

Space and Substance A Theme in Madhyamaka-Vedānta Polemics

Olle Qvarnström

Department of the History of Religions
University of Lund
Sweden

Bhavya as a Svātantrika-Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika

The immense importance of Bhavya's¹ scholarship within the history of Mahāyāna Buddhist thought is indisputable. Bhavya (AD 500–70)² was successful in influencing not only his contemporaries, but also later philosophers in the Mahāyāna tradition. Within the Madhyamaka tradition, his *svātantrika* approach was followed and developed by such authors as Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla.³ Nāgārjuna and Buddhapālita, on the other hand, used *prāsaṅgika* arguments to show that the opponent's position, with its implicit or explicit assumptions, has consequences unacceptable to the opponent himself. This was criticized by Bhavya, who maintained that these *prāsaṅgika* arguments should be supplemented by independent propositions (*svatantra*), e.g. in the form of formal syllogisms (*prayogavākya*), a characteristic feature of Bhavya's own approach. This was in order to refute potential counter-arguments by opponents from various Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools. Bhavya's usage of a threefold syllogism⁴ suggests, *inter alia*, the influence of Dignāga (AD 480–540),⁵ especially the latter's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (PS), to which Bhavya frequently alludes in his *Tarkajvālā* (TJ) and *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* (MRP). Dignāga first reduced the five-fold syllogism of the *Nyāyasūtra* to a three-fold form and then incorporated and established the usage of syllogisms within the Buddhist tradition.⁶

¹ On the various names given to this *ācārya*, see n. 2 in my forthcoming edition of the eighth chapter of Bhavya's *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā*, "The Vedāntatattvaviniścaya Chapter of Bhavya's *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā*", to appear in WZKS XXXIII, 1989.

² See Kajiyama 1963, pp. 37f; 1968/9, pp. 193–203.

³ See Ruegg 1981a, pp. 67–71, 87–100; Lindtner 1986, p. 26.

⁴ Thesis (*pratijñā*): there is fire on the mountain, cause (*hetu*): because of smoke, example (*dṛṣṭānta*): as in a kitchen. See n. 81 of this paper and TJ 8.68.

⁵ See Frauwallner 1961, pp. 134–7. Cf. Hattori 1968, p. 4 with n. 21.

⁶ See Lindtner 1986, p. 78, n. 24. The usage of a five-fold syllogism at the very end of the *Prajñāpradīpa* (PP), Ch. 27, an independent essay on logic and *pramāṇa*, probably reflects the opponent's language, since Bhavya's reasons for not accepting the *pañcavāyana*-doctrine are explicitly given in PP (*loc. cit.*, 183b4–184b1); see Lindtner 1986, p. 81, n. 33. It may also reflect another, later period of his scholarship in comparison to MHIC/TJ. On Nāgārjuna's refutation of syllogisms, see Lindtner 1982b, p. 89.

Bhavya's influence on the Madhyamaka tradition is also shown by the opposition which he provoked. Candrakīrti's *prāsaṅgika* sub-school of Madhyamaka, which still dominates Tibetan Madhyamaka Buddhism, i.e. the dGe-lugs-pa branch of the Tibetan tradition, was actually formed in reaction to Bhavya's works.

The classification of Bhavya as a *svātantrika* is apparently a later sectarian formalization made by the Tibetan tradition. It stems from the basic division of the Indian Svātantrika Mādhyamikas into the sub-schools of the mDo sde [spyod] pa'i dbu ma [rañ rgyud pa] (Sautrāntika [Svātantrika-] Madhyamaka) and the rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma [rañ rgyud pa] (Yogācāra- [Svātantrika-] Madhyamaka). As early as the 9th century the Tibetan scholar Ye-śes-sde, a student of Śāntarakṣita, sets out this preliminary classification in his famous lTa-ba'i khyad-par, without, however, mentioning the terms *prāsaṅgika* and *svātantrika*,⁷ which we now know first came into usage during the Second Dissemination (*phyi-dar*, from ca AD 1000) of Tibetan Buddhism. The term *svātantrika* (*rañ-rgyud-pa*), applied to Bhavya, probably derives from passages in Candrakīrti's commentary on the *Madhyamakāvātāra* or from Jñānagarbha's *Satyadvayavibhāga*.⁸

The vast indigenous Tibetan *grub-mtha'* (*siddhānta*) literature deals to a large extent with the systematic presentation and ramification of the Madhyamaka school, a theme studied by Mimaki.⁹ The division of various Indian Madhyamaka masters into distinct sub-schools differs considerably, especially among the later dGe-lugs-pa doxographers.

We can observe the pivotal importance of Bhavya throughout the entire Tibetan doxographical tradition. From the very outset, Bhavya was exclusively classified as a Sautrāntika [-Mādhyamika].¹⁰ Sa-skya Pandita Kun-dga' rgyal-mtshan (AD 1182–1251), in his *gZuñ-lugs legs-par bśad-pa*,¹¹ designates Bhavya in the following terms: “Distinguishing [Madhyamaka] from a conventional level (*saṃvṛti*) ... [Bhavya is designated as a] Mādhyamika who advocates the absence of any contradiction whatsoever [in accepting] the definition of empirical reality (*vyavahāra*).”¹²

In fact, throughout all the Tibetan doxographical works, Bhavya is classed as a Sautrāntika- [Svātantrika-Mādhyamika]. The reason for such a classification is, most likely, the fact that conventionally (*saṃvṛtitaḥ*) he agrees with the Sautrāntikas. This is evident from TJ 8.66,¹³ where space (*ākāśa*) is

⁷ See Ruegg 1980, 1981b, 1982.

⁸ Jñānagarbha's *Satyadvayavibhāga*/^o*vibhāga* (The distinction between the two truths), vv. 25–35. See Eckel 1987, pp. 92–9.

⁹ See Mimaki 1980, pp. 27ff, 139ff.

¹⁰ See Mimaki *ibid.* pp. 27ff. On the relationship between the Sautrāntikas and the Mādhyamikas, see also La Valine Poussin 1971, Vol. 1, p. 8, n. 3.

¹¹ See *Sa-skya bka'-'bum*, Vol. 5, Tokyo 1961, fol. 146b2–150a1: kun rdzob kyi sgo nas dbye ba ... tha sñad rnam g'zag gañ dañ yan mi 'gal bar smra ba'i dBU ma pa ...

¹² This passage was brought to my attention by Per K. Sørensen, University of Copenhagen.

¹³ See below.

regarded as merely the absence of a resistant substance (*sapratighadravyā-bhāvamātra*). The *Prajñāpradīpa*, commenting upon *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (MMK) 1.6d, also affirms on a conventional level a Sautrāntika position: entities which cannot be described as existent (*bhāva*) or non-existent (*abhāva*), do indeed originate from their assembled causes and conditions (*hetupratyaya*).¹⁴

Bhavya the Doxographer

In the *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* (MHK) and its auto-commentary, the *Tarkajvālā* (TJ),¹⁵ Bhavya shows his thorough knowledge of Hīnayāna (or Śrāvakayāna), Yogācāra, Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika, Vedānta and Mīmāṃsā (Chs. 4–9). This is, therefore, the earliest Sanskrit doxographical work that has come down to us, preceding the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* (ṢDS) of the Jaina scholar Haribhadrasūri (8th cent.), which, according to Halbfass, is the earliest Sanskrit doxography.¹⁶ The critique found in the *uttarapakṣa* sections of MHK/TJ constitutes, as it were, a strengthening of the principles and methods expounded by Bhavya at great length in his crucial *Tattvajñānaiṣanā* chapter of MHK/TJ, where he explicitly states his own philosophy. Therefore, when it comes to identifying a Madhyamaka approach to other schools, his work has unique value. As a doxographer, Bhavya actually initiated the genre of comprehensive histories of philosophy in Buddhism, such as the *Tattvasaṃgraha* (7–8th cent.) by Śāntarakṣita. Such texts are also found within the traditions of Jainism and Vedānta, e.g. the already mentioned *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* (8th cent.)¹⁷ by Haribhadrasūri, the *Sarvasiddhāntasaṃgraha* (SSS, 8th cent.), ascribed to Śāṅkara¹⁸ and the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* by Mādhava (SDS, 14th cent.), based upon the SSS.

The position which Bhavya holds in Tibet with regard to doxographical knowledge is as dominant as the position which Candrakīrti holds in the interpretation of Nāgārjuna. MHK/TJ is the earliest and most substantial work translated into Tibetan which seriously and in greater detail presents and critically examines various heterodox schools.

The main narrative structure of MHK/TJ differs from ṢDS, SSS and SDS in that it first outlines Bhavya's own philosophy (Chs. 1–3) and then, in the following chapters (4–9),¹⁹ gives a presentation of various heterodox systems in a *pūrvapakṣa* submitted to a critical examination in a collateral

¹⁴ See Ames 1986, Ch.1, pt. 2, pp. 21f, and p. 59, n. 90. See also La Vallée Poussin 1933, p.67.

¹⁵ For purely practical purposes, I will in the following refer to the verses as MHK and the prose commentary as TJ. For a detailed discussion of these titles, see Qvarnström 1989: "Transmission of the Text".

¹⁶ See Halbfass 1979, p. 196.

¹⁷ For an edition and commentary of ṢDS, see Halbfass 1979, pp. 196f, n. 7; Suali 1905.

¹⁸ The SSS (see e.g. Raṅgacārya et al. 1909 for an edition and translation) is not by Śāṅkara, the author of the BS-bhāṣya. See Hacker 1968/69, p. 147; Nakamura 1968/69.

¹⁹ On the titles of the eleven chapters of MHK/TJ see Gokhale 1985, p. 76.

uttarapakṣa. The ŚDS, SSS and SDS, on the contrary, give the authors own system at the very end of the treatise, having outlined the various systems without an *uttarapakṣa* attached to each chapter. The structure of MHK/TJ and the above mentioned doxographies reveal clearly, however, the apologetic bias behind the historical interest of these authors.

Bhavya's major inspiration for the composition of a doxography may have been Dignāga's PS, which deals with Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya and Mīmāṃsā within the *pramāṇa*-tradition. One reason why Dignāga did not include Vedānta in his PS, or in the lost works known to us from the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (where he refuted adversaries from the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya traditions among others),²⁰ was perhaps the fact that the Vedānta systems at that time did not include an independent theory of the "means of [valid] cognition" (*pramāṇa*).²¹ This does not seem to be a possible reason for the ŚDS of the eighth century to omit Vedānta philosophy, since although early Vedānta philosophers did not pay much attention to epistemological and logical problems, at least Śaṅkara deals with *pramāṇa*, even if he does not deal with it systematically in his works.²² Bhavya then supplements Dignāga by treating various schools now within the *vāda* tradition.

The didactic and historical interest of Bhavya is implicitly put in doubt by Halbfass, who, from an analysis of the usage of the terms *drṣṭi* (Pali *diṭṭhi*) and *darśana*, contrasts the Buddhist doxographical tradition with that of Jainism and Vedānta. The latter's usage of the term *darśana* reveals, according to him, a rather neutral and non-committal stance, with no normative or idealizing implications.²³ But the narrative structure of ŚDS, SSS and SDS does not support that conclusion, since the author's own system stands at the very end of the treatise, implying its superiority. Halbfass also maintains that, in contrast to the Buddhist texts, the Jaina and Vedānta works are characterized by a "perspective inclusivism" (in the Jaina works, even towards Vedānta). Jaina doxographers arrange the systems in a systematic order and framework, in order to arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of Jaina philosophy itself, in terms of its co-ordination and comprehension of all the other philosophical systems or viewpoints.²⁴ Bhavya identified a Madhyamaka approach to heretical systems and by so doing not only saved the existence of the school, but also clearly defined its philosophical fundamentals. As far as the Jaina relationship to Vedānta is concerned, we may have to reconsider their attitude in the light of MHK/TJ 8.86.²⁵ The inclusiveness found in Jaina and Vedānta treatises, which constitutes, according to Halbfass, a salient difference from the Budd-

²⁰ *Nyāyaparīkṣā, Vaiśeṣikaparīkṣā, Sāṃkhyaparīkṣā*, etc. See Hatton 1968, pp. 3f, 9.

²¹ Mayeda 1968/69, p. 221.

²² Mayeda, *ibid.*, pp. 221f.

²³ *Op. cit.* Halbfass 1979, p. 199.

²⁴ *Op. cit.* Halbfass 1979, pp. 199, 201 (n. 23).

²⁵ See "Bhavya's attitude towards the Vedāntadarśana", below.

hist tendency not just to refute other systems but even mere aviewsw (*dr̥ṣṭi*), seems mistaken. Perceiving various systems as expressions of partial truths is not unique for those traditions, since it is found in Bhavya's *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* (MRP). In the second chapter, Bhavya arranges different doctrinal systems under incorrect relative truth (*mīthyāsaṃvṛtisatya*) and correct relative truth (*tathyaṣaṃvṛtisatya*).²⁶ The Vedāntavādins would be classified under the former, whereas the Hīnayānists and Yogācāras come under the latter. Needless to say, Bhavya's Madhyamaka system reflects the absolute truth (*paramārthasatya*).

Bhavya's attitude towards the Vedāntadarśana

In the *Vedāntatattvaviniścaya* (VTV) chapter of MHK/TJ, Bhavya is obviously biased due to his own philosophical affiliation, though he assures us of his non-dogmatic attitude in trying to incorporate the Vedāntadarśana²⁷ notion of a "Self" (*ātman*) into the framework of his theory of "intrinsic nature", (*svabhāva*). MHK 8.18 states:

As far as this [teaching in the *pūrvapakṣa*²⁸ and the meaning which has been stated previously in the work (*prakaraṇa*)²⁹] is concerned, it is to be critically investigated by persons who do not take up a dogmatic position (*pakṣa*). (Because

²⁶ Lindtner 1987, pp. 9–11. On *tathya-saṃvṛtisatya* see MRP 1, 3–4, translated by Lindtner 1981b, p. 170. On the classification of various truths (*satya*), see *Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha* (MAS), translated by Lindtner 1981a, p. 200, n.14. See also Śastri 1931.

²⁷ Bhavya defines Vedānta and Vedāntavādin in TJ 8.1: (P* 282b7) || rig pa'i mthar phyin pa ni rig byed mtha' ba ste | chags pa med par nes par rig pa'o || de smra ba'i ñaṅ tshul ga la yod pa'am | tshig de gaṅ la yod (P 282b8) pa ni rig byed kyī mthar smra ba'o || "Vedānta' means the end of all knowledge, which certainly should be known as [a knowledge with] non-attachment (*asaṅga*). One who discusses it or maintains it as his own theory is a 'Vedāntavādin'." On *asaṅga* see GK 4.72, 79 (*niḥsaṅga*), 96, 97 (*saṅgatā*). The term "Vedānta" is thus not defined in reference to the Upaniṣads, i.e. the final textual portion of the Vedas. Nakamura (1983, pp. 90–100) notes that with the process of transmission and separation into different schools (*śākhā*) the appendices to a *saṃhitā* came to vary. This means that we observe instances where "vedānta" was explained by referring to, e.g., the Āraṇyaka, i.e. whatever constituted the appendix to the *saṃhitā* at any particular period of a school was then regarded as "Vedānta". With the firm establishment of the tradition in the post-Śāṅkara period, "vedānta" came to denote wthe general position of the Vedānta school, including the so-called *prasthānatraya*: the Upaniṣads, *Bhagavadgītā* (BhG) and *Brahmasūtra* (BS). On the term *darśana*, see Halbfass 1979, 1981. Bhavya's usage of [*vedānta/darśana* (TJ 8.1, MHK 4.7)] as a designation of a philosophical system is to be noticed as an early occurrence of such a connotation. The title of MHK Ch. 3 is perhaps Bhavya's term for "philosophy": *tattvajñānaiṣaṇā* (the search for knowledge of Reality), cf. Greek *philosophia*. The Buddhists are designated with the rare and interesting term *śūnyasaṃskāravādinaḥ* (MHK/TJ 8.1). Cf. SSS 4.15. (*P = Peking bsTan-'gyur.)

²⁸ Gloss on "atra" in TJ 8.18.

²⁹ Gloss on "apīdam" in TJ 8.18, which also glosses "di ltar", not found in the Skt. manuscript.

a person whose] mind is concealed by attachment to a position (*pakṣarāgāvṛtamati*) does not even understand the truth (*satya*).³⁰

Bhavya, advocating the middle way (*madhyamā pratīpat*), which avoids the extremes of nihilism (*ucchedavāda*) and eternalism (*śāśvatavāda*),³¹ disagrees of course with the Vedāntavādins, who, according to his summary, are attached to an extreme (*anta*). According to TJ 8.18, the one who should investigate is rather one who has examined whether his own and others' positions (*pakṣa*) are logical (*yukti*) or not, and who is free from attachment (*anurāga*) and anger (*krodha*). This is because a mind which is stained by attachment to a position will not believe even faultless words (*nirdoṣapāda*), since it is attached to its own position (*svapakṣarāga*).³² The main reason, however, for Bhavya to introduce the notion of a "Self" (*ātman*) into the concept of "intrinsic nature" (*svabhāva*) is the fact that he maintains that the Vedāntavādins have actually adopted or stolen their notion from Madhyamaka. MHK 8.86 states:

Being convinced that this infallible system of the Tathāgata is a good one, here [in the Vedānta system], the heretics, being desirous of [that doctrine], have made it their own.³³

TJ 8.86:

Sometimes in a hundred [i.e. rarely], a Tathāgata has arisen in the world, not only to teach the system of his sacred words (*pravacana*), which is without fault (*avitatha*), but also to display his Final Extinction (*parinirvāṇa*). When that happens the heretics (*tīrthika*) generate desire (*spṛhā*) for that doctrine of his, whereafter they mix it into their own system (*siddhānta*) and even make it their own, saying: "This is our system." But that is a mixture of doctrinal systems, endowed with the fault which consists in the contradiction of former and latter parts and is, therefore, to be classified as a mental construction (*vikalpa*).³⁴

This explains Bhavya's reply in the *Śrāvakatattvaniścayāvatāra* chapter of MHK. Here the Hīnayānists maintain that Mahāyāna does not represent

³⁰ atrāpidaṃ parīkṣante pakṣapātānapekṣinaḥ /
pakṣarāgāvṛtamatiḥ satyaṃ yathāpi nekṣate //

For a critical edition of the Sanskrit verses of VTV, see Qvarnström 1989.

³¹ See *maṅgala śloka ad MMK*.

³² In *Catuḥśataka* (CS) 8.10, *Āryadeva* states that *nirvāṇa* is not attained if one has attachment to one's own position (*svapakṣa*). See Lang 1986, p. 81 with n. 10. Cf. also CŚ 12.1, Lang, *ibid.*, pp. 110f with n. 1 on p. 111.

³³ tathāgatīm avitathāṃ matvā nītim imāṃsubhām /
tasmā jātasprhais tīrthyaiḥ kṛtaṃ tatra mamāpi tat //

³⁴ (P 302b5) || brgya la res 'ga' de bzin gśegs pa 'jig rten du byuñ bar gyur ciñ | des brdzun pa ma yin pa'i gsuñ rab kyi lugs kyañ rab tu bstan nas yoñs su mya ñan las 'das pa (P 302b6) yañ bstan pa na de'i lugs de la mu stegs pa rnam 'dod pa skyes par gyur nas rañ gi grub pa'i mtha'i nañ du bsreg śiñ lugs 'di ni kho bo cag gi yin žes bdag gir yañ byed do || de ni sñon dañ phyi mar yañ (P 302b7) 'gal ba'i skyon dañ bcas pa'i grub pa'i mtha'i 'dres pas rnam par rtog pa yin par mtshon par bya ba yin te |

the teaching of the Buddha, since it is not included in the doctrinal scriptures (*sūtrāntādi*), and since it teaches heterodox paths to liberation, like the Vedāntadarśana. Bhavya answers in MHK 4.56ab:

Vedānte ca hi yat sūktam tat sarvaṃ buddhabhāṣitam³⁵

Gokhale, Nakamura and others take this to mean that Bhavya had a favourable attitude towards the Vedāntadarśana, but in the light of MHK/TJ 8.86 it is quite the reverse: “Whatever is well said in the Vedānta has [already] been said by the Buddha”—all that is well said in Vedāntadarśana is actually nothing but Buddhism which the Vedāntavādins have stolen or borrowed. Śāntarakṣita, quoting the *Gauḍapādīyakārikā* (GK 2.31f, 35), exclaims in his *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*: “What they state has already been said by the Tathāgata!”³⁶ This also strengthens our assertion that the Vedānta tradition from the time of the *Brahmasūtra* (BS) to that of GK was strongly influenced by Buddhism. Consequently, Bhavya felt obliged to explain the “stolen goods” thoroughly for the Vedāntavādins. Having done that, he says in MHK 8.95, with respect to the notions of a “Self” or an “intrinsic nature”:

Obviously, if such a Self, [or intrinsic nature, described above] is accepted even by you, [then that Self, or intrinsic nature] is infallible and completely proper, because of extensive conceptual correspondences between name, etc.³⁷

Bhavya explains in TJ 8.95 that, if the Vedāntavādins also maintain that the Self is the general characteristic (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) of non-origination, then the dispute concerns a mere name. The Vedāntavādins say “supreme Self” (*paramātman*) and Bhavya says “non-origination” (*ajātitva*), so there is no contradiction. Therefore, Bhavya invites his opponents to be contented with the supreme nectar of reality (*tattvāmṛta*) offered by the friends of the world, the Buddhas.³⁸ As far as Bhavya himself is concerned, the apologetical purpose is, consequently, not admitted. Instead he wants us to accept his didactic purpose.

Bhavya on “intrinsic nature” (*svabhāva*)

The Mādhyamikas were generally notoriously reluctant to attribute intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*)³⁹ to anything, including emptiness itself.⁴⁰ Bhavya ac-

³⁵ Quoted by Gokhale 1958, p. 179; cf. Hartmann 1987, p. 229.

³⁶ de dag gis gañ brjod pa de ni bde bar gśeḡs pas gsuñs pa. *Op. cit.*, Lindtner 1982b, p. 280.

³⁷ Īdṛśo yady abhipreta ātmā hi bhavatām api /
nāmādibahusādharṃyān nirdoṣaḥ sopattikaḥ //

³⁸ MHK 8.97.

³⁹ For references to technical terms like *svabhāva*, *bhāva*, etc., see May 1959, pp. 493–531 (index).

⁴⁰ *Op. cit.*; Eckel 1980, p. 23. See TJ ad 3.26. Cf. the *Prasannapadā ad* MMK 13.7 by Candrakīrti, quoted by Eckel 1980, p. 23.

cepts, however, that from a relative perspective (*saṃvṛtitaḥ*) entities (*bhāva*) do originate, exist and have an intrinsic nature. Earth (*pr̥thivī*), for example, has solidity (*khara*) as its intrinsic nature.⁴¹ No entity exists, however, *a priori*: entities (*bhāva*) have not originated (*utpanna*) from themselves (*svataḥ*), from another (*parataḥ*), from both (*dvābhyām*) or from no cause (*ahetutaḥ*).⁴² “Intrinsic nature” would here connote “ens,” “existence” or “being”, i.e. that which gives something its status as an independent entity, or its independent existence.⁴³ From an absolute perspective (*paramārthataḥ*), entities do not originate or exist since they are interdependently originated (*pratītyasamutpāna*): that which arises (*samutpāda*) “depends on” (*pratītya*) other factors for its arising. Consequently, according to Bhavya, “intrinsic nature”, here connotating the “essentia” or “nature” (*prakṛti*)⁴⁴ of all entities, is ultimately an absence of intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāva*), since nothing can be different (*anya*) in itself.⁴⁵ Ultimately earth has, therefore, no intrinsic nature,⁴⁶ since it is made (*kṛta*) and since it has causes (*hetu*).⁴⁷ Bhavya states that this is a total negation (*prasajya pratiṣedha*), not a negation for affirmation (*paryudāsa pratiṣedha*), i.e. it affirms neither another intrinsic nature nor an intrinsic nature which is itself empty of intrinsic nature.⁴⁸ Differently expressed, the statement that earth does not have solidity as its intrinsic nature does not imply that it has something else as its intrinsic nature. Furthermore, even emptiness (*śūnyatā*) itself is without intrinsic nature. All entities are, therefore, ultimately nonexistent, being empty by intrinsic nature (*svabhāvena śūnya*). The middle way (*madhyamā pratipat*) consequently implies both dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) and emptiness (*śūnyatā*). According to Nāgārjuna, it is because things arise dependently that they are without intrinsic nature, and because they are empty of intrinsic nature that they are able to enter into dependent relations. The middle way is then beyond existence and non-existence (*bhāvābhāva*). These two extremes must be avoided,⁴⁹ since non-existence (*abhāva*)⁵⁰ would be non-existence of existence (*bhāva*), i.e. nonexistence would be derived from something else (*parāśrayāt*) and therefore

⁴¹ MHK/TJ 3.21c.

⁴² TJ 8.89; MMK 1.1.

⁴³ See de Jong 1972, pp. 2f; Steinkellner 1973. For further references, see May 1959, p. 124, n. 328.

⁴⁴ Nāgārjuna glosses “*svabhāva*” with “*prakṛti*” in MMK 15.8. Cf. GK 4.9, 29.

⁴⁵ TJ 3.122.

⁴⁶ MHK 3.26; TJ 3.27.

⁴⁷ MHK/TJ 3.26; see Lindtner 1986, pp. 62f.

⁴⁸ Bhavya is to our present knowledge the first philosopher to introduce these two kinds of negations into the Madhyamaka tradition. The *locus classicus* is found in the *Prajñāpradīpa*, Ch. 25; see Eckel 1980, pp. 342f. See also Eckel 1987, p. 126, n. 46; Matilal 1971, pp. 162–5; Kajiyama 1966, pp. 38f; 1968/69, p. 203; 1973.

⁴⁹ See the *Bhāvābhāvaparīkṣā* Chapter of MMK (esp. 15.7, 10).

⁵⁰ The *locus classicus* of “*abhāva*” is found in the *Ratnāvalī* 1.72. Cf. TJ 3.111.

conditioned (*saṃskṛta*).⁵¹ If intrinsic nature depended on anything else for its origin, it would not be ‘intrinsic’ (*sva-°*), and would no longer define a unique, independent entity.”⁵² Bhavya explains in MHK 8.88 his position in reply to the following objection from the Vedāntavādins:

If you say that, do not great contradictions also occur for the Mādhyamikas who say that there is something which possesses a Self (*sātmatā*) and [there is something which does] not [possess] a Self (*anātmatā*) and there is emptiness (*śūnyatā*) and external emptiness (*bāhyaśūnyatā*), origination (*utpāda*) and non-origination (*anutpāda*), existence (*bhāva*) and non-existence (*abhāva*), we answer:⁵³

Due to the manifoldness of the [Buddhist] teaching let this principle [of Self and non-Self etc.] be like this here, for the sake of attracting some and [for the sake of] turning the rest away from grasping.⁵⁴

TJ 8.88 explains:

The Blessed One (*bhagavant*) has taught the very existence (*astitva*) of the Self (*ātman*) in order to divert [i.e. to remonstrate] those who grasp non-existence and advocate non-existence, [and] whose minds are impaired by the view (*dr̥ṣṭi*) which negates (*apavāda*) cause and effect (*hetuphala*). He attracts those and in order to stop attachment to the grasping of a Self (*ātmagraha*) among the adherents of a Self (*ātmavādin*), he teaches: “The Self does not exist” (*ātmā nāsti*). Conventionally (*saṃvṛtitaḥ*), he teaches the abandonment of the Self, and to those who are endowed with receptivity (*kṣānti*) for the vast and profound doctrine (*dharma*), he teaches that in ultimate reality (*paramārthataḥ*) there is neither Self (*ātman*) nor non-Self (*anātman*). Thus the very teachings in the many preachings (*pravacana*) of the Blessed One are taught in accordance with relative (*saṃvṛti*) and absolute (*paramārtha*) [truth (*satya*)], so there is no contradiction (*virodha*).⁵⁵

⁵¹ MHK/TJ 3.109–16.

⁵² Eckel 1980, p. 136.

⁵³ (P 303a3) || gal te yañ dbu mar smra bar¹ rnam la (P 303a4) yañ bdag dañ bcas pa² ñid dañ | bdag med pa ñid dañ | stoñ pa ñid dañ | phyi stoñ pa ñid dañ | skye ba dañ | skye ba med pa dañ | dños po dañ | dños po med par smras bas ’gal ba chen po ’byuñ bar ’gyur ba ma (P 303a5) yin nam ze na | (TJ 8.87) Notes: ¹bar: ba P.

²bdag dañ bcas pa: bcas pa P.

⁵⁴ deśanāyās tu vaicitryād ihaivaṃ syād ayaṃ nayaḥ /
ākaraṣaṇārtham ekeśāṃ śeṣagrāhanivṛttaye // (MHK 8.88).

⁵⁵ (P 303a5) || rgyu dañ ’bras bu la skur (P 303a6) ba ’debs pa’i lta bas sems ñams par byas pa med par smra ba | yod pa ma yin par ’dzin pa rnam bzlog par bya ba’i phyir | bdag yod pa ñid du bcom ldan ’das kyis bstan te | de dag ’dren (P 303a7) par mdzad pa dañ | bdag tu smra ba rnam bdag tu ’dzin pa la mñon par ’žen cin ’jig pa rnam bzlog par bya ba’i phyir bdag med do zes ston par mdzad pa yin te | kun rdzob tu de bdag¹ tu ’dzin pa spañ (P 303a8) par bstan pa yin no || don dam par ni bdag kyañ ma yin bdag med pa yañ ma yin no zes zab ciñ rgya che ba’i chos la bzod pa dañ ldan pa rnam la bstan pa yin te | de ltar na bcom ldan ’das kyis gsuñ (P 303b1) rab rnam pa du mar bstan pa ñid ni kun rdzob dañ don dam pa’i ijes su ’brañs nas bstan pa yin te | ’gal² ba med do || Notes: ¹bdag (ego): dag P. ²yin te I ’gal: ste ’gal D.

Similar pedagogical devices are found throughout Buddhist literature. In the *Samyutta Nikāya*, brahmins who are annihilationists are taught that a Self does exist, whereas brahmins who are eternalists are taught its nonexistence.⁵⁶ In the *Ātmadharmaparīkṣa* (“The critical examination of Self and phenomena”),⁵⁷ which Buddhapālita in his *Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti* sees as an expression of the Buddha’s pedagogy,⁵⁸ Nāgārjuna states:

They used the designation “Self”. They also taught “no-Self”. The Buddhas also taught “neither Self nor no-Self”. Everything may be true or not true, or true as well as not true, [or] neither true nor not true. This is the gradual teaching of the Buddha.⁵⁹

Bhavya concludes in MHK 8.84:

Therefore, neither existence nor non-existence, difference nor non-difference is [applicable to] the Self, [which is furthermore] neither eternal nor non-eternal, nor an object of word and cognition.⁶⁰

The concept of “intrinsic nature”, defined in MMK by Nāgārjuna as one (*eka*), eternal (*nitya*) and independent (*anapāyīva*), is considered axiomatic and is the main issue in the prolonged Buddhist criticism of Brahmanical philosophies.⁶¹ Whereas Nāgārjuna in his MMK and *Śūnyatāsaptati* directed his critique of *svabhāva* towards Buddhist Abhidharma, Bhavya, for his part, took up this principal discussion of *svabhāva* in connection with Vedānta philosophy.

⁵⁶ SN, pt. IV, pp. 281f (tr.), pp. 400f (ed.).

⁵⁷ MMK XVIII.6, 8

⁵⁸ Lindtner 1981b, p. 208.

⁵⁹ ātmety api prajñāpitam anātmety api deśitam /

buddhair nātmā na cānātmā kaś cid ity api deśitam //

(MMK 18.6, tr. by Eckel 1980, pp. 2180. Sarvaṃ tathyaṃ na vā tathyaṃ tathyaṃ cātathyaṃ eva ca / naivātathyaṃ naiva tathyaṃ etad buddhānuśāsanam // (MMK 18.8, see Lindtner 1981b, p. 208 with n. 100). Bhavya states in his *Prajñāpradīpa*, commenting upon MMK 18.5: “There are sentient beings whose minds are stained by the false view of denying (*apavāda*) cause and effect. They mistakenly think that the present world and the world to come do not exist, good and bad actions do not bear fruit, and sentient beings are born spontaneously. They become obsessed with bad actions, and they hover on the brink of bad states of rebirth (*gati*). Buddhas have pity on them. Because of their vow to seek the welfare of others, they see that if these beings depended only on themselves, they would never escape rebirth, and [the Buddhas] use conventional designations to say, “there is a self.” (Quoted and translated by Eckel 1987, p. 37.) See also *Catuhśataka* 8.15, 20; 12.12 (Lang 1986, pp. 83, 85 with n. 20, pp. 114f with n.12 on p. 115); *Bodhicittavivaraṇa* 98f; *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* 30, 33; GK 4.42.

⁶⁰ nāto bhāvo na cābhāvo na pṛthag nāpṛthag pumān /

na nityo nāpy anityaś ca na buddhidhvanigocaraḥ //

⁶¹ On the definition of *svabhāva*, see MHK 3.29cd; MMK 15.1, 2, 8; 7.30. Claus Oetke has recently published a book entitled: “*Ich*” und das Ich. *Analytische Untersuchungen zur buddhistisch-brahmanischen Ātmankontroverse* (see Bibliography). This does not, however, include an analysis of MHK/TJ.

The “pot-space” simile (*ghaṭākāśadr̥ṣṭānta*)

On the basis of the above reasoning, we are now in a position to analyse the Madhyamaka-Vedānta polemics, as presented in the “pot-space” simile of the VTV. This simile provides a clearly defined framework for a study of the polemics regarding the concepts of “intrinsic nature” (*svabhāva*) and “Self” (*ātman / puruṣa*). Even though the doxographical genre neglects historical developments and presents a fixed system (*siddhānta*), the advantage of using VTV is that we may trace early stages of the Vedānta philosophical tradition through a description and critique from an external source. By so doing, it provides us, furthermore, with a *corpus comparationis* to the still extant texts of early systematic Vedānta philosophy up to the time of Bhavya: the *Vākyapadīya* (VP), the *Brahmasūtra* (BS), the *Gauḍapādīyakārikā* (GK), the *Paramārthasāra* (PaS)⁶² and the various fragments found for example in Śaṅkara’s commentaries (*bhāṣya*) on BS and the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*.⁶³ As far as the “pot-space” simile is concerned, it is most likely that Bhavya in VTV draws on GK.⁶⁴ Gauḍapāda is, as far as we know, the one who introduced this simile into the Vedānta tradition, perhaps under Buddhist influence.⁶⁵ Bhavya’s criticism of the **ajātisamatāvāda* (“the doctrine of unborn sameness”) of GK,⁶⁶ found in VTV,⁶⁷ further strengthens this assumption.⁶⁸ However, this does not mean that the Vedāntadarśana, presented by Bhavya, is in complete accordance with GK or even comes from the same tradition as GK. Therefore references are given to the above Vedānta

⁶² On the dates of these texts see: Walleser 1910, p. 18; Bhattacharya 1943, pp. lxxii–lxxxviii (GK); Frauwallner 1961, pp. 134f (VP); Nakamura 1983, pp. 435f (BS). The date of PaS is, however, more uncertain. Frauwallner (1953, p. 287), followed by Rüping (1977, p. 2) and Danielson (1980, pp. 1f) dates the PaS before AD 550 on the basis of the *Yuktidīpikā*, which quotes PaS 83 *ad* the commentary on *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 2. Cf. Wezler’s (1974) analysis of the *Yuktidīpikā*.

⁶³ See Hiriyanna 1924, 1925, 1928; Nakamura 1983, pp. 369–90. Walleser (1910) actually initiated the study of pre-Śaṅkara Vedānta philosophy in modern scholarship. He was then followed by Nakamura, Hiriyanna, Gokhale, Vetter and others.

⁶⁴ Walleser (1910, p. 18), followed by Bhattacharya (1943, pp. 50–3), was the first to establish the relationship between VTV and GK: MHK 8.10 resembled GK 3.3, MHK 8.11, 12; GK 3.6cd. However, Walleser (*ibid.*, p. 18) and Bhattacharya (*ibid.*, p. 52) maintained incorrectly that MHK 8.13 was a verbatim quotation of GK 3.5 (cf. PaS 36). This inaccuracy was due to the fact that these scholars could not benefit from access to the Sanskrit MS of VTV. On the possibility of Gauḍapāda borrowing from Bhavya, see Lindtner 1985.

⁶⁵ On *ghaṭākāśadr̥ṣṭānta*, see *Prasannapadā ad XVIII.9* (B 374.14ff, Vaidya 1960, p. 31, pp. 105f). Here, an early Mahāyānasūtra, the *Āryasatyadvāyāvātāra Sūtra*, is quoted, which, apparently, already knows this example. (For a translation, see de Jong 1949, p. 31). Since Bhavya frequently refers to this Sūtra in his works, the “pot-space” simile was probably familiar to him even from Buddhist *āgama*. Although it is not historically established, Gauḍapāda may also have benefitted from this Mahāyānasūtra in his discussion of the “pot-space” simile.

⁶⁶ See GK 3.2, 38; 4.80, 93, 95, 100.

⁶⁷ See MHK 8.78–84.

⁶⁸ See Qvamström 1989, “Source materials”; Lindtner 1985.

treatises, without implying any historical relationship to VTV (except for GK) due to the ideological complexity, etc., of these texts. One salient feature of the Vedāntavādins, in trying to describe their supreme reality, is the attempt—at least according to Bhavya’s presentation—to synthesise religio-philosophical concepts of different historical and semantic settings into a consistent framework. MHK 8.17cd states: “[Various words] are applied to it by those whose cognition is led astray by difference.”⁶⁹ TJ 8.17 states:⁷⁰

By him the term Brahman is “used to describe it”, as well as other terms like: Self (*ātman*), Person (*puruṣa*), Lord (*īśvara*), the All-pervasive (*sarvatraḡa*), the Eternal (*nitya*) and so forth. The reason [for such usage] is the practicality [of these terms]. The meaning of other such terms is to be understood just like the meaning of the Self.⁷¹ Its nature being inexpressible, the Vedas have called it: “self-born, actionless, immeasurable”, “the Person beyond darkness” [and further] “I have known that great Seer, radiant like the sun and living beyond darkness. Having known Him, one surpasses death. There is no other way leading to the place of non-birth”.⁷²

The passage above, as well as other textual passages of VTV, gives an anthropomorphic description of *puruṣa* (“Person”), originating probably from the *Puruṣasūkta* of the *Rgveda* (10.90). *Puruṣa* is conceived as an embodied being (*dehin*) in which the individual parts of its body (*deha*) correspond to the various phenomenal elements of relative existence.⁷³ In VTV, this idea is combined with a purely philosophical notion of *puruṣa*, identical to that of *ātman*. Thus, on a macrocosmic level, the Absolute and relative existence are comprehended within a “Person” regarded as an embodied being. This

⁶⁹ giras tatra prayujyante bhedāpahṛtabuddhibhiḡ /

⁷⁰ The translation of TJ 8.1–17 (my numbering, see Qvarnström 1989) is that of Gokhale (1958) except for some minor changes in order to make his English translation and his rendering of Tibetan terms into Sanskrit conform with my edition and translation of TJ 8.18–104, Peking bsTan ’gyur (P) fol.: Dza 287b4–306a2, sDe-dge bsTan ’gyur (D) No. 3855, fol.: Dza 255a4–271a2. The Tibetan edition of TJ 8.1–17 (*pūrvapakṣa*) is, apart from some corrections, in agreement with Nakamura’s (1958).

⁷¹ I do not see how Gokhale (1958, p. 177, l. 32) arrives at the translation, “according to the context”. I have chosen here to deviate from him and translate *ji ltar bdag gi don* with “just like the meaning of the Self”.

⁷² (P 287a3) | des de la tshaṅs pa’o || žes tshig sbyor bar byed de | ’di lta ste | bdag daṅ | skyes bu daṅ | dbaṅ phyug daṅ | kun la khyab pa daṅ | rtag pa žes bya ba la sogs pa’i bar ro || ci’i phyir že na | kun (P 287a4) tu tha sṅad du bya ba’i phyir te | gžan dag gi¹ don ji ltar² bdag gi don ji bžin³ du rtogs par ’gyur žes bya bar ro || ’di’i ṅo bo ni brjod par bya ba ma yin pa ṅid yin te | rig byed las raṅ byuṅ byed pa med pa boṅ tshad (P 287a5) med pa ste | mun pa las gžan pa’i skyes bu ni | skyes bu draṅ sroṅ chen po ṅi ma’i mdog | mun pa las gžan gyur pa de rigs⁴ na || ’chi ba med par ’gyur te bdag gis rtogs || skye med ’gro ba (P 287a6) la lam gžan med || Notes: ¹gis D*. ²ltar: lta P. ³bdag gi don ji (de?) bžin: ba bžin P. ⁴rigs: rig D. Cf. Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad 3.8 (which is also found in TJ 8.2): vedāham etaṃ puruṣaṃ mahāntam ādityavarṇaṃ tamasahaḡ parastāt / tam eva viditvātimṛtyum eti nānyaḡ panthā vidyate ’yanāya // Quoted by Gokhale 1958, p. 168, n. 9. (*D = sDe-dge bsTan ’gyur)

⁷³ See TJ 8.4.

explains why the Vedāntavādins, according to Bhavya, hold that “whatever is past, present and future, is all regarded as the Person ... and He is the agent”.⁷⁴ This is in reply to a hypothetical question as to how *puruṣa* could be an agent (*karṭṛ*) if He is beyond the three spheres of existence (*traiḍhātuka*).⁷⁵ The microcosmic counterpart consists of a human embodied being, who comprises a Self⁷⁶ and a psychophysical constitution (*dehādi*). These two aspects of “embodied being”: the Absolute/Self and relative existence/the psychophysical constitution, are illustrated in the “pot-space” simile as “space” (*ākāśa*) and “pot” (*ghaṭa*) respectively.

The following objection is raised in TJ 8.8cd:

Now, if someone were to raise the question: “This Person (*puruṣa*), who is [said to be] omni-present (*sarvavyāpin*), and from whom, although he is alone, the bodies of all kinds of living beings (*gati*), like gods and men, are [said to be] born—how is it that he, like any [other] embodied being, is neither non-eternal (*anitya*), nor non-pervasive (*asarvatraga*)?”⁷⁷, the following is said as a rejoinder:⁷⁸

MHK 8.10:

When a pot is being produced or destroyed, the space [in it] does not have the same nature [of being produced or destroyed]. When bodies, etc., are born or die, they cannot be considered [to have the same nature] as the Self.⁷⁹

The parallelism (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) between Self and space, pot and bodies, etc., illustrates two distinct realities with their respective intrinsic natures, according to the Vedāntavādin. The perceivable and obvious division of space into different pots causes, however, another Vedāntavādin⁸⁰ to raise the following objection as to the oneness (*ekatva*) of the Self (MHK 8.11):

Objection: Of the one [Self] there is the property of being many, like space in pots. [Reply: Of space] there is the property of being one, because it is not differentiated through the breaking of pots, since it is considered the same for all.⁸¹

⁷⁴ bhūtaṃ bhavad bhaviṣyac ca sarvaṃ puruṣa iṣyate / ... sa ca karmakṛt // (MHK 8.4).

⁷⁵ TJ 8.3.

⁷⁶ The proofs for the existence of a Self (*ātman*): remembrance (*smṛti*), recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*), knowledge (*jñāna*), etc., found in MHK/TJ Chs. 3 and 8, are similar to those stated in the Nyāyasūtra.

⁷⁷ Cf. TJ 3.290: “If [the dharma-body] is free from conceptual diversity, non-conceptual and pervasive, how do we know that it is the Tathāgata’s body and not the body of someone else?” (Translated by Malcolm D. Eckel.)

⁷⁸ (P 285a7) | gal te ’ga’¹ žig’ di skad du ||² gaṅ skyes bu ni thams cad du khyab pa ||³ gcig űid yin la de la las lha daṅ mi la sogs pa ’gro ba rnam pa sna tshogs kyi lus rnam (P 285a5) ’byuṅ bar ’gyur ba yin na | ji ltar lus can bžin du mi rtag pa daṅ | thams cad du ma khyab pa’i űo bor mi ’gyur že na | de la lan gdab par bya ba’i phyir smras pa | Notes: ¹’ga’ (*ego*): ’ba’ P. D. ²||: | D. ³||: no single or double *śad* (*danda*) in D.

⁷⁹ ghaṭotpattau vināše vā nākāśasya tadātmātā /
tadātmātātmano ’pīṣṭā na dehādyudayavyaye //

⁸⁰ This technique of playing off one school against another school before conducting one’s own criticism (i.e. Bhavya’s) is also found, e.g., in GK and SSS.

⁸¹ ghaṭākāśavad ekasya nānātvaṃ ced abhedataḥ /
ghaṭabhedena caikatvaṃ sāmyaṃ sarvasya yan matam //

The Vedāntavādin’s reply takes the form of an actual syllogism (*prayogavākya*): the subject (*dharmin*) “of space” (*ākāśasya*), the inferred property (*sādhya dharma*) “oneness” (*ekatva*), and the inferring property (*sādhana dharma*) “because it is not differentiated” (*abhedataḥ*), with the subsidiary cause “through the breaking of pots” (*ghaṭabhedena*). See TJ 8.68.

TJ 8.11 adds:

The ether within a pot which is being broken is not different from that in another pot which is already broken.⁸²

Bhavya states in MHK 8.64 the consequences of a singular (*eka*) Self/space:

The enjoyer of happiness and suffering may then be liberated when that [Self of another] is liberated, or alternatively, if that [Self! is bound, there [must also exist] bondage for that [liberated Self], or [if] one suffers, there should [also] be suffering of that [liberated Self].⁸³

The Vedāntavādin replies in TJ 8.64:⁸⁴

Although I have designated the support of the elements (*bhūta*), etc., and the oneness (*ekatva*) without distinction between fools (*bāla*) [and the learned...], etc.,⁸⁵ what harm is there? For I show as an example the ‘spot-space’ [simile] which is accepted by both sides.⁸⁶

By referring to the “pot-space” simile, the Vedāntavādins here defend themselves from the absurd outcome of the notion of a singular Self. If we look at the passage in the *pūrvapakṣa* where the equality (*tulyatā*) of the ignorant (*bāla*) and the learned (*pañḍita*), the outcaste (*caṇḍāla*) and the brahmin (*vipra*) is stated, the argument of TJ 8.64 becomes clearer. MHK/TJ 8.9 states that the equality between the ignorant and the learned, etc., is only real for one who has *experienced* the Self (*puruṣa*). Viewed in this context, the simile is to be read, according to the Vedāntadarśana, whilst taking the status of the perceiver into consideration.⁸⁷ The question as to the oneness and multiplicity of space is, therefore, an epistemological issue. Bhavya’s

⁸² (P 285b5) | gcig chag par gyur pa’i nam mkha’ dañ¹ bum pa gzan chags² pa’i nam mkha’ khyad par med pa de bzin du bum pa thams cad kyi nam mkha’ yañ yin la | Notes: ¹no single or double śad (*daṇḍa*) in P: | D.

²chags: chag D.

⁸³ sukhaduḥkhopabhoktā ca tanmuktau cāpi mucyatām /
tadbandhe cāpi bandho ’sya tadduḥkhe vāstu duḥkhitāḥ //

⁸⁴ (P 298b7) | gal te ’byuñ¹ la sogs pa’i rten ñid dañ | byis pa la sogs pa’i khyad par med pa gcig pa ñid du bdag gis btags su ziñ kyañ gnod pa ni ci yañ med de | ji ltar bdag gis phyogs gñi ga la (P 298b8) grags pa’i bum pa’i nam mkha’ dpe² bstan pa yin³ no že na | Notes: ¹byuñ: ’byuñ ba D. ²dpe: dper D. ³yin: bzin P.

⁸⁵ See MHK 8.9cd.

⁸⁶ (Vedānta:) MHK 8.11, cf. GK 3.3; MHK 8.13, cf. GK 3.4f, PaS 36, 51; MHK 8.12, cf. GK 3.6; MHK 8.13, 39, cf. GK 3.5, 7, PaS 36, 51. (Buddhist:) *Āryasatyadvāyāvātāra sūtra*, see n. 65.

⁸⁷ MHK/TJ 8.9cd.

fundamental criticism of the oneness of the Self is linked to the very notion of intrinsic nature. The Self, in the strict sense of the word, cannot be arranged under, or subordinate to, the device of different epistemological theories, since, according to the Vedāntavādins, the Self has the intrinsic nature of cognition (*jñāna*).⁸⁸ The Self and the cognition of the Self are, therefore, not different. The distinction between an individual [mortal] Self (*antarātman*) and a supreme [immortal] Self (*paramātman*) is, therefore, not an epistemological difference, but a difference as to the ontological status of the very Self, according to Bhavya. This would, therefore, conflict with the very concept of “intrinsic nature”. If the supreme reality has an intrinsic nature, it cannot have inherent opposite natures such as manifoldness (*nānātva*) and oneness (*ekatva*), bondage (*bandha*) and liberation (*mokṣa*), suffering (*duḥkha*) and happiness (*sukha*). This leads Bhavya to conclude that the supreme reality of the Vedāntavādins is without intrinsic nature and could not, therefore, be a “Self” by definition. The assertion that space has the nature of oneness is, accordingly, not established (*siddha*).⁸⁹ Bhavya is, however, well aware that his opponent classifies Self in two ways. MHK 8.23 states:⁹⁰

The adherent of Vedānta (Vedāntavādin) postulates this Self (*ātman*) as appearing in two forms: that Self which is bound to the so-called body (*deha*) and the liberated (*mukta*) Self which rests in the supreme (*parameṣṭhātman*).⁹¹

In order to combine the notion of space/Self having an intrinsic nature with the notion of a “twofold” space/Self,⁹² the Vedāntavādins introduce an additional element to the simile. MHK 8.13 states:

Just as when space in a pot, being one, becomes covered by dust, smoke, etc., it is certainly not so [that this takes place] similarly regarding all [pots], just as [when] the Self [of a person, being one] possesses pleasure, etc., it is not so [that the Self of all other persons also comes to possess pleasure and pain].⁹³

TJ 8.13 adds:

⁸⁸ MHK/TJ 8.40 etc.

⁸⁹ MHK 8.65.

⁹⁰ || rig byed smra bas bdag de ni || rnam pa gñis su 'dod byed de || lus zes bya ba bciñs bdag dañ || mchog na gnas pa grol pa'i bdag | Omitted in the Skt. MS., but found in the Tibetan version of MHK in the Peking bsTan-'gyur (PK) [vol. 96] (No. 5255) fol. Dza: 31b3f; P fol. Dza: 289a4; the Tibetan version of MHK in the sDe-dge bsTan-'gyur (DK) (No. 3855), fol. Dza: 28b3; D fol. Dza: 256a7–bl.

⁹¹ In MHK 8.24 Bhavya seems to have coined (*metri causa?*) the term *pareṣṭhātman* (mchog na gnas pa grol pa'i bdag, P fol. Dza: 289a4–289a5; D fol. Dza: 256bl), which is short for *parameṣṭhātman*, found in, e.g., the Upaniṣads.

⁹² I.e. the Self being both one (*eka*) and many (*nānā*), etc., without undergoing any deviation, which would make the Self a non-Self (*anātman*) or something without intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāva*).

⁹³ ghaṭākāśe yathaikasmin rajodhūmādibhir vṛte /
tadvattā na hi sarveṣāṃ sukhāder na tathātmanaḥ //
Cf. GK 3.5; PaS 36.

Nor does the absence of any such covering in the case of one pot, cause the absence of the same in the case of all other pots.⁹⁴

This is an answer to a Buddhist objection found in TJ 8.13, repeated by Bhavya in MHK/TJ 8.64, as to the oneness of the Self. The space in a pot covered by dust, smoke, etc. (*rajodhūmādi*) is here likened to the Self which “possesses” pleasure, etc., (*sukhādi*), i.e. an “individual” (*antara*), “mortal” (*martya*) and “bound” (*bandha*) Self. The transformation of the “mortal” (*martya*),⁹⁵ “individual” Self (*antarātman*),⁹⁶ forming a part of the threefold existence [defined in TJ 8.2 as: “the cumulative result of the process of cause and effect”⁹⁷], to the immortal (*amṛta*), supreme Self (*paramātman*)⁹⁸ located beyond this relative existence, implies, according to the Vedāntavādins, not an actual change in the status of the very Self. To the question, “How do pleasure (*sukha*) and pain (*duḥkha*) arise in these individual continua [i.e. streams of consciousness, *saṃtāna*]?”⁹⁹ MHK 8.14, therefore, replies:

It is from being unawakened [to the immortal *puruṣa*] that someone who does not know the Self collects *karma* and experiences its result—which is good or bad—just as in one’s dreams one imagines oneself to have [real] experiences.¹⁰⁰

The Vedāntavādins seem here to regard the question as to the intrinsic nature of the Self as an epistemological issue, avoiding the principal objection that the Self actually changes status and thereby is without intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāva*). The Vedāntavādins could, therefore, legitimately agree with Bhavya in MHK 8.7 that the mortal (*martya*) cannot be regarded as having immortality (*amṛtatva*). One has, however, to be awakened (*prabodha*)¹⁰¹ to the state of the immortal (*amṛtatā*) Person (*puruṣa*) in order to realize the true nature of the Self. Bhavya, who does not accept this way of arguing, states in TJ 8.51:

⁹⁴ (P 286a3) | gcig bsgribs pa dañ bral bar gyur pas thams cad bsgribs pa dañ bral ba ma yin pa (P 286a4) de bžin du |

⁹⁵ TJ 8.3, 43.

⁹⁶ MHK/TJ 8.50–3, 71, 98, 101. Bhavya’s rare usage of the term *antarātman* as connotating an “individual [mortal] Self” is also found in *Manusmṛti* 6.73, 12.13 and *Catuhśataka* 10.1 (see Lang 1986, p. 95 with n.l. The Upaniṣads use it consistently for an “inner/internal Self”).

⁹⁷ (P 283a4) | rgyu dañ ’bras bu’i cha bsags pa ñid kyi kham s gum du¹ srid pa’o || Note: ¹du: na P.

⁹⁸ MHK/TJ 8.50–3.

⁹⁹ (P 286a5) || yañ ji ltar ’di dag so so’i rgyud la bde ba dañ | sdug bsñal ’byuñ bar ’gyur ba yin ze na | (TJ 8.13).

¹⁰⁰ aprabodhād anātmajñāḥ svapne bhogābhimānavat /
cinoti karma bhunkte ca tatphalaṃ yac chubhāsubham //

¹⁰¹ MHK 3.291 states in connection to TJ 3.290 (see n. 77, above): “It (i.e. the *dharmakāya*) does not belong to someone who does not have this understanding (*bodha*).” (Translated by Malcolm D. Eckel.)

Because it will not change from the nature of mortality. Therefore, how would it become immortal, since there is no deviation from intrinsic nature?¹⁰²

The Self having the properties, according to Bhavya, of being one (*eka*) and many (*nānā*), mortal (*martya*) and immortal (*amṛta*), etc., simultaneously would contradict the very notion of intrinsic nature, discussed above. The existence (*astitva*) of the Self (*ātman*), and its being the cause of the world (*jagatkāraṇatā*) is, therefore, negated.¹⁰³ The Self is as non-existent as the son of a barren woman (*bandhyātanaya*),¹⁰⁴ a flower in the sky (*khapuṣpa*)¹⁰⁵ or a hare's horn (*śaśāśṛṅga*).¹⁰⁶ The intrinsic nature of an entity (*bhāva*) is, according to Bhavya, unoriginatedness (*ajātata*) and that is, strictly speaking, the "Self" (*ātman*) of all entities (*bhāva*).¹⁰⁷ The intrinsic nature or Self of entities is, therefore, emptiness (*śūnyatā*) or absence of intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāvatā*). This is the one (*eka*), all-pervasive (*sarvatraga*) and permanent (*nitya*) "nature" of entities.¹⁰⁸ Absence of intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāva*) is then equal to absence of Self (*nairātmya*) and that is, in Bhavya's opinion, not to be regarded as Self (*ātman*), which would be a logical contradiction (*virodha*).¹⁰⁹ Before we continue with our analysis of the "pot-space" simile of VTV, we should, for the historical reasons given above, look into the *Gauḍapādīyakārikā* and its presentation of this simile. The "pot-space" simile in GK begins with an illustration of origination (*jāti*):

The Self, which can be compared to space, has arisen in the form of individual selves, which can be compared to the space in pots, and in the form of conglomerations, which can be compared to pots, etc.¹¹⁰

These "individual selves" (*jīva*) are then said to be "merged" into the Self (*ātman*), just as when pots (*ghaṭa*) are destroyed and the "space in pots"

¹⁰² (P 296b1) | 'chi ba'i no bo las 'gyur pa med pa yin pa'i phyir ji ltar 'chi ba med pa ñid du 'gyur te | rañ gi no bo las ñams pa med pa'i (P 296b2) phyir ro || Cf. MMK 15. 1f, 8; *Trīśaranasaptati* (TSS) 12f (Sørensen 1986, pp. 21f with nn. 12, 13, pp. 65f); GK 3.21f, 4.7f, 29. Because of the Buddhist influence on GK, especially Ch. 4 (see Vetter 1978), it is difficult to attribute the following statement from GK 3.22 to either side of our contracting parties: *svabhāvenāmṛto yasya bhāvo gacchati martyatām / kṛtakenāmṛtas tasya katham sthāsyati niścalaḥ* // "How can he, according to whom a thing which is naturally immortal becomes mortal, maintain that an immortal thing, when it becomes artificial, will remain changeless?" (Bhattacharya 1943, p. 61).

¹⁰³ MHK/TJ 8.19.

¹⁰⁴ MHK/TJ 8.49.

¹⁰⁵ MHK/TJ 8.50.

¹⁰⁶ TJ 8.67.

¹⁰⁷ MHK8.89.

¹⁰⁸ MHK8.90.

¹⁰⁹ MHK 8.100.

¹¹⁰ ātmā hy ākāśavaḥ jīvair ghaṭākāśair ivoditaḥ /

ghaṭādivac ca saṅghātail jātāv etan nidarśanam // (GK 3.3)

Cf. MHK/TJ 8.10; PaS 51. On the historical background of this passage, see Vetter 1978, pp. 117f.

(*ghaṭākāśa*) is “merged” into Space (*ākāśa*).¹¹¹ The distinction in GK between *ātman* and *jīva*, “Space” and “space in pots”, does not, as was the case in VTV, account for any ontological difference between the two. GK 3.6 explicitly states that there is no difference in Space (*ākāśasya na bheda*).¹¹² The “space in pots”/“individual selves” are neither a transformation (*vikāra*),¹¹³ nor a part of Space/Self.¹¹⁴ *Ātman/jīva* are one (*eka*) because of non-differentiation (*abheda*).¹¹⁵ GK, like VTV, solves the problem of intrinsic nature, discussed above, by the device of a relative (*saṃvṛti*) and an absolute (*paramārtha*) theory of knowledge. The latter describes relativity as a dream (*svapna*), projected by the illusion (*māyā*) of the Self.¹¹⁶ Origination (*jāti*) is, therefore, only true from a conventional level. Ultimately, according to GK 3.2, there is “sameness of non-origination” (*ajātisamatā*). Similar to MHK 8.13, GK 3.5 averts the dilemma of a possible deviation from intrinsic nature, on the part of the Self, by comparing the “bound” or “differentiated” Self, being “related” to pleasure, etc., (*sukhādi*), to a single “pot-space” which is connected to dust, smoke, etc., (*rajodhūmādi*).¹¹⁷ GK (3.8) also uses the analogy of the sky (*gagana*) appearing to the ignorant (*bāla*) as if it were covered with impurities, just as the Self appears with impurities to the non-enlightened (*abuddha*).¹¹⁸ The reason why the Self (*ātman/jīva*) becomes, as if it were, “mortal”, “bound”, “plural”, “differentiated”, etc., is because it is connected (*yuta*) with, or in the state of attachment (*saṅga*)¹¹⁹ to, the object. This causes the mind (*citta*), consciousness (*viññāna*) or knowledge (*jñāna*) to be vibrant (*spandita*), and this in turn brings forth the appearance of duality between subject and object, perceiver and perceptible (*grāhya/grāhaka*).¹²⁰ *Citta*,¹²¹ *viññāna* and *jñāna*¹²² are ultimately non-attached due to the absence of objects to be cognized (*jñeya*).¹²³ Resuming the discussion of the “pot-

¹¹¹ GK 3.4. Cf. MHK/TJ 8.10, 11.

¹¹² Cf. MHK 8.11: ... abhedataḥ / ghaṭabhedena caikatvaṃ sāmīyam sarvasya yan matam // MHK 8.12: ... mṛdbhedo nāsti kaś cana /.

¹¹³ The concepts of *parināma* and *vivarta* were not consistently used and distinguished until post-Śāṅkara times. On the historical usage of these terms, see Hacker 1953.

¹¹⁴ GK 3.7.

¹¹⁵ GK 3.13.

¹¹⁶ Cf. MHK/TJ 8.14.

¹¹⁷ Cf. MHK/TJ 8.64; MHK 8.65; PaS 36.

¹¹⁸ Cf. TJ 8.39; PaS 35. The example of space covered by impurity may have been taken from *Madhyāntavibhāga*, to which there are several allusions in GK.

¹¹⁹ See the definition of “Vedānta” and “Vedāntavādin (n. 27). Bhavya, however, maintains that the Vedāntavādins are attached to a position (*pakṣa*) or an extreme (*anta*).

¹²⁰ See GK 4.47f, 72. Cf. the *Yogasūtra* (YS), from which MHK/TJ seems to draw some information regarding “supernormal powers” or *siddhis* (see MHK 8.8; Gokhale 1958, p. 172, n. 27). YS states that [the Self] takes the same form as the activity [of the mind (*citta*)] (YS 1.4). This does not, however, occur in the state of *yoga*, defined in YS 1.2 as “the suppression of the activity of the mind (*yogaścittavṛttinirodhaḥ*), i.e. when the Perceiver (*draṣṭṛ*), the Self, rests in itself (YS 1.3).

¹²¹ See, e.g., GK 4.72.

¹²² See, e.g., GK 4.96.

¹²³ See, e.g., GK 3.32, 4.1 etc.

space” simile of VTV, Bhavya proceeds in his critical examination (*parīkṣā*) with an analysis of the very concept of *wspace* (*ākāśa*), since this was the correlate of the Self (*ātman*) in the “pot-space” simile (*ghaṭākāśadr̥ṣṭānta*). Bhavya states in TJ 8.65 that the example of space which was shown is quite unestablished,¹²⁴ because: “That object which is empty of substance, that is relative space. There is movement for those who move, there is room for those demanding room.”¹²⁵

TJ 8.66 states:

In the view of the Sautrāntikas, we accept on the conventional level (*saṃvṛtyā*) that space is the mere absence of a resistant substance (*sapratighadravyābhāvamātra*).¹²⁶ Because that [space] is neither a substance (*dravya*) nor permanent (*nitya*), entities (*bhāva*) that are mobile move and perform actions of going and coming, etc., in it, and in that same space those who desire room (*avākāśa*) acquire room. Therefore, that is designated “space” (*ākāśa*).¹²⁷

Bhavya states further in TJ 8.66 that since space is dependent on the nonexistence of substance (*dravya*), it has no definite status (*niyama*). Space does not exist and continue as a substance and a support (*ādhāra*)¹²⁸ with intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*), since it, strictly speaking, has the nature of a non-existent Self. To this the Vedāntavādins object:

If in that way space (*ākāśa*) is totally non-existent,¹²⁹ why has your teacher, the Buddha, taught that that [space] is the support of wind (*vāyu*)? Does not the following passage occur? “Oh Gautama, on what is earth (*pṛthivī*) supported? Oh Brahmin, earth is supported on water (*ap*). On what is water supported? It is supported on wind (*vāyu*). On what is wind supported? Wind is supported on space (*ākāśa*).” [Reply:] From the same sūtra, having ascertained definitely (*avadhārya*), it is taught: “Oh Gautama, on what is space (*ākāśa*) supported? Oh Brahmin, now you are going too far! It is impossible to be able to understand the limit of the question, [since] if space is formless (*arūpya*), non-illustrative (**anidarśana*) and non-obstructing (*apratigha*), on what is it [then] supported?”¹³⁰

¹²⁴ (P 299a1) | nam mkha’i dpe bstan pa de ni śin tu ma grub pa yin no |

¹²⁵ mukto dravyasya yo bhāvas tad ākāśam hi sāmṛtam /
gatiḥ gatimatām tatra so ’vakāśo ’vakāśinaṃ // (MHK 8.66)

¹²⁶ *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya ad 2.55d.*

¹²⁷ (P 299a2) || mdo sde pa’i lta ba’i rjes su ’brañs nas thogs pa dañ bcas pa’i rdzas kyi dños po med pa (P 299a3) tsam nam mkha’o źes bdag gcig kun rdzob tu khas blañs pa yin pas gañ gi phyir de ni rdzas kyañ ma yin | rtag pa yañ ma yin pas de’i phyir ’gro ba dañ ldan pa rñams de la ’gro ba dañ ’oñ ba la sogs pa’i¹ bya ba (P 299a4) yañ ’jug par byed la | de ñid la skabs ’dod pa rñams kyi kyañ skabs thob par ’gyur pas² des na nam mkha’ źes brjod pa yin te | Notes: ¹pa’i: pha’i P. ²pas: bas D.

¹²⁸ Cf. MHK/TJ 8.60.

¹²⁹ The Upaniṣads as well as VP, BS, GK, PaS, BS-*bhāṣya* by Śāṅkara, etc., regard space (*ākāśa*) as a positive entity.

¹³⁰ (P 299a8) || gal te ’di ltar nam mkha’ śin tu med pa źig yin na ci’i phyir khyod kyi ston pa sañs rgyas gyis¹ de rluñ gi brten² yin par³ bstan⁴ | (P 299b1) ji⁵ ltar⁶ źe na | gau ta ma sa ci la brten te |⁷ gnas źes gsol pa⁸ dañ | bram zes ni chu la brten te gnas so || chu ci la brten chu ni rluñ la brten to⁹ || rluñ ci la brten rluñ ni nam mkha’ la brten to ||¹⁰ źes ’byun (P 299b2) ba ma yin nam źe na | mdo de ñid las ñes par byas nas bstan pa yin te | gau ta ma nam mkha’ ci la brten źes gsol pa dañ ’bram ze śin tu ’da’ bar byed de dris pa’i mtha’ rtogs par nus par dka’o | (P 299b3) nam mkha’ ni gzugs med pa | bstan du med pa | thogs pa med ba¹¹ yin na de ci źig la brten par ’gyur | Notes: ¹gyis: kyi P. ²brten: rten D. ³par: bar D. ⁴bstan: brten D. ⁵ji: ci P. ⁶ltar: lta D. ⁷]: no single or double śad (*dañda*) in D. ⁸pa: ba P. ⁹brten to: to P. ¹⁰||: no single or double śad (*dañda*) in D. ¹¹ba: pa D.

This apparently unknown sūtra-passage seems to recur frequently in the polemics between Buddhist and Vedantic philosophers. It is quoted in the *Sphuṭārthāvyākhyā* of Yaśomitra, alluded to in the *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara, the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, and in the *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari.¹³¹ VP 3.7.151 (III.407) states:

Because it establishes differentiation as to place, space—having the capacity of a “support”—is, according to some, regarded as the primordial [support] of all conjunctions [like earth etc.].¹³²

Bhavya concludes in TJ 8.66:

Therefore, there is not any substance (*dravya*) called space (*ākāśa*), and since space was given as an example of a Self (*ātman*) which is said to be permanent (*nitya*), all pervasive (*sarvatraga*) and single (*eka*), it is in fact dissimilar to that and thus it is not established for the other (i.e. for the Vedāntavādin).¹³³

Bhavya continues in MHK 8.67:

Space is therefore not unblocked and it is not an [active] provider of room. When this reason is mentioned by the opponent regarding its (i.e. space’s) existence, it should not be accepted as a proper reason.¹³⁴

TJ 8.67 states:

¹³¹ Yaśomitra’s *Sphuṭārthāvyākhyā* ad AK 1.5 states: pṛthivī bho gautama kutra pratiṣṭhitā / pṛthivī brāhmaṇa abmaṇḍale pratiṣṭhitā / abmaṇḍalaṃ bho gautama kutra pratiṣṭhitām / vāyau pratiṣṭhitām / vāyur bho gautama kutra pratiṣṭhitah / ākāśe pratiṣṭhitah / ākāśaṃ bho gautama kutra pratiṣṭhitam / atisarasi mahābrāhmaṇa atisarasi mahābrāhmaṇa / ākāśaṃ brāhmaṇa apratiṣṭhitam anāmbanam iti vistaraḥ / Cf. Śaṅkara’s *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* ad 2.2.24: pṛthivī bhagavaḥ kiṃ saṃnīrayā ityasya praśnasya prativacanaṃ bhavati vāyurākāśasaṃnīrayaḥ iti / tadākāśasyāvastutvena samañjasaṃ syāt / tasmād anyayuktam ākāśasyāvastutvam / Cf. The *Ratnagotravibhāga* I.55 and prose (ed. Johnston, pp. 10, 44 with n. 6).

¹³² ākāśam eva keṣāṃ cid deśabhedaprakalpanāt /
ādhāraśaktiḥ prathamā sarvasaṃyogināṃ matā //

¹³³ (P 299b5) | des na nam mkha’ zes bya ba ba’i rdzas ni cuñ žig kyañ yod pa ma yin no¹ gañ gi gyhir ’di ni rtag pa² dan³ thams cad la khyab pa dan⁴ gcig pu ñid do zes bya ba’i bdag gi dper bstan pa dan chos mthun pa ñid du (P 299b6) ’gyur ba ma yin pas ’di ltar gžan la ma grub pa ñid yin no || Notes: ¹No single or double śad (*daṇḍa*) in P: || D. ²pa: ba P. ³No single or double śad (*daṇḍa*) in P: | D. ⁴: no single or double śad (*daṇḍa*) in D.

¹³⁴ nāto ’nāvṛtir ākāśaṃ nāvakāśasya dātṛ ca /
taddhetūktau tadastitve hetos tu syād asiddhatā //

On the usage of a simile (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) as a logical reason (*hetu*), see GK 4.20; *Nyāyasūtra* (NS) 1.1.34–7, 5.1.11.

The Vaibhāṣikas maintain that space (*ākāśa*) has the characteristic of nonobstruction (*anāvṛti*), and it has the result that it provides room (*avakāśa*),¹³⁵ but that does not exist because space is not a substance possessing existence (*dravyasat*).¹³⁶ Objection: Space, indeed, exists, because it has the characteristic of non-obstruction (*anāvṛti*) and because it has the result of making room (*avakāśa*).... [Answer:] We maintain that space (*ākāśa*) is just devoid of the nature of a substance (*dravya*).¹³⁷ Moreover, as to the statement of the opponent that the Self (*ātman*) is a permanent (*nitya*) entity (*bhāva*) and is all pervasive (*sarvatraga*) and is the support (*ādhāra*) of all entities (*bhāva*) like space,¹³⁸ as to that, in order to adduce a conflict differently from that, the *ācārya*¹³⁹ [i.e. Bhavya] says the following:¹⁴⁰

MHK 8.68 states:

Again, space cannot be regarded as an entity, since it does not stand in relation to a cause. It is, therefore, not one, just as [the unreal] son of a barren woman [is not one].¹⁴¹

TJ 8.68 explains:

The subject (*dharmin*) is “space”, the property [which is to be proved] (*sādhya*) of [the subject in the thesis] is “that is not an entity”. The logical reason (*hetu*) is “because it is not originated (*anupapannāt*)¹⁴² from a cause (*hetu*)”. The meaning is that it originates having been produced from causes and conditions (*hetupratyaya*). Space has not originated from a productive cause (*janakahetu*). How can that which has no cause (*hetu*) be an entity (*bhāva*)? [It is, therefore, unreal] like the son of a barren woman (*bandhyātanaya*).¹⁴³

¹³⁵ AK 1.5d: tatrākāśam anāvṛtiḥ /

¹³⁶ See, e.g., AK 5.25–7.

¹³⁷ C. TJ 8.66.

¹³⁸ TJ 8.66.

¹³⁹ Bhavya refers here to himself as *ācārya*; see Qvarnström 1989, n. 2.

¹⁴⁰ (P 299b7) | nam mkha' ni sgrub pa med pa'i mtshan ñid can yin la ||¹ skabs sbyin par byed pa zes bya ba ni de'i 'bras bu can yin no zes bye brag tu smra bas 'dod |² ña la de yañ yod pa ma yin te | nam mkha' ni rdzas yod (P 299b8) pa dañ ldan pa ma yin pa'i phyir ro || gal te yañ nam mkha' ni yod de | sgrub pa med pa'i mtshan³ ñid can yin pa'i phyir ram | skabs sbyin par byed pa'i 'bras bu can yin pa'i phyir ro || ... (P 300a2) || de skad smras pa'i gtan tshigs 'di dag ni g'zan la ma grub pa ñid yin te | nam mkha' ni rdzas⁴ kyi dños po dañ bral ba tsam ñid yin par kho bos khas blañs pa'i phyir ro || g'zan (P 300a3) yañ dños po rtag pa thams cad la khyab pa'i bdag dños po thams cad kyi rten du gyur pa nam mkha' dañ 'dra ba yin no zes smras pa de la | de las g'zan du rtag ge'i gnod pa ñe bar dgod⁵ pa'i sgo nas slob dpon (P 300a4) gyis smras pa | Notes: ¹||: | D. ²||: no single or double śad (*dañḍa*) in D. ³mtshan: mchan D. ⁴No single or double śad (*dañḍa*) in P; D. ⁵dgod: dgos P.

¹⁴¹ nāpi hetvanupādānān ākāśam bhāva iṣyate /
bandhyātanayavan nāpi tad ekam ata eva hi //

¹⁴² ñe bar ma byuñ ba'i phyir suggests anupapannāt and not anupādānāt (= ñe ba ma blañ ba'i phyir) as in MHK 8.68.

¹⁴³ (P 300a4) || nam mkha' zes bya ba ni chos can no || de ni¹ dños po ma yin te zes (P 300a5) bya ba ni de'i chos so || rgyu las ñe bar ma byuñ ba'i phyir zes bya ba ni gtan tshigs so || 'byuñ bar 'gyur bas na dños po ste ||² rgyu dañ rkyen las bskyed nas 'byuñ ba zes bya ba'i tha tshig go ||³ nam mkha' ni skyed (P 300a6) par byed pa'i rgyu 'ga' las kyañ byuñ ba ma yin pas rgyu dañ ldan pa ma yin pa 'di dños por lta ga la 'gyur te 'mo g'sam gyi bu b'zin no || Notes: ¹de ni: de D. ²||: | D. ³||: | P.

In order to cope with the grand edifice of Buddhist dogma handed down and codified in the Abhidharma, and to substantiate his criticism of the Vedāntadarśana, Bhavya refers to the views of the Sautrāntikas¹⁴⁴ and the Vaibhāṣikas.¹⁴⁵ In TJ 8.67, the Vedāntavādin's view on space is linked to that of the Vaibhāṣikas, who considered space to be an unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*) *dharma*¹⁴⁶ in contrast to empirical entities (*bhāva*) which are only nominally existent (*prajñaptisat*). Space is, however, considered as a substance possessing existence (*dravyasat*) and intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*).¹⁴⁷ Space (*ākāśa*), as an existing substance (*dravyasat*), is therefore considered by the Vaibhāṣikas to be unblocked (*anāvṛti*) and an [active] provider (*dātṛ*) of room (*avakāśa*).¹⁴⁸ Even if the relationship between the Vaibhāṣikas and the Vedāntavādins may be severely questioned from a historical or philosophical point of view, Bhavya seems to motivate his comparison and criticism of space/Self by taking recourse to his main point of comparison: The notion that space as well as the Self exists by virtue of intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*).

In order to further clarify Bhavya's criterion of judgement, we may look into the rather complex picture of space given in both the unsystematic and the systematic texts of early Vedānta philosophy. The Vedic Upaniṣads contain propositions concerning space as an element (*bhūta*), as well as an ultimate principle from which everything arises.¹⁴⁹ From Āryadeva's (?) *T'i p'o p'u sa shih lang chia ching chung wai tao hsiao sheng nieh pan lun* ("Treatise on the explanation of *nirvāṇa* by heterodox and Hīnayana teachers in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*") there even seems to have existed an "ākāśa-school":

On demande: Quels sont les hérétiques qui soutiennent que l'espace (*diś* ...) s'appelle le *nirvāṇa*? On répond: Les maîtres de la deuxième école hérétique, celle de l'espace, qui disent: Au commencement (*ādau* /.../) naquit l'espace; de l'espace naquit l'homme cosmique; de cet homme naquirent le del et la terre.¹⁵⁰ Quand le ciel et la terre se dissolvent et rentrent dans le lieu de cet (*espace*), cela s'appelle le *nirvāṇa*. C'est pour cela que les maîtres de l'école de l'espace

¹⁴⁴ TJ 8.66.

¹⁴⁵ TJ 8.67.

¹⁴⁶ See AK 1.5a–c. Bhavya refers to the major text (*grantha*) of the Vaibhāṣikas in TJ 3.128. From the enumeration of *asaṃskṛta* dharmas found in MHK 3.129cd ("asaṃskṛtā nirodhau dvāv ākāśaṃ tathatā tathā //"), Bhavya does not rely upon the Sarvāstivāda teaching as reported in the AK by Vasubandhu.

¹⁴⁷ See e.g. AK 5.25, 6.4. The intentionality of consciousness (*vijñāna*) expressed for example in AK 5.25, along with the notion of the intentional object's *a priori* existence, may explain the Vaibhāṣika position.

¹⁴⁸ TJ 8.67. See AK 1.5d: *tatrākāśam anāvṛtiḥ*

¹⁴⁹ On space (*ākāśa*) as an element (*bhūta*), see *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (Chānd.Up.) 1.9.1; *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* (Taitt.Up.) 2.1.1.

¹⁵⁰ See Ṛgveda 10.90 (*puruṣasūkta*), quoted by Tucci 1926, p. 21, n. 1.

disent que l'espace est éternel et qu'il s'appelle le *nirvāna*.¹⁵¹

Furthermore, we find passages in, e.g., the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* identifying space with the Self (*ātman*).¹⁵² The very same Upaniṣad, however, states explicitly that the ultimate principle is that which is within space.¹⁵³ This would be in agreement with the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, e.g., which contains passages against a confusion of space and brahman as well as propositions as to the symbolic function of space.¹⁵⁴ As far as the systematic treatises of early Vedānta philosophy are concerned, i.e. BS, VP, GK and PaS, space, being a positive entity, is used consistently as a symbolic representation of their respective supreme reality.¹⁵⁵ Even though these textual passages express opposing doctrines, Bhavya would have been able to synthesise these by means of his yardstick of comparison: space as an entity possessing existence. This approach is also instrumental in denying the Self by referring to the *Vaiśeṣikatattuaviniścaya* (ch. 7) and the *Sāṃkhyatattvāvātāra* (ch. 6) of MHK/TJ.¹⁵⁶ The synthesis and criticism of these Brahmanical systems, including the Vedāntadarśana of VTV, are restricted to the same kind of methodology. The fundamental differences between Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya and Vedānta philosophy are no obstacle to Bhavya's criticism, since his focus is only on the idea of the Self as something which possesses existence and intrinsic nature. By referring to the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas, Bhavya demonstrates his firm ideological affiliation with Buddhist tradition (*āgama*), when, as a true Buddhist, he applies his reason (*yukti*)¹⁵⁷ to Vedānta philosophy. Whereas the overall Madhyamaka critique of the Vaibhāṣika doctrine is used by Bhavya to reject the notion of space and Self held by the Vedāntadarśana, the reference to the Sautrāntika system is meant to consolidate his own view on space.

As we have seen, Bhavya agrees conventionally (*saṃvṛtitaḥ*) with the Sautrāntika view on space as the mere absence of a resistant substance (*sapratighadravyābhāvamātra*).¹⁵⁸ The Sautrāntikas refuted the doctrine of unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*) dharmas postulated by the Vaibhāṣikas:

Le Sautrāntika affirme que l'inconditionné, le triple inconditionné (1.5b), n'est pas réel."¹⁵⁹

¹⁵¹ Tucci 1926, pp. 20f. See also Nakamura 1983, p. 168 with n.17, p. 178; Lang 1986, p. 10 with n. 17, p. 15 with n. 30.

¹⁵² Chānd.Up 3.14.2: ākāśātman

¹⁵³ Chānd.Up 8.1.1. Cf. 8.14.1: te yad antarā. See also passages where *ātman* (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (Bṛh.Up.) 4.4.22) and *puruṣa* (Bṛh.Up. 2.1.17; Chānd.Up. 3.12.7–9; Taitt.Up. 1.6.1) is said to be in the space (*ākāśe*) in the heart (*hṛdaye*).

¹⁵⁴ Brh.Up 2.1.5, 3.7.12, 3.8.11, 4.4.17–20.

¹⁵⁵ BS, e.g. 1.1.22, 1.3.14, 1.3.41; VP, e.g. 3.7.112 (III.368); GK 3.3, 6, 9, 12; 4.1.

¹⁵⁶ TJ 8.18; MHK/TJ 8.19.

¹⁵⁷ On *āgama* and *yukti* in the works of Bhavya, see Iida 1966.

¹⁵⁸ See TJ 8.66; AK 2.55d.

¹⁵⁹ AK-*bhāṣya ad* 2.55d, *op. cit.* La Vallée Poussin 1971, vol. 1, p. 278.

They considered these dharmas, therefore, as being without intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāva*):

Le Sautrāntika s'autorise encore de l'Abhidharma où nous lisons: "Quels sont les dharmas *avastuka*? Les inconditionnés—Le terme *avastuka* signifie 'irréel', 'sans nature propre'."¹⁶⁰

Space (*ākāśa*) is, therefore, according to Bhavya and the Sautrāntikas, a purely analytical concept explaining the absence of something real (*dravya*), which ultimately (*paramārthataḥ*) does not exist either. Without implying any historical connections between Bhavya's summary of Vedānta and the VP, a proposition diametrically opposite to that of Bhavya and the Sautrāntikas is found in VP 3.7.112 (III.368):

Just as the non-real absence of space manifests itself as form, in the same way the non-real absence of form [manifests itself as] the support of space.¹⁶¹

Bhavya's view on space is not unique in the Madhyamaka tradition. Nāgārjuna states, e.g., in the *Ratnāvalī* 1.99ab, "Space is a mere designation, because it has the property of a mere absence of form."¹⁶² Āryadeva writes, in his *Śataka* 9.3, on the same line of reasoning as Bhavya:

La où il n'y a pas de matière (*rūpa*), rien ne s'oppose à la naissance de dharmas matériels: l'absence de matière reçoit le nom d'ākāśa, parce que les choses y brillent fortement (*bhṛśam asyāntaḥ kāśante bhāvāḥ*). Les Vaibhāṣikas supposent dans l'Abhidharmaśāstra que l'ākāśa est une réalité (*vastu*), ne voyant pas que l'écriture se borne à donner un nom à une irréalité, à un pur néant (*avastusato kiṃcanasya*).¹⁶³

The fact that Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Bhavya etc. criticize the very concept of "space" as a designation for something which is said to possess existence and intrinsic nature does not, however, prevent them from using space as a symbolic representation of their own fundamental reality (*tattva*),¹⁶⁴ since that was regarded as empty (*śūnya*), without intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāva*), etc. Nāgārjuna states, therefore, in his *Acintyastava* 37–9:

[That which] has transcended the duality of being and non-being without, however, having transcended anything at all; that which is not knowledge or knowable, neither existent nor non-existent, neither one nor many, neither both nor

¹⁶⁰ AK-*bhāṣya* ad 2.55d, *op. cit.* La Vallée Poussin, *ibid.*, p. 286.

¹⁶¹ yathaiṅkāśa nāstitvam asan mūrtinirūpitam /
tathaiṅkāśa nāstitvam asad ākāśānīrayam //

¹⁶² rūpasyābhāvamātratvād ākāśam nāmamātrakam /.

¹⁶³ *Op. cit.*; La Vallée Poussin *ibid.*, p. 8, n. 3. For further references to the refutation of space (*ākāśa*) see Lang 1986, p. 89, n. 5.

¹⁶⁴ See also Nāgārjuna's *Bodhicittavivarāṇa* (vv. 46, 47, 51) and Bhavya's MHK 3.11, 28, 275, etc.

neither; [that which is] without foundation, unmanifest, inconceivable, incomparable; that which arises not, disappears not, is not to be annihilated and is not permanent, that is [Reality] which is like space [and] not within the range of words [or] knowledge (*akṣarajñāna*).¹⁶⁵

The Self (*ātman*) as a substance (*dravya*)

MHK 8.59 states:

If the Self were a substance, it would not be all-pervasive, due to substantiality—as with a pot—nor could it be eternal. How [then] could the whole world be full of it?¹⁶⁶

In the light of the preceding critique, stated by Bhavya in connection with the “pot-space” simile, the hypothetical assertion that the Self is a substance simply means that the Self is an object which exists by virtue of intrinsic nature. We cannot, however, exclude the possibility that Bhavya actually refers to some early Vedānta text or school which considered the Self to be a substance. The following fragments¹⁶⁷ ascribed to Bhartṛprapañca, and the passage from VP, given below, are the only passages of pre-Śaṅkara Vedānta philosophy known to the present author which explicitly declare the Self (*ātman*) to be a substance (*vastu / dravya*).

On this some say: the Self is a substance that by itself has oneness and multiplicity, just as a cow is one as the substance cow, but its features, the dewlap, etc., are different from [one cow to] another.¹⁶⁸

Just as there exists oneness and multiplicity in gross [substances], so we can infer that there exists oneness and multiplicity in indivisible formless substances.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁵ bhāvābhāvadvayātītam anātītaṃ ca kutra cit /
na ca jñānaṃ na ca jñeyaṃ na cāsti na ca nāsti yat //
yan na caikaṃ na cānekaṃ nobhayaṃ na ca nobhayam /
anālayam athāvyaktam acintyam anidarśanam //
yan nodeti na ca vyeti nocchedi na ca śāśvatam /
tad ākāsapratīkāśaṃ nākṣarajñānagocaram //
Op. cit. ; Lindtner 1982b, p. 153.

¹⁶⁶ dravyaṃ yadi bhaved ātmā dravyatvāt sarvago na saḥ / ghaṭavan nāpi nityaḥ syāt tena pūrṇaṃ kuto jagat //
See the fourth derivation of “*puruṣa*” (TJ 8.2): “He fills up” (Gokhale 1958, p. 168 with n. 10). Cf. *Īśa Upaniṣad* (Ī.Up.) 6; BhG 6.29–30; MHK 8.4ab; *R̥gveda* 10.90.2; Up. 3.15; Ī.Up. 1.5; BhG 13.15, referred to by Gokhale 1958, p. 170, n. 16.

¹⁶⁷ See Śaṅkara’s *bhāṣya ad Bṛh.Up.* 2.3.6; 4.3.30. Suresvara’s *Vārttika* as well as Ānandajñāna’s *Ṭikā ad Śaṅkara’s bhāṣya ad Bṛh.Up.* also give numerous references to Bhartṛprapañca.

¹⁶⁸ atra ke cid vyācakṣate ātmavastunaḥ svata evaikatvam nānātvaṃ ca / yathā gor godravyatayāikatvaṃ sāsnādīnām dharmānām parasparato bhedaḥ /.

¹⁶⁹ yathā sthūleṣv ekatvaṃ nānātvaṃ ca tathā niravayaveṣv amūrtavastuṣv ekatvaṃ nānātvaṃ cānumeyam /

The difference between Bhartṛprapañca's position and that of the Vedāntadarśana, as presented in VTV, is that, whereas the former considers oneness as well as multiplicity as the nature of the Self, the latter maintains the Self to be one by intrinsic nature; oneness and multiplicity is connected to different epistemological perspectives. Therefore, in reply to an objection from Bhavya, that his opponent ascribes opposed characteristics to the Self, such as it being subtle (*sūkṣma*) and great (*mahā*), one (*eka*) and many (*nānā*), with and without form (*rūpa*), the Vedāntavādin states in TJ 8.54:

Likewise also for the Self (*ātman*), those who do not see reality see it in many forms: some say it is all pervasive (*sarvatraga*), some say that it is just the extent of the body (*deha*), again others think that it has just the nature of an atom (*paramāṇu*).¹⁷⁰ Like the elephant's (*hastin*) intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) it is just one (*eka*), but like the major and minor limbs (*aṅga / pratyāṅga*) of the elephant it is also many.¹⁷¹

Bhavya replies in MHK 8.55:

On the basis of the example of the elephant, multiformity of a single [nature] is not logical, since the trunk is not considered to be the elephant and [since] oneness does not [apply] to the trunk etc.¹⁷²

The usage of the concept of “substance” as a designation of ultimate reality is not exclusive to Brahmanical philosophy. Nāgārjuna and others also use this device, though in a completely different way. Using the same reasoning as that used in the case of space, substance could also accurately be a designation for the Mādhyamikas' ultimate reality, since this is without intrinsic nature (*nīḥsvabhāva*).¹⁷³ The *Acintyastava* 45ab runs, “It is also termed (*iti*) own-being, nature, truth, substance, the real [and the] true.”¹⁷⁴ The following interesting passage from the *Vākyapadīya* 3.2.1 (III.111) seems almost to be modelled on the ACS:

¹⁷⁰ Cf. CŚ 10.18: | la lar kun tu son bar mthoñ | la lar skyes bu lus tsam žig || la lar rdul tsam žig mthoñ ste | šes rab can gyis med par mthoñ | “Some see that [self] as ubiquitous; some see it as the size of a person's body; and some see it as minute in size. One endowed with insight (*prajñā*) sees it as non-existent.” See Lang 1986, pp. 100f with n. 18.

¹⁷¹ (P 297a2) || de bžin du bdag la yañ de kho na ñid ma mthoñ ba rnams kyis¹ nram pa du ma žig tu lta bar byed de² || kha cig gis ni kun la khyab par ro || gžan dag gis ni (P 297a3) lus kyi tshad tsam du'o || yañ gžan dag gis phra rab kyi ño bo tsam yin no sñam du sems te | glañ po'i rañ gi ño bo bžin du gcig ñid kyañ yin la³ yan lag dañ ñiñ lag bžin du du ma ñid kyañ yiñ no že na | Notes: ¹kyis: kyi P. ²de: do P. ³No single or double śad (*dañḍa*) in P: | D.

¹⁷² na yuktā hastidṛṣṭāntād ekasyānekarūpatā /
karaḥ karī yato neṣṭaḥ karāḍīnām na caikatā //

Cf. TJ 8.56, MHK 8.57, where the example of a *palāśa* tree is discussed.

¹⁷³ On relative substance (*dravya*), see *Acintyastava* (ACS) 49 (Lindtner 1982b, p. 157 with n. 49); *Ratnāvalī* 5.14 (here “material goods”).

¹⁷⁴ Svabhāvaḥ prakṛtis tattvaṃ dravyaṃ vastu sad ity api / Lindtner 1982, pp. 154f. Cf. TŚS 12f (Sørensen 1986, pp. 21f with nn. 12, 13, and pp. 65f).

Regarding the concept of substance, its synonyms are [in accordance with some schools]: Self, the real, intrinsic nature, body and reality, and it has been declared eternal.¹⁷⁵

In the *Prakīrṇakaparakāśa* by Helārāja,¹⁷⁶ it is said that the Advaitavādins call this ultimate substance (*pāramārthika dravya*)¹⁷⁷ “Self” (*ātman*), whereas some other school [probably some Ābhidharmika] maintains that it is the “own-characteristic” (*svalakṣaṇa*) which is the ultimate substance. The Sattādvaitavādins equate substance with “existence” or “being” (*sattā*), which is claimed to be the intrinsic nature of things (*sva bhāvaḥ*), whereas some other school again [perhaps a Sāṃkhya school] holds that the body (*śarīra*) or primordial matter (*prakṛti*) is the ultimate substance, while the Cārvākas say that the four elements, air (*vāyu*), fire (*tejas*), water (*ap*) and earth (*pṛthivī*) constitute that ultimate substance which they term “Reality” (*tattva*).

Acknowledgements

Here I would like to express my profound gratitude to the following Indo-Tibetologists who have provided me with substantial support and invaluable suggestions: Lect. Per K. Sørensen, University of Copenhagen, Denmark; Dr. Christian Lindtner, University of Copenhagen, Denmark; Dr. William Ames, University of Washington, Seattle, U.S.A; Prof. T. E. Vetter, Institut Kern, Indologisch Institut der Riksuniversitet Leiden, Holland and Prof. J. W. de Jong, The Australian National University, Canberra.

Bibliography

- | | |
|-------------------------|--|
| Ames, W. (1986) | Prajñāpradīpa, Chs. 3–5, 23, 26. Edition and translation. Unpublished Diss., Univ. of Washington, Seattle. |
| Bhagavadgītā | Śrīmadbhagavadgītā. Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series (ASS) 34, 1936. |
| Bhattacharya, V. (1943) | The Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda. Calcutta. |
| Brahmasūtrabhāṣya | The Brahmasūtra Śāṅkara Bhāṣya.... Ed. by A. Śāstrī. Nirṇaya Sāgar Press. Bombay 1938. |
| Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad | Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad. ASS 15, 1939. |
| Chāndogya Upaniṣad | Chāndogyopaniṣad. ASS 14, 1934. |

¹⁷⁵ ātmā vastu svabhāvaś ca śarīraṃ tattvam ity api /
dravyam ity asya paryāyās tac ca nityam iti smṛtam //

¹⁷⁶ Ad VP 3.2.1 (III.111).

¹⁷⁷ Bhartṛhari defines conventional substance (*sāṃvyaḥārikadravya*) in VP 3.4.3 (III.219).

- Danielson, H. (1980) *Ādiśeṣa. The Essence of Supreme Truth (Paramārthasāra)*. Leiden.
- Eckel, M. D. (1980) *A Question of Nihilism. Bhāvaviveka's Response to the Fundamental Problems of Mādhyamika Philosophy*. Unpublished Diss., Harvard Univ., Cambridge, Mass.
- (1987) *Jñānagarbha's Commentary on the Distinction between the Two Truths. An Eighth Century Handbook of Madhyamaka Philosophy*. Albany.
- Ejima, Y. (1980) *Chūgan-Shisō no Tenkai-Bhāvaviveka Kenkyū. Tokyo. (Tattvajñānaīśanā)*
- Frauwallner, E. (1953) *Geschichte der indischen Philosophie*. Salzburg 1953–6.
- (1961) *Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic*. WZKSO, Band V, pp. 125–48.
- Gnoli, R. (1960) *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti (The First Chapter with the Autocommentary)*. Serie Orientale Roma (SOR) 23.
- Gokhale, V.V. (1958) “The Vedānta Philosophy described by Bhavya in his Madhyamaka-hṛdaya.” *Indo-Iranian Journal* (IIJ), Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 165–80.
- (1985) “Madhyamakahrdayakārikā Tarkajvālā.” Chapter I.” In: Chr. Lindtner (ed.), *Indiske Studier* 5. Miscellanea Buddhica, pp. 76–108. Copenhagen.
- Hacker, P. (1953) “Vivarta. Studien zur Geschichte der Illusionistischen Kosmologie und Erkenntnistheorie der Inder.” In: *Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur. Abhandlungen der geistes- und sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse*. Jahrgang 1953. Nr. 5, pp. 187–242. Wiesbaden.
- (1968/9) “Śāṅkara der Yogin und Śāṅkara der Advaitin. Einige Beobachtungen.” WZKSO, Band XII–XIII, pp. 119–48.
- Halbfass, W. (1979) “Observations on Darśana.” *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* (WZKS), Band XXIII, pp. 195–203.
- (1981) “Darśana, Ānvīkṣikī, Philosophie.” *Indien und Europa. Perspektiven ihrer geistigen Begegnung*, pp. 296–327. Basel/Stuttgart.
- Hartmann, J-U. (1987). *Das Varṇārhavarṇastotra des Mātr̥ceṭa*. Göttingen.
- Hattori, M. (1968) *Dignāga, On Perception, Being the Pratyakṣapariccheda of Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya* (ed. D.

- H. H. Ingalls). Harvard Oriental Series, Vol. 47. Cambridge, Massachusetts.
- Hiriyanna, M. (1924a) “Bhartṛprapañca: An Old Vedāntin.” *The Indian Antiquary* (IA), Vol. 53, pp. 77–85.
- (1924b) “Fragments of Bhartṛprapañca.” *Proceedings of the All Indian Oriental Conference* (PAIOC) 3, pp. 439–50.
- (1925) “Prapañcavilayavāda—A Doctrine of Pre-Śāṅkara Vedānta.” *The Journal of Oriental Research, Madras* (JORM), Vol. 1, pp. 109–17.
- (1928) “Brahmadatta: An Old Vedāntin.” JORM, Vol. 2, pp. 1–9.
- Iida, S. (1980) *Reason and Emptiness. A Study in Logic and Mysticism*. Tokyo. (*Tattvajñānaiṣanā*).
- Īśa Upaniṣad *Īśāvāsyaopaniṣad*. ASS 5, 1934.
- Jong, J. W. de (1949) *Cinq Chapitres de la Prasannapadā*. Paris.
- (1972) “The Problem of the Absolute in the Madhyamaka School.” *Journal of Indian Philosophy* (JIP), 1972, pp. 1–6.
- Kajiya, Y. (1963) *Bhāvaviveka’s Prajñāpradīpaḥ*. (1. Kapitel). WZKSO 7, pp. 37–62.
- (1966) *An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy. An Annotated Translation of the Tarkabhāṣā of Mokṣākaragupta*. Kyoto.
- (1968/9) “Bhāvaviveka, Sthiramati and Dharmapāla.” WZKSO 12/13, pp. 193–203.
- (1973) “Three Kinds of Affirmation and Two Kinds of Negation in Buddhist Philosophy.” WZKS, Band XVII, pp. 161–75.
- Lang, K. (1986) *Āryadeva’s Catuḥśataka. On the Bodhisattva’s Cultivation of Merit and Knowledge*. Indiske Studier 7, ed. Chr. Lindtner. Copenhagen.
- La Vallée Poussin, L. de (1933) “L’auteur du Joyau dans la Main.” In: *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques* (MCB) 2 (1932–3). Bruxelles, pp. 60–7.
- (1971) *L’Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu*. Nouvelle édition, présentée par Étienne Lamotte. MCB XVI, tome 1–6 (1923–31). Bruxelles.
- Lindtner, Chr. (1981a) “Atisa’s Introduction to the Two Truths, and its Sources.” JIP 9, pp. 161–214
- (1981b) “Buddhapālita on Emptiness.” [Buddhapālita on Emptiness.] *madhyamakavṛtti XVIII.1*. IJ 23, pp. 187–217.

- (1982a) *Adversaria Buddhica*. WZKS, Band XXVI, pp. 167–94.
- (1982b) *Nagarjuniana. Studies in the Writings and Philosophy of Nāgārjuna*. Indiske Studier 4, ed. Chr. Lindtner. Copenhagen. (*Yuktiṣaṣṭika*, pp. 102–19; *Acintyastava*, pp. 140–61, *Bodhicittavivaraṇa*, pp. 184–217).
- (1985) “Remarks on the Gauḍapādīyakārikās (GK).” *IIJ*, Vol. 28, no. 4, pp. 275–9.
- (1986) “Bhavya, the Logician.” Golden Jubilee Volume. *The Adyar Library Bulletin (ALB)*, Vol. 50.
- (1987) “On Bhavya’s Madhyamakaratnapradīpa.” *Indologica Taurinensia* XII, pp. 2–21.
- Lopez, D.S. *A Study of Svātantrika*. Ithaca, New York 1987.
- Madhyamakāvātāra *Madhyamakāvātāra par Candrakīrti. Traduction Tibétaine*. Ed. L. de La Vallée Poussin. St. Pétersbourg 1903–13.
- Madhyāntavibhāga *Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya*. Ed. G. N. Nagao. Suzuki Research Foundation. Tokyo 1964.
- Mahadevan, T.M.P. *Word Index to the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*. 2 parts. Madras. 1971/3.
- Manusmṛti *Mānava Dharma-śāstra. The Code of Manu*. Original Sanskrit Text. Ed. J. Jolly. London 1887.
- May, J. (1959) *Candrakīrti. Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti*. Paris.
- Mayeda, S. (1968/9) “The Advaita Theory of Perception.” WZKSO, Band XII–XIII, pp. 221–39.
- Matilal, B.K. (1971) *Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis*. Paris.
- Mimaki, K. (1980) “Sur le Rôle de l’Antaraśloka ou du Saṃgrahaśloka.” In: *Indianisme et Bouddhisme: Mélanges Offerts à Mgr. Étienne Lamotte*. Louvain-la-Neuve, pp. 233–44.
- (1982) *Blo gsal grub mtha’*. *Chapitres IX (Vaibhāṣika) et XI (Yogācāra) édités et Chapitre XII (Mādhyamika)*. Kyoto.
- Mūlamadhyamakakārikā In: *Chr. Lindtner, Nāgārjunas Filosofiske Værker*. Copenhagen, 1982, pp. 67–215.
- Nakamura, H. (1958) “The Tibetan Text of the Madhyamaka-hṛdayavṛtti Tarkajvālā (Dbu-ma’i sniñ-po’i ’grel-pa rtog-ge ’bar-ba).” *IIJ*, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 181–90.
- (1968/9) “Some Notes on the Sarvadarśanasamgraha.” WZKSO, Band XII–XIII, pp. 241–51.

- (1983) *Nyāyasūtra* *A History of Early Vedānta Philosophy*. Part 1. Delhi. *Die Nyāyasūtras. Text, Übersetzung, Erläuterung und Glossar*. W. Ruben. Leipzig 1928.
- Oetke, C. *“Ich” und das Ich. Analytische Untersuchungen zur buddhistisch-brahmanischen Ātmankontroverse*. Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien 33. Stuttgart 1988.
- Qvarnström, O. (1989) “The Vedāntatattvaviniścaya Chapter of Bhavya’s *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā*.” To appear in WZKS (1989), Band XXXIII.
- Raṅgācārya, M. (1909) *Ratnagotravibhāga* *The Sarva-Siddhānta-Saṅgraha of Śaṅkarācārya*. Madras. *Ratnagotravibhāga*. Ed. E.H. Johnston and T. Chowdhury. Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society 36, 1950.
- Ratnāvalī *Nāgārjuna’s Ratnāvalī*. Indica et Tibetica, Vol. 1. Ed. M. Hahn. Bonn, 1982.
- Ruegg, D.S. (1980) “On the Reception and Early History of the dBu-ma (Madhyamaka) in Tibet.” In: *Tibetan Studies in Honour of Hugh Richardson*, pp. 277–9. Warminster.
- (1981a) *The Literature of the Madhyamaka School in India*. A History of Indian Literature, Vol. 7, Fasc. 1. Ed. J. Gonda. Wiesbaden.
- (1981b) “Autour du lTa ba’i khyad par de Ye śes sde.” *Journal Asiatique* (JA), pp. 207–29.
- (1982) “Toward a Chronology of the Madhyamaka School.” In: *Indological and Buddhist Studies: Volume in Honour of Professor J. W. de Jong on his Sixtieth Birthday*. Ed. L. A. Hercus et al. Canberra Faculty of Asian Studies, pp. 505–30.
- Rüping, K. (1977) *Studien zur Frühgeschichte der Vedānta-Philosophie. Teil 1. Philologische Untersuchungen zum Brahmasūtra-Kommentaren des Śaṅkara und des Bhāskaras*. Wiesbaden. *Sa skya bka’ ’bum*. Vol. 5. Tokyo 1969.
- Sa skya bka’ ’bum *The Book of the Kindred Sayings (Saṃyutta Nikāya)*. Part IV. Pali Text Society (PTS). Translation Series, No. 14. London 1927.
- Saṃyutta Nikāya *Saṃyutta Nikāya*. Part IV. *Salāyatana-Vagga*. PTS. London 1894.
- Sarvadarśanasamgraha *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*. ASS 51, 1977.

- Sastri, N.A. (1931) “*Madhyamakārthasaṅgraha of Bhāvaviveka.” JORM, Vol. 5, pp. 41–9.
- Sphuṭārthāvyākhyā *Abhidharmakośa and Bhāṣya of Ācārya Vasubandhu with the Sphuṭārthā Commentary of Ācārya Yaśomitra.* Ed. D. Śastri. Varanasi. 1970–3.
- Steinkellner, E. (1973) “On the Interpretation of the Svabhāvahetuḥ.” WZKS, Band XVII, pp. 117–29.
- Suali, L. (ed.) (1905) *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya by Haribhadra with Guṇaratnas Commentary Tarkarāhasyadīpikā.* Calcutta.
- Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad.* ASS 17, 1927.
- Sørensen, P.K. (1986) *Candrakīrti's Trisaraṇasaptati. The Septuagint on the Three Refuges.* Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde. Heft 16. Wien.
- Taittirīya Upaniṣad *Taittirīyopaniṣad.* ASS 12, 1977.
- Tattvasaṅgraha *Tattvasaṅgraha.* Ed. Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, with the Commentary “Panjikā” of Kamalaśīla. Varanasi 1968: Bauddha Bharati Series I–II.
- Tucci, G. (1926) “Un Traité d’Āryadeva sur le ‘Nirvāṇa’ des Hérétiques.” Young Pao, Vol. XXIV, pp. 16–31. Leiden.
- Vaidya, P.L. (1960) *Madhyamakāśāstra of Nāgārjuna with the Commentary: Prasannapadā by Candrakīrti.* Dharbanga.
- Vaiśeṣikasūtra *The Vaiśeṣika-System. Described with the Help of the Oldest Texts.* Faddegon, B. Amsterdam 1918.
- Vākyapadīya *Vākyapadīya of Bhartrhari with the Commentary of Helārāja.* Kāṇḍa III. Part 1. Deccan College Monograph Series. Ed. S. Iyer. Poona 1963.
- *Bhartrharis Vākyapadīya.* Ed. W. Rau. Wiesbaden 1977. (Numbering of verses given in parentheses).
- Vetter, T. (1978) “Die Gauḍapādīya Kārikās: Zur Entstehung und zur Bedeutung von (A)dvaita.” WZKS, Band XXII, pp. 95–133.
- Walleser, M. (1910) *Der Ältere Vedānta. Geschichte, Kritik und Lehre.* Heidelberg.
- Wezler, A. (1974) “Some Observations on the Yuktīdīpikā.” ZDMG, Supplement II, pp. 434–55.
- Yamaguchi, S. *Index to the Prasannapadā Madhyamaka-vṛtti, I–II.* Kyoto 1974.
- Yogasūtra *Pātañjalayogasūtrāṇi.* ASS 47, 1904.