discursive way, the Mādhyamikas use systematic argument.

Emptiness, for the Madhyamaka school, means that dharmas are empty of intrinsic nature (svabhāva). All Buddhists hold that conditioned dharmas arise in dependence on causes and conditions. For the Mādhyamikas, this fact of dependent origination (pratītya-samutpāda) implies that dharmas can have no intrinsic, self-sufficient nature of their own. Since dharmas appear when the proper conditions occur and cease when those conditions are absent, the way in which dharmas exist is similar to the way in which mirages and dreams exist. Thus attachment and aversion are undermined, since ultimately, they have no substantial objects and lack any self-sufficient status of their own. Moreover, the Mādhyamikas argue that if things existed by their own intrinsic nature, they would be changeless; but this contradicts our everyday experience.

The Madhyamaka school was founded by Nāgārjuna (active c. 150-200), the author of the Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā (MMK). The MMK inspired a number of commentaries which not only expounded the meaning of the MMK but also often acted as vehicles for the commentators' own views. The Akutobhayā seems to be the earliest of the extant commentaries. It is of uncertain authorship, although it is sometimes ascribed to Nāgārjuna himself.

The earliest extant commentary on the MMK by a known author is that of Buddhapālita (c. 500). Buddhapālita closely followed Nāgārjuna's own method, which utilized mainly prasaṅga arguments. These are arguments which show that the opponent's position leads to consequences (prasaṅga) unacceptable to the opponent himself, without, however, committing the Mādhyamika to affirming a contrary position.
Bhāvaviveka (c. 500-570) was the next important Madhyamika philosopher. Besides his commentary on the MMK, the Prajñāpāramitā, he wrote some notable independent works, such as the Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā and its autocommentary, the Tarkajvalā. Bhāvaviveka seems to have been the first to use the formal syllogism of Indian logic in expounding the Madhyamaka; and he strongly criticized Buddhapālita for failing to do so. He felt that the author of a commentary should state independent inferences (svatantra-anumāna) rather than simply giving prasaṅga arguments. Bhāvaviveka’s position was later criticized by Candrakīrti, who defended Buddhapālita in his own commentary on the MMK, the Prasannapadā.

Bhāvaviveka’s Prajñāpāramitā is, in the first place, of great interest for its explanation and elaboration of the MMK. In the second place, it is important in the history of the Madhyamaka. Bhāvaviveka’s criticisms of Buddhapālita in the Prajñāpāramitā resulted in the division of the Madhyamaka into two subschools: the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka of Bhāvaviveka and the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka of Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti. (The names of these subschools, derived from svatantra-anumāna and prasaṅga, seem to have originated some centuries after Candrakīrti and are known to us only from Tibetan sources.)

Moreover, the Prajñāpāramitā is the first commentary on the MMK to make use of the formal apparatus of Buddhist logic and the first to discuss non-Buddhist philosophical schools extensively. Bhāvaviveka’s accounts, in the Prajñāpāramitā and elsewhere, of the positions of other Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools give valuable information on the state of Indian philosophy in his day.

As mentioned above, Candrakīrti, in his Prasannapadā, criticized Bhāvaviveka’s interpretation of the MMK; and in some cases, he quotes from the Prajñāpāramitā when he does so. Some of the passages quoted by Candrakīrti occur in chapter one of the Prajñāpāramitā. Chapter six contains another such passage. In it, Bhāvaviveka defends Nāgārjuna against the criticism that he has failed to state complete syllogisms. Bhāvaviveka argues that the words of a learned teacher (ācārya) such as Nāgārjuna must be understood as condensed, aphoristic statements (arthavaikya) pregnant with meaning (mahārtha), so that many syllogisms are implicit in them. In the Prasannapadā, Candrakīrti turns this argument against Bhāvaviveka, asking why, in that case, he criticizes the ācārya Buddhapālita for not stating syllogisms.

Chapter six is called "Examination of rāga and rakta." Rāga is a noun derived from the verbal root rañj or raj, meaning "to be dyed or colored, to become red, to glow; to be affected or moved, be excited or
Ames: Bhāvaviveka’s *Prajñāprādīpa*, Ch. 6-7

glad, be charmed or delighted, be attracted by or enamored of, fall in love with." Thus *rāga* means, among other things, "the act of coloring or dyeing; color, hue, tint, dye, (esp.) red color, redness; any feeling or passion, (esp.) love, affection, or sympathy for, vehement desire of, interest or joy or delight in." In Buddhist usage, *rāga* is often mentioned as one of a triad of "afflictions" (*kleśa*), along with *dvesa*, "hatred," and *moha*, "confusion." Hence it is less broad than "any feeling or passion," and I have followed the common practice of translating it as "desire."

*Rakta* is the past passive participle of the same verb and so means, among other things, "colored, dyed, painted; reddened, red; excited, affected with passion or love, impassioned, enamored with, attached or devoted to, fond of." In this chapter, *rakta* is used as a grammatically masculine noun meaning "one who is ... (the various meanings cited)." I have translated it, a little freely, as "the one who desires." It could also be translated as "the desirous" or "the impassioned."

In the case of both *rāga* and *rakta*, one can see how dyeing, especially with red dye, became a metaphor for passion or desire, just as we speak of someone's being "inflamed with desire." Moreover, just as dye soaks into a piece of cloth and changes its color, so desire colors all the mental processes of one affected by it.

The argument in chapter six can be seen as an extension of the argument in chapter five regarding defining characteristics (*lakṣana*) and the things they characterize (*lakṣya*). A defining characteristic cannot exist without characterizing something, and a thing cannot be what it is without its defining characteristic. Likewise, desire cannot exist if there is no one who desires; and one cannot be "one who desires" without desire. Since desire and the one who desires are mutually dependent and, indeed, mutually defining, they cannot be established as independent entities.

In both chapters, arguments are made that two mutually dependent entities (defining characteristic and the thing it characterizes in chapter five, desire and the one who desires in chapter six) cannot arise consecutively. Since neither can exist without the other, neither can arise first. In chapter six, Nāgārjuna goes farther and asserts (MMK 6-3) that they cannot arise simultaneously either, since they would then be unrelated. Bhāvaviveka explains that they cannot be causally related if they arise simultaneously, since a cause must precede its result.

A Vaibhāṣika opponent points out that there is another kind of relation, "dependence on a particular expression" (*brjod pa khyad par can brten pa*). For example, the two horns of a cow, which originate simultaneously, are dependent on the particular expression, "This is the left [horn];
this is the right." The meaning of this argument is not entirely clear to me, but it seems to be connected with the fact that left and right are logically related (like long and short) rather than being related as cause and effect.

Bhāvaviveka replies that the two horns of a cow are not established in ultimate reality. Presumably he is conceding that conventionally, desire and the one who desires can be said to arise simultaneously with a mutual relationship of logical dependence. This very relationship, however, precludes either one’s being established by its own intrinsic nature and thus having ultimate reality. As Nāgārjuna will say in the next chapter, "That which arises dependently is tranquil by intrinsic nature" (MMK 7-16ab); that is, it has no intrinsic nature and does not arise by or with intrinsic nature.

Chapter seven is called "Examination of Origination, Duration, and Cessation" (utpāda, sthiti, and bhaṅga or nirodha). These three, to which a fourth, "ageing" (jarā), is sometimes added, are the "defining characteristics of the conditioned" (samskṛta-laksana) which all conditioned dharmas possess. While these characteristics are mentioned in the sūtras, they are much more elaborated and discussed in the Abhidharma.13

Chapter seven has more verses than any other chapter in the MMK, with the exception of chapter twenty-four. While this is partly because Nāgārjuna had three characteristics to deal with, it also suggests the he regarded it as particularly important to show that the defining characteristics of the conditioned do not exist in ultimate reality and so do not establish conditioned things as being ultimately real. As he says in MMK 7-33, "Because origination, duration, and cessation are not established, the conditioned does not exist. Since the conditioned has not been established, how will one establish the unconditioned?" Since all dharmas are either conditioned or unconditioned, this verse implies that by showing that the three characteristics of the conditioned are not established, Nāgārjuna has been able to show that neither samsāra nor nirvāṇa is established.

Lest one think that this means that nothing exists in any sense, Nāgārjuna goes on in the next verse (MMK 7-34) to compare origination, duration, and cessation to dreams, magical illusions, and cities of the gandharvas. Although these lack the intrinsic nature they seem to have, they do appear to perception. In this connection, it is worth citing again MMK 7-16ab, "That which arises dependently is tranquil by intrinsic nature." In his commentary, Bhāvaviveka explains that in superficial reality, things do originate in dependence on causes and conditions, but that in ultimate reality, they are unoriginated since they do not originate by intrinsic nature; thus they are like magical illusions.14

Nāgārjuna gives many arguments in the course of refuting the ultimate
reality of the defining characteristics of the conditioned. Some revolve around the question of whether the characteristics are themselves conditioned or unconditioned and the difficulties that flow from both positions. Other arguments are concerned with showing that origination, duration, and cessation cannot take place either simultaneously or sequentially. Taking another line of attack, MMK 7-14 explicitly cites the pattern of argument used in chapter two and applies it to origination, while 7-22 applies the same pattern to duration. MMK 7-26 and 7-27 take arguments from MMK 2-1 and 2-17b and apply them to cessation.

In MMK 7-8, an opponent uses the example of a lamp's illuminating both itself and others to show that origination can produce both itself and the thing which is originating. Nāgārjuna rejects the opponent's example in MMK 7-9 through 7-12. He argues that illumination is the destruction of darkness and that since light and darkness cannot exist in the same place, a lamp's light cannot reach darkness in order to destroy it. Nāgārjuna makes essentially the same argument in Vigrahavyāvartani 34-39, where it is stated in terms of illumination by fire rather than by a lamp. (MMK 3-3 and chapter ten reject a different use of the example of fire, where fire's property of burning is in question rather than its property of illuminating.)

Bhāvaviveka's commentary contains a number of interesting passages. Following MMK 7-2c2,d, we find one of a number of instances in the Prajñāpradīpa where he states a Sautrāntika objection and answers it by saying (or implying) that their position is acceptable conventionally, while rejecting it as ultimate truth. Such passages support the Tibetan doxographical classification of Bhāvaviveka as a Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika or Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika, that is, one who accepts the Sautrāntika position as conventional truth, while maintaining a Mādhyamika's view of ultimate truth.

Contrary to some later doxographical classifications, the Prajñāpradīpa gives no indication, at least in the chapters I have read, that Bhāvaviveka considered the Buddhist logicians to be Sautrāntikas. Bhāvaviveka was strongly influenced by the work of Dignāga and made extensive use of the machinery of formal Indian logic. But whenever the Prajñāpradīpa describes a position as being "Sautrāntika," that position is never one which expresses Dignāga's views on logic and epistemology. Instead, all such passages show that Bhāvaviveka considered the Sautrāntikas to be an Abhidharma school very much like the Sautrāntikas described in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.

In chapter seven, there is additional evidence that Bhāvaviveka did not consider the Buddhist logicians to be Sautrāntikas. In his commentary
following MMK 7-30cd, Bhāvaviveka has an opponent state Dignāga’s doctrine of *apoha*. Bhāvaviveka introduces the objection in question merely with "Some say"; but Avalokitavrata identifies the opponents as gzhan sel bar smra dag, anyāpohavādīn, not as Sautrāntikas. It is also significant that Bhāvaviveka appears to reject the opponent’s position conventionally and not just ultimately. This fact suggests that Bhāvaviveka either did not consider the logicians' *apoha* doctrine to be a Sautrāntika view or that, if he did, he rejected some Sautrāntika doctrines even on the level of conventional truth. 15

Another passage relevant to a doxographical issue occurs near the end of Bhāvaviveka’s commentary on chapter seven where he quotes from and criticizes Buddhapālita’s commentary. Buddhapālita implies that even in the Śrāvakayāna, "without self" (anātman) means "without intrinsic nature." Bhāvaviveka argues that in the Śrāvakayāna, ātman simply means "self" in the ordinary sense. In the Tibetan doxographical literature, this came to be considered another point of dispute between the Svātāntrika-Madhyamaka subschool, represented by Bhāvaviveka, and the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka, represented by Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti. Thus it is curious that Candrakīrti does not attempt to refute Bhāvaviveka’s view in his own commentary on MMK 7-34, 16 though he does so elsewhere in his writings. 17

Aside from a few quotations in the Prasannapadā, the Prajñāpradīpa has been lost in the original Sanskrit. It exists in Tibetan and Chinese translations. The Chinese translation is reportedly rather poor, 18 but the Tibetan translation, done by Jñānagarbha and Cog ro Klu’i rgyal mtshan in the early ninth century, seems to be excellent. The same translators also translated Avalokitavrata’s massive subcommentary on the Prajñāpradīpa, called the Prajñāpradīpa-tīkā. (Avalokitavrata’s work is not extant in Sanskrit, and apparently no Chinese translation was ever made.)

The present English translation was made from the Tibetan. I consulted the Peking, Derge, and Cone editions19 and made my own edition of the text. Most of the variants found in the different Tibetan editions are either obvious scribal errors or else represent different orthographic conventions. Rarely do the variants offer significant alternatives for the meaning of a sentence.

I also made extensive use of the Peking and Derge editions20 of Avalokitavrata’s subcommentary. Since the Prajñāpradīpa is often terse, allusive, or technical, sentences frequently need to be amplified with phrases in square brackets; and explanatory notes sometimes need to be provided. For both purposes, Avalokitavrata’s work is invaluable. Also, since the subcommentary quotes the entire Prajñāpradīpa, it is sometimes helpful in
establishing the text.

An English-Tibetan-Sanskrit glossary has been provided for important terms. Although we do not have the Sanskrit text of the Prajñāpradīpa, the Tibetan practice of using standardized translation equivalents enables one to infer the Sanskrit original of many terms with a high degree of confidence. Sanskrit terms in the glossary are given in the translation in parentheses at their first occurrence, unless the English translation equivalent is so widely used that this seems unnecessary. Sanskrit and Tibetan words and phrases which are not in the glossary are also sometimes quoted in parentheses, especially when the translation is a bit conjectural.

Notes to Introduction

1For the convenience of the reader, the introductions to my translations of chapters one and two of the Prajñāpradīpa (Ames (1993) and (1995)) and chapters three, four, and five (Ames (1999)) are repeated here, except that material specific to those chapters has been replaced by a discussion of chapters six and seven. For more details on all the matters discussed in this introduction, see Ames (1986), "Part I: Introduction," and the sources cited therein.

2As a general rule, "Madhyamaka" is the name of the school and its philosophy; a follower of the school is called a "Mādhyamika." See Ruegg (1981), p. 1 and n. 3.

3See, e.g., MMK 7-34 and 17-33.

4See, e.g., chapter 23 of the MMK, which is discussed in Ames (1988a).

5See MMK 15-8.

6On the Akutobhayā, see Huntington (1986).

7There is also a Chinese translation of a commentary ascribed to Asaṅga which deals only with the dedicatory verses of MMK (MMK 1-A,B). See Ruegg (1981), p. 49, and Keenan (1989).

8In this connection, it is interesting to note that in his commentary on MMK 2-19 (see Ames (1995)), Bhāvaviveka admits that Nāgārjuna gives a prasaṅga argument. In his commentary on MMK 1-1 (see Ames (1993), pp. 222-3, 225-6, 234) and elsewhere, Bhāvaviveka criticizes Buddhapālita's prasaṅga arguments because, among other reasons, they could be converted into syllogisms asserting things which Buddhapālita does not, in fact, wish to say. For example, Bhāvaviveka claims that Buddhapālita's prasaṅga argument against things' originating from themselves could be converted into a syllogism showing that things originate from another. In the case of MMK 2-19, however, Bhāvaviveka converts Nāgārjuna's prasaṅga argument against a goer and his or her going's being the same into a syllogism which simply negates sameness without asserting difference. Thus Bhāvaviveka seems inconsistent, if not biased, on this point.


p. 244 nn. 102, 103, 114; p. 246 nn. 133, 135; p. 250 nn. 197, 199; and also Ames (1994), p. 129 nn. 98, 102.

11 See Bhāvaviveka's commentary following MMK 6-4b and n. 42 to my translation.

12 All the meanings cited in this discussion of rāga and rakta are taken from Monier-Williams (1899), pp. 861, 872.

13 See the references cited in note 1 to my translation of chapter seven.

14 The connection with magical illusions is made in the commentary immediately following 7-16cd and the last part of the commentary following 7-17d.

15 The question of Bhāvaviveka and the Sautrāntikas is discussed more extensively in Ames (1988b).

16 See PSP 177.

17 For a much more extensive discussion of these issues, see Lopez (1988).


19 For the Prajñāpradīpa, the Peking edition is text no. 5253; the Derge edition is no. 3853.

20 For Avalokitavrata's ūkā, the Peking edition is text no. 5259; the Derge edition is no. 3859.
Translation of *Prajñāpradīpa*, Chapter Six:
Examination of Desire (rāga) and the One Who Desires (rakta)

Now [Nāgārjuna] begins the sixth chapter with the aim of showing that desire, the one who desires, hatred (dveṣa), the one who hates (dvīṣa), and so on have no intrinsic nature, by means of negating a particular counterposition (vipaksa) to emptiness.

*Objection:*²

**[Thesis:]** In ultimate reality, the aggregates, elements (*dhātu*), and āyatanas do indeed exist,

**[Reason:]** because the Blessed One has taught affliction (*samklesa*) and [its] disadvantages (*ādīnava*) based on those [aggregates: elements, and āyatanas].

**[Dissimilar Example:]** Here, as for that which does not exist, the Blessed One has not taught affliction and [its] disadvantages based on that. For example, [he has not taught affliction and its disadvantages based on] the hairs of a tortoise.

**[Application:]** The Blessed One has taught affliction and [its] disadvantages based on the aggregates, etc.:

One who desires does not know dharmas; one who desires does not see dharmas.

[When] a person adheres to desire, then [his or her] darkness becomes deep darkness.

One who hates does not know dharmas; one who hates does not see dharmas.

[When] a person adheres to hatred, then [his or her] darkness becomes deep darkness.

One who is confused does not know dharmas; one who is confused does not see dharmas.

[When] a person adheres to confusion, then [his or her] darkness becomes deep darkness.³

**[Conclusion:]** Therefore, by the evidence (*upapatti*) of the stated reason, the aggregates, elements, and āyatanas do indeed exist.

**Answer:** Desire and so on and the faults of their disadvantages are taught based on a collection of conditioned factors in which the function of desire and so on is predominant. Those [afflictions and their disadvantages] are like magical illusions, mirages, dreams, and cities of the gandharvas. They exist conventionally but not in ultimate reality. Therefore [we] will
examine those very [afflictions].

Here, do you maintain that the one who desires [exists] prior to desire or subsequent [to desire] or that desire and the one who desires exist together? [Do you maintain that] desire [exists] prior to the one who desires or subsequently or that desire and the one who desires exist together? As to that, to begin with, [Nāgārjuna says,]

If prior to desire, one who desires existed without desire ... [MMK 6-1ab]

The rest of the phrase is, "If prior to desire, someone who who desires existed without desire ..." "Desire" (rāga), "attachment," and "clinging" (adhyavasāna) are synonyms. [The meaning of 6-1b] is, "If without that [desire] and apart [from it], someone [who desires] existed without relation to desire." Without ripening, it is not possible that there is a ripened fruit; [but] it is not the case that one who desires is likewise not possible [without desire].

What results from this hypothesis [that one who desires exists prior to desire]?

Desire would exist in dependence on that [one who desires]. [MMK 6-1c]

Desire would exist in dependence on that one who desires; one could say, "This is the desire of this one who desires."

Well, in that case, although there was no desire, that [person without desire] would just be one who desires. [But, in fact,]

If one who desires existed, desire would [necessarily] exist. [MMK 6-1d]

If [that person] were [already] one who desires, the origination of desire would just be pointless for him [or her]. Therefore that [hypothesis] is not maintained.

Thus because here [in MMK 6-1] there is a prasaṅga-argument, by reversing the original meaning [one has the following] inference: [Thesis:] One who desires is characterized by (tshul can) necessary connection with desire, [Reason:] because he [or she] is related [to desire], [Example:] like desire's own self.
Objection: In the Abhidharma definition (laksana), it is said,

[The cause] called "universal" (sarvatraga) is [a cause] of afflicting (klista) dharmas belonging to [its] own stage (bhumi). [It consists of] previous universal dharmas. [AK 2-54ab]

Hence the very one who desires is the cause of desire; therefore there is no fault [in our position].

Answer:

Even if one who desires exists, how will desire exist? [MMK 6-2ab]

[This is so] because here when desire arises in one who does not [yet] desire, [his or her becoming one who desires] depends on [desire as] a causal condition for [his or her] being called "one who desires." But that [pre-existing one who desires] has [already] become "one who desires" by means of that very [propensity for] desire by which one who has become one who desires is called "one who desires." For [that person who is already one who desires], the origination of desire is pointless. [This is so also] because there is no inference showing that [i.e., that there is one who desires even before desire exists]. "How will [desire] exist?" [means] that it is not possible. The idea is,

Even if one who desires exists, how will desire exist? [MMK 6-2ab]

Alternatively, [one can explain MMK 6-2ab as follows:]

[Thesis:] Devadatta who [already] desires is not an immediate cause (mgon sum gyi rgyu) of that desire which originates in Devadatta's series, [Reason:] because he is [already] one who desires, [Example:] like Yajñadatta who desires.

Objection: That is not possible. If [your] position is that one who desires is not a cause of desire in a series separate [from his or her own, that] establishes what is [already] established [for us]. [If your position is that one who desires is not a cause of desire in a series] which is not separate [from his or her own, that position] has a contradictory meaning.

Answer: That is not good. Since [our] position is that one who desires is not a cause of desire in [his or her own] series, which is not separate, [we] do not establish what is [already] established [for you]. [We] negate [any alleged] counterexamples in the same way as [the negation] to be established, because [those alleged counterexamples] are of the same kind as
what is to be established. Therefore [our position] also does not have a contradictory meaning.\textsuperscript{19}

\textit{Objection:} [Your] example does not exist [1] because it is accepted that by offering [Devadatta things] which give rise to desire, Yajñadatta who desires is a cause of the origination of desire in Devadatta's series and [2] because one who desires, belonging to one series, is also a cause of the origination of desire in another series, by means of [being] a nonobstructing cause.\textsuperscript{20}

\textit{Answer:} That, too, is not [logically] possible. That [objection of yours] is a specious refutation [1] because [we] negate [the proposition] that [Devadatta who desires] is a special (\textit{asādhāraṇa}) cause [of the desire which originates in his own series], [2] because [things] which give rise to desire, such as flowers and ointments, are causes of the conceptual construction of desire,\textsuperscript{21} and [3] because there is a particular [property] to be proved [in our syllogism].\textsuperscript{22}

But if [you] maintain that desire exists prior to the one who desires, even so,

The same method also [applies] to the one who desires, whether desire [already] exists or not. [MMK 6-2cd]

The meaning is that the method of negation will be stated below. How? To explain just that, [one can interchange "desire" and "one who desires" in MMK 6-1,2:]

If prior to one who desires, desire existed without one who desires ... [Compare MMK 6-1ab]

If prior to one who desires, some desire existed without one who desires, one who desires would not [then] exist.

Moreover,

One who desires would exist in dependence on that [desire]. [Compare MMK 6-1c]

One who desires would exist in dependence on that desire [which first exists] without one who desires; one could say, "This one is impassioned\textsuperscript{23} by this desire." If so, there would be this fault: Here one establishes the activity expressed by a verb (\textit{bhāva}) [according to the rule,] "Because it impassions, it is desire;"\textsuperscript{24} but since the activity expressed by a verb is dependent on a
basis, [that activity] does not exist prior to [its] basis.\textsuperscript{25} For example, cooking does not exist before the rice gruel [which is cooked].

If [you] maintain that desire exists without relation to one who desires, [we reply that, on the contrary,]

If desire existed, one who desires would [necessarily] exist. [Compare MMK 6-1d]

That is not maintained, just as it is not possible that [the activity of] cooking originates without relation to the cooked [food] itself.

Here also, because there is a prasaṅga-argument,\textsuperscript{26} by reversing the original meaning, [one has the following] inference:

- **Thesis:** Desire is characterized by (tshul can) necessary connection with one who desires,
- **Reason:** because it is related [to one who desires],
- **Example:** like one who desires' own self.

**Objection:** It is possible that a son and so on exist even without [i. e., in the absence of] a father. Therefore [the reason in your syllogism] is inconclusive.\textsuperscript{27}

**Answer:** For just that reason, that also has been negated. Therefore that [objection of yours] does no harm [to our position].\textsuperscript{28}

**Objection:** [We] accept that the very moment of desire [which is] characterized by (tshul can) occurring previously - [that is, when] the moment of the one who desires which is about to originate is [still] nonexistent - is the cause of the later moment of the one who desires which is about to originate. Therefore there is no fault [in our position].\textsuperscript{29}

**Answer:**

Even if desire exists, how will one who desires exist? [Compare MMK 6-2ab]

[That is, he or she] will simply (eva) not exist. [This is so] because it is not established that a moment of desire which just [exists] at a different time causes a moment of the one who desires which will occur later to be affected by desire.\textsuperscript{30} For example, it is not possible that one [activity of] cooking makes another [i. e., quite separate thing] cooked.\textsuperscript{31} The idea is that it is not possible for a past moment of desire to cause one to be affected by desire\textsuperscript{32} now. Therefore [your position] will conflict with inference.

How will it conflict with that? [It will conflict with the following inference:]
Devadatta's desire is not the cause of Devadatta's being one who desires,
because it is desire,
like desire in a series separate from Devadatta's.

The same method also applies to desire, whether one who desires already exists or not. [Compare MMK 6-2cd]

Here there is no occasion for censure of our examination of desire and the one who desires as being former and later, because we have not shown a specious reason. But if, in order to avoid that fault [i.e., that desire and the one who desires cannot be established as being successive in time], you maintain that desire and the one who desires originate just together, in that case, too, listen!

It is not logically possible that desire and the one who desires originate just together (sahaiva). [MMK 6-3ab]

Why? On that hypothesis, one would have the following undesired consequence:

For desire and the one who desires would be mutually unrelated. [MMK 6-3cd]

There would not be a relation [such that one could say,] "This is the desire of this one who desires. This desire impassions this one." Therefore that is not maintained. [Rather,] it is maintained that those two are indeed related. Here by virtue of the property of the subject [which proves the thesis], the inference is:

There is no concomitance of desire and the one who desires, because they are related, like seed and sprout.

Objection: Here the Vaibhāṣikas say: What is the meaning of that reason [of yours]? [Does it mean] "because they are related as to origination" or "because they are related as to dependence on a particular expression"? If [your reason means] "because they are related as to origination," it is inconclusive. [This is so] [1] because mind and the companions of mind, which arise simultaneously, are also causes [of each other] through being simultaneously arisen causes and [2] because a lamp and [its] light
also arise simultaneously.\textsuperscript{36}

[The Vaibhāśikas continue:] If [your reason means] "because they are related as to dependence on a particular expression," in that case, too, [your reason] is inconclusive. [This is so] because again it is seen that the two horns of a cow, which arise simultaneously, are also dependent on a particular expression, [that is,] "This is the left [horn]; this is the right."\textsuperscript{37}

\textit{Answer:} The fault [in our reason] which [you] have stated does not exist. [This is so] because mind and the companions of mind and a lamp with [its] light arise just by virtue of [their] group [of causes and conditions]; therefore, even conventionally, concomitance [of things which are related as cause and effect] is not accepted.\textsuperscript{38} [It is so] also because the two horns of a cow are not established in ultimate reality.

Moreover, [if desire and the one who desires are supposed to exist together,] either concomitance is supposed in the case where desire and the one who desires are identical (ekatva) or else concomitance is supposed in the case where they are separate (prthaktva). As to that, to begin with, if concomitance is supposed in the case where they are identical, [Nāgārjuna says,]

In the case where they are identical, there is no concomitance. [MMK 6-4a]

That [pāda] sets forth the thesis.

That [does] not [exist] together with that very [thing]. [MMK 6-4b]

The idea is that [this is so] because there is concomitance for two [things, not for a single thing].\textsuperscript{39} Therefore that [second pāda] is also a statement of a similar example. Here the inference is:

[Thesis:] Desire does not originate together with the one who desires,
[Reason:] because they are identical,
[Example:] like that very desire's own self.\textsuperscript{40}

Therefore there will be conflict with [your] own inference.

\textit{Objection:} The ācārya [Nāgārjuna] has not stated the members [of a syllogism] completely; therefore [his argument] has the fault of being an incomplete proof.

\textit{Answer:} That is not good. [This is so] [1] because the statements of an ācārya are [highly] meaningful statements (artha-vākya)\textsuperscript{41} and [2] because [highly] meaningful statements give rise to great meanings (mahārtha); [thus] although [those statements] have few words, many syllogisms are established
[by them]. Moreover, the syllogisms [which I have stated as Nāgārjuna's commentator] are not defective. Alternatively, [those syllogisms] would not be [defective even if not all the members were explicitly stated], provided that even in that case, something is commonly known to someone from [the context of] the chapter or the doctrine [in question].

But if concomitance is supposed in the case where [desire and the one who desires] are separate, even so, when there is no concomitance in the noncontradictory case where they are identical, [Nāgārjuna asks,]

But if they are separate, how will they be concomitant? [MMK 6-4cd]

Concomitance simply does not exist in the case where [desire and the one who desires] are separate. The idea is that [this is so] [1] because there would be conflict with inference and [2] because there is no inference showing that concomitance exists in the case where they are separate.

Here also [in MMK 6-4cd], a thesis has been set forth. The property of the subject [which proves the thesis] is separateness. [This follows] from an examination of the thesis because [the thesis is that] concomitance does not exist in the case where [desire and the one who desires] are separate. For example, it is like [the argument that] if [something] is made, it is impermanent. Here, because it shows the meaning which one wishes to state (vivakṣita-artha), the inference is:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, desire and the one who desires are not concomitant,

[Reason:] because they are separate,

[Example:] like desire and one who is free from desire.

Therefore [the opponent's position] will be in conflict with the inference [just stated].

Moreover,

If there were concomitance in the case of identity, that [concomitance] would exist even without [there being] a companion. [MMK 6-5ab]

The context [of MMK 6-5ab] is "[in the case where] desire and the one who desires [originate] just together." It is not maintained that desire and the one who desires are concomitant without a companion. This [half-verse] has also shown that [their] being related is the [disproving] property of the concomitance of desire and the one who desires, which is to be negated.

Therefore the inference is:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the identity of desire and the one who desires
is not concomitance,
[Reason:] because they are related,
[Example:] like desire's own self.

[Buddhapālita's commentary:] Here [Buddhapālita]\(^{52}\) says: To begin with, if desire and the one who desires were concomitant even though they are identical, in that case, there would be concomitance even without a companion. How? Here "identical" (gcig, eka, literally, "one") refers to a single [thing] (gcig pu). Then the identity (ekatva) of "one cow and one horse" both refers to the cow and refers to the horse. Therefore it would follow that wherever identity exists, there concomitance [also] exists, and that even without a companion, concomitance would exist in just a single cow or just a single horse. Thus it would be pointless to suppose that [desire and the one who desires] are concomitant.

[Bhāvaviveka's critique:] That [explanation] is not [logically] possible, [1] because an undesired consequence\(^{53}\) belongs to neither proof (sādhana) nor refutation (dūsana) and [2] because, since one wishes to state those [i.e., proof of one's own position and refutation of the opponent's position], just those must be expressed; but they are not expressed [by Buddhapālita]. Likewise,

If there were concomitance in the case of separateness, that [concomitance] would exist even without [there being] a companion. [MMK 6-5cd]

The context [of MMK 6-5cd] is "[in the case where] desire and the one who desires [originate] just together." It is not maintained that desire or the one who desires is concomitant without a companion. This [half-verse], too, has also shown that [their] being related is the [disproving] property of the concomitance of desire and the one who desires, which is to be negated.\(^{54}\) Therefore the inference is:

[Thesis:] It is not maintained that in ultimate reality, concomitance exists in the case where desire and the one who desires are separate,
[Reason:] because they are related,
[Example:] like cause and result.\(^{55}\)

[Buddhapālita's commentary:] Here also [Buddhapālita]\(^{56}\) says: But even if [desire and the one who desires] were concomitant even though they are separate, in that case, too, there would be concomitance even without a companion. How? Here a horse is separate from a cow, and a cow is also separate from a horse. Therefore it would follow that wherever separateness exists, there concomitance [also] exists, and that even without a companion,
concomitance would exist just in a separate cow or just in a separate horse. In that case, also, it would be pointless to suppose that [desire and the one who desires] are concomitant.

[Bhāvaviveka’s critique:] That also is not [logically] possible, just as [Buddhapālita’s commentary on MMK 6-5ab] was answered before.

Moreover,

If there were concomitance in the case of separateness, what is the use [of concomitance] to desire and the one who desires? [MMK 6-6ab]

"Of concomitance" [is implied]. That has been shown [already].

[Thesis:] Those [i.e., desire and the one who desires] have no concomitance,

[Reason:] because they are separate,

[Example:] like desire and one who is free from desire.

Therefore [the opponent’s position] will conflict with [this] inference.

Again [Nāgārjuna] says,

If separateness (prthakprthagbhāva) is established ...

"Separate" (prthakprthak) means "mutually unrelated." "-ness" (bhāva) [means] "coming into existence" (ātmālābha).

Then those two would be concomitant. [MMK 6-6d]

If the separateness of desire and the one who desires is established, Nāgārjuna replies,

For what purpose (kim artham) do you imagine the concomitance of those two? [MMK 6-7]

"Those two" refers to desire and the one who desires.

Objection: [Concomitance] has the purpose of [establishing] the defining characteristic of relationship: "This is the desire of this one who desires. This one is impassioned by this desire."

Answer: That [argument of yours] has shown the reason which [in fact] negates the separateness of desire and the one who desires, [namely,] "because they are related." [Therefore,] even with a hostile mind, [you] cannot suppose that the meaning in that [reason] is unestablished.
Moreover, we have shown that separateness is not possible for desire and the one who desires, by means of [the argument] beginning with

If prior to desire, one who desires existed without desire ... [MMK 6-1ab]

And [so] you rely on the concomitance of those two in order to establish desire and the one who desires. In that case, too, we have negated [concomitance] by means of [the argument] beginning with

It is not [logically] possible that desire and the one who desires originate just together ... [MMK 6-3ab]

That concomitance is also not maintained, because [desire and the one who desires] are related. 64 [We] have [also] negated concomitance because it is identity, 65 by means of [the half-verse,]

In the case where they are identical, there is no concomitance. That [does] not [exist] together with that very [thing]. [MMK 6-4ab]

And [so] again you accept separateness in order to establish that [concomitance]! Hence [Nāgārjuna asks,]

Since [desire and the one who desires] are not established separately, do you therefore maintain 66 that they are concomitant?

In order to establish concomitance, do you again maintain that they are separate? 67 [MMK 6-8]

When [it is the case that]

Since separateness is not established, concomitance is not established, [MMK 6-9ab]

Then, venerable one,

In regard to what separateness do you maintain concomitance? [MMK 6-9cd]

Just tell [us] that! [In other words,] do you maintain [that there is] concomitance for [two] separate [things] which originate successively or for
[two] separate [things] which originate together (sahaja)? As to that, if [you] say that [there is concomitance] for [two] separate [things] which originate successively, [that sort of concomitance] is not possible. That has been shown before:

[Thesis: In ultimate reality, desire and the one who desires are not concomitant.]
[Reason:] because they are separate,
[Example:] like desire and one who is free from desire. 68

But if [you] say that [there is concomitance] for [two] separate [things] which originate together, [that sort of concomitance is also not possible]. That, too, has been shown before:

[Thesis: There is no concomitance of desire and the one who desires,]
[Reason:] because they are related,
[Example:] like seed and sprout. 69

Because, in that way, desire and the one who desires are not established as concomitant or nonconcomitant, therefore [Nāgārjuna] sums up,

Thus desire is not established together or not together with one who desires. [MMK 6-10ab]

One should understand [that this implies] "according to the investigation which has been shown previously." [MMK 6-10ab] is the conclusion [of the argument concerning desire and the one who desires].

One should specify that, according to the method which has been shown, all dharmas are also not established as concomitant or nonconcomitant. In order to show that [the case] is similar, [Nāgārjuna says,]

Like desire, all dharmas are not established70 together or not together. [MMK 6-10cd]

Like desire, all external and internal dharmas, such as hatred, confusion, and so on, are also not established as concomitant or nonconcomitant.

Therefore, since in that way desire and so on are not established in ultimate reality, the meaning of that reason stated by opponents at the beginning of [this] chapter - "because [the Blessed One] has taught affliction and [its] disadvantages based on those [aggregates, elements, and āyata­nas]" 71 - is not established. If [that] reason is stated according to superficial reality, [its] meaning is contradictory. 72

In that connection, here the meaning of the chapter is [as follows:] By
describing the fault in the reason stated by the opponent, it has been shown
that desire, the one who desires, and so on have no intrinsic nature.

Therefore [scriptural] statements such as the following are established: 73

Mañjuśrī, desire does not exist; the designation of desire 74 does not
exist. Hatred does not exist; the designation of hatred does not exist.
Confusion does not exist; the designation of confusion does not exist. Desire
is enlightenment (bodhi). Hatred is enlightenment. Confusion is enlighten­
ment. How does one rightly proceed (yang dag par zhugs pa)? When one
does not proceed in order to put an end to desire, [when] one does not
proceed in order to put an end to hatred, [when] one does not proceed in
order to put an end to confusion, then one proceeds rightly. The past mind
(citta) does not desire, because it has [already] passed; the future mind does
not desire, because it has not [yet] come. The present mind, too, does not
desire, because the present has no duration (gnas pa med pa). 75

Likewise, [from the Bhagavati-prajñā-pāramitā-suvikrāntavikrāmi­
sūtra,] 76

Suvikrāntavikrāmin, matter does not have the property of desire
(rāgadharmin) or the property of being free from desire (virāgadharmin).
Feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition also do not
have the property of desire or the property of being free from desire. The
fact that matter does not have the property of desire or the property of being
free from desire 77 is the perfection of discernment. The fact that feeling,
perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition do not have the
property of desire or the property of being free from desire is the perfection
of discernment.

Matter does not have the property of hatred or the property of being free
from hatred. Feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and
cognition also do not have the property of hatred or the property of being
free from hatred. The fact that matter does not have the property of hatred
or the property of being free from hatred is the perfection of discernment.
The fact that feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cog­
nition do not have the property of hatred or the property of being free from
hatred is the perfection of discernment.

Matter does not have the property of confusion or the property of being
free from confusion. Feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and
cognition also do not have the property of confusion or the property of being
free from confusion. The fact that matter does not have the property of
confusion or the property of being free from confusion is the perfection of
discernment. The fact that feeling, perception/conception, mental forma­
tions, and cognition do not have the property of confusion or the property
of being free from confusion is the perfection of discernment.

Suvikrāntavikrāmin, matter does not become afflicted or purified (na...samkliśaye vā vyavadāyate vā). Feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition also do not become afflicted or purified. The fact that matter does not become afflicted or purified (asamklesatā-avyavadānata) is the perfection of discernment. The fact that feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition do not become afflicted or purified is the perfection of discernment.

The sixth chapter, "Examination of Desire and the one who Desires," of the Prajñāpradīpa, a commentary on [Nāgārjuna's] Mūlamadhyamaka composed by ācārya Bhavyakara/Bhavyakāra (legs ldan byed) [is concluded].

Notes to Translation of Chapter Six

1Avalokitavrata explains, "Emptiness is [our] own position. The counterposition to that is the opponent's position." See Ava P 100b-7, D90a-7 to 90b-1.
2Avalokitavrata attributes this objection to "fellow Buddhists." See Ava P 101b-3,4; D91a-3,4.
3Avalokitavrata does not give the source of this quotation. Similar verses occur in the Iti-vuttaka (p. 84) and are quoted with variants in the Mahānīdādesa (pp. 15-16). (Page references are to the Pali Text Society editions.)
4Although the Tibetan of the commentary contains a few more morphemes than the Tibetan of the verse, it is not clear what the commentary adds to the sense of the verse. Avalokitavrata explains that the idea here is that the one who desires exists first and that desire later arises in dependence on that pre-existing one who desires. See Ava P 101a-8 to 103b-5, D92b-7 to 93a-4.
5Here chags pa probably translates saṅga or sakti. Compare PSP 138.6
6This sentence expresses the opponent's reason for holding that one who desires exists prior to desire. See Ava P 104a-1 to 6, D93b-1 to 5.
7Because, according to this hypothesis, one who desires exists prior to desire, in the absence of desire. Thus even someone free from desire would be "one who desires." See Ava P 104b-2,3,4; D94a-2,3,4.
8The point being made in MMK 6-1d seems to be the following: The opponent here holds that one who desires exists prior to desire. In fact, that is impossible, because such a view leads to the absurd consequences (prasaṅga) pointed out in the commentary. Thus one who desires is necessarily connected with desire. (Compare the syllogism which follows.)
9Being already "one who desires" by intrinsic nature, even in the absence of desire, the origination of desire would make no difference to him or her. See Ava P 104b-6,7; D94a-6.
11Here the nine bhūmis are the realm of desire (kāmadhātu), the four dhyānas of the realm of form (rūpadhātu), and the four ārūpyas of the formless realm
That is, every universal (sarvatraga) dharma is a universal (sarvatraga) cause of every future afflictive dharma belonging to its own stage. The universal dharmas are eleven of the fifty-eight anusayas ("negative propensities" or "latent afflictions;" see LVP AK V, pp. 6-7) and the dharmas coexisting with those eleven anusayas (except for the prāptis). See LVP AK II, pp. 268-9; AK 5-12,13 with the bhāsya (LVP AK V, pp. 31-4); and Ava P105b-4 to 106a-6, D95a-3 to 95b-4.

Avalokitavrata explains that in all ordinary persons (prthag-jana), the unmanifest propensities for the afflictions exist. Thus, since they have the propensity for desire, all ordinary persons can be called "one who desires." When the right conditions are present, that latent desire becomes manifested; and then one says that desire has originated. Thus the one who desires (in the sense of possessing the propensity for desire) is a cause of (manifest) desire. See Ava P106a-2 to 6, D95b-1 to 4; note that he quotes AK 5-34.

Here the Sanskrit of PSP has rakte 'sati punā, corresponding to chags pa med par gyur na yang, "even if one who desires did not exist." The Tibetan of PSP, however, agrees with the other commentaries in having yod rather than med. See PSP 138.11 and p. 139 n. 1 and Saito (1984), translation, p. 250 n. 3.

Avalokitavrata explains that according to worldly convention, one who does not desire becomes one who desires when he or she is conjoined with desire; thus his or her becoming "one who desires" depends on desire as a causal condition. On the other hand, the origination of desire is pointless if one is already one who desires simply by virtue of having the propensity for desire. See Ava P106b-1,2,3; D95b-7 to 96a-1.

If you hold that Devadatta who desires is not a cause of the origination of desire in Yajñadatta's series, that is also established for us. But if you hold that Devadatta who desires is not a cause of the origination of desire in his own series, that is contradictory. In particular, your example contradicts your thesis, since Yajñadatta who desires is a cause of the origination of desire in his own series. See Ava P107a-2 to 8, D96a-7 to 96b-6.

Our argument proves that, like Devadatta who desires, Yajñadatta who desires is also not an immediate cause of the desire which originates in his own series. Thus there is no counterexample. See Ava P107b-4 to 7, D97a-2 to 5; and compare MMK 4-8,9.

Every dharma is a nonobstructing cause of every conditioned dharma, except itself. See AK 2-50a and LVP AK II, pp. 246-8.

That is, our thesis is that Devadatta who desires is not the immediate cause
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(mgon sum gyi rgyu, perhaps sākṣāt-kāraṇa) of desire which originates in his own series. We do not say that he is not a cause of it at all. See Ava P108b-8 to 109a-2, D98a-4,5,6.

23 chags so, probably rajyate.
24 chags par byed pas 'dod chags so, probably rāṇjayātī ṛāgaḥ.
25 That is, desire which impassions no one is not desire; desire cannot exist without someone who desires. Here the "basis" (gzhi, probably ādhāra) referred to is the direct object of desire's activity of impassioning, that is, the one who desires. See Ava P110a-4,5,6; D99a-7 to 99b-1.

26 See note 10.
27 The opponent's idea is that although father and son are mutually related, the son may still exist when the father is dead or absent. See Ava P111a-8 to 111b-2, D100b-2 to 5.
28 Just as we have refuted the idea that desire and the one who desires have a relation such that one comes first and the other later, so also we have (implicitly) refuted the idea that father and son have such a relation. See Ava P111b-3,4; D100b-5,6.
29 According to Avalokitavrata, the opponent holds that desire pre-exists in a latent state (i. e., as an anuṣaya). When it encounters the right causal conditions, it becomes manifest as actual desire; and then it impassions the one who desires. Therefore it is not the case that desire's activity of impassioning exists without a basis, i. e., a direct object. See Ava P111b-7 to 112a-3, D101a-2 to 5.
30 Literally, "a moment of desire ... makes a moment of the one who desires ... into one who desires," 'dod chags kyi skad cig ma ... kyis chags pa'i skad cig ma ... chags pa nyid du byed par ...
Avalokitavrata remarks that the conventional designation, "one who desires," is said according to mere superficial reality but does not exist in ultimate reality. See Ava P112b-1 to 4, D101b-3,4,5.
31 When Devadatta cooks at home, his activity of cooking does not cook rice gruel in Yajñadatta's house. Likewise, an earlier moment of desire does not impassion a later moment of one who desires. See Ava P112b-4 to 8, D101b-5 to 102a-2.
32 ... chags pa nyid du byed par ...
33 Ihan cig gi dngos po, sahabhiiva; see MMK 6-9. (For the most part, the Tibetan translation of sahabhiiva in this chapter is Ihan cig nyid.) Since sahabhiiva (literally, "existence together") implies both simultaneity in time and proximity in space, I have translated it as "concomitance." In this chapter, the emphasis is on sahabhiiva as simultaneity, as opposed to successive existence in time.
34 The companions of [a moment of] mind (citta-anuvartin) are listed in AK 2-51.
35 See AK 2-50cd.
36 A lamp and its light are related and also originate together. The same is true of mind and its companion dharmas. See Ava P114b-8 to 115b-1, D103b-6 to 104a-6.
37 Thus the two horns of a cow are related and also originate together.
Mind and its companion dharmas do not originate because of each other but because of their shared group of causes and conditions. Thus their cause-and-effect relationship is with those causes and conditions, not with each other; and they do not exist at the same time as (and thus are not concomitant with) those causes and conditions. The same can be said of a lamp and its light. See Ava P115b-8 to 116a-8, D104b-5 to 105a-3; and compare the position of the Sautrāntikas in LVP AK II, pp. 253-5.

A single cow is identical with itself; but one does not say that a single cow exists together (i.e., is concomitant) with that same single cow. See Ava P116b-7 to 117a-2, D105b-2,3,4.

One does not say that desire exists together with its own self. See Ava P117a-5,6,7; D105b-7 to 106a-1.

Avalokitarāta says that the ācārya is an author of aphorisms (sūtra-kāra) and that aphorisms are merely [condensed] statements of the meaning (don snos pa tsam, perhaps artha-graha-mātra). See Ava P117b-1,2; D106a-3,4.

Candrakirti seems almost to quote this sentence in PSP 25.3. The Tibetan translation of the Prajñāpradīpa has: ... slob dpon gyi tshig dag ni don gyi tshig dag (P om. dag) yin pa'i phyir dang | don gyi tshig dag gis ni don chen po dag skyed par byed de | tshig nyung ngu nyid yin yang sbyor ba'i tshig du ma dag 'grub pa'i phyir ro | (P119a-4,5; D98a-2; C98a-1,2). The Sanskrit of the Prasannapadā reads: athārthavākyatvād ācāryavākyānām mahārhatve saty anekaprayoganiṣṭhātutvam parikalpyate ... (PSP 25.3,4). See also PSP 23.1.

See Ava P117b-2 to 6, D106a-4 to 7.

That is, if some member of the syllogism is obvious to both proponent and opponent, either from the context of the discussion or from their knowledge of the doctrine being discussed, it need not be stated explicitly. See Ava P117b-7 to 118a-1, D106a-7 to 106b-1.

According to Avalokitavrata, in the opinion of the world, identity and concomitance are not incompatible; but when one examines the matter, concomitance is not possible in the case of identity. If even in that case, concomitance is not possible, how will it be possible that two separate things are concomitant? For concomitance and separateness are opposites. See Ava P118a-2 to 5, D106b-3,4,5.

The Madhyamika has an inference showing that concomitance does not exist in the case where they are separate, and the opponent has no inference showing the opposite. See Ava P118a-6,7; D106b-6,7.

See Ava P118b-1,2; D107a-1,2,3. Here "thesis" translates phyogs, pakṣa, glossed by Avalokitavrata as dam bca' ba'i phyogs, pratiṣṇā-pakṣa.

That is, if the thesis is that what is made is impermanent, then from an examination of that thesis, one sees that the proving property is the fact of being made. Likewise, here the thesis is that what is separate is not concomitant; and the proving property is separateness. See Ava P118b-2,3,4; D107a-3,4.

This translation follows the Sanskrit. The Tibetan of MMK 6-5a translates as, "If a single [thing] were concomitant ... " The idea is that if desire and the one who desires were identical, they would be one single thing. But one single thing
is not said to be concomitant with itself.  

50 Compare MMK 6-3ab.  

51 That is, in the following syllogism, the fact that desire and the one who desires are related is the reason which proves that if they are identical, they are not concomitant. Compare the syllogism following MMK 6-3cd and also the syllogism following MMK 6-4b.  


54 That is, in the following syllogism, the fact that desire and the one who desires are related is the reason which proves that if they are separate, they are not concomitant.  

55 Due to their causal relationship, cause and result cannot exist at the same time (the cause must precede the result); and thus they are not concomitant. Compare the syllogism following MMK 6-3cd.  


57 According to Avalokitavrata, this is a reply to an opponent who says that separateness does not exist only in desire or only in the one who desires but instead is a general result of their originating together. Thus it exists in the two of them when they have originated together. According to Bhāvaviveka, Nāgārjuna's reply means that it has already been shown that two things which are separate cannot be concomitant. See Ava P120b-5 to 8, D109a-3,4,5.  

58 See the syllogism following MMK 6-4cd.  

59 According to Avalokitavrata, MMK 6-6cd means that if, as the opponent holds, separateness exists in the two when they have originated together, it follows that separateness is established first and then concomitance. Nāgārjuna refutes this position in MMK 6-7. See Ava P121a-1,2,3; D109a-7 to 109b-1.  

60 Avalokitavrata points out that concomitance is contrary (mi mthun pa) to separateness. See Ava P121a-5,6; D109b-2,3.  

61 dgos pa, probably prayojana.  

62 Compare the syllogism following MMK 6-1d.  

63 In other words, the opponent contradicts himself by asserting that desire and the one who desires are both separate and related.  

64 See the syllogism following MMK 6-3cd.  

65 Apparently, the idea is that since separateness has been eliminated as a possibility, the only remaining alternative is identity.  

66 vikānksasi, translated by 'dod byed.  

67 Here MMK 6-8ab and 6-8cd are translated as two rhetorical questions, as the Tibetan takes them. In the Sanskrit, they seem to be two statements.  

68 See the syllogism following MMK 6-4cd.  

69 See the syllogism following MMK 6-3cd.  

70 PDC have 'gyur, as does N107a-2, while Ava P122b-2, D110b-5 have 'grub in MMK 6-10d. The Sanskrit (as given in PSP 142.10) corresponds to 'grub. My translation follows the Sanskrit and Ava.
See the opponent's initial syllogism at the beginning of this chapter.

It is contradictory to try to prove a thesis about ultimate reality using a reason which is valid only in superficial reality.

See Ames (1999), p. 45 n. 149; Avalokitavrata's remarks are similar here. See Ava: (1) P123a-3, 4, 5, D111a-5, 6; (2) P123b-1, D111b-2, 3; and (3) P124a-5 to 8, D112a-6 to 112b-2.

'dod chags su gdags pa, probably rāga-prajñāpatti.

Identified by Avalokitavrata only as "from the whole [corpus of] Mahāyāna sūtras (iheg pa chen po'i mdo sde mtha' dag las)." See Ava P123a-5, D111a-6, 7.

Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P123b-1, 2; D111b-3. The Sanskrit of the first three paragraphs is found in Hikata (1958), p. 32; the Sanskrit of the last paragraph is in ibid., p. 30.

... rūpavedanāsamjñāsamskāravijñānānām na rāgadharmatā nāpi virāgadharmatā ... Note that the Sanskrit (Hikata (1958), p. 32) condenses this and the following sentence into one sentence. It does the same with the corresponding sentences concerning hatred, confusion, and affliction and purification (ibid., pp. 32, 30).

See Ames (1999), p. 46 n. 159.
Translation of *Prajñāpradīpa*, Chapter Seven: Examination of Origination, Duration, and Cessation

Now [Nāgārjuna] begins the seventh chapter with the aim of showing that the aggregates and so on have no intrinsic nature, by means of negating a particular counterposition (vipakṣa) to emptiness.

**Objection:**

**[Thesis:]** One should grasp that conditioned [dharmas], the aggregates, elements, and āyatanas, do indeed have the intrinsic nature of conditioned [dharmas],

**[Reason:]** because they possess origination, etc., the defining characteristics of the conditioned.

**[Dissimilar Example:]** Here that which does not exist is not grasped as possessing the defining characteristics of the conditioned; for example, a hare’s horn [does not possess those characteristics].

**[Application:]** The aggregates and so on do possess origination, etc., the defining characteristics of the conditioned.

**[Conclusion:]** Therefore, by virtue of the stated reason, [we] who possess trained minds say that conditioned [dharmas], the aggregates and so on, do indeed have the intrinsic nature of conditioned [dharmas].

**Answer:** In this [context], are those [characteristics,] origination and so on—which [you] maintain are defining characteristics of the conditioned—themselves conditioned; or are they unconditioned? If [you] say that those [characteristics] are conditioned, in that case, to begin with, [Nāgārjuna] says in regard to origination:

If origination is conditioned, that [origination] will possess the three characteristics (tteva yuktā trilakaṃ). [MMK 7-1ab]

"[That origination] will possess the three characteristics" [means] "the three characteristics will come together [in that]," just as [one says,] "possessing the three staves." Therefore,

**[Thesis:]** In ultimate reality, [if] origination and so on [are] themselves conditioned, [then they] are not maintained to be defining characteristics of the conditioned,

**[Reason:]** because they are conditioned,

**[Example:]** like the thing which they characterize (laksya).

**Objection:** A thing characterized [may] also be a defining characteristic which characterizes another thing characterized. Therefore [the example in your syllogism] is inconclusive.
**Answer:** A thing characterized does not characterize another thing characterized as being conditioned. Therefore, since there is no counterexample, [our example] is not inconclusive.

**Objection:** Even if origination and so on are themselves conditioned, [nevertheless] since they [respectively] cause [the thing which they characterize] to originate, to endure, and to cease, they are indeed defining characteristics of the conditioned.

**Answer:** Since there is no positive concomitance [with a similar example], [your argument] is a mere assertion.

[Conventionally,] [the activity of] originating [is called] "origination;" [the activity of] enduring [is called] "duration;" and [the activity of] ceasing [is called] "cessation." But [you] have nihilistically negated [the fact] that origination and so on are activities because [you] have accepted that they are agents. Even conventionally, if [origination] is the agent [which causes a conditioned thing to originate],

[Thesis:] Origination is not a defining characteristic of the conditioned,

[Reason:] because it causes [conditioned things] to originate,

[Example:] just as a father [begets his son and so] is not a defining characteristic of [his] son.

Likewise,

[Thesis:] Duration, too, is not a defining characteristic of the conditioned,

[Reason:] because [according to you,] it causes [conditioned things] to endure,

[First Example:] just as food causes the body to endure and so is not a defining characteristic of the body,

[Second Example:] or just as a female servant who carries a jar (bum thogs ma) sets the jar [in place] and so is not a defining characteristic of the jar.

Likewise,

[Thesis:] Cessation, too, is not a defining characteristic of the conditioned,

[Reason:] because [according to you,] it causes conditioned things to cease,

[Example:] just as a hammer destroys [a jar] and so is not a defining characteristic of the jar.

Therefore in that way, since it is not established that origination and so on are defining characteristics of the conditioned, the meaning of the reason [in the opponent's syllogism] is not established; or else it has a contradictory meaning. Therefore since one wishes to get rid of the fault stated [in MMK 7-1ab], one should not understand [the matter] in that way, [that is,] that origination is [itself] conditioned. Thus to begin with, [we] have pointed out the fault that if origination is conditioned, it is not possible that it is a
defining characteristic of the conditioned.

If, out of a desire to be rid of the stated fault, [you] maintain [that origination is unconditioned], [Nāgārjuna replies,]

But if origination is unconditioned, how [can it be] a defining characteristic of the conditioned? [MMK 7-1cd]

[That is,] origination is not a defining characteristic of the conditioned. The idea is that [this is so] because the unconditioned does not itself exist.

Alternatively, [one can explain MMK 7-1cd as follows:] The property of the unconditioned [which proves the thesis] is [the fact] that it is unconditioned. Hence [we have the following syllogism:] [Thesis:] In ultimate reality, an unconditioned origination cannot be a defining characteristic of the conditioned,
[Reason:] because it is unconditioned,
[Example:] like space.
Therefore [to say that origination is unconditioned] conflicts with [your] own inference.9

Because "origination" is used [in] the manner of a word which implies more than its literal meaning,10 both duration and cessation are also included [implicitly], since [the opponent] alleges that they are defining characteristics of the conditioned. Since those two [characteristics] are also negated in that [same] way, it is not necessary to express the negation of those two also.11

Moreover, here if these [characteristics,] origination and so on, are supposed to be defining characteristics of the conditioned, it must be supposed that they [are defining characteristics] either separately or in combination. As to that, to begin with, [Nāgārjuna says,]

The three, origination and so on, are not adequate separately for the function of characterizing the conditioned. [MMK 7-2ab,c1]

The three, origination and so on, are not adequate separately for the function of characterizing the conditioned. The idea is that [this is so] because the combined defining characteristics [of an ox], a dewlap, etc., are able to characterize the thing which they characterize [but they are not able to do so separately].

Even if [you] accept that origination and so on occur successively, an entity which has not [yet] originated does not have origination, duration, and cessation. Therefore [origination and so on] lack the power to function as defining characteristics of the conditioned [in the case of a conditioned entity]
which has not yet originated]. Also, in the case of [an entity] which has [already] ceased, because the thing characterized does not exist, [its] origination, duration, and cessation do not exist. Therefore they lack the power of functioning as defining characteristics of the conditioned [in the case of a conditioned entity which has already ceased].

In the case of [an entity] which has [already] originated [but which has not yet ceased], origination does not exist; therefore [duration and cessation also do not exist]12 For [an entity] which [presently] endures, cessation is not possible; therefore [origination and duration also do not exist].13 [An entity] which [presently] endures is connected with impermanence; therefore [even duration is not a defining characteristic of a presently existing conditioned entity].14 Thus also [Āryadeva]15 says:

**Without duration, how could an entity exist? Since it is impermanent, how could it endure?**

If at first it endures, it will not finally grow old. [*Catuḥśataka 11-17]*
If it is always impermanent, it will never endure.
Alternatively, after having been permanent, it would later become impermanent.16 [*Catuḥśataka 11-23]*
If an entity had duration together with impermanence,
Either [its] impermanence would be false, or [its] duration would be untrue.17 [*Catuḥśataka 11-24]*

But if [you] maintain that origination, etc., in combination are defining characteristics of the conditioned, even so, [Nāgārjuna replies,]

**Even if they are combined, how could they exist in one [thing] at one time?** [*MMK 7-2c2,d]*

The meaning of the sentence is that those combined do not exist in one conditioned entity at one time.

**Objection:** How is that ascertained?

**Answer:** [It is so] because it is not [logically] possible for those who are sane18 to suppose that the originated, the enduring, and the ceased - which are quite incompatible [with each other] - occur in any entity at one time.

**Objection:** The Sautrāntikas19 say: In [a particular] series which has arisen from the power of specific causes and conditions, at one and the same time [four defining characteristics of the conditioned exist as follows:] Origination is that which is the arising of an entity which is about to originate, which has not arisen [previously]. Duration is continuation by
means of the series of successive preceding moments. Ageing is [the fact] that [each moment] has a defining characteristic unlike [that of] the previous moment. Cessation is disappearance [after] having arisen [previously]. Thus, by a definite relation, the combined defining characteristics, origination and so on, [do indeed] exist in one moment at one time. Therefore that argument [of yours] does not harm to our [position].

Answer: Even if you imagine so, because the series does not exist as a substance and because [you] conceptually construct origination, duration, etc., by means of the relationship [between successive moments of the series], the three defining characteristics [of the conditioned] are conventional; but they are not ultimately real. Also, at the time when [an entity] endures, [its] cessation, which is incompatible with that [duration], does not exist. Therefore that [position of yours] also does not escape the fault which [we] showed previously.

Objection: The Vaibhāṣikas say: The coming into existence (ātmalābha) of an entity which has not arisen previously is origination. The continuing [to exist] of what has originated is duration. The growing old of what has endured is ageing. The ceasing [to exist] of what has aged is cessation. The successive occurrence of origination, etc., is invariable (avyabhācārīn) in that which is conditioned. Therefore those are established as defining characteristics [of the conditioned]. Hence what [Nāgārjuna] has said,

The three, origination and so on, are not adequate separately for the function of characterizing the conditioned, [MMK 7-2ab,c1]

is not [logically] possible.

Answer: That [argument of yours] is [itself] not [logically] possible. [This is so] because [what is called] a "defining characteristic" is never absent (vyabhicār) from the thing which it characterizes. For example, solidity is not [ever] absent from earth; and the marks of a great man (mahāpurusa) are not [ever] absent from a great man.

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, origination and so on cannot be entities' defining characteristic of the conditioned,

[Reason:] because they occur successively.

[Example:] For example, the particular stages of [unformed] clay, a lump [of clay], the compressed (?) (smyad pa), the flattened (glebs pa), and the contracted (bcum pa) are not a jar's defining characteristics of the conditioned.

Objection: Origination and so on are invariable [in the conditioned],
because those [defining characteristics] do not exist in the unconditioned.

**Answer:** They are metaphorically designated (*upa-car*) [as defining characteristics of the conditioned], but they do not exist in ultimate reality.\(^{25}\) [This is so] because origination has been negated and because what has not originated has no duration and cessation. [Also, this is so] because [an entity,] even at the time when it originates, [has] a nature without duration and without cessation [and so] does not have the nature of those; hence it does not possess those.

Even if [you] suppose that [an originating entity] has the nature of those [i. e., duration and cessation] on account of [their] occurring later, [that] is mere convention. Hence the fault which [we] have shown is not avoided. Therefore, in that way, it is not established that origination and so on, separately or in combination, are defining characteristics of the conditioned. Therefore that very fault in the reason [in the opponent's initial syllogism at the beginning of this chapter] has not been removed.

Moreover,

> If origination, duration, and cessation (*bhaṅga*) have [in turn] another defining characteristic of the conditioned,
> There is an infinite regress. [MMK 7-3abc]

There would be an infinite regress, [namely,] that [additional defining characteristic of the conditioned] would also have another [defining characteristic of the conditioned]; and that [in turn] would also have another. Hence that is not maintained. One should not maintain that origination and so on possess origination and so on.

But if [you] say, "Very well, let it be so,"\(^ {26}\) in that case, too, that same [refutation] will be repeated:\(^ {27}\)

> If they do not have [another defining characteristic of the conditioned],
> those [defining characteristics of the conditioned] are not [themselves] conditioned. [MMK 7-3d]

**Objection:** [We] maintain that origination and so on are indeed conditioned, but there will also be no infinite regress. [Because] origination and so on characterize [a conditioned thing] as being conditioned, [they are called] "defining characteristics of the conditioned." For example, auspicious and inauspicious marks [characterize other things as being auspicious or inauspicious; and they are also themselves auspicious or inauspicious, without needing further marks to characterize them as such.]\(^ {28}\) Likewise,
since there are no other defining characteristics of the conditioned, there will also be no infinite regress\textsuperscript{29} [in this case].

\textit{Answer:} It has been shown previously\textsuperscript{30} how

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, [if] origination and so on [are] themselves conditioned, [then they] are not maintained to be defining characteristics of the conditioned,

[Reason:] because they are conditioned,

[Example:] like the thing they characterize.

Likewise, origination and so on are also like that.\textsuperscript{31} Therefore one should not maintain that in ultimate reality, origination and so on are conditioned.

Even if origination and so on are not conditioned, they cannot be defining characteristics of the conditioned, for the answer to that [alternative] has also [already] been given here:

If they do not have [another defining characteristic of the conditioned],

those [defining characteristics of the conditioned] are not [themselves] conditioned. [MMK 7-3d]

Therefore, again, the fault which [we] have shown [in the reason in the opponent's initial syllogism at the beginning of this chapter] has not been avoided.

\textit{Objection:} Here the Vātsiputriyas say:\textsuperscript{32} Origination, duration, and cessation are indeed conditioned; but an infinite regress will not follow, either. How? Because here a dharma originates with fifteen [dharmas] including itself.\textsuperscript{33} There originate: [1] that dharma [itself]; [2] the origination of that [dharma]; [3] the duration of that [dharma]; [4] the cessation of that [dharma]; [5] the possession (samanvāgama)\textsuperscript{34} of that [dharma]; [6] the change from duration (sthitī-anyathātva) [that is, the ageing] of that [dharma]; [7] here, [a] if that dharma is "white," the true liberation (samyag-vimukti) of that [dharma]; or [b] if it is "black,"\textsuperscript{35} [its] false liberation (mithyā-vimukti); and [8] [a] if that dharma is conducive to deliverance (nairyānika), the being conducive to deliverance of that [dharma]; or [b] if it is not conducive to deliverance, [its] not being conducive to deliverance. Those [i. e., 2-8] are [called] the "retinue" (parivāra) [of that dharma].

[The Vātsiputriyas continue:] There also originate: [9] the origination of origination; [10] the duration of duration; [11] the cessation of cessation; [12] the possession of possession; [13] the change from duration of change from duration; [14] [a] the true liberation of true liberation or [b] the false liberation of false liberation; and [15] [a] the being conducive to deliverance
of being conducive to deliverance or [b] the not being conducive to deliverance of not being conducive to deliverance. Those [i.e., 9-15] are [called] the "retinue of the retinue" [of that dharma]. Thus a dharma originates with fifteen [dharmas] including itself.

[The Vātsīputrīyas continue:] As to that, the principal (maula) origination produces fourteen dharmas, not including itself. The origination of origination produces only that principal origination. Duration and so on are also like that; hence an infinite regress will not follow.

[The following] verse [states] that previous position [of the Vātsīputrīyas]:

The origination of origination produces only the principal origination. The principal origination produces the origination of origination. [MMK 7-4]

The origination of origination produces only the principal origination, but does not produce [any] other [dharma]. The principal origination produces the origination of origination.

Answer: That [theory of yours] is both extensive and various, but that [theory] is not so.

If your origination of origination produces the principal origination, How will that [origination of origination] produce that [principal origination when the origination of origination] has not [yet] been produced by your principal [origination]? [MMK 7-5]

If your origination of origination produces the principal origination, how will that origination of origination produce that principal origination when the origination of origination has not [yet] been produced by your principal origination? The idea is:

[Thesis:] [The origination of origination] indeed does not produce [the principal origination],
[Reason:] because [the origination of origination] has not [yet] originated,
[Example:] as before.

Objection: The origination of origination produces the principal origination when the origination of origination has just (eva) been produced by the principal origination.

Answer:

If that [origination of origination] produces the principal [origination
when the origination of origination] has been produced by your principal [origination].

How does that principal [origination] produce that [origination of origination when the principal origination] has not [yet] been produced by that [origination of origination]? [MMK 7-6]

If that origination of origination produces that principal origination [when the origination of origination] has been produced by your principal origination, how does that principal origination produce that origination of origination [when the principal origination] has not [yet] been produced by that origination of origination? The idea is:

[Thesis:] [The principal origination] indeed does not produce [the origination of origination],
[Reason:] because [the principal origination] has not [yet] originated,
[Example:] as before.40

Objection: Because the principal origination and the origination of origination perform their own functions when they are [in the process of] originating (utpādyamāna), there is no fault [in our position].

Answer:

Granted that (kāmam) that [principal origination or origination of origination] of yours, [when] it is originating, would produce that [origination of origination or principal origination],

If that, [when] it has not [yet] originated, could produce that. [MMK 7-7]

Granted that that principal origination or origination of origination of yours, [when] it is originating, would produce that origination of origination or principal origination, if that [principal origination or origination of origination], [when] it itself has not [yet] originated, could produce that origination of origination or principal origination. The idea is:

[Thesis:] That principal origination or origination of origination, [when] it is originating [or when] it itself has not [yet] originated, cannot produce that origination of origination or principal origination,
[First Reason:] because it has not [yet] originated,
[First Example:] as before,41 or
[Second Reason:] because it is [in the process of] originating,
[Second Example:] like an entity which is about to originate.42

Objection: That which is [in the process of] originating also has the power to produce by means of [its being] a simultaneously arisen cause.43
Therefore the meaning of [each] reason [in your syllogism], "because it has not [yet] originated," or "because it is [in the process of] originating," is inconclusive. [This is so] because of [the fact that the principal origination and the origination of origination are] simultaneously arisen [causes of each other, whether they are considered as] unoriginated or [as in the process of] originating.44

Answer: That argument [of yours] is not able to show that [our reasons] are inconclusive. [This is so] [1] because simultaneously arisen [causes] have also been negated in the context of negating the concomitant origination of desire and the one who desires [i.e., in chapter six of the MMK] and [2] because the nonobstructing cause has also been negated.45 Hence [you] have not avoided the undesired consequence of an infinite regress.

Objection: In order to avoid [that] undesired consequence, an infinite regress, others46 say:

Just as a lamp illuminates itself and others (svaparātmānau),
So origination, too, would produce both itself and others. [MMK 7-8]

Therefore an infinite regress will not follow.

Comment: Here the meaning [of the opponent's position] is easy to understand; and that which has been explained [already] should not be explained [again], for fear of prolixity and because [expending] effort on a point which is common knowledge or on a point which has been explained [already] is pointless.

[Nevertheless,] here an inference will be stated [in order to put the opponent's position into syllogistic form:]

Objection:
[Thesis:] Origination performs [its] function on itself and others as [its] spheres of action (viṣaya),
[Reason:] because it has that intrinsic nature.
[Example:] For example, a lamp, because it has the intrinsic nature of illumination, illuminates itself and others.

Answer: What is to be proved is that in ultimate reality, origination indeed has the intrinsic nature of producing; [but your] reason, "because it has that intrinsic nature," itself states [something which is] unestablished, like what is to be proved. Also, [your reason] is one part of the meaning of [your] thesis. Therefore, that [argument of yours] is not logically possible, like [the fallacious argument.] "Sound is impermanent because it is impermanent."

Moreover, here [if one accepts your example,] it has to be said that in
ultimate reality, a lamp illuminates because it removes the darkness which obstructs the apprehension of itself and others. But here that argument [just] stated [i. e., that a lamp illuminates because it removes darkness] is not possible. How? Therefore [Nāgārjuna] explains,

Darkness does not exist in a lamp or [in a place] where that [lamp] is located.
What [then] does the lamp illuminate? [MMK 7-9abc]

The meaning of the sentence is that it does not illuminate anything. Thus here [in MMK 7-9abc] it has been shown that the property to be proved is that a lamp does not illuminate and the proving property is [the fact] that darkness does not exist in a lamp itself or [in] other [things in the vicinity of the lamp].

Therefore here the inference is:
[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, a lamp does not illuminate [that] lamp itself and others,
[Reason:] because darkness does not exist [there],
[Example:] just as [there is no darkness in] the light of the sun, which possesses clear and harmonious ('jebs pa) light rays [and so the sun cannot be illuminated by a lamp].47

Alternatively, [one may explain MMK 7-9ab as follows:]

Darkness does not exist in a lamp or [in a place] where that [lamp] is located, [MMK 7-9ab]
because [the lamp] illuminates. This [half-verse] has shown that the [proving] property of a lamp is that it illuminates. Therefore here the inference is:
[Thesis:] One should understand that in ultimate reality, a lamp does not illuminate [that] lamp itself and others [in the vicinity of the lamp],
[Reason:] because it illuminates,
[Example:] like the sun [which illuminates and thus is not illuminated by a lamp].48

Likewise, one should also state [syllogisms showing that] a lamp does not illuminate, [using] reasons such as "because it is an element" [i. e., fire], "because it must be assisted" [by other causal conditions?], "because it is made," "because [lamps] are various due to [their having] distinct causal conditions," etc., and [using] examples such as earth [and the other elements].49 Therefore, since the example [in the opponent's syllogism pre-
ceding MMK 7-9abc] does not exist, [that syllogism] has the fault of being an incomplete proof.

**Objection:**

Illumination is the destruction of darkness. [MMK 7-9d]

A lamp which is [in the process of] originating dispels darkness. Because, by means of that [lamp], darkness does not exist in the entity to be illuminated and [because the lamp] illuminates, [the lamp] is illumination. Therefore it is said that illumination is the destruction of darkness. Therefore that [reason] which was stated [in Bhāvaviveka's first syllogism following MMK 7-9abc], "because darkness does not exist [there]," is not established. Hence the meaning of the reason [in that syllogism] is not established. It is also not the case that the example [in our own syllogism] does not exist, because the object to be illuminated by a lamp is [in fact] apprehended.

**Answer:**

How [could] darkness be dispelled by a lamp which is [in the process of] originating? [MMK 7-10ab]

"How" (katham) implies (snyegs) impossibility. "How [could] it be dispelled?" The meaning of the sentence is, "It indeed [could] not be dispelled." This [phrase], "by a lamp which is [in the process of] originating," shows that the [proving] property of what is [in the process of] originating is [the fact] that it is originating. That [half-verse] sets forth the [property] to be proved and the proving property.

When a lamp which is [in the process of] originating does not come in contact with darkness. [MMK 7-10cd]

[MMK 7-10cd] sets forth a similar example. It is like saying, "How [could] a sound which is made be permanent? [It is impermanent] just as a jar which is made is impermanent." As to that, here the inference is: [Thesis:] In ultimate reality, a lamp does not dispel [its] opposite [i. e., darkness], [Reason:] because it is [in the process of] originating, [Example:] just as darkness [does not obscure] the lamp.\(^{50}\)

**Objection:** [Your reason] is inconclusive because of [the case of] knowledge and ignorance.\(^{51}\)
**Answer:** Because [knowledge and ignorance] are included in what is to be established, they are negated in the same way. Therefore [our reason] is not inconclusive.\(^{52}\)

Alternatively, [one can say that] what is [in the process of] originating has not been brought about.\(^{53}\) [Thus one has the following syllogism:]

[Thesis:] A lamp does not illuminate,
[Reason:] because it has not been brought about,
[Example:] just as an unborn son cannot [perform] an activity.

Alternatively, [one can explain MMK 7-10 as follows:]

How [could] darkness be dispelled by a lamp which is [in the process of] originating? [MMK 7-10ab]

Because it is stated in the example [given in MMK 7-10cd] that [a lamp which is in the process of originating] does not come in contact [with darkness], it has been shown that the [proving] property of a lamp is that it does not come in contact [with darkness].

When a lamp which is [in the process of] originating does not come in contact with darkness. [MMK 7-10cd]

[This] is a statement of a similar example. Here the inference is:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, a lamp which is [in the process of] originating does not dispel darkness,

[Reason:] because it does not come in contact [with darkness],

[Example:] just as the lightless darkness of the spaces between the worlds (lokāntarikā) [does not come in contact with a lamp and so does not obscure it].\(^{54}\)

Alternatively, [one can state the following syllogism:]

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, a lamp does not dispel darkness,
[Reason:] because it does not come in contact with [its] opposite [i. e., darkness],
[Example:] just as darkness [does not].

**Objection:** Just as a ritual of "black magic"\(^{55}\) [kills one's enemy even without coming in contact with him or her],\(^{56}\) [so also] light dispels darkness even without coming in contact [with it]. Therefore [the reason in the preceding syllogism] is inconclusive.

**Answer:** In that case, too, [our reason] is not inconclusive. [This is so] 
[1] because the ritual does not illuminate [and so is not comparable to a lamp] and [2] because, since the ritual is performed against an enemy, the
gods of the spell\(^{57}\) harm [that enemy] precisely (eva) by means of coming in contact [with him or her].

But [your] eye may be closed by attachment to [your] own position, [and] so [you] may say:

*Objection:* One sees that a lamp illuminates without contact [with darkness], but one does not see that darkness illuminates without contact.

*Answer:* That [objection of yours] does no harm [to our position] because it establishes the example [in our last syllogism]. [Moreover,] that very [point] should be examined. Is that observed [illumination by a lamp] as it is seen to be, or is it otherwise? [In fact,] the observation that a lamp illuminates without contact [with darkness] is not so. But if [you] maintain that a lamp dispels darkness even without contact [with it], [then] accept this [following undesired consequence] also!

If a lamp dispels darkness even without contact [with it],
That [lamp] located here will dispel [all] the darkness which exists in the whole world. [MMK 7-11]

[You] do not maintain that. Therefore do not maintain, either, that a lamp dispels darkness without contact [with it].
Moreover, since according to what you maintain, [a lamp] dispels darkness, [therefore:]

If a lamp illuminates itself and others,
Darkness, too, will undoubtedly obscure both itself and others. [MMK 7-12]

[You] do not maintain that; [rather, you] maintain that [darkness] does not obscure itself and others.\(^{58}\) Therefore that [verse] is a statement of a similar example. Here the inference is:

**Thesis:** In ultimate reality, a lamp does not dispel [its] opposite [i. e., darkness] existing in itself and others,

**Reason:** because it has an opposite,\(^{59}\)

**Example:** like darkness.

Alternatively, [one can state the following syllogism:]

**Thesis:** In ultimate reality, a lamp does not dispel darkness,

**Reason:** because it has an opposite,

**Example:** like a shadow.

Therefore, in that way, [we] have rejected [the supposition that] a lamp illuminates itself and others. Hence the example [in the opponent's
syllogism following MMK 7-8] does not exist. Therefore that which the opponent has said - "Like a lamp, origination, too, produces itself and others; hence an infinite regress will not follow" - just remains like that.60

Moreover, in what way do [you] maintain that origination produces its own self? Does it produce [itself when] it has [already] originated or [when] it has not [yet] originated? The point is this: If [you] say that [it produces itself when] it has not [yet] originated, [Nāgārjuna asks,]

How could this origination produce its own self [when] it has not [yet] originated? [MMK 7-13ab]

The idea is:
[Thesis:] Origination indeed does not produce its own self [when] it has not [yet] originated, [Reason:] because it does not [then] exist, [Example:] as before.61

But if [you] say that [it produces itself when] it has [already] originated, [Nāgārjuna asks,]

But if it produces [itself when] it has [already] originated, what more is produced if it has originated [already]? [MMK 7-13cd]

The idea is that [this is so] because the activity of originating would just be pointless for what has [already] originated. Therefore, if one examines in that way, it is not possible that origination produces its own self. Hence there is no avoiding the consequence of an infinite regress.62

Even if origination and so on are just unconditioned, [then] because they are unconditioned, that [statement,] "Those are not conditioned," likewise stands.63 Hence there is the fault that the meaning of the reason [in the opponent's initial syllogism at the beginning of the chapter] - "because they possess the defining characteristics of the conditioned, origination, etc." - is not established.

Moreover, the proponents of origination should be asked, "Does origination produce [something] originated or unoriginated or [in the process of] originating or what?"64 Having in mind that it is not [logically] possible in any way, [Nāgārjuna] says,

The originated, the unoriginated, and that which is [in the process of] originating are not produced in any way. [MMK 7-14ab]
How [is that so]?

That has been explained by means of the traversed, the untraversed, and that which is being traversed.⁶⁵ [MMK 7-14cd]

Just as inferences were shown extensively in that [context, i. e., chapter two of the MMK], they should be stated here also.

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, what is [in the process of] originating is not produced,

[Reason:] because [its] intrinsic nature is not ascertained,⁶⁶

[Example:] like that which is [in the process of] ceasing.

Alternatively, [one can state the following syllogism:]  
[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, that which is [in the process of] originating is unproduced,

[Reason:] because it is about to pass over into another time,⁶⁷

[Example:] like that which is [in the process of] ceasing.

Objection: That which is said to be "[in the process of] originating" is partly originated [and] partly unoriginated.

Answer: Even so, whatever [part] of that has [already] originated is not produced, because the origination of that [again] would be pointless. [As for the other part,]

[Thesis:] Whatever [part] of that has not [yet] originated is also not produced,

[Reason:] because it is empty of origination,

[Example:] like the future.

Objection: What is "[in the process of] originating" is about to originate (upāda-abhimukha).

Answer: The question raised in objection is the same: What is that? Is it originated, or is it unoriginated? [Our] answer [to your reply to that question] is also the same: The originated is not produced, because the origination of that [again] would be pointless. The unoriginated is also not produced, because it is empty of origination, like the future.

Objection: What is the meaning of that reason [in the first syllogism following MMK 7-14cd], "because [its] intrinsic nature is not ascertained"? [Does it mean] "because [its] intrinsic nature is not ascertained by perception," or [does it mean] "because [its] intrinsic nature is not ascertained by inference?" As to that, according to the former supposition, [your reason] is inconclusive. [This is so] because [being in the process of] originating exists even for an entity whose intrinsic nature is not ascertained by perception. According to the latter supposition, that [reason] is not
established. [This is so] because [an entity] originates in dependence on origination; and by means of origination, that which is originating is inferred.68

*Answer:* For the proponents of the absence of intrinsic nature [in] the original nature of all entities,69 there is no existence of an entity apprehended by perception or inference. Hence, because there is no counterexample, [our reason] is not inconclusive. It is also not the case that the meaning [of our reason] is not established. How [is that so]?

When it is not the case that this which is [in the process of] originating proceeds (kramate) because origination exists ...70 [MMK 7-15ab]

You have said, "[An entity] originates in dependence on origination; and by means of origination, that which is originating is inferred." That very [statement of yours] will be examined here. [The entity which originates] must be either existent or nonexistent or both existent and nonexistent; but the negation of [all] those [alternatives] has also been shown at length.71 Hence [Nāgārjuna asks,]

How [can] it be said that what is [in the process of] originating [is produced] in dependence on origination? [MMK 7-15cd]

Then how [can] it be said that what is [in the process of] originating is produced in dependence on origination? Therefore there is no inference [showing that what is in the process of origination exists]. Hence it is not the case that the meaning of [our] reason - "because [its] intrinsic nature is not ascertained" - is unestablished.

*Objection:* For example, suppose an ignorant [person], skilled in swordplay, kills [his] mother and [thus] practices the behavior of the wicked. Likewise, you also, being skilled in logic (tarka), refute the doctrine of dependent origination expounded by the best of sages [i.e., the Buddha], [a doctrine which is] the generatrix (skyed ma) of the śrāvakas and pratyeka-buddhas; and [you thus] practice the behavior of the unspiritual (anārya). Therefore [you] will be in conflict with what [you] previously accepted [i.e., dependent origination].

*Answer:* [Some] persons to be trained (vineya) possess the bad view which nihilistically negates cause and result [and] uproots what is wholesome (kuśala-pakṣa). In order to cleanse the stain of [that] bad view, [the Buddha] spoke as follows: "When this exists, that arises; because this has originated, that originates. Namely, karmic formations (samskāra) [originate] with ig-
Norance (avidyā) as [their] causal condition, etc. [We] accept that that was taught as superficial reality, but it was not taught as ultimate reality. Therefore [we] are not in conflict with what [we ourselves] accept.

Moreover, this has been shown [before]. If [you] ask, "Where was what shown?" [We answer that] that [point] was shown in this [previous negation of the dominant causal condition:]

Because there is no existence (sattā) of entities which lack intrinsic nature,
This [statement,] "When this exists, that arises," is not possible. [MMK 1-10]

Here [Nāgārjuna] also says:

That which arises dependently is tranquil [or "extinct," śānta] by intrinsic nature (svabhāvataḥ). [MMK 7-16ab]

That entity which has originated dependently is, in ultimate reality, tranquil [or "extinct"] by intrinsic nature. The meaning is that it is without origination (anutpāda). As the Blessed One has said [in the Ārya-nāga-rāja-anavatapta-paripṛcchā-sūtra],

That which originates by means of causal conditions is unoriginated.
It has no origination by intrinsic nature.
That which is subject to causal conditions is called "empty."
One who knows emptiness is careful (apramatta).

And likewise,

Those [things] which originate dependently do not have any intrinsic nature.
Those [things] which have no intrinsic nature do not arise anywhere.

Likewise, [from the Ārya-laṅkāvatāra-sūtra], "Mahāmati, [I] have said that all dharmas are without intrinsic nature, meaning that they are unoriginated by intrinsic nature."

Therefore, in that way, what [our] opponents have done in setting forth a refutation with hostile intentions, is like throwing a handful of ashes in order to stain the stainless disk of the moon.
Therefore what is [in the process of] originating and origination, too, are tranquil [or "extinct," sānta]. [MMK 7-16cd]

Thus when one examines correctly, what arises dependently has no origination and is like a magical illusion. Therefore what is [in the process of] originating and origination, too, are tranquil [or "extinct"]. As to that, what the opponent has said—"What is [in the process of] originating should be inferred [as existing] in ultimate reality in dependence on origination"—is incorrect.

Objection: One sees the origination of a jar and the origination of a cloth in dependence on various causes and conditions. Since there is no means of knowledge superior to seeing, that which [Nāgārjuna] has said, the originated, the unoriginated, and that which is [in the process of] originating are not produced in any way, [MMK 7-14ab]

is not [logically] possible.

Answer: Who [would] contradict the seeing [of things] which are conducive (rjes su mthun pa) to the accumulation [of merit], moral conduct and so on? Those are conventional, but they are not ultimately real. Therefore [Nāgārjuna] composed [this] treatise out of a desire to get rid of attachment to such [things] as those; hence the fault [which you have alleged] does not exist.

Objection: How is it ascertained that those [statements], "A jar originates" and "A cloth originates," are conventional but are not ultimate reality?

Answer: Listen to that [argument]! Here, if it has originated, it is a jar or a cloth; but if it has not originated, it is not. There is no origination again of what has [already] originated; therefore that [claim of yours,] "A jar and a cloth originate," is not possible.

On the other hand, one might bear in mind [the idea of] a jar, although no [jar] has [yet] originated, and [then], imputing the name ["jar"], say, "A jar originates." That [however,] is a mere conventional designation. [This is so] because there is no origination of the jar which is borne in mind.

Objection: The Vaibhāṣikas suppose that matter and so on and a jar and so on, because of passing [into the present] time [from the future], originate only after having existed [and not after having first been nonexistent].

Answer: That, too, is not [logically] possible.

If any unoriginated entity existed anywhere ... [MMK 7-17ab]
If any unoriginated entity such as a jar, a cloth, etc., existed in [its] causal conditions or in the collection of those [conditions] or elsewhere ...

Why would that originate at that [time]? [MMK 7-17c]

Why would that which [already] exists originate at that time? The idea is that [this is so] because the origination of the existent would just be pointless.

Therefore [Nāgārjuna] says,

If it existed [already], it would not originate. 79 [MMK 7-17d]

Thus this [verse] has shown that [the thesis] of the proponents of existence 80 has the fault of being in conflict with their own inference. [This is so] because the thesis of those who say that an unoriginated entity exists prior to [its] origination, excludes origination because [such an entity] possesses nonorigination, since they infer that it exists [already].

The proponents of passing in time 81 also have that same fault [i. e., that their thesis is in conflict with their own inference]. [This is so] because [their thesis] excludes [a future entity's] passing into the present time because [a future entity] has no passing into present time, since [they] infer that it exists [already, even when it is in the future]. 82 This [argument] has also answered [the proponents] of [1] difference of nature (bhāva), [2] difference of characteristic (laksana), [3] difference of state (avasthā), and [4] relative difference (anyonyathātva). 83

Objection: The Sāmkhyas say: Because [we hold that] an entity which indeed exists [already] is made manifest, there is no fault [in our position]. 84

Answer: That is not [logically] possible, because manifestation (vyaktī) has been negated [in our commentary on MMK 1-1]. [Besides.] how could one know that what has not originated exists?

Objection: The Sāmkhyas and Vaibhāsikas say:

[Thesis:] One can know that what has not originated indeed exists,

[Reason:] because it is included in time, 85

[Example:] like a present entity.

Answer: In ultimate reality, it is not established that a present entity, either, exists by intrinsic nature; hence [your] example does not exist. Therefore the point which [you] maintain is not established.

One should understand that this [preceding refutation] has also answered [any] faults [alleged] in the proof that matter and so on do not exist before [their origination] and do not exist after they have ceased. Nor will [we] be
in conflict with conventional truth.\textsuperscript{86} [This is so] [1] because [we] accept that entities such as present matter and so on do exist like magical illusions, etc., and [2] because [we] accept that conventionally, matter and so on do exist as conceptually constructed entities.\textsuperscript{87}

Enough of this incidental discussion! The original subject will be summarized here. As to that, to begin with, [we] have explained that [half-verse],

The originated, the unoriginated, and that which is [in the process of] originating are not produced in any way. [MMK 7-14ab]

Also, [Nāgārjuna] says,

If that origination produces what is [in the process of] originating ... [MMK 7-18ab]

If, as you maintain, that origination produces that which is [in the process of] originating, well then,

That origination is what produces.\textsuperscript{88} [MMK 7-18c]

[But, in fact,]
[Thesis:] What produces [something] is not [that thing's] origination,
[Reason:] because it is the producer [of that thing],
[Example:] just as a father is not the birth of [his] son.

Thus [Nāgārjuna asks,]

But what is origination? [MMK 7-18d]

The meaning is that origination lacks the intrinsic nature of origination. So, too, the thesis of a disputant who says, "Origination produces," has the fault that it excludes the intrinsic nature of the subject [of the thesis, i.e., origination].\textsuperscript{89}

It also cannot be said that another [origination] produces that [origination]. If one says so, the following [undesired consequence] will occur:

If another origination produces that [origination], there will be an infinite regress. [MMK 7-19ab]

Alternatively, in order to get rid of the undesired consequence of an
infinite regress, one might maintain that origination has no [other origina­tion] which produces [it]. If [you] say, "So it will be," to that [Nāgārjuna] replies,

But if [origination] has originated without [another] origination [which produces it], everything would originate in that way. [MMK 7-19ed]

That is not maintained; therefore do not conceptually construct origination. Moreover, the origination of [things] which possess origination must be either the origination [of things] which exist or [of things] which do not exist or [of things] which are both existent and nonexistent. As to that,

To begin with, the origination of existent [things] and also [the origination] of nonexistent [things] are not [logically] possible. Nor [is the origination of things] which are both existent and nonexistent [logically possible]. [This] was indeed shown previously. [MMK 7-20]

It has indeed been shown in the chapter on nonorigination [i. e., the first chapter of the MMK] that

Neither for a nonexistent nor for an existent thing, is a causal condition [logically] possible. [MMK 1-6ab]

and

When neither an existent nor a nonexistent nor an existent-nonexistent dharma is brought about ... [MMK 1-7ab]

Therefore it is not necessary that [we] again make an effort [to demonstrate that]. Moreover,

The origination of an entity which is [in the process of] ceasing is not possible, [MMK 7-21ab]

[Reason:] because it is [in the process of] ceasing,
[Example:] just as one who is dying [is not then being born].

Objection: What is not [in the process of] ceasing originates. Hence
there is no fault [in our position].

*Answer:*

It is not possible that what is not [in the process of] ceasing is an entity.  
[MMK 7-21cd]

The idea is that [this is so]  
[Reason:] because it does not possess the defining characteristic of an entity,  
[Example:] as a sky-flower [does not].

*Objection:* [Your reason] is inconclusive, due to the fact that what endures [is an entity but is not in the process of ceasing].

*Answer:* Because even that [which endures] is connected with impermanence, it is not established that it is not [in the process of] ceasing. Hence there is no fault [in our reason]. The extensive [explanation] is as before.

*Objection:*  
[Thesis:] Origination does indeed exist,  
[Reason:] because a dharma exists which occurs [only] if that [origination] exists.

[Disimilar Example:] Here, as for that which does not exist, there is no dharma which occurs when that [nonexistent thing] exists. For example, in the case of tortoise hair, which does not exist, a coat [made] of that [tortoise hair] does not occur.  
[Application:] In the case of origination, which does exist, there exists a dharma which occurs [when origination exists, namely,] the defining characteristic of duration.  
[Conclusion:] Therefore, by the evidence (upapatti) of the stated reason, origination does indeed exist.

*Answer:* Since origination simply (eva) does not exist, that [duration] is not established. Nevertheless, having accepted the origination which is common knowledge conventionally, [we] will examine duration as to [its] ultimate reality. Here, in ultimate reality, that entity [which allegedly endures] must endure either [when] it has [already] endured (sthita), or [when] it has not [yet] endured (asthita), or [when] it is [in the process of] enduring (tisthamāna). In that connection,

An entity which has [already] endured does not [now] endure,  
[MMK 7-22a]

[Reason:] because it is not possible for both present and past time to come together in one [thing],
[Example:] just as [one cannot be] dead and born [simultaneously].

Alternatively, [an entity which has already endured] does not [now] endure because duration would be pointless [for it].

An entity which has not [yet] endured does not [now] endure, [MMK 7-22b]

[Reason:] because it has not [yet] endured [and thus lacks the activity of
enduring], [93]
[Example:] like cessation.

[An entity] which is [in the process of] enduring does not [now] endure.
[MMK 7-22c]

[This is so] because that [sort of entity] is not possible apart from [an entity]
which has [already] endured and one which has not [yet] endured, as [has
been shown] at length [in similar cases] before.

When the origination of all entities has been excluded by means of
showing that in ultimate reality, no entity exists, then

What unoriginated [entity] endures? [MMK 7-22d]

The idea is that no entity endures, whether origination is accepted or not
accepted. Therefore the meaning of the reason [in the opponent's syllogism
preceding MMK 7-22a] - "because a dharma exists which occurs [only] if
that [origination] exists" - is not established; or else it has a contradictory
meaning. [94]

Moreover,

Duration is not possible for an entity which is [in the process of]
ceasing. [MMK 7-23ab]

The idea is that [this is so:]
[Reason:] because [duration and cessation] are incompatible.
[Example:] That which is incompatible with something does not occur if
that [second thing] exists, as with clear appearance and darkness.

Objection: Since what is not [in the process of] ceasing endures, there
is no fault [in our position].

Answer:
It is not possible that what is not [in the process of] ceasing is an entity. [MMK 7-23cd]

The idea is that [this is so] because all conditioned [dharmas] are connected with impermanence. Alternatively, the idea is that 

[Thesis:] that [which is not in the process of ceasing] is not an entity, 

[Reason:] because it is not [in the process of] ceasing,  

[Example:] like a sky-flower.  

Objection: Subsequent to origination, the activity of duration is predominant. Therefore [a thing] is not [then in the process of] ceasing; but it is an entity. It is also not permanent, since ageing and impermanence occur after duration.  

Answer: That, too, is not [logically] possible. If impermanence did not exist at the moment [when] these entities, matter and so on, endure, they would also not possess that [impermanence] later. [This is so] because they [would] arise without that [impermanence]. For example, since fire is characterized by (tshul can) arising even without water, [fire] will never become the entity, water.  

Objection: Because [the cessation of entities] is seen, it cannot be negated.  

Answer: Therefore that very [seeing] should be examined. Is that seeing of cessation seen in the case of [an entity] which is connected with that [cessation], or in the case of one which lacks that [cessation]? As to that, on the first supposition, duration is not established. On the second supposition, it is not established that the entity [in question] is not [in the process of] ceasing. Therefore, in both of those [cases], the meaning which [the opponent] maintains is lost.  

Objection: Some who hope to be learned say: For example, even one previously without Buddhahood will attain Buddhahood later. Likewise, even [an entity] previously without cessation will attain cessation later.  

Answer: Even conventionally, that argument does no harm [to our position], because it is not accepted that that moment of cognition which lacks Buddhahood will attain Buddhahood later. For the word "Buddhahood" should be used in regard to a moment of cognition which has abandoned the obscurations of the afflictions and [the obscuration of] the object of cognition (kleśa-jñeya-āvarana), but that [earlier moment?] has no necessary connection with Buddhahood. Hence that [argument of yours] is worthless. Likewise, [a similar proof] should also be applied in the case of ageing.  

Because, in that way, the existence of an entity without ageing and death
cannot be proved,99 therefore the acārya [Nāgārjuna] says,

Since all entities at all times have the properties of ageing and death, What entities are there which endure without ageing and death? [MMK 7-24]

It is seen that if origination exists, duration occurs; but origination is not established.100 Therefore [the fault that] the meaning [of the opponent’s reason] is not established, is unimpaired; or else [the fault that] it has a contradictory meaning is unimpaired.101

Moreover, here you maintain that duration also has duration. In that case, too, [you] must maintain that that duration endures either by means of another duration or else by means of that [duration] itself. Neither of those [two alternatives] is [logically] possible. Therefore [Nāgārjuna] says,

The duration of duration is not [logically] possible, [either] by means of another duration or by means of that [duration] itself. [MMK 7-25ab]

How [is that so]?

Just as the origination of origination [is not logically possible] by means of [that origination] itself or by means of another [origination]. [MMK 7-25cd]

How is it not [logically] possible that origination is produced by itself? Because the following [argument] has been stated:

How could this origination produce its own self [when] it has not [yet] originated?
But if it produces [itself when] it has [already] originated, what more is produced, if it has originated [already]? [MMK 7-13]

How is it not [logically] possible that origination is produced by another [origination]? Because the following [argument] has been stated:

If another origination produces that [origination], there will be an infinite regress.
But if [origination] has originated without [another] origination [which produces it], everything would originate in that way. [MMK 7-19]
Likewise here also,

How could this duration cause its own self to endure [when] it has not [yet] endured?

But if it causes [itself] to endure [when] it has [already] endured, what more is made to endure, if it has endured [already]?

[That] explanatory verse (vyākhyāna-kārikā) follows the refutation of the production of origination by its own self. By means of [that verse], one should also state a refutation of [the corresponding position that] duration is caused to endure by its own self.

If another duration causes that [duration] to endure, there will be an infinite regress.

But if [duration] has endured without [another] duration [which causes it to endure], everything would endure in that way.

[That] explanatory verse follows the refutation of the production of origination by another [origination]. Here, too, by means of [that verse], one should also state a refutation of [the corresponding position that] duration is caused to endure by another [duration].

Therefore, in that way, duration does not exist. Hence it is difficult [for the opponent] to answer [our charge] that the meaning of the reason [in his syllogism preceding MMK 7-22a] - "Origination does indeed exist, because a dharma exists which occurs [only] if that [origination] exists" - is not established.

Objection:
[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the origination and duration of entities do indeed exist,
[Reason:] because a dharma exists which invariably accompanies (sahacārin) those.
[Dissimilar Example:] Here that which does not exist has no dharma which invariably accompanies it. For example, a horse's horn has no cessation.
[Application:] Origination and duration do have a dharma which invariably accompanies [them, namely] cessation.
[Conclusion:] Therefore, by virtue of the stated reason, in ultimate reality, origination and duration do indeed exist.

Answer: The cessation of an entity, too, must be the cessation either of [an entity] which has [already] ceased (niruddha), or of one which has not
Ames: Bhāvaviveka’s *Prajñāpradīpa*, Ch. 6-7

[yet] ceased (*aniruddha*), or of one which is [in the process of] ceasing (*nirudhyāmāna*); [but] that [cessation] is not possible in any way. Therefore [Nāgārjuna] says,

What has [already] ceased does not [now] cease.  [MMK 7-26a]

[This is so] because one who is dead cannot die again.

What has not [yet] ceased does not [now] cease.  [MMK 7-26b]

[Thesis:] [What has not yet ceased, being] empty of cessation, does not cease,
[Reason:] because it is without cessation,
[Example:] like duration.

And that which is [in the process of] ceasing likewise …  [MMK 7-26c]

does not cease. [This is so] [1] because apart from what has [already] ceased and what has not [yet] ceased, what is [in the process of] ceasing is not possible and [2] because there would be both faults. 102

Alternatively, [one can explain MMK 7-26c as follows:]
[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, what is [in the process of] ceasing does not cease,
[Reason:] because it is about to pass in time (*kāla-samkrānty-abhimukha*),
[First Example:] like what is about to originate (*uptiṣu*) or
[Second Example:] like the present.

Alternatively, 103 because the origination of all entities has been negated,

What unoriginated [entity] ceases?  [MMK 7-26d]

[Thesis:] Cessation is not possible for the unoriginated,
[Reason:] because it is unoriginated,
[Example:] like a childless woman’s son.

Therefore, in that way, whether origination is accepted or not accepted, cessation is not established in any way.

Moreover, here cessation must be supposed either for [an entity] which has [already] endured or for one which has not [yet] endured; but that [cessation] is not possible in either of those [cases]. As to that,

To begin with, cessation is not possible for an entity which has [already]
endured. [MMK 7-27ab]

Cessation, which is incompatible with duration, is not possible for [an entity for which] the activity of enduring has originated. [This is so] because [that entity] endures. That is common knowledge.

Objection: There is cessation for [an entity] which has not [yet] endured. Hence there is no fault [in our position].

Answer:

Cessation is also not possible for an entity which has not [yet] endured. [MMK 7-27cd]

The idea is that [this is so]
[Reason:] because it has not [yet] endured [and thus lacks the activity of enduring],
[Example:] just as what has ceased [lacks the activity of enduring].

Moreover, here does this stage (avasthā) cease [while it] endures by means of that same stage; or does it cease [at one stage and] endure by means of a different stage? The point is this:

What endures by means of that stage does not indeed cease by means of that [same stage]. [MMK 7-28ab]

[Thesis:] [An entity] does not indeed cease by means of that stage by which it was formerly characterized (upalaksita),
[Reason:] because it does not abandon [its] former intrinsic nature.
[Example:] For instance, milk does not indeed cease by means of that very stage of milk.

Nor does what endures by means of one stage indeed cease by means of a different [stage]. [MMK 7-28cd]

The word "indeed" has the sense of specification. Here one should understand [MMK 7-28d as meaning,] "It does not indeed cease by means of a different stage." Otherwise, [the meaning] would be, "It ceases by means of a nondifferent [stage]."

That [half-verse, MMK 7-28cd] sets forth the thesis. Because of the difference [of the stages of duration and cessation], the [proving] property, [that is,] the reason, is difference. Here the inference is:
[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, milk does not cease by means of the stage of
curds,
[Reason:] because [curds] are different from that [milk],
[Example:] like a pot and so on, which are different from that [milk].

Objection: [Our] opponents say:
[Thesis:] Cessation does indeed exist,
[Reason:] because it depends on an entity,
[Example:] just as [the activity of] cooking [depends on the food which is cooked].

Answer: To that, [Nāgārjuna] replies,

When the origination of all dharmas is not possible,  
Then the cessation of all dharmas is not possible. [MMK 7-29]

When, by the method which has been shown, the origination of all dharmas is not possible, then [their] cessation is also not possible. The idea is that [this is so] because the example [in the opponent’s syllogism] does not exist, since [the food] which is to be cooked and [the activity of] cooking are not established.

Moreover, here cessation must be supposed to be either of an existent entity or of a nonexistent one. As to that, [Nāgārjuna says,]

To begin with, the cessation of an existent entity is not possible. [MMK 7-30ab]

The idea is that [this is so]  
[Reason:] because [an existent entity and cessation] are incompatible,  
[Example:] like fire and coldness.

Therefore [Nāgārjuna] says,

If there is identity, both an entity and a nonentity are not possible. [MMK 7-30cd]

Objection: [After] an entity has existed [previously], when that same [entity] is absent (bra/ ba), it is called a "nonentity."

Answer: Well, by that same [argument], in ultimate reality, external and internal entities have no intrinsic nature. As [in the case of] magical illusions and so on, [their] lack of intrinsic nature is clearly shown by [their] becoming nonentities [after] having been entities.

But if [the cessation] of a nonentity is supposed, [the opponent's argument and the Mādhyamika's answer are as follows:]

Objection: Some\textsuperscript{114} say:

[Thesis:] The cognition of visible form has as its object the absence of anything different from visible form itself.

[Reason:] because if that absence is seen, the cognition of that visible form originates.

[Similar Example:] Here that cognition which originates if some thing is seen, has that thing as its object. For example, if a dewlap and so on - [from which] the nature of anything different from an ox, such as a horse, etc., is absent - are seen, the cognition of an ox originates.

[Application:] Likewise, if visible form - [from which] the nature of anything different from visible form, such as taste, etc., is absent - is seen, the cognition of visible form originates.

[Conclusion:] Therefore, the cognition of visible form has as its object the absence of anything different from visible form itself.

Answer: That is not logically possible. [This is so] [1] because that reason [in the opponent’s syllogism] is not proved by that reason itself\textsuperscript{115} and [2] because there is the fault that the example lacks the property to be proved.\textsuperscript{116}

Also, [Nāgārjuna] says,

The cessation of a nonexistent entity is also not possible, [MMK 7-31ab]

because [a nonexistent entity] does not exist,

Just as there is no cutting off of a [nonexistent] second head. [MMK 7-31cd]

This [verse, MMK 7-31] has shown [the following:] Since [the opponent] infers that [what ceases] is nonexistent, [it must also] lack cessation. Therefore, the thesis of those who say that there is cessation of a nonexistent entity, has the fault that it excludes the intrinsic nature of the possessor of the property [to be proved].\textsuperscript{117}

Moreover, if that which you call "cessation of cessation" existed in ultimate reality, [cessation] would have to cease either by means of itself or by means of another. In that connection, [Nāgārjuna says,]

The cessation of cessation is not logically possible, [either] by means of another cessation or by means of that very cessation.\textsuperscript{118} [MMK
7-32ab]

How [is that so]?

Just as the origination of origination [is not logically possible] by means of [that origination] itself or by means of another [origination]. [MMK 7-32cd]

How is it not [logically] possible that origination is produced by itself? Because the following [argument] has been stated:

How could this origination produce its own self [when] it has not [yet] originated?
But if it produces [itself when] it has [already] originated, what more is produced, if it has originated [already]? [MMK 7-13]

How is it not [logically] possible that origination is produced by another [origination]? Because the following [argument] has been stated:

If another origination produces that [origination], there will be an infinite regress.
But if [origination] has originated without [another] origination [which produces it], everything would originate in that way. [MMK 7-19]

Likewise here also,

How could this cessation cause its own self to cease [when] it has not [yet] ceased?
But if it causes [itself] to cease [when] it has [already] ceased, what more is made to cease, if it has ceased [already]?

[That] explanatory verse follows the refutation of the production of origination by its own self. By means of [that verse], one should also state a refutation of [the corresponding position that] cessation is caused to cease by its own self.

If another cessation causes that [cessation] to cease, there will be an infinite regress.
But if [cessation] has ceased without [another] cessation [which causes it to cease], everything would cease in that way.
[That] explanatory verse follows the refutation of the production of origination by another [origination]. Here, too, by means of [that verse], one should also state a refutation of [the corresponding position that] cessation is caused to cease by another [cessation].

**Objection:**-[119] [Things] which are perishable cease by means of [some] cause of cessation.-[120]

**Answer:** To those [who hold that position], the following should be said:

[Thesis:] That which is ascertained to be the cause of the cessation of some [thing] is not [in fact] the cause of the cessation of that [thing],

[Reason:] because it is different from that [cessation],

[Example:] like [things] other than that [alleged cause of cessation].-[121]

Therefore in that way, by the arguments which have been shown at length, [we] have rejected origination, duration and cessation. Hence in ultimate reality, the reason stated by the opponent at the beginning of [this] chapter has a meaning which is unestablished; and [the opponent's] example is nonexistent. If [the opponent] states [the same] reason and example as superficial reality, they have a contradictory meaning.-[122]

In order to summarize [this examination of origination, duration, and cessation] according to the result of the method which has been shown, [Nāgarjuna says,]

Because origination, duration, and cessation (bhāṅga) are not established, the conditioned does not exist. [MMK 7-33ab]

As to that, the opponent has said [in his initial syllogism at the beginning of this chapter], "One should grasp that conditioned [dharmas], the aggregates, elements, and āyatanas, do indeed have the intrinsic nature of conditioned [dharmas], because they possess origination, etc., the defining characteristics of the conditioned." That [statement] is not established.

**Objection:**-[123] In ultimate reality, conditioned [things], such as an ox and so on, do indeed exist, because their defining characteristics, such as a dewlap and so on, exist.

**Answer:** Also to those who state [such an argument], one should likewise-[124] raise a question in objection: Do those defining characteristics, such as a dewlap and so on, [themselves] have defining characteristics? Or are they without defining characteristics? As to that, if they have defining characteristics, in that case,

[Thesis:] Those [alleged defining characteristics of an ox,] a dewlap and so on, do not characterize either the "oxness" or the conditionedness of an ox,
[Reason:] because [a dewlap and so on] possess defining characteristics, [Example:] like [the thing characterized,] the substance of an ox.

But if they are without defining characteristics, [then] because they are without defining characteristics, they themselves are not established. Hence they are not able to characterize the thing characterized. Thus one applies [such arguments] at length as before. One should also say that if those [defining characteristics] have other defining characteristics, an infinite regress will follow; but if they have no other defining characteristics, it will indeed follow that the thing characterized also [has no defining characteristics]; and so on.

Objection.: One should also say that if those [defining characteristics] have other defining characteristics, an infinite regress will follow; but if they have no other defining characteristics, it will indeed follow that the thing characterized also [has no defining characteristics]; and so on.

[Reason:] because it has an opposite (pratipakṣa).

[Example:] Here what is known not to exist does not have an opposite, just as a childless woman's son [has no opposite].

[Application:] The conditioned does have an opposite, [namely,] the unconditioned.

[Conclusion:] Therefore by virtue of the stated reason, one should understand that in ultimate reality, the conditioned does indeed exist.

Hence the inferences which [you] have previously stated are in conflict with [our] counterbalancing [inference]; and the aggregates and so on also established.

Answer: Here, if the conditioned had been established, [then] by removing that, it would also be possible to say that some substance called "the unconditioned" exists. But if that conditioned is examined, [one finds that] it does not exist. Therefore, [Nāgārjuna says,]

Since the conditioned has not been established, how will one establish the unconditioned? [MMK 7-33cd]

The idea is that even conventionally, [the unconditioned] is unoriginated like a hare's horn. Hence [the unconditioned] is not commonly known as a substance. Therefore those [members of the opponent's syllogism,] the reason and so on, are not possible.

Objection.: If [you] show that in ultimate reality, origination and so on are not defining characteristics, [then] in that way, [you] have established that their being defining characteristics of the conditioned is excluded. Hence [your syllogisms] will have the fault that [their] subject (pakṣa), reason, what is exemplified [by the example], and so on are not
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established.

Answer: In ultimate reality, they do not exist. But there is no fault, because [we] accept that they exist conventionally,

Like a dream, like a magical illusion, like a city of the gandharvas. [MMK 7-34ab]

Dreams have as [their] causes [1] the memory of experiencing what was conceptually constructed [in the waking state], [2] virtue (dharma), [3] nonvirtue (adharma), and [4] the controlling power (adhīṣṭhāna) of a god. [Dreams] have as [their] result the perception (nye bar dmigs pa) that one is encountering desired and undesired objects. If one examines [them], [dreams] have no intrinsic nature; but conventionally, they become objects [of cognition] (viṣaya) by being causes of the cognition of existence and so on.

Magical illusions become perceptible to the senses [and] arise as the intrinsic nature of elephants, bulls, women, places, and so on, because of the particular powers of magicians and spells and herbs. Although they have no intrinsic nature, they are said to exist because they are causes of mistaken (bhṛṇta) cognition. Cities of the gandharvas are causes for the arising of the cognition of cities which have wide moats; gates; turrets; white, joyous, shining towers; pavilions [ornamented] with moons; windows; and penthouses (kuṭāgāra).

So origination, so duration, so cessation (bhaṅga) are spoken of. [MMK 7-34cd]

To sages (ṛṣi) [for whom] the eye which sees reality has fully opened, [the Buddha] has spoken of [origination, duration, and cessation] in order to cause (rgyu nyid du) the arising of the cognition of the origination and so on of the conditioned. [The teaching of origination and so on] causes the ignorant, whose intellectual eye is closed, to produce the conceit that [as a matter of] real fact (bhūtārtha), entities originate, endure, [and] cease - just as [in] a dream and so on [one imagines that the objects one sees are real]. Therefore, in that way, [we] accept that origination and so on exist according to the conventional usage of the wise and the unwise. Hence [our syllogisms] do not have the fault that [their] subject (pākṣa), reason, what is exemplified [by the example], and so on are not established.

Objection: [Nāgārjuna's] three examples, a dream and so on, are shown in order to point out the three conceptual constructions, which are
different from that cause of the functioning of the afflictions [which the proponents of the existence of the object suppose, namely, an external object].

*Answer*: The three examples, a dream and so on, are stated in [that] order for the purpose of showing that these [three reasons] stated by an opponent [in the following syllogism] are inconclusive:

[Opponent's Thesis:] Origination and so on do indeed exist,
[Opponent's First Reason:] because they are objects (grāhyā) of perceptual cognition (pratyakṣa-buddhi),
[Opponent's Second Reason:] because [they] have a maker (kartr),
[Opponent's Third Reason:] because a nondifferent series grasps [them],
[Opponent's Example:] as in the case of matter.

In the Śrāvakayāna, although the intrinsic nature of a self and what belongs to a self (ātma-ātmiya) does not exist, it appears so. Therefore the Blessed One has also stated [the following] as an antidote to the obscuration [consisting of] the afflictions (kleśa-āvaraṇa):

Matter is like a mass of foam; feeling is like a bubble;
Perception/conception is like a mirage; mental formations are like a [pithless] plantain tree;
Cognition is like a magical illusion: so the seer of reality has said.

In the Mahāyāna, too, although the intrinsic nature of the conditioned does not exist, it appears so; and it is so taught. Therefore [the Blessed One] has stated [the following] as an antidote to the obscuration [consisting of] the afflictions and [the obscuration which obscures] objects of knowledge (kleśa-jñeya-āvaraṇa):

Like stars, faulty vision, lamps, magical illusions, dew, bubbles,
Dreams, lightning, and clouds, so should one see the conditioned.

Therefore here there is no occasion for fear. The intelligent, having examined [this scripture and reasoning], should be receptive [to it].

*Buddhapālita's commentary:* [Buddhapālita] says: As examples of the absence of self in conditioned factors, the Blessed One pointed out magical illusions, echoes, reflections, mirages, dreams, masses of foam, bubbles in water, and trunks of plantain trees. He also said, "Here there is not any thusness or nonfalsity (avitathāta). Rather, these are conceptual proliferation; and these are also false." In the statement, "All dharmas are without self," "without self" has the meaning of "without intrinsic nature," be-
cause the word "self" is a term for intrinsic nature.

[Bhāvaviveka's critique:] As to that, here [in the Śrāvakayāna], the appearance of a self is falsity; and also the word "self" is a term for self. Therefore there is no self in those [aggregates] which is different [from them]; nor are [the aggregates] themselves a self, just as anātman [means both "having no lord different [from oneself]" and "not being a lord"]. That [scriptural] source [which Buddhapālita has quoted] cannot teach the absence of self in dharmas (dharma-nairatmya). [This is so] because in the Śrāvakayāna, the meaning of the phrase ["absence of self"] must be explained etymologically as "absence of self in persons (pudgalanairatmya)." If [Śrāvakayāna scriptures] could [teach the absence of self in dharmas], it would be pointless to embrace another vehicle (yāna) [i.e., the Mahāyāna].

As to that, here the meaning of the chapter [is as follows:] By explaining the faults in the proof stated by the opponent at the beginning of the chapter, it has been shown that conditioned [dharmas] have no intrinsic nature.

Therefore [scriptural] statements such as the following are established:

[From the Bhagavatī-prajñā-pāramitā-sūtra,] 155
Subhūtī, however much is conditioned, that much is false.
Likewise, [from that same Prajñā-pāramitā,] 156
One who does not practice the conditioned and does not practice the unconditioned, practices the perfection of discernment.
Likewise, [from other Mahāyāna sūtras,] 157
All dharmas remain in thusness. In that which is thusness, there is neither conditioned nor unconditioned. Where there is neither conditioned nor unconditioned, there is no functioning of duality (gnyis su 'jug pa). Where there is no functioning of duality, that is thusness.
Likewise, [from the Ārya-brahma-viśeṣa-cintā-paripṛcchā-sūtra,] 158
[Mañjuśrī said.] "Brahma, what difference is there between conditioned and unconditioned dharmas?"
[Brahma] said, "Mañjuśrī, the difference between conditioned and unconditioned dharmas is mere conventional designation. A bodhisattva who holds this dhāraya does not vainly imagine, does not apprehend conditioned and unconditioned dharmas."
Likewise, [from the Bhagavatī-prajñā-pāramitā-suviśrāntavikrāmi-paripṛcchā-sūtra,] 160
Suviśrāntavikrāmin, matter, feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition are neither conditioned nor unconditioned. [The fact] that matter, feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and
cognition are neither conditioned nor unconditioned, is the perfection of discernment. Matter, feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition do not have the property of originating (utpāda-dharmin) or the property of ceasing (vyaya-dharmin). [The fact] that matter, feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition do not have the property of originating or the property of ceasing, is the perfection of discernment. Apart from conceptual construction, the conditioned and the unconditioned do not exist. Confused, spiritually immature [people] grasp "the conditioned and the unconditioned," [which are unreal] like a son seen in a childless woman's dream.

The seventh chapter, "Examination of Origination, Duration, and Cessation," of the Prajñāpradīpa, a commentary on [Nāgārjuna's] Mūlamadhyamaka composed by ācārya Bhavyakara/Bhavyakāra (legs ldan byed)161 [is concluded].

Notes to Translation of Chapter Seven

1In the Prasannapadā, chapter seven is called "Examination of the Conditioned" (samskṛta-pariksā, see PSP 179.9). The Abhidharma-kāśa-bhāṣya on AK 2-45cd,46 contains a lengthy discussion of Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika views on the three (or four) defining characteristics of the conditioned. See LVP AK II, pp. 222-38. For further references, see May (1959), p. 106 nn. 255, 256. See also Cox (1995), pp. 146-151.

2The "particular counterposition" is the opponent's objection which immediately follows. See Ava P124b-2 to 125a-4, D112b-3 to 113a-3.

3Avalokitavrata ascribes this objection to "fellow Buddhists ... Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas." See Ava P125a-4,5 and 125b-3; D113a-3,4 and 113b-1.

4blo gros kyi 'du byed skyed pa dag, perhaps utpādita-mati-saṃskārāḥ.

5'di la, "here," glossed by Avalokitavrata as "in the third [piṭaka], the Abhidharma-piṭaka," chos mgon pa'i sde snod gsum po 'di la. See Ava P125b-5, D113b-2,3.

6The point here is probably to explain the feminine dvigu compound trilakṣāṇi, "the three characteristics." The example given, chad pa gsum dang ldan pa: "possessing the three staves," may translate tridantī yuktā.

7See Ava P127a-7 to 127b-2, D114b-7 to 115a-2.

8It is not established in ultimate reality; and it is contradictory to try to prove a positive thesis about ultimate reality with a reason which is valid only conventionally. See Ava P128a-5, D115b-3,4.

9That is, if origination is unconditioned, it cannot be a defining characteristic of the conditioned; but this contradicts the reason in the opponent's syllogism at the beginning of the chapter.

10skye ba ni mshan nyid kyi sgra'i tshul nye bar bzung ba'i phyir, where mshan nyid, laksana or laksanā, is probably used in the sense of "indirect
expression."

11In other words, although the argument in MMK 7-1 is stated in terms of origination, it applies to the other two alleged defining characteristics of the conditioned as well. See Ava P129a-1,2,3; D116a-5,6,7.

12See Ava P129b-6,7; D116b-7 to 117a-1.

13See Ava P129b-8 to 130a-1, D117a-1,2.

14See Ava P130a-1,2,3; D117a-2,3,4.

15Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P130a-3,4; D117a-4. The same three verses are quoted by Buddhapedita in his commentary on MMK 7-2. See Saito (1984), 87.8-19.

16This alternative is rejected as absurd. See Ava P130a-7 to 130b-1, D117a-7 to 117b-1.

17Duration and impermanence are incompatible. If a single entity seems to possess both simultaneously, one or the other must be an illusory appearance.

18\textit{sems bde bar gnas pa dag}, contrasted by Avalokitavrata with those who are insane or possessed by a demon. See Ava P130b-6, D117b-5.

19Compare LVP AK II, pp. 226ff.

20Avalokitavrata points out that because the Sautrāntikas are proponents of momentariness (\textit{ksanikavādin}), they themselves do not hold that the series of moments is a real substance. (Only the individual moments are ultimately real.) See Ava P131a-3,4,5; D118a-2,3.

21According to Avalokitavrata, origination is conceptually constructed in relation to the stage of origination (\textit{skye ba'i gnas skabs}), duration in relation to the originated (\textit{skyes pa}), and cessation in relation to duration (or "what has endured") (\textit{gnas pa}). See Ava P131a-7,8; D118a-4,5.

22That is, the fault that the three defining characteristics of the conditioned cannot all exist in the same locus at the same time. See Ava P131b-1,2,3; D118a-6,7.

23If origination and so on occur successively, they are not always present in the conditioned thing which they characterize. See Ava P131b-8 to 132a-2, D118b-4,5.

24From the context and Avalokitavrata's explanation, \textit{smyad pa}, \textit{glebs pa}, and \textit{bcum pa} are apparently stages in the shaping of clay to make a jar. See Ava P132a-5,6,7; D118b-7 to 119a-2.

25One can metaphorically designate origination, etc., as defining characteristics of the conditioned because they do not occur in the unconditioned. Nevertheless, the fact remains that all three do not occur in the series of one entity at the same time. Hence, since they are not invariably present in the conditioned, they are not, in fact, defining characteristics of the conditioned. See Ava P132b-5,6,7; D119a-6 to 119b-1.

26That is, let it be the case that origination and so on do not themselves possess origination and so on. See Ava P133b-1,2; D120a-2.

27Compare 7-1cd.

28See Ava P133b-4,5,6; D120a-4,5.

29\textit{thug pa dang} | \textit{gnas pa dang} | \textit{mu thug ste} | (Ava P133b-3, D120a-4: \textit{de} med
par yang mi ’gyur ro. Apparently, gnas pa med pa (aniketa) and mu thug med pa (anaryāda) are used here as synonyms of thug pa med pa, anavasthā.

30See the first syllogism following MMK 7-1ab.

31That is, if you say that origination and so on also characterize themselves as conditioned, then they are defining characteristics and also are the things characterized; and the same argument applies.


According to Avalokitāvṛata, the origin of the name "Vātsīputriya" is as follows: A wandering ascetic (parivṛjka) named *Vatsa (gnas pa) became a Buddhist monk. He taught his disciples a doctrine of pūdga/viśīda which was similar to āṭha-vāda. Because his disciples considered him to be like a mother, they were called "Vātsīputriyas" (gnas ma bu'i sde pa dag), "those who are [like] sons of Vatśī [feminine ending]." See Ava P134a-5,6,7; D120b-4,5.

33All fifteen dharmas originate at the same moment. They are: (1) the principal dharma itself; (2-8) its "retinue" (parivāra); and (9-15) the "retinue of the retinue." See Ava P134b-5,6; D121a-2,3.

34See May (1959), p. 111 n. 279. Samanvāgama is very similar in meaning to the more familiar Abhidharma term, prāpti.

35"White" dharmas are wholesome dharmas; "black" dharmas are afflictive dharmas. See May (1959), p. 111 and AK 4-59cd,60.

36That is, the principal duration causes the other fourteen (out of the fifteen) dharmas to endure. The duration of duration causes only the principal duration to endure. Parallel statements apply to the remaining five members of the retinue and the corresponding five members of the retinue of the retinue. See Ava P134b-8 to 135a-8, D121a-5 to 121b-4.

37This translation follows the Tibetan. A literal translation of the Sanskrit of MMK 7-4ab is, "The origination of origination is the origination of the principal origination alone."

38Again, this translation follows the Tibetan. A literal translation of the Sanskrit of MMK 7-5ab is, "If your origination of origination is the origination of the principal origination ..."

39That is, prior to the time when it allegedly produces the principal origination, the origination of origination has not originated and so does not produce anything. But it has also not originated at the time when it allegedly produces the principal origination, because it has not yet been produced by that principal origination. See Ava P135b-8 to 136a-2, D122a-3,4.

40The remarks in the previous note apply here, interchanging "origination of origination" and "principal origination." See Ava P136a-6,7; D122a-7 to 122b-1.

41See note 39.

42The idea seems to be this: The opponent has proposed that the principal origination and the origination of origination produce each other when both are in the process of originating. Nāgārjuna replies that this would be possible only if they could produce each other when they have not yet originated.
On Bhāvaviveka's syllogism, see Ava P136b-4,5,6; D122b-4,5,6. It is not quite clear whether Bhāvaviveka is actually equating "in the process of originating" and "unoriginated."

43See AK 2-50cd,51 and the bhāṣya, especially LVP AK II, pp. 253-5.
44See Ava P136b-7 to 137a-8, D122b-7 to 123a-6.
45The opponent might hold that the principal origination and the origination of origination are nonobstructing causes of each other when both are in the process of originating. Nonobstructing causes, however, have already been negated. (See, for instance, MMK 1-10.) See Ava P137b-3,4,5; D123b-1,2.
46Identified by Avalokitarātā only as "members of other [Buddhist] schools (nikāyāntariya)." See Ava P137b-7, D123b-4.

On the example of a lamp and its light, see May (1959), pp. 113-4 n. 284. Compare the discussion of fire's illuminating both itself and others in Vighraha-vyāvärtana 34-39; see Bhattacharya, Johnston, and Kunst (1978), pp. 27-9.

47See Ava P139a-2,3; D124b-3,4.
48See Ava P139b-1,2; D125a-1,2.
49See Ava P139b-3 to 7, D125a-3 to 6.
50According to Avalokitarātā, darkness does not come in contact with a lamp; and because [the darkness] is in the process of originating, it does not obscure the lamp. See Ava P141a1,2,3; D126a-4,5.
51The opponent charges that the reason in the Mādhyamika's last syllogism, "because it is [in the process of] originating," is inconclusive, since knowledge (shes pa) which is in the process of originating removes ignorance. See Ava P141a-3 to 6, D126a-6 to 126b-1.
52Just as in ultimate reality, a lamp does not dispel darkness, so also in ultimate reality, knowledge does not remove ignorance. Hence there is no counterexample. See Ava P141a-6,7; D126b-1,2.
53mgon par ma grub pa, probably anabhinirvartita.
54See Ava P141b-7,8; D126b-7 to 127a-1.
55mgon spyod kyi las, probably abhicāra-karman.
56See Ava P142a-3,4,5; D127a-3,4,5.
57rig sngags kyi lha dag, probably vidyā-devāḥ.
58If darkness obscured itself, it would never be perceived; and objects would always be visible. See Ava P142b-8 to 143a-3; D127b-6,7.
59That is, darkness does exist, contrary to the undesired consequences adduced in MMK 7-11 and 7-12. (See the preceding note.)
60That is, since the example of a lamp fails, the opponent's theory that origination produces itself and others likewise fails.
61That is, before the time when it originates, it does not produce itself, because it does not then exist. Likewise, it will not produce itself even at the time when it supposedly originates, if it has not yet originated then. Compare Ava P143b-7,8; D128b-2,3.
62If origination does not produce itself, it would require another origination to produce it; but that origination would need a third origination; and so on ad infinitum. Compare MMK 7-3abc.
The opponent may say that since origination is not produced by itself or by another origination, it is just unproduced and unconditioned. But if it is unconditioned, how can it be a defining characteristic of the conditioned? See MMK 7-1cd,3d and Ava P144a-3,4,5; D128b-5,6.

If origination produces something other than itself, is that other thing something which has already originated or something which has not yet originated or something which is in the process of originating? See Ava P144a-8 to 144b-1, D129a-1,2.

Just as one does not traverse a path already traversed, a path not yet traversed, or a path which is in the process of being traversed, so one does not produce what has already originated, what has not yet originated, or what is in the process of originating. Compare MMK 2-1; and see Ava P144b-3,4,5; D129a-3,4.

nages par ma zin pa, probably anirdhārīta, glossed by Avalokitavrata as med pa, "nonexistent." See Ava P144b-7,8; D129a5,6.

dus gzhon du 'pho ba la mngon par phyogs pa, perhaps kālāntara-samkrānty-abhimukha. The idea seems to be that the phase of "being in the process of originating" lasts only for an instant. See Ava P145a-1 to 4, D129a-6 to 129b-2.

According to Avalokitavrata, "origination" here means "causal conditions." For example, in dependence on causal conditions such as the eye, visible form, and so on, visual cognition originates. By means of that origination, one infers that the visual cognition which is in the process of originating exists. See Ava P146a-8 to 146b-2, D130b-3,4.

dngos po thams cad kyi rang bzhin ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du smra ba rnams la. Since ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du smra ba corresponds to niḥsvabhāva-vādin, rang bzhin may stand for prakṛti, "original nature," here.

The Sanskrit of MMK 7-15ab is utpadyānām utpattāv idam na kramate yadā. This may be an allusion to the formula asmin satīdham bhavati, or in this case, utpattāv asyām satyām utpadyānām idam bhavati.

Avalokitavrata quotes MMK 1-7, which negates the hetupratyaya. See Ava P146b-8 to 147a-1, D131a-1,2.

Compare Majjhima-nikāya I, pp. 262.37-263.2.

Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P147b-5, D131b-4. The Sanskrit is quoted several times by Candrākīrti; see PSP, pp. 239, 491, 500, 504.

Identified by Avalokitavrata only as being "from other sūtrāntas." See Ava P147b-6, D131b-5.

Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P147b-7, D131b-5. The Sanskrit is quoted in PSP, p. 262 (with anuppana for niḥsvabhāva) and p. 504 (with śūnya for niḥsvabhāva). See also Nanjio (1923), p. 76, which has anupattiṃ samdhāya Mahāmate niḥsvabhāvāh sarvasvabhāvāh (Tibetan: sarvabhāvāh).

Avalokitavrata comments, "[This] teaches dependent origination as it is in ultimate reality (pāramārtika-pratītyasamutpāda). Thus both that which is 'dependent' (pratītya) and that which is 'origination' (samutpāda) are tranquil/extinct by intrinsic nature and are without origination. Therefore, for the
proponents of dependent origination, both what is [in the process of] originating and origination are tranquil/extinct by intrinsic nature and are without origination." See Ava P148a-4,5,6; D132a-2,3,4.

That is, according to Avalokitavrata, Nāgārjuna composed the MMK in order to get rid of the opponent's attachment to conventional things as being ultimately real. See Ava P148b-5,6; D132b-2.

According to Avalokitavrata, "The Vaibhāṣika-Sarvāstivādins suppose that the entities of the three times, [past, present, and future] pass from future time into present time only after having [first] existed [in the future], and also pass from present time into past time. Therefore, since those originate only after having [first] existed, the principal origination, in dependence on that origination, produces what is [in the process of] originating. Here those [Vaibhāṣika-Sarvāstivādins] say, 'An entity does not originate after having [first] been nonexistent. Rather, that jar, [for example,] existing in future time with the intrinsic nature of visible form, taste, odor, and the tangible, passes into present time [as] the intrinsic nature of a jar and [thus] originates. Likewise, it also passes from present time into past time according to circumstances and [so] originates [as past?]. Therefore, depending on that origination, the principal origination produces what is [in the process of] originating.'" See Ava P149a-3 to 7, D132b-6 to 133a-1.

On the controversy between the Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas over the issue of time, see LVP AK V, pp. 50-65.

PP's Tibetan translation of MMK 7-17d (which I have translated here) differs from the Sanskrit and the Tibetan translation in the Prasannapadā, which has bhāva upadāya 'sati. See Saito (1984), translation, p. 257 n. 53.

Glossed by Avalokitavrata as "those who say that entities originate only after having [first] existed." See Ava P149b-7,8; D133b-1,2.

Glossed by Avalokitavrata as "those who say that entities pass from future time into present time and [then] pass from present time into past time." See Ava P150a-3,4; D133b-4.

If past and future entities exist, what differentiates them from present entities? Bhāvaviveka refers here to four answers to this question, given in the Mahāvibhāṣa and associated with four different teachers: [1] Bhadanta Dharmatīra; [2] Bhadanta Ghosaka; [3] Bhadanta Vasumitra; and [4] Bhadanta Buddhadeva, respectively. In the Mahāvibhāṣa and the AK, it is said that Vasumitra's theory, difference of state (avasthā-anyathāva), is the best. For details, see LVP AK V, pp. 52-4 and Ava P150a-4 to 152a-3, D133b-5 to 135a-6.

According to Avalokitavrata, the Śāmkhyas hold that an entity existing in future time with the nature of potentiality (sakī) is made manifest in present time by causal conditions. See Ava P152a-4,5; D135a-6,7 and also Larson and Bhattacharya (1987), pp. 100-1.

An unoriginated entity, i. e., an entity which has not yet originated, is included in future time. See Ava P152a-8, D135b-2,3.

By saying that a present entity does not exist by intrinsic nature. See Ava
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P152b-6,7; D135b-7 to 136a-1.

87 *braṭags pa'i dngos po yod pa nyid du.* This is the reading of DC. P omits *braṭags pa'i,* "conceptually constructed," while Ava P152b-8, D136a-2 has *braṭags pa'i yod pa nyid du,* *prajñaptisat(tā/tva)," existence as designations."

88 PP's Tibetan translation of MMK 7-18c, which I have translated here, corresponds to a Sanskrit text different from that in the *Prasannapadā,* which has *uttādayet tam uttādam.* See Saito (1984), translation, pp. 257-8, n. 54.

89 By saying that origination produces, one contradicts the nature of origination.

90 Origination (*uttāda*) is glossed by Avalokitavrata as *skyed par byed pa gzhon,* "another producer." See Ava P154a-4,5; D137a-2,3.

91 Avalokitavrata refers to Bhāvaviveka's quotation from the *Catuḥśataka* which follows MMK 7-2ab,c1. See Ava P155a-6 to 155b-1, D138a-2,3,4.

92 The idea may be that a particular moment of enduring cannot take place after it has already occurred.

93 See Ava P156a-7,8; D139a-1,2.

94 The opponent's reason is not established in ultimate reality, and it is contradictory to state a reason which is valid only conventionally in order to prove a positive thesis about ultimate reality. See Ava P157b-4, D140a-2.

95 MMK 7-23cd is identical with MMK 7-21cd.

96 In other words, intrinsic nature is unchanging. Hence if things exist by intrinsic nature, what does not cease at one instant will not change its nature and cease at a later instant.

97 According to Avalokitavrata, some opponents who think, "If I say this, others will consider me learned in the Buddha's word and the science of grammar." See Ava P158b-4,5; D140b-7.

98 It has been shown that what lacks cessation at first will not cease later, either. By a parallel argument, one can show that what at first lacks ageing will not age later. See Ava P159a-3,4; D141a-5,6.

99 *mi 'thad pa dang ldan pa,* probably *anupapattimat.*

100 More literally, "Origination - in regard to which it is seen that if origination exists, duration occurs - is not established."

101 The reason referred to is that in the opponent's syllogism preceding MMK 7-22a, "because a dharma exists which occurs only if that [origination] exists." Earlier (before MMK 7-23ab; see note 94) Bhāvaviveka pointed out two alternative faults in this reason. Here he is saying that these faults remain, despite the opponent's attempts to remove them. See Ava P159a-7,8; D141b-1,2.

102 That is, if what is in the process of ceasing has partly ceased and partly not ceased, neither of those two parts could cease, for the reasons already stated.

103 According to Avalokitavrata, MMK 7-26abc show that even if origination is accepted, cessation is not possible. MMK 7-26d applies to the case where origination is not accepted. See Ava P161b-3,4; D143a-7.

104 MMK 7-22a (7-22b in the Sanskrit) says, "An entity which has [already] endured does not [now] endure" (*sthitā bhāvo na tiṣṭhati*). This appears to contradict Bhāvaviveka's explanation of *sthitā* here as referring to something
which is still enduring. It is probably significant that MMK 7-22 uses the pattern sthita-asthita-tisthamāna, whereas 7-27 mentions only sthita and asthita. With an intransitive verb like sthā, the "past passive participle" often has a present sense; and in 7-27 there is no contrast between sthita and the present middle participle tiṣṭhamāna. Also, in 7-22 the argument requires a distinction between past and present moments of enduring (cf. n. 92 above), whereas in 7-27 the contrast is between an entity which is now enduring (whether it began to endure earlier or not) and one which has not yet endured.

Here "stage" (avasthā) apparently refers to the successive states of a thing which is undergoing change. In what follows, Bhāvaviveka uses the example of milk changing into curds.

In MMK 7-28ab and also 7-28cd, PP's Tibetan translation (which I have translated here) seems to be based on a Sanskrit version slightly different from that of PSP 169.1.2. See Saito (1984), translation, pp. 259-60 n. 76.

Consider the case of milk changing into curds. Milk does not cease to be milk and become curds at that stage at which it is still milk.

MMK 7-28d reads na cānyaiva nirudhyate in PSP 169.2, nānyaiva nirudhyate in Saito's reconstruction. (See note 107.) Bhāvaviveka is saying that despite the word order, eva has to be understood with na. (Compare PSP 169.7.) Otherwise, one would be affirming that it does cease at the same stage (implicative negation), rather than merely denying that it ceases at a different stage (simple negation).

The relevance of the opponent's objection in this context is as follows: Suppose that, as Dignāga et al. hold, the cognition of something has as its object the absence of anything different from that thing. Then the cessation of that thing is equivalent to the cessation of that absence. Thus an absence, that is, a nonentity, is what ceases. See Ava P164a-3 to 8, D145b-1 to 5.

Avalokitavrata gives a long argument supporting this first reason of Bhāvaviveka's. Suppose that the opponent's reason means that if visible form is seen, the cognition of visible form originates. Then the cognition of visible form has as its object the presence of visible form, not the absence of anything different from visible form. On the other hand, suppose that the reason means that if the absence of anything is seen, then the cognition of that absence originates. Then it is not the case that the cognition of visible form originates, but rather the cognition of an absence, i.e., of nothing at all. See Ava P164b-7 to 165b-1, D146a-3 to 146b-2.

The cognition of an ox has as its object the presence of an ox, not the
absence of anything different from an ox. See Ava P165b-1 to 6, D146b-3 to 6.

In other words, the thesis is self-contradictory because it is impossible for an entity which is already nonexistent to cease.

PP's Tibetan translation of MMK 7-32ab, which I have translated here, is a little different from the Sanskrit and Tibetan of the Prasannapadā. PSP's version can be translated as, "Cessation by means of itself does not exist; cessation by means of another [does not exist]." See PSP 171.6 and 171 n. 4.

PP's Tibetan translation seems to influenced by the fact that MMK 7-32cd is identical to MMK 7-25cd. See Saito (1984), translation, p, 260 n. 82.

Avalokitavrata identifies the opponents here as "those who maintain that cessation ('jig pa) has a cause." See Ava P166b-3,4; D147b-2.

'jig pa, probably bhaṅga here. Compare MMK 7-33a.

See Ava P166b-5,6,7; D147b-3,4. Note that Ava P166b-6 omits Ava D147b-4's da (read de) yang 'jig pa after nges par shes pa.

It is contradictory to adduce a reason which is valid only conventionally in order to prove a positive thesis about ultimate reality.

Concerning this objection, Avalokitavrata says, "The negation of the general characteristics (sāmānyya-lakṣaṇa) of the conditioned, origination, duration, and cessation, has been shown previously. Now [Bhāvaviveka] shows the negation of the supposition by the Vaiśeṣikas, etc., that there are specific individual characteristics (svalakṣaṇa) of each conditioned [thing]." See Ava P167a-4,5; D148a-1,2.

Compare MMK 7-1.

Compare MMK 7-3.

Avalokitavrata ascribes this objection to "fellow Buddhists." See Ava P168a-6,7; D149a-1.

Another meaning of pratipakṣa is "adversary."


Avalokitavrata also ascribes this objection to "fellow Buddhists." See Ava P168b-6, D149a-7.

Avalokitavrata, perhaps upameya.

According to Avalokitavrata, "In the waking state, although the identifying marks of the object do not exist externally, [they] are experienced, [being] conceptually constructed by the mind." See Ava P169a-3,4; D149b-3,4.

According to Avalokitavrata, much practice of virtuous actions in waking life produces good dreams, while nonvirtuous actions produce bad dreams. See Ava P169a-4, D149b-4,5.

According to Avalokitavrata, in the dreaming state, they are causes of the cognition of existence, whereas in the waking state, they are causes of the cognition of nonexistence. See Ava P169a-7,8; D149b-7 to 150a-1.

According to Avalokitavrata, the Buddha taught origination and so on to the sages in order to establish the superficial truth and produce the cognition of the
defining characteristics and thing characterized of the conditioned. See Ava P169b-4 to 7, D150a-4,5,6.

According to Avalokitavrata, the ignorant, hearing the Buddha speak of origination, etc., imagine that in ultimate reality [and not merely in conventional reality], conditioned dharmas originate, endure, and cease - just as one takes objects in a dream to be real or believes that magical illusions or cities of the gandharvas are real things. See Ava P169b-7 to 170a-2, D150a-6 to 150b-1.

Literally, "some say;" glossed by Avalokitavrata as "some proponents of cognition only (rnam par shes pa tsam smra ba dag, vijñāna-mātra-vādinaḥ) say." See Ava P170a-8, D150b-5.

"The three conceptual constructions (rnam par rtog pa, vikalpa)" are glossed by Avalokitavrata (ibid.) as "the imagined (parikalpita), the dependent (paratamra), and the perfect (parinispanna)," better known as the three natures (svabhāva). Avalokitavrata also explains at length how the opponent applies Nāgārjuna's three examples in MMK 7-34ab to the three "conceptual constructions." See Ava P170b-2 to 171a-4, D150b-7 to 151a-7.

"Some proponents of cognition only (mam par shes pa tsam smra ba dag, vijñāna-mātra-vādinaḥ) say." See Ava P170a-8, D150b-5.

The idea seems to be that all beings who have similar sense organs, who are in the same vicinity at the same time, etc., perceive them. Compare the following note, where it is pointed out that a city of the gandharvas, i.e., a Fata Morgana, is also seen by everyone who is in the right place at the right time. For a discussion of this type of mirage, see Fraser and Mach (1976) and Tape (1985), especially pp. 127-129.

According to Avalokitavrata, the example of a dream shows that the opponent's first reason is inconclusive, because a dream is an object of mental, etc., perceptual cognition. The example of a magical illusion shows that the opponent's second reason is inconclusive, because a magical illusion has a maker, namely, a magician and various causes and conditions. The example of a city of the gandharvas shows that the opponent's third reason is inconclusive, because a city of the gandharvas is seen by [beings with] nondifferent series. See Ava P171b-4 to 172a-4, D151b-7 to 152a-5.

Avalokitavrata amplifies this as follows: "For the Śrāvakayāna, in ultimate reality, all dharmas lack the intrinsic nature of a person's (pudgala) self and what belongs to it. But in superficial reality, the image/aspect (rnam pa) of the intrinsic nature of a self and what belongs to a self appears like that. Therefore attachment to that [self and what belongs to a self] becomes the obscuration [consisting of] the
afflictions." See Ava P172a-7 to 172b-1, D152a-7 to 152b-2.

This paragraph and the rest of Bhāvaviveka’s commentary through his critique of Buddhapālita’s commentary on MMK 7-34 are translated and discussed in Lopez (1988).

This verse occurs, with a variant, Sanyutta-nikāya III 142.29-31. A Sanskrit version is quoted in PSP 41.9-11 and 549.2-4. Also, see references in May (1959), p. 257 n. 924.

Avalokitavrata explains these similes as follows: Matter will not bear examination; feeling, having arisen, ceases and becomes nonexistent; perception/conception is a false imputation; mental formations have no essence (snying po) that can be apprehended; cognition has no intrinsic nature that can be apprehended. See Ava P172b-1 to 4, D152b-2,3,4.

According to Avalokitavrata, it is taught in the Mahāyāna that although in ultimate reality, all dharmas are without intrinsic nature, nevertheless in superficial reality, they appear as just [having] the intrinsic nature of magical illusions and so on. See Ava P172b-6,7; D152b-6.

This verse is from the Vajracchedikā; see Conze (1957), p. 62.

Avalokitavrata explains these similes as follows: (1) Just as stars appear at night but not in the daytime, so the conditioned appears when the darkness of ignorance exists but not when the sun of wisdom has risen. (2) Conditioned things appear due to attachment to the view that persons and dharinas exist, even though there are no such objects [just as someone with faulty vision sees nonexistent objects]. (3) The defining characteristic of cognition "burns," having arisen in dependence on the wick of action and the oil of craving (Ava D153a-4: sred pa; Ava P173a-5 has srid pa).

(4) Like a magical illusion, the conditioned appears as a false image (nor ba'i rnam pa). (5) The conditioned is impermanent like dew. (6) The conditioned has the nature of suffering, broadly understood as the three types of suffering. The simile of a bubble is used because feeling is like a bubble (see the previous note), and all feelings have the nature of one of the three types of suffering.

(7) Past conditioned (dharmas) are like a dream. (8) Present conditioned (dharmas), like lightning, cannot be grasped. (9) Their seeds produce a future result like a cloud in the sky of the mind. See Ava P172b-8 to 173b-6, D152b-7 to 153b-3.

According to Avalokitavrata, there is no occasion to fear that all entities are nonexistent even in superficial reality. In superficial reality, they exist as conventional designations, like dreams and so on. In ultimate reality, they have no intrinsic nature. See Ava P174a-2 to 5, D153b-6 to 154a-1. ("Should be receptive" translates" bzod pa bskyed par bya.)


A very similar passage is quoted in PSP 41.6-7; see PSP 41 nn. 5, 6, 7. See also PSP 237.12-238.1.

"dbang phyug ma yin pa. For the gloss in square brackets, see Ava D154b-4; there is an omission in Ava P175a-2. The point is that anātman is to
be understood as meaning both "not having a self" and "not being a self."

153 For Avalokitavrata's subcommentary on this paragraph, see Ava Pi74b-4 to 175a-7, D154a-6 to 154b-7. Avalokitavrata sums up Bhāvaviveka's position as follows: "Magical illusions, echoes, and so on, which were used by the Blessed One as examples of the absence of self in conditioned factors, were stated as examples of pudgala-nairātmya. The statement [in Śrāvakayāna scriptures], 'All dharmas are without self,' is also stated in the sense of pudgala-nairātmya, not in the sense of absence of intrinsic nature in dharmas. The word 'self' is a term for 'person,' not 'the intrinsic nature of a dharma.'" (Ava Pi75a-4,5,6; D154b5,6,7.)

Hence, in Bhāvaviveka's interpretation, the "self" referred to in the phrase, "the absence of a self in persons (pudgalanairātmya)," is a person, a personal self. The "self" referred to in the phrase, "absence of a self in dharmas (dharma­nairātmya)," is the intrinsic nature of a dharma. See Lopez (1988).

Moreover, given this interpretation, one can speak of pudgala-nairātmya in relation to all dharmas. Thus if one were to translate strictly in accordance with Bhāvaviveka's interpretation, one should translate pudgala-nairātmya as "absence of a self which is a person" and dharma­nairātmya as "absence of a self which is [the intrinsic nature of] a dharma."

154 See Ames (1999), p. 45 n. 149; Avalokitavrata's remarks are similar here. See Ava Pi75b-2,3,4; D155a-3,4 and Pi76a-7 to 176b-2, D155b-5,6,7.

155 Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava Pi75b-4, D155a-4.

156 Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava Pi75b-5, D155a-5.

157 Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava Pi75b-6, D155a-5,6.

158 Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava Pi75b-8, D155a-7.

159 tha dad du bya ba, probably nānākarana.

160 Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava Pi76a-2, D155b-1,2. The Sanskrit of the first two sentences is found in Hikata (1958), p. 36; the second two sentences are on p. 31 of the same work. I have not been able to locate the Sanskrit of the last two sentences.

161 See Ames (1999), p. 46 n. 159.
Sanskrit Text of MMK, Chapters Six and Seven, according to PSP as emended by J. W. de Jong (1978) and further emended by Akira Saito (1985)

Chapter Six

rāgād yadi bhavet pūrvam rakto rāgatiraskṛtah | 1
tam pratiyā bhaved rāgo rakte rāgo bhavet sati ||

rakte 'sati punā rāgah kuta eva bhaviṣyati | 2
sati vāsa sati vā rāge rakte 'py eṣa samaḥ kramaḥ ||

sahaiva punar udbhūtir na yuktā rāgaraktayoh | 3
bhaveṁ rāgaraktau hi nirapekṣau paraparaṁ ||

naikatve sahahāvo 'sti na tenaiva hi tat saha | 4
prthaktve sahahāvo 'tha kuta eva bhaviṣyati ||

ekatve sahahāvaś cet syat sahāyaṁ vināpi sah | 5
prthaktve sahahāvaś cet syat sahāyaṁ vināpi sah ||

prthaktve sahahāvaś ca yadi kim rāgaraktayoh | 6
siddhaḥ prthakprthagbhāvaḥ sahahāvas tatas tayoh ||

siddhaḥ prthakprthagbhāvo yadi vā rāgaraktayoh | 7
sahahāvam kim artham tu parikalpayase tayoh ||

prthag na sidhyati evam sahahāvam vikāṅkṣasi | 8
sahahāvaprasiddhyartham prthaktvaṁ bhūya icchasi ||

prthagbhāvaprasiddheś ca sahahāvo na sidhyati | 9
katamasmin prthagbhāve sahahāvaṁ satīcchasi ||

evaṁ raktena rāgasya siddhir na saha nāsaha | 10
rāgavat sarvadharmāṁ siddhir na saha nāsaha ||

Chapter Seven

yadi saṃskṛta utpādas tatra yuktā trilakṣaṇī | 1
athīsaṃskṛta utpādaḥ katham saṃskṛtalakṣaṇaṁ ||
upādādyās trayo vyastā nālam lakṣānakarmanī |
saṃśkr̥taśya samastāḥ syur ekatra katham ekadā  |  2

upādāsthitbhaṅgānām anyat saṃśkr̥talakṣānam |
asti ced anavasthaivam nāsti cet te na saṃśkr̥tāḥ |  3

upādotpāda utpādo mūlotpādasya kevalaṁ |
upādotpādam utpādo maulo janayate punah | |  4

upādotpāda utpādo mūlotpādasya te yadi |
maulenājanitas taṁ te sa kathā janayisyati | |  5

sa te maulena janito maulaṁ janayate yadi |
maulaḥ sa tenājanitas tam utpādayate kathā | |  6

ayam utpadyamānas te kāmam utpādayed imam |
yadīmam utpādayitum ajātaḥ saknuyād ayam | |  7

pradīpaḥ svaparātmānau samprakāśayate yathā |
upādaḥ svaparātmānāv ubhāv utpādayet tathā | |  8

pradīpe nāndhakāro 'sti yatra cāsau pratiśthitah |
kim prakāśayate dīpaḥ prakāśo hi tamovadhaḥ | |  9

kathām utpadyamānena pradīpena tamo hataṁ |
notpadyamāno hi tamaḥ pradīpaḥ prāpnute yadā | | 10

aprāpyaiva pradīpena yadi vā nihataṁ tamaḥ |
ihaṣṭhaḥ sarvalokasthaṁ sa tamo nihāniṣyati | | 11

pradīpaḥ svaparātmānau samprakāśayate yadi |
tamo 'pi svaparātmānau chādayisyaty asaṃśayam | | 12

anuppana 'yam utpādaḥ svātmānām janayet kathām |
athotpanno janayate jāte kim janyate punah | | 13

notpadyamānam notpannam nānuppannam kathāmeṇa |
uptadyate tad ākhyātaṁ gamyamāṇagatāgataḥ | | 14

upādyamānam utpattāv idaṁ na kramate yadā |
Ames: Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa*, Ch. 6-7

katham utpadyamānaṃ tu pratītyotpattim ucyate| 15

pratītya yad yad bhavati tat tac chāntam svabhāvataḥ| 16

tasmād utpadyamānaṃ ca śāntam utpattir eva ca| 17

yadi kaścid anutpanno bhāvaḥ saṃvidyate kvacit| 18

upadhyeta sa kim tasmin bhāva utpadyate 'sati| 19

upadhyamānam utpādo yadi cotpādayaty ayaṃ| 20

utpādayet tam utpādam utpādaḥ katamāḥ punah| 21

anyā utpādayaty enam yady utpādo 'navasthitih| 22

athānuptāda utpannah sarvam utpadyatām tathā| 23

sataś ca tāvad utpattir asataś ca na yujyate| 24

na sataś cāsataś ceti pūrvam evopapāditam| 25

nirudhyamānasotpattir na bhāvasyopapadyate| 26

yaś cānirudhyamānas tu sa bhāvo nopapadyate| 27

nāsthis tisṭhate bhāvaḥ sthito bhāvo na tiṣṭhati| 28

na tiṣṭhate tiṣṭhamānaḥ ko 'nutpannaś ca tiṣṭhati| 29

sthitir nirudhyamānasya na bhāvasyopapadyate| 30

yaś cānirudhyamānas tu sa bhāvo nopapadyate| 31

jarāmaranadharmesu sarvabhāvesu sarvadā| 32

tiṣṭhanti katame bhāva ye jarāmaranāṃ vinā| 33

sthityānyayā sthiteḥ sthānam tayaiva ca na yujyate| 34

utpādasya yathotpādo nātmanā na parātmanā| 35

nirudhyate nāniruddhaṃ na niruddhaṃ nirudhyate| 36

tathā nirudhyamānaṃ ca kim ajātaṃ nirudhyate| 37

sthitasya tāvad bhāvasya nirodho nopapadyate| 38

nāsthitasyāpi bhāvasya nirodha upapadyate| 39
tayaivaivasthayāvasthā na hi saiva nirudhyate| 40

anyayāvasthayāvasthā na cānyaīva nirudhyate| 41
yadaiva sarvadharmānām utpādo nopapadyate|
tadāiva sarvadharmānām nirodho nopapadyate|| 29

sataś ca tāvad bhāvasya nirodho nopapadyate|
ekatve na hi bhāvaś ca nābhāvaś copapadyate|| 30

asato 'pi na bhāvasya nirodha upapadyate|
na dvitiyasya śirasaś chedanaṁ vidyate yathā|| 31

na svātmanā nirodho 'sti nirodho na parātmanā|
utpādasya yathotpādo nātmanā na parātmanā|| 32

utpādasthitibhaṅgānām asiddher nāsti saṁskṛtaṁ|
saṁskṛtasyāprasiddhau ca katham setsyaty asaṁskṛtaṁ|| 33

yathā māyā yathā svapno gandharvanagaram yathā|
tathotpādas tathā sthānaṁ tathā bhaṅga udāhṛtaṁ|| 34
### Glossary

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<td>about to originate</td>
<td>skye bar 'dod pa</td>
<td>utpitsu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>absence of self</td>
<td>bdag med pa nyid</td>
<td>nairātmya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>action</td>
<td>las</td>
<td>karman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>activity</td>
<td>bya ba</td>
<td>kriyā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aeon</td>
<td>bskal pa</td>
<td>kalpa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agent</td>
<td>byed pa po</td>
<td>kārtri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>affliction</td>
<td>nyon mongs pa</td>
<td>klesiśa</td>
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<tr>
<td>afflictive</td>
<td>kun nas nyon mongs pa</td>
<td>samkleśa</td>
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<tr>
<td>aggregate</td>
<td>nyon mongs pa can</td>
<td>kliśa</td>
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<tr>
<td>appropriation</td>
<td>'phung po</td>
<td>skandha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>appropriator</td>
<td>nye bar len pa</td>
<td>upādāna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) being blessed one</td>
<td>nye bar len pa po</td>
<td>upādātr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blessed One</td>
<td>dam bcas pa</td>
<td>pratijñā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>causal condition, condition</td>
<td>mgon par zhen pa</td>
<td>abhiniveśa</td>
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<tr>
<td>cause</td>
<td>yid la byed pa</td>
<td>manasikāra</td>
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<tr>
<td>basis</td>
<td>gzhī</td>
<td>āśraya, etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(a) being common knowledge</td>
<td>sems can</td>
<td>sattva</td>
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<tr>
<td>(a) being conceptual</td>
<td>bcom ldan 'das</td>
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<tr>
<td>(a) being causative</td>
<td>rkyen</td>
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<tr>
<td>cause of maturation</td>
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<td>cognition</td>
<td>rgyu</td>
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<td>rnam par smin pa'i rgyu</td>
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<td>cognition</td>
<td>blo</td>
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<td>coming into existence</td>
<td>rnam par shes pa</td>
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<td>conceptual construction</td>
<td>bdag nyid thob pa</td>
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<td>grags pa</td>
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<td>Proliferation</td>
<td>lhan cig nyid,</td>
<td>sahabhāva</td>
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<td>Concomitance</td>
<td>lhan cig gi dngos po</td>
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<td>Conditioned</td>
<td>'dus byas</td>
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<td>Conditioned Factor</td>
<td>'du byed</td>
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<td>Conflict</td>
<td>gnod pa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Confusion</td>
<td>gti mug</td>
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<td>Conjoined Cause</td>
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<td>tha snyad</td>
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<td>tha snyad kyi bden pa</td>
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<td>tha snyad du</td>
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<td>'gal ba 'khrul pa med pa</td>
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<td>mi mthun pa'i phyogs</td>
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<td>Dissimilar Case,</td>
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<td>Set of All Such;</td>
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<td>Counterposition</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Defective Vision</td>
<td>rab rib</td>
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<td>Defining</td>
<td>mthshan nyid</td>
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<td>Characteristic</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Dependent</td>
<td>brten nas gdags pa</td>
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Ames: Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa*, Ch. 6-7

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>doctrine</td>
<td>tshul</td>
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<td>domain</td>
<td>mdzad pa'i mtha'</td>
<td>krṛttānta</td>
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<td></td>
<td>grub pa'i mtha'</td>
<td>siddhānta</td>
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<td></td>
<td>spyod yul</td>
<td>gocara</td>
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<tr>
<td>dominant causal condition</td>
<td>bdag po'i rkyen</td>
<td>adhipati/ādhipateya-pratyaya</td>
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<tr>
<td>element</td>
<td>'byung ba</td>
<td>bhūta</td>
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<td></td>
<td>sprul pa</td>
<td>nir-mā</td>
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<td>(to) emanate</td>
<td>byang grol</td>
<td>apavarga</td>
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<td>emancipation</td>
<td>dngos po</td>
<td>bhāva</td>
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<tr>
<td>entity</td>
<td>grub pa</td>
<td>vastu</td>
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<tr>
<td>established</td>
<td>grub pa la sgrub pa</td>
<td>siddha</td>
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<tr>
<td>establishing what is [already] established</td>
<td>rkyen 'di dang ldan pa nyid</td>
<td>siddha-sādhanā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fact of having this as a causal condition</td>
<td>tshor ba</td>
<td>idāmpratyayatā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>feeling</td>
<td>vedanā</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>fellow Buddhist (more literally, &quot;coreligionist&quot;)</td>
<td>rang gi sde pa</td>
<td>svayūthya</td>
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<td>founders of non-Buddhist sects</td>
<td>mu stegs byed</td>
<td>tīrthakara</td>
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<tr>
<td>futile rejoinder</td>
<td>ltag chod</td>
<td>jāti</td>
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<td>hatred</td>
<td>zhe sdang</td>
<td>dveśa</td>
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<td>higher realms</td>
<td>mtho ris</td>
<td>svarga</td>
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<td>identifying mark</td>
<td>mtshan ma</td>
<td>nimitta</td>
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<tr>
<td>immediately preceding causal condition</td>
<td>de ma thag pa'i rkyen</td>
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<td>implicative negation</td>
<td>ma yin par dgag pa</td>
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<tr>
<td>imputation</td>
<td>sgro 'dogs pa</td>
<td>samāropā</td>
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<td>in superficial reality</td>
<td>kun rdzob tu</td>
<td>samvṛtyā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in ultimate reality</td>
<td>don dam par</td>
<td>paramārthataḥ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inconclusive</td>
<td>ma nges pa</td>
<td>anaikāntika</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
inference  rjes su dpag pa  anumāna
inherent nature  rang gi ngo bo  svarūpa
instrument  byed pa  karaṇa
internal  nang gi  ādhyātmika
intrinsic nature  ngo bo nyid  svabhāva
invariable  rang bzhin  svabhāva
locus  'khrul pa med pa  avyabhicārin
svarīpa
logical mark  gzhī  āśraya
[logically]  (as in āśraya-asiddhi)
possible  rtags  līṅga
manifestation  rigs pa  yukta
possible  gsal ba  vyakti
material  gzugs can  rūpin
matter  gzugs  rūpa
material dependent  (as first aggregate)
'on the elements  'byung ba las gyur pa'i  bhautika-rūpa
matter dependent  gzugs  dhyāna
'manifestation  bsam gtan  samāpatti
meditation  snyoms par 'jug pa  meditative ting nge 'dzin  samādhi
meditational attainment  gzhī  samādhi
meditative  mnyam par bzhag pa  samāhita
concentration  bsgom pa  bhāvanā
(in) meditative  skye mched  āyatana
cultivation  'du byed samskara  caittā
concentration  sems las byung ba  samśkāra
mentality  tshul khrims  pratijnā-mātra
mentality  med na mi 'byung ba  punya
mentality  dam bcas pa tsam  citta
merit  bsod nams  manas
mind  sems  śīla
moral conduct  yid  avinābhāva
necessity  tshul khrims  pratiśedha
connection  med na mi 'byung ba
neutral  dgag pa  avyākṛta
neutral  lung du ma bstan pa
Ames: Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa*, Ch. 6-7

nihilistic negation

skur pa 'debs pa

apavāda

nobleness

'phags pa

ārya

nonconceptual wisdom

rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye shes

nirvikalpaka-jñāna

noncondition

rkyen ma yin pa

apratyaya

nonobstructing cause

byed pa'i rgyu

cāraṇa-hetu

object

yul

viśaya

object, object to be grasped [by a subject]

gzung ba

grāhyya

object of cognition

dmigs pa

ārambaṇa,

ālambara

object of correct knowledge

gzhal bya

prameya

object of knowledge

shes bya

jñeya

one who desires

chags pa

rakta

one who hates

sdang ba

dviṣṭa

original meaning, point under discussion

skabs kyi don

prakṛta-artha

overextension

ha cang thal ba

atiprasaṅga

perception-conception

'du shes

samijñā

perfection

pha rol tu phyin pa

pāramitā

gang zag

pudgala

person

phyogs

pakṣa

position

rjes su 'gro ba

anvaya

positive concomitance

nus pa

śakti

potentiality

phyogs snga ma

pūrvapakṣa

previous position

gtso bo

pradhāna

primary matter

rang bzhin

prakṛti

primordial matter, original nature

phyogs kyi chos

pakṣa-dharma

property of the subject [which proves the thesis]
property to be proved
proving property
question raised in objection
reality
reason
reasoning
refutation
result
samsāric existence
scripture
secondary matter
self-contradiction
sense organ
separate
set of all similar examples
similar cause
similar example
simple negation
simultaneously arisen cause
specific
specification
specious
spirit
spiritually immature
state of existence
student
subject [of a thesis]

bsgrub par bya ba'i chos
sgrub pa'i chos
brgal zhing brtag pa
proving property sgrub pa'i chos sadhana-dharma
brgal z hing brtag pa paryanuyoga

realality de kho na
gtan tshigs
rigs pa
sun dbyung ba
'bbras bu
'bbras bu
srid pa
lung
gsung rab
rgyur byas pa'i gzugs
dgag pa mi mthun pa
dbang po
tha dad pa
tattva
hetu
yukti, nyāya
dūṣana
phala
kārya
bhava
āgama
pravacana
upādāya-rūpa
vipratiṣedha
indriya
prthak, bhinna,
vyatirikta, etc.
sapakṣa

sabhāga-hetu
sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta
prasajya-pratiṣedha
sahabhū-hetu
pratiniyata
avadhāraṇa,
nirdhāraṇa
-ābhāsa
puruṣa
bāla
gati
śiśya
dharmin
subsequent reasoning
substance, real substance
superficial reality
superficial truth
superficially real supramundane
syllogism
system
thesis
thing characterized
tranquil
trace
treatise
true state
ultimate reality
ultimate truth
ultimately real unconditioned undesired consequence
universal cause
unreal
unwholesome
valid means of knowledge
virtue
visible form
wholesome
wisdom

rtog ge phyi ma
rdzas
kun rdzob
kun rdzob kyi bden pa
kun rdzob pa
'jig rten las 'das pa
sbyor ba'i tshig
gzhung lugs
dam bcas pa
mtshan nyid kyi gzhi
zhi ba
bag chags
bstan bcos
yang dag pa ji lta ba
bzhin nyid
don dam pa
don dam pa'i bden pa
don dam pa pa
'dus ma byas
thal ba
kun tu 'gro ba'i rgyu
yang dag pa ma yin pa
mi dge ba
tshad ma
chos
gzugs
( as an āyatana)
dge ba
ye shes
uttara-tarka
dravya
saṃvṛti
saṃvṛti-satya
sāmvrta
lokottara
prayoga-vākya
mata, samaya
pratijñā
lakṣya
śiva
vāsanā
śāstra
yāthātathya (?)
paramārtha
paramārtha-satya
pāramārthika
asamāskṛta
prasāṅga
sarvatraga-hetu
abhūta
akuśala
pramāṇa
dharma
rūpa
kuśala
jñāna
Bibliographical Abbreviations


Akutobhayā In Dbu ma Tsa: D vol. 1; P vol. 95.

Ava Avalokitavrata's Prajñāpradīpaṇīkā. Chapters one and two in Dbu ma Wa: D vol. 4; P vol. 96. Chapters three through sixteen (part) in Dbu ma Zha: D vol. 5; P vol. 97; Chapters sixteen (part) through twenty-seven in Dbu ma Za: D vol. 6; P vol. 97. Text numbers: Peking no. 5259; Derge no. 3859.


C Co ne edition of bstan 'gyur, Dbu ma Tsha. Published on microfiche by the Institute for the Advanced Study of World Religions, Stony Brook, New York, 1974. ("C" without further specification refers to PP C.)


LVP AK L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu, tr. Louis de La Vallée Poussin, 6 volumes, Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1923-31 (reprinted 1971-2 as vol. 16 of Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques). (Roman numerals following "LVP AK" refer to chapter numbers, not volume numbers.)

MMK Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. Sanskrit in PSP. Tibetan in Dbu ma Tsa: D vol. 1; P vol. 95 and also in Akutobhayā, Ava, Bp, PP, and PSP.
N  Snar thang edition of the bstan 'gyur, Dbu ma Tsha. Microfilm of the blockprint in the Royal Library, Copenhagen. ("N" without further specification refers to PP N.)


PP  Bhāvaviveka's Prajñāpradīpa. In Dbu ma Tsha: D vol. 2; P vol. 95. Text numbers: Peking no. 5253; Derge no. 3853.

Bibliography of Works Cited


Hierarchy and Housing in a Buddhist Monastic Code

A Translation of the Sanskrit Text of the Šayanāsanavastu of the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya
— Part One —

Gregory Schopen

— Introduction —

The Šayanāsanavastu, or "Section on Bedding and Seats," that is translated here is a small part of a massive collection of monastic texts called the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya. Significant parts of this Vinaya are preserved in Sanskrit among the comparatively early manuscript materials from Gilgit. An "incomplete" Chinese translation by I-Ching which has been described as "mediocre" is also extant — how much of this Vinaya I-Ching actually translated is not known, but it seems certain that a significant portion of what he did was lost after his death. And what may be a "complete" version of this Vinaya has come down to us in Tibetan. Truth be known, however, we still do not know what would have constituted a "complete" vinaya — we know what the Pāli Vinaya now contains, but it appears to lack correspondants to sections which occur in other vinayas; and we know — imperfectly — what the Tibetan translation of the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya contains, but, at least by Hirakawa's calculations, "it is about four times longer than other vinayas." Its bulk, in fact, is impressive and one of its most immediately obvious characteristics. In the version printed at Derge, for example, it consists of the following sections and sub-sections, given in the order in which they occur:

Vinayavastu — containing seventeen individually titled vastus or "sections" in four volumes: Ka of 311 folios or 622 pages; Kha of 317 folios or 634 pages; Ga of 293 folios or 586 pages; and Nga of 302 folios or 604 pages.
Prātimokṣasūtra — the first 20 folios, or forty pages, of Volume Ca.

Vinayavibhaṅga — in four volumes: Ca, folios 20-292 or 544 pages; Cha of 287 folios or 574 pages; Ja of 287 folios or, again, 574 pages; and Nya of 269 folios or 538 pages.

Bhikṣunīprātimokṣa — the first 25 folios, or 50 pages, of Volume Ta.

Bhikṣunīvinayavibhaṅga — folios 25b-328 of volume Ta, or 606 pages — the Tibetan polymath Bu-ston suggests on more than one occasion that this text is not Mūlasarvāstivādin.6

Vinayakṣudrakavastu — in two volumes, Tha, of 310 folios or 620 pages, and Da, of 330 folios or 660 pages.

Vinaya-uttaragrantha — in two volumes, Na, of 302 folios or 604 pages, and Pa, of 313 folios or 626 pages — there appear to be two 'works' or versions of the text here, the first incomplete; and the complete Uttaragrantha is made up of several discrete, named 'sections,' some of which are preserved as separate 'works' in the Chinese Canon, as S. Clark is in the process of showing.7

If this is a 'complete' Vinaya of the Mūlasarvāstivādins then that Vinaya in Tibetan translation amounted to 13 volumes and almost 8000 pages. Although it is only a crude approximation, some sense of the size of such a complete Vinaya in Sanskrit might be got by noting that Gnoli's edition of the Sanskrit text of the Śayanāśana printed in Roman script takes up 53 pages, and this corresponds to about 35 folios, or 70 pages, in the Derge version of the Tibetan; while Dutt's edition of the Cīvavastu, which is printed in modern Devanāgarī, takes up 145 pages, its Tibetan translation in the Derge print covers some 65 folios, or 130 pages. Dutt in fact has estimated that the complete Vinayavastu, which covers some 2446 pages in the Derge Kanjur, would have taken up in Sanskrit "about 1700 pages" of his printed Devanāgarī.8 These numbers are staggering, even by Indian standards, and it should be obvious that no matter how it is described this Vinaya could not have been simply a code of monastic rules.

Already very long ago Barth had rather nicely suggested that "the threefold basket [Tripiṭaka] of the Mūlasarvāstivādins lacked a lid and that an incessant process of osmosis operated across its partitions;"9 and Lévi, referring more specifically to the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya, has said: "it is in itself a canon that is already complete."10 That this last is more than simply rhetoric is slowly becoming clear, and what this might mean can be seen in the fact that, for example, a significant number of the texts now found as separate sūtras in the Pāli Dīgha-
nīkāya are also found (still) embedded in the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya. This holds, again for example, for the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra (Pāli Digha no. 16) which occurs in the Kṣudrakavastu of the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya;¹¹ the Śrāmāṇyaphalasūtra (Pāli no. 2) found in the Saṅghabhedavastu;¹² the Mahāsudarsanāsūtra (Pāli no. 17) which occurs twice in the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya, once in the Bhaisajyavastu and once in the Kṣudrakavastu;¹³ the Aggaṇāsutta (Pāli no. 27), which is again found twice in the Vinaya, once in the Saṅghabhedavastu and once in the Vibhaṅga;¹⁴ the Ambhāṣṭasūtra (Pāli no. 3), also found in the Vinaya twice, once in the Bhaisajyavastu and once in the Kṣudrakavastu;¹⁵ etc. Very much the same pattern holds, moreover, for — quite literally — uncounted smaller texts that occur in other Pāli sūtra collections. A particularly interesting example concerns a little untitled sūtra which occurs in the Pāli Aṅguttaranikāya (ii 54-57), a sūtra which, to judge by the Kathāvatthu (VII. 5), gave Mahāvihārīn scholarly monks some doctrinal trouble — it is found in full in the Bhaisajyavastu of the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya.¹⁶ This same Vinaya, finally, also contains complete versions of other texts which are elsewhere known as separate sūtras, like the Upasenasūtra, which occurs in the Vinayavibhaṅga, and the Nagaropamasūtra, found in the Pravrajyāvastu.¹⁷

When looked at in light of the orderly, even architectonic, arrangement of the Pāli Canon — and it is this Canon more than anything else which has shaped our ideas and expectations of what a Buddhist canon and its parts should look like¹⁸ — the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya looks decidedly messy, and one might easily think that its compilers had only a very sketchy idea of what a canon or vinaya should be. How we are to explain this situation is, of course, not at all clear. Sylvain Lévi had already seen the contrast, and had in fact already offered a carefully understated explanation. He said of the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya: "... its tumultuous and chaotic outpouring contrasts with the dry and dull regularity of the Pāli Vinaya. But the correct and rigorous arrangement of materials, rather than the confusion of genres, marks a late stage of the art or the technique."¹⁹ In other words, the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya might look like it does because it might represent something other than a "late stage" in the process by which Buddhist canons were formed; it might represent what a Buddhist canon looked like before it was subjected to many centuries of "rigorous" analysis, sorting, classification and arrangement. J.W. de Jong, however, seems to want to account for the character of the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya in quite another way. He suggests more than once that the Vinaya "had finished by absorbing the substance of the Āgamas [or Nikāyas]," but has no explanation for why this should have happened.²⁰

However this might eventually be worked out — and worked out it must be — it seems certain that the presence of blocks of 'sūtra' material in the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya, sometimes in duplicate, could easily account for some of its enormous bulk. It will, though, only account for part of it, and almost certainly
not the most significant part. For that we must look at still other literary genres that it contains in abundance — one might well say, superabundance.

Oskar von Hinüber has recently said:

"Besides material relating to Buddhist law, even the Theravāda Vinaya contains quite a few stories. In the course of the development of Vinaya texts more and more stories were incorporated, so much so that, e.g. Cullavagga VII. Saṃghabhedakkhandhaka, [The] 'Chapter on Splitting the Order,' which comprises 26 printed pages in the Theravāda version has been expanded into more than 500 pages in the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya. Thus the law texts are slowly overgrown with stories, to such an extent that there is almost a change of the literary genre, from law book to Avadāna."\textsuperscript{21}

Von Hinüber has as usual put his finger on precisely the right point — there can be no real doubt that the presence of a very large number of "stories" accounts for much of the bulk of the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya.\textsuperscript{22} He also offers by the choice of his language — "stories were incorporated," "law texts are slowly overgrown" — a perfectly reasonable scenario to account for how that bulk was achieved, one that dovetails nicely with de Jong's explanation for the presence of sūtra material in our Vinaya, but also shares with it the fact that no reason for why this should have happened is given. Moreover, R. Gnoli has described a situation just as reasonably in which the importance of the 'story' material is again clearly flagged, but its movement goes in quite a different direction. He has said:

"Doubtless, as observed by Bareau, the Vinaya of the MSV [=Mūlasarvāstivādins] seems to be marked by more archaic features, not only in comparison with that of the SV [=Sarvāstivādins], but also with the major part of other Vinayapiṭaka... This Vinaya must have enjoyed a noticeable fortune also on account of its unusual literary qualities. Jātakas, avadānas, vyākaraṇas, sūtras, tales written in a style both plain and vivid, relieve the dry enumeration of the disciplinary duties, that ruled the life of the Buddhist communities. The major part of the tales of the Divyāvadāna, of the Avadānaśataka, and other works that make for edifying reading... are all of them inspired by this Vinaya, that has supplied to generations of pious compilers an inexhaustible mine..."\textsuperscript{23}

Here, of course, the movement of "jātakas, avadānas, vyākaraṇas, sūtras, tales" is not from largely uncanonical, genre-specific collections into an authoritative, if amorphous, work, but rather from that authoritative, if still unsorted work, into ever
more genre specific separate collections. This, in turn, could be explained by at least two developments. Over time, as ever more sophisticated and analytical editorial procedures were applied to the accumulated mass of authoritative materials, and the sense of separate genres came to be increasingly felt, texts of related types would have been peeled off that previously unsorted mass and grouped together to form separate collections of specific genres. Over time, as the accumulated mass of authoritative materials increased in size there would have been an increasing need for smaller, usable handbooks or collections. These two factors could easily have functioned in tandem, and seen in the light of this scenario the Mulasarvastivada-vinaya might indeed be described as "in itself a canon that is already complete" — again, a very primitive one, one that was never completely subjected to the editorial procedures that eventually produced, for example, the Pali Canon.

These are, indeed, very big questions and cannot be further entertained here; though eventually entertained they, again, must be. Ironically, however, regardless of which developmental scenario comes to be established one important point seems clear: either jatakas, avadanas and 'tales' were, from the beginning, overwhelmingly considered to be monastic forms of literature intended for monks, or they came increasingly to be so considered over time, at least in the Mulasarvastivadin case. Such conclusions seem unavoidable since a truly large proportion of the Mulasarvastivada-vinaya as we have it — regardless of how it got that way — is made up of just such texts, and it, most definitely, was intended for monks.

The monastic character of jataka and avadana literature has rarely been suggested by modern scholars, and never quite as adroitly as by Phyllis Granoff. She first says:

"While little is actually known about the growth and circulation of the avadanas, the texts themselves tell us that they are stories that were related by the Buddha to his monks. There is no question that the stories postdate the lifetime of the Buddha; on the other hand, there is less reason to doubt their claim that they were meant for circulation within the Buddhist monastic community itself."

To this she adds the following note:

"In some cases, but not in all, this seems obvious from the subject matter or tone of the stories. Thus we have stories told to illustrate why a monk should not store food or to explain why reverence, should be paid to elders in the community. Many stories are decidedly misogynistic in tone, which would also be in keeping with their being told to monks."
There are multiple versions of the story of the monk who cannot break his ties with his family and returns home, only to be reclaimed by the Buddha for the monastic community, a theme particularly appropriate in a monastic setting. Scholars have tended to see in the āvadānas and jātakas examples of popular preaching for the masses and have seen these two related types of literature as distinctly non-monastic, and suited for the laity. The texts themselves have a different story to tell, and do not necessarily support the standard scholarly assessment of monks as learned as opposed to an illiterate lay population. There is thus good reason to accept the evidence of the stories themselves and to regard them as part of the teaching offered to monks. This would also be consistent with the parallels we see between the āvadānas and the various vinaya stories, which were undoubtedly addressed to the monks."

"Much almost certainly could be added here that would both confirm and extend Granoff's observations, but that must wait. For the moment her remarks will suffice to indicate that a good—and perhaps definitive—case can be made for the monastic character and audience of āvadāna and jātaka literature, a case which would support the distinct likelihood that just as average monks in medieval European monasteries did not read learned theological tomes, but Lives of the Saints that carried and confirmed monastic rules and values, average Buddhist monks in early and medieval India typically read āvadānas and jātakas that did the same for them.

All of what has been said so far is relevant to the Śayanāsana-vastu that is translated here because—being in most regards representative of the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya as a whole—more than half of it is made up of jātakas, āvadānas and tales. Indeed almost all of the first half of the text is so constituted. Very near the beginning a version of "The Jātaka of the Partridge" occurs—this is almost certainly the same text that Granoff alludes to when she refers to a story "told to ... explain why reverence should be paid to elders in the community." This in turn is shortly followed by a long story about the founding of the Jetavana Monastery by the householder Anāthapiṇḍada, which itself contains several stories of his former births. In fact it is only in the second half of the text—which will be published in the second installment of this work—that we get extended strings of monastic rules delivered, and even here there are tales, like the story of a past life of the monk Upananda as a greedy dog. This structure is something of a pattern in regard to the more elaborate vastus of this Vinaya—it holds as well for both the Cīvara- and Bhaiṣajya-vastus, for example. Given this significant place of jātakas, āvadānas and stories in our Vinaya, and given that all three have every right to be classified as genres of Indian literature, it would seem that the Mūlasarvāstivāda-
vinaya must be described, in part at least, as a work of literature — it is as much that as it is a monastic code. Once again, Sylvain Lévi recognized this a long time ago.

Lévi not only considered the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya as a work of literature, he seems to have considered it good literature — in fact he calls it "one of the masterpieces of Sanskrit literature" ("un des chefs-d’oeuvre de la littérature sanscrite"); describes it as "written with art," and says "the prescriptions often appear to simply be pretexts to tell at length familiar stories — heroic, comic, fabulous and romantic." I have tried in fact to reflect at least some of this both in the tone of the translation and in the headings I have added to the sections into which I have divided the text. Perhaps even more important here, however, is what Lévi says in comparing our Vinaya to another master-work of Indian story literature: "The Vinaya of the Mūlasarvāstivādins is," he says, "a kind of Brhatkathā for the usage of monks," and here we strike a final point that needs to be drawn out.

As Sternbach has so clearly shown in regard to the Pañcatantra, one of the characteristics of Indian story literature is that many of its tales are informed by, turn on, or reflect juridical problems or points of law — this much alone is perhaps sufficient to call into question at least the significance of the shift "from law book to Avadāna" that von Hintüber saw in the development of the Vinaya: it may have been only a shift — if shift it was — in how rules were delivered, or a shift in style, not in purpose. But Sternbach also noted — again in regard to the Pañcatantra — another point that appears to be particularly germane to the Sayanāsanavastu of the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya, especially to its long and sometimes obscure account of the founding of the Jetavana. Sternbach has said:

"We know that various versions of the Pañcatantra exist in which some of the tales, especially those which have something in common with law, were narrated in different ways. Some of them were in conformity with the rules contained in the Smṛti-s, and others were not. In particular, later texts, the longer versions (textus ornatus), tried to make the text conform to the legal rules in order to eliminate illogical passages which might shock the reader or listener."

But if the redactors of "the longer versions" of the Pañcatantra were in fact sometimes trying to 'normalize' their tales and bring them into line with established legal norms and expectations, there are some indications that the redactors of our Sayanāsanavastu may well have been engaged in a similar process. They go out of their way to explain, for example, how as a child Anāthapiṇḍada could give away what in effect was family property when Indian law was very clear that a minor, or
a son whose father was still alive, could not enter independently into any sort of valid transaction involving property. Given this kind of demonstrated sensitivity to legal issues involving minors on their part, it seems very unlikely that our redactors would not have noticed, or could have ignored, an even more serious legal problem in the received accounts of Anāthapiṇḍada's purchase of the land for the Jetavana: since Anāthapiṇḍada was said to have bought it from a prince, or boy, whose father was still living, the sale — by dharmasāstric law or expectation — would have been highly illegal. Although there is, of course, no way of definitively demonstrating this, a certain embarrassment in regard to the received account, and a desire to recast it in a more acceptable form, or — at the very least — to obscure or blur the sharp edges of the observable illegality, could certainly account for the curious and possibly intentional ambiguities that occur in the account that we now find in the Śayanāsanavastu. If nothing else, however, all of this might at least alert the reader to the possibility that Buddhist stories and Avadānas — like Pañcatantra tales — might well be far more sophisticated than they appear at first sight to be, and that, in effect, these stories are not simply tales.

* * *

This is, of course, not the place for an extended discussion of either the date or place of origin of the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya. Such a discussion may not in fact be either required, nor at this point even fruitful. There is a broad consensus — but only that — that this Vinaya must have been redacted in the Northwest, the area between and including Gandhara and Mathura, and much of its contents would support this. There is also now a general consensus that this redaction must have occurred in the Kuśāna period, and that Lamotte's assertion that it can only be dated rather late — no earlier than the 4th or 5th centuries of the Common Era — was very much a red herring. As has already been pointed out elsewhere, Lamotte himself came to recognize this without, unfortunately, explicitly saying so.35

There can be, moreover, very little doubt about the influence of this Vinaya over time. It was — as already noted by Gnoli — heavily drawn on by the compilers of both the Avadānaśatakendra and the Divyāvadāna; the author of Le traité de la grande vertu de sagesse, who Lamotte thinks "certainly lived at the time of the Great Kuśānas," also drew heavily on it, especially in regard to the numerous avadānas and jātakas that he cites or alludes to;36 still later it was — as Schlingloff has shown — a major source of inspiration for the artists who covered the walls of the monasteries at Ajanta with paintings.37 It was, to judge by I-Ching's travel account, perhaps the Vinaya of choice in his day at both Nālanda and Tamralipti,38 and was almost certainly so in the Buddhist communities in Eastern India from which the Tibetans got their traditions. Manuscripts containing it have been found
— usually in fragments — at Gilgit, Turfan, and now, it seems, among the Schöyen collection from around Bamiyan. Its influence seems to have reached Sri Lanka and perhaps even Burma. Looked at from almost any angle the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya emerges as a major work of Indian Buddhism, one whose importance may actually have almost matched its size.

* * *

The fact that the Śayanāsana-vastu is in structure and content representative of the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya as a whole — about half of it is made up of jātakas, avadānas and tales, the other half of more formally delivered monastic rules — makes it, perhaps, an ideal candidate for translation. So too does the fact that although it is similar to the Cīvara-, Bhaiṣajya-, and Saṅghabheda-vastus, it is considerably shorter than any of these. But these and other advantages might well be off-set by other factors. The manuscript on which our Sanskrit text is based, for example, is far, far older than anything we have for the Pāli Vinaya, but it is also a single manuscript, which in part at least has had to be pieced together, and even the best single manuscript is never entirely reliable or problem free. Gnoli’s edition — when it can be checked — is also not free of problems, and it can only be checked against the facsimile for about the first third of the text: the whereabouts of the original manuscripts that were in Italy are no longer entirely clear. There is a Tibetan translation of the Śayanāsana which, as usual, is generally of great help. It is, however, clear that the Sanskrit text on which it is based differed somewhat, and sometimes, from the text we have from Gilgit. All of this has meant that the translation would have to be accompanied with a good number of purely textual notes. In an attempt to distinguish these purely textual notes from other notes — also added in good number — that might be of some use for an appreciation of the contents of the text, and of interest to a broader readership, I have printed the numbers for the first type of note in normal type-face, and those for the second in bold. Since some of the notes actually contain material of both kinds, when this occurred — when a textual note, for example, also contained material of a more general sort — its number too is printed in bold. Occasionally it was difficult to decide which category a given note should be included in, and my choices may sometimes appear, alas, to be inconsistent.

* * *

I am grateful to Jan Nattier for reading this work carefully and making a number of suggestions which improved it. I am also grateful to Phyllis Granoff —
who I later found out acted as one of the readers for the Journal — for more of the same.

**The Section on Bedding and Seats\(^1\)**

**I. Dealing With Competing Claims For Status and First Access to Material Goods —**

The Buddha, the Blessed One, was staying in Śrāvastī in the Jetavana, in the Park of Anāthapiṇḍada.

On that occasion a large group of monks who were assembled and seated in the service hall\(^2\) had a discussion and conversation of this sort: "Venerables, whom must we honor, revere, respect and venerate? To whom must we perform the acts of salutation, deferential greeting, rising, the gesture of supplication and paying respect? Who among us is entitled to use\(^3\) the first seat, the first water, the first alms?"

Some there spoke in this way: "A member of the Buddha's clan\(^4\) who has entered into the religious life."

But others said: "A member of the priestly caste who has entered into the religious life."

Some said: "A member of the ruling caste who has entered into the religious life." Some: "A member of the productive caste who has entered into the religious life." Some: "A member of the serving caste who has entered into the religious life."

Still others said: "One who has entered into the religious life from an elevated family without blemish," or "one who has entered into the religious life from a wealthy family free of want."

Some said: "One who is handsome, a delight to see, lovely." "One of cultivated speech, possessed of verbal skill."

"One who is famous and of great fortune."

"One who preserves the sūtra, or preserves the vinaya, or preserves the summary. One who is learned, or an expounder of Dharma."

"A Royal Elder."

"A forest dweller, or one who limits himself to three robes, or wears felt, or wears rag robes, or a mendicant, or one who always uses the same seat, or who does not eat after the proper time, or who lives at the root of a tree, or who lives in a cemetery, or who lives in the open, or who sleeps sitting up, or one who accepts any seat that is offered."

"One who obtains the perception of the impermanent...and as before, up to... One who is an Arhat absorbed in the eight meditative releases."
But some said: "Among us all, Venerables, there is no agreement precisely because of the multiplicity of our designations. We are going to go to the Blessed One. Having done so we will ask the Blessed One about this matter. However the Blessed One will determine it for us, just so will we keep to it."

That large group of monks went then to the Blessed One. When they had arrived and had shown deference to his feet with their heads they sat down at one end of the assembly. Seated there, that large group of monks said to the Blessed One "Just now (4), Reverend One, a large group of monks who were assembled and seated in the service hall had a discussion and conversation of this sort: '...and as before, up to...: However the Blessed One will determine it for us, just so will we keep to it.' We, the very ones, ask the Blessed One about this matter: who must we honor, revere, respect and venerate:...and as before, up to...: who is entitled to use the first alms?"

The Blessed One said: "You, monks, must honor, revere, respect and venerate the more senior. To that one you must perform the acts of salutation, deferential greeting, rising, the gesture of supplication and paying respects. And that one among you is entitled to the first seat, the first water, the first alms."

When the Blessed One had said "You, monks, must honor...the more senior...and as before, up to...: that one is entitled to use...the first alms, the monks honored, revered, respected and venerated lay men who were senior. But when brahmins and householders heard about that they were contemptuous, dismissive, and spoke disparagingly: "We, Noble Ones, enjoy the sensual pleasures, are sunk in the mud of sensual pleasure, and yet you honor us?"

The monks reported this matter to the Blessed One. The Blessed One said: "Monks, what I said referred to those who have entered into the religious life, but not to lay men."

When the monks saw members of other religious groups who were senior they honored, revered, respected, and venerated them. The Blessed One said: "What I said referred to those belonging to this Dharma, but not to outsiders."

When they saw novices who had entered into the religious life when they were seniors they honored, revered, respected and venerated them. The Blessed One said: "What I said, monks, referred to those who are ordained, but not to novices."

They honored, revered, respected and venerated seniors who were newly ordained. The Blessed One said: "Deference must be shown only after having asked about each others' first year."

But when they were being asked they gave their year of birth. Then the Blessed One said: "The first year of ordination must be asked for!"

But the monks did not know how to ask. The Blessed One said: "They must be made to declare the seasonal period!"
But the monks did not know what the seasonal periods were. The Blessed One said: "There are, monks, five periods: winter, summer, the rainy season, the short rains, and the long rains. Winter then is four months; summer is four months; the rainy season is one month; the short rains are one day and night; the long rains are three months minus one night. When the seasonal period has been declared accordingly, deference must be shown to the one who was ordained earlier!"

"Monks, deference must be shown to four others. To which four must deference be shown? (5) The world together with its gods, Māra and Brahmā, all creatures including śramaṇas and brahmans, gods and men, must show deference to a Tathāgata, Arhat, Fully and Completely Awakened Buddha. All lay men must show deference to one who has entered into the religious life. All those who are ordained must show deference to one who was ordained earlier, except in the case of a nun: she—even if ordained for a hundred years—must show deference to a monk who has just been ordained that day! Anyone who is unordained must also show deference to one who is ordained!

"Ten must not be shown deference. Which ten? One who is on probation; one whose probation has had to start over; one who has undergone probation; one who is undergoing the procedure for becoming agreeable again; one who is suspended for not seeing a fault; one who is suspended for not correcting a fault; one who is suspended when reprehensible views are not abandoned; he who is a lay man; and one who is not ordained."

When the Blessed One had set them in order according to the principle of seniority the monks then honored, revered, respected, and venerated each other, and while honoring, revering, respecting and venerating each other they grew in good qualities like a lotus in water. But the monks, experiencing some uncertainty, asked He who Cuts off All Uncertainty, the Buddha, the Blessed One: "Look, Reverend One, how when the Blessed One has ordered them according to the principle of seniority the monks then honor, revere, respect and venerate each other, and while honoring, revering, respecting and venerating each other they grow in good qualities like a lotus in water!"

The Blessed One said, "But, monks, now that I am devoid of passion, hatred and delusion, am fully freed from birth, old age, illness, death, sorrow, lamentation, suffering, despair and anguish, am all knowing, have knowledge of every aspect, and have mastered what should be known by one who knows all, is there really anything remarkable in the fact that when I have set in order the principle of seniority, and when they have recourse to the principle of seniority, the monks honor, revere, each other...and as before, up to... like a lotus in water? But listen, rather, to an account of how when I was by no means devoid of passion, hatred and delusion, was not freed from birth, old age, illness, death, sorrow, lamentation, suffering, despair and anguish, and had fallen in bodily form, I set in

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order the principle of seniority and, having recourse to it, all creatures living on the Indian Continent were for the most part reborn among the excellent gods of the heaven of the thirty-three!"

II. *A Prehistory for the Principle of Monastic Seniority: The Jātaka of the Partridge* 1 —

In a time long ago, monks, four animals were living in a dense forest in the countryside of Kāśī: a partridge, a rabbit, a monkey, and an elephant. 2 (6) They, established in friendship, united, harmonious, congenial, without dispute and secure, spent their time living as they pleased until on one occasion the idea occurred to them: "But we do not know who we must honor, revere, respect and venerate. What if we were to order things according to the principle of seniority?" 3 They began to talk among themselves, saying "who among us is the senior?"

The partridge then showed them a Banyan tree. "Sirs," he said, "what size was the Banyan tree when first seen by each?"

The elephant said: "When I was going along this path with the herd and first saw it it was no bigger than I in height."

But the monkey said: "When I was going along this path with the troop and saw it it was also the same size as I in height."

They said to the monkey, "You are his senior."

Then the rabbit said, "With my tongue I was even able to lick the drops of dew off its two leaves when this was just a shoot."

"You," they said to the rabbit, "are the senior of both."

The partridge then spoke: "Look at that other huge Banyan tree over there!"

"We see it," they said.

"After I had eaten some fruit from it I left some droppings on this spot. From that this Banyan that you are asking about grew."

They said: "If that is so, you are the senior of all of us."

The elephant then began to honor all of them; the monkey honored the rabbit and the partridge; the rabbit honored only the partridge. Showing honor thus according to seniority they wandered around here and there in that thick forest. When they had to go through rough or deep places the monkey then mounted the elephant, the rabbit got on the monkey, and the partridge then perched on him.

When they had increased even more in mutual fondness and were always respectful this thought occurred to them: "We, sirs, have increased further in mutual fondness and are always respectful, but there is some other good which, when we have taken it up, we should pursue. What are we going to do?"

The partridge said: "We are going to stop taking life."

"But in what way do we take life?"
The partridge said, "There are grasses and flowers and fruits that have living things, and there are those that are free of living things. From now on, having given up those that have living things, we must eat those that are free of them." They then gave up those that had living things and began to eat those that did not.

This also occurred to them: "We have stopped taking life, but should we not stop taking what was not given?"

"But in what way do we take what is not given?"

The partridge said: "There are grasses and leaves and flowers and fruits that are fenced, and there are those which are unfenced. From now on, having given up those that are fenced, we must only eat those that are unfenced. (7)

They then gave up those that were fenced and began to eat those that were not.

This too occurred to them: "We have stopped taking what was not given, but not improper sexual conduct. But of what sort is our improper sexual conduct?"

The partridge said: "We go to both licit mates and to illicit mates. From now on then we must go to a licit mate, not an illicit one." And they went to a licit mate, not an illicit one.

This also occurred to them: "We have stopped improper sexual conduct, but not mindless talk. What if we were to stop mindless talk. But of what sort is our mindless talk?"

The partridge said: "We just prattle about this or that. From now on then we must not prattle about this or that. Rather we must speak at the proper time after having repeatedly considered it!" And they no longer prattled about this or that, but rather spoke at the proper time only after repeatedly considering it.

And this also occurred to them: "We have stopped mindless talk, but not getting intoxicated on intoxicating liquor and drink. What if we were to stop getting intoxicated on intoxicating liquor and drink? But of what sort is our intoxication?"

The partridge said: "There are intoxicating fruits, and there are nonintoxicating ones. From now on then we, having given up intoxicating fruits, must eat those that are not!"

When they had been established in these five religious observances the partridge then said: "We, sirs, are established in these five religious observances, but what if we were to also establish others in them?"

"We should do so."

"But who among you will do it?"

The monkey said: "I will establish all the animals who live among the branches."
Then the rabbit said: "And I will establish all rabbits and fur bearing animals."

"I," said the elephant, "will establish all elephants, lions, tigers and leopards."

The partridge said: "If that is so, then, in brief, those which are not disciplined by you, whether footless, or two-footed, or four-footed, or winged—all of those I will establish in these five religious observances."

(8) They then established in these five religious observances all those living things belonging to the animal kingdom in the region of Kāši. Those animals lived in the forest as they wished in mutual kindness and were always considerate. Through their powerful effect the god who brings the rains at the proper time came—the trees always had flowers and fruits and the earth grains.

Men saw the animals living in mutual kindness, the trees always with flowers and fruits, and the earth always with grain. The King said, "I govern with righteousness—this is my powerful effect." But the queens, the princes, ministers, the army, the townspeople and country people all said: "This is our powerful effect."

The King thought to himself: "Everybody says 'this is my effect, this is my effect,' but just whose powerful effect it is is not known." His curiosity aroused, he sent for those who read signs and asked them, but even they did not know.

There was then a garden not very far from Vārānasi. A Rsi who had the five kinds of supernatural knowledge lived there and was venerated, respected and approached with reverence by all the people who lived in Vārānasi. The King went to that Rsi, fell at his feet, and said: "All of the living things in the animal kingdom, Great Rsi, live as they wish in my country with mutual kindness and consideration, the god brings rain, the trees are always in flower and fruit and the earth with grain. I therefore thought: 'I govern with righteousness—this is my powerful effect.' But the queens, the princes and ministers, the army and townspeople and country people also thought: 'This is our effect.' Whose powerful effect it is is not actually known. I have become very curious and you are able to cut off the uncertainty. Whose powerful effect is this?"

The Rsi said: "This is not your powerful effect, Great King, nor that of the queens or princes or ministers or the army, townspeople or country people. But there are four animals living in your country—this is their powerful effect."

The King said: "I am going to go and see them."

"But, Great King," the Rsi said, "what is there for you in seeing them? You should rather undertake and pursue that which they have undertaken and pursued."

"And what have they undertaken and pursued?"

"Five religious observances."

"Of what sort, Great Rsi, are those five religious observances?"
"Great King, they do not deprive a living thing of life. They do not carry off the property of others. They do not go to illicit mates. They do not engage in mindless talk. And they do not use intoxicating drinks."

The King said: "If that is so, Great Rsi, I too am going to undertake and pursue these five religious observances." And that King undertook those five observances and began to pursue them. His queens, saying "The King has undertaken and pursues these five religious observances," did likewise. And the princes, ministers, army, townsmen and country people also undertook and began to pursue the five observances. (9) Even lesser kings of neighboring regions heard that King Brahmadatta together with his queens, princes, ministers, army, townsmen and country people had undertaken and were pursuing the five religious observances, and when they heard that they too, together with their queens, princes, ministers, armies, townsmen and country people, also undertook and began to pursue them. Indeed, for the most part everyone undertook the five religious observances and began to pursue them.

Anyone who died then on the Indian continent was, after the destruction of the body, reborn among the excellent gods of the heaven of the thirty-three. When Śakra, the leader of the Gods, saw the divine assembly becoming full he spoke this verse:

They dwell reverential and respectful in a forest of religious exercises, but the religious life of a partridge has made itself apparent in a different world.

The Blessed One said: "What do you think, monks?" That one who was the partridge—I indeed was he at that time, on that occasion. The rabbit was the Monk Śāriputra, the monkey was the Monk Maudgalyāyana, Ānanda was the elephant. Then too when I had set in order the principle of seniority, and they had recourse to the principle of seniority, all inhabitants of the Indian continent were for the most part reborn among the gods of the thirty-three. Now too when I have set in order the principle of seniority and the monks, having recourse to it, are honoring, revering, respecting and venerating each other, they grow in good qualities like a lotus in water."27

"You, monks, must therefore live now with reverence, respect, and the mastery of apprehension in regard to fellow-monks, elders, those of middle rank and new monks. And why? It is not possible, monks, that a monk will fulfill the rules of customary behavior so long as he continues to live without reverence, respect, and the mastery of apprehension in regard to elders, those of middle rank, and new monks. It is not possible that he will fulfill the rules of
training when he has not fulfilled the rules of customary behavior. It is not possible that he will fulfill the collections of moral action, of concentration, of wisdom, of the meditative releases, and of the knowledge and vision of the meditative releases, when he has not fulfilled the rules of training. And it is not possible that he, being free of attachment, will achieve final nirvana, when he has not fulfilled the collection of the knowledge and vision of the meditative releases.

"It is, however, possible, monks, that a monk will fulfill the rules of customary behavior so long as he continues to live with reverence, respect, and the mastery of any apprehension in regard to fellow-monks, elders, those of middle rank, and new monks. It is possible that he will fulfill the rules of training when he has fulfilled the rules of customary behavior. It is possible that he will fulfill the collections of moral action, of concentration, of wisdom, of the meditative releases and of the knowledge and vision of the meditative releases when he has fulfilled the rules of training. It is possible that he, being free of attachment, will achieve final nirvana when he has fulfilled the collection of the knowledge and vision of the meditative releases."

"Therefore, monks, one must train now in this way: 'We then will live with reverence, with respect and mastery of any apprehension in regard to fellow-monks, elders, those of middle rank, and new monks!'"

"In this way, monks, must you train!"

III. Dealing with the Housing Problem and the Origin of Viharas —

When the Blessed One had trained the first five monks they lived in the forest, but while living there they were vulnerable to lions, tigers, leopards and hyenas. The Blessed One then thought to himself: "Where have the disciples of past Fully and Completely Awakened Buddhas made their home?" He saw that it was in a vihāra. The gods also told the Blessed One that it was so.

At that time there was a householder named Kalyāṇabhadrā living in Vārānasī. This idea occurred to him since his disposition was enlivened by his roots of good: "I, indeed, should have a vihāra built for the disciples of the Blessed One!" He got up at day-break and went to the Blessed One. When he had arrived and had shown deference with his head to the feet of the Blessed One, he sat down at one end of the assembly. While he was seated at one end of the assembly the Blessed One, through talk about Dharma, led the householder Kalyāṇabhadrā to see. He inspired, incited and delighted him. When he had led him to see through various sorts of talk about Dharma, had inspired, incited and delighted him, the Blessed One was silent.
Then the householder Kalyāṇabhadra got up from his seat, put his upper-robe over one shoulder, made the gesture of supplication to the Blessed One, and said to him: "If the Blessed One were to order it I would have a vihāra built for the disciples of the Blessed One."

The Blessed One said: "Therefore, householder, I order6 it. Have one built!"

But Kalyāṇabhadra did not know what sort he should have built.

The Blessed One said: "If you have one with three cells built the Perfume Chamber must be built in the middle, the two other cells on each side. It is the same for one with three sides and nine cells. In a four-sided one the Perfume Chamber is in the middle of the far wall facing the entrance hall and there are two cells, one on each side of that entrance!"

He did not know how many levels must be built.

The Blessed One said: "For monks a vihāra must be built with five levels, a Perfume Chamber with seven levels, a summer room over the entrance with seven. But for nuns a vihāra must be built with three levels, a Perfume Chamber with five, and a summer room over the entrance with five!"12

IV. The Biography of Anāthapiṇḍada and Building the Jetavana:1

Anāthapiṇḍada’s Early Life —

At that time a householder named Datta was living in Śrāvasti. He was rich, had great wealth, many possessions, wide and extensive holdings. He approached Vaiśravaṇa in wealth, rivaled Vaiśravaṇa in wealth. He took a wife from a family of the same sort. He played, enjoyed himself and made love with her. In time, while playing, enjoying himself and making love, his wife became pregnant.2 After eight or nine months she gave birth and a son was born. After the birth festival had been performed in detail for three times seven or twenty-one days, he was given a name. "What must this boy’s name be?," it was asked.

His relatives said: "This boy is the son of the householder Datta. Therefore he should be named Sudatta." And so the name Sudatta was given to him.

The boy Sudatta was given eight nurses--two to carry him around, two to breast feed him, two to change him, and two to play with him. Those eight nurses brought him up, and he thrived on milk, thickened milk, fresh and clarified butter, butter scum, and a variety of other refined foods--quickly he grew, like a night-closing lotus in pool.3 Once he was sitting outside in the arms of his nurse wearing all his ornaments. A beggar asked him for one: "Young sir, I would like an ornament--could you give me one?"

Sudatta was delighted and gave him that ornament. When he was back inside the house his father asked the nurse: "Where is the boy’s ornament?"
The nurse said: "The boy gave it (12) to a beggar."

Datta adorned him with another ornament—he gave it away too. And when he once again was adorned, that also he gave away. Datta then said to his wife: "A fine son we have, my Dear—He is always giving things away!" 4

"If that is so, Noble Son," she said, "I will just not adorn him anymore."

"We have, my Dear, lots of gold and precious things but hardly pots of ornaments—just don't put him outside anymore." And Sudatta had to play indoors.

Once, though, the householder Datta 5 was going to bathe in the Ajiravati River with his servants, and the boy Sudatta said: "Father, I want to go too!"

Datta tried to cajole him: "But, son, there is lovely water right here, and the river is full of hungry monsters. 6 The nurse will give you a bath."

But he began to cry and his mother said: "Why, sir, is this boy howling?"

He explained what had happened and she said: "Sir, let him go with you! What's the problem here? He will be much safer with you!"

Datta took him and went to the river. When he had bathed and was back on the bank Sudatta said: "Father, why am I always watched?"

"Because you, son, have a fault." 7

"How?" 8

"Any ornament you are given you hand over to some beggar."

"But, father, do you want things?"

"Who doesn't, son?" 9

"If that is so, Father, then put me down."

His father put him down and Sudatta plunged both hands into the river and brought up four copper pots filled with gold. "Father," he said, "when you have used as much as you want of this wealth then just throw the rest back into the river!"

"Can you, son, see hoards that are in water?"

"Not just in water, Father, but also those in the ground, whether they have an owner or not, and those also which are far away or near."

The householder Datta, his eyes wide with amazement, thought to himself: "Such a lord of wealth 10 is certainly able 11 to give gifts." Knowing this he said: "If that is so, son, you must make gifts as you please!" 12

V. Anāthapiṇḍada Reaches His Majority, and Makes a Name for Himself —

--This, indeed, is the established rule: "A son does not have his own worth so long as his father lives"— 1

Later when the householder Datta died and Sudatta had become the owner of the house 2 he constantly gave alms to the lordless. Everywhere it was heard: "Sudatta, the son of the householder Datta, has become the owner of the house.
(13) He, to the lordless (anātha), gives alms (pīṇḍaka)," and he came to be called "The householder Anāṭhapindāda."

The householder Anāṭhapindāda then took a wife from a family of the same sort. He played, enjoyed himself and made love with her. While playing, enjoying himself and making love a son was born.3 In the same way seven sons were born. He made marriages for six of them and was looking about for the same sort of family for the seventh, whose name was Sujāta. But he met with none and sat dejected, cheek on hand.4

A young brahmin named Madhuskandha was a friend of his. He saw that Anāṭhapindāda was dejected and said: "Why, householder, are you sitting here dejected, cheek in hand?"

Anāṭhapindāda said: "I have made marriages for six of my sons, but now I am thinking about the same sort of family for Sujāta, the seventh--with what family can I make a marriage for him?"

Madhuskandha said: "You must not worry! I will go in search of such a family for him."

"But where?"

"I will go as far as the region of Magadha," he said.

"Yes. Do!"

Madhuskandha went to Rājagṛha. There was in fact a householder in Rājagṛha who was rich, had great wealth, many possessions and was very much like Anāṭhapindāda. Madhuskandha entered his house and standing in the entrance hall said: "Be well, be well!"5

The people of the house said, "But, brahmin, what do you want?"

"To beg for a marriageable girl."

"For whom?"

"The householder Anāṭhapindāda in Śrāvasti--his son named Sujāta."

They said: "That is the same sort of family as ours, but we also must have a substantial bride-price."6

"How substantial?"

"A hundred horses, a hundred gold niśkas,8 a hundred mule carts, and a hundred kāmbojika girls."

The young brahmin Madhuskandha sent a letter to that effect to the householder Anāṭhapindāda. When the latter had read it he too sent a return letter9 saying, "Accept it! I will give all of that." And he immediately agreed and accepted.

The household then regaled him with pure, fine and abundant food. But when he went to a hostel for young brahmans10 to stay he experienced vomiting and diarrhea11 and, the brahmans there being unacquainted with him,12 from fear of pollution13 threw him out and abandoned him.14 By fate15 the Venerables
Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana had come to that place and saw him. Both of them cleaned him with a bamboo brush, rubbed him with white earth and bathed him, and when they had taught Dharma to him they departed. But his diarrhea did not abate and, with a mind deeply moved in regard to the two monks, he died. He was reborn among the Gods of the Four Great Kings and went to the Great King Vaiśravana to ask for a mansion. Vaiśravana said: "Go! The funereal gate is your mansion."

He went there and became its resident.

(14) At that time the King of Videha had presented a hundred Himalayan elephants to King Bimbisāra, and he in turn had sent word to Prasenajit of Kośala saying: "The King of Videha has sent me a hundred Himalayan elephants. If you want them you should have them brought to you!"

The Householder Anāthapiṇḍada had gone to King Prasenajit of Kośala, and when he had arrived he said this to him: "Lord, I have something to do in Rājagṛha, but having gone there I will return."

The King said: "Very good. Go! I have a hundred elephants that must be brought from there. Will you bring them back?"

Anāthapiṇḍada said: "Since, Lord, I have something to do there anyway I will get them and, when returning, I can in this case fulfill the Lord's wish."

The King said: "Very good. Do so!"

VI. Anāthapiṇḍada Sees the Light and Meets the Buddha —

The householder Anāthapiṇḍada then took that substantial bride-price and went to Rājagṛha. The Householder in whose house he stayed got up while it was still dark and called out to his household: "Get up, Noble Ones, get up! Split the wood, sirs! Light the fire! Cook the food! Cook the sauce! Toss the cakes! Prepare the courtyard!" The Householder Anāthapiṇḍada began to wonder: "Will this householder be taking a wife or giving a daughter in marriage? Has he invited the whole country to this meal, or a guild or an association or an assembly? Maybe he has invited the King of Magadha, Śrenya Bimbisāra, to a meal?" So thinking he said to that householder: "Will you, householder, be taking a wife or giving a daughter? Or have you invited the whole country to a meal, or a guild or an association or an assembly? Or have you invited the King of Magadha, Śrenya Bimbisāra, to a meal?"

He said: "I will not be taking a wife, householder, nor giving a daughter. Nor have I invited the whole country to a meal, nor a guild or association or assembly; nor have I invited the King of Magadha, Śrenya Bimbisāra, to a meal. Rather, the community of monks headed by the Buddha has been invited to a meal."
When the householder Anāthapiṇḍada heard the sound of the word "Buddha," which he had not heard before, all of his hair stood on end. His hair on end, Anāthapiṇḍada said this to that householder: "But who, householder, is this one who is called Buddha?"

"He is the Śramaṇa Gautama, householder (15), a son of the Śākyas, from the Śākya clan, who cut off his hair and beard, put on yellow robes and, with full faith, went from the home to homelessness and the religious life. He fully and completely awakened to unsurpassed, full and complete awakening. He is the one, householder, called the Buddha."

"And what is this called the Community?"

"There are, householder, sons of good family from families of the ruling caste who have cut their hair and beards, put on yellow robes and, with full faith, have followed into the religious life that same Blessed One who had entered into the religious life. Sons of good family from families of the priestly caste, the productive caste and the serving caste as well have cut off their hair and beards, put on yellow robes and, with full faith, followed into the religious life that same one who had entered into the religious life, leaving home for homelessness. That is what is called the Community. That community of monks headed by the Buddha has been invited by me for a meal tomorrow in my inner rooms."

"But, householder, where is that Blessed One staying now?"

"Right here in Rājagrha, in the Śitavana Charnel Grounds."

"Are we permitted to get sight of this Blessed One?"

"For that, indeed, you, householder, must wait a while. You will have the opportunity to see him right here tomorrow."

That night the householder Anāthapiṇḍada went to sleep with his thoughts focused on the Buddha. While it was still night, thinking it was light out when it wasn't, he went to the funereal gate. At that time the funereal gate, during two watches of the night, the first and the last, was left open, it being said: "Let there be no hindrance to visitors, travelers and messengers." When he saw the funereal gate open and suffused with light it occurred to him: "It is surely morning since the funereal gate stands open." Having thought that he went out of the city by that same light. But as soon as he had gone out that light disappeared and it was dark. Anāthapiṇḍada was afraid, in a state of terror, his hair bristling, saying: "Surely someone--human, non-human, or criminal--will do me harm, or that substantial bride-price go astray?" So thinking, and wanting to turn back, he circumambulated and paid honor to the residential ground of the son of the gods Madhuskandha.

Then this occurred to the son of the god Madhuskandha: "Now, for sure, the householder Anāthapiṇḍada must be made to see the truth! Now, for sure, when he has disregarded the Buddha, the Blessed One, he will do honor to other gods!"
So thinking, he illuminated with lavish splendor the space between the funereal gate and the Sitavana Charnel Grounds and said to the Householder Anāthapiṇḍada: "Go forth, householder, not back! Far better for you is going forward, not going back! And why?

(16) A hundred horses, a hundred golden nīskas, a hundred mule carts,
And a hundred carts full of all sorts of wealth that are pulled by mares—
They are not worth a sixteenth part of a single step on a religious excursion.

Go forth, householder, not back! Far better for you is going forward, not going back! And why?

A hundred Himalayan elephants fitted out with gold and precious ornaments,
With tusks like poles, huge bodies and girth, unstoppable—
They are not worth a sixteenth part of a single step on a religious excursion.

Go forth, householder, not back! Far better for you is going forward, not going back! And why?

A hundred Kāmbojika girls hung with ornaments and ear-rings,
Wearing golden armlets, golden nīskas on their necks, finely adorned —
They are not worth a sixteenth part of a single step on a religious excursion.

Go forth, householder, not back! Far better for you is going forward, not going back!"22

The householder Anāthapiṇḍada then said this to that son of the gods: "Who, sir, are you?"

"I, householder, am the young brahmin named Maduskandha, an old friend of your house. I am the one who died with a mind deeply moved in regard to the monks Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana, and who was reborn among the gods of the Four Great Kings, a resident of this very Funereal Gate. That is why I spoke in this way: 'Go Forth, householder, not back! Far better for you is going forward, not going back!'"

This then occurred to the householder Anāthapiṇḍada: "This Buddha surely must be of no little importance, of no little importance his declaration of Dharma, since now even gods take such trouble to ensure sight of that Blessed One."25 So thinking he went to the Sitavana Charnel Grounds.

The Blessed One was then outside the vihāra, in the open air walking on the ambulatory, for the most part waiting for the householder Anāthapiṇḍada. Anāthapiṇḍada, the householder, first saw the Blessed One from a distance.
when he saw him he went closer. Having gone up to him the householder greeted the Blessed One with a familiar pleasantry: "I hope the Blessed One has slept well?" 28

Then on that occasion the Blessed One spoke these verses:

"The brahmin who is completely extinguished he, by all means, sleeps well indeed, Unstained by passions, freed indeed and without further connection.
When he has cut here all expectation, 29 has broken the fever of his heart,
Tranquil, with thought at peace, he sleeps well." 30

The Blessed One then took the householder Anāthapiṇḍada, entered the vihāra, and sat down on the seat arranged for him. The householder Anāthapiṇḍada showed deference with his head to the feet of the Blessed One 31 and also sat down at one end of the assembly. When he was seated at one end of the assembly, the Blessed One led the householder Anāthapiṇḍada to see by means of his talk about Dharma, he inspired, incited and delighted him. He illuminated in detail those teachings which promote the benefits of purifying, renouncing, and avoiding the enticements, the dangers and defilements of the sensual pleasures 32--- that which is the preparatory talk about Dharma of Buddhas, Blessed Ones, such as talk about giving, talk about morality, talk about heaven. But when the Blessed One saw that his thought was aroused, vigorous, exhilarated and free of obstruction, that he was suited and able to understand the preeminent teaching of Dharma, then he illuminated in detail the Four Noble Truths--- that which is the preeminent teaching of Dharma of Buddhas, Blessed Ones, that is to say: suffering, its origin, its suppression, the path.

Anāthapiṇḍada, the householder, while still seated on that same seat realized 33 the four noble truths--- that is to say: suffering, its origin, its suppression, the path. Like a pure white cloth readied for dyeing, and plunged in the dye, would take 34 the color entirely, just so the householder Anāthapiṇḍada, seated there on that very same seat, realized the four noble truths--- that is to say: suffering, its origin, its suppression, the path. The householder Anāthapiṇḍada, having seen the Dharma, having found, understood, penetrated the Dharma, having crossed over doubt, having crossed over uncertainty, not dependent on others, nor led by others, found confidence in the instruction of the Teacher in regard to things 35 rose from his seat, put his upper robe over one shoulder, made the gesture of supplication to the Blessed One, and said this to him: "I have gone forth, Reverend One, gone forth. 36 I am one who goes to the Blessed One as refuge, and to the Dharma, and to the Community of Monks. Keep me, for this day forward and for as long as I live and have breath, as a lay-brother 37 who has gone 38 for refuge and who has been deeply moved 39!"
VII. **Anāthapiṇḍada Invites the Buddha to Śrāvastī, Says He Will Build a Vihāra There, and Is Assigned a Monk Assistant —**

The Blessed One then said this to the householder Anāthapiṇḍada: "What is your name, householder?"

"I, Reverend One, am named Sudatta. But I give alms to the lordless and people consequently refer to me as 'the householder Anāthapiṇḍada, the householder Anāthapiṇḍada.'"

"And, householder, where do you come from?" (18)

"There is, Blessed One, in the eastern countries a town of the Kośalan people named Śrāvastī. I live there. The Blessed One should come to Śrāvastī! I will, for as long as I live, attend to the needs of the Blessed One, together with the Community of Monks, with robes, bowls, bedding and seats, medicines for the sick, and personal belongings.

"But are there vihāras in Śrāvastī, householder?"

"No, Reverend One."

"Where there are vihāras, householder, the monks consider that a place that they must come to, go to, and stay at."³

"The Blessed One should come! I will make it so that there will be vihāras in Śrāvastī, and the monks will consider it a place that they must come to, go to, and stay at."

The Blessed One assented to the householder Anāthapiṇḍada by remaining silent, and the householder Anāthapiṇḍada understood by that silence the Blessed One's assent, showed deference to the feet of the Blessed One with his head, and departed. Then, when he had looked after, had accomplished all of what he had to do and his obligations in Rājagṛha, he once again went to the Blessed One, approached, showed deference to the feet of the Blessed One, and sat down at one end of the assembly. So seated the householder Anāthapiṇḍada said this to the Blessed One: "Might you Blessed One, please give me a monk as an assistant? Together with him I will have a vihāra built for the Blessed One in Śrāvastī."⁴

The Blessed One thought to himself: "Which monk should guide the householder Anāthapiṇḍada, his dependents, and the people who inhabit Śrāvastī?"—He saw that it should be the monk Śāriputra.

The Blessed One then addressed the Venerable Śāriputra: "Give your attention, Śāriputra, to the householder Anāthapiṇḍada, his dependents, and the people who inhabit Śrāvastī!"⁶

The Venerable Śāriputra assented to the Blessed One by his silence. Then the Venerable Śāriputra showed deference to the feet of the Blessed One with his head and left his presence.
When that night had passed the Venerable Śāriputra dressed early in the morning, took his bowl and robe, and entered Rājagṛha for alms. He wandered through Rājagṛha for alms, finished his meal, and returned after mid-day. When he had put away the bedding and seat in the same condition as he had found them, he took his bowl and robe and set out wandering towards Śrāvastī.

The householder Anāthapiṇḍada took ample provisions and after passing several successive nights and days reached Śrāvastī. Without even entering Śrāvastī, he wandered along the paths from park to park, from garden to garden, from grove to grove, carefully considering them and saying, "Where will there be a place where I might have a vihāra erected for the Blessed One, a place that is neither too far (19) nor too near to Śrāvastī, that is little crowded by day and there is little commotion, that by night has few sounds and little noise, and one is bothered little by insects, mosquitoes, wind, heat, and crawling things?" Then the householder Anāthapiṇḍada saw that the park of Prince Jeta was neither too far nor too near Śrāvastī, that it was little crowded by day and there was little commotion, that by night it had few sounds and little noise, and one was little bothered there by insects, mosquitoes, wind, heat, and crawling things, and when he saw that it occurred to him: "Here I will have a vihāra for the Blessed One erected." Without even going first to his own house, he approached Prince Jeta and when he had approached him he said this to him: "Might you, Prince, offer me the park (ārāma). I am going to have a vihāra for the Blessed One built there."

The Prince said: "That is not my pleasure (ārāma), householder, although there is a garden that is mine."

Again a second time, and a third, the householder Anāthapiṇḍada said to Prince Jeta: "Might you, Prince, offer me the park (ārāma). I am going to have a vihāra for the Blessed One erected there."

"Householder, I cannot let my pleasure (ārāma) go even if covered with ten millions."

But the householder Anāthapiṇḍada said further: "You, Prince, are the one who has fixed a price for the park. You must accept these gold coins. The park is mine."

"Who is the one who has fixed the price?"

"You are."

And the two of them fell into dispute saying "A price was fixed, a price was not fixed!" They set off for the magistrates. When they were half way there, it occurred to the four guardians of the world: "This householder Anāthapiṇḍada is
committed to erecting a vihāra for the Blessed Ones. We should render assistance to him." They then transformed themselves into magistrates and sat on the property court.15

The householder Anāthapindāda and Prince Jeta approached the court and Anāthapindāda presented the case in detail to the magistrates. They said: "You, Prince, are the one who fixed a price for the park. You must accept the gold. The park is the householder's."

The prince remained silent.16

When the householder Anāthapindāda had carried out huge quantities of gold by wagons, bundles, bags, baskets, buffaloes, cows and donkeys he began to cover all of the Jetavana.17 But it was not completely finished and a spot remained still uncovered. The householder Anāthapindāda stood there silently for a moment thinking about the matter: "Which of my treasures will be neither too small nor too great so that it will cover this spot not yet covered, and so used I will no longer have the trouble of looking after it?"18

Prince Jeta thought to himself: "Surely the householder Anāthapindāda is now experiencing some regret, thinking 'Why have I parted with such a huge amount of money for the sake of a park?'" So thinking he said this to the householder Anāthapindāda (20): "If you, householder, now have some regrets, take this gold! This park will be mine again."

"But, Prince, I have no regrets. I was only standing here for a moment quietly considering this matter: 'Which of my treasures will be neither too small nor too great so that it will cover this spot not yet covered, and so used I will no longer have the trouble of looking after it?""

Then this occurred to Prince Jeta: "This Buddha surely must be of no little importance, of no little importance his declaration of Dharma, since now this householder has parted with such a huge amount of money for a park."19 So thinking he said this to the householder Anāthapindāda: "Might you, householder, give me this spot that is not yet covered? I will have the entrance hall erected here for the Blessed One."

The householder Anāthapindāda gave that spot not yet covered to Prince Jeta, and Prince Jeta had the entrance hall erected there for the Blessed One.20

IX. Quelling Local Religious Opposition to the Presence of a Vihāra: Śāriputra Struts his Supernatural Stuff1

Then, saying "The householder Anāthapindāda has undertaken to have a vihāra erected for the Blessed One," members of other religious groups united, being very hostile and much upset, and went to the householder Anāthapindāda.
When they approached him they said: "You, householder, must not have a vihāra made here for the Śramaṇa Gautama!"

"And why not?"3

"We have divided up the towns. Rājagṛha is the Śramaṇa Gautama's; Śrāvasti is ours."4

Anāthapiṇḍada said: "You might have divided up the towns, but not my private property.5 I will have a religious foundation built6 for whomever I want."

They went before the King, but there too they were defeated by Anāthapiṇḍada. Those members of other religious groups---a bunch of crows, their tune unchanged7-- said: "Householder, we are not going to just give you what you want. But the best disciple of the Śramaṇa Gautama has come. If he defeats us in a contest you should have the vihāra made!"

Anāthapiṇḍada said: "Very well. I will seek the consent of the Noble Śāriputra then." The householder Anāthapiṇḍada went to the Venerable Śāriputra. When he had approached him and had shown deference to the feet of the Venerable Śāriputra with his head, he sat down at one end of the assembly. So seated the householder Anāthapiṇḍada said this to the Venerable Śāriputra: "Reverend Śāriputra, members of other religious groups have said this: 'Householder, we are not going to just give you what you want. But the best disciple of the Śramaṇa Gautama has come. If he defeats us in a contest you should have the vihāra made!' What is to be done in this regard?"

The Venerable Śāriputra thought to himself: "Do those involved have any roots of merit, or do they not?" He saw: they do. "On whom are they dependent?8 I, myself." Again he thought to himself: "Are only so many dependent on me and to be guided, or are others also to be guided through this contest?" He saw: there are others too. "When will they assemble?" (21) He saw: after seven days. Having focused his attention in that way,9 he said: "Make it so, Householder, but in seven days!"

The householder Anāthapiṇḍada was both pleased and delighted. He went to the members of other religious groups and when he approached them he said this: "The Reverend One, the Noble Śāriputra10 says this: 'Very well. Make it so, but on the seventh day!'"

They thought to themselves: "There can only be two reasons here for his delay: either he wants to run away, or he wants to find supporters. Have we here not got a break?11 We too should find supporters." And they began to look around for supporters. In the course of looking around for supporters they saw the renunciant named Raktākṣa12 and said to him: "You are our colleague.13 We have challenged a disciple of the Śramaṇa Gautama to a contest and he is looking around for supporters. You should render assistance to us!"

"When?"14
"In seven days."

"Very well. Then make it so! When you have assembled then let me know."

Being apprehensive and anxious the members of other religious groups continued day after day looking for supporters, and counting the days.

On the seventh day the householder Anāthapiṇḍada had seats arranged on a large open space,15 and for the Venerable Śāriputra he arranged a lion-seat. Members of other religious groups from many different places assembled, and the inhabitants of Śravasti, and many hundreds of thousands who lived in the surrounding area, some from curiosity,16 some driven by their former roots of merit. Then when the Venerable Śāriputra, attended by the householder Anāthapiṇḍada and his dependents, had entered into the circle of disputants,17 had considered the people to be guided, and, smiling, had with undisturbed and calm demeanor18 mounted the lion seat, he sat down. And that entire assembly sat, their thought transfixed, considering the Venerable Śāriputra.

The Venerable Śāriputra then addressed the members of other religious groups: "Sirs, will you then create something, or will you transform it?"19

They said: "We are going to create something. You must transform it."

The Venerable Śāriputra thought to himself: "If I were to create something the whole world, together with its gods, would not even be able to transform it, how much less could the renunciant Raktākṣa." So thinking, he said this to the renunciant Raktākṣa: "Create something then! I will transform it."

Raktākṣa was skilled in magic.20 He conjured up a fragrant mango tree in full flower. But the Venerable Śāriputra sent forth a terrific blast of wind and rain (22) which tore it apart, roots and all, and scattered it around everywhere, until even practitioners of yoga could not perceive it.

Rātākṣa then conjured up a lotus pond. But the Venerable Śāriputra conjured up a young elephant which completely destroyed it.

Raktākṣa conjured up a seven-headed serpent demon. But the Venerable Śāriputra conjured up a garuḍa bird which carried it off.

Finally Raktākṣa conjured up a zombie.21 But the Venerable Śāriputra staked him down with mantras.22 Being badly employed, the zombie was intent on killing Raktākṣa himself.23 He rushed upon him and Raktākṣa then was afraid, frightened, terrified, his hair standing on end. He fell at the feet of the Venerable Śāriputra saying: "Noble Śāriputra, you must save me! I have gone for refuge.24" The Venerable Śāriputra then unstaked the mantras and the zombie was pacified.

The Venerable Śāriputra taught the Dharma to Raktākṣa.25 He, deeply moved,26 said: "Noble Śāriputra, might I obtain admittance, ordination and the state of a monk in this well proclaimed Doctrine and Discipline. Might I practice the religious life under the Noble Śāriputra."27
The Venerable Śāriputra admitted him, ordained him, and gave him admonition, and he, by setting to work, exerting himself and struggling, directly realized the state of an arhat through abandoning all impurities. Being an arhat he had no interest in the three spheres; a lump of dirt and gold were the same to him; he regarded all of space and the palm of his own hand as the same; for him an adze was the same as sandal paste; his shell shattered by knowledge; knowledge, supernatural knowledge, and special knowledge were obtained; his back was turned on the desire for the world and donations and on honors; and he became an object of veneration, respect, and deference for the gods including Indra and Upendra.28

The whole assembly, then, their eyes wide with amazement and deeply moved29 by the Venerable Śāriputra said: "A mighty bull of a contestant30 has been overwhelmed by the Noble Śāriputra," and so thinking they sat gazing31 at his face.32 When the Venerable Śāriputra became aware of the inclination, disposition, condition and propensity of that assembly, he gave such an explanation of the Dharma dealing with the four noble truths that when they heard it many hundreds of thousands of people arrived at great distinction33-- some produced the thought that is directed toward the awakening of a disciple, some that which is directed towards individual awakening, and some that which is directed toward unsurpassed, entire and complete awakening; some undertook going for refuge and the rules of training; some directly realized the fruit of entering the stream, some the fruit of returning only once, some that of not returning, and some, having entered into the religious life, directly realized the state of an arhat by abandoning all impurities. That assembly was, indeed, almost entirely inclined toward the Buddha, disposed toward the Dharma, in favor of the Community.

X. The Local Religious Opposition Does Not Give Up Easily: A Little More Magic Mixed with Some Kindness

But the members of other religious groups thought to themselves: "We cannot overwhelm this one in any contest-- we must try some other means or arrangement. We could do the wage labor here.1 Then, when we get our chance, we can, with a little bait, do him in."

When they had got together and gone to the householder Anāthapindaka they said: "You, householder, have completely cut off all the foundations of our livelihood. Have some pity on us! We will work for wages on your vihāra.2 We have been here a long time. Surely you will not make us abandon our country!"

Anāthapindaka said: "I will ask the Noble Śāriputra for permission then," and he went to the Venerable Śāriputra. Having approached him (23) he said this to the Venerable Śāriputra: "The members of other religious groups, Noble One, said: 'You have completely cut off all the foundations of our livelihood. Have some pity
on us! We will work for wages on your vihāra. We have been here a long time. Surely, you will not make us abandon our country!

The Venerable Śāriputra proceeded to focus his attention: "do they have some roots of merit, or do they not?" He saw: they do. "On whom are they dependent? -- me myself." After he had focused his attention he said: "Make it so, householder. Where is the harm in it?"

They began to work for wages on the vihāra. The Venerable Śāriputra conjured up a frightful fellow as the work-boss and he began to have that work done. When the Venerable Śāriputra knew that the time was right for their religious training, then he continued to do his walking exercise under a nearby tree. Those members of other religious groups who were now wage-laborers saw him and thought to themselves: "Now is the time to do away with this monk. He is all alone." They approached and hemmed him in.

The Venerable Śāriputra thought to himself: "With what sort of thought have these approached me?" When he saw: with the thought of murder, he let loose that conjured work-boss and he scattered them shouting "Get out of here! Get to work!"

They said: "Protect us, Noble Śāriputra!" Śāriputra said to the conjured work-boss: "Go, Venerable One! They must be left alone!"

They thought to themselves: "Such a one as this is indeed quite magnificent! Although we had thoughts of murder in regard to him, he had thoughts of friendliness towards us." So thinking they were deeply moved.

The Venerable Śāriputra, when he became aware of their inclinations, dispositions, condition and propensities, gave such an explanation of the Dharma dealing with the four noble truths that when they heard it they shattered with the thunderbolt of knowledge the mountain of the view of real individuality which has twenty peaks, and directly realized the fruit of entering the stream. Having seen the truths, they said: "Śāriputra, might we obtain admittance, ordination, and the state of a monk in this well proclaimed Doctrine and Discipline. Might we practice the religious life under the Reverend Śāriputra."

The Venerable Śāriputra admitted them, ordained them, and gave them admonition, and they, by being set to work, by exerting themselves and struggling came to understand this very five part wheel of rebirth-- both moving and stopped-- threw down all conditioned states because they are characterized by ruin, decline, destruction, and crumbling, and directly realized the state of arhat through abandoning all impurities. Being arhats they had no interest in the three spheres; a lump of dirt and gold were the same to them; they regarded all of space and the palm of their own hands as the same; for them an adze was the same as sandal paste, their shell shattered by knowledge, the various forms of knowledge, supernatural
knowledge and special knowledge were obtained, their backs were turned on desire for the world and donations and on honors,\textsuperscript{12} and they became objects of veneration, respect and deference for the gods including Indra and Upendra.

XI.  

Building a Vihāra Down Here Creates a Mansion in Heaven: Śāriputra's Revelation.

(24) The Venerable Śāriputra then took hold of one end of the carpenter's cord for the vihāra,\textsuperscript{1} and the householder Anāthapiṇḍada took hold of the other end as well. The Venerable Śāriputra began to smile. The householder Anāthapiṇḍada said: "Not without cause, not without reason, Noble Śāriputra, do Tathāgatas or the disciples of Tathāgatas smile-- what, Noble Śāriputra, is the cause, what is the reason for this smile?"

"Just so, householder, just so. Not without cause or reason do Tathāgatas or the disciples of Tathāgatas smile. But when you took hold of the carpenter's cord here a mansion of gold was produced among the gods in the Tuṣita Heaven."

The householder Anāthapiṇḍada then, his eyes wide with amazement, said: "If that is so, Noble Śāriputra, then you must indeed extend the cord still more! I am more and more deeply moved.\textsuperscript{2}"

The Venerable Śāriputra took hold of that carpenter's cord. The householder Anāthapiṇḍada--- through the force of a more and more powerfully deep feeling--- was still more deeply moved,\textsuperscript{3} and through that deep feeling\textsuperscript{4} the mansion of gold was immediately transformed into one made now of the four jewels, and the Venerable Śāriputra informed him of that.\textsuperscript{5}

With his mind focused on ever more increased merit, the householder Anāthapiṇḍada then had sixteen large vihāras\textsuperscript{6} erected and the sites for sixty huts.\textsuperscript{7} When he had the sixteen large vihāras erected and the sites for sixty huts, and when he had filled them with all their accouterments, he went to the Venerable Śāriputra, and having approached him, said: "When the Blessed One travels, Noble Śāriputra, how long are the stages in his journey?"

"The same as for a wheel-turning king."

"But how long are they for a wheel-turning king?"\textsuperscript{8}

"A wheel-turning king travels in stages of ten leagues, householder."

The householder Anāthapiṇḍada then calculated the number of halting places\textsuperscript{9} between Śrāvasti and Rājagriha and had way stations\textsuperscript{10} erected, alms halls made, and stationed a man there to announce the time.\textsuperscript{11} He had gateways erected that were made beautiful\textsuperscript{12} with umbrellas, banners, and flags, were sprinkled with sandalwood water and hung with pots of pleasing incense. And he had seasonal and nighttime medicines prepared.
When all the necessaries had been procured Anāthapiṇḍada addressed one of his men: "Ho, man, go! Approach the Blessed One! And when you have approached him and have shown deference to the feet of the Blessed One, you must ask, on my behalf, after the good state of his health, his physical well-being and condition, his needs, vigor and ease, and if he is without complaint and dwelling in comfort! And you must speak in this way "May the Blessed One come to Śrāvasti! I, Anāthapiṇḍada, will attend to the Blessed One, (25) together with the Community of Monks, for as long as I live, with robes, bowls, bedding and seats, medicine for illness, and personal belongings."

The man assented to the householder Anāthapiṇḍada saying "Yes, Noble One," and set off for Rājaḡrha. In time he arrived at Rājaḡrha and then, after he had recovered from the fatigue of his journey, he approached the Blessed One. When he had approached and shown deference with his head to the feet of the Blessed One he sat down at one end of the assembly. So seated that man said this to the Blessed One: "Reverend, The householder Anāthapiṇḍada shows deference with his head to the feet of the Blessed One... and as before, up to...'dwelling in comfort.'"

The Blessed One said: "Ho, man, may both the householder Anāthapiṇḍada and you be at ease!"

"Reverend One, the Householder Anāthapiṇḍada speaks thus: 'May the Blessed One come to Śrāvasti! I will attend to the Blessed One, together with the Community of Monks, for as long as I live, with robes, bowls, bedding and seats, medicine for illness, and personal belongings."

The Blessed One gave his consent to the man by remaining silent. When the man understood that the Blessed One had given his consent by remaining silent, he showed deference with his head to the feet of the Blessed One and departed.

XII. The Buddha Goes to Śrāvasti with Considerable Pomp and Circumstance

1The Blessed One, then, restrained and surrounded by those who were restrained, calm and surrounded by those who were calmed, freed and surrounded by those who were free, emboldened and surrounded by those who were emboldened, disciplined and surrounded by those who were disciplined, an arhat surrounded by arhats, devoid of desire and surrounded by those who were devoid of desire, beautiful and surrounded by those who were beautiful2-- like a bull surrounded by his herd, like an elephant surrounded by its young, like a lion surrounded by other beasts of prey, like a goose surrounded by a flock of geese, like a garuḍa surrounded by a flock of birds, like a sage surrounded by his students,3 like a physician surrounded by a crowd of patients, like a powerful soldier surrounded by his warriors, like a guide surrounded by a group of travelers, like the leader of a
caravan surrounded by a horde of merchants, like a prominent man surrounded by his entourage, the ruler of a fort by his counselors, a wheel-turning king by this thousand sons, the moon by the constellations, the sun by its thousand rays, Dhrarāstra by the gandharvas, Virūdhaka by the kumbhāṇḍas, Virūpākṣa by the nāgas, Dhanada by the yakṣas, Vemacitrin by the asuras, like Śakra surrounded by the host of the thirty-three, like Brahmā surrounded by the gods of Brahmā, like an ocean full of water, like a rain cloud bringing moisture, like a lord of elephants free from rut-- with his faculties well restrained, his demeanor and appearance unruffled, fully ornamented with the thirty-two physical characteristics of the great man, his limbs glorious with the eighty secondary signs, his figure ornamented with a nimbus that extended a full fathom, a nimbus that surpassed thousands of suns, stunningly beautiful like a moving mountain of jewels (26), possessed of the ten powers, the four forms of fearlessness, the three special foundations of mindfulness and great compassion-- he, being followed by the Community of Monks, by the householder Anāthapiṇḍada and his dependents, by the inhabitants of Śrāvastī and several hundreds of thousands of gods, arrived at the city Śrāvastī.

And when the Blessed One was entering the city of Śrāvastī and put his right foot down on the threshold of the city with a determined intention, then the earth quaked in six ways: the whole world moved, trembled and shook; it rolled, swayed and jerked. The eastern quarter heaved up, the western sank down; the western heaved up, the eastern sank down; the southern heaved up, the northern sank; the northern heaved up, but the southern sank down; the ends heaved up and the middle sank down; the middle heaved up but the ends sank down. And this entire world, together with the otherwise always dark intermediate spaces, was suffused with a dazzling light, the drums of heaven were pounded, and the gods, hovering in the air, began to scatter divine blue lotuses down upon the Blessed One-- they scattered lotuses, red lotuses and white, aloe wood powder, saffron powder, Tamāla leaves and divine mandāra flowers. And they waved their garments. When the Blessed One actually entered into the city there were these sons of wonders and others as well-- the narrow became broad and the low became high and the high became even. Elephants trumpeted, the horses neighed and bulls bellowed. In the houses all sorts of musical instruments played on their own; the blind obtained sight, the deaf hearing, the dumb were able to speak, and those who had impaired faculties regained their full use. Those who were drunk came to be sober; those who were poisoned came to be free of it. Those who were mutual enemies came to be friends; pregnant women successfully gave birth; those held in bonds were set free, and the poor obtained riches-- these and hundreds of thousands of other marvels appeared when the Blessed One entered into the city.
XIII. A Telling Glitch in the Presentation of the Vihāra and an Attempt to Account for Its Anomalous Name

The Blessed One, then, had entered Śrāvastī with such great honor, and having entered sat down at the front of the Community of Monks on the seat prepared for him. The householder Anāthapiṇḍada, surrounded by friends, family, relatives and kin (27), took up a golden vase and started to pour the water of donation, but it would not come out. Feeling badly, the householder Anāthapiṇḍada thought to himself: "Surely I must have committed some faulty acts?"

The Blessed One said: "You, householder Anāthapiṇḍada, have not committed any faulty acts. It is rather that while standing on this spot you presented it to former Fully and Completely Awakened Buddhas. You must pour on another spot!"

When Anāthapiṇḍada had poured on another spot then the Blessed One himself declared aloud with a voice with five qualities the Jetavana, and when the Jetavana was being declared aloud Prince Jeta thought to himself: "Ah, indeed, might the Blessed One take up just my name the very first of all!"

The Blessed One knew through his own thought what Prince Jeta was thinking and took that name up first, saying "This, monks, is the Jetavana, the Park of Anāthapiṇḍada."

When Prince Jeta heard that he was very deeply moved, saying "The Blessed One has taken up my name first," and—delighted and joyful—he had an entrance hall made of the four jewels built for the Blessed One using all of his resources.

---Accordingly, the Compilers, the Elders, also recorded in the Sūtra, "The Blessed One was staying in Śrāvastī, in the Jetavana, in the Park of Anāthapiṇḍada."*

XIV. Legal or Not, Anāthapiṇḍada Had Given the Same Land before and Will Do It Again.

The monks had some uncertainties and asked He who Cuts Off All Uncertainty, the Buddha, the Blessed One: "When, Reverend One, did the householder Anāthapiṇḍada previously present this piece of ground to former Fully and Completely Awakened Buddhas?"

The Blessed One said: "In a past time, monks, in the ninety first aeon, a Fully and Completely Awakened Buddha named Vipaśyin appeared in the world—Perfect in Knowledge and Conduct, a Sugata, One who Knows the World, Unexcelled, a Leader of Men who can be Tamed, a Teacher of Gods and Men, a
Buddha, a Blessed One. With a train of sixty-two thousand monks he arrived at this spot. At that time too there was in this Śrāvastī a householder named Tisya. When he had covered this piece of land with six leagues of gold coins, had bought it from a royal prince, he presented it to Vipaśyin, the Fully and Completely Awakened Buddha, entered into his Order, and directly realized the state of an arhat by abandoning all impurities.

A nephew of the householder Tisya, through his association with him, was profoundly impressed in regard to the Tathāgata Vipaśyin. He had a stūpa built for the hair and nail-clippings of Vipaśyin (28), the Fully and Completely Awakened Buddha. He then thought to himself: "By what means might I be able to see this stūpa without obstruction both at night and in the day?"

One of his dependents who lived on the shore of the ocean gave him a self-luminous jewel as a gift. He mounted it on that shrine and through its powerful effect he saw the stūpa of hair and nail clippings without obstruction both at night and in the day. Then, deeply moved, he made a vow: "As my uncle bought this piece of land from a prince, covered it with gold coins, and presented it to Vipaśyin, the Fully and Completely Awakened Buddha, just so may I cover this piece of land with gold coins and present it to seven Fully and Completely Awakened Buddhas. May I enter the Order of the last of these and directly realize the state of an arhat by abandoning all impurities!"

What do you think, monks? He who was the nephew of that householder, that was this householder Anāthapiṇḍada at that time, on that occasion.

After that, in the thirty first aeon, a Teacher named Śikhin appeared in the world... and as before, up to... a Buddha, a Blessed One. He, with a train of sixty thousand monks, arrived at this spot. At that time too there was a householder named Puṣya. When he had covered this piece of land for two and a half leagues with many jewels, had bought it from a prince, he presented it to Śikhin, the Fully and Completely Awakened Buddha together with the Community of his Disciples. Would it then occur to you, monks, that at that time, on that occasion, the householder named Puṣya was someone else? Not so, again, should it be seen. Rather, that was this same householder Anāthapiṇḍada, at that time, on that occasion.

After that, in this same thirty first aeon, a Teacher named Viśvabhuj appeared in the world... and as before, up to... a Buddha, a Blessed One. He, with a train of sixty thousand monks, arrived at this spot. At that time too there was householder named Māghu. He too covered this spot for two leagues with pearls, bought it from a prince, and presented it to Viśvabhuj, the Fully and Completely Awakened Buddha, together with his Community of Disciples. Would it then occur to you, monks, (29) that at that time, on that occasion, the householder named
Māghu was someone else? Not so, again, should it be seen. Rather, that was this same householder Anāthapiṇḍada, at that time, on that occasion.

After that, in this auspicious aeon, a Teacher named Krakutsunda appeared in the world...and as before, up to...a Buddha, a Blessed One. He, with a train of forty thousand monks, arrived at this spot. At that time too there was a householder named Bhavadatta. He too filled this spot with cattle, bought it from a prince, and presented it to Krakutsunda, the Fully and Completely Awakened Buddha, together with his Community of Disciples. Would it then occur to you, monks, that at that time, on that occasion, the householder named Bhavadatta was someone else? Not so, again, should it be seen. Rather, that was this same householder Anāthapiṇḍada at that time, on that occasion.

After that, in this same auspicious aeon, a Teacher named Kanakamuni appeared in the world...and as before, up to...a Buddha, a Blessed One. He, with a train of thirty-thousand monks arrived at this spot. At that time too there was a householder named Brhaspati. He too covered this spot with cloth, bought it from a prince, and presented it to Kanakamuni, the Fully and Completely Awakened Buddha, together with the Community of his Disciples. Would it then occur to you, monks, that at that time, on that occasion, the householder named Brhaspati was someone else? Not so, again, should it be seen. Rather, that was this same householder Anāthapiṇḍada at that time, on that occasion.

After that, again in this same auspicious aeon, when a person's normal lifespan was thirty thousand years, a Teacher named Kanakamuni appeared in the world...and as before, up to...a Buddha, a Blessed One. He, with a train of thirty-thousand monks arrived at this spot. At that time too there was a householder named Brhaspati. He too covered this spot with cloth, bought it from a prince, and presented it to Kanakamuni, the Fully and Completely Awakened Buddha, together with the Community of his Disciples. Would it then occur to you, monks, that at that time, on that occasion, the householder named Brhaspati was someone else? Not so, again, should it be seen. Rather, that was this same householder Anāthapiṇḍada at that time, on that occasion.

After that, again in this same auspicious aeon, when a person's normal lifespan was twenty thousand years, an Entirely and Completely Awakened One named Kāśyapa appeared in the world...and as before, up to...a Buddha, a Blessed One. He, with a train of twenty thousand monks, arrived at this spot. At that time too there was a householder named Āśāda. He too covered this piece of land for nine leagues with golden grains, bought it from a prince, and presented it to Kāśyapa, the Fully and Completely Awakened Buddha, together with the community of his Disciples. Would it then occur to you, monks, that at that time, on that occasion, the householder named Āśāda was someone else? Not so, again, should it be seen. Rather, that was this same householder Anāthapiṇḍada at that time, on that occasion.

(30) Now too I, monks, a Teacher, have appeared in the world, a Tathāgata, Arhat, Fully and Completely Awakened One, Perfect in Knowledge and Conduct, a Sugata, One who knows the World, Unexcelled, a Leader of Men who can be Tamed, a Teacher of Gods and Men, a Buddha, a Blessed One. I too, with a train of twelve hundred and fifty, have arrived at this spot. Now too the householder Anāthapiṇḍada has covered with a layer of ten million the ground plowed by a plow pulled by a team of sixteen, has bought it from Prince Jeta, and presented it to me, together with the Community of my Disciples.
There will also be, monks, in the future, when a person's normal life-space is eighty thousand years, a Teacher named Maitreya. He too, with a train of ninety six ten millions of thousands of arhats, will come to this spot. At that time too a householder named Sudhana will arise. He too, when he has covered this spot for three yojanas with gold coins, has bought it off a prince, will present it to Maitreya together with the Community of his Disciples. When he has entered Maitreya's Order he will directly realize the state of an arhat by abandoning all impurities. Would it then occur to you, monks, that at that time, on that occasion, the householder named Sudhana will be someone else? Not so, again, should it be seen. Rather, that will be this same householder Anāthapiṇḍada.

XV. The Religious Roots of Anāthapiṇḍada's Extraordinary Vision and Poking Some Fun at Other Religious Groups

The householder Anāthapiṇḍada saw hoards whether they had an owner or not, whether they were in the ground or in water, whether they were far away or near. It was said everywhere "The householder Anāthapiṇḍada sees hoards whether they have an owner or not, whether they are in the ground or in water, whether they are far away or near." Now at that time large numbers of members of various religious groups, śramaṇas, brahmins, carakas, and wanderers had assembled and were seated in the hall where they gossiped, and a discussion and conversation of this sort arose: "What physical mark does the householder Anāthapiṇḍada have since he sees hoards whether they have an owner or not, whether they are in the ground or in water, whether they are far away or (31) near?"

A young Brahmin named Upagā had on that occasion come and was seated in the assembly. He said: "You, sirs, should not worry. When I have looked into it, sirs, I will tell you what physical mark the householder Anāthapiṇḍada has which allows him to see hoards whether they have an owner or not, whether they are in the ground or in water, whether they are far away or near." He then constantly followed behind the householder Anāthapiṇḍada, totally occupied with watching his movement and activities, until on one occasion when the householder Anāthapiṇḍada had bathed in the Ajīravatī River and come out. Then he slapped him on the back with his hand. Although the householder Anāthapiṇḍada saw him, he said nothing. Then he informed the members of other religious groups and they, bragging, spread it around everywhere. Everywhere, it was said: "The householder Anāthapiṇḍada has patience and gentleness by which he sees hoards, whether they
have an owner or not, whether they are in the ground or in water, whether they are far away or near."

The monks reported this matter to the Blessed One, and the Blessed One said: "Monks, it would not be easy for even ten million hundreds of thousands of members of other religious groups to know what physical mark the householder Anāthapiṇḍada had by which he sees hoards. Rather, the householder Anāthapiṇḍada has an inner eye of variegated jewels and a voice of gold, as a consequence of which he sees hoards whether they have an owner or not, whether they are in the ground or in water, whether they are far away or near.

The monks, then, had some uncertainties and asked He who Cuts off All Uncertainty, the Buddha, the Blessed One: "But, Reverend One, through the maturation of which action that he had done did the householder Anāthapiṇḍada come to have an inner eye of variegated jewels and a voice of gold?"

The Blessed One said: "Monks, actions were done and accumulated by the householder Anāthapiṇḍada alone that had arrived at their fullness, their causes matured, in full flood, imminent, unavoidable. Since the householder Anāthapiṇḍada had done and accumulated these actions, how could someone else experience the result? Monks, actions done and accumulated do not mature outside, in the element of earth, nor in the element of water, nor in the elements of heat or wind. Rather, actions that are done—both good and bad—mature only when the constituents, elements, and spheres of a living thing are acquired.

Actions which are done never vanish even
After a hundred aeons,
But, having reached completion and the proper
Time, they bear fruit for living creatures.

(32) In a past time, monks, there was a householder living in a rural village who was rich and had great wealth, many possessions, wide and extensive holdings; he approached Vaiśravaṇa in wealth, rivaled Vaiśravaṇa in wealth. When spring time had come, and the trees were in full flower, and the woods were filled with the sounds of geese, curlews and peacocks, of parrots, mainas, cuckoos and pheasants, he, with his household, went out to his gardens.

--When there are no Buddhas then solitary buddhas appear in the world who are compassionate towards the forsaken and miserable, prefer to have a bed and seat on the margins, and are alone worthy of the world's gifts--
When a solitary Buddha was wandering through the countryside, he came to that rural village and stayed at a spot in that garden. The groundskeeper informed the householder: "On that spot over there a renunciant of calm demeanor is staying."

When he heard that the householder was delighted. Saying "fortunate am I that such a renunciant is staying in my garden." He, being deeply moved, set out to have sight of him. But that high-minded one, the solitary Buddha, had entered the sphere of nirvana in which there is no remainder and was dead. The householder, then, with his friends, family, relatives, household and associates, cremated him with great honors, extinguished the pyre with milk, and placed the bones in a crystal pot mixed with jewels. And the bones inside the pot gave off a brilliant light and emitted sound.

The householder then fell at their feet and made this vow: "As this renunciant's bones mixed with jewels shine inordinately and emit sound, just so may I, through this root of merit, come to have an inner eye of variegated jewels and a voice of gold!"

What do you think, monks? He who was that householder was at that time, on that occasion, this very same householder Anathapiṇḍada. He performed the funeral honors for the solitary Buddha and made the vow. He, as the nephew of the householder Tisya, mounted the self-luminous mani jewel on the stūpa of the hair and nail clippings of the Fully and Completely Awakened One Vipaśyin. Through the maturation of that action he came to have an inner eye of variegated jewels and a voice of gold. Indeed, monks, the maturation of entirely black actions is entirely black; of entirely white actions it is entirely white; of those that are mixed it too is mixed. Therefore, monks, one should train in such a way that he has left behind black actions and those that are mixed, and satisfaction should be found only in actions which are entirely white. In this way, monks, you must train!"
Abbreviations

(Only those abbreviations which are frequently used or will otherwise not be obvious are listed)

Adhikaraṇavastu = see Gnoli


Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo = Zhang Yisun et al, Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo (Beijing: 1985) Vols. I-III.


Derge = The Tibetan Tripitaka. Taipei Edition, ed. A.W. Barber (Taipei: 1991) — unless otherwise stated all references are to the 'dul ba section and give volume letter, original folio number, and line number.


JIABS = *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies*

JIP = *Journal of Indian Philosophy*


Ms. = The facsimile reproduction of a part of the Gilgit Manuscript of the Śayanāsanavastu in R. Vira & L. Chandra, *Gilgit Buddhist Manuscripts (Facsimile Edition)* Part 6 (Ṣata-Piṭaka Series 10(6)) (New Delhi: 1974) folios 940-949 — note that what are given here as the original folio numbers are off by a hundred, e.g. 214 should be 314, etc. — cited by folio number assigned in the facsimile & line.

Poṣadhavastu


Saṅghabhedavastu = R. Gnoli, *The Gilgit Manuscript of the Saṅghabhedavastu*
Buddhist Literature


Śayanāsanavastu = See Gnoli


Vinayasūtra
(Bapat & Gokhale) = P. V. Bapat & V. V. Gokhale, Vinaya-Sūtra and Auto-Commentary on the Same by Gunaśrīprabhā. Chapter I — Pravrajyā-vastu (Patna: 1982).

Vinayasūtra

NOTES

Introduction

5 Hirakawa, Monastic Discipline for the Buddhist Nuns, 11.
7 Clarke, "The Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinaya — A Brief Reconnaissance Report;" Clarke, "The Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya Muktaka," Buddhist Studies (Bukkyō Kenkyū) 30 (2001) 81-107. Note however that we have — in addition to the material cited by Clarke — at least two canonical enumerations of the component parts of the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya which seem to include the sections or 'books' of the Uttaragrantha, one at Bhikṣunīvibhanga, Derge Ta 148 a.3-.6 (if, again, this is a Mūlasarvāstivādin work), and one at Uttaragrantha, Derge Pa 251b.2-.4. They are also enumerated, and their titles 'explained,' in the colophon at Derge Pa 310b.1-311a.3. — For a very uneven and not infrequently inaccurate survey of the contents of the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya in Tibetan see A.C. Banerjee, Sarvāstivāda Literature (Calcutta: 1957) 79-246.
8 But even this estimate is much to small since Dutt misread the number on the final folio of the Vinayavastu manuscript: he read as 423 what is in fact the number 523, and so thought that the manuscript contained a hundred less folios than it did — see Wille, Die handschriftliche Überlieferung, 22, and the sources cited there.
12 Sanghabhedavastu ii 216-51.
14 Sāṅghabhedavastu i 5-16; Vibhaṅga, Derge Ca 106a.3-113a.6; G. Schopen, "The Monastic Ownership of Servants or Slaves: Local and Legal Factors in the Redactional History of Two Vinayas," JIABS 17.2 (1994) 158ff. esp. n. 33.


16 Bhāṣājyavastu, GMs iii 1, 45.13-19; Derge Kha 144b.1-145a.4. This little text, which at least in its Mūlasarvāstivādin version deals with an important 'moment' in the acquisition of permanent buildings by the Buddhist monastic community, is also quoted elsewhere — Bhikkhu Pāśādika, Kanonische Zitate im Abhidharma-Abhāsya des Vasubandhu (Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden. Beiheft 1) (Göttingen: 1989) 75, [275].


18 Lévi refers to "savants, séduits par la belle ordonnance du Canon pali;" "Les saintes écritures du bouddhisme," 77.


22 For a very good idea of both the extent and kinds of "stories" found in this vinaya see J.L. Panglung, Die Erzählstoffe des Mūlaśarvāstivāda-Vinaya. Analyser auf Grund der Tibetischen Übersetzung (Tokyo: 1981), but note that even it is not complete — it does not include the stories that occur in the Uttararāṇḍa — and it is weak in citing parallels found in the Avasānasātaka; see G. Schopen, "Dead Monks and Bad Debts: Some Provisions of a Buddhist Monastic Inheritance Law," Indo-Iranian Journal 44 (2001) esp. n. 21.


24 Even individual 'stories' sometimes point in this same direction — see the discussion of the various versions of the story of the stūpa of the Buddha Kāṣyapa at Toṣkā in G. Schopen, Bones, Stones, and Buddhist Monks. Collected Papers on the Archaeology, Epigraphy, and Texts of Monastic Buddhism in India (Honolulu: 1997) 28-29.


26 S. Lévi, "Note sur des manuscrits sanscrits provenant de bamiyan (afghanistan) et de gilgit (cachemire)," Journal Asiatique (1932) 23.


28 In his edition Gnoli too has divided the text into sections and imposed headings on them, but I have chosen not to follow them, and the two 'systems' only partially overlap.


Burnouf had already recognized something of the 'vinaya' function of the avadāna literature that he knew. He knew, for example, that at least some of the avadānas in the Divyāvadāna occurred in the Tibetan translation of the Vinaya and he had said: "maintenant, pour que quelques Avadānas aient pu être compris au Tibet dans le cadre du Vinaya, il fallait que ces Avadānas eussent plus ou moins directement trait à la discipline" (E. Burnouf, *Introduction a l'histoire du bouddhisme indien* (Paris: 1844) 39). In introducing the long extract that he translated from the Samgharakṣitavādāna (=Divyavadāna no. 23) he had said that in it "on vit clairement de quelle manière les compilateurs de légendes se sont représentés les obligations imposées aux Religieux réunis dans les Vihāras." In concluding it he had also said: "Une collection complète de légendes de ce genre ne nous laisserait probablement rien ignorer de ces [vinaya] règles; elle nous ferait connaître surtout avec exactitude les devoirs auxquels le régime de la vie commune soumettait les Religieux" (313, 335). — See also II n. 36 below.


For details see below IV n. 12 — It is worth noting incidentally that the Pañcatantra and the Mulasarvāstivāda-vinaya sometimes tell the same story, e.g. the story entitled "How the Greedy Jackal Died Eating a Bowstring" in P. Olivelle, *The Pañcatantra*. *The Book of India's Folk Wisdom* (Oxford: 1997) 84, is told in a variant version as the account of a previous life of the monk Upananda at Cīvaravastu, GMs iii 2, 121.10-122.19.

See the notes to the translation below, especially VIII ns. 7,8,16,17,20; XIII ns. 3,4,5 — Schlingloff, for example, has seen something similar in the different 'versions' of 'The Bodhisattva's First Meditation: "The text of the earliest version could be interpreted to mean that the king himself worked in the fields. This behavior was regarded as unsuitable for a king and therefore, when the episode was rendered into Sanskrit, the formulation was made less explicit (cf. Majjhimanikāya I, p. 246, 31-32: abhijānāmi kho paṇāhāṃ pitu sakkassa kammante sūyā jambucchāyāya nisimpan with MĀV, p. 107, 26-27: abhijānāmy aham pituh suddhodanasya nivesāne karmāntān amisangamya jambucchāyāyān niṣada)." D. Schlingloff, *Studies in the Ajanta Paintings. Identifications and Interpretations* (Delhi: 1987) 29. — For an example much farther afield cf.the chapter entitled "Jesus and the Adulteress" in Watson, *Ancient Law and Modern Understanding. At the Edges* (Athens/London: 1998) 46-57.


Ét. Lamotte, *Le traité de la grande vertu de sagesse*, t. III (Louvain: 1970) xi; xviii ("Mais il [the author of Le traité] s'inspire bien plus fréquemment encore du Vinaya des Mūlasarvāstivādin auquel il emprunte la majorité des Avadāna et des Jātaka dont il agrémenté son exposé... Il serait impossible de dresser ici la liste des emprunts plus ou moins directs au Vinaya des Mūlasarvāstivādin...")

Schlingloff, *Studies in the Ajanta Paintings*, 14, 16ff, 34, 61, 66, 70-71, 118, 152-53, etc.

39 For the Turfan material see Wille, Die handschriftliche Überlieferung des Vinayavastu der Mūlasarvāstivādin, 134 ff; for the Sāhyāy material see below n.9.


41 See the foreword to Gnoli's edition for the description of how the manuscript material for the Śayanāśana was, in effect, pieced together. To this must be added the two additional fragmentary leaves published in Wille, Die handschriftliche Überlieferung des Vinayavastu der Mūlasarvāstivādin, 115-21.

42 Although my translation is based on Gnoli's edition I have not always been able to accept his readings. In fact on at least forty occasions I have — on the basis of the manuscript, the Tibetan translation, or parallels elsewhere — read otherwise, and my proposed readings or emendations are clearly marked in the notes with the word Read in bold type.

I

1.1 As is typically the case with Indian texts the title of the work occurs at its end, not at the beginning where I have put it. The text actually begins with an uddāna, a "summary." Such 'summaries,' if they come before the text they are keyed to, can be thought of as a kind of table of contents where the contents are signalled by key-words in what follows; if they follow the text they refer to, they might be described as a kind of 'index' of key-words in what precedes them. There are, moreover, several sub-categories or types of uddānas and the system — if it can be called a system — is both complicated and not yet fully understood. The various uddānas found in our text are certainly both and will be discussed in an appendix to Part II of the translation, where a rendering and explanation of the opening uddāna will also be given. For the moment see J.L. Panglung, "Preliminary Remarks on the Uddānas in the Vinaya of the Mūlasarvāstivādin," in Tibetan Studies in Honour of Hugh Richardson, ed. M. Aris & A.S.S. Kyi (Oxford: 1979) 226-32; R. Salomon, A Gandhāri Version of the Rhinoceros Sūtra (Gandhāran Buddhist Texts 1) (Seattle & London: 2000) 33-36 and the literature cited there.

1.2 upasthāna-sālā. BHSD s.v. gives "hall of meeting (for monks)," but cf. upasthāna-kārī, "serving, doing service to;" upasthāyaka, "servant, attendant;" etc. For the corresponding 'hall' among other religious groups see below XV n.4.

1.3 arhati...paribhoktum = longs spyod par 'os /. Forms from parṇbhuj have in our Vinaya a technical or at least a specific sense. See below.

1.4 śākyu. Literally "a member of the Śākyu clan."
1.5 *pravrajita*. This and other related forms will be similarly rendered throughout; cf. Ét. Lamotte, *L'enseignement de Vimalakirti*, (Louvain: 1962) 384.2: "entré dans la vie religieuse."

1.6 *abhirūpa darśaniyāḥ prāśādikāḥ*. Two things should be noted here. Starting at this point Gnoli has made no attempt to punctuate his text and thereby separate the designations into groups. The Tibetan does better but is not always consistent from one 'edition' to another. Adopting Gnoli's conventions Read a semi-colon after *prāśādikāḥ*. Physical beauty might — but probably should not — strike us as an odd indicator of status. Note, however, that elsewhere in our *Vinaya*, in the Mūlasarvāstivādin version of the Aggaṇīṇa-sutta that is still embedded in its Saṅghabhedaśāstara, virtually the same characteristics determine, for example, who will be the first human king — Saṅghabhedaśāstara i 15.4. See also H. Scharfe, *The State in Indian Tradition* (Leiden: 1989) 35 and notes, on the 'requirement' that a king be handsome, and, more broadly, R.W. Lariviere, "Never Marry a Woman with Hairy Ankles," in *Festschrift Dieter Schlingloff zur Vollendung des 65. Lebensjahres*, hrsg. F. Wilhelm (Reinbek: 1996) 163-72.

1.7 Read a semi-colon after *vākkaraṇeṇopeto*.

1.8 There can be very little doubt that *jñāto mahāpuṇyaḥ* represent a distinct pair and that we must Read a semi-colon after the latter. They, and their opposites, occur repeatedly as a pair in the Mūlasarvāstivāda-*vinaya* and its related literature. That *jñāta* means "famous" is not, of course, problematic — cf. *jñāta-kulina*, "belonging to a known family" or *jñātra* — sometimes replaced by *jñāta* — "public reputation for skill" (BHSID 244). But "of great fortune" for *mahāpuṇya* may at first sight seem more difficult. It appears by usage, however, to have been fairly certainly a circumlocution or euphemism for "rich," and is consistently applied to individuals — almost always monks — who have received large stores of material possessions. There are numerous passages which would support such a meaning. At *Vibhaṅga*, Derge Ca 91a.7, for example, two monks are contrasted. The one described as *grags pa dang/bsod nams che ba yin te* — *jñāto mahāpuṇyaḥ* — is said to have large amounts of bowls, robes and other material possessions (*de la lhung bzed dang/chos gos dang/dra pa dang/phor bu dang/ska rags lhag ba dag yod do*). But the other, described as *grags pa dang/bsod nams chung ste alpa-jñāta-punya* — is further described as struggling to get his three robes and even then they were miserable and his waistcloth was old (*chos gos gsum lhur len cing de'chos gos gsum ngan cing snam sbyar yang yongs su rnyings pa yin no*).

At *Vibhaṅga*, Derge Ca 79b.4 a monk who is said to be *shes pa dang ldan pa jñāta* — is also said to be one who has "many material goods, many accouterments" (*rdza mang ba yo byad mang ba yin te*): here *mahāpuṇya* is actually replaced by 'having many material goods, etc.' But here too a second monk, with which the first is contrasted and who is described as *shes pa chung ba, alpa-jñāta*, is said to be wanting even in the three robes (*chos gos gsum la 'chel ba yin pa*). Many more passages could be cited here, but some of these have already been discussed elsewhere (G. Schopen, *Daijō bukkō kōki jidai: indo no sōin seikatsu*, trans. N. Odani (Tokyo: 2000) 210ff) and the point seems clear: a monk who was *mahāpuṇya* was a monk who had or received large amounts of material possessions. There are, moreover, clear traces of this usage even in Pāli sources — see *Vinaya* iii 45.24(*mahāpuṇhi' attha tumhe āvuso, bahun tumhākaṃ cīvaram uppanan ti* or...
Samyutta ii 210.3 (tatra yo hoti bhikkhu nāto yaśassī labhī cīvarāpadātasenaśanagañiñapaṃcavyabhajaparīkhaṃnarām).

1.9 sthāvira rājanyah, here translated into Tibetan as gnas brtan rgyal po 'os pa, is not a common designation, but what is certainly a variant translation of it — gnas brtan rgyal po gyur pa — occurs in the Uttaragrantha, Derge Pa 33b.7, where it is explained: ji ltar gnas brtan rgyal po lla bur gyur pa yin zhe nā′ bsnyen par rdzogs nas lo nγu lon par gyur pa 'am bγal ngan de las 'das so lī: "In what sense is he said to be a veritable Royal Elder? He is one who has been ordained for twenty years, or even more than that." That the Uttaragrantha's gnas brtan rgyal po gyur pa was translating sthāvira rājanya was serendipitously confirmed recently when J.-U. Hartmann showed me the transcriptions of some of the manuscript fragments from the Schwyzer collection done by K. Wille. Several of these fragments were easily identified as coming from the Uttaragrantha, and one of them corresponded to Derge Pa 33b.7. It read — in Wille's transcription — katham sthāvira bhavati rājanya vimśati....... — One cannot help but suspect that rājanya is somehow connected with the difficult Pāli designation rattañīmu, of similar import and applied similarly to monks, and the Jain title rāṇīya (see C. Caillat, Les expiations dans le rituel ancien des religieux jaina (Paris: 1965) 60ff), but this cannot be pursued here.

1.10 This is a list of the dhūtagunaḥ or "severe ascetic practices." In both the printed text and the ms. twelve items are listed, and BHSD says that there are twelve in Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit sources, as opposed to Pāli sources where there are thirteen dhūtaganga. The Tibetan translation of our text, however, also has thirteen, inserting bsod snyoms mi 'dam pa between pinḍapāti and ekāsanika, and bsod snyoms mi 'dam pa looks very much like it might be translating what appears in Pāli as sāpadāna-cārika, "one who goes on an uninterrupted begging round (i.e. does not pick and choose)," which, of course, is one of the 'additional' dhūtagangas in the Pāli list. Since it is unlikely in the extreme that the Tibetan translators would have added this item, it must be assumed that there were thirteen items in the Sanskrit text they were working from, and that one of them was something like Pāli sāpadāna-cārika, perhaps sāvadāna-pinḍapāti (although one difficulty here is that Mahāvyutpattī 8505 gives mthar chags or 'thar chags as the equivalent of sāvadāna) — for other variant lists of the dhūtagangas see P.V. Bapat, Vinuktimārga Dhutagaṇa-Nirdeśā (London: 1964) 5 & n.3; A. Wayman, Analysis of the Śrāvakabhūmi Manuscript (Berkeley & Los Angeles: 1961) 82; on the dhūtagangas as a whole see now J. Dantinne, Les qualités de l'Ascète (Dhutagāna): Etude sémantique et doctrinale (Brussels: 1991).

1.11 This is an abbreviation in the text itself. Since it occurs on the first page of the vastu the "as before" clearly does not refer to a passage in it. In fact these abbreviations are often used rather loosely and may have little to do with the actual location or physical proximity of the full form of the passage — they often refer simply to passages that are assumed to be well known and that occur in a number of places.

1.12 sarveśām asmākam āyuṣmanto na sameti vaduta nāṇāpraṇāpiṣṭaḥ appears in the Tibetan translation as: tshe dang ldan pa dag bdag cag thams cad ni di la ste / so sor brtags nas mi mthun pa'yin gyis /. See BHSD s.v. sameti, where this passage is cited.
I.13 Both Gnoli and Dutt read *ete vayam*, but the ms. almost certainly has *eta vayam* (fol. 941.1 — cf. *te vayam* at 941.3). That *eta* is correct, and that it is intended for *eta = Sanskrit atra = "here, hither,"
seems to be supported by the Tibetan which reads *tshur*, "here, to this place, hitherward." Note that *BHSD* s.v. *etta* cites an instance where the Kashmir ms. of the *Saddharmapundarika* has *eta* for what the Nepalese ms. read as *etta*; and note too the usage also cited there where *etta etta = "here, here!,"
It is perhaps equally possible to see in *eta* a second person plural imperative from *vi* (cf. the construction *āyim’ ānanda yena pājāgāmo ten’ upasamkamissāmāti* (the Buddha is speaking here) at Dīgha ii 84.9, and repeatedly in the same text), though in this case the Tibetan should perhaps be *tshur shog* (cf. Mahāvuyutpaṭṭi 6620: *eta vayam = khyed tshur shog — the citation of this in *TSD* s.v. *tshur* is misleading). Oddly enough either choice produces the same general sense: "Here then, we are going...," or "Come on! We are going..." I have taken here the second possibility, but remain open to the first. In any case Read: *eta*.

I.14 Both Gnoli and Dutt read: *ṛddhatarako bhikṣur yuṣmābhīḥ satkartavyah... "You must honor...the more senior monk," and this is the reading of the ms. (fol. 941.4). There are, however, at least three good reasons for thinking that the ms. presents us with a scribal error, and that this was not the original or intended reading. First the statement is supposed to be repeating what the Buddha had just said, and that was not *ṛddhatarako bhikṣur yuṣmābhīḥ satkartavyah*, but *ṛddhatarako yuṣmābhīr bhikṣavah satkartavyo... Second, the Tibetan confirms that the Buddha’s original statement and its repetition were exactly the same in the Sanskrit text(s) it was working from — in both cases it has: *dge srong dag khyed kyi ces rgyan pa la bshnyen bkur bya* (Ga 252a.7 and .7) = "Monks, you must honor the more senior." Third, if the Buddha had said what the scribe said he said in the repetition none of the misunderstandings or ambiguities which the text goes on to enumerate could have arisen, and the text which follows here would not have made good sense — Read: *ṛddhatarako yuṣmābhīr bhikṣavah satkartavyo...

Notice that the force of the Buddha’s ruling is to in effect subordinate everything, including learning, asceticism and religious attainment, to the principle of seniority. From the institutional point of view the former simply do not count. Notice too that caste and birth were among the first things to be so subordinated. The principle of seniority was not, however, absolute. The *Ṣayanāsana* itself puts limits on its application on three different occasions: at XXVI (39.18) it is said not to apply to visiting monks unless they come on "the Community’s or stūpa’s business;" at XXXI (43.3 ff) it is said not to apply when a junior monk is sick; and at XXXIV (49.10) it is again said not to apply to monks who arrive at night. Elsewhere, at *Uttararagrantha*, Derge Pa 124b.4ff, for example, a rule similar to that in *Ṣayanāsana* XXXIV occurs, and at Derge Pa 125 a.7ff it is said that seniority cannot be invoked in lining up to use the privy.

I.15 Gnoli has misparagraphed and mispunctuated the text here. The paragraphing in Dutt is correct but the punctuation there too is overdetermined.

I.16 *āgārika = khyim pa. BHSD* s.v. gives "householder, one living in worldly life." *āgārika* is fully generic and points to the run-of-the-mill. One so designated is not necessarily a grhapati, and the use of the term here is almost certainly intended to heighten the anomaly: the monks were honoring not
just grhapatis, but any non-religious, however common, who was senior. See III n.4 below on the title grhapati.

1.17 The Tibetan has bram ze dang khyim bdag dad pa can, adding the qualifier šrāddha, "devout, believing" — see Gnoli 38.15: šrāddhā brāhmaṇagṛhapatayaḥ — šrāddhā could easily have dropped out of the ms. here.

1.18 anyatīrthika = gzano mung stegs can. BHISD is almost certainly right in seeing the "original neutral" meaning of tīrthika as "adherent (or founder of (any) religion," and when it says "a trace of this may also remain in the not infrequent prefixation of anya- to tīrthika/, other (than Buddhist) sectarian."

1.19 Both Gnoli and Dutt read iha dhārmikān, but the Tibetan suggests that the collocation was taken as a compound: chos 'di pa rnam la and that we should read ihadhārmika. Similar compounds are attested — iha kūla, "this life," ihaloka, "this world" (from Monier-Williams) — and ihadhārmika would seem to form a legitimate pendant to bāhyaka, whereas dhārmika on its own would almost certainly have been too non-specific to meet the needs of the context here. Compare also the examples quoted by BHISD from the Bodhisattvabhūmi, s.v. bāhyaka, where this term itself is in compound with ito-: ito-bāhyakeṣu tīrthikeṣu, "external...to this (i.e. Buddhist);" and note that in the old commentary embedded in the Vibhaṅga the title bhikṣu (dge slong) is repeatedly glossed by chos 'di pa, which in our text is transling, apparently, ihadhārmika: dge slong zhes bya ba ni chos 'di pa'o (Derge Cha 59a.5); dge slong dag ces bya ba ni chos 'di pa dag go (Derge Ja 90b.2); dge slong gis zhes bya ba ni chos 'di pas so (Derge Cha 136a.4); etc.

The Tibetan translation (dge slong dag nagas chos 'di pa rnam la...), and the parallel constructions which immediately precede and immediately follow our passage (pravrajītān bhikṣavo mayā... upasampannān bhikṣavo mayā...), would both seem to indicate that a vocative bhikṣavo after ihadhārmikān has dropped out of our ms.

Read: ihadhārmikān bhikṣavo.

1.20 vanditavya, vandya = phyag bya ba. These will be consistently rendered here as "to show deference" or forms thereof. The Sanskrit can, of course, mean "respect, veneration," even "worship."

1.21 The ms. is damaged here (fol. 941.8), approximately six aksaras being lost. Both Gnoli and Dutt supply [kati vārṣāgrāniṭ], probably on analogy with the kati sāmayikānī which occurs almost immediately below in exactly the same construction: bhikṣavo na jānate kati sāmayikānī. Unfortunately this is not supported by the Tibetan. For our passage it has dge slong rnam kyi js jil tar dri ba ma shes nas, "when the monks did not know how to ask;" but for the following passage it has: dge slong rnam kyi dus tshig du yin pa mi shes nas, "when the monks did not know what the seasonal periods were" — i.e., according to the Tibetan, the two passages were not entirely parallel. Since the Sanskrit text is undeterminable here I have translated the Tibetan, though, as the next note might indicate, it may have had a somewhat different text here.
The Sanskrit text reads *sāmāyikam ārocayitavyam* here and that is what I have translated. The Tibetan, however, has: *re zhog dang por dus tshigs dri bar bya'o*, "One must be asked the seasonal period in the first (year of his ordination)." The Tibetan here is obviously in conformity with its version of the question that immediately precedes it (see n. 19), using a form of *'dri ba* (*śvāraḥ*) in both. Both text and translation are therefore tentative — for the "seasonal periods" see next notes.

This scheme is referred to in several places: *Pravrajyovasaḥ* (Eimer) ii 150.11-18; B. Jinananda, *Upasampadāṇapatiḥ* (Patna: 1961) 19.9-14; M. Schmidt, "Bhiṣṇū-karmavācanā. Die Handschrift Sansk. c. 25 (R) der Bodleian Library Oxford," in *Studien zur Indologie und Buddhismuskunde. Festgabe des Seminars für Indologie und Buddhismuskunde für Professor Dr. Heinz Bechert*, hrsg. R. Grünendahl et al (Bonn: 1993) 259.20-23; *Vinayasūtra* (Sankrityayana) 2.16-17; J. Takakusu, *A Record of the Buddhist Religion as Practiced in India and the Malaya Archipelago* (AD 671-695) (Oxford: 1896) 101-02; etc. There is general agreement among these sources, and only one textual problem of concern here. For the fourth of these seasons both Gnoli and Dutt read *mṛtavārśika*, and in so far as I can make it out — at least the facsimile here is damaged (fol. 941.9) — this seems to be the reading of the ms. But *BHSI* s.v. *sāmāyika*, quoting notably the Sanskrit of the *Mahāvyutpatti*, already noted that this reading was a problem. Edgerton cites the *Mahāvyutpatti* as *mita-vārśika* and notes that the Tibetan for our passage is *thung ngu*, "short," which clearly supports it. While the latter is correct, the former is more complicated. The new critical edition the *Mahāvyutpatti* in fact has for the Sanskrit *mṛtavārśika*, without variants except for Sakaki's old edition cited by Edgerton. Edgerton also cites the old edition of the ms. newly re-edited by Schmidt as giving the form *mita-twice*, and Schmidt does read the second instance there as *mita-*, but the first he reads as *mita-*. In the corresponding passages in the *Upasampadāṇapatiḥ* Jinananda prints both as *mita-*. Both *Vinayasūtra* (Sankrityayana) 2.17 and *Vinayasūtra* (Bapat & Gokhale) 12.11 read *mita-*. Takakusu translates I-Ching as "the fourth is the last season so called," which would also appear to point to *mṛta-*. The interchange of *mita-* and *mṛta* is, therefore, far broader than Edgerton realized and this remains to be worked out. But since the Tibetan renderings that I have seen are consistent — the *Pravrajyā- and Sāyanāsana-vastus* and the *Mahāvyutpatti* all have *thung ngu*, "short" — and since their meaning is consistent with the description of the season in all sources, this what I have translated. In light of this dual consistency, moreover, I would suggest that for the moment we Read: *mitavārśikam*.

The ms. is damaged here (fol. 941.10). Both Gnoli and Dutt restore /prajā/yāḥ and this is supported by Tibetan: *skye dgu*.

Like the Tibetan translators I have translated here, and in the next three sentences, genitive Sanskrit constructions with English instrumental.

Here the Sanskrit is *grhin*, but the Tibetan is again *khyim pa*—cf n.16 above. Note also that both grammar (i.e. its construction with *sarveṣām*) and the Tibetan indicate that *grhīnāḥ* must be emended to *grhinām* — so Read.
1.27 Gnoli prints *tadahāḥ* but says the ms. reads *tadarhaḥ*; Dutt prints *tadarhaḥ* without comment. The ms., however, reads *tadarha upa-* (fol. 942.1), although the Tibetan (*de ring*) and parallels elsewhere (Schmidt, *Bhikṣuṇī-Karma-vācanā*; 270.19: *tad ahar upasaṃpannasya*; A.C. Banerjee, *Two Buddhist Vinaya Texts in Sanskrit* (Calcutta: 1977) 72.14 *tadahopasampannena*), make it virtually certain that *tadarha* is a scribal error for *tad ahar*. **Read:** *tad ahar.*

The rule that a nun, regardless of her seniority, must show deference to even the most junior monk is not of course limited to the Mūlasaṃvītādī-viṇaya — see É. No lot, *Règles de discipline des nonnes bouddhistes* (Paris: 1991) 9; M. Wijayaratna, *Les moniales bouddhistes. Naissance et développement du monachisme féminin* (Paris: 1991) 30; 70-71. A. Heimann, "Some Remarks on the Rise of the bhikṣunīsamgha and the Ordination Ceremony for bhikṣunīs according to the Dharmagupta Vinaya," *JlABS* 20.2 (1997) 35; etc. But III n. 12 below also makes it clear that the redactors of our *Vinaya* did not just want nuns to be subservient to monks, they also wanted any *vihāra* for nuns to be architecturally inferior to a *vihāra* for monks.

1.28 Gnoli prints here sarvasyānu/pasampannakasypasampannako; Dutt has *sarvasyopasampannako*. The ms. (fol. 942.1) here is damaged and seems to read: *(sur)v(as)y-xx(pu)-sammpannasyopasampannako*. Dutt's reading has, of course, very little in common with what is actually found in the ms., but Gnoli is fully supported by the Tibetan: *bsnyen par ma rdzogs pa thams cad kyis phyag bya ba bsnyen par rdzogs pa'o l*. Note however, that the -ka- in Gnoli's *-janu/pasampannaka* is not found in the ms., and that *BllSD* s.v. *upasaṃpannaka* cites Dutt's reading and must therefore be corrected.

1.29 Gnoli and Dutt have both normalized this list. The ms. has: *pāśivāsika mūlapāriṇāsikaḥ paryuṣita-parivāsah mānāpyacārika caritimānāpyah adarsanāyottkṣiptakah apratikarmayottkṣiptakah apratimīṣṛṣe pāpake dvāṣīgate utkṣiptakah* (fol. 942.1). Apart from silently correcting pāśivāsika to pāriṇāsika, the normalization has otherwise only affected the sandhi. In fact the normalization of sandhi is characteristic of both editions and will not be specifically noted here.

This list is a typical, though not exhaustive, list of forms of probation and suspension that the community can, by formal act, impose on an errant monk. The chief point of interest here may be that if the temporal aspect of the participle paryuṣita- and carita- continued to be felt then it would appear that even after a monk had undergone probation or "the procedure for becoming agreeable again" he still was denied deference; i.e., was permanently (?) stigmatized. This, however, remains to be demonstrated — for the terms "probation," "procedure for becoming agreeable," and "suspension," see *BllSD* s.v. *parivāsa*, mānāpya and utkṣipta; for a very good treatment of the Pāli material see É. No lot, "Studies in Vinaya Technical Terms I-III," *Journal of the Pali Text Society* 22 (1996) 116-36; No lot, "Studies in Vinaya Technical Terms IV-X," ib. 25 (1999) 5-37.

1.30 Gnoli prints *sarvo grihi [sarvaš] cănupaṃpannḥ*, but he notes that this is "ex conject." from the Tibetan, which reads: *khyim pa thams cad dang 'bsnyen par rdzogs pa ma yin pa thams cad do, "All lay men and all who are not ordained." He also cites the ms. as reading *sa ca grihi cănupaṃpannḥ* (fol. 942.2), which is exactly what Dutt prints in his edition. **Read:** *sa ca grihi cănupaṃpannḥ* in spite of the Tibetan.
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The rule — one version of which we have here — that a monk must not show deference to a layman (here again grhin) or to one who was not ordained could, presumably, have created problems for any Mahāyāna group which contained both monk and lay bodhisattvas. The issue was still being discussed as late as Bhavya and Candrakīrti, as Skilling has recently pointed out (P. Skilling, "Citations from the Scriptures of the 'Eighteen Schools' in the Tarkajvala," Baudhavidyāsūddhākarah, (605-14; esp. 605). Skilling himself says "that the two great 6th century Mādhyamikas felt obliged to deal with the topic shows that it was one of no small importance."

1.31 Gnoli has supplied /gurukurvanto/ here which both context and the Tibetan indicate has dropped out of the ms.

1.32 This is a cliché of extremely common occurrence; see, for example, Sanghabhedavastu ii 11.4; 12.7; 13.6; 14.12; 16.14; 17.32; 19.29; etc.

1.33 This and all further abbreviations that occur in the translation occur in the text itself — I have introduced no abbreviations of my own. This one, unlike the abbreviation noted in n.10 above, obviously refers to a passage that closely preceded it.

1.34 vinipatitaśarīra; i.e. had been reborn as an animal.

II

II.1 For some discussion and a classification of the numerous variant versions of the jāśaka given here see Ét. Lamotte, "La conduite religieuse du faisan dans les textes bouddhiques," Le Muséon 49 (1946) 641-53; for an English translation of the Tibetan translation of our text see F.A. von Schiefner, Tibetan Tales Derived from Indian Sources (London: 1882) 302-07. See also, for example, the use of a version of the text by Daoxuan, cited in E. Reinders, "Ritual Topography: Embodiment and Vertical Space in Buddhist Monastic Practice," History of Religions 36 (1997) 244 ff; or what appears to be a widespread elaboration of it in Bhutan, B. Crossette, So Close To Heaven. The Vanishing Buddhist Kingdoms of the Himalayas (New York: 1995) 199-200 and the photo facing p. 193.

II.2 Gnoli reads gajas ca, and notes that Dutt reads gajasvah. The facsimile is not perfectly clear, but seems to favor Gnoli — certainly the second -a- is short (fol. 942.7). If Gnoli is correct then BHSD's entry for gajasva must be cancelled.

II.3 The narrative fact that the animals did not leave what appears to have been a perfectly fine situation alone may point to how deep seated was the Indian cultural notion that social harmony ultimately depends on hierarchy. In any case, this narrative turn which may seem odd to us would almost certainly have made good 'cultural sense' to an Indian audience.
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II.4 mayāpy āsya dvipatraksaya patresv evāvaśyāyabindavo jihvayā nirūdhā iti = kho bos 'di 'i lo ma gnyis skyes pa na / lo ma'i zil ba'i thigs pa lces bldags so — the translation here is free. Von Schiefner translates the Tibetan: "When the tree had only two leaves, I licked the dew-drops off them with my tongue."

II.5 Gnoli in both cases prints sarvesāṁ which is, of course, only a misprint. There are in fact a fairly large number of such misprints in this edition, but, since most are obvious, they will not generally be noted here.

II.6 santi tūnapuspaphalāni saprānakāni santi nisprānakāni = lo ma dang / me tog dang / 'bras bu srog chags dang beas pa yang yod / srog chags med pa yang yod pas / . L. Schmithausen, The Problem of the Sentience of Plants in Earliest Buddhism (Tokyo: 1991) has made it impossible not to be sensitive to the issues that such a passage might raise, but the language here would seem to avoid the many ambiguities. It seems clear enough that grasses, etc, are described here not as themselves being 'living things' but as having 'living things' — even perhaps more specifically "insects" (BHISD s.v. prāṇaka) — on or in them. Both saprāṇaka and nisprāṇaka are used elsewhere, for example, to describe water and in these cases there is agreement on what they mean. BHISD, s.v. prāṇaka, translates nisprāṇakenodakena as "with water free from insects;" and Schmithausen (p. 53) paraphrases the Pāli sappāṇakam udakam with "water containing tiny animate beings (i.e. small animals)."

II.7 Both Gnoli and Dutt read the verb here as pratīviramāmah, but the ms. has pratīviramemah (fol. 943.4), which can be taken as a regular optative with the 'visarga' functioning — as it not infrequently does in the Gilgit mss. — as a mark of punctuation; or as an intended optative the form of which was influenced by the preceding pratīviramāmah. The Tibetan here also points to an optative: slar ldog par bya'o (it had, however, the exact same form for the first occurrence of the verb which in the ms. was clearly pratīviramāmah). Until there is further ms. material Read: pratīviramema.

II.8 saparigraha and nisparigraha are translated into Tibetan as yongs su 'dzin pa dang beas pa and 'dzin pa med pa, and both are difficult to translate here since it is highly likely that there is some intentional word-play going on. One of the primary meanings of pari'grahā is "to fence round, hedge round" and then by extension "to take possession of." Though common usage of pari'grahā tends to pick up on the latter, here, given that the characters involved are browsing animals, the former, more literal sense would almost certainly have been felt as well, if not even more so. For the same reason, a similar invocation of a more primary meaning also seems to be in effect in regard to mṛśā below (see n. 11). "Fenced" is an attempt to represent the first meaning without excluding the second.

II.9 In both instances Gnoli and Dutt again read pratīviramāmah, but the ms. has pratīviramemah (fol. 943.5;6) and the Tibetan slar ldog par bya'o. In both places Read pratīviramema. Here additional support might be taken from the fact that the verb is part of a yan nu construction; see further n. 13 below.
II.10 This bird apparently knew a good deal of dharmāstra since both gamyā and agamyā are technical terms frequently found there to designate which women are "fit for cohabitation" and which are not.

II.11 As in the case of parigraha (see n.7), here again the text seems to be playing with the technical meaning of mṛṣāvāda and a more etymological meaning. mṛṣāvāda is as a moral fault generally taken to mean "lying," but it first of all may mean "speaking to no purpose, uselessly," and the further description here — yadvā tadā vipralapāmaḥ — makes it abundantly clear that that is the sense our author wants to be primary here. The Tibetan takes it mechanically as "lying," brdzun du smra ba.

II.12 Here the ms. itself has prativiramāmah, but probably by scribal error. Read prativiramena.

II.13 vrata pāda = brtu zhugs kyi gzhī.

II.14 The verb here is pratīṣṭhāpayāmah, a present, even though constructed with yan nu, and even though the Tibetan again points to an optative. In fact all of the verbs in what follows where the individual animals declare their intentions for the future are, in the ms., indicatives, but in the Tibetan "futures," rab tu dgod par bya. Without emending I still follow the Tibetan in translating. BHSD s.v. yan (yan) nu gives: "conj., suppose, now, with opt. of 1st person," and although it notes under yan (yan) nūna that this "rarely" occurs with the indicative, and that Pāli yan nūna is recorded with both the future and the indicative, in addition to the optative, BHSD does not refer to our passages.

II.15 The text here is uncertain. Gnoli reads by emendation yady evam etat saṃkṣepāt, citing the Tibetan: gal te de lta na mdo r na khyed kyi's 'dul ba ma yin pa... Dutt, also citing the Tibetan, reads yady evam etat tu saṃkṣepayā... Neither notes the ms. reading, and the facsimile is not clear enough here to be certain of its reading (fol. 944.1).

II.16 Gnoli reads avināvā, which is what the ms. appears to have (fol. 944.1); Dutt reads avinīyā. BHSG 219 s.v. ni cites Dutt's reading as a gerundive, but suspects an error: "...not to be disciplined (if not error for avinya or avinīta)" (see also its § 34.27). The facsimile is clear enough to say that there is no -i-, short or long, in the third syllable. Tibetan is of no help here: 'dul ba ma yin pa.

II.17 Dutt here and below reads samprajānavihāriṇo, but Gnoli — both times with the ms. (fol. 944.2 & .5) — samprajānadvihiṇīṇo; cf. BHSG § 18.53.

II.18 anubhāvād = mthus, a deceptively difficult term to translate and one of some moment. E. Conze, Materials for a Dictionary of the Prajñāpāramitā Literature (Tokyo: 1967) 40 gives simply "might;" J. Nobel, Suvarnaprabhāsottamasūtra. Das Goldglanz-Sūtra. Ein Sanskrittext des Mahāyāna-Buddhismus. Die Tibetischen Übersetzungen mit einem Wörterbuch (Leiden: 1950) Bd. II. 93, although defining the Tibetan mthu, gives a much better idea of the range of ideas involved: "Macht, Stärke, magische Kraft, Gnade." In Sanskrit sources it is frequently found in association with the Buddha himself in the form buddhānubhāvena, and has crucial bearing on how this figure was understood (see III n. 3 below for an example). It is therefore curious that little attention has
been paid to it. At a minimum, the term seems to refer to the power, force or ability to effect and affect things which are external to oneself — people, events, etc. It appears to be as much magical as moral, and in fact overlaps and is sometimes paired with pādhi. See also below XIV n. 15 where anubhāva is used in regard to an object.

II.19 There is almost certainly a scribal omission here and Gnoli has rightly restored [kathayanti: asmākam eso 'nubhāvāḥ] on the basis of the Tibetan, although it might better be...'nubhāva iti.

II.20 naimittika = lhas mkhan rnams.

II.21 It is probably too easy to read too much into this little exchange, but note that the king responds to the information that there are powerful — we might say religiously powerful — beings in his kingdom by resolving to go and "see" them, and this, of course, was and remains a common Indian mode of 'worship' or contact with the religiously powerful. But the Rṣi's response, then, could also represent an equally typical Indian critique of worship. It, in effect, puts pratipatti, "practice," above pājā. This is an old debate in Indian Buddhist sources here, perhaps, tucked into a little jātaka.

II.22 This is the first time that the king is given a name. Brahmadatta is, of course, the name of the 'mythical' king in whose reign all stories of the past about which there are any uncertainties must be placed, at least according to a rule found in the Mulasarvastivādā-vinaya. In fact more than four-fifths of the 547 jātakas found in the Pāli Jātaka collection are so placed; see G. Schopen, "If You Can't Remember, How to Make It Up: Some Monastic Rules for Redacting Canonical Texts," in Baudhavidyāsudhākaraḥ. Studies in Honour of Heinz Bechter on the Occasion of his 65th Birthday, ed. P. Kieffer-Pilz & J.-U. Hartmann (Swiss Balordorf: 1997) 571-82.

II.23 kāyasya bhedaḥ = lus zhiḥ nas. This is of course a common idiom, but it is still worth noting that its very commonness might be important if the idiom is carrying with it the belief that one is not actually reborn until after the physical body is destroyed. There are other texts in our Vinaya where, for example, a dead monk is reborn even before his body is removed from his cell (Schopen, BSBA 209-211), so the whole question needs to be sorted out.

II.24 Gnoli notes that the ca punar in this phrase which occurs in the ms. (fol. 945.2) is not represented in the Tibetan and is perhaps to be expunged. Since, in addition, it makes for an awkward construction I have in effect done so, and do not translate it.

II.25 Gnoli notes that Dutt reads here tayor vane, but not that this is clearly a misreading.

II.26 Dutt reads with the ms. kapinjalaṃ brahmacaryam (fol. 945.2), but the Tibetan here — as well as grammatical requirements — point to a genitive compound: gong ma sregs kyi tshangs spyod pa, and so have I taken it, emending, with Gnoli, to kapinjalaṃbrahmacaryam.

II.27 For the presence of jātakas and avadānas in vinaya texts see the Introduction. Here note as well that when jātakas like "The Jātaka of the Partridge" are read as vinaya it is easy to see how they could
inculcate monastic rules and beliefs which might otherwise be awkward to more directly express. If it is clear, for example, in our jātaka that there is an intended equation between its animals and the community of monks, then the effects of their similar behaviors must also be the same, and the strong sub-text here must be that rains in their proper season and agricultural regularity and abundance are effected by the proper behavior of the monks themselves — this is a powerful message, if not a heady belief, but it is not difficult to imagine that some monks might well have held and actively promoted it.

II.28 sabhayavaśavartin = 'jigs pa'i dbang du 'gro ba dang bcas pa. Although on one level what this means is pretty clear it is hard to know how to properly nuance it. bhaya, 'jigs pa, most straightforwardly means "fear, alarm, dread, apprehension" — see for example the common phrase applied to a 'good' monk: anumārṣav advaśy bhayadarśi, Sanghabhedavastu ii 232.8; anumattēsa vajjesu bhaya-dassāvī, Dīgha i 63.15, "looking with dread/fear at even the smallest of reproaches." Though at first sight it might seem odd that a monk might have, and need to control, fears, apprehensions or dread in regard to his fellow-monsks, once it is admitted that in dealing with Buddhist monks we are dealing with people — and this is too commonly forgotten — in fact with celibate males living in close quarters with a strong hierarchical pecking order, then the acknowledgement of such a need has a certain ring of truth and practical wisdom.

II.29 sabrahmacārīn = tshungs pa mtshungs par spyod pa. This is a term that is common enough but the exact boundaries of the group it designates are not easy to establish. At Civaravastu, GMs iii 2, 119.8, for example, when the Monk Upananda dies in Śrāvaṇī and the king is about to confiscate his estate the Buddha asserts the monastic rights to it by saying, in part, sabrahmacārīnām esa lābhā prāpadyate, "this acquisition falls to his fellow-monsks." In the same text after the monks of Śrāvaṇī had already divided the estate monks from Sāketa hear about it and come to claim a share, saying asmākam api bhadantopanandah sabrahmacārī asmākam api tatsatato lābhā prāpadyata iti, "The reverend Upananda was also our fellow-monk. The acquisitions belonging to him also fall to us," and monks from the other four great cities — Vaiśāli, Vārānasi, Rājagṛha and Campā — also come and make the same claim. Here at least there is no geographical limitation on the term, nor any reference to 'parishes' (simā) — these monks are from completely different and distant cities and yet all claim to be "fellow-monsks." That claim is moreover, not contested in the text. Whether or not this usage is standard or the dominant one has yet to be fully established.

II.30 sthavira, madhya (bar ma), navaka (gsar bu). Whether in contexts like the present one these terms are simple adjectives, or designations for formally recognized categories of monks, is not entirely clear. They obviously refer to relative seniority, but apart from the first they — like sabrahmacārīn — appear to lack clear boundaries. navaka, for example, is defined by association with ādiśvārma, "beginner," and acirapapravājita, "one who has only recently entered the religious life," in the Rāṣṭrapālaparipṛccha (Pinot) 5.1, and Vinaya sources are generally no more precise, except in regard to sthavira, and even here the details are not always clear. For further references to sthaviras and some of their functions see below XXIII (37.7) and XXVI (39.6). For a long enumeration of the duties (bya ba) of a sthavira in a variety of situations see Uttaragrantha, Derge Pa 280a.7ff; there are also sets of duties for both madhyas and navakas given there (300b.5ff).
II.31 āsamudācārikān dharma. āsamudācārika with dharma, almost always plural, has a very specific referent. They are sets of rules—always delivered by the same stereotyped formula—that are required of a monk, in addition to the prātimokṣa rules, when he is fulfilling a specific, and often temporary, monastic office or function, or has undertaken a specific task or action. The Šayanaśānavastu itself delivers two sets of such rules—the rules of customary behavior for the monk who is the keeper of the monastery’s dogs (XXV (38.30)), and for the monk acting as “the giver of explanations” (XXXIII (47.18)) — and they represent something of the range and diversity of functions that such rules cover. These sets, moreover, occur in all parts of the Mūlasarvāstivādavinaya, as some further examples will make clear: in the Poṣadhaivastu (Hu-von Hinüber) §§ 18-23.3 there is a set governing the monk in charge of religious exertion (prāhanapratiyāγra khoikṣu); in the Pārvīṣikavastu, GMs iii 3, 96.19ff, a set governing monks who are under probation (see G. Schopen, "Marking Time in Buddhist Monasteries. On Calendars, Clocks, and Some Liturgical Practices," in Sūryacandraya. Essays in Honour of Akira Yayama on the Occasion of His 65th Birthday, ed. P. Harrison & G. Schopen (Swisttal-Odendorf: 1998) esp. 157-61); in the Civavastu, GMs iii 2, 90.8ff, they govern a monk with leprosy. In the Viṃhaṅga, we find such rules for monks who do construction work (Derge Ca 146a 2ff), for a monk who cuts down a tree when he is acting as a navakarmika (Derge Cha 279b.3ff), for how a monk who is travelling must deal with his baggage, (Derge Ca 78a.4ff), or for the Elder of the Community in regard to preparations for a recitation of the Dharma (Derge Ca 157a); in the Kṣudrakavastu we find them for monks in charge of the monastery’s orchards (Derge Tha 234a.3ff), for monks who wear perfume for medical reasons (Derge Tha 4a.7ff), etc. Such sets of rules are, in brief, extremely common, but our passage is one of the few which indicates the value placed on them: regardless of what modern scholars might make of these rules, monastic authors themselves—to judge by our passage—held that their fulfillment, and the fulfillment of the śaikaśa rules (see next note), were foundational to, and essential for, the achievement of final nirvāṇa, the highest religious goal. Without their fulfillment this simply was not possible. The fact that they are not commonly so valued by modern scholars may be a good indication of how far removed we are from the monastic authors that we try to understand.

II.32 śaikaśa dharma. As in the case of the āsamudācārika rules, the reference here to the śaikaśa rules almost certainly has a specific referent. It almost certainly refers to the rules in the penultimate section of the various Prātimokṣas. There are 108 rules in the Mūlasarvāstivādin version of this section, and they have generally been taken as the least important of the Prātimokṣa rules. This, however, may be off the mark in at least two ways. First, our passage suggests that they—again like the āsamudācārika rules—were considered foundational and essential to any higher religious achievement. They are, moreover, the only rules in the Prātimokṣa specifically mentioned here. Second, the śaikaśa rules are often dismissed as ‘late’ and of little historical interest because they are the least uniform of the Prātimokṣa rules in the various versions of the Prātimokṣa. But this same lack of uniformity may in fact suggest that they are historically the most important of the rules since they are the least levelled or homogenized, and therefore the most likely to allow us to define the differences between the various monastic orders.

II.33 -skandha, i.e. śīla-skandha, samādhi-skandha, etc.
II.34. *vimukti*.

II.35. There is what appears to be an extra *sthānam etad vidyate* in the ms. It could be either the first or the last, depending on how one chooses to structure the text. The ms. reads... *parinirvāsyati* / *nedām sthānam vidyate* / *sthānam etad vidyate* / *sa lāvadd*... (fol. 945.6) and both marks of punctuation are in the ms. itself. If we read in this way the final occurrence of the phrase (the fifth in the ms.) should then either be deleted or, taken as a repetition, standing by itself, for emphasis. If the first occurrence in the ms. is to be deleted then the structure of the second paragraph here would be the same as that of the first; i.e. the statement about possibility would come at the end of the individual statements in both. Both Gnoli and Dutt have omitted the first occurrence of *sthānam etad vidyate* that is found in the ms., but neither gives any indication that they have done so or that the phrase is there. The Tibetan structures both paragraphs in the same way and translates only four occurrences of the phrase. I have followed it, with some hesitation.

II.36. *tasmāti tarhi bhikṣava evaṁ śikṣitavyam... ity evaṁ vo bhikṣavah śikṣitavyam.* In a Vinaya text addressed to monks and dealing with monastic issues this exhortation is of course perfectly at home. It is therefore of some interest to note, for example, that only a very few of the hundred *avadānas* in the *Avadānasataka* do not end with the same exhortation, either in its full form (tasmāti tarhi bhikṣava evaṁ śikṣitavyam... ity evaṁ vo bhikṣavah śikṣitavyam — nos. 1, 11-36, 38, 40), or in a shortened form (ity evaṁ vo bhikṣavah śikṣitavyam — most of the rest, with nos. 2-10 the only notable block of exceptions). This too would seem to mark this collection of *avadānas* as a work intended for and addressed to monks; cf. n. 27 above.

III. The facsimile here is hard to read (fol. 945.9). Both Gnoli and Dutt seem to have read *taskarāṁ*; the former printing *ta∫ra∫/kśūnām*, the latter — without any indication that he was emending — *tara∫kśūnām*. The aksara both read as -kśū- does not look much like that to me, and the Tibetan translators clearly saw something else in their text. They translate *chom rku∫ pa rnams*, "thieves." Since *taskara*, "thief," is an attested equivalent for *chom rku∫* the text used by the Tibetan translators could well have had *taskarāṁ*, and this may also have been intended by our scribe. Still, given the uncertainties, I follow Gnoli.

III.2. I have not translated *vihāra* = *gisug lag khang* here or elsewhere in the text. It is commonly translated by "monastery," but such a rendering is misleading and conceals the fact that the precise nature of the structures that are referred to by the term is, in most cases, not actually determinable. The term in fact — as, for example, our passage makes abundantly clear — is applied to a wide range of structures of various sizes and configurations. (For a similar problem in regard to the term "monastery" in Western medieval sources see G. Schopen, "Ritual Rights and Bones of Contention: More on Monastic Funerals and Relics in the *Mīlasarvāstivāda-vinaya*," *JIP* 22 (1994) 74 n. 26). How vague the term is can be seen in the definition it is given in the *Vibhanga* (Derge Ca 249b.3): "vihāra means: where there is room for the four bodily postures — walking, standing, sitting and
lying down." The history of Buddhist monastic architecture is, moreover, especially in its early periods, badly understood; (see G. Schopen, "Doing Business for the Lord: Lending on Interest and Written Loan Contracts in the Miśrasvarasvātādivinaya," Journal of the American Oriental Society 114 (1994) esp. 547ff), and for this reason, if no other, it is worth noting that in our passage the vihāra has not yet been reduced to what became a single quadrangular type (cf. Ét. Lamotte, Histoire du bouddhisme indien. Des origines à l'ère saka (Louvain: 1958) 197).

III.3 devatābhīr apy evam bhagavata āroci tam. This statement is of interest because it seems to imply that its author may have thought that the Buddha's 'vision' needed confirmation. For some further instances where the Buddha knows or acts in concert with devatā or gods see the account of Pūrna found in our Vinaya where a miracle occurs buddhānām buddhānubhavena devatānām ca devatānubhāvena, Divyāvadāna 43.25 = Derge Ka 309b.1 (but note the plurality of Buddhas here); Divyāvadāna 147.23; 151.4; 162.27 (although the relationship of the Sanskrit text here to the Tibetan version in the Vinaya has yet to be worked out); Avadānaśataka (Speyer) i 9.11; 24.10; etc. A full study of such passages could be of great interest. Cf. Granoff, "The Ambiguity of Miracles," 31.

III.4 The name in its first occurrence here is given as kalyānabhadra, but below as kalyānabhadrika. I have adopted the former throughout. A kalyānabhadra or -bhadrika does not seem to be known elsewhere, and this too may be an indication of the relative age of our passage — in the corresponding text in the Pāli Vinaya (ii 146 ff) the corresponding character is a nameless "merchant" (setthi) from Rājagṛha. This is the first instance in our text of a named gṛhapati, a title I have conventionally translated as "householder." J. Nattier, however, has rightly pointed out to me that the full implications of the title gṛhapati are still not clear and that — although this is rarely noted — it remains problematic. She prefers to render it as "eminent householder," and such a rendering has merit although it would still leave the problem of what any such eminence is based on. When gṛhapatis are further characterized — and that is not very often — it is usually in terms of their wealth. This is the case, for example, in regard to Datta, Anāthapiṇḍada's father, in IV below, and in regard to the father of the girl that Anāthapiṇḍada secures as a wife for his seventh son in V. In fact the old commentary embedded in the Vibhanga actually glosses the term gṛhapati as "a rich man" (khyim bdag gam zhes bya ba ni phyug pa'o). Derge Cha 125a.5 — phyug pa regularly translates ādhyā). But there are problems here as well. The fact that only some gṛhapatis, like Datta, are additionally characterized as very wealthy might of necessity imply that all were not; and the same old commentary that glosses the term in one place as "a rich man," elsewhere glosses it simply as "a man" (khyim bdag ces bya ba ni skyes pa'o, Derge Cha 118a.2).

III.5 kusalamālapratibodhitasa santater = dge ba'i rtsa ba des sems kyi rgyud bskal nas.

III.6 amujāniyād and amujāṇāmi. Forms of amujāṇā are extremely common in our Vinaya but are used almost exclusively in regard to persons of authority, and usually of clear legal authority — kings (Carmavastu, GMs iii 4, 191.13., .15), parents (Paṇḍulophitakavastu, GMs iii 3, 20.10), but above all, as here, the Buddha. They are, again, deceptively difficult to translate. Bechert has noted that "most Vinaya interpreters down to the present day have translated the word amujāṇāmi as 'I permit,' 'I allow,' both of which are incorrect in this context [he is talking about a statement of the Buddha very much
like the one in our passage: it means 'I order' here" (H. Bechert, "The Laws of the Buddhist Sangha: An Early Juridical System in Indian Tradition," Hokke-Bunka Kenkyū 19 (1993) 7). Earlier the same author had said: "Unfortunately, some authors still translate anujānāmi in most passages in the Vinayapitaka with 'I allow.' However, when the Buddha speaks, the appropriate translation in most cases is 'I prescribe'" (H. Bechert, "The Importance of Asoka's So-Called Schism Edict," in Indological and Buddhist Studies. Volume in Honour of Professor J.W. de Jong on his Sixtieth Birthday, ed. L.A. Hercus et al (Canberra: 1982) 63). The general purport of Bechert's remarks is almost certainly correct, but even he, obviously, wavered in his choice of exactly the right word that was to be used in translation. And for good reason: one's choice here will, to a surprisingly large degree, determine the "tone" of most of the Vinaya. Though not entirely convinced that it is the best choice, I have still adopted Bechert's "order." Needless to say, the same choice confronts a translator of the Pāli Vinaya.

III.7 layana = gnas khang. As with vihāra and almost all the architectural terms here, the concrete referent of layana is not certain. In contexts like the present it is commonly, and probably correctly, taken to refer to a residential cell or room in a vihāra. It is, however, not difficult to find usages where this sense does not work smoothly. In the Pāli text which seems to correspond to ours vihāra is given as the first of five kinds of lena (=Skt. layana).

III.8 gandhakuti = dri gtsang khang — always so spelled here. Of all the architectural terms here gandhakuti may be the least problematic. Originally it seems to have referred to a special structure or cell reserved for the use of the Buddha in the Jetavana; then it came to refer to the central cell of any vihāra that was to be occupied by the Buddha — in later times in the form of his image (for both inscriptional and textual references, see G. Schopen, "The Buddha as an Owner of Property and Permanent Resident in Medieval Indian Monasteries," JIP 18 (1990) 181-217 [=BSBM 258-89] to which numerous further references in our Vinaya could easily be added). But even here there are cases which seem not to correspond to standard usage: at Uttaragrantha, Derge, Derge Pa 119b.2, for example, we find...mchod rten la mtha' ma dri gtsang khang gis bskor la... which would seem to suggest that a stūpa was to be encircled by a border of gandhakutis, and may be referring to something like what Marshall found at the Dhrmarājika at Taxila (see J. Marshall, Taxila (Cambridge: 1951) Vol. III, pl. 45); and at Kṣudrakavastu, Derge Tha 176a.1 the gandhakuti seems to have been a free standing structure that — like an image or the pole of a stūpa — could cast a shadow (monks are there told that they could step on the shadow cast by any of the three after reciting "a verse of the Rśi").

III.9 dvārakoṭṭhaka = sgo khang; cf. BHSD s.v. and below VIII n. 20. I assume that triśāla or "three sided" refers to a vihāra like those whose ground-plans are illustrated as nos. 15 or 21 on pl. XIII in H. Sarkar, Studies in Early Buddhist Architecture of India, 2nd ed. (New Delhi: 1993) from Nāgārjunakonda. They would have been like a quadrangular vihāra, but with an open 'front' and therefore lacking a dvārakoṭṭhaka.

III.10 pura = rtseg. Another difficult term. Hu-von Hinüber translates it as "Raum" with no discussion (Paśadhavastu (Hu-von Hinüber) § 13.1); BHSD gives "upper chamber," following, it
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says, the Tibetan, and I have followed it elsewhere (Schopen, "Doing Business for the Lord," 529); to judge by Gernet the Chinese understood it to refer to "étages" (J. Gernet, *Les aspects économiques du bouddhisme dans la société chinoise du Ve au Xe siècle* (Paris: 1956) 156 — which appears in the recent English translation as "stories," J. Gernet, *Buddhism in Chinese Society. An Economic History from the Fifth to the Tenth Centuries*, trans. F. Verellen (New York: 1995) 160). *Poṣadhaṇavastu* (Hu-von Hinüber) § 13.1-3 makes it clear that without stairs access to a *pura* was difficult, and that once reached monks could fall off it, prompting the Buddha to require a railing. *Kṣudrakavastu*, Derge Tha 158b.2-.5 also indicates that stairs were required to reach a *pura* and adds that "from the ground floor there are two doors" allowing access. Both the *Vibhaṅga* (Derge Cha 154b.3ff) and the *Uttaragrantha* (Derge Pa 178a.1ff) indicate that the presence of puras led to the collapse of the structures they were built on, the latter specifically indicating that this was due to their weight (steng gi leid kyis rtsig pa 'jig tu byed de), leading the Buddha to order that the number of *pura* could be reduced. The prescribed number is in any case not uniform in all passages.

III.11 *bāḷagrapotika* = sgo khang steng gi bsil khang. The translation here — like the definition in *BHISD* — is entirely based on a rather mechanical understanding of the Tibetan.

III.12 The rule here that a *vihāra* for nuns must be architecturally inferior to a *vihāra* for monks by having — whatever *pura* and *bāḷagrapotika* mean — less monumental or architectonic development is consistent. It is found with varying detail here in the *Śayanāsanavastu*, in the *Vibhaṅga* (Derge Cha 154b.3), the *Kṣudrakavastu* (Derge Tha 158b.2), the *Uttaragrantha* (Derge Pa 178a.1), probably in the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* (Derge Ta 222a.5), and at *Vinayasastra* (Sankrityayana) 112.22. In many instances — e.g. *Vibhaṅga*, Derge Cha 154b.3 — the residence of nuns is not even allowed the title *vihāra*, but is called a *vārṣaka* = *dhyār khang*, a "retreat house" (for some further examples see *Vibhaṅga*, Derge Ja 91a.3; *Kṣudrakavastu*, Derge Tha 112a.3; 113a.3; Da 139a.5; 173a.5; *Uttaragrantha*, Derge Pa 86a.3; 7; etc.) It is particularly unfortunate that nunneries are not, in spite of this rule, visible in the archaeological record, or at least none have as yet been definitively identified. It is not impossible that the failure to identify nunneries is at least in part a result of not looking in the right places. There are, for example, incidental references that would seem to suggest that *vārṣakas* were — unlike *vihāras* — located within towns or cities. At *Vibhaṅga*, Derge Ja 103b.1ff, to cite one instance, the text first says that the monk Udāyin entered Śrāvasti for alms, but then it says: "While making the round for alms in Śrāvasti he came to where the retreat house for nuns was "(mnyan yod du bsod snyoms la rgyu ba na dge slong ma'i dhyār khang ga la ba der song ngo') In light of such passages it may be possible to rethink the intra-urban stūpas and their associated 'house' found at Sirkap, or even the so-called "House of Naradakha" at Shaikh Dheri (for convenience see for both F.R. Allchin, *The Archaeology of Early Historic South Asia. The Emergence of Cities and States* (Cambridge: 1995) 283, 288 and references there). These could just as easily have been such *vārṣakas*. (*BHISD* has not noted the close association between *vārṣakas* and nuns.)
IV

IV.1 No other vihāra has anything like the importance or the Jetavana in the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya and this explains, in part, why so much space in our text is devoted to the story of its founding and the biography of its 'founder.' It was, quite literally, the model for all other vihāras. In the Saṅghabhedavastu, for example, when the monk Udāyin tells King Suddhodana that the Buddha will be returning to Kapilavastu, and that the Buddha makes his residence in a forest or in a vihāra, the king says ka evānvidho vihāra iti, "But of what sort is a vihāra?" Then the text says āyuṣmatā udāyinā āruñcākāreṇa līkhitvā darsitāḥ: "When the venerable Udāyin had drawn one with the plan of the Jetavana he showed it to him (i.e. the king )." Having seen it the king orders his ministers to build sixteen large vihāras with exactly the same plan (jetavānikāreṇa sūḍaśaṁmahakān vihārān māpayata – Saṅghabhedavastu i 186-87). Interestingly, the Jetavana was still functioning as the model or "ideal" monastery in Tang China — though now it looked like a Chinese palace complex (see Puay-peng Ho, "The Ideal Monastery: Daoxuan's Description of the Central Indian Jetavana," East Asian History 10 (1995) 1-18; N. Shatman Steinhardt, "Early Chinese Buddhist Architecture and Its Indian Origins," in The Flowering of a Foreign Faith. New Studies in Chinese Buddhist Art, ed. J. Baker (Mumbai: 1998) 38-53.) Whether our text was known to Daoxuan is unknown. His work was written in 667 so I-Ching's translation of the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya would have been done after Daoxuan. But a text with strong affinities to ours was, however, done into Chinese already in 445 CE — this was the chapter entitled "Sudatta Erects a Monastery" in the Chinese version of The Sūtra on the Wise and the Foolish. This chapter has recently been translated into English twice (T.R. Brown, "From Sūtra to Pien-wen: A Study of 'Sudatta Erects a Monastery' and the Hsiang-mo Pien-wen" Tamkang Review 9 (1978) 67-101; and V.H. Mair, The Linguistic and Textual Antecedents of the Sūtra of the Wise and the Foolish (Sino-Platonic Papers 38) (Philadelphia: 1993) — the latter makes no mention of the former). A glance at either, in comparison with our text, will show the sometimes strong similarities of the Chinese version with what we have here in Sanskrit.

It was not, however, just the Jetavana itself that was famous. A tradition that Anāthapindāda had purchased the land on which it came to stand by covering it with 'gold' also seems to have been widespread and old. It is, for example, represented several times in the very earliest Buddhist narrative art, at Bharhut (R.C. Sharma, Bharhut Sculptures (New Delhi: 1994) 24-25; H. Lüders, Bharhut Inscriptions (Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum II.2) (Ootacamund: 1963) 105; pls. XIX, XXXVIII), at Bodh-gaya (K.K. Chakravarty, Early Buddhist Art of Bodh-Gayā (New Delhi: 1997) pl. 11), and at Amarāvatī (see Schlingloff, Studies in the Ajanta Paintings, 245-46 and Ch 24 fig 24).

But — as will become clear below — the redactors of our Vinaya appear to have been aware of more than just the importance of the Jetavana and the tradition about its purchase. As has already been signalled in the Introduction, there are good indications that they were also aware of the fact that there was something odd — if not, indeed, illegal — about the way in which the land for this famous vihāra had been acquired. They may, in short, have received an account of its 'purchase' which they knew was not in accord with Indian law, and this too may account, in part, for the amount of space they devoted to it.
IV.2 The word for "pregnant" in this cliché (see next note) is of some interest in terms of what is often presented as more formal Buddhist doctrine: अपना-सत्या = sems can dang ldan par gyur nas, "one into whom a sattva has entered."

IV.3 From the beginning of IV up to this point the text is made up of several set phrases or narrative clichés which occur throughout and characterize Mūlasarvāstivādin literary sources — the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya, Avadānāsataka, Divyāvadāna. While much could be gained by the systematic collection and analysis of these narrative formulae, there seems little point in citing random samplings so, for the most part, I have refrained from doing so in the following notes, and simply mark such passages as clichés. Here as an example of the extent of such formulae, and only that, one might look at Avadāna-cūtaka (Feer) 3-4 ("Lieux communs bouddhiques" nos. 6, 7, 9); C. Vogel & K. Wille, Some Unidentified Fragments of the Pravrajyāvastu Portion of the Vinayavastu Manuscript Found Near Gilgit (Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen. I. Philologisch-Historische Klasse. Jg. 1984 Nr. 7) (Göttingen: 1984) 312; G. Schopen, "Deaths, Funerals, and the Division of Property in a Monastic Code," in Buddhism in Practice, ed. D.S. Lopez, Jr. (Princeton: 1995) 488, 498, 500; J. Tatelman, The Glorious Deeds of Pūrṇa (Richmond, Surrey: 2000) 46, 48.

IV.4 Spoken, I assume, with irony and irritation, like American English "What a fine mess!"

IV.5 Dutt reads sūdattō and this is the reading found in the ms. (fol. 947.1), but both the Tibetan (sh.rill bhu) and context make it clear that this is a scribal error for datta. Gnoli has recognized this and emended accordingly.

IV.6 nādi grāhākula = 'bab chu ni chu srim 'dzin khris gang ba yin pas. Sanskrit grāha could, of course, refer to an actual animal. Monier-Williams s.v. gives "a rapacious animal living in fresh or sea water, any large fish or marine animal (crocodile, shark, serpent, Ganges alligator, etc.)". But unless I am much mistaken what we have here is just another case of a parent trying to scare his child with a story about monsters. Notice that vipralambhāyitum, which I have translated here as "to cajole," means more commonly and strongly "to deceive."

IV.7 putra tava doṣo 'sti = bu khyod la nyes pa yod do — see n. 12 below.

IV.8 As Gnoli has already signalled, the Tibetan is fuller here: yab bdag la nongs pa ci 'dra ba zhiṅ mchis, "But, Father, what have I done wrong?"

IV.9 The reading here is uncertain. The facsimile seems to have kim tāto dravyenārthi putra ka (possibly ko) nārthi (fol. 947.3); Dutt reads: kim tāto dravyenārthi putrake nārthi; Gnoli has kim tāto dravyenārthi ? putra ko nārthi, citing A as dravyenārthi putrakenārthi, but the latter is not the reading of either Dutt or the ms. The Tibetan here is: yab ci nor don du gnyer lags sam / bu su zhiṅ don du mi gnyer /, but since nor more commonly translates dhana — as it does in what immediately follows — this may suggest a slightly different text. For the second sentence Read: putra ko nārthi.
IV.10 Ms. (fol. 947.5), Gnoli and Dutt all read dānapati-, but Tibetan has nor gyi bdag po, which points to dhanapati, and this would seem better suited to the context. Moreover, everywhere else in the Tibetan version of our text dānapati is rendered by either yon bdag or sbyin bdag. With some hesitation Read: dhanapati.

IV.11 Dutt reads satyam and this is what the ms. appears to have (fol. 947.4), but Gnoli has already recognized that this must be a scribal error for sākyam, which is both required by the infinitive construction and supported by the Tibetan: blang bar mūs so.

IV.12 Without some sensitivity to Indian cultural norms and expectations it will probably not be immediately obvious what issues are being addressed here. First of all it is necessary to keep in mind that Indian story or narrative literature is, as already noted in the Introduction, very often far more sophisticated than it might at first sight seem, and is often particularly concerned with 'legal correctness.' Our narrative is no exception, but in presenting Sudatta as a munificent donor from his early childhood our narrative could not avoid the cultural 'fact' that his actions, under normal circumstances, would have been in direct conflict with Indian law and cultural expectation. 

Manu 8.119, for example, says that any gift given by one who does not own it is invalid; Nārada 1.38, that 'a transaction done by one who is not independent is invalid;' and in 1.31-32 it says further that as long as his parents are alive a child is not independent 'no matter how old he is' (R.W. Lariviere, The Nāradasmṛti, Part II (Philadelphia: 1989) 43; 40) — that our author was familiar with such ideas is signalled by his insertion of the 'established rule' that almost immediately follows. In other words, the actions of the young Sudatta — far from being exemplary — would have appeared culturally reprehensible, and this too is signalled by our author when he has Datta explicitly declare the 'fault' (doṣa) in his son's behavior. But our author also very cleverly resolves the conflict with two further legal points. Sudatta in our text was able to find 'hoards' or nidhis, but nidhi is an established legal term, and at least a part of any nidhi belongs to its finder (Manu 8.35-.39; Nārada 7.6-.7; Sternbach, Juridical Studies in Ancient Indian Law, ii 4ff.). Since, however, Sudatta's minority status might still compromise this, Datta's permission to 'make gifts as you please' (yatṛteṣāṃ), is a far more definitive solution — the ability to do as one pleases with property is, in both Roman and Indian law, "the defining characteristic of absolute possession or ownership" (G. Schopen, "The Lay Ownership of Monasteries and the Role of the Monk in Mūlasarvāṣṭi Vimocanā, Journal of the American Oriental Society 117.1 (1997) 87 and n. 18). A high degree of legal awareness and sophistication is evident throughout the Šayanāsanavadau.

V

V.1 The text in both Gnoli and Dutt is almost certainly misparagraphed here. The statement starting dharmatā hy esā and ending jīvāti should not end the previous paragraph, but — as given in the translation — head the following one. This is confirmed when the statement is recognized for what it is. It is what might be called, for lack of a better term, an editorial insertion. Such insertions are common in and even characteristic of the Mūlasarvāṣṭivāda-vinaya. They are generalizing statements that are syntactically isolated from the passages that they are inserted into which explain to the reader
— in effect tell him how to read — both what has preceded and, more commonly, what follows them. They are often directed towards points which might otherwise cause problems. In the Bhaisajyavastu, GMs iii 1, 83.4, for example, when Mahākāśyapa does not initially recognize Śakra, who has disguised himself as a poor weaver, and just at the point where a reader or hearer might be expected to ask himself how a great arhat could not have known what was going on, the following generalizing statement is inserted: "This, indeed, is the established rule: 'without having first focused his mind, knowledge and vision do not arise for an arhat.'" And then the text says, Kāśyapa goes on to focus his mind and comes to know that the weaver is Śakra himself. In the Pravrajyāvasūti, to cite another example, just before a boy kills his mother — a culturally shocking act that an Indian reader or hearer might well be expected to find hard to believe — a syntactically isolated general statement occurs: "Surely, for one who indulges the passions there is no evil act that is not to be done" (OMs iii 4, 55.5 — Dutt has not recognized the parenthetical nature of this and several other statements in his text here). Although most such insertions pick up on what precedes them in the narrative, their main function seems to be to instruct the reader or hearer as to how the following action is to be understood or came about, and they are therefore overwhelmingly often placed at the head of that action. In our present case the editorial assertion picks up on the legal questions that preceded it, but more fully legitimates what follows it: Sudatta got his reputation and new name as a result of his behavior after he had become a legal person and therefore an unproblematic donor. A very similar editorial insertion, in virtually the same context, occurs in the biography of Jyotisha in the Kaṇḍikavasūti, a Sanskrit text for which is now preserved in the Divyāvadāna: ācaritam etalokasya na āvat putrasya nāma prajñāyate āvat pitā jīvati. ūvad aparena samayena subhadra grhapatiḥ kālagatāḥ / jyotishah Kumārah svagre pratiṣṭhitah... (Divyāvadāna 274.7).

V.2 grhasvāmin — a very good parallel in both form and implication for the important Buddhist term vihārasvāmin.

V.3 An abbreviated form of one of the narrative clichés noted above IV n. 2.

V.4 sa kare kopolam dattaḥ cintāparo vyavasthitah. Another narrative cliche of very common occurrence and of considerable importance for 'reading' Buddhist art. How common it is can be gauged by the fact that it occurs more than a dozen times in the texts translated in von Schiefner's Tibetan Tales (pp. 21, 26, 50, 60, 80, 84, 86, 110, 125, etc), and this is only a small fraction of the occurrences I have noted — for some further occurrences in Sanskrit and Tibetan see Sanghabhedavastu i 184; ii 39, 50, 124, 175, 187, 256; Adhikaranavastu 69; Bhaisajyavastu, GMs iii 1, 27, 85, 99, 104, 130, 141; Cīvaravastu, GMs iii 2, 10, 15, 17, 53, 70, 103; Vibhanga, Derge Ca 82b.5, 153a.6, 245b.4, 248b.7; Bhikṣuṇī-vibhanga, Derge Ta 27b.4, 31b.4, 32a.6. For some particularly good examples of the posture in Indian Buddhist art see A. Cunningham, The Stūpa of Bharhut (London: 1879) pl. xlvi; J.M. Rosenfield, The Dynamic Arts of the Kushans (Berkeley & Los Angeles: 1967) pl. 81, 82, 90, 100; B.K. Behl, The Ajanta Caves. Artistic Wonder of Ancient Buddhist India (New York: 1998) pp. 47, 51, 152. In the texts the posture is invariably associated with dejection, disconsolateness, despair, anxiety, grief and depression. When the contexts are clear the same holds for the art. Indeed, the posture is prescribed for "sitting in sorrow" in the Nātyaśāstra (T. Mehta, Sanskrit Play Production in Ancient India (Delhi: 1995) 138, 140). All of this makes the
identification of princely figures sitting in this posture as "celestial" Bodhisattvas very problematic, unless we allow that such bodhisattvas spent a lot of time seriously depressed.

V.5 svasti svasti. This is in our texts the standard greeting delivered by a brahmin, and the narrative response always shows — as here — that those he so addressed assumed he wanted something (see Civaravastu, GMs iii 2, 57.3; Kṣudrakavastu, Derge Tha 226a.6; etc). This was probably intended as a little brahmin joke. In the Tibetan translation of our texts there is what corresponds to only a single svasti, but this is very likely by mistake.

V.6 kulāśūlka = gnyod. Bod rgya tshil mdzod chen mo gives for gnyod: (rnying) rin thang dang / bud med kyi rin /; cf. BJSID s.v. which cites only Mahāvyutpatti.

V.7 The Tibetan 'adds' at the head of the list gangs kan gyi ri'i glang po che brgya. In the verses below gangs can ri yi glang chen brgya translates sātām haimavatā nāgāḥ, but there is placed after the horses, nīska and mule carts are mentioned, and right before the kāmbojika girls. Given these later verses and the Tibetan it would seem reasonable to assume that sātām haimavatānāṃ nāgānāṃ has probably dropped out of the ms. But since this would create narrative difficulties in light of Bimbisāra's request that Anāthapiṇḍada bring back to Śrāvastī a hundred such elephants which Prasenajit had given to him, and the verses may justly be referring to them, the presence of the elephants at the head of the list in the Tibetan could also have resulted from a hyper-correction by the editor of the Sanskrit text the Tibetans used who had overlooked this. In any case, the complexities do not allow an easy emendation.

V.8 nīska = gser gyi rgyan. A nīska was both a golden ornament and the name of a coin. The Tibetan has chosen the first, and given that the last of the verses already referred to describes the kāmbojika girls as having "golden nīska on their necks" this is a natural choice, were it not for the fact that coins were also commonly worn as jewelry in early India.

V.9 Both Gnoli and Dutt have omitted the words pratīlekhā dattāh here, apparently by oversight. They are very clear in the ms. (fol. 948.1) and are translated in the Tibetan: ye gi laṃ spring ngo (for another instance where a letter is sent (lekho 'nupreṣītah) to someone who then sends a return letter (pratīlekhā visarjitaḥ) see Civaravastu, GMs iii 2, 11.8 — here too the Tibetan translates pratīlekhā as yi ge lan, Tog Ga 62A.7). Read: tenāpi vacayitvā pratīlekhā dattāh.

V.10 Both Gnoli and Dutt read mānavaṅkaḥ sālām, apparently taking mānavaṅkaḥ with what in the present translation is the previous sentence. But the ms. (fol. 948.2) clearly has mānavaṅkasālām — there is no case ending on mānava — and the two words are almost certainly intended as a genitive tātpuruṣa. The Tibetan has taken it as such: bram ze'i khye'u zhig gi khyim. Note too, incidentally, that both Gnoli and Dutt have printed mānavo, mānavena, and mānava — where the ms. has correctly mānavo, mānavena, and mānavaḥ. Read: mānavaṅkasālām.

V.11 viṣūcitaḥ. Whatever the precise nature of viṣūcita it seems to have resulted from overeating rich foods and to have been fatal; see Civaravastu, GMs iii 2, 118.10 and 144.13 where two different
monks die of it after overeating (note too that just below viṣṇūcita is replaced with pravāhika). Jain narrative literature uses much the same expression in a story that satirizes the proclivity — apparently widely known — of Buddhist monks toward fine food and gluttony; see P. Granoff, "Divine Delicacies: Monks, Images, and Miracles in the Contest between Jainism and Buddhism," in *Images, Miracles, and Authority in Asian Religious Traditions*, ed. R.H. Davis (Boulder: 1998) 60; also 56, 66, 69, 70, 72 and 90 for the Buddhist monk's penchant for fine foods.

V.12 Dutt reads apariceto brāhmaṇah, but the ms. clearly has plurals — apariceto brāhmaṇah (fol. 948.2)— and so does the Tibetan: bram ze rnam dang ngo shes pa ma yin pas. For the construction here see BHSG § 7.13, and for the meaning of apariceto note that Madhuskandha, although a brahmin, was a stranger or "foreigner" in Rājaśanī.

V.13 aśucibhayād = mi gtsang bas skrag pas.

V.14 Note that below in XXXI (43.3 ff) a senior monk throws a sick junior monk out of the cell that had been newly assigned to the senior — a form of the same verb, niśvikas, is used in both passages — but here "brahmins and householders," in criticizing the senior monk's actions, deny that they do such things, they deny that they do precisely what brahmins at least are described as doing in our present passage. The message is mixed, although the emphasis on the brahmanical fear of impurity in our passage is clear enough, and this emphasis is probably another attempt to tweak brahmanical values. For some further brief remarks on this passage see G. Schopen, "The Good Monk and His Money in a Buddhist Monasticism of The Mahāyāna Period," *The Eastern Buddhist*, n.s. 32.1 (2000) 94ff.

V.15 daivād = stes te. Needless to say this is not a common explanation of events in Buddhist narrative literature, although it does occur elsewhere in the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya*. At, for example, both Cīvaravastu, GMS iii 2, 121.11, and Bhaisajyavastu, Derge Ka 299a.5 and 299b.2 (=Divyāvadāna 29.8 and 29.15), narrative actions are said to occur duivayogād, "according to fate."

V.16 At Cīvaravastu, GMS iii 2, 129, the Buddha himself is described as doing very much the same thing for a sick monk who he finds lying in his own urine and excrement, and virtually the same language is used: vaṃśavidalikāyā nirlikhitāḥ / pāṇḍumṛtikāyā udvartitaḥ snāpitaḥ ; and in the Vibhaṅga, in a text available only in its Tibetan translation, Queen Mālikā is said to have "had the dirt removed from the [dead body of] the Venerable Udāyin with white earth" (sa dkar gyis dril phyé byed du bcug nas .. Derge Nya 65b.7). As is usually the case with everyday things, the precise nature of both a vaṃśavidalikā and pāṇḍumṛtika is not actually known. For the former BHSD (s.v. vidalikā), citing only our passage and the Cīvara passage, gives "splinter (of bamboo)." Context suggests that it might have been a kind of soft brush probably made by splintering and splaying one end of a piece of bamboo. pāṇḍumṛtika seems to mean "yellowish white, white, pale" earth or clay, and is said to be "chalk," which it might well be. But in discussing the account of the death of the Monk Kālodayin I have been hesitant about the Sanskrit equivalent of Tibetan sa dkar (G. Schopen, "Ritual Rights and Bones of Contention," esp. 38) and should have referred to the present passage and Cīvaravastu, GMS iii 2, 129, since in both sa dkar po translates pāṇḍumṛtika. In fact the
translation of the phrase *paṇḍumṛtti-kāyā udvarātāḥ* in the *Cīvāra* is *sa dka r pos drl phye byas te*, and this is almost the same as what is found in the *Vibhāṅga*.

V.17 Given the context this almost certainly refers to recitation of the Dharma as a 'healing' or deathbed ritual. Recitations of this sort were considered important enough that our *Vinaya* requires its monks to break their rain retreat if asked to perform them; see *Vārṣāvastus*, GMs iii 4, 140.17 and G. Schopen, "The Ritual Obligations and Donor Roles of Monks in the Pāli *Vinaya*" *Journal of the Pali Text Society* 16 (1992) 87-107 [=BSBM 72-85].

V.18 *cittam abhiprasādya = sems dang bskyed nas.* It is perhaps ironic — at least unexpected — that the cluster of expressions that is probably the most difficult to translate in a *Vinaya* text like ours has nothing to do with monastic realia or institutional procedure or technicalities of any sort, but rather with an inner experience, a 'feeling' or emotional reaction, which is very frequently referred to in our texts, and is presented as the personal response of an individual to persons, actions, and objects which affect him. The cluster includes the expression found here — *cittam abhiprasādya* — but also *prasādajāta, abhiprasanna, prasannah prasannādhi-kāram karoti*, etc. Just how common such expressions are, and the sort of difficulty they have presented to translators, both ancient and modern, can be seen at a glance in Feer's translation of the *Avadānāsata*ika, a text which appears in part to be dependent on our *Vinaya* (see Schopen, "Dead Monks and Bad Debts," ns. 20 & 21 and the sources cited there), and is overwhelmingly addressed to monks (II n.35 above). Feer's translation is not heavily annotated and it is therefore all the more remarkable that more than fifty of his notes deal with the words *prasāda, cittam prasādayamasa, prasannacitta*, etc., and their treatment in the Tibetan translation of his text. *prasāda*, for example, is often translated into Tibetan in two different ways, often on the same page, and Feer himself then translates it in yet a third way. On p. 69, for example, he translates *prasāda* as "une grande faveur," but adds in a note: "On 'joie.' *Prasāda, tib. dga;*" on p. 122 he translates *cittam prasādya* as "il mourut avec des sentiments joyeux," noting that the Tibetan renders it *sems dga ba bskyed nas*, but is compelled to add: "Cependant cette expression désigne plutôt le calme de l'esprit, le silence des passions;" on p. 359 he translates *prasāda* first as "sentiments pieux," but notes that the Tibetan has "dad 'foi,'" then by "bonnes dispositions," while noting that the Tibetan renders it "par dga 'joie,'" and finally again by "bonnes dispositions," but citing the Tibetan as "dad 'foii'" — all of this on a single page; on p. 46 *prasāda* is rendered "joie," "joie intime" and twice by "foii;" elsewhere he uses "dispositions joyeuses" (66), "dispositions . . . favorables" (74), "profonde joie," (159), etc. All of this should by no means be taken to indicate confusion on Feer's part; nor it seems were the Tibetan translators confused when they shifted back and forth between *dga' ba* and *dad pa;* they were rather struggling to get a difficult expression right, and to mark the fact that a single term like this can mean many things — joy, faith, favorable disposition, gratitude, pious feeling, and more. Since many of the Sanskrit expressions will appear repeatedly in our text, and since they are more than usually context-sensitive, it will be more convenient to formulate any generalizations about them not here, but after their occurrences have been seen. For the moment note that in the *Śayanāsana-vastu* — as almost everywhere else — these expressions occur overwhelmingly in two contexts, and the occurrence of the experience they refer to virtually always has predictable results. One of these contexts is the one we find in the present passage: the experience occurs at or near the moment of death and — as here — results in a favorable
rebirth. In the second, the experience results from the encounter of an individual with a Buddhist person, action or object and results in that individual making a generous donation. One example from the *Avadānaśataka* nicely illustrates the pattern: "La vue du Buddha fit naître chez les brahmanes maîtres de maison, une grande joie [mahāprasāda], et par suite de la joie qui s'était produite en eux, ils fournirent abondamment Bhagavat et la confrérie de ses auditeurs, de vêtements, de boulettes de riz, de lits, de sièges" (Feer, 65).

V.19 bhavana = gnas.

V.20 Dutt reads śīvikadvāram, and BHSD s.v. follows him. But Gnoli, with the ms. (fol. 948.4) here (but cf. below), śīvikādvāram. Tibetan has lho sgo, "the south gate." Misled by Dutt, BHSD had trouble explaining the term, but it is almost certainly to be taken as "the gate for [funereal] palanquins/biers" (note that both śīvikā and šibikā occur as variant spellings of the same word). Funereal biers were apparently always taken out of the southern gate, hence the Tibetan, or the Sanskrit it depends on. (Note that in the Pāli Vinaya the yakṣha who plays the role Madhuskandha has in our text is named Sivaka (Pāli Vinaya ii 156.2), but this may be only one of several details that seem to suggest that the Pāli version is a badly bowdlerized one. Note too that Arthaśāstra (Kangle) 2.36.31 uses the term śāvadvāra to refer to what must be the same gate.)

V.21 Both Gnoli and Dutt read presaya iti, and the Tibetan has len pa thong zhig ces. In spite of this I still think that the ms. (fol. 948.5) cannot have had this. It appears to read nāyayeti (i.e. nāyaya + iti) — a comparison of these four akṣaras with anupreṣitam which occurs only six akṣaras before them in the same line would seem to completely rule out reading presaya iti; see also āneyam and āneyasi (Gnoli misprints aneṣyasi) a few lines below. Read: nāyayeti.

V.22 Gnoli reads by emendation "Ex conject., from Tib.": tatra praṇoyanam /ṇa/bhavati. He used the Lhasa edition of the Tibetan and it presumably reads — as does Derge — der bdag la 'isha! ba ma mchis na. But Tog here may be correct and reads: der bdag 'isha! ba mchis na, so for the moment Read: with /ṇa/ deleted, although the construction remains odd.

VI

Although Gnoli's notations differ somewhat from place to place, in his edition of the *Sāyanaśana* he says that the text in the *Sānghabhedavastu* that "repeats" verbatim this and the following sections (up through XIII) of the *Sāyanaśana* starts here. The verbatim 'repetition' of *Sāyanaśana* VI through XIII in the *Sānghabhedā* begins: "Again, on that occasion the Blessed One was staying in Rājagrha, in the Bamboo Forest, in the Haunt of the Kalandakas. There was a householder in Rājagrha. He had invited the Blessed One, together with the Community of Monks, to his house. And on that occasion the householder Anāthapindīḍa had arrived at Rājagrha just on account of some business (kenacid eva karanīyena). He spent the night in the residence of that householder..." etc, with the text of the *Sāyanaśana* following. In other words the *Sānghabhedā* omits the account of Anāthapindīḍa seeking a bride for his seventh son, the story of Madhuskandha's negotiating the bride-price, his
death and divine rebirth, and the account of Prasenajit asking Anāthapiṇḍada to bring back the elephants. But since all of these things are then alluded to later in the Saṅghabheda, where on their own they would make no sense, this would seem to be clear indication of the dependency of the Saṅghabheda on the Śayanāśāna, and would seem to make it certain that the redactors of the former simply repeated the text of the latter without adjusting it or removing the anomalies. — The repetition of the account of the founding of the Jetavana would seem to point once again to its importance.

VI.2 Dutt reads ullāṭṭayata, and BHSD s.v. ullāḍayati cites this. But the ms. (fol. 948.7) almost certainly has ullāḍayataṁ, as Gnoli reads, but without visarga.

VI.3 manḍalavatām (and this is the spelling in the ms. - fol. 948.8) = bka‘ sa. Jäschke defines the latter as either "a bake-house, kitchen, cook's shop" or an "open hall or shed, erected on festive occasions;" Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo gives "(1)zas g-yos sbyor byed sa'i khang pa 'am : zas za sa'i khang pa ' : (2) 'dug gral dang 'tshog sa sie 'dons sa. The meaning "courtyard" given by BHSD s.v. manḍala-māḍa is entirely dependent on the Tibetan — khor gyi (') khyams — which it cites from the Mahāvyutpati, where this is in fact given as the equivalent of manḍalamanḍa (5518). BHSD also describes the considerable variation in the 'spelling' (?) of the Sanskrit term.

VI.4 Gnoli has agārād in both the Śayanāśāna and Saṅghabheda, but the ms. (fol. 949.1) for the former has correctly and so Read: agārād.

VI.5 Gnoli in both Śayanāśāna and Saṅghabheda is rather garbled here. The ms. (fol. 949.2) reads: samti grhapate ksatriyakulād api kulaputaṁ keśaśmasravyavitārva kāśyāni vastrāṇy āchādyā samyavacchāddyā tam eva bhagavantam pravrajitam anuprajitatā [1] brāhmaṇakulād api vaśyakulād api śūdrakulād api kulaputrāḥ keśaśmaśravyavitārva kāśyāni vastrāṇy āchādyā samyug eva śraddhāya āgārād anagārāk tam eva pravrajitam anuprajaitāḥ. Dutt is much closer to the ms., though he twice reads -śmaśravy for what I would read with hesitation -śmaśravy (the facsimile is difficult to read). Gnoli has tried to normalize and regularize the repetitions (and in the process introduced such anomalies as anāgārād) apparently being led by the Tibetan. Read: with ms.

VI.6 Gnoli inserts śvah/. It is in the Tibetan — sang — and apparently in the ms. for the Saṅghabheda, where it appears in Gnoli's edition without brackets. So Read.

VI.7 The Śitavana was not, of course, literally in Rājagrha, but, as our own narrative makes clear, outside the city walls. It is well known in our Vinaya. In the Vibhaṅga (Derge Ca 123a.6), for example, a monk who chooses to do meditation rather than recitation, goes to the Śitavana; at Cīvaravastu, GMs iii 2, 42.20, the physician Jivaka goes there to get "flesh" that he needs to cure a patient, and it is explicitly described as having corpses (aśūnyam ca śitavanam śmaśānaṁ mrtakaṇapena). This last raises the issue of the nature of śmaśāna. In spite of the fact that Saṅghabhedaśastu ii 92.23, for example, explicitly defines śmaśāna as "where one who is dead is cremated" (śmaśāneti yatra mrtuo dhayate), a large number of passages elsewhere in the same Vinaya indicate that uncremated corpses were left there (for a particularly good example see Kṣudrakavastu,
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Derge Tha 222b.2-224b.1, which contains instructions on how monks should strip corpses), and this corresponds to what is found in Indian literature as a whole: “In most literary references the śmaśāna, or cremation ground, is described as covered with putrefying corpses and haunted by dogs and vultures, rather than as the scene of cremation. The descriptions of such places show that many people in ancient India did not cremate their dead, but . . . merely abandoned their bodies to the wild beasts. No doubt economic considerations played a big part in this practice.” (A.L. Basham, The Wonder That Was India, 3rd ed. (New York: 1968) 178 — for a particularly graphic description of a śmaśāna translated from the Tamil, see P. Richman, Women, Branch Stories, and Religious Rhetoric in a Tamil Buddhist Text (Syracuse: 1988) 54 ff). For Sitavana in Pāli sources see G.P. Malalasekera, Dictionary of Pāli Proper Names (London: 1938) Vol. II, 1154-55.

VI.8 Like Brahmadatta (see above II n.21), Anāthapiṇḍada’s immediate reaction to hearing about a religiously powerful person is the desire to “see” him: labhyam . . . so ’śmābhīr bhagavān draśṭum.

VI.9 buddhālasambanayā smṛtyā = sangs rgyas la dmigs pa’i dran pas.

VI.10 Here, and almost always below spelled sīvika-, but Gnoli in Sāṅghabheda always gives sīvikā.-

VI.11 There is an aksara after rātryā and before dvau in the ms. (fol. 949.5) that looks very much like -pra-, although there may be the trace of a vowel marker above it. The sense does not seem to require it, nor the Tibetan to reflect it. Since I cannot explain it it would have been more convenient, of course, to ignore it, which is what both Dutt and Gnoli did.

VI.12 BHSD, s.v. sīvika-dvāra, seems to take pūrvakaṃ and pāscimakam as qualifications of the gate, and the grammar of the Sanskrit might well suggest this. It says of the construction: “implying a double gate, both parts open.” But sense, it seems, requires it, and the Tibetan (mīshan mo’i thun dang po dang tha ma gnis la) makes it virtually certain that both pūrvaka and pāscimakam refer here to the first and last watches of the night.

VI.13 The appearance, and subsequent disappearance, of this light is not explained.

VI.14 A culturally natural assumption since city gates were normally closed during the night (see, for example, J. Auboyer, La vie quotidienne dans l’inde ancienne (Paris: 1961) 157). Arthaśāstra (Kangle) 2.36.34-.38 in fact suggests that, in theory at least, movement at night even within the city was severely restricted — Scharfe actually uses the word “curfew;” H. Scharfe, The State in Indian Tradition (Leiden: 1989) 172; but cf. XIV n. 16 below.

VI.15 sthāndīla = ’dug gnas. Presumably the space for offerings for the divine resident of the gate.

VI.16 Gnoli prints anyadevātanamaskāram kariṣyati in the Śayanāsana and anyadevātā namaskāram kariṣyati in the Sāṅghabheda. But the ms. (fol. 949.8) and Dutt read -anyadevātā namaskarikṣyati. Read: with ms. Note too that this statement is, presumably, inflected with some alarm on the devaputra’s part. The implications of anyadevatā here seem to be much like those of
ananyadeva, cited by BHISD s.v. from the Lalitavistara as an epithet of the Buddha, and interpreted there — almost certainly correctly — as "having no other god (beside him), i.e. sole god;" or like those of ananyadevatā, "having no other god," a characterization of those who become Buddhist lay brothers or sisters (upāsaka, upāsikā — see N. Dutt, Gilgit Manuscripts (Srinagar: 1939) Vol. I 19.7 [This is the Bhaisajyaguri-stūra]; P.M. Harrison, The Tibetan Text of the Pratyutpanna-buddhasannukhāvasthitā-samādhi-stūra (Tokyo: 1978) 11B.14; 12B.8; 12C.8). All these expressions would seem — at least by implication or innuendo — to place the Buddha into the category of deva.

VI.17 This verse is missing from the ms. (fol. 949.9) but found apparently in Gnoli’s ms. of the Saṃghābhedra (he gives no indication in his edition of either the Sāvanāsana or the Saṃghābhedra of this omission in our ms.). It is also found in the Tibetan, and there are other indications that it was the first of the set of three (see below n. 21). Given the repetition of exactly the same prose exhortation before each verse it is easy to see how a typical scribal eye-skip could have occurred. Dutt’s n.2, p. 140, is misplaced and misleading in regard to the end of the ms.; see n. 22 below.

VI.18 padāvihārasyaikasya = gom pa geig geig bor ba yi. For padāvihāra or padā vihāra see BHISD s.v. vihāra (3). The expression is not common and the occurrences here should be added to those in BHISD which, in effect, all come from a single text (Divyāvadāna 74.17-80.10 = Divyāvadāna 465.10-469.19 = Bhaisajyavastu, GMs iii 1, 73.16-78.14; and cf. pa[da][n] (vi)hāre samatikramamtti in a fragment from Kucha — H. Lüders, Philologica Indica (Göttingen: 1940) 612). In the Bhaisajyavastu/Divyāvadāna text(s) the expression is clearly interchangeable with pradaksinikrtas: anyatamena copāsakena sa pradeśāh pradaksinikrtah / evam ca cetasā cittam abhisamāskṛtān / asmān me padāvihārāh kiyat punyam bhaviṣyati/. But such an equation does not work well in our text since Anāthapiṇḍada has already done pradaksinā at the "residential ground" of Madhuskandha at the city gate, and pradaksina is about the only thing he does not do when he actually meets the Buddha. A good guess here in regard to padā (-) vihāra is that it is an old — perhaps almost obsolete — expression for what we might call pilgrimage, a religious journey or visit undertaken by foot. (The corresponding expression in the Pāli version of the account (Pāli Vinaya ii 156.5) is padavītihāra.)

VI.19 Dutt reads eṣā dattā, but Gnoli, correctly, īśādantā (see fol. 949.9); Tibetan: gshol mda’i mche bar ldan.

VI.20 Dutt reads mahāgajāh, but Gnoli, correctly, mahaṅgajāh (see fol. 949.9); Tibetan ma’i tang gar skyes.

VI.21 These verses — certainly the first one — had a life beyond our text. The first verse, for example, also occurs towards the end of the Tibetan version of the Caitiyapradaksinīgāthā (Derge Mdo Sa 200b.3), but not, apparently, in the version found among the Gilgit manuscripts. More interesting perhaps, and as has been pointed out elsewhere (Schopen, "Marking Time in Buddhist Monasteries," 166 and n. 14), Vinitadeva, in his commentary on the Vibhaṅga called the Vinayavitthangapaḍavāyākhyāna, identifies these verses (he actually cites the first two lines of the first verse, and then adds "etc") as the verses used in the worship of a monastery's stūpa. — In the Pāli
version (this part of which also occurs at Saṁyutta 1 210-12) similar verses occur, but in spite of the fact that the verses refer to a hundred elephants, horses, carts with she-mules, and "a hundred thousand maidens," none of these things have been referred to before in the Pāli version, so the verses themselves lack context and make little natural sense, pointing again, perhaps, to the bowdlerized character of this version (see also V. 20 n.2 above). Interestingly enough, the corresponding verse in the Pāli version of the same incident (Pāli Vinaya ii 156.3) is also the verse that a novice is to reflect on in worshipping the monastery's stupa according to the Sinhala monastic handbook entitled Dinacariyā (see R.S. Hardy, Eastern Monachism (London: 1850, repr. Delhi: 1989)27).

VI.22 The continuous folios reproduced in the facsimile edition of the Śayanāsana end here. There are two additional fragmentary folios, now carefully edited in Wille, Die handschriftliche Überlieferung des Vinayavastu der Mūlasarvāstivādin, 115-21, one of which appears to have immediately followed the last complete folio.

VI.23 citīm abhiprasādyā — see V n. 18 above.

VI.24 nāvara = mchog ma yin pa ma yin zhiing.

VI.25 yatredāni devatā api autsukyam āpadyante tasya bhagavato darśanāya. Note the role of darśan here, but note as well that Buddhist, Jain, and Hindu narrative literature are full of instances in which — as here — a deceased individual who has been reborn as a devatā, or "demi-god," returns or appears to a former acquaintance or his or her old community to point them religiously in the right direction; see Granoff, "Divine Delicacies," esp. 94 n.35.

VI.26 In referring to the excerpt of it in the Saṁyutta, Mrs. Rhys Davids has already noted the weird character of this account: "There is an eerie atmosphere about the simple story that is Bunyanic" (Mrs. Rhys Davids, The Book of the Kindred Sayings (London: 1917) 271 n. 2). But it is weird in several senses of the term, and the role of Madhuskanda in particular can probably not be fully appreciated unless one realizes how preposterous it almost certainly would have seemed to an Indian audience that a rich and respectable businessman would have gone — in the middle of the night — to a charnel grounds to see some otherwise shiftless sadhu: to be believable such action would have required — as it duly receives here — divine intervention!

VI.27 bahir vihārasyābhhyavakāse bhagavān caṅkramena caṅkramyate — but Read, with Saṅghabheda and Wille...caṅkrame caṅkramyate. This would seem to suggest that there was a vihāra — whatever its precise nature — in the charnel grounds, and other texts indicate that a vihāra could at least be close enough to such places so that the smell of dead bodies could disturb a delicate monk's concentration (see Bhaiṣajyavastu, GMs iii 1, 223.7-224.12, where the Buddha as a consequence allows vihāras to be adorned with perfumes, garlands, incense and aromatic powders). But, although the expression we find here in the Śayanāsana is also something of a cliché, and although it occurs at least once in a context where narratively there should not have even been a vihāra (i.e. at Kuśinagara just before the Buddha’s death; Avadāṇāśataka (Speyer) i 228.9), here there
can be no doubt: immediately below the Buddha takes Anāthapiṇḍada into the vihāra. It is, of course, narratively very unusual to have a vihāra at such a site and monks are more routinely described as going out to a charnel grounds and returning to the vihāra (see Schopen, *Deaths, Funerals and the Division of Property in a Monastic Code*, 487, 488, 494, 496, 501).

VI.28 pratisammodanyā pratisammodate = yang dag par dgyes par 'gyur bas / yang dag par dgyes par byed de. It is hard to know how precisely to nuance this phrase, but such a greeting was clearly to be seen as out of character with the "proper" approach of a layman to the Buddha — notice that it is not even included in the exchange allowed between monks in I above — and might even have invoked laughter on the part of its monastic audience. This guy — Anāthapiṇḍada — clearly did not know what was going on, and, given Anāthapiṇḍada's otherwise later exemplary behavior, the Chinese translators of the version found in The Sūtra of the Wise and the Foolish (or their Khotanese brethren who recited it) apparently felt this required an explanation. They twice say he "did not [yet!] know the rules for ceremonial obeisance and offerings," and then they have "Suddhāvāsa Deva" transform himself into four people who show him what should be done. Indeed, if Mair's translation is anywhere near correct, Anāthapiṇḍada's greeting is far more outrageous in Chinese than in Sanskrit. Mair has: "Not knowing the ceremonial rules, he straight-forwardly asked the World Honored, 'Hi, Gautama! How are you?,'" adding in a note to "Hi:" "Pu-shen is a highly colloquial greeting" (Mair, *The Linguistic and Textual Antecedents of the Sūtra of the Wise and Foolish*, 41 and n. 63; but cf. Brown, *From Sūtra to Pien-Wen: A Study of 'Sudatta Erects a Monastery' and the Hsiang-mo Pien-wen,* 91, where the translation is much tamer). Much of the awkwardness appears to have been edited out of the Pāli version, where Anāthapiṇḍada at least "inclined his head to the Lord's feet," and in Horner's translation it is weakened even further.

VI.29 Gnoli reads āsaktiṁ, Dutt āsaktim, but Wille (supported by Udānavarga XXX.29) āsāṣtim. Read: with Wille.

VI.30 For the very limited parallels or partial parallels for these verses see Udānavarga XXX.28-.29 and notes.

VI.31 It is only at this point — and even then it is somewhat awkwardly placed — that Anāthapiṇḍada behaves "properly" (i.e. as everybody else in approaching the Buddha). This is after the Buddha's response to the pleasantry, which, presumably, made it clear to Anāthapiṇḍada what he was dealing with.

VI.32 Everyone has 'seen' a different grammar here. Dutt (and this is not supposed to be a reconstruction): kāmānām āsvādādīnavasāṃklesāsavāvadānam naiskramyapravivekānusāṃsām vyavādānapakṣyān dharmān vistareṇa samprakāśayati ; Gnoli: kāmānām āsvādādīnavasāṃklesāsavāvadānanaiskramyapravivekāna śaṁśāvaya-vadānapakṣyān dharmān, etc; Wille: kāmānām āsvādādīnavasāṃklesāsavāvadānanaiskramyapravivekānusāṃsāvyavādānapakṣyān dharmān, etc; even the normally helpful Tibetan offers no aid or comfort: 'dod pa rnams kyi mnog dang / nyes dmigs dang / kun nas nton mongs pa dang / rnam par byang ba dang / nges par 'byung ba dang ; rab tu dben pa'i phan yon gyi phyogs dang mthun pa'i chos . . . , although
it — like Wille — appears to take most of the text as one long dvandva compound. The Sanskrit appears to be corrupt and the translation here merely provisional — I do think, however, that the second -vyavadāna - should be deleted, as in the Tibetan for the Śayanāsana (but cf. Wille 116 n.13), and have translated accordingly.

VI.33 abhisameti = mgon par rtogs te.

VI.34 Gnoli: pratigrhnāti; but with Dutt and Wille. Read: pratigrhnīyād.

VI.35 dharmanu.

VI.36 abhikrānto 'ham bhadantābhikrāntah. Notice how this echoes Madhuskandha’s repeated exhortation above: abhikrāma grhapate...

VI.37 upāsaka. As has been pointed out elsewhere this is a term and a category which requires much fuller study, both in inscriptions (Schopen, "Ritual Obligations and Donor Roles of Monks in the Pāli Vinaya," 103-4 & n.1 [= BSBM, 80 & n. 24]) and texts (Schopen, "Ritual Rights and Bones of Contention," 42-43 and n. 30). It is becoming clearer that although upāsaka and upāsikā have habitually been translated as "layman" and "laywoman" they appear rather to have been "a small group that fell somewhere between monks and nuns and the general population" that "had a particularly close and formally acknowledged relationship with their monastic communities" (ib. n. 30 — see also P. Harrison, "Searching for the Origins of the Mahāyāna: What are We Looking For?", The Eastern Buddhist, n.s. 28 (1995) 67). The comparative rarity of the term upāsaka in donative inscriptions, for example, is mirrored by its infrequency in our text. Our text refers repeatedly to donors and devout laymen, but — although other titles are used — they are almost never called upāsaka. Note too that according to the formula found here, and frequently elsewhere, one became an upāsaka for life — "for as long as I live and have breath."

VI.38 Gnoli reads śaraṇāgatam, but Dutt and Wille śaraṇagatam. Read with the latter.

VI.39 abhiprasamanna = mgon par dad.

VII

VII.1 Śrāvasti, normally called a nagara or mahānagara, is here called a nigama. This is very likely what the Tibetan translators had also read: grong rdal.

VII.2 Gnoli reads: cīvarapindapātagālānapratīvahaisajya-; but Dutt and Wille (and the Tibetan) have the expected cīvarapindapātāsayanāsanaagālānapratīvahaisajya- (Wille ms. actually has -bhairajya-). Read with Dutt and Wille.
VII.3 The use of the future passive participles here is almost certainly not casual or coincidental since—as we will see below (XIX, 35.1 ff)—Mūlasarvāstivādin monks were under strict obligation to "use" all vihāras that were made available.

VII.4 Gnoli reads in both the Śayanūsana and Saṅghabheda: amuprayaccha me bhagavan bhikṣuṃ sahāyakam yena sahāyakena śrāvastyām bhagavato 'ṛṭhaya vihāraṃ kārayāmi (śrāvastyām is omitted in the Saṅghabheda). But this does not correspond with what remains of the fragmentary folio, nor with either Tibetan translation (see Wille 118 & n. 31). Wille suggests: amuprayaccha me bhagavan ekam bhikṣuṃ sahāyakam / tena sārdham aham śrāvastyām, etc. So Read.

Such monk "assistants" are not uncommonly met with in our Vinaya, almost always in association with constructional or building projects. They are referred to as sahāyakas, as here and in the account of the founding of the Ghoṣālārama that is given in the Vibhaṅga (Derge Nya 140b.4), or as dharmasaḥāyas in the Varsāvastu (GMs iii 4, 139.9, 15— in connection with establishing stūpas or adding accoutrements to them; for an inscriptive record of a monk acting in just such a capacity see Schopen, "The Ritual Obligations and Donor Roles of Monks in the Pali Vinaya," 95ff [=BSBM 76ff]) and in the Kuḍrakavastu (Derge Tha 192a.6, again in connection with founding a vihāra) or, finally, as punyasaḥāyas as in both the Vibhaṅga (Derge CA 146a.5) and the Uttarāgrahaṇa (Derge Pa 123b.3; the first in association with the construction of a "steam bath house;" the second with yet another vihāra). These references typically occur—though not always—in a set narrative frame, the Kuḍrakavastu passage just referred to being a good example:

"A certain householder lived in Śrāvastī and from time to time a mendicant monk came to his house. The mendicant monk established him in the refuges and the foundations of training. On one occasion he recited to him the praises of the seven things which make the merit that arises from material goods (punyakriṣṭāvastu—see below XVI, 33.20), and the householder said: 'Noble One, I would do something which makes the merit that arises from material goods.'

The mendicant monk said: 'That is good, householder, you should do so!'

'But, Noble One, what should I do?'

'Householder, you should make a vihāra for the community!'

'Noble One, I have the money (kārṣāpaṇas), but not one who acts as the religious assistant (dharmasaḥāya).'

'Householder, give the money! I am your religious assistant.'

Saying 'Noble One, it is good—this is the money,' he gave it to him..."

Such passages go on to make it clear that a monk who is acting as a "religious assistant" not only receives the money for the project, but "hires, oversees and pays the laborers; buys the necessary tools; and is told, for example, to use the construction funds for his food" as well (Schopen, "The Good Monk and His Money," 100).
VII.5 Gnoli prints *vidheyah*, but signals in the *Saṅghabheda* (171n.1) that this is an emendation and that the ms. has *vineya*; Wille has *vīśī(neyah)* and the Tibetan for both has "dul bar 'gyur. Read: *vineya*.

VII.6 Narratively this appears to be the beginning of a close association between Anāthapiṇḍada and Śāriputra. In the account of the disposition of Śāriputra's mortal (?) remains in the *Kṣudrakavastu* Anāthapiṇḍada claims a special relationship with Śāriputra, and this claim is sanctioned by the Buddha himself who grants him — initially — sole and private possession of Śāriputra's relics — see Schopen, "Ritual Rights and Bones of Contention," 44 ff.

VIII

VIII.1 *yathāparibhuktaṃ = ji ṭar longs spyad pa*. More literally "as he had used them." Bedding and seats normally belonged to the vihāra, or "donor," not to the individual monk, and they must stay where they were 'given;' see *Vibhanga*. Derge Cha 205a.6; *Uttaragrantha*, Derge Pa 84a.7; 122b.5-123a.3; 123a.4-.7; Schopen, "The Lay Ownership of Monasteries," 109-10; and below VII n. 7, end.

VIII.2 Gnoli has *ekaikārātrinivāsenā*; but Wille *ekaikārātridivasesa* — the Tibetan here supports Gnoli, but not conclusively: *nub mo nub mo zhing*; still, Read with Wille.

VIII.3 Gnoli reads *sa praviśann eva śrōvastīm*. The reading is not preserved in Wille's fragment but the Tibetan for both Śāyānasana and Saṅghabheda (*de mnyam yod du ma zhugs pa nvid du*), and context (parks, groves, etc. would normally be expected to be outside the city), render Gnoli's reading suspicious. Bearing in mind that *avagraha* is not used in these manuscripts, the remedy is to assume the loss of the privative *a-* of an original *apraviṣan* and an irregular sandhi of *sah*. This would bring the text into line with the Tibetan and with context. Read *sa praviśann*. Exactly the same thing seems to occur several lines further on; see n.6 below.

VIII.4 Wille's first fragmentary folio — no. 319 — ends here.

VIII.5 The description here is that of an ideal site for a monastery and is, of course, a cliché.

VIII.6 Gnoli reads *sa praviśann eva svam nivesanam*, but once again this does not fit with the Tibetan for either the Śāyānasana or Saṅghabheda (*de rang gi khyim du ma song ba nvid du*) which require a negative. Since the construction here is exactly the same as that noted above (n. 3), the interpretation advanced there should presumably be applied here as well. Read: *sa praviśann*.

VIII.7 I assume there is some word-play going on here in what follows — in the Chinese version (see IV n.1 above) Jeta explicitly says he was "joking." *ārāma* does of course mean "park," but it also means "pleasure," and there are good reasons for suspecting that the wording here was intentionally vague, or even obscure. In fact there are good reasons to suspect that the wording here may have been intended to obscure an acute embarrassment: our author almost certainly knew, and knew his
audience would recognize, that this 'sale' of the Jetavana was almost certainly illegal. Jeta is repeatedly referred to as a kumāra, which can mean "prince," but first of all means "child" or "boy," (see the use of kumāra in the text cited at the end of V n. 1 above) and a child — according to dharmaśāstra — cannot legally dispose of any property. Moreover, Jeta was supposed to be the son of King Prasenajit, and narratively Prasenajit was still very much alive, so Jeta himself was dependent. Since a child remains dependent as long as his father is alive "no matter how old he is," and since "a transaction done by one who is not independent is invalid," any sale on Jeta's part would be illegal. Our author has already earlier given every indication that he was familiar with such ideas (see IV above), and since he had already dealt with the legal problems that Anāthapiṇḍada's actions as a child raised he could not have been unaware of the even more serious ones here. In the absence of a ready solution — and there appears to have been none — some obfuscation might well have been in order. But that our author appears to have remained nervous about the 'transaction' would seem to follow from the further fact that he will shortly have the case decided in Anāthapiṇḍada's favor through divine inspiration — never a good sign. Note, finally, that the translation here is merely intended to show that the exchange in the original almost certainly involved some sort of word-play or intentional vagueness — I am by no means sure I got it right, and there are almost certainly other, and probably better, ways of doing this.

[In spite of the previous "finally" there is one other point that might well bear on the troubling character of the 'sale' of the Jetavana, but it needs very much to be kept in brackets because it involves the vexed and much discussed question of whether or not the king owned the land — all of it — in early and classical India. The debate is an old one and as usual nicely summarized by Basham (The Wonder That Was India, 110-111) — if proof be needed that the discussion has not moved much beyond what it was in his day, see, for example, S. Dutta, Land System in Northern India. c. AD 400- c. AD 700 (New Delhi: 1995) 8ff). But even without attempting to fit it into the larger debate it is important to note that the redactors of our Vinaya appear to have been of the opinion that the King did, indeed, own the land. This view is, at least, explicitly expressed in several places, and anyone familiar with the passages in which it is expressed would almost certainly have been discomfited with what he read in our text. One of the clearest of such passages occurs in the Vibhaṅga (Derge Ca 246.6ff), in a text which begins very much like that cited above at VII n. 4. But here when a brahmin is advised to have a vihāra constructed, he says to the monk who had advised him: "Noble One, although I have the money (kārṣāpanas), in regard to land, since the king is the owner, I do not have the ground to give on which to build a vihāra for the Community" (phags pa bdag la kār śa pa na dag ni mchis na 'on kyang sa gzhi ni rgyal po dbang bas gang du dge 'dun gyi gtsug lag khang bgyid du stsal ba'i dog sa ma mchis so /). The monk tells him not to worry, that he will solicit land from the king (...kho bos rgyal po las sa bslang bar bya'o /), and as the text continues we find it said three different times that "the king owns the land (gzhi rgyal po dbang pos... and gzhi rgyal po mnga ba' bas... and gzhi ni rgyal po dbang bas...), and that "the lord (i.e. king) must necessarily bestow the land" (ilas dog sa stsal bar rigs so /). In a very different context, and in a general statement in regard to what we think of as 'monastic' property, we also find it said at least twice: "the king owns the land; the owner (of the vihāra) owns the seats and bedding; the monk owns the bowl and robe" (rgyal po ni sa gzhi la dbang la / bdag po ni gnas mal la dbang / dge slong ni lhung bzed dang chos gos la dbang ngo /; Vibhaṅga, Derge Cha 205a.6; rgyal po ni sa gzhi la dbang ngo / bdag po ni mal ston la dbang ngo / dge slong ni lhung bzed dang chos gos la dbang...
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ngo /; Uttaragrantha, Derge Pa 84a.7). Again, anyone familiar with passages like these would have had a problem getting around the 'fact' that Jeta was — from yet another angle — in no position to sell what did not belong to him.]

VIII.8 In the Tibetan translation of the Sayanāsana, but not in that of the Saṁghabheda, skyed mos tshal, i.e. udyāna, appears here, not kun dga' ra ba = ārāma, indicating that the word-play, or at least the passage, gave those translators trouble too.

VIII.9 koṭisamstarenāpi, but Tibetan: gser bye ba gshibs kyang, suggesting perhaps that a word for 'gold' has dropped out of the manuscript.

VIII.10 kṛtaṛgho 'si kumāra ārāmasya = gzhon nus kun dga' ra ba'i rin bcud zin gyis /. The Tibetan translators made no attempt here to translate the grammar of the Sanskrit.

VIII.11 hiranyasuvarna. Tibetan takes as a dvandva — gser dang dhyig — but either or both of the Sanskrit terms can refer to a coin.

VIII.12 vyāvahārikapuruṣa = zhal che gcod pa'i sna chen po la gtogs pa'i mi. This term is not a common one and the Tibetan is more gloss than translation.

VIII.13 lokapāla.

VIII.14 ātimānam abhinirmāya = bdag nyid mgon par sprul nas.

VIII.15 arthādhikarana = dgos pa'i phyir 'dus so.

VIII.16 Silence in our Vinaya frequently signals assent, but not always. It can also indicate consternation, confusion or dismay (see G. Schopen, "Monastic Law Meets the Real World: A Monk’s Continuing Right to Inherit Family Property in Classical India," History of Religions 35 (1995) 114-15). Here it is especially difficult to interpret since at least the reader, having been informed of the composition of the court, could hardly have been convinced of the fairness of the judgement, and this element in fact would seem to render the whole account not more, but less convincing and to emphasize the weakness of Anāthapindada's case and its irregularity. But the redactors of our account probably intended it otherwise, and probably assumed (perhaps wrongly) that their audience would react to the divine intervention in the same way as Anāthapindada did to the actions of the Devaputra Madhuskandha and be convinced of how important the building of a vihāra was — even the 'guardians of the world' engaged themselves to see that it happened, in spite, perhaps, of its illegality.

VIII.17 Until this point the land in dispute and under purchase was called an ārāma or "park," and once an udyāna or "garden." Here for the first time it is called the "grove of Jeta," Jetavana, and this came to be the name most commonly used to refer to the entire complex, and often to the vihāra itself (see, for example, the passage from the Saṁghabheda referring to the "plan of the Jetavana" cited
above IV n. 1, or the passage below — where devout pilgrims seek permission to also build
something "in the Jetavana" (vayam...jetavane kimcid vastu kārayemai ti — XVI, 33.13). This usage
— which will be addressed below — is also irregular and may reflect in yet another way the
irregularities involved in the 'purchase' of the Jetavana. A thorough study of the names of Buddhist
monasteries in both texts and inscriptions will undoubtedly show, when undertaken, what Stein
already noticed a long time ago in regard to both Gandhara and Kashmir, that the "Vihāras whose
founders are referred to in Ou-K'ong's account, bore the names or titles of those who established
them," and that for Kashmir "We are led to the same conclusion by an examination of the names
which Kalhana's chronicle has recorded of Vihāras founded in Kaçmir" (M.A. Stein, "Notes on Ou-
K'ong's Account of Kaçmir," Sitzungsberichte der Philosophisch-Historischen Classe der
Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien 135 (1896) VII. 1-32, esp. 3-4 n. 1). By this
pattern — which appears to be both old and well established — the vihāra established by
Anāthapiṇḍada should have been named after him, not Jeta, but that is not the case, and as we will see
immediately below, the tradition itself apparently felt some need to 'explain' this.

VIII.18Gnoli's punctuation here might be particularly misleading; the text appears to be best taken as
one long interrogative statement. The last clause — na ca punar gopayitavyo bhaviṣyatāti — is
particularly elliptical. Its point seems to be that in giving a gift one does not incur a loss, but gains the
benefit of not having to look after any longer that which was given away.

VIII.19The first part of Jeta's statement echoes exactly Anāthapiṇḍada's response to the actions of the
Devaputra Madhuskandha in VI above.

VIII.20dvāra-kosṭhakā = sgo khung = "entrance hall." This is the same term already met with in III
above in the passage giving the obligatory plan or layout of various types and sizes of vihāras, and
although its exact nature is not — like so many of the architectural components of a vihāra — known,
its importance or prominence is not in doubt. BHSD s.v. has already noted that it literally should
mean "gate-room" and says that it is "a room, or (often) roofed but open space, over a gate or
entrance...covered but open in front." But BHSD also notes that — "perhaps by extension" — it also
"seems to be used in the sense of gate, entrance; and sometimes it is hard to say which is meant." In
our text, however, "gate" is dvāra, as in the śivikā-dvāra, or "funereal gate," in VI above, and the use
of the terms dvāra and dvāra-kosṭhaka in some other passages in our Vinaya would seem to mark a
reasonably clear distinction. In, for example, the Mahāparinirvānasūtra that is still embedded in the
Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinaya, in the well-known account of the founding of Pātaliputra, when the
minister Varṣākāra says he will name the "gate" by which the Buddha departs "Gautama's Gate," the
term used both times is dvāra = sgo (Mahāparinirvāna (Waldschmidt) § 7.3); in the same text when
Subhadra first sees Ānanda the latter is described as "walking on the ambulatory in the open air at the
gate of the ārāma (..ānanda ārāmadvāre bhavakāše cañkrame cañkramyate § 40.7); and in a
narrative cliché which says that one or another of the group of six was always hanging around the
gate of the Jetavana so they could see who was coming to the "monastery" the term used is, again,
always dvāra (ācaritaṃ śadvargikānāṁ aṣūnyam jetavanadvāram anyatamānayaśena
śadvargikena, Civaravastu, GMs iii 2, 99.2; Karmavastu, GMs iii 2, 199.12; Āṣṭakavastu, Derge
Tha 101b.4; 232a.7, but especially Viḥaṅga, Derge Ca 205b.1). These and many other instances
would seem to indicate that the "gate" to a monastic complex, like the "gate" to a city, was called a dvāra, and this, therefore, is not what Jeta wished to build. He wanted to build a dvārako$!haka, and a dvārako$!haka appears not to have been the gate, or even the main gate to the monastic complex as a whole, but a part of the "monastery" building itself. III above indicates that the dvārako$!haka must be in the middle of the front wing of a quadrangular monastery facing and aligned with the "Perfume Chamber," which is in the center of the back wing, and this would seemingly of necessity mean that only a quadrangular vihāra had one — a single or three winged vihāra would in fact not have a wing facing the "Perfume Chamber" but would be open in front. This alignment obviously emphasizes the centrality of the dvārako$!haka in such a vihāra, and other texts equally emphasize in other ways its importance. There are texts, for example, which indicate that it must be kept free of mundane facilities, like the equivalent of our drinking fountains (Kṣudrakavastu, Derge Tha 109b.7), and others which forbid the presence there of 'unsightly' things like leprous monks, "smelling bad and covered with flies" (Civāravastu, GMs iii 2, 90.19). More positively, the importance of the dvārako$!haka is suggested in other texts by the fact that its location, together with the Perfume Chamber, was one of the first things to be determined in laying out a vihāra (Vibhanga Derge Ca 248b.1), or the fact that it was in the dvārako$!haka that monks first thought to display important royal donations given to the monastery (Utaragrantha, Derge Pa 154b.6). But perhaps the fullest indication of the importance of the dvārako$!haka emerges in a series of mostly related texts dealing with paintings and their placement in a vihāra. Here we find both a clear distinction between the dvāra and the dvārako$!haka, and the apparent fact that the most religiously important paintings in the monastery are to be placed in the dvārako$!haka. The Vibhanga, for example, has an important text dealing with painting the wheel of rebirth and "the twelve limbs of conditioned co-production" (pratityasamutpada) in the vihāra (Derge Ja 113b.3ff), a Sanskrit text for which is, fortunately, preserved now in the Dīvyāvadāna (Dīvyāvadāna 298.24ff), and the placement of this painting is clearly and explicitly mandated: it must be painted in the dvārako$!haka (tasmād dvārako$!hake paścagāndakam cakram kāraṇāyām). Moreover, the text goes on to require that a competent (pratibala) monk be assigned to the dvārako$!haka to explain the painting to 'brahmans and householders' who come to the vihāra (dvārako$!hake bhikṣur udeṣṭavayo ya āgatāgatānām brāhmaṇaghrapatinām darśayati — for a translation of the corresponding Chinese text see J. Przybiski, "La roue de la vie à Ajanṭa," Journal asiatique (1920) 313-331, with citation of other relevant literature; for fragments of what appears to have been a similar Sanskrit text see B. Pauly, "Fragments sanscrits de haute asie (mission Pelliot)," Journal asiatique (1959) 228-40). It is, however, not just the wheel of rebirth that is to be placed in the dvārako$!haka, nor is the Vibhanga the only text to talk about the paintings there. There is a text in the Kṣudrakavastu that deals even more extensively with the location of paintings in various parts of the vihāra. It is preserved in Tibetan (Kṣudrakavastu, Derge Tha 225a.3-226a.5 — treated most fully so far in M. Lalou, "Notes sur le décor de caves des monastères bouddhiques," Revues des arts asiatiques, 5.3 (1930) 183-85) and Chinese (see, for example, A.C. Soper, "Early Buddhist Attitudes toward the Art of Painting," The Art Bulletin 32 (1950) 149; E. Zürcher, "Buddhist Art in Medieval China: The Ecclesiastical View," in Function and Meaning in Buddhist Art. Proceedings of a Seminar Held at Leiden University 21-24 October 1991, ed. K.R. Van Kooij & H. van der Veere (Groningen: 1995) 6), and we even have now the Sanskrit text as it was digested by Guṇaprabha (Vinayatātra (Sanskrityayana) 114.16-31).

Here, first of all, the dvāra and dvārako$!haka are clearly distinguished and designated as the
locations for very different kinds of paintings. At or on the dvāra paintings of yakṣas "with hands holding vajras, etc." are to be painted (dvāre yakṣānām citraṇaṃ vajradhāraṇīdastānām — the Sanskrit cited here and below is from the Vinayasūtra). The apotropaic function of such paintings — like those of all such dvārapālas — is not, of course, difficult to surmise. But the paintings to be placed in the dvārakoṣṭhaka are of a distinctly different type. They are first of all — as in the Viheṣṭha — the wheel of rebirth (dvārakoṣṭhake samsāracakrasya). But to this the Kṣudrakavastu adds "The Great Miracle," and the Vinayasūtra adds "The Defeat of Māra" as well (śānātākānāsaśi [i.e. the cakra] mahāprāthārya-māraścakrasya) — for the Tibetan texts of the Vinayasūtra and the four Indian commentaries on it see Derge, bstan'gyur 'dul ba Wū 95a.5ff; Zu 258a.3ff; Yu 368a.7ff; Ru 256b.3ff; Lu 331b.6ff). These are doctrinally the most important and the most religiously charged paintings in the list. And they are all to be located in the dvārakoṣṭhaka. Everything then — the dvārakoṣṭhaka's architectural and quite literal centrality; the clear exclusion of certain kinds of things from it; and the presence in it of the monastery's most important paintings — seems to suggest that the dvārakoṣṭhaka was considered one of the most important components of a vihāra. What Jeta wished to construct was not, then, a mere appendage or secondary element of what was to come to be the new vihāra, but one of its central and most important component parts. The fact that this is what he both sought and received permission to do is odd — and virtually unique — if the resulting vihāra was unambiguously Anāthapiṇḍadā's.

IX

IX.1 It does not seem difficult to determine what the redactors of our Vinaya thought — or least wanted their audience to think — about the kind of public demonstration of supernatural powers that is to follow here. They commonly add to their narratives a typical stenciled 'editorial insertion' (see above V n. 1) which makes that explicit: āśu prthagjanāvarjanakari rddhiḥ, so so'i skye bo dag ni rdzu 'phrul la myur du sems gdod par byed pa yin pas. (Divyāvadāna 133.9 = Bhaiṣajyavastu, Derge Ga 33b.4) or āśu prthagjasānyāsa rddhir āvarjanakari, so so'i skye bo ni rdzu 'phrul la myur du sems gdod par byed pa yin pas (Divyāvadāna 192.8 = Viheṣṭha, Derge Nya 70a.5). Fussman translates the latter form: "les miracles convertissent rapidement les gens simples" (G. Fussman, "Upāya- kausalya. L'implantation du bouddhisme au gandhāra," in Bouddhisme et cultures locales. Quelques cas de réciproques adaptations, éd. F. Fukui & G. Fussman (Paris: 1994) 43n. 160); BHSD, s.v. āvarjana, renders the former: "magic converts the vulgar quickly" (citing also Divyāvadāna 313.15 and 539.5). The attitudes towards the public display of 'magical' powers in Buddhist literary sources are, however, considerably more complex — see Granoff, "The Ambiguity of Miracles," 79-96, for example.

IX.2 śūrtya; see above I n. 17.

IX.3 The Tibetan takes kim kāraṇaṃ? as a part of the speech of the members of other religious groups and this may be correct, or at least one good interpretation. The sometimes sparing use of 'speaker tags,' or the unmarked back and forth shifts of speakers in dialogue, is however, a characteristic of the style of our Vinaya and so I have taken it here.
IX.4 A similar practice among Buddhist monks themselves is referred to at Cīvaramātthāya, GMs iii 2, 109.16ff., although there bhājita is not used, and it is not cities that are, in effect, divided, but "families" or households. The division or assignment of households is effected by making a local monastic ordinance at the beginning of the rainy retreat: ...bhiksāva idam evauṁ rūpaṇī kriyākāraṁ krīvā varṣā upagacchanti / amukaṁ kulam yuṣmākam / amukaṁ kulam asmākam / rathyāvithicaravāsyaṁ gātakā madhyam iti: "...Monks, having made a local monastic ordinance, undertake the rainy season retreat saying 'such-and-such family is yours, such-and-such family is ours, the roads, streets cross-roads and forks are neutral."

IX.5 madiyāṁ svāpateyam = bdag gi nor.

IX.6 dharmaskandhāma kārayāmi = chos kyi phung po brtisig go. The use here of dharmaskandha is very unusual though in some ways it approaches the sense discovered by Olivelle in an important passage in the Chāndogya (P. Olivelle, "Dharmaskandhāma and Brahmamāndalam. A Study of Chāndogya Upanisā 2.23.1," Journal of the American Oriental Society 116 (1996) 205-19. Here, however, dharmaskandha is almost certainly a noun and a tatpurusa, rather than Olivelle's bahirvīri, and the object of the verb kārayāmi, which the Tibetan has clearly taken to mean "build," rather than the more generic "make" or "do." The compound — following Olivelle as far as we can — would seem to mean something like "a trunk or torso for dharma," i.e. something which, like the trunk of a tree that supports branches and further growth, supports and allows the further growth of dharma. Notice too that in the Chāndogya as Olivelle reads it, those who are dharmaskandha (bahirvīri) "gain worlds earned by merit" (punyālokāḥ), and, as we will see, by building this dharmaskandha Anathāpiṇḍaka is virtually assured of the same sort of thing; see below XI.

IX.7 For Sanskrit dhvānkaśās...avikṛtaśavadanāḥ the Tibetan has spyi brtal can mu cor smra ba rnams kyi, "impudent...talking nonsense."

IX.8 Sanskrit pratibaddha, but Tibetan rag las par 'gyur.

IX.9 Notice that the text is careful to say that Šāriputra had "focused his attention," samanvāhṛtya, because this is how arhats are able to know such things; cf. the discussion of the 'editorial insertion' in V n. 1 above.

IX.10 bhadantā āryaśāriputraḥ. But the Tibetan has shes idam dag shā ri'i bu. The latter appears to have read bhavamīh, as a vocative of address to the āryas, and to not have had an ārya- in their Sanskrit text.

IX.11 kim atra prāptakālam. But Tibetan: de ma yin na dus der gdab ci dgos."

IX.12 Rakṣāka = mig dmar. A figure of the same name also occurs in the account of the defeat of the āryas that is given in the version of The Great Miracle of Śravastī now preserved in Sanskrit in the Divyāvadāna under the title Prañihārya-sūtra (Divyāvadāna 143-66; translated in E. Burnouf,
Introduction à l'histoire du bouddhisme indien (Paris: 1844) 162-89). His role there, however, is much less central, and although the Sanskrit text of the Prāṇītāyā-sūtra has numerous parallels in both narrative details and language with our text, its relationship to account of the Miracle of Śrāvasti found in our Vinaya (Kṣudrakavastu, Derge Da 40a.1ff) has yet to be worked out.

IX.13 sabrahmacārin. Buddhist monks use the same term for their fellow-monks in our Vinaya, as has already been noted above II n. 28.

IX.14 kāyata kālana seems, again, to be a separate statement made by Raktākṣa, but see above n. 2. Here the Tibetan is less certain.

IX.15 avakāše, but Tibetan bla gab med = abhyavakāśe.

IX.16 kūṭihalajata = ngo mīshar skyes. In II above exactly the same compound is used to describe King Brahmadatta when he began to wonder by whose "powerful effect" his kingdom was thriving — it is there also translated into Tibetan as ngo mīshar skyes te, and into English as "(I) have become very curious."

IX.17 vādimaṇḍalam: Gnoṅ cites his ms. as having vādivaṇḍalām; Tibetan: rtsod pa'i dkyil 'khor du.

IX.18 smitaḥpūrṇam samaśānātīryāpathena. But smitaḥpūrṇam as an isolated adverb here is syntactically odd and the Tibetan suggests a very different text. It has dran pa srong du bstan ste / spyod lam zhi bas... It makes no reference to "smiling," and in place of smitaḥpūrṇam seems to have read something like pratimukham smṛtim upasthāyā. Although the latter is far more typically translated as dran pa srong du bzhag nas (Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra (Waldschmidt) §§ 27.16; 30.16), dran pa srong du bstan ste is virtually as good. The Tibetan for our passage also seems to have nothing corresponding to sama-. But if the marked discrepancy between the Tibetan and Gnoṅ’s Sanskrit might raise some suspicions about the latter, it is not the only thing that might. According to a narrative cliché — one example of which occurs not far below in the Śayanāsana itself (XI) — Buddhas and disciples of Buddha never smile without a cause (nāheta-pratītyam...tathāgatā vā tathāgataśrāvakā vā smitaṁ praviśākvantā), and when they do smile that is noted, and the cause or reason is explained, as is the case when Śāriputra definitely smiles, and as it is elsewhere (see, for example, Sanghahṛdayavastu ii 161-63; 172; 173; Avadāna-gata (Feer) 10-12 — the cliché occurs twenty times in the first three decades of the text). But here neither occurs and that makes the reading that much more suspicious. There are at least good reasons to suspect that Gnoṅ might have misread here, or that the manuscript tradition itself might be faulty. But neither is certain.

IX.19 vikarigṛtha. The Tibetan translates as jīg, which goes more strongly toward "destroy."

IX.20 indrajāla = mig 'phrul. The former literally means "The Net of Indra," but is commonly used for "magic," "illusion," "jugglery," etc. The Tibetan is not a literal translation: "eye trick."

IX.22 mantraḥ kilitah = snags kyi phur pas btab pa. The verb here is presumably part of a technical vocabulary of 'sorcery' or 'conjuring.'

IX.23 Because the Sanskrit text reads veṭāda aṭīmavadhāya cetayate, which should mean "The zombie was intent on killing himself," and because the rest of the incident is narrated almost exclusively through the use of pronouns whose referents must be surmised, the meaning is ambiguous. At first sight it appears that it is the zombie who wants to kill himself, but then the sa tasyāivopari pradhāvatih, "He (the zombie) rushed upon that very one," makes no sense, and "that very one" must refer to Raktākṣa. Moreover, unless tasya and the following asau refer to Raktākṣa, it would be the zombie who entered the order and became an arhat, and that seems unlikely. It seems best to take aṭīma- of aṭīma-vadhāya and tasyāivoparet he as both referring to Raktākṣa. Conceptually it is of course possible that the veṭāda conjured up by Raktākṣa was considered to be an extension of himself.

IX.24 Gnoi reads śaṟaṇāgato 'smi and this could be correct. The Tibetan, however, has here skyabs su mchi lags kvis and this is exactly the same as its translation of aham...śaṟaṇaṁ gacchāmi above in VI where Anāthapindā become a lay brother. Moreover, in this same passage dealing with Anāthapiṇḍada where Gnoi read śaṟaṇāgata, as here, both Wille and Dutt read śaṟaṇāgata (VI n. 37), and the Tibetan again has skyabs su mchi ba. Read: śaṟaṇāgato 'smi.

IX.25 The text here has only tasya — I have supplied what I take to be its referent.

IX.26 prasūdajāta = dad pa skyes nas.

IX.27 A cliché, though overwhelmingly said to the Buddha himself and not, as here, to a disciple.

pa'i ma rig pa'i sgo nga'i shubs dral cing, but in Derge rig pas ma rig pa'i sgo nga'i, etc., whereas the Tibetan for the *Pravrajyavastu* passages just referred to is *rig pas sgo nga'i shubs dral bar gyur cing*. This is symptomatic of the continuing uncertainties regarding the 'correct' form in both languages, and in light of this uncertainty, and in the absence of a comprehensive study of both the cliché and the manuscripts that deliver it, it seemed best to follow Gnoli's reading of the Sanskrit here, while, of course, reserving any final judgment. In specific regard to the occurrence of the cliché here note that Gnoli has read in both the *Sayanaśana* and *Saṅghabheda* *bhavalabhohasatkāraparāṇmukhaḥ*, but on the next page the standard form occurs: *bhavalabhohasatkāraparāṇmukhaḥ*. This, the standard form, confirmed by both Tibetans (bkur sti), would seem to suggest that -satkāra- has dropped out of our text and should be restored. Read: *bhavalabhohasatkāraparāṇmukhaḥ*. The Sanskrit for "knowledge, supernatural knowledge, and special knowledge were obtained" is *vidyābhijñāpratisamvivṛptaḥ. abhijñā and pratisamviv have, of course, specific technical meanings, but it is hard to know how much of such meanings would have been felt in what had become a cliché. — upendra should probably mean here "the younger brother of Indra," but as such it is as applied to a variety of divine figures.

IX.29 *abhīprasaṇa = mngon par dad par gyur te.* Here, however, we have some additional indication of the nature of the state that the term *abhīprasaṇa* expresses: that state here is explicitly linked with wide-eyed amazement — *vismayotphullalocana*.

IX.30 Gnoli prints vādirsabhoh in the *Sayanaśana*, but vādirsabhoh in the *Saṅghabheda.* Since the text of the former is at this point supposed to have been supplied by the latter something is obviously wrong here. Given the oddity of vādirsabhoh it is obviously best to take it as a mere misprint. The Tibetan has *smra ba'i khny mchog.* Read: vādirsabhoh.

IX.31 The form avalokika is problematic but printed as such in both *Sayanaśana* and *Saṅghabheda*. Tibetan: *ita bar gyur to.*

IX.32 From here to the end of this paragraph the text is made up almost entirely of clichés.

IX.33 *mahaṇ viṣeṣa = khyad par chen po.* "Great distinction" is sometimes used alone, with no further explanation or — as here — enumeration, to express religious achievement. See, for example, *Avadānasataka* (Speyer) i 242.1, 260.3; ii 33.17, 136.2.

X

X.1 bhṛtiṣkāya karma kurmaḥ = gla mi'i las byas la. Although they allow — when necessary — the participation of monks in construction work on religious structures, the redactors of our *Vinaya* seem to have taken it very much for granted that, under normal circumstances, vihāras were built by paid laborers (see, for examples, *Vibhaṅga*, Derge Ca 146a.2ff (gla mi) and Ca 246b.6ff (gla mi). In these texts, as in ours, it was the monk who was acting as "assistant" (saḥāyaka) or "assistant for religion/merit" (dharma-punyasyāhāya) who was in charge of the labor force. Note, incidentally, that according to our *Vinaya* the houses of at least the wealthy were also built by paid labor, and such
laborers are described as a rough and dirty sort; see Vibhaṅga, Derge Ja 116b.6ff = Divyāvadāna 303.30ff: sphaṭitapaṁṣā [but correct to: sphaṭitaparṇā] cf. Saṅghabheda 76.7] rūkṣakeśā malinastraṁvasanāḥ, "chapped and rough, with dirty hair, and wearing filthy clothes." This description is of interest here because it indicates what these tīrthaṇas agreed to become, and gives some idea how low they have stooped. Not only would such figures be extremely unattractive to an Indian audience of any refinement, but the fact that they undertook paid labor of this sort would make them even more vile.

X.2 tvādiyavihāra = khyod kyi gtsug lag khang. The implications of the wording here for the question of the ownership of vihāras will become clearer below.

X.3 latāvārikah puruṣo = lcag thogs kyi mi. The Sanskrit literally means "the man in charge of the whip," and the Tibetan is close to that. This may indicate a little more fully what wage labor was like. This individual is not commonly — perhaps, not otherwise — referred to, but presumably if one could not, like Śāriputra, conjure one up, he too would have to be hired.

X.4 caṇḍramyaminaṁ tiṣṭhati.

X.5 The second of Wille's fragmentary leaves starts here; it is numbered 322.

X.6 Gnoli reads abhidrutā, but Wille has vidruti and the Tibetan has thag byung pa. Read: vidruti.

X.7 The form of address here is odd, but although misprinted in the Śayanāsana as āyusman, the Saṅghabheda has āyusman and the Tibetan confirms this: ishe dang ldan pa. Since āyusmat is a form of address almost always applied to monks, the easiest explanation may be that the work-boss conjured up by Śāriputra was, in spite of his "frightful" aspect, in appearance a monk. Certainly, the navakarmika, "the monk in charge of new construction" is, for example, one of the earliest monastic offices referred to in inscriptions (see M. Njammasch, "Der navakarmikä und seine Stellung in der Hierarchie der buddhistischen Klöster," Altorientalische Forschungen 1 (1974) 279-93 — unfortunately the textual material here is limited to Pali), but we normally do not think of such a monastic officer as a whip-toting bully. Our passage, however, may at least be hinting at the fact that on some occasions he might well have been something very like that; cf. the behavior of the senior monk below (XXXI, 43.4ff) who is described as niṣṭhura, "harsh, cruel," and who throws a sick junior monk out of a cell without repercussion.

X.8 maitracittā.

X.9 abhiprasanna = dad par gyur to.

X.10 This entire paragraph and the next one as well are made up of clichés.

X.11 satkāyadrśi = 'jig tshogs la lta ba; see J. Rahder, "La satkāyadrši d'après Vibhaṅga, 8," Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques 1 (1931-1932) 227-39; C.A. Scherrer-Schaub, Yuktisāstikāvṛtti.
Commentaire à la soixantaine sur le raisonnement ou Du vrai enseignement de la causalité par le Maître indien Candrakīrti (Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques 25) (Bruxelles: 1991) 137 n. 99; 166 n. 201; 208 n. 364.

X.12 Here, as already noted (IX n. 27), Gnoli reads bhava-lābha-lobah-ṣatkārāparāṇāmukha-, which is what is normally found in this cliche, but it is worth pointing out that in translating the Sanskrit compound I have, with some reluctance, followed the Tibetan understanding of it: srid pa dang / rnyed pa la chags pa dang / bkur sti la rgyab kyi phyogs pa . The Tibetan has apparently taken bhava and lābha as a dvandva which is the object of an accusative tatpurusa, bhava-lābha-lobah, and then seen the tatpurusa and satkāra as another dvandva, etc. It might be more 'natural' to in fact take bhava-lābha-lobah-ṣatkāra- as a simple four membered dvandva and translate "their backs were turned on the world, donations, avarice and honor."

XI

XI.1 vihārasūtra = gtsug lag khang gi thig skud. Though context is probably enough to make it clear what is meant here by vihārasūtra, the Tibetan makes it all but certain: Jāschke gives for thig alone "carpenter's cord or string to mark lines with, marking-string..." (he also gives thig skod as "string to mark lines with;" see also Das who cites the form thig skor as "carpenter's cord," etc., and thig skud as "sūtra, thread, yarn; also straight line"). Śāriputra and Anāthapindāda are here laying out and marking the site with the plan of the vihāra.

XI.2 In both Śāyānāsana and Saṅghabheda Gnoli punctuates: ...tena hi punaḥ sūtraṃ prasāraya bhīyasāya mātrayā; cittam abhiprāśadayāmi; but both sense and the Tibetan (...de līt nam deś slad du yang thig skud brkyang ba dang lhag par sems mgon par dad par bygy’o :) would seem to require that the adverbial phrase go with cittam abhiprāśadayāmi. Note too that here again — as above X n. 28 — the state expressed by abhiprāśadayāmi is linked with wide-eyed amazement.

XI.3 anāthapindādanda gṛhapatinā bhīyasāya mātrayā tīvrenā prasadavegena cittam abhiprāśadītītum = khyim bdug mgon med zas shyiṅ gvis lhag par dad pa drag po’i shugs kyi sems mgon par dad par byas te . Notice here that regardless of how the various derivatives from prāṣad are nuanced, there remains a clear and distinct pattern: the more the prasāda increases the more Anāthapindāda gives; the more he is moved the greater his gifts.

XI.4 Gnoli reads yena prasādayātēna samanantaram eva, but Wille: yena prasādayasamantaram eva; Tibetan: dad pa de’i mjug thogs kho nar. The 'correct' reading here remains uncertain.

XI.5 This account is a narrativization or dramatization of an idea expressed much more prosaically elsewhere in our Vinaya. At Saṅghabheda ii 206.19 we find, for example: punar uparam yaḥ pudgalah apratiṣṭihatāvive prthivipradeśe cānūndhāsya bhikṣusangha-sva vihāram pratiṣṭhāpayati; ayam dvitiyā pudgalah brāhmaṇam punyam prasavati; kalpaṃ svargesu mode, "Moreover, that person who establishes a vihāra for the Community of Monks from the Four Directions on a spot
which has had no previous foundations, this is the second person who produces the merit of Brahmā — he delights in the heavens for an eon" (for 'the merit of Brahmā' see P. Pradhan, Abhidharmakosabhāṣyam (Patna: 1975) 274.7; L. de La Vallée Poussin, l'Abhidharmakosā (Paris: 1923-31) T. III, 250-51; Bhikkhu Pāsādika, Kanonische Zitate im Abhidharmakośabhāṣya des Vasubandhu (Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden. Beiheft 1) (Göttingen: 1986) 93; U. Pagel, The Bodhisattvapotaka. Its Doctrine, Practices and Their Position in Mahāyāna Literature (Buddhica Britannica. Series Continua V) (Tring: 1995) 139 n. 77; 374).

XI.6 mahallikā vihārā = gtsug lag khang chen po.

XI.7 kutikāvastu = khang phran. When Śuddhodana has a vihāra built in Kapilavastu after Udāyin draws for him the plans of the Jetavana, he too has sixteen large vihāras and sites for sixty huts built "according to the plan of the Jetavana;" see IV n. 1 above.

XI.8 The same sort of curious exchange occurs in the Mahāparinirvānasūtra, for example, when Ānanda asks how the funereral "honors for the body" are to be performed for the Buddha. He is told by the latter: tadyathānanda rājñās cakravartino yathā. But then Ānanda — as here — has to ask: kathām bhadanta rājñās cakravartino (Mahāparinirvāna-sūtra (Waldschmidt) §§ 36.1-6). At least narratively, neither Ānanda nor Anāthapindaka seem to know very much about cakravartins.

XI.9 Vāsakā: wille (vā) / sakām. Wille is unsure: "Lies mit SBV I 178.9 vāsakān?" The Tibetan has gshogs dgongs, something like "going until evening" — Jäschke gives dgong(s) by itself as "a day's journey." Sanskrit vāsaka in this sense seems not to be well attested, but see HHSID s.v. udghāṭikā, which cites and discusses the compound vāsodghāṭikā that occurs at Divyavadāna 173.20 and 24 (in neither case, however, does the Tibetan appear to have a clear equivalent — Vibhanga, Derge Nya 21b.7).

XI.10 parikramanaka = (g)zes dag. This is another term whose form and meaning in our text are not well attested elsewhere. It does, however, occur several further times in the Śayanāsana. At XXXV (49.12ff) Anāthapindaka gets authorization from the Buddha to build parikramanakas between Śrāvastī and the Jetavana where monks could eat their meals. Anāthapindaka also is said to have had wells made there, and to have provided spices and fruits. At least the wells were administered by monks who were ordered to allow lay persons access to them. At XXXVII (51.10ff) it is further said that alms that were given to the Jetavana came mostly to be given at the parikramanakas once but were built. But whereas in our current passage parikramanaka is translated into Tibetan by (g)zes, in these latter passages it is always rendered by bṣiṅ gnas, and a very similar translation — bṣiṅ bā'i gnas — is found in the Tibetan text of the Vinayasūtra for pratikramanaka-, the Sanskrit term Gaṇaprabha uses in digesting Śayanāsana 49.12ff (Vinayasūtra (Sankrityayana) 110.25 = Derge bstan 'gyur, 'dui ba Wu 92b.1). Jäschke in fact gives bṣiṅ (bā'i) gnas as "resting place." Although, then, the Sanskrit form is unsettled, its meaning, following the Tibetan, cannot be in serious doubt. Oddly enough, however, in the largely parallel account of the founding of the Ghoṣilārama in the Vibhanga (Derge Nya 141b.1) Ghoṣila is said to have had gshogs dgongs sa dag prepared along the Buddha's route, indicating even further variation within Tibetan sources.
XI.1 1) kālārocakaḥ puruṣaḥ [Read: puruṣaḥ] = dus iṣhod gsol ba’i mi dag (the Tibetan is marked plural). Passages like this and those discussed in Schopen, "Marking Time in Buddhist Monasteries," 157ff, point toward an India that was much more time conscious than has generally been allowed.

XI.1.2 śobhita. Aesthetic values and a sense of beauty play prominent roles in our Vinaya. This perhaps could not be made clearer than it is in the text from the Kṣudrakavastu cited above in VIII n. 20 that deals with paintings in the vihāra. The reason that is given for allowing such paintings in a vihāra is, quite simply, because without them a vihāra "is not beautiful" (‘di ri mo ma bris pas mi sdug ste (Derge Tha 225a.4). But virtually the same reason is given in the Uttaragrantha for plastering a stūpa (...rdo thal gyis ma byangs kyi bur du mi mdzes par gyur na, Derge Pa 114b.1) or adding gateways (torana) to the railing surrounding it (... rta babs med pa dang mi mdzes par gyur te, 115a.4; see also XIV n.16 below). Even a certain cut of the monastic robes is justified by the fact that without it "they are not beautiful" (na śobhante — Civaravastu, GMs iii 2, 50.16; see also the paper referred to in n. 35 of the Introduction). For the value placed on human physical beauty see above I n. 6; for the physical beauty of the Buddha, below XIII ns. 2, 4.

XI.1.3 Most of what follows here are clichés.

XI.1.4 Note that the commitment on the part of the 'donor' here (i.e. Anāthapiṇḍada) to in effect maintain the monks who live in the monastery he founded is — as it commonly is in such narratives — for life (yāvajīvam). This 'obligation' on the part of the donor will in fact be taken up in more general terms again below XXIII (37.6ff). But it is important to note that the redactors of our Vinaya took it nervously for granted that the 'obligation' was not inherited by, or binding on, the founder's heirs upon his death; see, for example, Vibhaṅga, Derge Cha 184a.1 where "a devout and good householder" founded a beautiful vihāra — "it captivated both the heart and the eye," not be it noted, the head (see n. 11 above) — and maintained sixty monks who lived there. But on his death when the monks asked his son (heir) if he would continue to do so, and the son said he had to decline, the monks had to abandon the vihāra — notice that it was assumed that it was the monks who were obliged to go to the heir to seek a continuance of support (i.e. it was not automatic), and it was assumed that the heir was not under obligation to do so and could decline (the text makes no adverse judgement — in fact no judgement at all — in regard to the son). If Buddhist monasteries were actually funded in this way they would have been very vulnerable institutions. Both may very well have been true, and this, in turn, may account for the strong emphasis found at least in our Vinaya on the need to secure donations.

XII

XII.1 This entire section is again made up of a series of narrative clichés — for other examples, see Sāṅghabheda: 188.3ff; Vibhaṅga, Derge Nya 141b.5ff; Divyāvadana 125.24ff; 148.7ff; 182.1ff; Avadānasūtra (Speyer) i 108.1ff. However stereotyped or stenciled such passages are they are not unimportant. They may in fact represent the crystallization of a conception of the Buddha that was
current from the early centuries of the Common Era, if not before, a conception that was mainstream during, for example, the formative period of 'early' Buddhist art. Although what he takes to be chronological differences may just as easily be sectarian or even geographical in origin, Étienne Lamotte has made a start on getting some sense of this conception (Lamotte, Histoire du bouddhisme indien 713ff), but much remains to be done here. Lamotte wants, for example, to contrast what he calls "Le Buddha divinisé" with the Buddha "dans les vieux textes canoniques," but what he is actually contrasting is the Buddha of Sanskrit ("Northern") sources with the Buddha of some Pali sources, and that of course is a very different matter. The fact that his "Deified Buddha" occurs in the Mulasarvastivada-vinaya makes it perfectly 'canonical,' as does its occurrence elsewhere in the literature of other 'schools' (see A. Baceau, "The Superhuman Personality of the Buddha and Its Symbolism in the Mahaparinirvānasūtra of the Dharmaguptaka," in Myths and Symbols: Studies in Honor of Mircea Eliade (Chicago: 1969) 9-22.

XII.2Wille's fragmentary leaf no. 322 ends here. "Beautiful" translates prāsādika = dang ba.

XII.3The first leaf of Gnoli's continuous ms. for the Śayanāsana starts here and is numbered 323.

XII.4samanatobhadraka = kun nas mdzes pa.

XII.5sābhisaṃskāram; see BHSD s.v. which says "chiefly in Divyavādāna," which means in effect 'chiefly in the Mulasarvastivāda-vinaya.'

XII.6The text has only lokantarikā and I have added "the otherwise always dark" because this would have been known, almost certainly, by the audience, and because it is necessary to fully appreciate the truly extraordinary nature of the event. BHSD s.v. says: "interstice(s) between the worlds; they are dark, gloomy places, a kind of purgatories," and gives detailed treatment of a part of the cliché. It omits, however, an additional part — omitted also in our text — which might justify his use of the term "purgatories." At Saddharmapundarikā (Kern & Nanjio) 163.11, for example, we find the following statement after the description of the penetration of light into the intermediate spaces: ye 'pi tāśu lokantarikāsa sattvā upapannās te 'py anyonyam evam paśyanty anyonyam evam sanjānanti: anye 'pi bata bhoḥ sattvāḥ santhopapannāḥ: anye 'pi bata bhoḥ sattvāḥ santhopapannā iti, "those individuals who had been reborn in the intermediate spaces, they too saw each other [for the first time], were aware of each other, saying 'look here! Other individuals have also been reborn here ...'" As this instance illustrates elements of the cliché found in our text also occur widely in Mahāyāna sūtra literature.

XII.7āścarya = ya mtshan.

XII.8Gnoli emends as kroṣanti, citing the ms. as krodheti. But in Sanghahhedu he prints without note: kruṇānti. Tibetan is of no help, having in both texts yang skad 'byin (it also translates the next two verbs as well with yang skad 'byin)
XII.9
Gnoli prints vāditrabhāṇḍāṇi, but since he prints vāditrabhāṇḍāṇi in Sanghabheda this is presumably a misprint. Tibetan has rol mo'i cha spyad.

XII.10
The last part of this cliché must have been a particularly powerful trope. Elements of it keep showing up, as Lamotte has already noted, in a variety of Mahāyāna sūtras (Histoire du bouddhisme indien, 715 n. 4), and its implications may indeed be very far reaching. Simply put, this cliché establishes that the presence of the Buddha — his entrance into a place — has powerful curative and transformative effects. That being so, any 'equivalent' or 'substitute' of the Buddha must have the same effects. In the case of what we call 'images,' for example, the implications are clear enough: if in some essential way the image of the Buddha was thought to be the Buddha himself — and there is good evidence to suggest it was or could be (see, for example, G. Schopen, "The Buddha as an Owner of Property and Permanent Resident in Medieval Indian Monasteries," JIP 18 (1990) 181-217) — then bringing it/him into a place, more specifically a town, must — in light of our cliché — take on a very specific meaning, and our Vinaya has two long sets of rules governing just such an image procession (Uttaragrantha, Derge Pa 137b.4 - 140a.7; 175b.1 - 177b.7, and a digest of both passages has come down to us in Sanskrit, Vinayasūtra (Sankrityayana) 120.25 - 121.12 — the key wording in the latter is nagarapraveśe āgyāś karanam — a translation of the canonical rules governing image processions will appear in the paper "On Sending the Monks back to their Books: Cult and Conservatism in Early Mahāyāna Buddhism" which will be Chapter IV of G. Schopen, Figments and Fragments of a Mahāyāna Buddhism in India (Honolulu: 2002)). But our cliché also has the same sorts of implications for other 'equivalents' of the Buddha, and a particularly striking instance may occur in our text below at XXXII (45.22). There the Buddha is made to say that he himself dwells in that region (diś) in which a person who preserves the Vinaya (vinayadhara) lives, that he is not absent from that region, and that that region is — significantly in light of our cliché — filled with his light, radiance and splendor. The curative or transformative power of such a place would therefore be considerable.

Two points need here to be emphasized. First the operative idea here — the powerful effects of the Buddha's presence — is expressed in a cliché and is therefore by definition common and widely current. Second, with such ideas so firmly established in mainstream sources it is not at all clear what, if anything, a movement like the Mahāyāna had to offer in this particular and important area. There, again, may have been no felt need for it in India (cf. G. Schopen, "The Mahāyāna and the Middle Period in Indian Buddhism: Through a Chinese Looking-glass," The Eastern Buddhist 32.2 (2000) 24.

XIII

XIII.1
mahātā sakārena. Exactly the same expression is used in the Vinayasūtra in regard to the 'procession' by which an image of the Buddha is brought into town (see above XII n. 10), and the commentary attributed to Dharmamitra, in particular, suggests that, in so far as it was possible, the 'procession' was to mimic elements of the description found in our cliché — he refers, for example, to those who have assumed the appearance of (presumably, dressed up as) gods scattering flowers (de la lha'i gtags byas ba dag gis me tog dag 'thor ba dang / ...Derge btsan 'gyur Yu 388a.4 — could
the still puzzling Śiva "mask" published in G. Fussman, "Le 'masque court': une effigie en laiton de Śiva au gandhara," Journal Asiatique (1991) 137-74, have been connected with such a Buddhist procession?)

XIII.2 "Similarly the pouring of water by the donor became the most significant part of the giftmaking rite. Without it no gift could be considered complete," so V. Nath, Dāna: Gift System in Ancient India. A Socio-Economic Perspective (New Delhi: 1987) 218 & notes with references to both dharmaśāstra and Buddhist sources. The "vase" and the ritual of pouring water is the central focus of the composition in one of the earliest representations of "The Gift of the Jetavana" in Buddhist art, a frequently reproduced, labelled relief from Bharhut (see, for example, Sharma, Bharhut Sculptures 24-25). — The text here has only vāridhārāmi pātayitum ārabdhah, "(He) started to pour the stream of water;" I have added "of donation."

XIII.3 Since he could not pour the water he could not complete the gift (see previous note) — another of the narrative curiosities in this account, as is the expression sāpakṣālāni karmāṇi which is used to express what Anāthapiṇḍada thought he might have done. The term apakṣāla is not common and even its etymology is badly understood. BHIN s.v. gives for it "fault, defect, failing, sin," and the Tibetan renders sāpakṣālāni karmāṇi as las nyes pa dang bcas pa, "an act which is connected with a moral fault (or "offence" or "sin" or "crime")," so the approximate meaning cannot be very far off from this. Then there is the fact that Anāthapiṇḍada is described as "feeling badly" — durmanas — and an Indian reader of the text could, as already indicated, have naturally assumed that he had good reason to both feel this way and to think he had committed a fault: he had just duped a minor out of a piece of property that did not legally belong to him, and this action had been confirmed by a prejudicial court. Indeed, this curious incident — in fact the whole of the remaining account — is probably best seen as an attempt on the part of the redactors of our Vinaya to explain and to justify what they saw as the legal and ethical difficulties that were embedded in what must have been the 'old' account of the 'purchase' of the Jetavana that had come down to them. Notice that they deftly have Anāthapiṇḍada entertain a suspicion that they themselves might well have had, or that they could anticipate their audience already having arrived at.

XIII.4 The reason given here for the water not pouring might not have great explanatory powers, but that was probably not its main function. The whole incident, in fact, appears to have been solely devised so that the Buddha himself could declare publicly that — in spite of good evidence to the contrary — Anāthapiṇḍada had not acted wrongly or illegally.

XIII.5 The Sanskrit for these last two paragraphs is once again oddly allusive, and once again, given the irregularities in both the purchase and the double name assigned to the place, this is most likely intentional. But the net effect perpetuated and formalized the ambiguity. By putting Jeta's name first — where it is always found in the texts — the Buddha left the impression at least that he was the first donor, and by pattern and implication, the real owner.

XIII.6 atīvābhīrpasanna, which is here translated by shin tu dga' bar gyur te (see the material cited from the Avadānākātaka in V n. 18 above), and linked directly with both prīti and prāmodya (dga'
ba and rab tu dga' ba), "delight" and "joy." Characteristically, here too the feeling results in an even more elaborate donation.

XIII.7 (athaṃ sampūnakāra [Saṅghabheda: saṃgītikāra] api sthavirath [Saṅghabheda: -ais] sūtra [Saṅghabheda: sūtранta] upanibaddham bhāgaṇān śrāvastyāṁ viharati jatavane 'nāhapiṇḍasāyārame iti = de bzin du sdu pa byed pa rnam s kyis kyang / mdo sde'i nang du sangs rgyas bcom ldan 'das rgyal byu rgyal byed kyi tshal mgon med zas shyin gvi kun dga' ra ba na bzhugs so zhes gdags pa byas so / . This is another 'editorial insertion' of a particular type and stencilled form (cf. V n. 1 above) found almost exclusively in association with events in the biography of the Buddha. It occurs widely. In addition to the present passage (Saññásana 27.15 = Derge Ga 205b.6) see Saññābheda i 166.12 = Derge Da 79a.3; i 181.14 = Da 89b.4; i 199.28 = Da 101b.7; Civāravastu, GMs iii 2, 9.4 = Derge Ga 53a.2 = von Schiefner, Tibetan Tales 79; GMs iii 2, 70.10 = Ga 79b.4 = von Schiefner, Tibetan Tales 125; Divyāvadāna 274.13 = Kṣudrakaṇvastu, Derge Tha 20b.5; Kṣudrakaṇvastu, Derge Tha 97a.2 = W.W. Rockhill, The Life of the Buddha and the Early History of His Order (London: 1907) 121, where the insertion is omitted altogether, etc. There is — as there always is with such formulae — a certain amount of variation in the precise wording of the insertion, the most important of which are: saṃgītikāra is usually omitted (Gnoli's saṃgītikāra is almost certainly an error — for the Saññāsana too Read: saṃgītikāra); and rather than sūтра, as in our text, sūt vånta (i.e. sūt vånte) or sūt våntesa is far more commonly found (in fact Gnoli's sūtra in our passage is unique and should perhaps be emended). Apart from these variations the formulae is, of course, adapted to the particular context in which it occurs so that the phrase starting bhāgaṇān...and ending with it is different in every case; e.g. rather than bhāgaṇān śrāvastyāṁ viharati jatavane, etc., as in our text, we could have bhāgaṇān rājagṛhe viharantī veyuvane, etc... This formulaic insertion is of particular interest. It may provide a small but rare bit of evidence for how a reader of this Vinaya might have understood his text, and the texts of any sūtras he might have read, both as texts and the products of a redactional process, since the term upanibaddha almost certainly is referring to some such process. Apart from correcting upanibaddha — which Cowell & Neil print at Divyāvadāna 274.14 — to upanibaddha, BHISD s.v. does not, however, treat the term, saying only "written, recorded; surely error for Skt. upanibaddha." The Tibetan translations are helpful here, even though not entirely consistent. They overwhelmingly render upanibaddha as gdags pa byas so, as in our passage, which means most basically "to bind, fasten, tie to...to fix, attach." But brjod do, "to say, pronounce...promulgate, set forth," nye bar sbyar ro, which here almost certainly means "to compile, compose," and bris so, "to write," also occur. Reference to the 'fixing,' 'writing,' 'compiling,' of the sūtrantas, combined always with a reference to "Elders," and occasionally to Elders who had rehearsed the texts, would almost of necessity have referred the reader to one or more redactions of the canon that the tradition knew. But even more than that, a reader would not have to have been unduly perceptive to notice that since his text refers to that redaction as a past event — upanibaddha is a past passive participle — it could not have been an actual part of that redaction, and must itself be still later. In other words this 'editorial insertion' inserts between the reader and the text he had before him several chronological removes. He would have, or could have, been aware of the fact that he was separated even from the original redaction of events by at least one further redaction that referred to it, and by possibly more, depending on what he took upanibaddha to refer to. Some of these issues have been discussed elsewhere in a preliminary
way (Schopen, Daijō bukkō kōki jidai: Indo no sain seikatsu, 50-70), but they deserve and require a much fuller treatment.

The 'repetition' of the Śayanāsanavastu that occurs in the Saṅghbhedaśavastu ends after the 'editorial insertion;' i.e. it runs from VI through XIII.

XIV

XIV.1 A cliché; also below in XV.

XIV.2 prthivipradeśa.


XIV.4 A cliché.

XIV.5 pradeśa.

XIV.6 krītva = nyos nas. The occurrence here (and below) of the word "bought" can only highlight its curious omission in the account of the 'transaction' between Anāthapiṇḍada and Jeta above in the story of the 'present.'

XIV.7 Correct Gnoli's misprinted pravrajya. Read: pravrajya.

XIV.8 utsamparkād. This is an unusual expression and there is some variation in the Tibetan: Tog has des bstan pas, but Derge and Peking des bsten pas, neither of which would seem to translate samparka altogether well.

XIV.9 atyartham abhiprasanṇah = shin tu dad pa skyes nas. Here, too, however abhiprasanna is nuanced it results in donation.

XIV.10 keśanakhastūpa = dbu skra dang sen mo'i mchod rten. Feer long ago described such a stūpa as a "monument élevé à un Buddha de sont vivant et renfermant de ses reliques, rognures d'ongles et cheveux" (Avadhana-çataka, (Feer) 482). They are, in other words, monuments that contain parts of the body of a person who is still very much alive, parts, moreover, that are themselves particularly associated with continued growth — hair, nails, etc. That this class of objects could be legitimately called "relics" seems doubtful, and they would seem to require a different vocabulary and a fundamental rethinking of what their distribution means. Such a rethinking has yet
to be done in spite of the fact that reference to these objects as a focus of religious activity is extremely common in our Vinaya and its associated literature (for a small sample of references see G. Schopen, "An Old Inscription from Amarāvatī and the Cult of the Local Monastic Dead in Indian Buddhist Monasteries," JIABS 14.2 (1991) 320 n. 34 [=BSBM 196 n. 34] and n. 16 below).

XIV.11Gnoli, 28 n. 2, says that Tibetan omits divā ca, but Tog, Derge, and Peking all have nyin mtshan du.

XIV.12tasyāntevasinā = de la ren pa. antevāsinā is, presumably, a misprint for antevāsinā, but even then this is a strange use of the term, especially for a Vinaya text, and it is not well supported by the Tibetan. antevāsin is usually translated by nye gnas or slob ma, both of which suggest "pupil," so if the Tibetan translators had a Sanskrit text which actually read antevāsin they too, by rendering it here as ren pa, must have understood that in this case the term meant something different than it usually does.

XIV.13Gnoli reads prāvṛtta, but must have realized that this does not make for good sense, and adds in a note to it: "Omit in Tib. Read prabhṛtta?" Oddly enough the first part of this is wrong, but his uncertain suggestion is almost certainly right. Tog, Derge and Peking all have...nor bu rin po che 'bar ba zhiig skyes su bskur nás (Peking alone and incorrectly has bskur nás), that is to say, all have skyes as a translation of what Gnoli prints as prāvṛtta. But not only does Jäschke give "present" for skyes, he cites a variant of our very phrase — skyes skur ba, "to give or send a present" — and skyes is an attested equivalent of prabhṛtta (TSD 168). Read: prabhṛtta.

XIV.14cāitya — a notable instance of the interchangability of stūpa and cāitya in virtually the same breath.

XIV.15-anubhāvāi = mthus. See above II n. 18.

XIV.16Here too Gnoli says that the Tibetan omits divā, but Tog, Derge and Peking all have nyin mtshan du.

It is worth noting, however briefly, that references to the illumination of these stūpas, and to worship of them at night, are common. Both are found, for example, in two of the most interesting texts dealing with keśanakhaṣṭūpas. In the Uttaragrantha, after Anāthapinḍāda has gotten authorization to build such a stūpa and to plaster it, he goes to the Buddha and says: "Blessed One, although after I plastered the stūpa .... I worshipped it with perfumes and incense and flowers, still, there being no oil lamps at night (mtshan mo), it is not beautiful (mi mdzas pa) ...", and the Buddha responds: "Therefore, Householder, since I order it, you now while worshipping must at night light a garland of oil lamps on the stūpa of hair and nails" (de lta bas na khyim bdag ngas rjes su gnang gis de la mchod pa gyes te 'nub mo dbu skra dang sen mo'i mchod rten gyi steng du mar me'i phreng ba bus shig; Derge Pa 114a.3ff). Also in the Uttaragrantha, in what is almost certainly the original version of the Śrīmatī Avadāna which now forms Tale no. 54 in the Sanskrit Avadānaśataka, and where a keśanakahastūpa is established in the women's quarters (antahpure) of King Bimbisāra, it is a garland of lamps (dipamālā) that Śrīmatī makes at the keśanakha-stūpa, and their illumination at night
which gets her into trouble with Ajātaśatru who had forbidden that the stūpa be worshipped (Derge Pa 115b.1-119a.6; Avadānasataka (Speyer) i 307.1-312.8). In fact, although it has rarely been noticed, our texts present a world in which much — if not most — activity at Buddhist monasteries took place at night, and for good practical reasons: most ordinary people had a life! In an interesting text in the Vibhāṅga, for example, a text in which the term punya = bsod nams is again used to indicate 'wealth' (see above 1.7), those who are described as, literally, "those who live by the fruit of merit" (bsod nams kyi 'bras bus 'tsho ba), are able to hear the Dharma taught during the day. But when they ask "those who live by the fruit of labor" (rtsol ba'i 'bras bus 'tsho ba) why they too do not listen to the Dharma, the latter say: "Since you are those who live by the fruit of merit [i.e. don't have to work for a living] you can listen to Dharma during the day. But since we are those who live by the fruit of labor, if we did not work during the day we would starve and die." When the Buddha hears of this he orders the monks: "Dharma must be taught at night!" (mtshan mo chos bstan par bya'o — Derge Ja 203a.3ff). And in yet another Vibhāṅga text thieves who plan on robbing a vihāra plan to do it when the monks "have the recitation of Dharma at night" (de dag mtshan mo chos nyan pa de'i 'tsho), and when the thieves come and pound on the door at night the monks inadvertently let them in thinking "since, surely, a group of people from the hamlet has come for the recitation of Dharma, we must open the door!" (Derge Ca 156a.5ff). The Kṣudrakavastu (Derge Tha 161b.4) repeats the Buddha's order concerning recitation of the Dharma at night, and has him further instruct the monks to light a lamp to keep snakes away, and, in summer, to construct a shade for it so insects do not fly into its flame. There are in fact many more indications of night time activities in monasteries which need to be more fully studied — how this fits with passages in non-buddhist sources which seem to indicate that movement at night was seriously restricted (see above VI n. 14) also needs to be determined.

XIV.17 prasāda-jātena = dad pa skyes te.

XIV.18 pranidhāna = smon lam. Such vows are extremely common in our Vinaya (see below XV for another example) and its related literature, but little work appears to have been done on them; see S. Hiraoka, "A Classification of the Two Types of Vows (pranidhāna) in Buddhist Texts — An Application to the Case of the Divyāvadāna," Shūkyō Kenkyū 66.2 (1992) 327-46 [in Japanese, with English summary].

XIV.19 kṛśivā = nyos nas.

XIV.20 Notice that a word for "bought" does not occur in the Sanskrit, though the Tibetan has one: ...bzhiṅ du 'bdag gis kyang s Parsons 'di gser dang dbyigs gshis pas rgyal bu gzhon nu las nyos nas.

XIV.21 kośān, an odd usage and one not supported by the Tibetan which has dpag tshad. dpag tshad seems almost exclusively to translate vyāja, but that would be a radical emendation. Since both syntax and context suggest some measure of distance, Read: krośān, even though kroṣa is twice translated below by rgyang grags.
XIV.22 Here niṣkṛiya (ms. — according to Gnoli — niṣkrayaḥ) = nyos nas.

XIV.23 pati = gos. No further specification of the kind of cloth is given. Though it is not possible to take up the question here, there are good reasons for thinking that 'cloth' — a variety of terms are used — was for our Vinaya a recognized medium of exchange or a kind of currency.

XIV.24 Gnoli reads viṃśatisahasraparivāraḥ, but the Tibetan has 'khor dge slong nvi khri. The latter, together with the fact that up until this point everywhere else in these formulaic paragraphs the corresponding compounds have -bhikṣu- as one member, would seem to suggest that it has inadvertently dropped out here. In spite of the fact that -bhikṣu- is also omitted in the following paragraph (see n. 27 below), here Read: viṃśatibhikṣusahasraparivāraḥ.

XIV.25 Gnoli prints ardhakroṣam sauvarṇair yavair āṣīrya, but notes that this is "ex conject. from Tib. rgyang grags phyed gser kyi bkram pas," and he gives the ms. reading as navakroṣo sauvarṇair yavair āṣīrya. The Tibetan itself, however, shows significant variation — while Tog has the same reading as that cited by Gnoli, both Derge and Peking have rgyang grags phyed gser gvi nas bkram pas, i.e. they both translate yava — so it can not safely serve as the basis of an emendation. It would seem preferable to assume that the Sanskrit text used by the Tibetan translators had a different reading here, and to emend the ms. reading less radically to Read: navakroṣam sauvarṇair etc.

XIV.26 Here the Tibetan also does not have -bhikṣu-.

XIV.27 Gnoli reads sodaśālāṅgalavakākotai samstareṇa, but notes that "the expression is obscure and perhaps corrupted." He cites the Tibetan as rmon pa dor bcu drug gis smos pa'i khyon phy ba gshib pas, and although this might be what Lhasa has, Tog, Derge and Peking read rmon pa dor bcu drug gis rmos pa'i khyon bye ba gshib pas gshibs nas, which is certainly to be preferred and may be translated "having covered with a covering of ten million (koṭi) the extent which is plowed with sixteen pair of oxen." To judge by the reading koṭisamstareṇa samstārya found below at 33.9, -koṭai here should probably read as koṭi and compounded not with what proceeds it, but with the following samstareṇa; and judging by the Tibetan found in Tog, etc., -lāṅgalavakta- might have been intended for something like -lāṅgalakṛṣṭum. Although a radical emendation, tentatively Read: sodaśālāṅgalakṛṣṭam koṭisamstareṇa samstārya.

XIV.28 niṣkṛiya = nyos te.

XIV.29 This whole section dealing with the past, present, and future Buddhas looks, even on the surface, to be not particularly well integrated into the main account here, and the same is true of the next section as well (XV). But if XIV is an 'addition,' the language of the paragraph dealing with the 'present' Buddha in particular may well indicate that it at least is not late. It is probably better to think of at least the paragraph dealing with Śākyamuni as simply a separate, independent tradition. It clearly has too many distinct elements to have been closely related to the account in VIII above: there is in the account at VIII only a passing reference to a "layer of ten million" (koṭisamstura) which is a
key element of the statement here and is, apparently, old — it is found already in the Bharhut label (jetavana anādhapedikō deti koṭisamhatena ketā — see above IV n. 1; it will also, curiously, occur below in XVI); there is no reference at all in the preceding account to the extent of the land being that which one can plow by "a team of sixteen" (for some comparatively late Sri Lankan references to marking the boundaries of land to be given for a vihāra by plowing it see S. Paranavitana, "Ploughing as a Ritual of Royal Consecration in Ancient Ceylon," R. C. Majumdar Felicitation Volume, ed. H.B. Sarkar (Calcutta: 1970) 31-39); and the main account carefully avoids — it seems — explicit reference to the word "bought," which is found both here and in the Bharhut label.

XIV.30 saṃyavatarkatāśkasahasraparivāra. This even more than usually fantastic number is hard to get into English and gave the Tibetan translators some problems as well: 'khor dgra beom pa khrag khrig phrag dgu dang / ther 'bum chen po phrag drug. Something like it — saṃyavatarka rhatām bhavissati — occurs in the Bhaisajyavastu in its account of Maitreya's future revelation of the Monk Kāśyapa's intact but tiny body in the Gūnpṇḍaka Mountain (Derge Kha 32b.2ff = Divyavadāna 61.19ff — where Divyavadāna 61.20 has 'štībhiṣotenāvāra, the Tibetan has 'khor dge slong 'bum phrag dgu beu rtsa drug). The figure of Maitreya seems not to have had a significant role in our Vinaya, however, and there are very few references to him. The Maitreyavākarana, found both at Gilgit and in the Kanjur, may, by presumption, be Mulasarvāstivādin, but Maitreya may be a figure who is more commonly referred to in modern scholarly literature than in the Indian Buddhist sources themselves; see J. Nattier, "The Meanings of the Maitreya Myth: A Typological Analysis," in Maitreya, the Future Buddha, ed. A. Sponberg & H. Hardacre (Cambridge: 1988) 23-47.

XV

XV.1 Like XIV, this section seems not to have been well integrated into the main account and would perhaps have fit more naturally at the end of IV above. Anāthapiṇḍada's ability to see hoards is also referred to independently elsewhere, at Avadānaśataka (Speyer) i 314-15, for example, when Anāthapiṇḍadda undertakes "a general collection of alms" (chandoka-bhikṣaṇa) a poor woman asks a lay brother: yadi tāvad ayaṁ gṛhapair ādhya mahādhano mahābhogāḥ nitar/bhūmati nidadhāny apī nidhānāni paśyati kasmād ayaṁ parakulebhhyo bhāikṣyam atatihitā, "But if this householder is so rich, wealthy, and well off, and can even see hoards buried in the ground, why does he wander around begging from other families?"

Note too that although sadly under appreciated, there is a good deal of humor in Indian Buddhist literature and, in particular, in the Mulasarvāstivāda-vinaya. Sylvain Lévi noticed this (see his remarks quoted in the Introduction), and it is important to note that without some appreciation for the sometimes sly, sometimes slapstick humor that can be woven into these stories, the little tale that follows here might not make very much sense — it is, after all, a tale about a brahmin trying to peek at Anāthapiṇḍada when he is naked and still not understanding that he cannot, in any case, see what he is looking for.
XV.2 This has already explicitly been said above in IV, and yet is delivered here as if it were news.

XV.3 caraka = spyod pa pa. BHSD s.v. says no more than "one of a heretical sect of ascetics."

XV.4 kutīhalaśālā = rtogs khang. BHSD s.v. gives "hall of discussion" and notes that it is ordinarily used of gatherings of non-Buddhists." But kutīhala seems to mean above all else "curiosity, interest in any extraordinary matter," (see above IX n. 16) the implication being that any talk about it was idle gossip and there is, of course, no kutīhalaśālā for Buddhist monks — they have upaśhānaśālā (see above I n. 2).

XV.5 laksanena, but in Tibetan it is translated as plural: mtshan gung dag [dang] Idan na. A reader of this Vinaya would have recognized immediately that the question was misconceived or even silly — such powers are there not the result of a physical mark or somatic characteristic, but they, and any physical mark as well, are the result of former religious acts (see, for example, the explanation for why Nanda, the Buddha's half-brother, had a golden body and thirty of the thirty-two marks of the Great Man and was therefore hard to distinguish from the Buddha himself — Kṣudraka, Derge Tha 153a.2ff; it was incidentally to avoid any such confusion that the Buddha ordered that monastic robes must be marked with an "insignia" (mtshan ma) that would show their wearer's rank (Tha 162b.7); or the repeated descriptions of the Buddha's hand as caikrasvastikanandiyāvartanānekapunyāsatanirjāte-na, "with a hand marked with a wheel, a swastika, a nandi, and a spiral produced by many hundreds of merits;" Cīvaravastu, GMs iii 2, 129.12; Saṅghabhādavastu ii 188.25; etc).

XV.6 Although bathing in modern India does not necessarily involve total nakedness, there are good indications in our Vinaya that it commonly did in the India of its day (see, for example, Cīvaravastu, GMs iii 2, 85.14 where a servant girl sent by Viśākha sees the monks bathing naked (tayā bhīkṣavo drṣṭā nagnāḥ snātum), and the resulting requirement that they, at least, use "bathing clothes"). Upagū is therefore being presented here as a kind of Peeping Tom following Anāthapindāda around trying to see him naked — a tongue in cheek representation of brahmanical behavior!

XV.7 tasya tena pṛṣṭhena talaprajāro datāh = des de'i rgyab tu thal mos brgyab pa dang/. Neither the Sanskrit nor Tibetan is necessarily difficult to translate, but what such a gesture or action meant culturally is a different matter. I have not come across this action elsewhere in our Vinaya or in other Indian sources and so am without other contexts for guidance. It could mean something like it does, or can, in modern America: to show an artificial or disingenuous camaraderie or sense of acquaintance. This, however, could be wrong; and Phyllis Granoff has ingeniously suggested to me that the text is saying that Upagū "tapped him on the back" so that Anāthapindāda would turn around and he could see his private parts — this seems more than a little plausible! See also below n.9.

XV.8 ksānīsaunātvasamanvāgatah = bzod pa dang des pa dang Idan pa. Upagū could hardly have learned this by seeing Anāthapindāda naked, and since neither patience nor gentleness are "physical marks," his statement — given the context — makes no sense at all. This, however, is almost certainly the point, and it is driven home by the additional fact that, as the text will immediately add, non-buddhist religious not only believed this nonsense, but spread it about; but see also next note.
V.9 ratnacitrāntakaśa = mig gi 'bras bu rin po che ltar bkra ba; hiranyeśvara = dhyig kyi skad. There are problems with both of these lakṣaṇas, and several ways of interpreting the situation. As read by Gnoni — and repeatedly so — the first should mean "having a magnificent private treasury of jewels (and even this may require -ānta- as intended for -antar-, though the former can also mean "inside");" and the second, "the lord of gold," but neither then would be "physical or bodily marks," neither would correspond very well with the account of the "vow" which follows and purportedly explains them, and both would be unsupported by the Tibetan. This may suggest either that Gnoni has misread the ms. — and repeatedly so — or that the ms. itself is corrupt, and extensively so. The Tibetan for the first would have to be translated as "having an eye (or pupil) variegated like a jewel," and for the second — dbyig gi skad — "having a voice of (like) gold (or wealth)." Both then would be physical characteristics; both — but especially the second — would correspond to the account of the vow that produced them; and from both it is not impossible to at least interpret the Sanskrit. The Tibetan dbyig gi skad would, for example, point to the need to emend hiranyeśvara to hiranyaśvara, and this is not a radical emendation. ratnacitrāntakaśa, though, requires something a bit more acrobatic. It would seem to require, in addition to understanding -ānta-in the sense of antar, either that -kośa is an abbreviated nominal compound for netra-kośa, "eye-ball," or that netra- (or something like it) has dropped out of the ms. Finally, it is also possible that the Sanskrit as read and printed by Gnoni is correct and that it then involves some fairly wild punning or word-play which the Tibetan was forced to reduce. Given the uncertainties and possibilities, and in the absence of further manuscript material or parallels (the Pāli tradition, for example, seems to know nothing about these "characteristics" of Anāthapiṇḍada), I have basically followed the Tibetan here, but with no strong conviction, although I have also factored in the Sanskrit -antar-antar- because of the possible parallel noted below in n.18. Note too that P. Granoff has once again suggested to me that the two expressions, however they finally be read, refer to Anāthapiṇḍada's balls and penis, and there are some reasons for thinking this so — antakośa, for example, could well be a pun on anḍakośa, and such things could well have been associated with "jewels" in early India, as in America (e.g. "family jewels"); etc. If this is the case that would explain the obscurity of the text which may well contain a joke that turns on a series of puns and double entendres that I, at least, cannot successfully untangle.

V.10 From here to the end of the verse is a cliche which occurs, for example, in more than fifty of the individual texts in the Avadānaśataka; see Avadāna-çataka (Fcer) 6 and n. 2.

V.11 Another cliche; see above IV and n. 3 there.

V.12 Still another cliche.

V.13 Here yet another cliche occurs — as it frequently does — as an 'editorial insertion' explaining how it is that in this case honor and veneration is shown to someone other than a known Buddha. For another example — one which occurs in a narrative which, in outline, is almost identical to the one we have here and is made up of most of the same clichés — see the account in the Kṣudrakavastu
of the former acts of Nanda which resulted in his having thirty of the thirty-two marks of a Great Man (see above n. 5 and Derge Tha 156a.1ff).

I have translated prayekabuddha as "solitary Buddha," though aware that there are other possibilities.

XV.14\(\text{prasādajāta = dad pa skyes te.}\) Here prasāda is closely associated with saumanasya, "delight." In fact the Tibetan puts them cheek by jowl: \(\text{des thos nas de yid dga' bar gyur cing dad pa skyes te,}\) and to judge by Gnonli's note (32 n.1) — which is hard to interpret — that may have been the case in the ms. as well. Given Gnonli's note, the text here remains unsure.

XV.15\(\text{taddarśānāya samprasthitah.}\) This clause is not translated in the Tibetan. For darśan elsewhere in our text see II n. 21 and VI n. 8 above.

XV.16\(\text{parinirvāta.}\)

XV.17\(\text{tāny āsthīni sphaṭikamaye kumbhe ratnair vyāmśrya prakṣiptāni = rus pa de rnam she las byas ba'i bhum pa'i nangs du rin po che dang bres te blugs pa:}\) This passage is of considerable interest because it is one of the very rare references in Buddhist literary sources to what is, in effect, a crystal 'reliquary,' and to the deposition of precious substances together with post-cremational remains, both of which are, in turn, not infrequently found in the archeological record (for some good illustrations of early crystal 'reliquaries' see M. Willis, Buddhist Reliquaries from Ancient India (London: 2000) figs 88, 98, 103, 105, 110; for a survey of the kinds of precious substances found in 'relic' deposits see A. Ghosh, ed., An Encyclopaedia of Indian Archaeology (New Delhi: 1989) Vol. 1, 270-75.

The reference to extinguishing the pyre with milk (kṣīra) is also found elsewhere — see, for example, the text in the Kṣudrakavastu referred to in n. 13 above; or the account of the death and cremation of the Monk Kālodayin from the Viḍhāṅga translated in Schopen, "Ritual, Rites and Bones of Contention," 35.

XV.18\(\text{tāny anahāsthanā, there is no word for pot.}\) Notice, though, that the bones then shine "inside" (antar) the pot, like Anāthaśriyad's "inner" eye (-ānta/vīra/kośa) — this possible parallelism might add some support to the interpretations suggested above for ratmacitrāntakāśa, although they remain very shaky.

XV.19\(\text{pādayor nipatya = drung du gtugs nas.}\) If the Tibetan was translating the same Sanskrit it can only be considered a free rendering. This same curious, 'anthropomorphic,' idiom — with the same explicitly dual form — is also applied to stūpas; see Adhikaranavastu 70.12 (pādayor nipatya is here also translated by drung du gtugs te — Derge Ga 229b.7); Sanghabhedavastu i 161.25 (where it is translated as drung du bzhud des — Derge Nga 75b.7); but also Viḍhāṅga Nya 66a.3, where \(\text{rrkang pa gnyis la phyag 'ishal nas occurs.}\) Notice that at Śayanāsa 8.14 (= II above) the same idiom is used to describe what a king does when he approaches a revered Rṣi, and at 22.8 (=IX above) to describe what the Renunciant Raktākṣa does when he takes refuge with Śāriputra.
XV.20 \( \text{kārām kṛtvā = bya ba byas nas.} \)

XV.21 The very large place that relics, stūpas, and veneration of them played in the religious 'biographies' of both Buddhist lay brothers and sisters is nicely exemplified here in this account of Anāthapiṇḍada. But it is important to note that the same pattern occurs in, for example, the religious biographies of Buddhist monks — at least as they are presented in Mūlasarvāstivādin sources; see M. Hofinger, *Le congrès du lac anavatāpla (Vies de saints bouddhiques)* (Louvain: 1954).

XV.22 The whole of this exhortation explicitly addressed to monks is a cliché and, as already noted, it is perfectly fitted to and characteristic of Vinaya literature. The fact that it also occurs in, for example, almost half of the *avadāṇas* in the *Avadānaśataka* would seem to confirm that such collections should also be considered Vinaya texts; see *Avadāna-cataka* (Feer) 3, and II ns. 27 and 35 above.

XV.23 This *antarodāna*, like the *uddāna* at the head of our text and the various *uddānas* that will occur below, will be treated in an appendix to Part II of this translation. In this particular instance although the key word-index comes after XV it summarizes XIV and makes no reference to the former.
Dandala, Dhāraṇī, and Denarii

A T’ien-t’ai Perspective on

The Great Vaipulya Dhāraṇī Sūtra

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The Ta fang-teng t’o-lo-ni ching 大方等陀羅尼經, or “The Great Vaipulya Dhāraṇī Sūtra” (T #1339, 21.641–661)\(^1\) appears to have been one of the earliest dhāraṇī texts available in China, the translation into Chinese being attributed to Fa-chung 法衆 sometime between 402 and 413.\(^2\) It served as the basis for T’ien-t’ai Chih-i’s 天台智顗 (538–597) explicatio of the “Vaipulya Samādhi” 方等三昧, one of the two practices explained under the category of the “Both-walking-and-sitting Samādhi” 半行半坐三昧 in the Mo-ho chih-kuan 摩訶止觀 (T 46.13a–14b).\(^3\) It is therefore of interest at many levels. First, it is the scriptural basis for Chih-i’s explicatio of the Vaipulya Samādhi, which in turn served as authoritative for the subsequent T’ien-t’ai tradition, with its broad

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\(^1\) This title is Sanskritized in the Hōbōgirin Taishō catalogue (p. 116) as *Pratyutpanna-buddha-sammukhāvasthita-samādhi-sūtra* (same as for T #417 and #418), but this must be a mistake; *Mahā-vaipulya-dhāraṇī-sūtra* would be a better reconstruction from the Chinese.

\(^2\) As Daniel Stevenson points out, “an earlier translation of a Ta fang-teng t’an-ch’ih (or t’an-teh) t’o-lo-ni ching in one fascicle dating from between 291 and 299 is mentioned in certain early catalogs as well, but whether it represents an earlier recension of the work is unknown.” See p. 91, note 54 in “The Four Kinds of Samadhi in Early T’ien-t’ai Buddhism,” Traditions of Meditation in Chinese Buddhism, Peter Gregory, ed., Honolulu: The University of Hawai‘i Press, 1986, pp. 45–97. Yamabe Nobuyoshi has done some work on this sūtra, in conjunction with his study of the Fan wang jing, and claims (personal communication, 21 April 1995) that there is reason to believe that the text (or at least parts of it) is apocryphal.

\(^3\) For details on this samādhi see the article by Stevenson quoted above.
influence on Buddhist practices in East Asia. Second, it serves as an example of Buddhist practice during the early years of Buddhism in China, as well as a specific practice undertaken by Chih-i himself in his younger years. Third, it contains some surprising and intriguing contents—such as the dreams required to authenticate a person’s insight and allow one to continue to practice, and the story of the man who sells himself for a few denarii (Roman currency) in order to make offerings to his master. Finally, it is an example of an early dhāraṇī text, whereas most of the scriptures important in the esoteric (Jpn. mikkyō) tradition of later Tendai Buddhism in Japan were translated into Chinese after the time of Chih-i.

The Great Vaipulya Dhāraṇī Sūtra and its use in medieval Chinese Buddhism merits study on its own—the practice of the Vaipulya rite was widespread in early medieval China and certainly not limited to Chih-i and his associates. In this translation, however, I have focussed on the sections of the sūtra referred to by Chih-i in his texts such as the Mo-ho chih-kuan. Passages quoted by Chih-i in the Mo-ho chih-kuan or other texts are highlighted with bold type. I have thus omitted many tales, points of cultic lore, doctrinal dialectics, and sections that would be of interested to those concerned with the sūtra itself, the influence of dhāraṇī texts, or the significance of the Vaipulya rite in early medieval Chinese society. A fully annotated translation of the complete sūtra and a broader analysis of its influence would certainly be welcome, but would require a book-length study and is left to those with a greater expertise in these issues.

The Contents of the Sūtra and its Central Dhāraṇī

The Great Vaipulya Dhāraṇī Sūtra teaches about the origins, merits, methods of practice, and so forth, of the Mo-ho t’an-ch’ih t’o-lo-ni (*Mahā t’an-ch’ih dhāraṇī—“Great Dhāraṇī for Overcoming Evil and Upholding the Good,” or “Great Dhāraṇī for Subduing *Dandala”). Before outlining the contents of this sūtra, some comments are in order concerning the meaning of the characters t’an-ch’ih 祖持, particularly as understood by Chih-i.

In the Mo-ho chih-kuan (T 46.13b22–23) Chih-i glosses the compound t’an-ch’ih to mean “inhibiting evil and upholding good.” Although ch’ih means “upholding,” the character t’an 祖 does not mean preventing or inhibiting, but rather “to lay bare, to strip,” and
the character appears often in the sūtra as part of the compound “laying bare the shoulder” when one pays homage to the Buddha. It seems more likely that t’an is used here for its phonetic value to represent a Sanskrit sound, perhaps the Sanskrit letter ṭa or ḍha. Mochizuki suggests that ṭa can stand for the (Prakrit) word ṭahati (Skt. dahati, to burn), and can therefore signify “burning away the defilements.”

Perhaps this is the reason why Chih-i glosses the character to mean “inhibiting” or “overcoming” evil.

There is another possibility for interpreting this compound. The sūtra itself (T 21.641c-642) says that the dhāraṇī were provided by the Buddha as a means to subdue the evil power of the Māra (demon) king “T’an-t’u-lo” 神茶羅, who had threatened to destroy the good roots of the Buddha’s followers, and the Māra king is indeed subdued by these dhāraṇī in the course of the sūtra’s narrative (642c). The first character in the name of this Māra king, t’an 神, is the same as that in the name of the dhāraṇī. It is possible, despite Chih-i’s gloss, that this phrase means “great T’an(-t’u-lo)-subduing dhāraṇī.” These two explanations need not be contradictory—in either case the dhāraṇī are meant to subdue evil influences.

As for the name of the Māra king, the Karlgren phonetic readings for these characters is ‘d’an-,d’a-)a, suggesting a possible transcription of *Dandala.

Another possibility is that t’an-ch’ih is a “mixed binome,” a transliteration-cum-translation of the term “dhāraṇī” itself. T’an could be a transliteration of some form of the Sanskrit root of dhar or ḍhy, and the character ch’ih 持 (“to hold”) commonly occurs in the compound 持持, a translation of dhāraṇī. As Stevenson explains:

“The Sanskrit term dhāraṇī, derived from the root dhā [or ḍhy], “to

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5 The only reference to this dhāraṇī that I could track down [thanks to the help of Charles Orzech] was an entry in Soothill and Hodous’s A Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms (though the fourth character is a misprint; 持 instead of the correct 持), which defines the phrase as “Mahātantra(dhāraṇī), great spell power for overcoming the evil and cleaving to the good” (p. 437).
6 Endō Yūjin et al., in their recent Japanese translation of The Great Vaipulya Dhāraṇī Sūtra (Shin Kokuyaku Daizōkyō 12, Tokyo: Daizō Shuppan, 1994, p. 211), opt for the transliteration “Daṇḍala,” linking the name with 梵陀羅, one of the five great yakṣa associated with Vaiśravaṇa in the Āgama texts (see T 1.130c).
hold” or “to retain,” carries the general meaning of something that enables one to retain, recollect, secure, hold, and so forth. Chih-i’s description of dhāraṇī as “securing the good” and “checking evil” renders this basic idea and, in fact, itself seems to derive directly from a definition of the term in the Ta chih tu lun, which states:

Dhāraṇī is a word from the western regions. In this region it translates as “able to secure” or else “able to check.” As for being able to secure, it gathers and secures various wholesome qualities and is able to hold and secure them and prevent them from being scattered or lost.... As for being able to abolish, when evil or unwholesome propensities arise, it is able to check them and prevent them from manifesting. [T 25.95c10–16]

If this interpretation is correct, then the name of the dhāraṇī in this sutra would translate “Great-dhāraṇī Dhāraṇī”—a bit redundant, but there are more extreme examples of redundancy in Buddhist literature.

Let us now take a quick look at the contents of the sutra. In brief, the sutra consists of five parts:

1. INTRODUCTION [641A–648A]

The Buddha responds to the entreaty of Manjusri by revealing a variety of dhāraṇī that are efficacious for practicing confession or repentance, extinguishing evil and bestowing blessing, quelling demonic forces, and so forth. These are the mahā t’an-ch’ih dhāraṇī (given along with a set of eighteen other types of dhāraṇī). These dhāraṇī are taught to subdue the demonic Mara king *Dandala, who had threatened to destroy the “good roots” of one of Buddha’s followers. The bodhisattva “Flower Cluster” 華聚 (*Puṣpakūṭa) uses these dhāraṇī to overcome the demons, who then become the “twelve dream kings” responsible for protecting those who practice the dhāraṇī rite. The Buddha explains the “history” of these dhāraṇī, how they have helped various figures overcome temptation and arouse bodhicitta, and the various powers of the dhāraṇī.

2. PREDICTIONS [648A–651C]

The Buddha entrusts these dhāraṇī to Ānanda and predicts the eventual realization of Buddhahood by various divine, human, and sub-human beings. He sings the praises of these dhāraṇī and, in response again to Manjusri’s entreaty, explains their meaning and

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how to cultivate them. Finally, the Buddha explains the evil karma that will befall those who slander this Dharma.

3. THE PRACTICE OF DREAMS [652A-656A]

The Buddha, with reference to the “twelve dream kings,” explains in detail the seven-day practice of these dhāraṇī. He teaches that one who keeps and recites these dhāraṇī will be reborn in the pure land of Flower Cluster. This is the section referred to most frequently by Chih-i in explaining the content of the Vaipulya Samādhi.

4. KEEPING THE PRECEPTS [656A-658A]

The Buddha explains the dhāraṇī and method of repentance taught by the seven Buddhas in the past for the sake of those who have broken the four major precepts, as well as the dhāraṇī and method of repentance for those who have broken the eight major precepts. The Buddha encourages his listeners to accept and follow the eight major precepts, and explains the content of the precepts, five matters with regard to keeping the precepts, and the fact that the practice of keeping the precepts has two aspects—the worldly and the transworldly.

5. ON THE INCONCEIVABLE LOTUS [658A-661A]

The Buddha praises the benefits of the dhāraṇī and encourages the assembly to disseminate and keep these dhāraṇī.

_T‘ien-t’ai Chih-i’s Practice of the Vaipulya Samādhi_

It is known that Chih-i’s master Hui-ssu 慧思 (515–577) taught a “Vaipulya samādhi” based on this sutra, but Chih-i was familiar with the sūtra and the samādhi taught therein even before practicing under Hui-ssu. According to the biography of Chih-i by Kuan-ting (T 50.191c), Chih-i practiced this samādhi in his early twenties on Mt. Ta hsien 大賢山, and again at Mt. Ta-su 大蘇山 under the tutelage of Hui-ssu. Basically it consisted of chanting over and over the _mahā t’an-ch’ih_

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dhārāṇī as one circumambulated a Buddha image or altar, repented of one’s inadequacies, and then retreated to sit in contemplation. It was a method open not only to monks but also to lay people, and promised such “worldly benefits” as the healing of disease and fostering a long life. It was very popular during the era of the Northern and Southern dynasties in China (5th–6th centuries), and it is said that Chih-i’s brother also practiced this samādhi and lengthened his life by fifteen years (T 50.197c).

This samādhi is discussed in detail by Chih-i in two other works:

1. the *Fang-teng san-mei hsing-fa* 方等三昧行法 (Method for practicing the Vaipulya Samādhi), T 1940, 46.943–949; and
2. Section 6 (*Fang-teng ch’an-fa* 方等禪法, The Vaipulya repentance method) of the *Kuo-ch’ing pai-lu* 國清百錄 (One hundred records of the Kuo-ch’ing temple, a collection of one hundred and four historical records, including letters, explanations of temple life and regulations, etc., connected with Chih-i), T 1934, 46.796b–798c.

The first of these two works, the *Hsing-fa*, is not mentioned at all in the *Mo-ho chih-kuan*. Neither does it appear in any of the early catalogues of Buddhist texts until 1024, when it was reintroduced to China from Japan by Jakushō, a disciple of Genshin, in the tenth century. These facts lead one to suspect that the *Hsing-fa* may not be properly attributed to Chih-i. Satô Tetsuei, however, upon comparing the contents of the text to other works known to be by Chih-i, and references to it in Buddhist works by later authors, concludes that it is an authentic yet very early work of Chih-i that came to be overlooked in favor of the simpler accounts in the *Kuo-ch’ing pai-lu* and *Mo-ho chih-kuan*. The practice taught in the *Hsing-fa* is very similar to, though much more complicated than, the later explanations. For example, it calls for many more days of practice than the seven suggested in the *Mo-ho chih-kuan*. The structure of the explanations is also quite different:

- The *Hsing-fa* consists of six sections:
  1. Preparing the six conditions 具六緣
  2. Being conscious of the obstacles to practice 識遮障
  3. Prohibitions 禁法
  4. An outline of the “internal” precepts 内律要決
  5. The practice proper 修行
  6. Accepting the precepts 受成

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[The last two sections, 5 and 6, are not extant.] The Kuo-ch'ing pai-lu account (the Ch'an-fa) consists of five sections on:
1. Exhortations
2. Preparations
3. The method
4. Mental states that are contrary to or in accordance with [nirvāṇa and saṃsāra]
5. Manifestation of [the symbolic significance of] the method

The presentation of Vaipulya samādhi in the Mo-ho chih-kuan consists of the three sections: 1. on the body (what actions to take), 2. speech (when to speak and when to be silent), and 3. mind (the purpose or goal of contemplation), followed by exhortations to practice this samādhi.

As Satō points out, these three works attributed to Chih-i are quite different in apparent structure, but a comparison of their actual content shows that they are quite similar. Most of the content of the Ch'an-fa, though in an abbreviated form, is given in the Mo-ho chih-kuan. The content of section 4 of the Kuo-ch'ing pai-lu on “a mind that is contrary to or in accord with [nirvāṇa or saṃsāra]” is found in the Mo-ho chih-kuan not under the explanation of the Vaipulya Samādhi, but in a later section (fascicle 4, part 1; T 46.39c). Another difference between the texts is that in the Hsing-fa the interpretation of the content of samādhi (referred to as kuan in the Mo-ho chih-kuan) is not discussed in terms of the integrated threefold truth and threefold contemplation, the central philosophical insight of Chih-i’s mature work. This indicates that the Hsing-fa was an earlier work of Chih-i, taught before his great insight into the integrated threefold truth attained during his seclusion on Mt. T’ien-t’ai between 575 and 585 and his major explication of this insight in his later works.

Satō (p. 218) concludes that the abbreviated explanation in the Mo-ho chih-kuan assumes knowledge and use of the version provided in the Kuo-ch'ing pai-lu, and that the much earlier and more complicated Hsing-fa was superseded by these versions. Thus the material in the Ch'an-fa of the Kuo-ch'ing pai-lu is crucial for a full understanding of the Vaipulya Samādhi as presented in the Mo-ho chih-kuan, while the details in the Hsing-fa provide insight into the early development of Chih-i’s teaching concerning this practice.¹¹

¹¹ Translations of these two works are under preparation as part of the
Finally, it is significant that Chih-i is not much concerned with the dhāraṇī themselves, nor in their magical or supranormal powers as explained in the sūtra. Chih-i does not deny their magical powers, but the practice is seen, especially in the Mo-ho chih-kuan, as “merely” another means for attaining the higher goal of realizing the integrated threefold truth of emptiness, conventionality, and the Middle (see the Mo-ho chih-kuan, T 46.13a24–14b25).

Partial Translation

Ta fang-teng t’o-lo-ni ching
大方等陀羅尼經
[The Great Vaipulya Dhāraṇī Sūtra]
[T #1339, 21.641–661]12

translated by the monk Fa-chung 法衆 of Pei-liang 北涼, at Kao-ch’ang commandery 高昌郡 [Turfan].

1. Introduction [641a–648a]
Thus have I heard. At one time the Buddha was at the Jeta grove in

project to translate the Mo-ho chih-kuan. See Swanson, “Report on the 10-Year Project to Translate the Mo-ho chih-kuan into Western Languages,” Bulletin of the Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture 15 (1991), pp. 13–20. Daniel Stevenson has prepared annotated translations of both of these works which, I hope, will be published eventually.

12 As explained above, my interest in this sūtra derives from its use by Chih-i, particularly in the Mo-ho chih-kuan. The sections translated below were chosen on the basis of being referred to by Chih-i in the Mo-ho chih-kuan, not necessarily on the basis of their intrinsic interest or importance in other contexts. Phrases or passages referred to by Chih-i in the Mo-ho chih-kuan or other texts are given in bold type. There are many suggestive passages in the sūtra that beg for more detailed annotation, but I offer this partial translation as one perspective in hopes that those more qualified in such topics as early Chinese sūtras, the use of dhāraṇīs, dream interpretation, and Sanskrit-Chinese transliteration will provide a more thorough study.

Taishō page numbers are given in brackets at appropriate breaks in the text and at a column break. I have translated about a third of the content of the sūtra. Sections left untranslated are marked by ellipses and/or short summaries of the content.
Śrāvastī, together with five hundred great disciples. At that time Mañjuśrī, the prince of the Dharma, came from Rājagrha together with an assembly of ninety-two kotis of bodhisattva-mahasattvas. Their names were Prince of the Dharma Mañjuśrī, Prince of the Dharma Compassion-King, Prince of the Dharma Great Eyes, Prince of the Dharma Brahma Sounds, Prince of the Dharma Wondrous Appearance, Prince of the Dharma Candana Incense Grove, Prince of the Dharma Sound of the Lion’s Roar, Prince of the Dharma Wonderful Voice, Prince of the Dharma Wonderfully Formed Visage, Prince of the Dharma Myriad Adornments, Prince of the Dharma Śākya Banners, Prince of the Dharma Ūrṇa, and so forth, ninety-two kotis in all. They arrived at the Jeta grove and saw the Buddha, the World Honored One. They circumambulated the Buddha three times, bowed their heads at his feet and withdrew to one side, beseeching the World Honored One to turn the wheel of the Dharma.

[641a13–b4: Five hundred princes led by King Prasenajit, six hundred upāsaka, five hundred devout upāsikā, and five hundred sons of grhapati 長者子 also arrive and beseech the Buddha to preach the Dharma].

[641b4] At that time Mañjuśrī arose from his seat, bared his right shoulder, put his right knee on the ground, pressed his palms together with respect, and without wavering in his gaze spoke to the Buddha, saying, “O World Honored One, Tathāgata, all the dhāraṇī gates that you expound, from beginning to end, are supreme in the world, supreme within the Saddharma, and supreme among all the gods. Sentient beings, here and with these supreme dharmas, can enter the gates of dhāraṇī and contemplate the realm of Buddhahood. World Honored One, through the power of your great compassion—and for the sake of innumerable, boundless sentient beings—expound and explain the names 名字 of the dhāraṇī.”

The Buddha said to Mañjuśrī, “Excellent, excellent, good son. You have asked about the gates of dhāraṇī for the sake of [relieving] the immeasurable suffering of sentient beings. Good son, you should now listen carefully. I will now briefly teach for your sake the names of the dhāraṇī.”

13 The Sanskrit koti usually means “ten million,” and the Chinese 億 means 100 million. The most elegant solution would be to round these numbers off to the English “million” or “billion,” but in this translation I will retain the term koti.
Good son, [there are many kinds of dhāraṇī]:

[1] there is a dhāraṇī called *mo-ho t‘an-ch‘iḥ 摩訶祖持 [K. ‘d‘ân-d‘i’];\(^{14}\)
[2] there is a dhāraṇī called *Mahā-revati摩訶離婆帝 [K. ‘ljič-b‘uā-tie’i’];
[3] there is a dhāraṇī called Jeweled Banner 瑪幢;
[4] there is a dhāraṇī called Jeweled Flame 瑪焰;
[5] there is a dhāraṇī called Jeweled Parasol 瑪蓋;
[6] there is a dhāraṇī called Vajra Parasol 金剛蓋;
[7] there is a dhāraṇī called Vajra Resplendence 金剛耀;
[8] there is a dhāraṇī called Various Colored Adornments 諸色莊嚴;
[9] there is a dhāraṇī called Vajra-Colored Body 金剛色身;
[10] there is a dhāraṇī called Assorted Adornments 種種莊嚴;\(^{15}\)
[11] there is a dhāraṇī called *Bahudara 貶睆陀羅 [K. b‘uāt-gyṛu-d‘ã-lå];
[12] there is a dhāraṇī called *Vigadara 里伽陀羅 [K. b‘jĩ-g‘i-a-d‘ã-lå];
[13] there is a dhāraṇī called Water-Light 水光;\(^{16}\)
[14] there is a dhāraṇī called Samādhi 三昧;
[15] there is a dhāraṇī called Flower Cluster [*Puspakūṭa] 華聚;
[16] there is a dhāraṇī called Established 決定;
[17] there is a dhāraṇī called Eternal Abiding 常住;
[18] there is a dhāraṇī called Many Flower Fragrances 衆華香;
[19] there is a dhāraṇī called Assorted Rays of Light 種種光明.

“Good son. In this way there are ninety-two koṭis of gates of dhāraṇī, as many as the sands of the Ganges River. Each and every dhāraṇī also has ninety-two koṭis of gates, as many as the sands of the Ganges River. Accordingly, the wise one[s] explain successively in accordance with three sets [of dharaṇī].”

When the names of these dhāraṇī were taught, the ninety-two koṭis of bodhisattvas led by Mañjuśrī dwelt in the patience [of tolerating the knowledge] that dharmas do not arise 無生法忍 (anupattika-dharma-kṣānti), the six hundred upāsaka dwelt with the aspiration to become a

\(^{14}\) See my discussion of this term above.

\(^{15}\) I follow the variant reading for this term.

\(^{16}\) Or, “Eternal Light.” It is possible that the character 水 “water” is a mistake for 永, “long” or “eternal.”
pratyekabuddha 住辟支佛心 (pratyekabodhicitta); the five hundred upāsikā were liberated from defilements and attained the purity of the Dharma-eye; and the five hundred sons of grhapati aroused the aspiration for full enlightenment (sambodhi).

Then the princes led by King Prasenajit went before the Buddha and asked for permission to become home-departed ones. [641c] The Buddha said to the princes, “Excellent, excellent. Now is the proper time for you to be able to seek permission to become home-departed ones in my Dharma.”

The Buddha said [further] to the princes, “Welcome 善來, bhikṣus” [ehi bhikṣu]. Then their hair and beards fell off and Dharma robes clothed their bodies, and [the princes] became śramaṇas, replete with the precepts.

At that time the World Honored One taught the Dharma of the four [noble] truths for the sake of the bhikṣus. Then the bhikṣus became endowed with the three illuminating insights 三明 and the six supranormal powers 六神通. Then the bhikṣus beseeched the World Honored One to turn the wheel of the Dharma.

At that time the World Honored One silently gave his seal of approval 印可 and, entering the gates of dhāraṇī, emitted a great ray of light that illumined the immeasurable kotis of thousands of nayutas of trichiliocosms to the east ... [and so forth to the west, south, north, the four intermediate directions, nadir, and zenith]. ... Each one had immeasurable kotis of thousands of nayutas of assemblies of yakṣa having seen this light, and they were led by this light to this sahā-world. Arriving at the Jeta grove, they saw the Tathāgata Śākyamuni having entered the gate of dhāraṇī, and saw Mañjuśrī and the princes of the Dharma seated near the Buddha, wishing to beseech the Buddha to turn the wheel of the Dharma.

17 The “three illuminating insights” are three supranormal insights attained by arhats: 1) the ability to see the conditions and events of the past and thus know the faults of oneself and others; 2) the ability to see the results that are to come in the future, and thus be able to sever mistaken views; and 3) the ability to know and thus exhaust all the passionate afflictions of the present. The six supranormal powers (abhijñā) are 1) the ability to appear anywhere one wishes; 2) the ability to see one’s own and others’ future lives; 3) the ability to hear sounds that others cannot hear; 4) the ability to read other peoples’ minds; 5) the ability to perceive one’s own and others’ past lives; and 6) the ability to remove one’s passionate afflictions.
At that time the assembly of immeasurable thousands of koṭis of nayutas of yaksas, along with Mañjuśrī and all the bodhisattva-mahāsattvas, and the five hundred great disciples and upāsaka and upāsikā and householders and householders’ sons each followed the Buddha in entering the gate of dhāraṇī.

At that time in the crowd there was a certain bhikṣu named Thunder Voice. He arose from his seat, came to the [Jeta] grove, and entered meditation (dhyāna samādhi).

Then in the sky there was an assembly of māra-demons. At that time in that assembly there was a Māra king named *Dandala 柵荼羅 [K. ‘dān‌-d’ā-lā]. There, in mid-air, he thought to himself, “Just now, the Buddha Śākyamuni, surrounded on all sides by an immeasurable assembly of beings, has preached the Dharma so that they reap great and good benefits. Now this bhikṣu [Thunder Voice] has also entered into meditation. If I do not destroy the good roots and conditions of this bhikṣu, then this bhikṣu will undoubtedly during this bhadrakalpa attain anuttarasamāyaksambodhi, attain omniscience (sarvajña), and reap great and good benefits. I should now lead my retinue [of demons] to destroy the good roots and conditions of this bhikṣu.”

At that time the Māra king led his retinue of ninety-two koṭis [of demons] and came to the Jeta grove, and attempted to cover up and conceal this bhikṣu’s good roots and conditions. Then the bhikṣu Thunder Voice, in great lamentation cried out in a great voice, “I pay homage (nama) to the immeasurable Buddhas of the ten directions and the three times [of the past, present, and future]. I pay homage to the immeasurable Dharmas of the ten directions and the three times. I pay homage to those who are content with little 少分足人 (ārya-sangha?) in the ten directions.” He thus intoned in this way.

At that time the Buddhas of the ten directions intoned in unison, [642a] “What Dharma can save this bhikṣu?”

Then the Treasure-King Buddha raised his hand and said, “There are a great many bodhisattvas in this bodhisattva assembly. Is there no one who can save this bhikṣu from his suffering?”

At that time there was within the assembly a bodhisattva named Flower Cluster 華聚 (*Puṣpakūta). He arose from his seat, bared his right shoulder, put his right knee on the ground, and pressed his

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18 Endō, et al., interpret this phrase to mean “bodhisattvas” (p. 211, note 13), in light of a later passage (642a20) which uses this phrase to refer to a bhūmi-stage at which 84,000 bodhisattvas were dwelling.
palms together in the direction of the Buddha. Then he said to the Buddha, “What Dharma is able to command this Dandala?”

Then the Buddha said to the bodhisattva-mahāsattva Flower Cluster, “Do you not know? I can command this Dandala with the secret Dharma of the Buddhas.” At that time the Buddha spoke to the bodhisattva-mahāsattva Flower Cluster, “I can, by means of the verses of the *Mahā t’an-ch’ih dhāraṇī, conquer the evil one (Pāpiyān) and increase the good roots of that monk. Listen well now, and I will explain for you this secret Dharma of the Buddhas.”

Flower Cluster said to the Buddha, “May it be so, World Honored One. I joyfully desire to hear such a wonderful Dharma as this.”

The Buddha said to Flower Cluster, “I now say to you, do not recklessly proclaim such a wondrous Dharma as this. One should use [a sign from] the spirits as a confirmation. Who are these called ‘the spirits'? Good son, there are surely twelve ‘dream kings.’ When someone sees one of these kings, you can expound [the verses] to them.”

Then the World Honored One explained the verses of the dhāraṇī.

[642a15–c12: The Treasure-King Buddha expounds and teaches to Flower Cluster two sets of dhāraṇī (642a15–19). Flower Cluster magically transports himself to the Sāhā realm, confronts and subdues Dandala and his retinue by calling on the power and wisdom of the Buddha, and recites these two sets of dhāraṇī (b23–23 and b29–c1). At Flower Cluster’s urging, Dandala and his retinue see the error of their ways and recite a third set of dhāraṇī (642c9–12) in order to arouse sambodhicitta. (These three sets of dhāraṇī comprise the t’an-ch’ih dhāraṇī.) Flower Cluster praises Dandala as a “son of the Buddha” and for his receiving the verses of the t’an-ch’ih dhāraṇī. Dandala and his retinue become the Twelve Great (Dream) Kings and vow to uphold the verses of the mahā t’an-ch’ih dhāraṇī, bless those who pay homage to and receive this sūtra, and act as the “twelve spiritual kings” to protect these people from suffering and misfortune. Flower Cluster gives the names of the twelve kings (c20–24), and each king vows to save and protect those who recite and practice this dhāraṇī sūtra. They thus serve as the sworn protectors of the Vaipulya Dhāraṇī and its rite. Again, upholding this sūtra causes people to quickly attain samyaksambodhi.]

[643a2–8] At that time Thunder Voice arose from his seat, pressed his palms together, paid respect to Flower Cluster, and said, “Well

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19 For details on the dream kings and the role of dreams, see section 3 of the sūtra on “The Practice of Dreams” [652a1–656a23].
done, you who have accumulated many dharmas. By upholding these great Vaipulya dhāraṇīs, you have come and saved me. I have been caused to have an increase in life-span, and to arouse a mind that is within the Dharma. It is as if a dead person has come back from the dead. I am also now like this. Your fortitude in the Dharma is now such that you are the mother of Dharmas. I have been caused to have a mind that is firm in the Dharma, and life has been given to my body.” Then Flower Cluster said, “I am not the mother of Dharmas. Dhāraṇī like these are surely the mother and father. You should accept and uphold these dhāraṇīs.” ...

[643a8–645a6: Thunder Voice tells Flower Cluster about Śākyamuni. They set off for the Jeta grove, accompanied by Dandala and his retinue, to pay homage to Śākyamuni. The gods anticipate hearing of the ambrosia of the Dharma from this encounter and cause a stir; Śākyamuni hears this heavenly music and instructs Ānanda to go out and meet the approaching visitors. Flower Cluster emits a ray of light that illuminates immeasurable lands in all directions. This light liberates Vasu and ninety-two kotis of offenders, who join the assembly at Jeta. There follows a lengthy discussion of these figures—where they came from, the conditions that led them here, and the efficacy of the Vaipulya dhāraṇī. These figures provide the background for the following story. The Buddha points out to Thunder Voice that these figures were his teachers (“good friends”) in the past.]

[645a6] [The Buddha said to Thunder Voice,] “Now, you should listen clearly. I will expound this for your sake. Good son, in the past there was a Buddha named *Caṇḍanapuṣpa 梵檀華, a Tathāgata, an unattached one (arhat), one who has reached the truth (arhat), a samyaksambuddha. This Buddha departed from the world at an exceedingly great and inconceivable span of time ago. At this time [my relationship] to him was no different than yours [to me now].

Also, good son, at this time there was a bodhisattva named Foremost One [*Pūrvamgama], who as a mendicant entered the city to beg for food. At that time there was a bhikṣu named *Gaṅga 伽伽[K. yangga]22 who asked the mendicant, “From where did you come?” He

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20 Vasu was a sage who fell into hell due to committing offenses such as taking life. See, for example, the *Ta chih tu lun, T 25.76a.

21 The use of two different epithets for “arhat” suggests that this is an apocryphal text.

answered, "I have come from the midst of the truly real."
Gaṅgā then asked, "What is real?"
He said, "It is truly real if it is marked by quiescent extinction."
[Gaṅgā] said, "Is there something to be sought within that called 'the marks of quiescent extinction'?"
Foremost One answered, "There is nothing to be sought."
He said, "If there is nothing to be sought, then what use is seeking?"
Foremost One answered, "Precisely because I am in the midst of that which cannot be sought, I seek it."
[Gaṅgā] said, "But in the midst of that which cannot be sought, how does one seek?"
He answered, "Whatever one seeks, all is empty. Attainment is empty; attachment to something is empty; reality is empty; he who comes is also empty. Speech is also empty; questions are also empty. The quiescent extinction in nirvāṇa again is also empty. All of space and the realms of the world are also all empty. Because of this progressively ordered dharma of emptiness [that has just been expounded], I seek the truly real."
Gaṅgā said, "How does one seek the 'real'? You say that all the myriad dharmas are also empty. Then how does one seek?"
He answered, "Because the empty [dharmas] are empty 皆空, they are real."
[Gaṅgā] asked, "Where should the bodhisattva now seek the real dharmas?"
He answered, "One should seek them within the midst of the six pāramitās."
"What are these six?"
"They are dāna-pāramitā, śīla-pāramitā, kṣaṇi-pāramitā, virya-pāramitā, dhyāna-pāramitā, and prajñā-pāramitā."
When Foremost One had spoken (thus), at that time Gaṅgā rejoiced and danced for joy, and immediately respectfully bowed his head at Foremost One’s feet, and asked further, "What food should be offered to this person [i.e., you]?
Foremost One answered, "This person [I] should be offered the flavor of ambrosia (sudhā)."23
Then Gaṅgā went toward the city and announced, "I want to sell my body. Who needs it?"
At that time there was within the assembly a certain householder

23 Sudhā refers to "the nectar of the gods." See Monier-Williams, p. 1225.
named *Vinuli 般奴律 [K. b'ji-nuo-linēt; p'ī-nu-lu] who came forward and said, “I want to buy it. How much are you asking?”


He said, “How many pieces do you want?”

Gaṅgā replied, “I want five pieces.”

Then the householder immediately counted out five coins 五銖, thus purchasing this monk, and used him to fill [the ranks of] his servants.

Then Gaṅgā said to the great householder, “My body belongs to you. [But] temporarily, for seven days, I wish to make offerings to the bhikṣu Foremost One.”

At that time the householder spoke to Gaṅgā, saying, “I will now take you and show you my house; then you will be free to go back.” So Gaṅgā saw the house [of the householder], and then walked back on the road and returned. He saw that Foremost One had not yet received any food from his begging rounds, and so he took Foremost One into the city and bought food and drink of a hundred flavors. After he had bought this food [and drink], he brought him to a certain temple. The temple was called “The Four Kings” 四王. He arranged gifts of various kinds of mats and seats, various kinds of

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24 Nakamura’s Bukkyōgo daijiten (p. 901) states that this is the transliteration for Skt. dināra, or a Roman denarius, an ancient Roman silver or gold coin. Though the standard of exchange would be different, this is a coinage also quoted in the Bible as the wages for a day’s work (see the parable of the workers in the vineyard [Matthew 20:1-16], who agree to work for a denarius a day). Nakamura cites Paramartha’s translation of the Abhidharmakośa, T 29.230a10; see also the Sphutarthā Abhidharmakośavyākhya, The Work of Yaśomitra, ed. by Unrai Wogihara, Tokyo: The Publishing Association of Abhidharmakośavyākhya, 1932–1936 (reprinted in two parts, Sankibo Buddhist Book Store, 1971). p. 368. The Index to the Abhidharmakośabāhāṣya, HIRAKAWA Akira, et al., eds., Tokyo: Daizo Shuppan, part two (Chinese-Sanskrit), 1977, p. 317, also lists this compound as “dināra.” Perhaps the use of this common currency is not so surprising if we consider that the use of Roman coins was widespread in the ancient world from Europe to India.

Or should the four characters 須陀那羅 be taken as a full transliteration of sudhā nara, since sudhā (ambrosia) is the requested offering (as with Endō, et al., p. 232)? But then why would the next question be, “how many pieces do you ask for?” And the character 須 is definitely used in its verb form in Gaṅgā’s answer in the next line that he wants five pieces, and “five coins” are offered. Nevertheless the coincidental use of the same characters is interesting, perhaps reflecting some playful word games on the part of the translator?
incense and flowers, and made offerings to Foremost One. He also set up various food and drink and with these made offerings to Foremost One. He also made offerings with assorted wonderful offerings.

At that time Foremost One said to Gāṅgā, "Good son, now is the time. You should now listen carefully and I will explain the real dharmas that are accepted and practiced by all Buddhas."

Then Foremost One, for the sake of Gāṅgā, expansively explained the acceptance and practice of the real dharmas: "You should receive the dhāraṇī verses as follows":

[645b14–21: the sutra repeats the full t’an-ch’ih dhāraṇī; receiving this dhāraṇī is said to be equivalent to receiving "the real dharmas that are received and practiced by the Buddhas.”]

[645b22] At that time Gāṅgā rejoiced, dancing with joy, and asked, "How does one receive and uphold the real dharmas of the Buddhas?"

At that time Foremost One said to Gāṅgā, "If there is a good son or a good daughter who wishes to hear, then you should go before that person in a dream and manifest your body. If that person sees your body, then you should teach him/her to practice the real dharmas such as these."

[Gāṅgā] asked, "How should one practice them?"

[Foremost One] answered Gāṅgā, saying, "At the time when one wishes to practice, [he should proceed as follows.] For seven days, fast after noon, wash [the body] three times daily, and put on pure and clean robes. Set up an image of the Buddha and make a five-colored parasol. Chant the lines of this text one hundred and twenty times while circumambulating [the Buddha image] one hundred and twenty times. When you are finished, sit down and meditate. When you are finished meditating, again chant the lines of this text. Do this for seven days."

[645c1] Then Gāṅgā asked, "Foremost One, [on] what days should [one perform this practice]?"

"Good son. One should practice these dharmas on the eighth and fifteenth day of the month. Then, [even] if a sentient being commits the five heinous offenses and his body breaks out with leprosy, it will not be the case that one cannot remove these features; if a layman (upāsaka) offends against the three refuges up to six times, and there will be no case in which [the offenses] are not removed and [the leprosy] healed; or if a bodhisattva [offends against] the twenty-four [bodhisattva] precepts [see below], the śramaṇa [against] the ten precepts; or
the novices, monks, and nuns [against their] precepts; in this way if one offends against the precepts, against each and every precept, then one should single-mindedly repent, and it will not be the case that one cannot recover [the holy life], and it will remove the imperfect heart [that caused the transgressions]."

Next, good son, at that time Foremost One taught Gaṅgā in detail the terms of the twenty-four major precepts:

1. Suppose there is a bodhisattva, and starving sentient beings came to him seeking food, drink, and shelter. If [the bodhisattva] does not respond accordingly [to their needs], then this is an offense against the first major precept.

2. Suppose there is a bodhisattva who is filled with lust without degree, and not choosy with regard to birds and animals; this is called an offense against the second major precept.

3. Suppose there is a bodhisattva who sees a bhikṣu who is nurturing a wife and children, and freely speaks about his faults; this is called an offense against the third major precept.

4. Suppose there is a bodhisattva who sees a person who is depressed and unhappy and wishes to commit suicide ["destroy his own body"], but out of his own self-interest [the bodhisattva] exacerbates the other man's anger and frustration, causing him to do harm to his life faculties, as someone with fire might set everything around him ablaze; this is called an offense against the fourth major precept.

5. Suppose there is a bodhisattva who goes out from the retreat (vihāra) [of the Buddha's disciples] and onto the wide avenues, finds material wealth and takes it as he likes; this is called an offense against the fifth major precept.

6. Suppose there is a bodhisattva who sees that another person is angry and wants to injure others, yet with flattering words [the bodhisattva] praises [and encourages] that person's anger; this is called an offense against the sixth major precept.

7. Suppose there is a bodhisattva who sees that another person is angry, and if he hears that [in his] hostility he wants to burn down the sangha's dwellings; if he does not to the limit of his resources [try to] constrain these evil people, then this is called an offense against the seventh major precept.

8. Suppose there is a bodhisattva who sees a certain person or hears of a certain person who commits severe offenses; this bodhisattva should secretly call this person to come to him and
counsel him, saying “I have some good medicine that can nourish the roots of [one’s desire to keep] the precepts, and can lead you to recover the holy life.” If the man does not respond, you should exhort him three times; if you do not do so a full three times, then this is called an offense against the eighth major precept.

9 Suppose there is a bodhisattva who hears or sees that a person has committed the five heinous offenses. He should go to this person and say the following: “This is against the true Dharma. You are acting contrary to the pure practices (brahmacarya). You should not do these things.” If he does not do like this, then this is called an offense against the ninth major precept.

10 Suppose there is a bodhisattva who sees or hears that another person wishes to do a great and good deed, but then feels anger and destroys the other’s good wisdom; this is called an offense against the tenth major precept.

11 Suppose there is a bodhisattva who sees another person absorbed in drink and drunk with wine. He should bring him to his senses and scold that other person. Just removing the causes and conditions is not brahmacarya. [646a1] This is called an offense against the eleventh major precept.

12 Suppose there is a bodhisattva who sees or hears of a certain person who debauches another person’s wife, and goes to the woman’s husband and tells him, “so-and-so is violating you; perhaps you should look into it.” This is called an offense against the twelfth major precept.

13 Suppose there is a bodhisattva who sees a family against which his family bears a grudge, and arouses in himself thoughts of this family hatred; this is an offense against the thirteenth major precept.

14 Suppose there is a bodhisattva who sees another person who is angry and has thoughts like a little child, and [this bodhisattva] goes to this [angry] person and says, “Look here. Why do you perceive these people like a little child? This is an inauspicious quality.” This is called an offense against the fourteenth major precept.

15 Suppose there is a bodhisattva who sees a group of other people fighting, and goes to them to offer help, but with his power aids them with his own energies. This is called an offense against the fifteenth major precept.
16 Suppose there is a bodhisattva who sees another person's private matters and exposes them, and slanders [this person] in front of the four assemblies, thus causing this person not to feel joy but to arouse anger. This is called an offense against the sixteenth major precept.

17 Suppose there is a bodhisattva who sees or hears another person doing good deeds, but does not speak of this [to others]. This is called an offense against the seventeenth major precept.

18 Suppose there is a bodhisattva who goes out on the road and comes across other people who are building a stupa, or comes across people who are building a *vihāra*, and does not help them. This is called an offense against the eighteenth major precept.

19 Suppose there is a bodhisattva who sees or hears a person who distances himself from his good friends, or who is becoming closely acquainted with evil friends, and does not admonish him, telling him, “For the sake of what is good, leave those evil friends and associate with good friends.” This is called an offense against the nineteenth major precept.

20 Suppose there is a bodhisattva who does not go to the places of outcasts, or of evil people, or of evil dogs, or the places of the śrāvaka and those of the two vehicles, or other such places of trouble, and try to remove such adversity. This is called an offense against the twentieth major precept.

21 Suppose there is a bodhisattva who sees and hears and suspects a killing [of an animal for meat to feed him], and eats this meat deliberately; this will cut off the seed of compassion within him, for he has committed a great offense. If he has doubts about the killing but has not seen or heard of it, and thinks that there is no wrong in eating it anyway, then this is called an offense against the twenty-first major precept.

22 Suppose there is a bodhisattva who sees and hears and suspects a killing [of an animal for meat], or has doubts about the killing but has not seen or heard of it, and goes ahead and eats this meat. This person has lost the treasure-store of the Buddhas of the three times, and has lost the grace of the Buddhas of the three times. If one thinks that such a person should be honored, this is called an offense against the twenty-second major precept.

23 Suppose there is a bodhisattva who understands [skillful] means and knows the faculties of sentient beings, and yet does not
expound it [to save those people], thinking that the people should reap the retribution for their offenses. This is called an offense against the twenty-third major precept.

24 Suppose there is a bodhisattva who, at the time when he is keeping these precepts, perceives Flower Cluster, or perceives Ākāśagarbha, or perceives Avalokiteśvara, or perceives each and every bodhisattva. Whether it is something seen, not seen, or any other sort of experience, in all cases one may not profess it to others saying, “I have seen such and such Dharma-princes.” If a person says that he has seen such things, that person makes an obstruction for the manifestation of these bodies, he may get leprosy, or at times may go mad or become blind or have his sight become blurry, or become deluded and discriminate [falsely] concerning the essential of the Dharma of the Buddhas, and suffer the disease of madness. If you slander these precepts you bring misfortune upon yourself in this way. When you uphold these precepts, you should not verbalize or proclaim to others that “I have seen such and such.” As you do not speak of it within the seven days [of the practice of this rite], you should not speak of it outside of this period. Good son, these are called the twenty-four precepts of the bodhisattva-mahāsattva.

Good son, this secret Dharma of all Buddhas should not be recklessly expounded just anywhere. Good son, each and every Buddha, without exception, has attained supreme enlightenment through these precepts. In the past all Buddhas have also attained supreme enlightenment by means of these precepts. All Buddhas in the future will do likewise.

Then Gaṅgā said to Foremost One, “What about kṣatriyas, brahmans, vaiśyas, and śudras? Should they [all] receive these precepts or not?”

Foremost One answered, “People of all castes may receive these precepts.”

Gaṅgā said, “How should one receive such wonderful precepts as these?”

Foremost One said, “When you receive these precepts, you should petition a single bhikṣu who understands the features of these precepts. You may make this request of the sangha-assembly as often as you want. Also, you should petition the twenty-four images, though more would not impede [the practice]. Provide various sorts of ritual food and drink, and make offerings to the assembly of monks and to
individual bhikṣus. Bow down, touching the ground with the five
points [of the body: two feet, two hands, and head], and in front of
the images and all the accomplished monks, pay respect with a sincere
mind and chant these words: ‘[Before] the forms of all Buddhas and
the whole assembly of monks outside, I now take refuge in and accept
the noble Dharma of the precepts. May the assembly [of monks], in
their expansive loving-kindness, recognize and accredit me.’ Also
chant these words: ‘You wonderful and noble ones who are brave in
the Dharma, listen to me as I now proclaim that I will accept and
uphold these precepts.’ At this time, this person should himself say
these things. Having fully comprehended the precepts, he should
thrice repeat the three requests. When finished, he will have a pure
and mature precept-nature. To the end of this present state and even
unto the change of his form, he will uphold them. Those who truly
accept, truly hear, truly practice without transgressing, and uphold
these precepts, will be reborn according to their will. Gaṅgā, this is the
method by which all bodhisattva-mahāsattvas who consummate their
bodhi-nature hear and receive these precepts.” [end offascicle 1]

[646c1–647a23: Foremost One explains the origin of the
dhāraṇī in the distant past with another avadāna involving the Buddha Caṇḍanapuṣpa,
King Ratnacandra, his younger brother Fruit Grove 林果, and the king’s
nine-hundred ninety-nine sons.]

[647a24] Then the Buddha said to Ānanda: “Have you heard the
true Dharma of the Buddhas?

[Ānanda answered,) “Yes indeed, World Honored One, today I have
heard the profound Dharma treasury of texts [of dhāraṇī] like these
that are extraordinarily marvelous, and which can cause all hell-
beings, hungry ghosts, gods and humans—that is, all beings to be lib­
erated—to be able to extinguish all the retribution from karmic
offenses [by means of these dhāraṇī].

Then the Buddha said to Ānanda, “Good son, I am happy you have
spoken these words. What you have said is genuine and not vacuous.
Whether I am still in the world or have already left the world, this
sūtra is present in Jambudvīpa and illuminates the world like the shin­ing
rays of the sun; sentient beings benefit from its grace and can
[thereby] see in [all] four directions.

“Also, just as Mt. Sumeru is the highest among all the mountains,
and if one dwells on its peak one can all see what is happening in all
four directions, so this [Vaipulya] dhāraṇī sūtra is the highest among all
dhammas, and one can [thereby] perceive the marks of the dharmas.

"Also, it is like the great sea that is of unlimited depth. This Dhārani sūtra is also like this; it is of unlimited depth, there is no bottom to the benefits to be gained. Good son, in this way I have access to the unlimited Dharma treasury, and entrust it to you. You should maintain and cultivate and receive and uphold it."

[647b5–c22: The Buddha and Ānanda discuss the upholding and cultivating of this sūtra.]

FURTHER PRAISES FOR THE SŪTRA [647c22–648a14]

[647c22] "Good son, one should know that this sūtra has immeasurable spiritual vitality and power of virtues. It is for these reasons that I now tell this to you: receive and uphold this sūtra. After I have left this world, if this sūtra remains in this world of Jambudvīpa, it will be a great and precious treasure to sentient beings. If someone is able to cultivate and practice, receive and uphold, read and chant [this sūtra], one should know that this person will fully utilize this treasure. If also there is a person who is only able to read and chant it, then one should know that this person will attain a middling portion of this treasure. If one makes offerings of various kinds of perfumed paste, powdered incense, flowers, silk banners, and parasols, then one should know that this person will attain a small portion of this treasure.

"Good son, I will now explain to you the conditions and marks of the small portion of this treasure. Good son, [648a1] suppose there is a person whose supranormal powers are unobstructed like Mañjuśrī or like myself, or who is unobstructed in eloquence just like Mañjuśrī and myself, and throughout an entire kalpa constantly utilizes this eloquence and is able to preach the Dharma to immeasurable and unlimited numbers of sentient beings, and lead then to dwell in the state of a bodhisattva-mahāsattva who has only one more life to live (ekajātīpratibaddha) [before becoming a Buddha]; that this person exhausts these supranormal powers by offering various kinds of robes, bedding, food and drink, and medicines to the bodhisattvas. Would this person's good karmic rewards be many, or not?"

Then Ānanda said, "They would be exceedingly many, World Honored One."

"Good son, suppose there is another person who uses perfumed paste, powdered incense, flowers, silk banners, and parasols to make offerings to one four-lined verse from within this sūtra; or again he
reads and chants this as his offering, this person’s merit will surpass that of the two of us. How much more so if one exhausts the forms by cultivating and practicing, receiving and upholding, and reading and chanting [this sūtra]? This person’s merit is incalculable. If a mathematician or a mathematician’s student attempted to calculate [this merit], it would add up to beyond the calculation of hundreds of thousands of millions, and could not be known by a single person.

“Good son, ponder this matter. Suppose there are bodhisattvas who in just one more life will attain Buddhahood. Even if ten thousands of koṭis of bodhisattvas—more numerous than the sands of the Ganges River—exhaust their supranormal powers and exhaust their eloquence; if for one kalpa or for even ten thousands of koṭis of kalpas they all enter samādhi, even such immeasurable bodhisattvas as these would not equal one hundredth, one thousandth, or one ten-thousandth [of the merit] of a person who desires to ponder, cultivate and practice, receive and uphold, read and chant this maha-vaipulya-dhāraṇī sūtra.

Good son, you should know that this sūtra has great spiritual vitality and the power of virtue. It is a great treasure-house for whatever country it is in. All sentient beings can take refuge in it. For these reasons I now speak of it to you. Receive and uphold this sūtra in Jambudvīpa. Preach and disseminate it widely for the sake of sentient beings. Cause the sentient beings to attain ultimate bliss.”

At that time Ānanda and the five hundred great disciples and the immeasurable great assembly arose from their seats, bared their right shoulders, placed their right knees on the ground, bowed at the Buddha’s feet, and joyfully received this practice.

[end of Introduction; 648a22]

2. Chapter on Predictions 授記 [648a23–651c19]

[648a23] At that time Thunder Voice arose from his seat, bared his right shoulder, pressed his palms together, and facing the Buddha said, “Excellent, World Honored One, is your skillful preaching of the causes and actions that were done in the past. Now you have finished preaching. This Great Vaipulya Dhāraṇī Sūtra has been entrusted to

25 This could be the original ending of the sūtra, with the following sections added at a later time.
Ananda for disseminating later. Immeasurable sentient beings will gain great and good benefits from this sūtra. Excellent, World Honored One, the master of great compassion!"

The Buddha said to Thunder Voice, "Good son, it is as you say. I have now finished preaching what should be preached. I should now preach on things that have not yet been preached. Truly it is as you say."

"Good son, in this good eon (bhadrakaśāpa) you will attain Buddhahood and be named Thunder Voice Treasure-King, a Tathāgata, an arhat, a sāmyaksaṃbuddha, one who is equipped with knowledge and conduct, a well-gone one, one who understands the world, a supreme one, a tamer of men, a teacher of humans and gods, and Buddha, a World Honored One. Your land will be called "Universal Majesty" 常喜. It will be pure and incomparable, with only bodhisattvas gathered there. These bodhisattvas will be of unhindered eloquence and immeasurahle supranormal powers, fully capable in skillful means. Each of the bodhisattvas possess great radiance, capable of illuminating eighty tens of thousands of koñis of lands, as many as the sands of the Ganges River. Those who see this light will attain the power of memory to embrace all dhāranī and immeasurable supranormal powers, no different from other bodhisattvas. This land is adorned in a way incomparable with this [mundane] world. In that world you will attain Buddhahood. Your lifespan will be six million two hundred thousand years, and [the duration of your] True Dharma (Saddharma) and Shadow Dharma will be the same.

[648b10] At that time the śrāvakas, the assembly of five hundred great disciples, arose from their seats, arranged their robes properly, bowed at the Buddha’s feet, withdrew to one side, and chanted in unison:

The wisdom of the World Honored One is like empty space—
All-perceiving of the characteristics of the coming and going of sentient beings,
Seeing and hearing all in the ten directions;
We will now pay reverence to the King of All Treasures.

At that time the Buddha said to the assembly of five hundred great disciples, "Each of you will certainly become a Buddha, all with the same title, the title ‘Treasure Moon King,’ ..."

[and so forth, as the Buddha gives the prophecy of future Buddhahood to those in the assembly of five hundred disciples. The Buddha then expounds on the benefits to be gained from keeping these dhāranī. Śāriputra then asks the Buddha how people should uphold this sūtra.]
At that time Śāriputra said to the Buddha, “World Honored One, this sūtra has such immeasurable spiritual power that it is able to draw and gather all divine and human beings, asuras, hellish beings, and hungry ghosts to the place of enlightenment. The power of the sūtra is such that it is able to save all beings; what are the merits for those who receive and uphold the sūtra?”

Then the Buddha said to Śāriputra, “I have already spoken of this; why do you ask me this question?”

Then Śāriputra said to the Buddha, “With what offerings should the people who receive and uphold this sūtra pay homage?”

The Buddha said to Śāriputra, “If there is a person who can offer to me his head, eyes, body, wife, sons, daughters, elephants, horses, and seven kinds of jewels, this is not equal to [the merit of] a person who is able to make a single act of worship to these sūtra-scrolls. Again, if there is a person who can lift up the four continents and can pile up treasures until they reach the Brahmā heavens and offer these to me, it is not equivalent to offering a single meal with which to fill the body of one who receives and upholds this sūtra. Again, if there is a person in this trichiliocosm who accumulates precious jewels until it makes the world collapse, and offers these to me, it is not equivalent to a person who upholds this text for a day and a night. How much more so for one who exhausts his body and life-force in keeping and upholding such a text; the merit from this is immeasurable.

Again, if there is a person who accumulates precious jewels so that they fill the worlds [as numerous as] particles of dust in the ten directions, up to the top of these worlds, and exhaustively offers these to me, this would not be equivalent to a person who upholds a single four-line verse [of this sūtra] and transmits and teaches it to others; the merit [from this] is immeasurable and unlimited.

The Buddha continues to tell Ānanda of the benefits of upholding this sūtra. Mañjuśrī joins the conversation, and then enters into a discussion with Śāriputra on the meaning of granting vyākaraṇa (prediction of the attainment of Buddhahood), specifically on the issue of śrāvakas and arhats receiving prediction of Buddhahood. This possibility is compared to dead and dessicated wood producing new branches, water running upstream to its source in the mountains, a cracked boulder becoming whole again, or burnt seeds giving rise to new sprouts. The issue is resolved with the emptiness logic of prajñā-pāramitā-style dialectics.
[650b1] Then the five hundred great disciples immediately arose from their seats, bowed their heads at [the Buddha’s] feet, and said to the Buddha, “World Honored One, as the Buddha explained, when a person practices this Dharma, Pāpiyān [Māra] will come to destroy these persons’ good roots and conditions. How did you know this?”

Then the Buddha said to the assembly of five hundred great disciples, “When these demons come there will be forty ten-thousands of kotis [of them]. They will come and let out a great evil voice. The land will shake and a great evil wind will be released. At times they will produce fire and at times flood, wishing to kill this person. At times they will stand before him in a dream and extract his tongue. At times they will spew forth fire in his face. At times they will lift up a mountain and threaten to crush him. This person should respond, ‘It is good that you have come.’ Upon saying this he will chant silently in his heart the words of the mahā t’an-chih dhārani. Also he should chant the words ‘I pay homage to Śākyamuni; I pay homage to the Dharma-prince Manjuśrī, the Dharma-prince Ākāśagarbha, the Dharma-prince Avalokiteśvara, the Dharma-prince Vaiśravana, the Dharma-prince Ākāśa [Space], the Dharma-prince Breaker of Darkness, the Dharma-prince Universal Hearer, the Dharma-prince Wonderful Form, the Dharma-prince Great Emptiness, and the Dharma-prince True Thusness.’ In this way the bodhisattva-mahāsattva should be mindful of these names. In this way all of these princes will certainly come to where he is and protect that person. They will cause this person to experience pleasure, not pain. If any bhikṣus experience these difficulties, they should be mindful of the names of these [Dharma-] princes in this way.”

At that time Ānanda spoke to the Buddha, saying, “World Honored One, when a practitioner suffers fear like this due to [actions of] Pāpiyān such as this, the princes with great compassion will be able to save him. With what offerings should one pay homage to these princes?”

Then the Buddha said to Ānanda, after the Pāpiyān are gone, one should prepare various kinds of incense and flowers and perfumed paste and make offerings to these princes. Prepare various kinds of incense and rub [the incensed] mud [on the walls?] in the room and paint colorful pictures. In unison²⁶ praise the Dharma-princes.”

[650b21] “At that time Avalokiteśvara will enter the room, either as a monk, or as a śramaṇera, or as a śramaṇeri, or as an upāsaka, or as a

²⁶ Lit., “different mouths, same sound.”
mendicant, or as a starving dog; in this [guise] he will enter the room. Or he will come as a wandering traveller, entering the room and staying there. Or he will come as a king or prince, and enter the room. Or he will come as an ordinary person, and enter the room."

Then Ānanda said to the Buddha, "World Honored One, when one practices this dharma, should there be a large number of people or not?"

The Buddha said to Ānanda, "There should not be more than ten people."

At that time Ānanda said to the Buddha, "World Honored One, when one practices this dharma, should one carry on any [secular] business or use jocular language, or not?"

The Buddha said to Ānanda, "One should only be single minded, being mindful of the words of the mahā t'an-chih dhāraṇī. One should not be embroiled in jocular talk, nor defile one's thought with any kind of evil [650c1]; how much more so [should one avoid] having [secular] duties."

The Buddha said to Ānanda, "If there is a good son or a good daughter who cultivates the practice of this sūtra, and if with their eyes they see [ten Buddhas:] the Buddha of Immeasurable Life (Amitāyus), the Buddha Śākyamuni, the Buddha Vipaśyin, the Buddha Śikhin, the Buddha Viśabhū, the Buddha Krakucchanda, the Buddha Kanakamuni, the Buddha Kāśyapa, the Buddha King of Thunder Voice of the Past, and the Buddha Secret Dharma Treasury, and if he or she sincerely repents in front of these Buddhas, he or she will extinguish the offenses of ninety-two kōṭis of lives and deaths." ...
Swanson: Dandala, Dhāraṇī, and Denarii

[this] dhāraṇī sūtra, you should teach them to seek the twelve dream kings. If they are able to see one of the [dream] kings, you should teach and confer upon them the teaching of the seven-day practice.

Mañjuśrī said to the Buddha, “What are the names of these twelve dream kings? What is that called the ‘the teaching of the seven-day practice’?”

The Buddha said to Mañjuśrī, “Good son:

1. If there is a good son or a good daughter who in a dream [sees a figure] that can miraculously fly and hangs up silk banners and parasols in back of this person; the one who is seen like this is *Dandala 祖茶羅 (t’an-t’u-lo, K. ‘d’ân-, d’â-, lâ).

2. If there is a good son or good daughter who in a dream sees a figure of a relic stūpa and [surrounded by] a great assembly of monks, the one who is seen is “Chin-t’i-lo” 斤堤羅 (K. kâ-an-, d’ie-i-, lâ).

3. If there is a good son or good daughter who in a dream sees kings and ministers, wearing clean and pure robes and each riding on a white horse, the one who is seen is “Mao-chih-lo” 茂持羅 (K. mau-, d’i-, lâ).

4. If there is a good son or good daughter who in a dream sees [a figure] riding an elephant across a great river; the one who is seen is “Kan-chi-lo” 乾基羅 (K. kân, g’iân-, kji-, lâ).

5. If there is a good son or good daughter who in a dream [sees a figure] riding a camel over a high mountain; the one who is seen is “To-lin-lo” 多林羅 (K. tâ-, lî-am-, lâ).

6. Suppose there is a bhikṣu who seeks this dharma, and in a dream [sees a figure] on a high seat turning [the wheel of the Dharma] of prajñā; the one who is seen is “Po-lin-lo” 波林羅 (K. puâ-, lî-am-, lâ).

7. Suppose there is a bhikṣu who in a dream [sees a figure who] arrives at the foot of a tree where there is an ordination platform, and there accepts the precepts; the one who is seen is “T’an-lin-lo” 塩(槳)林羅 (K. d’ân-, lî-am-, lâ).

8. Suppose there is a bhikṣu who in a dream [sees a figure who] sits in front of an image of the Buddha and beseeches the assembly of monks to make offerings; the one who is seen is “Ch’an-to-lin-lo” 禪多林羅 (K. tân-, tâ-, lî-am-, lâ).

27 Note that these twelve names are those given to the converted Dandala and his retinue above at 642c21–25.
9 Suppose there is a bhikṣu who in a dream sees a tree blossoming with flowers and fruit, and [a figure who] sits at the foot of the tree and enters into dhyāna-samādhi; the one who is seen is “Ch‘iung-chia-lin-lo” 窮伽林羅（K. ㄍ‘iung-ㄐ‘ia-ㄌ‘am-ㄌ‘a）。

10 Suppose there is a great king who in a dream fastens a sword around his waist and roams in all directions; [652b] the one who is seen in this way is “Chia-lin-lo” 迹林羅 (K. ㄍ‘ia-ㄌ‘am-ㄌ‘a)。28

11 Suppose there is a great minister who in a dream sees people all holding water bottles and washing their bodies, rubbing on various kinds of incense and wearing clean and pure robes; the one who is seen in this way is “Ch‘iung-chia-lin-lo” 窮伽林羅 (K. ㄍ‘iung-ㄐ‘ia-ㄌ‘am-ㄌ‘a)。29

12 Suppose there is a woman who in a dream [sees a figure who] rides on a sheep-cart and enters into deep water, and in that body of water there are many poisonous snakes; the one who is seen is “Po-lin-lo” 波林羅 (K. ㄆ‘a-ㄌ‘om-ㄌ‘a)。30

If [those who seek the dhāraṇī teachings] see these things [in a dream], you may teach them. Good sons and good daughters who see one or another of these should be taught the “seven-day method of practice.”

THE SEVEN DAYS [652B8–653C13]

Then Māñjuṣrī said to the Buddha, “World Honored One, what is ‘the teaching of the seven-day practice’? What does one receive and uphold, and what does one cultivate in such a practice?”

FIRST DAY [652B11–28]

Then the Buddha said to Māñjuṣrī, the Dharma-prince, “If there are good sons or good daughters [who are to practice this method], on the first day they should go to a practice site 道場, should use rubbing incense, powdered incense, sandalwood (candana), sandalwood incense [or “agaru incense” (lign aloes)], fragrant herbs, and incense

28 Note that many of the dreams have no explicitly Buddhist content. I invite those who are trained in the interpretation of dreams to speculate on the possible meaning of these dreams.

29 A repeat of the name for number 9.

30 The same name as for dream number 6. Since two of these overlap, there are actually a total of only ten different dream-kings.
from the seashore, and make an offering to the *Mahā t’an-chih dhāraṇī-sūtra.*

"At that time the bodhisattvas Flower Cluster (*Puṣpapūta) and Avalokiteśvara will come and dwell in that practice site. Then these two gentlemen will, in unison, praise the practicers in the practice site, saying, ‘Excellent, excellent, oh good sons and good daughters. You are able, in the Dharma of the Tathāgata Śākyamuni, to cultivate this Mahā t’an-chih dhāraṇī sutra. Then the bodhisattvas Flower Cluster and Avalokiteśvara will be suspended in space and mounted on jeweled lotuses, surrounded on all sides by a great immeasurable assembly.

"Mañjuśrī, I now say to you, tell all sentient beings to cultivate, accept and uphold the Mahā t’an-chih dhāraṇī sutra, and pass it on in turn, so that [beings] transcend the triple world and attain that which they wish according to their intent. If there are lay men or lay women, on the first day they should encourage living beings to come to the practice site. They should burn various kinds of incense and hang silk banners and parasols. If there are good men and good women who seek to make a wish concerning the present and the future, they may seek it. At that time the two figures [of Flower Cluster and Avalokiteśvara] will, in accordance to the capacities of these people, grant their wishes for the present and the future.

"Mañjuśrī, such practicers, if they are sincere, will see these two gentlemen dancing in the air. If they are not sincere, they will not see anything. Mañjuśrī, those who do not see anything are those who are not sincere. This is the practice of the dhāraṇī sutra for the first day.

SECOND DAY [652B29–C13]

"Next, Mañjuśrī, if there are good sons and good daughters at the practice site for the second day, they should burn various kinds of incense, such as rubbing incense and powdered incense, and hang silk banners and parasols, and make offerings to the Mahā t’an-chih dhāraṇī sutra.

"At that time the Tathāgata *Ratnarāja and I myself [Śākyamuni] will come to the practice site from the Vulture Peak, surrounded on all sides by immeasurable nayutas of great assemblies. Each and every one of these great assemblies will be mounted on a seven-jewelled lotus, and, each will sing the praises of those practicing in the practice site saying, ‘Excellent, excellent, good sons and good daughters. You will be able to receive and uphold and read and chant this dhāraṇī
sūtra after I have left this world. You should ponder it and commit yourself to cultivate, receive, and uphold this sūtra, and reflect on it well. You should also ponder the Buddhas and Tathāgatas of the ten directions three times, and think that by receiving and and upholding this sūtra, I am training under them.'

"Mañjuśrī, after I leave this world, as for those practicers who come to the practice site in this way, I should preach the Dharma to them in accordance with the differences in their capacities. Again, there will be those who hear and those who do not hear, those who see my form and those who do not see my form. Those who do not see or hear are those without sincerity, except for those who just do not see. This is the practice of the dhāraṇī sūtra for the second day."

THIRD DAY [652C14-27]

"Next, Mañjuśrī, if there are good sons and good daughters, who on the third day hang silk banners and parasols at the practice site, and use rubbing incense, powdered incense, sandalwood (candana), agaru incense (lign aloes), fragrant herbs, and incense from the seashore, and pay homage to the Mahā-t'an-chih-dhāraṇī-sūtra, then the Buddha Vipaśyin and the bodhisattva-mahasattva Akāśagarbha will come to the practice site, and will appear in space surrounded on all sides by an immeasurable great assembly. Each will be mounted on a jeweled lotus flower and floating in space at the height of seven tāla trees,31 emitting a great ray of light that illumines the Buddha lands in the ten directions. Among them, the practicers who have seen this light will all arouse the aspiration for complete supreme enlightenment (anuttarasamyaksambodhi-citta). Sagely people from all directions will come to the practice site to inquire after this light. At that time, among the practicers at the practice site, there will be those who, in accordance with their capacities, either see [all of this], or do not see. Some will see the forms, and some will not. Their powers of practicing will be differentiated in accordance with their capacities. At that time these people will hear the preaching of the Buddha in this way. The practicers will dance for joy, and will attain that which is unprecedented. Mañjuśrī, this is the practice of the dhāraṇī sūtra for the third day."

FOURTH DAY [652C28-653A13]

"Next, Mañjuśrī, if the good sons and good daughters are in the practice

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31 A tāla tree can grow to the height of twenty-five meters.
Swanson: Dandala, Dhāraṇī, and Denarii

site on the fourth day, chanting and cultivating, the practice of the *Mahā t'an-chih dhāraṇī sūtra*, hanging silk banners and parasols, and all, with various colors, adorning this practice site, burning various kinds of incense, such as rubbing incense, powdered incense, sandalwood (*candana*), *agaru* incense, fragrant herbs, and incense from the seashore, and making offerings to the *Mahā t'an-chih dhāraṇī sūtra*, then the Buddha Śikhin will come to the practice site with an immeasurable assembly in front and back and around, and be suspended in space ... [and so forth as above].

[653a9] “At that time, after the practicers finish gazing on the Buddha Śikhin, they bow their heads at his feet. Then the Buddha Śikhin will put forth his right hand and rub the top of the people's heads and say, ‘Good sons and good daughters, soon you will proceed toward the Bodhi tree, destroy vengeful Mara, overcome the heretics, and attain dhāraṇī, just as I have,’ Mañjuśrī, this is the practice of the dhāraṇī *sūtra* for the fourth day.”

FIFTH DAY [653a14–29]

“Next, Mañjuśrī, if the good sons and good daughters are in the practice site on the fifth day, [and so forth as above, and the practicers will be mindful of severing various defilements,] then the Buddha Viśvabhu will appear in space mounted on a jeweled lotus, and will preach the essentials of the Dharma for the sake of the immeasurable great assembly.

“At that time, those practicing in the practice site will fully hear the verses preached by the Buddha, and take all of it to heart, clearly understanding it, and not forget it.

“At that time, of those practicing in the practice site, some will see and some will not see [these things]; there will be those who see after a week, or do not see after two weeks, or see or do not see after three weeks. As for sentient beings, because their karma is not fixed, all this is due to the depth of their evil deeds in previous lives. Mañjuśrī, this is the practice of the dhāraṇī *sūtra* for the fifth day.”

SIXTH DAY [653b1–17]

“Next, Mañjuśrī, if the good sons and good daughters are in the practice site on the sixth day, [and so forth as above,] then the Buddha

32 That is, different people take a different amount of time, some more, some less.
Kanakamuni, surrounded on all sides by an immeasurable great assembly, will come from the other four continents to the practice site. At that time the practicers will fully see the Buddha Kanakamuni. The seven Buddhas [of the past] will be floating in the sky, and [the practicer will] see each of the Buddhas sitting on an individual seven-jeweled lotus flower seat. Each of these lotus seats will have a diameter of 84,000 yojana, and each lotus will be separated from the earth by 84,000 yojana.

“When the practicers have seen this, they will attain what was unprecedented, and they will dance with joy. Then the Buddhas will in unison praise the practicers, saying, “Excellent, excellent! Disciples of the Tathāgata Śākyamuni. If you are able, with respect to this bequethed Dharma, to receive and uphold and read and chant the Mahā t'an-ch'iḥ dhāraṇī sūtra, and come to the practice site, soon you will be free from the three evil destinies, work to save sentient beings, dwell in the human and divine realms, and ultimately [attain] joyful bliss.

“Maṇjuśrī, after I leave this world, this Mahā t'an-ch'iḥ dhāraṇī sūtra will comfort and benefit sentient beings in Jambudvipa. Maṇjuśrī, this is the practice of the Mahā t'an-ch'iḥ dhāraṇī sūtra for the sixth day.”

SEVENTH DAY [653B18–C13]

“Next, Maṇjuśrī, if there are good sons and good daughters who are in the practice site for the seventh day, sincerely paying homage and respect to the Mahā t'an-chih dhāraṇī sūtra, they should not produce extraneous thoughts, but only with a sincere mind truly hear and truly receive [this sūtra], not thinking of wives or children, elephants and horses, or the seven treasures. They should not disturb their good thoughts with deluded conceptions, passing though their lives in vain and without benefit, losing their merits and not becoming free of various evils [or sufferings].

“Maṇjuśrī, these practicers should then sincerely concentrate on the above thoughts. Then all Buddhas, the World Honored Ones, of the ten directions will appear in space, each and every one of these Buddhas coming to the practice site leading an assembly numerous as the sands of the Ganges River, or the sands of two Ganges Rivers, or the sands of three Ganges Rivers, or the sands of ten thousand Ganges Rivers, or twenty thousand, or sixty, seventy, eighty, or ninety [thousand], or a hundred, two hundred, three hundred, four hundred, five hundred, six hundred, [653c1] seven hundred, eight hundred, nine
hundred [thousand of the sands of the Ganges River]; and soon up to an incalculable number.

“At this time these great assemblies will mutually see one other, and all will have the thirty-two marks [of a Buddha], and a body shining like jambūnada gold. Each and every Buddha land will appear before them, adorned with various kinds of jewels that have not been attained yet by [other] lands. Like Mañjuśrī, the Dharma prince, they will be floating in space, and all will be surprised and have doubts, and they will think to themselves, ‘For what reason have these Buddhas all manifested these pure lands?’ When they think in this way, I and Mañjuśrī, surrounded on all sides by the great assembly, will come to the practice site. In accordance with the capacities [of the practitioners], I will preach the Dharma, lead the practitioners to see my forms with perfect clarity, empower them with spiritual power (adhiṣṭhāna), and allow them to see us seated in space and in the [various] pure lands. When they have seen the pure lands, they will rejoice and dance with joy, attaining what was unprecedented, and will arouse the mind of [aspiration for] anuttarasamyaksambodhi, and never backslide. On the seventh day they will attain [the ability to choose] rebirth according to their own intention. Mañjuśrī, this is called the practice of the Mahā t’an-chih-dhāraṇī sūtra for the seventh day.”

[653c14-656a22: Flower Cluster arises from his seat and asks the Buddha’s permission to make a vow. He then makes a vow expressing the benefits of upholding this Great Vaipulya Dhāraṇī Sūtra and his desire to attain enlightenment. The Buddha praises him for this vow. Then Vaśravana appears and expresses his wish to uphold the sūtra, and so forth to the end of the third fascicle.]

4. Keeping the Precepts [656a29–658a8]

[656a29] At that time Mañjuśrī arose from his seat, bared his right shoulder, pressed his right knee to the ground, and said to the Buddha, “World Honored One, after the World Honored One has left the world, if a bhikṣu breaks the four major precepts, or if a bhikṣuṇī breaks and offends against the eight major precepts, or if a bodhisattva or śramaṇa or śramaṇera or upāsaka or upāsikā breaks each of the precepts, how can the heavy offenses from having transgressed against the precepts be extinguished?”

The Buddha said, “This is good, oh Mañjuśrī, that you ask me concerning these matters! It is because your love and compassion are
superior that you can ask these questions. If you had not asked these questions, I never would have taught the bhikṣus of this evil generation about these faults. Excellent, excellent, Mañjuśrī! Now you should listen carefully and I will teach you. After I leave this world, if there are immoral bhikṣus who break the four major prohibitions, and silently keep receiving offerings from patrons (dānapati) and don’t repent, you should know that these bhikṣus will undoubtedly experience the sufferings of hell. I should now offer good medicine to save such bhikṣus from this serious disease. If you break the four major prohibitions after I leave this world, and do not shamefully repent, you should now listen carefully, and I will teach [about the precepts] for you.

[656b13; dhāraṇi to be recited one thousand four hundred times per repentance for eighty-seven days 八十七日 (or eighty weeks?) by bhikṣu who break the four major prohibitions (pārājika).]
[656c8; dhāraṇi to be recited forty-nine times per repentance for ninety-seven days (or ninety weeks?) by bhikṣuṇī who offend against the eight serious prohibitions.]
[657a8; dhāraṇi to be recited six hundred times per repentance for sixty-seven days (or sixty weeks?) by bodhisattvas, novices, or laypeople who have offended against the precepts.]
[657b4; dhāraṇi to be recited four hundred times per repentance for forty-seven days (or forty weeks?) by novices and laypeople who have offended against the precepts.]
[657b26; explanation of five matters with regard to keeping the precepts, and the explanation of the worldly and transworldly aspects of keeping the precepts].


[The sūtra closes with further dhāraṇi (658b24–29), with praises and exhortations for disseminating and upholding these dhāraṇi, and a standard ending with the great assembly paying homage to the Buddha.]

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The Teaching of Vimalakīrti (Vimalakīrtinirdeśa): A Review of Four English Translations

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Editor’s note: It is highly unusual for a book review to appear several years—let alone several decades—after the volume in question was published. Yet because English translations of Buddhist texts are still in short supply, many older works continue to circulate, to be used in classrooms, and to be consulted by scholars (if only to save time in finding a quick reference) long after their initial publication. Hendrik Kern’s translation of the Sanskrit Lotus Sūtra (Saddharmapundarīka-sūtra)—a work that first appeared in 1884 and is still the only published English version of this important Sanskrit text—is perhaps the most extreme example, but it is far from the only such case. As long as such translations continue to be printed and reprinted, to appear in bookstores, and to be used in courses, they still function as “current publications” regardless of their original copyright date. Since one of the roles of this journal is to offer critical assessments of the accuracy and usability of Buddhist texts currently available in English translation, it seems reasonable to include in the discussion not only recent publications but also older works that are still widely used. Earlier reviews have been published, of course, in the case of most of these works; yet the field of Buddhist Studies has continued to move forward, and our understanding of these texts has grown more nuanced. It seems worthwhile, therefore, not only to evaluate the most recent translation of a given text—in this case, Burton Watson’s The Vimalakīrti Sūtra—but older versions that continue to influence a current generation of readers as well. The following review will examine four different translations of the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa—two from Chinese, two from Tibetan—with an eye toward evaluating their accuracy, their readability, and their appropriateness for use by a variety of audiences. If this unusual approach proves to be useful, other such reviews may follow in future issues.


Like most Indian Mahāyāna scriptures, the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa* ("Teaching of Vimalakirti") has not survived—even in fragmentary form—in any Indic language. Its title, however, is assured, based not only on the transliteration preserved in the Tibetan version (a source which is not always reliable, since many of these transliterations are reconstructions based on the Tibetan itself) but on a handful of citations preserved in Candrakirti’s *Prasannapadā* and *Madhyamakavrtti* (seventh century), Śāntideva’s *Śikṣāsamuccaya* (seventh century), and Kamalaśīla’s *Bhāvanākrama* (eighth century). It is difficult to gauge the degree of influence exerted by this text in India, though it is worth noting that there is no evidence that a single Indian commentary on the text was ever composed. In East Asia, by contrast, the scripture appears to have been a source of fascination from the time of its first appearance. It is said to have been translated into Chinese no fewer than eight times, of which three versions

1 Just as this review was going to press, I received word that a complete Sanskrit version of the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa* has been discovered in Tibet and that scholars from Taishō University in Japan will be responsible for its publication. I am grateful to Dr. Stefano Zacchetti (International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology, Tokyo, Japan) for conveying this exciting news.

2 See Lamotte, *The Teaching of Vimalakirti*, p. xxv.

3 None, at any rate, is preserved in the voluminous Tibetan canon, and all of the commentaries on the text contained in the Chinese Buddhist canon are Chinese or Japanese compositions.

are still extant: those produced by Zhi Qian (T474, 223-228 CE), Kumārajīva (T475, 406 CE) and Xuanzang (T476, 650 CE). Numerous commentaries to the text were also composed in both China and Japan. In Tibet, on the other hand, this scripture garnered far less attention. Though an early translation by an unknown translator, preserved only in manuscript fragments found at Dunhuan, was completed in the late eighth or early ninth century CE, and another (which became the sole version incorporated into the Tibetan canon) was produced by Dharmatāsila (Tib. Chos-nyid tshul-khrims) around the same time, the text never seems to have received commentarial attention, and indeed it seems fair to say that it was largely ignored. It is thus not surprising that two of the published English translations—those of Luk and Watson—are renditions of Kumārajīva’s Chinese translation, which was by far the most influential version in East Asia. What requires comment, by contrast, is why there should exist two modern translations (those of Lamotte and Thurman) of the Tibetan version of a text that does not seem to have been used by the Tibetans themselves. This question—which has to do not with the quality of the English translations but with their status as scholarly artifacts—will be considered toward the end of this review.

Sources and Intentions

Every translator of a Buddhist text must confront, at the outset, two fundamental issues: from which version of the text will she translate (for in most cases, even when the text has been preserved only in a single language, these are multiple), and for what audience is the translation intended? Not all such decisions, however, are made consciously, much less clearly conveyed to the reader. Some translators are explicit about the first, others about the second, and still others leave the reader to guess at both. A not uncommon pattern is

5 For further details and a discussion of the non-extant versions see Lamotte, Vimalakirti, pp. xxvi-xxxvii.

6 See Taishō nos. 1775-1780, 1791, 2768-2778, 2186 (all based on the version translated by Kumārajīva) and 1782 (based on the version translated by Xuanzang).

7 Peking/Ōtani 843, Derge/Tohoku 176, Stog Palace 171.

8 While it is generally the case that only one translation of each text is preserved in the Tibetan canon, for example—though there are interesting and important exceptions—the translator must still decide whether to use a single manuscript or xylograph edition or to expend the considerable effort required to construct an adequate critical edition. For an insightful discussion of this issue see Paul Harrison, “Meritorious Activity or a Waste of Time? Some Remarks on the Editing of Texts in the Tibetan Kanjur,” in Tibetan Studies, Proceedings of the 5th Seminar of the International Association of Tibetan Studies, Narita 1989 (Narita: Naritasan, 1992), pp. 77-93.
for translators located within the academy to be quite articulate about the version(s) from which they are translating, but completely mute—perhaps not ever having consciously entertained the question—about who, if anyone, their audience might be. For translators outside the academy, by contrast—especially those whose primary identity as writers is that of practicing Buddhists—the opposite is frequently the case, and we may find a clear statement that the intended audience for the translation consists of Buddhist believers, but no indication as to which version of the text (much less which specific edition) served as its base.

The translations to be discussed here span this range of possibilities and can easily be arranged along a continuum from the scholarly to the popular. In his highly technical study Lamotte offers precise documentation (though only at the end of his long introduction, on p. cxxvi) of the textual basis of his translation, stating that he is working from the Tibetan version of the text (using the Otani edition alone) with significant variants found in Xuanzang’s Chinese version printed in smaller type. Lamotte also provides specific references to the earlier translations of Zhi Qian and Kumārajiva, which he occasionally cites in his notes. Nowhere, however, does he raise the issue of the audience for whom his efforts are intended, though the fact that his translation fairly bristles with parenthetical Sanskrit terms suggests that he envisioned a scholarly readership with high tolerance for Indological detail.

At the other extreme is Charles Luk, who provides no information whatsoever on the text from which his translation is drawn, stating only that “Our translation is based on explanations and annotations by the enlightened Indian translator Kumārajiva and his equally enlightened Chinese pupil and assistant, Seng Chao... and on the commentary in 1630 by Ch’ an master Po Shan of the Ming dynasty” (xiii). The reader is given no hint as to where published versions of any of these documents might be found, nor is it even made clear that he is working not simply from “explanations” by Kumārajiva, but from a Chinese sūtra translation produced by him at the beginning of the 5th century CE. Scholarly documentation, quite clearly, is not important to this translator.

The nature of his intended audience, by contrast, is stated explicitly at the end of the preface, where Luk writes:

Now that some Western Buddhists have made very good progress in their meditation... they should guard against falling into the stages of the śrāvaka and Pratyeka-buddha by starting their immediate training in Bodhisattva development into Buddhahood as taught in this important sūtra. (xxi)

One of his sources is certainly the earliest extant Chinese commentary on the text, Notes on the Vimalakīrti-sūtra (T1775), which includes comments by Sengzhao 僧肇 and Daosheng 道生 as well as by Kumārajiva himself.
Luk goes on to point to the “sacred duty of planting the Mahāyāna banner in the Occident in the present Dharma ending age” (xxii). Clearly this version—reissued in 1990 by Shambhala Press with a foreword by the longtime teacher at the Zen Center of Los Angeles, Taizan Maezumi Roshi—is intended not for historians or philologists, nor for the general reader with an interest in Buddhism, but for practitioners who have embarked on the Mahāyāna path.

The translations of Watson and Thurman fall between these two extremes. Of the four translators it is Watson who is most straightforward about the audience he is addressing: “Like my earlier translation of the Lotus Sutra,” he writes, “the present volume is intended primarily for readers who have no special background in Buddhist studies” (x). Watson also states clearly that he is working from Kumārajīva’s version of the text (ix), but offers no further specifics, referring the reader to the translations of Thurman and Lamotte for details. Finally, he notes that he has also consulted three Japanese translations of Kumārajīva’s version (x) and one Japanese translation of the Tibetan (xi).

For his part, Thurman states frankly that his translation is based on the Tibetan version “as I am most at home in that language” (ix), but he does not go on to provide any textual details. His comment that the text “was translated into Tibetan twice, the definitive version completed in the ninth century by the well-known translator Chos Śnid Tshul Khrims” (ix) leaves the reader to wonder what the status of the “non-definitive” version might be. It is only by consulting Lamotte’s introduction (xxxviii-xliii) that it becomes clear that Thurman is referring to an earlier translation, preserved in manuscript fragments found at Dunhuang, which differs in numerous respects from the version that was later incorporated into the Tibetan canon. Clearly Thurman does not wish to engage the full range of textual issues dealt with by Lamotte, but a brief clarification of the identity of this mysterious “other version” would have alleviated much potential confusion.

Although Thurman is not explicit about his anticipated audience, this can be inferred from his statement of intent: “My main goal in this translation is to present the authentic teaching of Vimalakīrti, and so my main focus is philosophical rather than philological” (x; emphasis in the original). By introducing the notion of authenticity Thurman reveals that he is writing from a standpoint of advocacy, thus allowing us to place his work near the end of the spectrum occupied by Luk’s earlier version.

The translator’s conception of his audience, as we shall see, has a direct bearing on the style of the resulting translation. It may also have an impact—though not always in ways that could have been predicted—on the accuracy of the translation. A concern with philological precision can coexist with either an emic or an etic stance on the translator’s part; a lack of such concern, unfortunately, can coexist with either as well. Where the author’s
own stance vis-à-vis the Buddhist tradition appears to have taken his translation in an unexpected direction, we will note this fact in passing.

We may begin, however, simply by examining a few representative passages to assess the accuracy of their treatment by these four scholars. Because Luk and Watson are working from Kumārajīva's Chinese text, while Lamotte and Thurman are drawing mainly upon the Tibetan, we will discuss these two groups of translations separately.

**Translations based on Kumārajīva's Chinese Version**

A section found in the opening chapter of the *Vimalakīrti* offers a good starting point from which to examine the English versions produced by these two translators. Following the standard opening statement “Thus have I heard” and a description of the location where the scripture was preached, the text identifies the members of the audience and then goes on to describe one contingent of those in attendance—a group of thirty-two thousand bodhisattvas—in greater detail. Three segments of this detailed description are given below, each first in the Chinese text of Kumārajīva (with volume and page references to the Tai Shō edition), then in the renderings offered by Watson and Luk, respectively.

1. 念定總持辯才不散 (14.537a13)

   Watson: “Their mindfulness, meditation, retention of the teachings, and eloquence never faltered” (17)

   Luk: “They had achieved right concentration and mental stability, thereby acquiring the uninterrupted power of speech.” (1)

Watson has done a good job of handling most of the Buddhist technical terms here, rendering *nian* 念 (presumably from Skt. *smṛti*) as “mindfulness,” *ding* 定 (*samādhi*) as “meditation,” and *biancai* 辯才 (*pratibhāna*) as “eloquence.” One key technical term, however, which is regularly applied to bodhisattvas and generally paired with eloquence in Mahāyāna scriptures, has been obscured. The compound *zongchi* 總持 does not simply mean “retaining [the teachings]” but is an early translation of *dhāraṇī*, a technical term for a particular type of mnemonic device employed by bodhisattvas.¹⁰ While Watson may have been

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¹⁰ Kumārajīva usually transliterates this term as *duoluoni* 多羅尼, but here he has followed the wording found in Zhi Qian's earlier translation (14.519a15-16). The word *dhāraṇī* itself is often treated as synonymous with *mantra* in the sense of "spell, magic charm" (and indeed both words are sometimes translated into Chinese as *zhou*...
aware of the significance of this term, its presence in the text is not made transparent to the reader. The net effect is to elide a reference to a powerful, indeed quite magical, technique and to offer a bland (and acceptably modern) reference to "retention" in its place.

Luk's translation, on the other hand, is problematic in other ways. His "right concentration" apparently stands for nian 念 (or nian ding 念定?), while "mental stability" is either a rendition of ding 定 or of zongchi 主持. If the former is the case, the expression zongchi 主持 has simply been left out; if the latter, the translation misses the mark altogether. Moreover, by adding the word "thereby" Luk introduces an element of causality which is not present in Kumārajīva's text. Based on this very brief sample, one would have to describe Luk's rendition not as a translation, but as an exegetical paraphrase.

Watson: "... and of almsgiving, keeping the precepts, forebearance, assiduousness, meditation, wisdom, and the power to employ expedient means, there was not one they were deficient in." (17)

Luk: "They had achieved all the (six) pāramitās: charity (dāna), discipline (śīla), patience (kṣānti), devotion (vīrya), serenity (dhyāna) and wisdom (prajñā), as well as the expedient method (upāya) of teaching." (1-2)

Once again Watson has done quite well in rendering this passage into English. Though "assiduousness" is an unusual translation of jìngjin 精進 (Skt. vīrya), which is usually given as "energy" or "exertion," it is quite an acceptable one, and all of the others are well established equivalents. Luk, on the other hand, has once again introduced into his translation a number of terms that are not contained in the Chinese text. The word pāramitā does not occur in Kumārajīva's translation, for example, despite the fact that the first six items here are generally 六, but in India dhāranī referred specifically to powerful formulae that allow the bodhisattva to retain what he has learned (or according to some texts, to retain the virtuous qualities he has developed) from one lifetime to the next. Given this distinctive usage, it is perhaps not surprising that unlike mantra, which is a pan-Indian religious expression, dhāranī is used exclusively by Buddhists, and only by Mahāyāna Buddhists at that. Kumārajīva's own translation of the Da zhidu lun 大智度論 (T1509), for example, contains a long discussion of this topic in which the author takes it for granted that dhāranīs are used only in Mahāyāna circles and proceeds to discuss why they should be unknown to the Āsavakus (25.269b ff).
associated with that list, nor is there any reference in the Chinese to "teaching." Thus while Luk's version might convey to the reader a good sense of how the sūtra would be understood by contemporary Chinese Buddhists, it does not represent a faithful rendering of the content of Kumārajīva's text.

(3) 逮無所得不起法忍 (537a15)

Watson: “They had learned to accept the fact that there is nothing to be grasped at, no view of phenomena to be entertained” (17)

Luk: “However, to them these realizations did not mean any gain whatsoever for themselves, so that they were in line with the patient endurance of the uncreate (anupattika-dharma-ksānti).” (2)

Here, however, both translators seem to have run into difficulty. The first part of this description (dai wusuo de 追無所得, lit. “they had reached [a state of] non-attainment”) corresponds fairly well to Watson's rendition, but Luk's rendering is less a translation than an interpretation. There is nothing in the Chinese text that refers to "realizations," for example, nor does it speak of any gain "for themselves." The words “they were in line with” are also Luk's own addition, for the text states simply that the bodhisattvas had "reached" (carrying over the word dai 逮 from the first phrase) the state of "enduring (ren 忍) the non-arising [of] dharmas (bugi fa 不起法).” The Sanskrit equivalent supplied by Luk is indeed the expression that usually corresponds to this Chinese phrase, but the term "uncreate" has (for this reader, at least) overtones of "the unconditioned" (wuwei 無為 or asamskṛta) that are not relevant here. What the bodhisattva is able to endure, according to this expression, is not something "uncreated" (and thus beyond all that is subject to change) but simply "unarisen," i.e., something that has never come into being (not at least in the way in which we usually imagine "being") at all.

Watson, too, had difficulty with this expression (perhaps even more so), for he translates it simply as "no view of phenomena to be entertained." This is, however, entirely too vague for what was a well-known technical expression.

11 It is important to note that upāya (or upāya-kauśalya) is not always used in reference to "adapting the teachings to suit the needs of one's listeners," though its use in this sense in the Lotus Sūtra has given this definition a very high profile. In a number of earlier Mahāyāna texts—e.g., the Ugraparipṛccha-sūtra and the Aṣṭasāhasrikā-prajñāparamita-sūtra—the term refers instead to certain countering measures used by a bodhisattva in order to avoid falling into Arhatship or a heavenly rebirth. Accordingly, it is better to simply translate the term as "skill-in-means" or "tactical skill" and let the reader determine, according to context, whether it has anything to do with teaching in a given instance.
in the Buddhism of Kumārajīva’s time. To translate this pivotal term as Watson does may well represent the way this phrase would look to a modern reader without any specialized knowledge of Buddhism, but it certainly cannot represent Kumārajīva’s understanding of the term. Once again the stumbling block is a Buddhist technical term that has gone out of currency in contemporary East Asian Buddhism.

We may now turn to a few lines from another section of the sūtra, drawing from Chapter 4 (in Kumārajīva’s version) in which Śākyamuni Buddha asks a number of bodhisattvas to visit Vimalakīrti. Each bodhisattva in turn refuses to go, citing a disconcerting encounter in the past in which he was bested by Vimalakīrti. One of these men, called “Good Virtue” (Shande 善德) in Kumārajīva’s version, relates his experience of having been the target of a discourse by Vimalakīrti on the nature of a true “dharma-gift.” Vimalakīrti’s comments, as recalled by Good Virtue, include the following:

(4) 於身命財起三堅法 (14.543c19)

Watson: “With regard to body, life, and wealth, one follows the doctrine that these three are indestructible…” (61)

Luk: “… the relinquishment of body, life and wealth [springs] from the three indestructibles…” (46)

This is admittedly a difficult passage, and it may well be these lines and those discussed below that Watson had in mind when he remarked that the Vimalakīrti is beautifully concise “except for a rather murky passage at the end of chapter 4” (ix). Yet there is a well-established Buddhist motif here which, if correctly understood, can clarify matters considerably. A number of early Mahāyāna sūtras refer to “extracting the substance (sāra) from the insubstantial (asāra),” exhorting the bodhisattva to do so with respect to three things: his body (kāya), life (jīva), and material wealth (bhoga). What is meant by this, in brief, is that although these three items are transitory and unreliable, the bodhisattva can

12 Kumārajīva usually translates this Sanskrit expression as wusheng fù ren 無生法忍, but here he has followed the wording found in Zhi Qian’s earlier translation (14.519a17).

make use of them to extract something truly enduring: the merit which will help him to attain buddhahood in the future. The three items from which this merit can be extracted are precisely those mentioned at the beginning of the passage given above, and what is more, the term jian 堅 “solid, firm, durable” is one of the regular equivalents of Sanskrit sūra “essence, substance” in this context. Re-reading this passage in light of this awareness, it becomes clear that it can easily be translated as “with respect to one’s body, life, and wealth, one brings forth the three [kinds of] substantial qualities” (reading the term fa 法 “dharma” not in the technical sense of “doctrine” but in its equally common sense of “quality, phenomenon, thing”). Without recognizing this traditional motif the passage remains quite inscrutable, forcing Watson to attempt to salvage the situation by suggesting that the three “indestructible things” are “Not the ordinary body but the true or eternal body, etc.” (p. 61, n. 5).

Luk’s translation once again contains interpolated material, but he has also misconstrued the grammar of the passage. Attempting to bring it into line with standard Chinese Buddhist teachings he adds the word “relinquishing” (which has no equivalent in Kumārajīva’s text). He then goes on to describe this postulated relinquishing as coming forth from “the three indestructibles,” which he defines in a note as “infinite body, endless life, and boundless spiritual possessions” (p. 46, n. 3; this may be the source of Watson’s interpretation). But the grammar makes it clear that these three “substantial qualities”—not “indestructibles,” which is an over-translation of jian 堅—are what is being brought forth, not the source from which something else arises. Luk’s rendition is therefore problematic in several ways.

(5) 以出家法起於深心。以如說行超於多聞 (543c22-23)

Watson: “By following the rules for those who have left the household life one cultivates a deeply searching mind; by carrying out religious practices in the prescribed way one acquires much learning. . . .” (61)

Luk: “. . . retiring from the world [springs] from the profound mind; knowledge gained [springs] from hearing (about the Dharma). . . .” (46)

Challenges to the translator continue to abound in this passage, and once again Watson does much better than Luk, due primarily to his far better grasp of classical Chinese grammar. Luk understands “reting from the world” (he

14 See for example the version of the Ugraparipṛchchā-sūtra preserved in the Ratnakūta section of the Chinese canon (T310[19], 11.473b26-28) and the Ratnarāsi-sūtra found in the same section (T310[44], 11.645b21).
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does not translate the word fa 法 “dharma”) as arising from a “profound mind,” but this is grammatically impossible; one must read chujia fa 出家法 “the qualities of the renunciant” (or of renunciation) as the basis upon which the profound mind is brought forth, and not the reverse. Here and throughout this section Luk seems to be unaware that the particle yu 於 is commonly used in early Buddhist translations to mark a direct object, an awareness which would have made the translation of these lines into English vastly simpler. Watson’s translation is not without its problems, but these are minor by comparison to those found in Luk’s version. Once again he has overlooked the possibility of translating fa 法 in the non-technical sense simply as “qualities” (the meaning it seems to have throughout this passage), and his “deeply searching mind” is a curious choice (there is no word for “searching” in the Chinese). But the significance of the character shen 深 “profound” in this context is admittedly less than transparent, and as we shall see it may be the result of an error in Kumārajīva’s text.

(6) 以無諍法起空閑處。趣向佛慧起於宴坐 (543c23-24)

Watson: “by observing ways that are free from contention one creates peaceful and uncrowded surroundings; by directing one’s efforts toward Buddha wisdom one learns quiet meditation. . . .” (61)

Luk: “absence of disputation [springs] from a leisurely life; the quest of Buddha wisdom from meditation. . . .” (46)

This is perhaps the most difficult passage yet, and once again Luk has inverted the grammatical order of the text, stating that a “leisurely life” leads to the absence of disputation, and meditation to “Buddha wisdom,” rather than vice versa, while Watson has interpreted the sentence structure correctly. It must be admitted, however, that what is found in Kumārajīva’s text is precisely the opposite of what one would expect. Is it not the case, for example, that meditation leads to the wisdom of the Buddha rather than the reverse?

But it is precisely this sort of material that tests the mettle of the translator. Several decades ago, at a certain divinity school in New England, students

15 On this feature of early Buddhist Chinese see Erik Zürcher’s invaluable article “Late Han Vernacular Elements in the Earliest Buddhist Translations,” Journal of the Chinese Language Teachers Association, vol. 12, no. 3 (1979), pp. 177-203 (p. 190 and p. 199, n. 42), where Zürcher suggests that this usage was probably derived from the vernacular language.

16 See below, p. 251.
taking the required French and German exams were routinely given writings on biblical scholarship that were at best grossly outdated and at worst self-evidently false. The reasoning behind this approach, it was said, was that if the student was able to translate correctly what the French or German text actually said, rather than what she thought it should say, this would constitute definitive proof that she could indeed read the language in question. When faced with an unexpected passage in a Chinese Buddhist text the same principle obtains: it is the translator who conveys in English what the text actually says, rather than what standard Buddhist categories might lead one to expect, who has successfully acquitted his task.

But there are difficulties of other types in this passage as well. What, for example, is the place of “peaceful and uncrowded surroundings” (in Watson’s version) or a “leisurely life” (in Luk’s reading) in a Buddhist text such as this? Both translations evoke the imagery of a life of luxury and ease, not the rigors of traditional Buddhist practice. Has the text again been modernized to appeal to contemporary readers? Indeed it has, but not—in this case—by Watson or Luk. Here the changes were made not in the twentieth century, but more than a millennium and a half before.

Even without an Indic-language text of the Vimalakirti at our disposal, it is possible to determine, in many cases, what the underlying Indian terminology would have been by comparing Kumārajiva’s text with other versions (above all the Tibetan) and by noting parallel passages found in other Chinese sūtras for which Indian versions are extant. And in the present case there is no question that Kumārajiva’s kongxianchu (空闲处, “empty leisure place”) stands for an underlying Sanskrit (or Prakrit) *aranyakāsu* “wilderness-dwelling,” an expression used in Indian Buddhist texts to refer to solitary dwelling in a wild and uncultivated place. This is hardly an image of comfort or ease; indeed such places are routinely described in Indian texts as infested with robbers and carnivorous beasts, and aranyakāsu itself was considered a severely ascetic practice, classified as one of the twelve (sometimes thirteen) dhātus-aṇuṇas. How is it, then, that Kumārajiva could have chosen to use the word xian (a term also used to refer to the country hermitage of a wealthy man) to describe this demanding religious practice?

The question, though, is wrongly put, for a comparison of Kumārajiva’s Vimalakirti with the earlier version by Zhi Qian quickly reveals that it was not Kumārajiva but his third-century predecessor who made this unlikely choice. Though above we have pictured Kumārajiva as translating from an Indian

17 See above, n. 1, for an update on this situation.

version of the sūtra, there is overwhelming evidence that he consulted the earlier translation of the *Vimalakīrti* by Zhi Qian as well.\(^{19}\) In this passage Zhi Qian has *xianju* 隘居 “leisure-dwelling” or “hermitage-dwelling” (14.525a25), which clearly served as the prototype for Kumārajīva’s translation. Indeed a characteristic feature of Zhi Qian’s work is the use of vocabulary that evokes the image of a leisurely and cultured life, a practice which no doubt contributed to the great popularity of his translations among the southern aristocracy.\(^{20}\)

The radical alteration of the tone of a Buddhist scripture in the course of translation, then, is hardly peculiar to translators of our own time. As a result, we must take note of yet another challenge confronting the translator of the Chinese *Vimalakīrti* into English: the degree to which she wishes to make transparent the changes that Kumārajīva—or in this case, his predecessor Zhi Qian—introduced into the text. Such changes can only be observed, of course, by comparing the Chinese text with an extant or postulated Indian prototype, which makes this a challenging task indeed.

... 

The passages discussed above are brief, yet a perusal of the entire text produced by each translator suggests that these examples are representative of their work as a whole. Watson’s translation is smooth and easy to read, but part of that smoothness is obtained by papering over jarring terms and concepts that have no place in the consciousness of a twentieth-century (and largely secularized) Japanese reader. Luk’s translation, on the other hand, veers off in another direction, freely interpolating explanatory material that serves to bring what is found in Kumārajīva’s text into line with modern Chinese Buddhist teachings. In terms of its faithfulness to a certain reading of the Chinese text (an issue to which we will return below), and above all in terms of its grammatical accuracy, Watson’s version is by far the better of the two. Thus of the currently available English translations of Kumārajīva’s Chinese text Watson’s rendition—despite certain shortcomings—is clearly preferable.\(^ {21}\)

\(^{19}\) Instances of Kumārajīva’s dependence on Zhi Qian’s translations are legion, and examples can easily be found in virtually any of Kumārajīva’s translations which have extant versions by Zhi Qian. We have already encountered two other examples in the brief passages cited in this review; see above, notes 10 and 12.

\(^{20}\) We have another example of this practice in this very passage, for the term translated as “quiet meditation” by Watson and simply as “meditation” by Luk is in fact *yanzuo* 安坐, an expression which means “leisurely sitting” but has overtones of attendance at a luxurious banquet (宴). The underlying Sanskrit term, *pratīsambhāyana* (“meditative seclusion”), has no such connotations.

\(^{21}\) Another English translation of Kumārajīva’s Chinese version, by John R. McRae, is expected to appear in a forthcoming volume of the Bukkyō Dendō Kyōkai
Translations based on the Tibetan

We may now turn to two very different translations of the *Vimalakīrti*, by Étienne Lamotte and Robert A. F. Thurman respectively, both based on the sole complete (and canonical) Tibetan version. The English text of Lamotte’s version is of course not his own work but a translation from the original French by Sara Boin. In evaluating the English version of Lamotte’s *Vimalakīrti* we are thus separated from the Tibetan text itself by not one but two layers of translation. For this reason the French original of each citation will be given in a footnote, and instances where Boin’s choices are unexpected will be noted there. It is a credit to Boin’s expertise as a translator that, in all of the passages discussed here, there is not a single grammatical problem to report. There are, however, a number of instances in which Boin has chosen English wording that appears to be based not on the French text itself, but on Lamotte’s reconstruction of the Sanskrit. Where the resulting divergences in meaning appear to be significant, they will be noted below.

For the sake of symmetry we will focus on the same passages—this time as found in the Tibetan version of the sūtra—that we examined above in translations from Chinese. Because the Tibetan version was based on a somewhat longer Indic recension of the text than was Kumārajīva’s Chinese, the two versions will not always correspond precisely.

Near the beginning of the sūtra the bodhisattvas in the audience are described in the Tibetan version as follows:

(1a) *dran-pa dang | blo-gros dang | rtogs-pa dang | ting-nge ‘dzin dang | gzungs dang | spobs-pa phun-sum tshogs-pa* (74.3.2)

Lamotte: “gifted with awareness, intelligence, knowledge, concentration, magical formulae and eloquence (*smṛtimatyaḥdhigāma-samādhiḥdāraṇīpratibhānasampānṇa*)” (I, §3, p. 2)\(^{22}\)

Thurman: “Their mindfulness, intelligence, realization, meditation, incantation, and eloquence all were perfected.” (10)

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\(^{22}\) In the original French version, “*doués de mémoire, d’intelligence, de science, de concentration, de formules magiques et d’éloquence*” (p. 98). Boin’s translation of “mémoire” as “awareness” appears to reflect the reconstructed Sanskrit term *smṛti* rather than the French translation itself.
There is nothing to quarrel with in either of these translations, for both present quite legitimate renderings of the Tibetan text. Though Lamotte’s “gifted with” (Fr. *doués*) and Thurman’s “were perfected” (for example) sound quite different, both are perfectly good translations of *phun-sum tshogs-pa* (“fully equipped [with], perfectly possessed [of]”). Note in particular that both Lamotte and Thurman have preserved the sense of the Tibetan by their choice of “magical formulae” and “incantation” (Fr. *formules magiques*), respectively, for *gzungs* (the standard equivalent of the term *dhāraṇī* discussed above).

**(1b) sgrib-pa dang kun-nas ldang-ba thams-cad dang-bral-ba | sgrib-pa med-pa’i rnams-par thar-pa-la gnas-pa | spobs rgyun mi-’chad-pa |** *(74.3.2-3)*

Lamotte: “based on the liberations without obstacle (*anāvāraṇavimokṣa*); gifted with indestructible eloquence (*anācchhedya-pratibhāna*)” *(i, §3, p. 2)*

Thurman: “They were free of all obscurations and emotional involvements, living in liberation without impediment.” *(10)*

Here, however, something has gone awry, for each translator has omitted part (though not the same part) of what is contained in the Tibetan. Lamotte has failed to translate *sgrib-pa dang kun-nas ldang-ba thams-cad dang-bral-ba* “free of all impediments and obsessions,” while Thurman has elided the phrase *spobs rgyun mi-’chad-pa* “[their] eloquence was uninterrupted.” Presumably these omissions were inadvertent—for there is nothing of doctrinal or sectarian significance at stake here—but they serve as a reminder to the translator of how easy it is to skip a passage when the text is repetitive.

**(2) sbyin-pa dang | dul-ba dang | mi-’gyur-ba dang | yang-dag-par sdom-pa dang | tshul-khrims dang | bzhod-pa dang | brtson-’grus dang | bsam-gtan dang | shes-rab dang | thabs-la mkhas-pa dang | smon-lam dang | stobs dang | ye-shes-kyi pha-rol-du {sic! phyin-pa-las nges-par byung-ba |** *(74.3.3-4)*

Lamotte: “complying with the perfections of giving, morality, patience, vigour, concentration, wisdom, skillful means, vows, power, and knowledge (*dānasālakṣāntividyānapajñānaprayākṣānaukapalikāpa-nidhānalājñānapāramitānirāyata*)” *(i, §3, p. 2)*

Fr. “fondés sur des libérations sans obstacle; doués d’une éloquence indestructible” *(pp. 98-99)*.

Fr. “accédant aux perfections du don, de la moralité, de la patience, de
Thurman: “They were totally dedicated through the transcen-dences of generosity, subdued, unwavering, and sincere morality, tolerance, effort, meditation, wisdom, skill in liberative technique, commitment, power, and gnosis.” (10)

Here Lamotte’s wording is more traditional, for where he refers to “perfections” (French id.) Thurman uses the unfamiliar “transcendences” (which is, however, an excellent rendition of one traditional Indian understanding of pāramitā). What is more significant, however, is the fact that several terms in the Tibetan text are missing from Lamotte’s translation. After the word sbyin-pa “giving” comes a term meaning “disciplined” (Tib. dul-ba, Skt. *dama), another meaning “unchanging” (mi-’gyur-ba, presumably for Skt. *niyama “fixed”), and yet another meaning “genuinely binding” (yang-dag-par sdom- pa, Skt. *samyama “self-mastery”). There are, in other words, an additional three items between the first and second of the traditional pāramitās that do not appear in Lamotte’s English (or French) translation at all. Strangely, when Lamotte provides his usual list of Sanskrit equivalents he omits these non-standard items here as well. Faced with several terms which should not appear in a list of pāramitās, in other words, Lamotte has simply eliminated them.

Thurman, by contrast, has struggled to find a way to incorporate them into his translation, treating all three as epithets of “morality.” Whether this is in fact their function in the sentence is debatable, but nonetheless Thurman’s faithfulness to what actually occurs in the Tibetan allows us to perceive that we have here an unusual list of pāramitās. But the Tibetan is not alone in this respect. The Chinese versions of Zhi Qian and Xuanzang, like the Tibetan, l’énergie, de l’extase, de la sagesse, de l’habileté dans les moyens, du voeu, de la force et du savoir” (p. 99). Here Boin’s choice of “concentration” again appears to owe more to the reconstructed Sanskrit term dhyāna than to Lamotte’s French “l’extase.” It also elides the distinction Lamotte makes between samādhi (which he regularly renders as “concentration”) and dhyāna (“extase”). Likewise, Lamotte distinguishes between adhigama (above, 1a), which he translates as “science,” and jñāna “savor” (2), a distinction which is masked in Boin’s version where both are translated as “knowledge.”

This interpretation is reflected in the Tibetan translation of pāramitā itself, as pha-rol-tu phyin-pa “gone to the other side.” Not all Indian Buddhists, however, accepted this etymology; for a spirited defense of a different interpretation (as “excellent,” from Skt. prama) see the commentary on the Heart Sūtra by Vimalakīrti translated in Donald S. Lopez, Jr., Elaborations on Emptiness (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 52-53 and n. 14.

Note that the Tibetan text, unlike that of Kumārajiva, actually uses this term.
both contain extra items—in this case, two rather than three—interspersed
between the first and the second (standard) pāramitās.\textsuperscript{27}

It is essential, therefore, that the translator not attempt to “correct” an
irregular-looking text, for in so doing she may inadvertently destroy evidence
of other, less familiar, Buddhist traditions. What we see in the Vimalakīrti (in
all versions except Kumārajīva’s) may well be evidence of the existence of lists
of pāramitās that differed from the six (later ten) that eventually became standard.
In this instance Thurman has done us a great service by providing an English
rendition that is as idiosyncratic and unexpected as its Tibetan original.

\begin{equation}
\text{(3) } \text{mi-dmigs-pa'i chos-la bzod-pa dang-ldan-pa} \quad (74.3.4)
\end{equation}

\begin{itemize}
\item Lamotte: “convinced of the ungraspability of all dharmas (anupalabdhaḥ dhammaksānti-pratilabdha)” (I, §3, pp. 2–3)\textsuperscript{28}
\item Thurman: “They had attained the intuitive tolerance of the ultimate
incomprehensibility of all things.” (10)
\end{itemize}

Here both Lamotte and Thurman have given reasonable accounts of what we
find in the Tibetan text, though Lamotte has translated the expression chos in the
technical sense as “all dharmas” while Thurman has opted for the more
general sense of “all things.”\textsuperscript{29} Based on what we find in the Chinese translations,
however—all three of which read buqi fa ren 不起法忍, “endurance of the non-
arising of things”—it seems likely that the Tibetan version was based on a
Sanskrit text which read *anupalabdha “unobtained” in place of the expected
*anutpāda in the technical expression *anutpāda-“unarisen” (or *anuttarapattika-) dharmaksānti.

\textsuperscript{27} Zhi Qian’s text reads 布施調意自損戒忍精進一心智發善業 (14.519a16-17),
adding tiaoyi 調意 “taming the mind” (for śama?) and zisun 自損 lit. “self-harming”
(for samyama “self-restraint”) between the pāramitās of “giving” and “morality.”
Xuanzang has 布施調伏寂靜戒忍精進靜慮解脫等持等善若方便願力智 (14.561a14-15),
adding tiaofu 調伏 “subduing” (“śama) and jijing 寂靜 “quieting, stilling” (“śama)
in the same position.

\textsuperscript{28} Fr. “convaincus de l’inexistence de tous les dharma” (p. 99). For “l’inexistence”
Boin gives “ungraspability,” a choice clearly determined by the reconstructed Sanskrit
term anupalabdha rather than by Lamotte’s French translation itself. It could well be
argued that Boin’s wording is preferable to Lamotte’s, yet such a choice reveals a
greater concern on Boin’s part with translating the meaning of the “original” text
(i.e., of the Sanskrit as reconstructed by Lamotte) than with conveying Lamotte’s
French rendition of the Tibetan.

\textsuperscript{29} Both translators are inferring the presence of the term “all,” which has no
equivalent in the Tibetan.
Turning now to the account by the bodhisattva Sudatta ( Tib. Legs-par byin “Well-Given,” the same figure who is called Shande 普德 “Good Virtue” in Kumārajiva’s version) of his encounter with Vimalakīrti, we find Vimalakīrti quoted as making the following remarks:

(4) snying-po med-pa-las snying-po len-pas mngon-par bsgrubs-pa’i lus dang | srog dang | langs-spyod rnyed-pa dang | (83.3.6-7)

Lamotte: “[The offering of the Law (dharma-yajña) means] the gains of body, life and riches (kāya-jñānabhogalābha) resulting from the action of taking for substantial that which is not substantial (asāre sāropādānam). . . .” (III, §72, 108)30

Thurman: “[The Dharma-sacrifice consists of] the gain of body, health, and wealth, consummated by the extraction of essence from the essenceless. . .” (40)

In this passage we have a noticeable difference between the two translations, with Lamotte’s version stating that these three types of gains result from “taking for substantial that which is not substantial,” while Thurman states that they culminate in “the extraction of essence from the essenceless.” The former might seem to conform to traditional Buddhist doctrine, but it is Thurman’s rendition that is correct. As we have seen, the underlying motif here is that the bodhisattva can extract something of substance (merit that can contribute to his future attainment of Buddhahood) from entities that are in themselves insubstantial (his transitory body, life, and wealth). In an apparent attempt to read the text in a way that would sound familiar, however, Lamotte has violated the grammatical constraints of the Tibetan.31

(5) rab-tu byung-bas mngon-par bsgrubs-pa’i lhag-pa’i bsam-pa dang | nan-tan-gyis mngon-par bsgrubs-pa’i thos-pa-la mkhas-pa dang | (83.4.1)

30 Fr. “les gains du corps, de la vie et des richesses résultant du fait de prendre du solide dans ce qui n’est pas solide” (pp. 213-214).

31 The structure here is quite straightforward: the Tibetan can only be understood as meaning “by extracting the substance” (snying-po len-pas, in the instrumental case) “from that which is without substance” (snying-po med-pa-las, in the ablative). Happily we have an occurrence of this expression in the Sanskrit Śīksāsamuccaya (200.17) where “insubstantial body” is also given in the ablative case (āsāre kāyāt). Lamotte’s Sanskrit reconstruction, by contrast, places the term “insubstantial” in the locative (asāre), thus departing from the grammar of the Tibetan.
Lamotte: “[It means] the high resolve (adhyāśaya) resulting from leaving the world (pravrajya), the ability in skillful means and learning (upāyabahuṣrutakaśāla) resulting from religious practice (pratipatti)” (III, §72, 109)

Thurman: “[It consists] of high resolve, consummated by renunciation; of skill in erudition, consummated by religious practice” (40)

Here there is little difference between the two translations, and both are acceptable renditions of the Tibetan. But the wording of the Tibetan offers a clue that can elucidate a puzzling passage in Kumārajīva’s Chinese version. The Tibetan lḥag-pa’i bsam-pa (as Lamotte indicates in his Sanskrit reconstruction) is the regular equivalent of adhyāśaya “high resolve,” a term which makes good sense here. Read in this light, we might ask whether Kumārajīva’s shenxin 深心 “profound mind” could be an attempt to make sense of an Indic text that read atisāya “deep” as the result of an error in transmission.34

(6) nyon-mongs-pa med-pa’i chos rtags-pas mngon-par bsgrub-pa’i dgon-pa-la gnas-pa dang | sangs-rgyas-kyi ye-shes ’thob-par byed-pas mngon-par bsgrub-pa’i nang-du yang-dag ’jog-pa dang | (83.4.1-2)

Lamotte: “[It means] the dwelling in the forest (aranyavāsa) resulting from the knowledge of the peaceful dharmas (aranādharmāvabodhana), the solitary absorption in meditation (pratisamālayana) resulting from the search for the knowledge of

32 The small type (so in the original) indicates that Lamotte is supplying words found in Xuanzang’s seventh-century Chinese version but not in the Tibetan.

33 Fr. “la haute résolution résultant de la sortie du monde, l’habileté en moyens salvifiqnes et en érudition résultant de la pratique religieuse” (p. 214).

34 Though space does not permit a detailed discussion of this issue here, evidence of confusion between voiced and unvoiced consonants and between aspirates and their unaspirated counterparts abounds in early Chinese Buddhist translations. For examples in the work of Dharmarakṣa (late 3rd/early 4th century CE) see Daniel J. Boucher, “Gāndhāri and the Early Chinese Buddhist Translations Reconsidered: The Case of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka,” Journal of the American Oriental Society, vol. 118, no. 4 (1998), pp. 471-506. Instances of these confusions are, if anything, even more common in the work of Zhi Qian, as I hope to document in a forthcoming lexicon of his translation terms.
the Buddhas (buddhajñanaparyṣṭi)" (III, §72, 109)\textsuperscript{35}

Thurman: "[It consists] of retirement in solitary retreats, consummated by understanding things free of passions; of introspective meditation, consummated by attainment of the Buddha-gnosis" (40)

Once again Lamotte's translation sounds more reasonable than Thurman's, but it is the latter that actually conforms to the wording of the Tibetan. Where Lamotte refers to "the search for the knowledge of the buddhas" (Fr. la recherche du savoir des Buddhas), the Tibetan text—as correctly translated by Thurman—refers to its "attainment" (thob-pa). Lamotte's translation of the expression dgon-pa-lad gnas-pa as "dwelling in the forest," however, is preferable to the "retirement in solitary retreats" given by Thurman, whose work (like that of his third-century counterpart Zhi Qian) betrays a general tendency to elide references to ascetic activity.\textsuperscript{36}

Of these two translations there is no question that Thurman's is more accessible to the general reader. His fluid and colloquial style succeeds—far better than any of the other translations considered here, whether based on the Chinese or on the Tibetan—in conveying not only the dramatic flair but also the abundant humor found in the text. It is also generally more accurate than Lamotte's version, both in grammatical terms and in its faithfulness to the (sometimes unexpected) content of the Tibetan. The very helpful glossaries of Sanskrit names and terms, numerical categories, and (English) Buddhist technical terms also contribute to its appropriateness for use in the classroom. While one might occasionally quibble with Thurman's choice of translation terminology,\textsuperscript{37} his version emerges as the best of the four in terms of both

\textsuperscript{35} Fr. "le séjour dans la forêt résultant de la connaissance des dharma exempts de dispute, la méditation solitaire résultant de la recherche du savoir des Buddha" (p. 214). For exemples de dispute Boin gives "peaceful," again presumably based on the reconstructed Sanskrit (araṇā) rather than the French.

\textsuperscript{36} See for example p. 59 of his translation, where the Tibetan text contains the standard expression "having gone forth in the well-taught Dharma and Vinaya" (legs par gsungs pa'i chos 'dul ba la rab tu byung nas, 89.4.5), which Thurman renders "renounced the world for the discipline of the rightly taught Dharma," thus causing the Vinaya to disappear into the category of "Dharma."

\textsuperscript{37} E.g., the rendition of mahāsiddha as "great sorcerer" (p. 8), or of brāhmaṇa (Tib. bram-ze) as "aristocrat" (p. 21), or the use of the term "supernovas" to refer to the fires that consume the universe at the end of a kalpa (p. 53).
accuracy and style.

Lamotte’s translation, however, retains a certain value for specialists, above all in his extensive introduction and annotations. While the examples given above make it clear that one cannot simply take his readings at face value, this volume remains a real contribution to our knowledge of Indian Buddhism.

Artifacts and Audiences

It is a fairly straightforward process to assess the accuracy of a translation by evaluating the author’s grasp of the grammar of his source-language and his faithfulness in rendering the words actually found the text. But a more fundamental question still remains. What is the translator doing when she produces an English rendition of Kumārajīva’s Chinese Vimalakīrti or of Dharmatāśila’s Tibetan version of the text? When we pick up such a book in a bookstore, or assign it to our students, what precisely—in the fullest sense of the word—does such a work represent?

This question involves a whole range of issues, from the author’s choice to translate a certain text to his selection of a particular source-version to the style in which he chooses to render that source into English. Indeed, it involves a prior and even more fundamental issue: Is this text worth translating at all? What makes a certain Buddhist scripture, and not another, worthy of the intensive scholarly effort required to make it available in English? Is it the significance of the text in India, its use in other Asian cultures, or its influence on one of the living traditions of Buddhism of our own day? Or is it, perhaps, simply that the potential translator likes what the scripture has to say?

In the case of the Vimalakīrti the decision to translate Kumārajīva’s Chinese version into English requires no justification. This scripture, as we have seen, had a profound impact on East Asian Buddhism, and Kumārajīva’s text soon outshone Zhi Qian’s pioneering translation, ultimately becoming the sole version of the scripture actually used in East Asia. Even the meticulous version produced by Xuanzang was unable to displace it, and (with one exception) it is Kumārajīva’s version that served as the basis for all of the extant East Asian commentaries. The pervasive influence of this version of the text in both medieval and modern East Asian Buddhism thus makes an English translation entirely appropriate.

Simply deciding to work from Kumārajīva’s version, however, is not the end of the matter. The translator must also decide how to read Kumārajīva’s text. Does she want to represent the text in English as it would be understood by a contemporary reader from, say, Taiwan, or Hong Kong, or Japan? Or

18 The sole exception is a commentary by Xuanzang’s student Kuiji (†1782), which is based on Xuanzang’s translation of the text.
does she want to create an English version that would convey the way the text might have been received by Kumārajīva’s original audience in fifth-century north China? Or again (if she is Indologically rather than Sinologically oriented) does she prefer to read through Kumārajīva’s Chinese text to recover the content of the underlying Indic version—that is, to translate the text as Kumārajīva himself, with the Indic text before him, might have understood it? There are decisions to be made at every step—decisions that are not always faced squarely, let alone made clear to one’s readership, by contemporary translators. In sum, simply to say that one is working from “Kumārajīva’s version” is not yet enough; the translator must also decide which reading of Kumārajīva’s text she wishes to convey.

None of the translations considered here includes an explicit discussion of this issue, though Watson ventured briefly into this territory in his earlier translation of the Lotus Sūtra (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). Since he states in the preface to his translation of the Vimalakīrti (x) that he intends to follow the same methods used in this earlier work, it is worth pausing to take note of the approach described there. As with his Vimalakīrti translation, Watson writes that his version of the Lotus Sūtra “is designed for readers who have no special background in Buddhist studies or Asian literature” (xxiii-xxiv). But he goes on to tell us more about the text—that is, about the reading of the text—on which his translation is based:

I have tried to render the text [of Kumārajīva’s Lotus Sūtra] in the way that it has traditionally been understood in China and Japan. That is why I have carefully taken into consideration the Japanese yomikudashi reading ... which rearranges the Chinese characters of the text so that they conform to the patterns of Japanese syntax. (xxvi)

The results of these methodological choices are evident. Watson has produced a translation that is smooth and easy to read, offering no strange technical terms or transliterated Sanskrit expressions that might deter a reader who knows little or nothing of Buddhism. But while he makes it clear that he will exclude from consideration the Indian background of the text, he does not discuss the fact that “the way [the sūtra] has traditionally been understood in China and Japan” is a category that contains a vast array of possible readings. In the case of the Vimalakīrti (and presumably of the Lotus as well) it is clear that Watson has not chosen to translate the Chinese text as Kumārajīva himself might have understood it (which would require, unavoidably, a familiarity with its Indian background), nor to produce an English rendering of the sūtra as Kumārajīva’s original audience would have received it (which would require reading the text primarily in terms of the vocabulary and religious currents circulating in north China in the fifth century CE). Rather, what Watson has done is to translate
the Chinese text as it was understood in twentieth-century Japan.\(^{39}\) As a result, the artifact that Watson has produced may be more useful for understanding the role of the *Vimalakirti* in modern Japan than for gaining access to its interpretation in early medieval China.

Luk’s creation, on the other hand, is clearly shaped by his own commitment to Buddhism, specifically to a particular Chan tradition taught in Hong Kong. As we have seen, on numerous occasions he has amplified and in some cases even altered the text to make it conform to current Chinese Buddhist expectations. The result is a text that is a useful source for understanding Buddhism in the contemporary Chinese cultural sphere, but which cannot serve as an entrée to the Buddhism of Kumārajīva’s day. Once again, in other words, we have a document that is distinctly modern in its rendition, though it lacks the demythologizing and secularizing tone that characterizes Watson’s work.

What, then, of the translations from the Tibetan? Here we are on quite different ground, for as noted above there is no evidence that this *sūtra* was ever actively used by Tibetan Buddhists. In light of this fact, it seems appropriate to ask why Lamotte and Thurman have chosen to base their translations on this version of the text. What could be the value of such an artifact? Or—to put the question more bluntly—does it have any value at all?

Certainly it cannot be argued that these translations represent a contribution to our understanding of Tibetan Buddhism, and indeed neither translator presents his work in this way. Granted, both are working from the version preserved in the Tibetan canon, but there are no traces here of how a Tibetan reader would perceive the scripture, either today or in Dharmatāśila’s time.\(^{40}\) On the contrary, both translators are using the Tibetan version to gain access to the way the text would have resonated in India. As noted above, Thurman states explicitly that he intends to convey “the authentic teaching of Vimalakirti” (x; emphasis in the original), while Lamotte’s objective—as his copious Sanskrit glosses make clear—is to reconstruct the underlying Indian text.\(^{41}\) What both translators are doing is thus to read through the Tibetan text

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\(^{39}\) The Japanese translations Watson cites range in date from 1934 to 1993, and the *yomikudashi* version was published in 1932.

\(^{40}\) A reading of the scripture through a Tibetan lens would necessarily require the rendering of the underlying word *nirvāṇa*, for example (Tib. *mya-ngan-las ’das*) as “having passed beyond suffering,” and the equivalent of arhat (*dgra bcom-pa*) as “one who has vanquished the enemies.”

\(^{41}\) Another difficulty with Lamotte’s work can be observed in retrospect now that we have seen how he handles the Tibetan text itself. For just as he attempted to regularize a passage which contained an unusual list of *pāramitās*, so in his introduction he attempts to standardize the doctrinal content of the text. The *Vimalakirti*, according to Lamotte, represents “a pure Madhyamaka” (lx), and when compared with the
to an underlying Indic version, and thus to convey in English what the postulated "original" would have said.\(^4^2\)

Ironically, this means that while the two translators of the (older) Chinese version of Kumārajīva have consciously or unconsciously engaged in a modernizing reading, the translators of the (considerably more recent) Tibetan version have deliberately undertaken an antiquarian project. For both Lamotte and Thurman, in other words, the fact that this sutra is being translated into English from its Tibetan version is largely irrelevant; what is at issue is not its cultural setting but its primordial truth. It is therefore worth noting that both translators are working form the version of the scripture which, by virtue of its relatively recent vintage, is the farthest removed from whatever the "original" Indian version of the text might have been. In Lamotte's case the irony is compounded, for the two versions on which he relies—the Tibetan and (where noteworthy differences occur) Xuanzang's Chinese version—are clearly those that have been the least influential of the four extant versions.\(^4^3\)

**Conclusions and Desiderata**

The four English versions of the *Vimalakīrti* considered above constitute four quite distinct representations of the text, produced with different audiences in mind and employing different (and not always consciously articulated) readings of their respective source-texts. Luk and Lamotte share the liability of having subordinated the scripture to a vision of what the text "ought" to say, drawn from contemporary Chinese Buddhism in Luk's case and from a study of medieval Indian Buddhist philosophy in Lamotte's. Watson has conveyed a good sense larger Perfection of Wisdom sutra (*Pañcavimśatisāhasrikā-prajñaāparāmitā-sūtra*) and with Candrakīrti's Madhyamakavṛtti the *Vimalakīrti* "expresses identical views" (lxxviii). But such statements are extremely hazardous if we are ever to have any hope of recovering the richness and variety of Indian Buddhism. No doubt there are points (perhaps many of them) at which the *Vimalakīrti* does coincide with perspectives found in these and other Buddhist texts. But to decide in advance that our text represents "pure Madhyamaka" is sure to limit, and not to expand, our perception of its content.

\(^4^2\) Once the surviving Sanskrit text of the *Vimalakīrti* has been published, we will be in a quite different situation.

\(^4^3\) Presumably Lamotte chose these two versions because of their philological precision, but this does not alter the importance of considering their date and their impact (or lack thereof) on actual Buddhist communities. If one wanted to gain access to the earliest possible recension of the text the best option would be to work from the third-century version of Zhi Qian, though it must immediately be added that Zhi Qian's version abounds in difficulties and cannot simply be taken as a word-for-word rendition of an Indian original.
of its overall grammar, though in his reading the sūtra is shorn of many of the distinctive terms and concepts that would be foreign to readers in contemporary Japan. All in all it is Thurman who—though clearly operating from a position of advocacy—provides the best access to a particular version of the text, though he does not confront directly the implications of the fact that his reading is based on a relatively late Indian recension preserved only in Tibetan.

What all of these works demonstrate, in sum, is that there is still room for greater reflection on the status of all translations, both ancient and modern, as cultural products. There can be no perfect or definitive translation, of course, just as there has not yet been, in the two and a half millennia or so since the time of the Buddha, any one definitive articulation of his message. But there is much to be said for the ongoing process of becoming more conscious of the locus of our source-texts in a complex network of transmission and of our own inevitably constructive role as translators. To borrow the sometimes amusing vocabulary used by Edward Conze in his translation of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra, if the translator can entertain these thoughts—and articulate them to potential readers—without becoming “cowed,” or “stolid,” or “cast down,” the translations we produce will surely be the better for it.