

Zwei deutsche Veröffentlichungen über den Shingon-Buddhismus

Yamasaki, Taikō, *Shingon: Der esoterische Buddhismus in Japan*.

Herausgegeben von Yasuyoshi Morimoto und David Kidd, Einführung zur deutschen Ausgabe von Advayavajra. Aus dem Amerikanischen übersetzt von Sylvia Wetzel. Zürich und München: Theseus Verlag, 1990. XVIII + 260 Seiten, mehrere Tafeln und Abbildungen, davon 2 in Farbe.

Kōbō Daishi Kūkai, *Ausgewählte Schriften: Sokushin-jōbutsu-gi, Shō-ji-jissō-gi, Unji-gi, Hannya-shingyō-hiken*. Übersetzt und kommentiert von M. Eihō Kawahara und C. Yūhō Jobst. München: iudicium verlag, 1992. 153 Seiten, 4 farbige Tafeln, 5 Zeichnungen.

Für den deutschen Leser, der sich mit dem esoterischen Buddhismus Japans bekannt machen möchte, ist die vorhandene Literatur noch spärlicher als die englischsprachige. Aus diesem Grunde allein ist das Erscheinen von zwei sogar sehr schön ausgestatteten Büchern zum Thema Shingon-Buddhismus sehr zu begrüßen. Das erste hier zu besprechende Werk ist eine Übersetzung des 1988 im Verlag Shambala (Boston und London) erschienenen *Shingon: Japanese Esoteric Buddhism*. Dies wiederum ist eine Kollation in englischer Sprache von zwei ursprünglich auf Japanisch verfaßten Werken, *Mikkyō meisō-hō* [Meditationsübungen des esoterischen Buddhismus] (Kyoto: Nagata Bunshodō, 1974) sowie *Mikkyō meisō to shinō-shinri* [Meditationsübungen des esoterischen Buddhismus und die Tiefenpsychologie] (Kyoto: Sōgensha, 1981). (Hier sollte nebenbei bemerkt werden, daß sich sowohl David Kidd als auch sein deutscher Übersetzer hier kleine Freiheiten bei der Übersetzung dieser Titel erlauben, obwohl die deutsche Fassung – im Gegensatz zur englischen – den Titel des zweiten Buches richtig angibt.) Ein Unterschied, der bei diesen formellen Fragen besonders auffällt, ist, daß die englische Fassung von Richard und Cynthia Peterson vorbereitet war, wohingegen man bei der deutschen Fassung vergebens nach diesen Namen sucht. Dies ist äußerst bedauerlich, da das Ehepaar Peterson tatsächlich den größten Teil der Arbeit geleistet hat, die für das vorliegende Buch notwendig war. Ihre Arbeit bestand nicht nur im bloßen Übersetzen, sondern auch darin, den Inhalt der zwei von Yamasaki für ein japanisches Publikum verfaßten Bücher für ein englischsprachiges Publikum, das sich natürlich aufgrund ganz anderer Voraussetzungen und Erwartungen über ein solches Thema informieren lassen will, zusammenzutragen. Man hofft, daß die Verfasser diesen Umstand in eventuellen späteren Auflagen dieses Buches berücksichtigen werden, besonders weil auf diese Unzulänglichkeit schon

hingewiesen worden ist.¹

Die englische Fassung ist schon dafür kritisiert worden, daß sie die interne Sektengeschichte des Shingon einfach weitergibt, ohne sich kritisch mit deren Voraussetzungen auseinanderzusetzen. Daß die deutsche Fassung diese Unzulänglichkeit einfach weitervermittelt, wird schon in der “Einführung zur deutschen Ausgabe” deutlich (S. XV f). Nachdem der Verfasser des Vorworts Advayavajra mit Recht auf die unberechtigte Vernachlässigung des esoterischen Buddhismus in Ostasien hinweist, beschreibt er die Zhenyan-Sekte als “eine Schule, die allerdings nur eine kurze Blütezeit hatte”. Er fährt fort mit der folgenden unlogischen und auch inhaltlich falschen Aussage: “Denn schon bald nach dem Tode des letzten indischen [*sic*] *Guru Amoghavajra* (705–774) erlosch es [*sic*] in China. Zuvor jedoch hatte der letzte chinesische Meister *Hui-kuo*, der ein direkter Schüler *Amoghavajras* war, den japanischen Mönch *Kūkai* initiiert und nach wenigen Monaten der Schülerschaft bereits zur Nachfolge ermächtigt” (S. XVI). Ganz abgesehen von der Tatsache, daß *Kūkai* erst 774 geboren wurde und daß die Begegnung mit *Huiguo* wohl 805 stattfand, zu welcher Zeit die Zhenyan-Sekte noch gedieh, gibt diese Aussage die hagiographischen Materialien wieder, die einen wesentlichen Bestandteil der religiösen Vorstellungen des Shingon-Buddhismus ausmachen. Der historische Wert dieser Materialien ist in den letzten zehn bis zwanzig Jahren sowohl von japanischen als auch von westlichen Gelehrten in Frage gestellt worden. *Yamasaki* ist ganz eindeutig eine Art Missionar für seine Religion, was natürlich nicht anzufechten ist. Das Problem mit dem vorliegenden Buch besteht aber darin, daß nicht deutlich gemacht wird, welche Teile als Missionsarbeit zu verstehen sind und welche als wissenschaftliche Aussagen. Einer der Gründe ist wohl der, daß keiner der Beteiligten über die Fähigkeiten verfügt, die für ein solches Unternehmen notwendig sind – Kenntnis der chinesischen und japanischen Primär- und Sekundärquellen und die dazu erforderlichen Sprachkenntnisse, sowie Grundkenntnisse des Sanskrit. Während es zu begrüßen ist, daß sich jemand diese Mühe gegeben hat, und während es nicht zu leugnen ist, daß das vorliegende Buch wertvolles Wissen über den Shingon-Buddhismus darbietet, ist es doch irgendwie frustrierend, daß eine umfassende Studie des Shingon-Buddhismus in einer westlichen Sprache immer noch ausbleibt.

Die Aufgliederung des Buches folgt im großen und ganzen der amerikanischen Ausgabe: in acht Kapiteln werden die Grundzüge des Shingon-Buddhismus, dessen Geschichte, Lehren und Ritualwesen dargestellt. Im ersten Kapitel werden dem Leser die indischen Ursprünge sowie die geschichtliche Entwicklung dieser Form des Buddhismus in China vorgestellt.

¹ “The Preface by the ‘Editors’ had better be omitted in a second ed., and replaced by a Preface in which the translators explain what the book is and what it is not, their method of translation and adaptation, which writings of *Yamasaki* they used, and their use of extra sources” (R. J. Z. Werblowsky, “Book Survey”, *Numen*, Bd. XXVII, Fasc. 1 (June 1990), S. 125.

Wie schon angedeutet, ist dieser Teil nur von Nutzen, wenn man die orthodoxe Geschichte des Shingon wissen möchte. Die Anmerkungen sind etwas dürftig, eine Kritik, die im allgemeinen zutrifft. Ein Hinweis, der lediglich aus der japanischen Aussprache des manchmal sogar abgekürzten chinesischen Titels eines *sūtra* besteht, nützt keinem etwas. Das zweite Kapitel setzt den geschichtlichen Teil des Buches fort, indem es den geschichtlichen Hintergrund des Shingon in Japan beschreibt. Obwohl dieser Teil auch die Shingon-Orthodoxie wiedergibt, enthält er doch nützliche Informationen zur Entwicklung des Shingon in Japan. Wichtige Hinweise auf die Bedeutung des Shingon unter anderen Gesellschaftsschichten als dem Hofadel bekommt der Leser im letzten Abschnitt dieses Kapitels, „Bergverehrung, Wallfahrten und Volksglaube“ (S. 51–57), wo unter anderem die Bedeutung von allgemeinen religiösen Vorstellungen und Gebräuchen der Japaner behandelt wird. Religionswissenschaftlich und -geschichtlich ist dieses Thema eins der interessantesten und potentiell ergiebigsten auf diesem Fachgebiet und verdient eigentlich eine eigene Monographie.

Die esoterischen Lehren des *mikkyō* bilden die Grundlage des nächsten, dritten Kapitels. Hier wird Grundsätzliches über die Hauptmerkmale des Shingon-Buddhismus gesagt, unter anderem Dainichi-nyorai (d.h. Mahaāvairocana-tathāgata) und die sechs Elemente, die die Grundlage der Shingon-Auffassung des Kosmos ausmachen. Die wichtigsten *sūtra* im Shingon-Buddhismus (das *Rishukyō*, das *Dainichi-kyō* und das *Kongōchō-kyō*) werden auch kurz dargestellt. Das vierte Kapitel ist ein wenig verwirrend, indem es den Titel „Die zehn Ebenen des Geistes“ trägt, aber dem Leser Darstellungen der Yogācāra-Lehre von zehn Bewußtseinsstufen (*sic*) und der zehn Ebenen des Geistes, so wie sie in Kūkais zehnfache, teils polemische Aufgliederung der möglichen religiösen Typen des Menschen zu finden sind, anbietet. Diese dürfen aber nicht miteinander verwechselt werden (S. 100). Das Kapitel enthält auch eine Auslegung vom Verständnis der drei *kalpa* im *mikkyō*, nämlich als drei Schichten der Verblendung (S. 103–5), und wird abgeschlossen mit ähnlich kurzen Exkursen über *samādhi*-Stufen und über *prajñā* und *upāya* (S. 105–9, 109–11).

In Kapitel Fünf geht der Verfasser zu den Aspekten der Shingon-Theorie über, die eine mehr unmittelbare rituelle Bedeutung haben, nämlich die Handlungen von Körper, Rede und Geist. Kapitel Sechs, „Das dynamische Mandala“ (S. 131–63), beschreibt die Grundzüge der *maṇḍala* im esoterischen Buddhismus. In den zwei abschließenden Kapiteln stellt der Verfasser die Eigenart der wichtigsten Formen von Meditation, Kontemplation und Ritual dar, die im Shingon-Buddhismus aufzufinden sind. Wohl aufgrund der praktischen, rituellen Fähigkeiten des Verfassers, die den eigentlichen Grund für das Ansehen ausmachen, das er in Japan genießt, sind diese Kapitel ohne Zweifel die besten Teile des Buches. Der Leser bekommt hier einen kurzen, aber interessanten und hilfreichen Einblick in die Vielfalt und Eigenart der shingonbuddhistischen Praxis.

Die Anmerkungen sind, wie schon erwähnt, von begrenztem Nutzen, was ein merkwürdiges Paradox darstellt: Wenn man voraussetzt, daß der Leser mit japanischen und chinesischen Quellen vertraut ist, indem man auf solche Materialien hinweist, sollten die Hinweise auch vollständig sein. Es ist auch merkwürdig, festzustellen, daß Hinweise auf Primärquellen manchmal älteren Sekundärquellen entnommen sind. Dies ist zum Beispiel der Fall in Anm. 2, S. 238, wo Kūkais *Benkenmitsu nikyō-ron* aufgrund eines Hinweises in Toganoo Shōuns Einführung in den Shingon-Buddhismus (*Shingon-shū tokuhon*, Kōyasan, 1948) zitiert wird. Diese Anmerkung mag wohl eine unbedeutende Ungenauigkeit sein, sie ist aber doch bloß ein Beispiel für die vielen Ungenauigkeiten in diesem Buch: die amerikanische Ausgabe lautet, “Wakayama: Kōyasan, 1948” (S. 221). In der Tat heißt der Ort Kōyasan und befindet sich in der Wakayama-Präfektur (jap. *ken*); der Verlag ist der Verlag der dortigen Universität, Kōyasan Daigaku Shuppansha. In der deutschen Version steht “Wakayma [*sic*], Kōyasan, 1948”. Andere Ungenauigkeiten sind nicht so unbedeutend, zum Beispiel der etwas unkonsequente Umgang mit diakritischen Zeichen. Ich bin der Auffassung, daß man sie entweder richtig setzen oder, wenn es zum Beispiel aus technischen Gründen nicht möglich ist, sie wiederzugeben, ganz weglassen sollte. Wenn man auf Seite XVI den (merkwürdigerweise kursiv gesetzten) Namen Śubhākarasimha [*sic*], die Fachausdrücke *Maṇḍalas* und *Dhāraṇīs*, sowie *Vajrayāna* und *Mahāvairocana* liest, wo nur “Mahayana” im Inhaltsverzeichnis steht, kann es einem um den Laien (oder noch schlimmer, Studenten in den ersten Semestern) nur leid tun—wie soli er einem solchen Buch die richtigen Formen entnehmen? Das Ganze deutet auf die unglückliche Tatsache hin, daß das Buch von Anfang an (sprich: die von Kidd und Morimoto herausgegebene amerikanische Ausgabe) nicht von Sachkundigen durchgesehen wurde, und daß wegen dieses Umstandes das Pünktchen übers *i* der harten Arbeit der Übersetzer (sowohl der amerikanischen als auch der deutschen Fassung) nicht gesetzt wurde. Dies ist auch schade, da sich der Verlag Mühe gegeben hat, das Buch schön zu gestalten, so daß die ästhetischen Aspekte des Shingon-Buddhismus unter anderem durch die hervorragenden Farbtafeln doch zum Vorschein kommen.

Während *Shingon: Der esoterische Buddhismus in Japan* eine allgemeine Darstellung des Shingon-Buddhismus anbietet, ist das zweite hier zu besprechende Buch eher konkreteren Charakters. Es besteht aus deutschen Übersetzungen von vier zentralen Werken Kūkais mit ausführlichen Anmerkungen. Im Gegensatz zum eben besprochenen Buch trägt diese Arbeit die Prägung Fachkundiger, die sich jahrelang mit den Quellenmaterialien beschäftigt haben. Die Übersetzer, Kollegen an der Waseda-Universität in Tokyo, sind jeweils Vertreter der eigenen Kultur, die eine Ausbildung in der Kultur des anderen vollzogen haben: Kawahara ist Japaner mit westlicher Philosophie als Forschungsgebiet, Jobst ist Deutscher mit einer abge-

schlossenen Ausbildung als Shingon-Priester.

Obwohl sich die Verfasser mit den geschichtlichen Problemen des Shingon-Buddhismus nicht auseinandersetzen und die schon erwähnten orthodoxen Aussagen dazu größtenteils wiedergeben (vgl. etwa S. 13), sind solche Fragen nicht Sinn und Zweck ihrer Bemühungen. Diese gelten eher der Frage, „Mit welcher Begründung nennen *Kōbō Daishi Kūkai* und seine Anhänger die von ihm gegründete *Shingon*-Richtung des japanischen Buddhismus geheim oder esoterisch?“ (S. 14). Da diese Bemühungen zum größten Teil gelungen sind, hofft man schon darauf, daß die an gleicher Stelle geäußerte Absicht der Verfasser, weitere Werke von Kūkai einem deutschsprachigen Publikum vorzulegen, in Erfüllung geht.

Die Auswahl der vier Werke, die den Kern dieser Veröffentlichung ausmachen, wird wohl keiner bestreiten. Zusammen geben sie sowohl dem Laien als auch dem mit dem Buddhismus oder ostasiatischen Religionen Vertrauten einen umfassenden Einblick in das Denken Kūkais, das wiederum für die Weiterentwicklung des esoterischen Buddhismus in Japan von grundlegender Bedeutung ist. Als „unabdingbare Hilfe“ für die „ersten Gehversuche im Übersetzen“ nennen die Übersetzer das schon 1972 vom leider frühzeitig verstorbenen Yoshito S. Hakeda verfaßte Buch, *Kūkai: Major Works* (bei Columbia University Press erschienen; vgl. S. 12). Diese vorsichtige Formulierung ist angebracht, da Hakedas Übersetzungen oft einer näheren Untersuchung nicht standhalten können, obwohl sein Buch trotz allem den meisten westlichen Forschern auf dem Gebiet als unentbehrliches Hilfsmittel gedient hat. Die deutschen Übersetzer bleiben dem Originaltext treuer, was zu dem einleuchtenden Paradox führt, daß Studenten am Anfang Ihres Studiums die englische Fassung von Hakeda als die leichtere Lektüre bevorzugen! Schade ist aber, daß die Übersetzer offensichtlich Inagaki Hisaos englische Übersetzung des *Sokushin-jōbutsu-gi* nicht kennen, denn diese stellt der Fassung von Hakeda gegenüber eine wesentliche Verbesserung dar.²

Der komprimierte Stil Kūkais und die semantische Bandbreite der Fachausdrücke des esoterischen Quellenstoffes machen die Aufgabe des Übersetzers so gut wie unmöglich. Daher ist man immer froh, wenn seine Bemühungen überhaupt etwas Verständliches geben. Ein Vorteil besteht jedoch auch darin, daß eine im Grunde genommen geglückte Übersetzung wie die vorliegende selbst zu einem Ausgangspunkt für ergiebige Diskussionen und Meditationen über den vorhandenen Stoff werden kann. Wenn ich mich im folgenden also mit einzelnen Punkten auseinandersetze, soll der Leser meine Kritik im eben geschilderten Sinne verstehen. Als erster Punkt möchte ich auf eine Neigung der Übersetzer hinweisen, eine Abstrahierung der vorhandenen Begriffe vorzunehmen, die meines Erachtens im Originalen

² H. Inagaki, *Principle of Attaining Buddhahood with the Present Body*, Kyoto: Ryukoku Daigaku, 1975.

nicht vorhanden ist. Dies geschieht manchmal bei dem von den Übersetzern ausdrücklich hinzugefügtem Stoff (der in Klammern gesetzt wird; vgl. Editorische Notiz, Nr. 2, S. 152). Dies ist an und für sich eine durchaus legitime Arbeitsweise, führt jedoch an einigen Stellen zu Übersetzungen, die nicht berechtigt sind.³

Als Beispiele möchte ich folgende Stellen in der Übersetzung heranziehen: zum Eigennamen Mahāvairocana wird im Text *Sokushin-jōbutsu-gi* von den Übersetzern die Glosse “Urgrund alles Seins” hinzugefügt (S. 27), was sich keineswegs unmittelbar aus dem Sanskrit oder dem Chinesischen ableiten läßt. Da dies aber ausdrücklich als Ergänzung der Übersetzung vermerkt ist, kann der Leser, der das Original nicht vor sich hat, seine eigene Meinung dazu bilden. Gefährlicher wird es, wenn die dritte Zeile des bekannten Preisliedes mit “Entsprechen sich der Mysterien drei, // Erscheint sogleich die Urnatur” (S. 21) übersetzt wird. An dieser Stelle darf Kūkais Text in vier Bestandteile analysiert werden: *sanmitsu*, “die drei Mysterien” (sprich: die esoterische, rituelle Ausübung von *mudrā* (zu Körper), *mantra* (zu Rede) und *samādhi* (zu Geist)); *kaji*, ein schwieriger Begriff (skt. *adhiṣṭhāna*), der sich auf die gegenseitige Beeinflussung von Buddha und Mensch bezieht; *sokushitsu*, das ganz einfach “schnell bzw. plötzlich” bedeutet; und gen [*ara-wareru*], nämlich “manifestieren”, “zum Vorschein kommen” oder “verwirklichen”. Das, was verwirklicht wird, ist natürlich die Erleuchtung des Erhabenen. In diesem Sinne wird mit der Verwendung des Wortes “Urnatur” Kūkais Text ein Aspekt hinzugefügt, der eine deutliche Interpretierung seitens der Übersetzer darstellt. Ähnlich ist es der Fall bei der Wiedergabe von *shin* (wörtl. “Körper”, wie im Titel von Kūkais Schrift selbst). Da *shin* sowohl “Körper” als auch “Leben, Existenz” bedeuten kann (diese Zweideutigkeit ist sogar Teil des Reichtums des Begriffes), läßt man diese Zweideutigkeit öfters besser zum Ausdruck kommen, wenn man mit “Körper” übersetzt, gerade weil man beim Leser so keine Nebenbedeutungen abstrahierter Art entstehen läßt. Ein klares Beispiel hierfür kommt gegen Ende des dritten Abschnittes vom *Sokushin-jōbutsu-gi* vor (vgl. S.28).

Ein weiteres Beispiel für diese Neigung zum Abstrahieren ist auch bei

³ Als Grundlage der folgenden Bemerkungen dient die von Nakagawa Zenkyō herausgegebene *Jikkanjō* (Kōyasan: Kōyasan Shuppansha, 1975), eine der am meisten verwendeten Ausgaben dieser grundlegenden Shingon-Texte (ich weise hier auch an die neue kritische Ausgabe der Werke Kūkais hin, die ich anderswo in dieser Nummer von SCEAR besprochen habe). Die *Jikkanjō* (verschiedene Aussprachen sind möglich!) besteht aus zehn Rollen (*jikkan*), die die wichtigsten sechs Werken Kūkais enthalten, nämlich *Sokushin-jōbutsu-gi*, *Shōji-jissō-gi*, *Unji-gi* (den drei ersten der im vorliegenden Buch übersetzten Werke), *Benkenmitsu-nikyō-ron* (in zwei Rollen), *Hizō-hōyaku* (in drei Rollen), *Hannya-shingyō-hiken* (dem vierten im vorliegenden Band übersetzten Werk), samt der *Bodaishin-ron*. Hier darf bemerkt werden, daß für den Spezialisten eine Schwäche dieses Buches darin besteht, daß die Übersetzer keine textkritischen Hinweise geben. Während das Buch vorerst an den allgemeinen Leser gerichtet ist, hätten sich die Übersetzer recht wenig Mühe geben müssen, um die von ihnen benutzte Originalausgabe (bzw. die benutzten Ausgaben, zu nennen).

der Übersetzung von *issai-shohō* festzustellen. Als im chinesischen Kanon direkte Übersetzung des Sanskrit *sarvadharmāḥ* ist dieser Begriff fast immer als “alle Gegebenheiten” zu übersetzen, also einfach ausgedrückt “alle Dinge”. Der von den Übersetzern bevorzugte Ausdruck “alle Gesetzmäßigkeit”, der öfters vorkommt, stellt meiner Meinung nach eine Abhebung dar, die dem Sinn des Textes eine unangemessene Drehung gibt. Ein Kernpunkt in Kūkais Denken — wie auch in vielen Phasen des buddhistischen Denkens überhaupt — besteht in der Behauptung, die einzelnen Erscheinungen der Welt seien Schlüssel zum Geheimnis der Erleuchtung selbst. Daher halte ich es für wichtig, dies auch bei der Übersetzung von *issai-shohō* zum Ausdruck kommen zu lassen.

Jeder Kenner dieser Texte weiß, daß über die Bedeutung von fast jedem Satz gestritten werden könnte. Trotz der obigen Kritik einzelner Punkte darf der Leser nicht den Eindruck gewinnen, die erheblichen Bemühungen der beiden Herren wären umsonst — ganz im Gegenteil. Dadurch, daß sie sich im Gegensatz zu Hakeda im großen und ganzen sehr nahe am Original halten, ist es für den Spezialisten relativ einfach, sich im Text zu orientieren. Regelrechte Fehler gibt es recht wenige, und die Stellen, wo die Übersetzer ihre eigenen Auslegungen hinzufügen, sind meistens deutlich als solche erkennbar und folgen einer konsequenten Herangehensweise. Das Fazit dürfte also lauten: für den allgemeinen Leser eine schwierige Lektüre, die durch die angemessene Annotierung den Zugang zu den Werken Kūkais ermöglicht; für den Spezialisten eine äußerst willkommene Unterstützung in der Auseinandersetzung mit einem der bedeutendsten Denker der japanischen Geistesgeschichte.

Zum Abschluß darf ich erwähnen, daß der Schutzumschlag an sich eine Einführung in den Shingon-Buddhismus ist: rechts oben die einem angeblich 813 verfaßten Brief entnommene Unterschrift Kūkais — er gilt ja immer noch als einer der größten Kalligraphen seines Landes — ; der Hintergrund eine Photographie der Mieidō auf Kōyasan im Abendlicht. Da riecht man sogar den Weihrauch.

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Tominaga Nakamoto, *Emerging from Meditation*. Translated with an introduction by Michael Pye. London: Duckworth, 1990. pp. ix + 214. Hardback. £29–95.

The present work is primarily to be welcomed for its having brought the thinking of a generally neglected participant in the discourse of the middle to late Tokugawa Period to the attention of a Western public, and that in a manner which immediately places Tominaga’s contribution in a much broader framework than merely the historical and geographical limitations

of his own lifetime. Pye's main interest in presenting *Emerging from Meditation* to his readership is to unsettle what he perceives as an implicit assumption in Western academic circles, namely that the methods and results of the rational, historical critique of religion are very much a consequence of the European Enlightenment, and hence "so culture-bound that they are of limited application only" (p. 46). Pye shows that Tominaga (1715–46) developed similar ideas around the same time, but without any significant contact with the culture of his Western counterparts. He is shown to have been a *Japanese* thinker through and through. Pye devotes a subsection of his forty-seven page introduction ("The distant west", pp. 24–30) to convincing refutations of possible claims of Western influence on Tominaga's intellectual development, showing that the latter developed his critical ideas on the religious traditions which constitute a major part of the East Asian view of man and the world, independently of those factors which brought about the European Enlightenment. The major virtue of Pye's contribution lies in drawing attention to this, and should not be forgotten, even when one takes issue with points of detail in his offering.

The book consists in fact not only of Pye's translation of Tominaga's *Shutsu-jō-kōgo* and the relevant apparatus (Introduction, Note on editions used, Conventions, Bibliography, Index of writings, Index of characters for names of writings, Index of other names), but also of a full translation (with prefaces) of the same writer's *Okina no fumi* under the title, *Writings of an Old Man*. This latter work will be known not only from the contribution by Kato Shuichi in *Monumenta Nipponica* (Vol. XXII/1–2 (Jan. 1967), pp. 1–35), but also from the more familiar, partial translation presented as long ago as 1958 in the indispensable volume in Columbia University's Introduction to Oriental Civilizations Series, *Sources of Japanese Tradition* (Vol. I, ed. R. Tsunoda *et al.*), pp. 474–79). Whilst Pye draws critical attention to minor details in the selection for this early anthology, he rightly praises the editorial team for including Tominaga in the collection and for presenting a useful translation of important passages (*viz.* sections I, VI, VIII, XII, XV, XVI). As with the main work in the book under review, Pye has also supplied useful background material on *Writings of an Old Man* and ample notes to his translation.

To return first to the introductory material: apart from the aforementioned points in the Introduction, the first forty-seven pages of the book contain a variety of information and argument. After a preliminary portrayal of Tominaga's critique of religious tradition, Pye sets out the main points of what is known about his subject's short life (pp. 7–13). Pye names three factors in Tominaga's life, which will not be disputed: firstly, that he was born into an Osaka merchant's family, a fact that gave him a certain social freedom and allowed him to devote his attention to his critical concerns and his writing. (Pye also seems fascinated with the soy sauce industry and uses this as a lever for a number of occasionally illuminating witticisms.) Secondly, there

is his training (from the tender age of nine, let it be noted!) in a Confucian school; and thirdly, his having acquired a knowledge of Buddhist sources without, however, having adopted the apologetic concerns of any particular school or sect. Tominaga is also placed, with suitable brevity, in his intellectual (pp. 13–18) and social (pp. 18–24) contexts, before Pye makes the already mentioned plea for the independence of Tominaga’s ideas from western influence. The Introduction is concluded with two further sections, in which Pye sets out several features of the Asian perspective which Tominaga represents (pp. 30–8), discusses his influence, and draws out the implications of his thought for Religious Studies as a global discipline (pp. 38–47), pointing out distinctive features (notably *kajō*, “superseding”) as well as the similarities which make comparison possible and fruitful.

I turn now to the body of the book, the translations themselves. *Writings of an Old Man* is, given the concerns of the translator, a sensible complement to Tominaga’s main work. Since it does, however, only play what may be described as an ancillary role I shall restrict myself here to a mainly descriptive treatment of this short writing. Pye includes three prefaces in addition to Tominaga’s own, one by a Layman Zenki, sandwiched between two by a certain Hayashi. *Writings of an Old Man* itself consists of sixteen sections, which along with Pye’s footnotes (which occupy a quarter to a third of the space, a healthy proportion) run to eighteen of Mr. Duckworth’s pleasantly sized pages. In these sections Tominaga’s style and method come clearly to the fore, in some cases (precisely because of the brevity in contrast to the main writing) even more strongly than in *Emerging from Meditation*. None of the major traditions with which Tominaga deals escapes the censure of his relativistic stance, as this typical quotation from section 7 indicates: “Now this way of truth did not originally come from India. Nor has it been handed on from China. Nor was it something originating in the age of the gods, to be learned in the world of today. It did not come down from heaven, nor rise up from the earth. It only concerns the people of today” (p. 59). And, being particularly interested in esoteric traditions myself, I enjoyed the final, sixteenth, section, too: “As to the propensity of Shintō, it is mysteriousness, esotericism and secret transmission, the bad habit of simply concealing things. Concealing everything is the root of lying and stealing, so that while magic is interesting to see and high-flown language is pleasant to hear, and therefore more or less forgivable, just this habit of concealment is very much worse” (p. 70).

We come now to the main part of the book under review, Pye’s annotated translation of *Emerging from Meditation and then Speaking (Shutsujō-kōgo)*. (This title is generally abbreviated in this book as “Emerging from Meditation”, on the basis of Tominaga’s own abbreviation in section 10 of the previous writing (cf. p. 64).) This translation of the title is obviously superior to that suggested in the above mentioned *Sources of Japanese Tradition*, where the work is referred to as *Historical Survey of Buddhism* (to be rejected, as

Pye points out, not only because it has nothing to do with the actual title, but also because it misrepresents Tominaga's purpose). The title itself is explained by Tominaga towards the end of Chapter 18 (p. 147; pp. 127f of the *Taikei* edition), when he refers to the Buddha's preaching the Middle Way, then entering meditation (*nyūjō*, where *jō* refers traditionally to the Skt. *samādhi*). On emerging from this state of absorption, the Buddha responds to the various questions of his followers by stating that if the correct principle (*shōri*) is present then the outer manifestations of one's understanding are secondary. Hence Pye's footnote to Tominaga's statement that "both [emptiness and existence] are reasonable and do not impede the Buddha's intention" (p. 147), to the effect that being critical is not necessarily destructive of religion (n. 134). I would take issue here with the translation of *ri* as "reasonable": it seems to me a little on the weak side for an idea which is obviously intended to be a facet of the "way of truth" (a pat on the back for the translator here for resisting the temptation to use capitals), a central concept in Tominaga's thinking, although it does fit in with the rational bent of the whole work.

Personally I would have opted for a translation of the title that might bring out more immediately the causal, and not merely temporal, connection between emerging from one's meditations and one's consequent pronouncements, and of course the didactic value of these pronouncements. (One might, by way of example, remember in this connection that the *Analects* of Confucius and what are commonly referred to in English language materials as the "Dharma-talks" of Chan and Zen masters, are also designated with the character *hua/go/[koto]*, a point which will not have escaped the highly erudite Tominaga.) Without wishing to make even a tentative plea for verbosity, something on the lines of, "Words subsequent to emerging from meditation" would also be a possible rendering, but the full significance of the title does not become clear until one has digested the quoted passage anyway.

Emerging from Meditation consists of twenty-five sections (Pye terms these "Chapters" in referring to them, but I fear that this term is perhaps too grand; also, the original has merely ordinal numbering of the sections), split more or less evenly across two scrolls. Tominaga deals quite forcefully with the inconsistencies to be found in Buddhist materials of varying antiquity, applying his talents to the arising of Buddhism, the differences in the contents of the various *sūtra*, Mount Sumeru, supernatural abilities, major Buddhist schools such as Yogācāra, Madhyamaka, Zen and Shingon, dogmas and doctrinal differences, and so on. Whilst not the first to attempt to come to terms with the haphazard materials which mark East Asian Buddhism—the *panjiao* systems first arose over a millenium before Tominaga's lifetime, for example—he was arguably the first to attempt to come to terms with them in a manner recognizable to critical methods familiar to the modern western world. Since a description of the contents or extended quoting would be in-

appropriate here, I shall simply recommend the reader to sample the work for himself, not least since Pye's translation reads well in its own right. At the risk of seeming a Grumpy Old Reviewer, I shall restrict myself here to a few suggestions for discussion or improvement.

T. H. Barrett, of the University of London, has published a short article in the current issue of the *Journal of the Asiatic Society*, occasioned by reading Pye's offering, in which he warns (as, in fact, does Pye) against over-reliance on Japanese paraphrases such as the *Taikei* edition, and makes a forcible plea for restoring Chinese names to their Chinese forms, rather than the Japanese forms commonly adopted by Pye. This latter criticism was also made in the July 1992 issue of *Philosophy East and West* by Michiko Yusa, of Western Washington University (Vol. 42/3, pp. 532–6). I must say, even taking Pye's apology into consideration (Conventions, pp. 188f), that I would tend to *go* along with these criticisms, at least part of the way. Whilst Pye has served the reader well in restoring those Sanskrit titles which appear in quite incomprehensible Sino-Japanese transliteration, and whilst one can see the case for a Japanese pronunciation of a Buddhist work when it has been part of the Japanese tradition for centuries, I think I would dig my heels in when it comes to the names of Chinese figures and figures in the Indian scriptures, at least. After all, the characters used for these Chinese and Indian names are not common in Japanese and thus have something of an exotic flavour for the Japanese reader. In that sense, I would suggest that giving the Chinese names in a recognized romanized form (preferably Pinyin), and reconstructing the Indian protagonists in Buddhist Holy Writ would in fact contribute to the atmosphere intended by Tominaga himself. A revised edition might also help the specialist by giving the original titles of the scriptures quoted, along with references and English titles where these have become agreed through usage (e.g. *The Lotus Sūtra*), or English translations of the titles. I am sure that this would contribute to the readability of the text and the usefulness of the book as a study tool.

Indeed, Pye, as pointed out by Yusa in her review (p. 535), has not been wholly consistent in this respect. There are a few similar instances which one might cite in addition to Yusa's, but two will suffice as illustration: firstly, the heading for Chapter 5 runs, "Tripiṭaka, Abhidharma, Sūtras, Verses", where Tominaga transliterates the Sanskrit terms, with the exception of the first (*sanzō*, the Sino-Japanese translation). The final term should properly also be dealt with thus, and given as "Gāthās". Secondly, on p. 154 Tominaga mentions the Central Asian scholar-monk Amoghavajra in two places, firstly as "Fu Kū" (which in any case should appear as one word, being as it is a translation of *amogha*), then lower down the page as Amoghavajra, even though the text has *Fukū* in both instances.

Before discussing some points of translation, I would also like to indicate, additional to Yusa's already mentioned corrections, some misprints and omissions that slipped past the proofreader. "Dīpaṅkara" (p. 61) should

read “Dīpaṅkara”; “Buddha-Darma” (p. 62) is an obvious oversight, as is “*dhāraṇī*” for “*dhāraṇī*” on p. 153, since it is set correctly elsewhere. (I also spotted inconsistencies in setting the *anusvāra*, sometimes as *m*, sometimes as *ṃ*, but now that I need them I cannot locate them.) Finally, in the nit-picking department, the Bibliography (pp. 190–3) needs another stroke of the comb: a well known Hanseatic city appears twice as “Hamburg” and twice as “Hamberg” (s.v. Fischer, Forke); Allan Grapard’s given name is misspelt here (and also on p. 46, n. 79); “Chih-I (538–597)” is the main element of the title of the late Leon Hurvitz’ study and should be italicized; under Lamotte, I would hyphenate “*Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*” at “*nir|deśa*” (and, incidentally, “Buddha” at “Bud|dha”, *passim*); under the entry for Mizuta, read “Nihon Shisō Taikei 43”; the date of the Ontario conference of the IAHR is given as 1893 (s.v. The Secretary General of same!); Tsukamoto’s given name has a long *u*: “Zenryū”; finally, read “*Sources of Japanese Tradition*” (s.v. Tsunoda) and “*Kindai no bukkyōsha*” (s.v. Wakimoto).

I shall conclude with a brief discussion of a few points where one might take issue with Pye’s translation. (One should of course be careful where one places one’s neck in dealing with a text as dense as this, since without the suggestions supplied by the editors of the modern Japanese editions, one is very often completely in the dark as to, for example, where a sentence is to be broken, or whether a given term is an abbreviation or a term in its own right—this, despite the otherwise fully justified criticisms of what Barrett, *op. cit.*, refers to *inter alia* as “*Taikei* paraphrases” and the like.) The translations given for the planes of meditative absorption on p. 62 could, for example, be amended or annotated (always the translator’s lifeline!) with profit. “[The] teaching of ‘nor non-conception’” refers to the highest level (apart from the attainment of *nirvāṇa*) of meditative achievement in Buddhism’s inner map (Skt. *naivasamjñānāsamjñā*), for which reason the term “conception”, suggesting as it does mental processes of a grosser nature, is perhaps a little weak. “Perception” or “cognition” would be more accurate, even though they too have been claimed by various translators for various tasks. “Self-abiding heaven” is a defensible translation of *jizai-ten*, but a fuller discussion of this term (Skt. *paranirmitavaśavartindeva*) in the footnote would have made the matter clearer. (I have attempted a description of this heaven in my translation of *The Rishukyō*, Tring 1991, pp. 56–63, to which I would refer the reader.)

“Sūtra Dharma Store” (p. 76) is accurate and literal as far as it goes, but “Sūtra-*Ṣṭaka*”, or a footnote to this effect, would be more immediately accessible—the *āgamas* do after all constitute the first of the three *piṭaka* of the Buddhist Canon. In the same vein, I would Sanskritize or give the English equivalent of collections such as the *Āgamas*: Tominaga and his readership knew exactly what was meant by, for example, *Zōichi-agon*, so why not let the informed modern western reader know that this is the *Ekottarāgama* (The Numerical Collection)? In the quotation on p. 96, the phrase, “of the

second millenium” seems to me to be unwarranted: “... the common people of the substitute Dharma” would be closer to the text, where “substitute Dharma” is of course the second phase in the fate of the Buddha’s teaching in this world, “The *Great Prajñā Sūtra*” referred to on pages 127, 130 and 178 is *dai-kyō* in the text, and surely refers to the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* rather than to the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra*. On p. 98 I would suggest “preaching” or “proseletyzing” instead of “teaching” for (lit. “teach and transform [such that the listener turns to the way of the Buddha”).

Whilst one could discuss many points in Pye’s translation, the balance to be drawn is that although one may dispute or seek to improve, one generally comes to the conclusion that Pye has good reason for the vast majority of his decisions, and that disagreements are in the main over points of style or emphasis. Since the book reads smoothly, as a continuous piece, the final judgement must be that his translation succeeds very well indeed, and that his purpose—presenting Tominaga to a western audience—has been fulfilled. Also, whilst one could spend much time agonizing over the translation of individual expressions, or tracing Tominaga’s sources, Pye’s translation lets the reader see clearly that Tominaga’s thesis stands regardless of such details. In fact (and this is perhaps a level of irony that Tominaga did not intend, but which I would suggest is there), one of the virtues of the book is that it invites the reader to pursue the various historico-critical avenues indicated by Tominaga, an activity which surely was a major part of the latter’s intention!

(IA)

Rita M. Gross, *Buddhism after Patriarchy: A Feminist History, Analysis, and Reconstruction of Buddhism*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1992. pp. x, 365. US\$14.95.

This book has one thing in common with my flying manuals: I can only manage to read it for approximately ten minutes at a time. There is also one essential difference: my flying manuals invariably teach me something. Whilst many of the *bodhicitta*-inspired ladies (and, let us not forget, gentlemen) in the same *milieu* as the author (I refuse to write authoress, even though this is a perfectly decent word that enjoyed currency before the feminist rape of certain aspects of our language) may have developed greater flying skills than I, then at least I can plead, both in my own defence and in the defence of my discipline, that I have managed to keep the two apart. In short, it is a prime example of that rare category of scholarly production, the perfectly awful book. The only reason why I consider it worthwhile to review it here is that the work has been received favourably in some university quarters, a fact that I find rather disturbing.

The greatest failing of this really rather awful pretence to scholarship is the author's inability to maintain the distinction between her personal involvement in a religion and her attempt at an academic treatment of the same (even though she parades this confusion as a revolutionary method in the study of religions). This failing the author has doubtless inherited from Mircea Eliade, who, as we are continually reminded, was an endless source of inspiration for her. (I often found myself wondering whether he would have remembered her.) In this respect it would appear that she has remained blissfully ignorant of issues in the theory, method, and methodology of Religious Studies since she completed her first course of tertiary level study. For this reason alone, the appendix on her approach to the study of religions (pp. 305–17) is nothing less than pathetic, and reinforces the impression, gained at the latest a hundred pages earlier, that the author is more interested in her own aggrandizement and the propagation of her own form of religiosity than in advancing the cause of knowledge and academic discourse on topics of value to our discipline. This is perhaps most clearly seen in her wish to convince the reader that she is “again working in territory without map or model”. She speaks of a “methodological vision” that drives her work, one that is apparently so new and revolutionary that she finds herself incapable of articulating this method (no indication that the author knows the difference between method and methodology is given or even detectable). The only crumb to fall from the delivery table at this new dawn is that it is “best summarized as the simultaneous or inseparable practice of theology and of the history of religions” (p. 305).

The author seems to be rather blissfully ignorant of the fact that one of the thorniest problems confronted by the history of religions, particularly in recent years, is precisely what she is now putting forward as a revolutionary method[ology], and that the origins of the problem can to a certain extent be located precisely in theological circles. (The reader should, however, not gain the impression that I wish to denigrate the significance of scholars with a theological background, such as Rudolf Otto, Friedrich Heiler, van der Leeuw, and Joachim Wach, in the historical development of the subject.) Whilst the author never defines what she means by theology, one gathers that her usage in fact indicates a person who speaks from within a religion, i.e. as an active believer and practitioner (typically on pp. 306, 309f, 317). The choice of term is unfortunate on at least two counts: firstly, I cannot, with the best of intentions, bring myself to connect anything which has to do with the study of a *theos* with the study of a *buddha*. Secondly, the only criterion which Gross would seem to require for calling oneself a theologian is the fervour of one's commitment, a criterion which I should imagine would cause a shiver to run down every professional theologian's spine.

This blurring of distinctions was not really present in the origins of the discipline in the closing decades of the nineteenth century, when philology and the newly born disciplines of anthropology and sociology gave Religious

Studies its first stimuli. Gross' mentor Eliade is perhaps the greatest problem in this whole complex of religiously committed (and hence, in their own estimation, religiously qualified) scholars of religion, since his immense and often arcane learning in fields quite unconnected with Christian apologetics bewilders many who might otherwise perceive the insidious effects of his own religious perceptions on the academic discipline. Eliade's history of religions is a very seductive brew, evoking as it does the reader's admiration for his learning, whilst at the same time appealing to the affective needs of people who have no place in a university.

Reading this appendix, which is perhaps the most revealing part of the book, one wonders (i) where the lady has been all these years, and (ii) who she thinks she is. No-one with an ounce of professional self-respect, let alone respect for fellow researchers, would question that it is incumbent on the student or scholar of religions to reflect deeply on the data at his disposal. It is an affront to generations of students and scholars to imply that all that has been done so far has been to collect data, arrange it nicely, and then go home (p. 306). Reflection on one's data is and always has been an integral, indeed the most essential, part of one's approach to the subject. I may have given the impression that early pioneers in the field did more harm than good, but this is clearly not so. We may still be struggling with the legacy of the phenomenologists and the theologians, but one should still recognize that people such as van der Leeuw did make significant contributions to the field which still deserve consideration. It is arrogant to imply that our deliberations today have more significance simply because we have more, and more reliable, data at our disposal. Indeed, the mark of a scholar is what he makes of whatever data he has at his disposal: it is quite emphatically a question of the quality of one's reflections and not the quantity of materials at one's disposal. Here, Gross' work fails miserably and shamefully. If anything in this book is prophetic, then it must be the following words: "For many years, even today in many cases, nothing is [*sic*] more likely to be the kiss of death for a 'serious' historian of religions than the suspicion of personal interest or involvement in the religion one studies professionally" (pp. 307f).

This book is, however, in many ways a godsend for those who in recent years have become heartily sick and fed up of the amateurish end of feminist studies. Numerous studies undertaken from a specifically female standpoint have made significant contributions to our understanding of the role of religion in various contexts. Based as they are on solid groundwork, either in the philologist's library or in the field (or indeed both), they have brought to our attention perspectives on the religious and sexual life of man which would otherwise be inconceivable. On the other hand, other studies, of which the book under review is a particularly gross example, have done nothing more than assist the creation of another form of sexual tyranny, for all their assurances that the aim of the movement is to create a just and equal society

for both men and women (I shall comment on the visionary aspects of this work below). Throughout the book, one doubts (despite the loud assurances on the cover) whether the author has any serious schooling either in any of the classical languages of the Buddhist tradition, or any of the languages of modern Buddhist countries. We are continually reminded that the author learnt this or that practice, or these or those teachings under the guidance of this or that *rinpoche*, or in this or that group. There is continual emphasis on the author's spiritual suffering or progress—a perfectly obscene way of behaving in any traditional Buddhist context—and nowhere does the informed reader gain the impression that the author is capable of treating questions of Buddhist doctrine or practice in a manner which does justice to our discipline's demands for the treatment of historical and philological data. The book is basically a plea and a programme for a form of Buddhism that is shaped by the personal problems and concerns of the author (who, sadly, will find many who take all this seriously). Were one to find this work on the shelves of one's local New [Porr]Age bookshop, one would react differently. But to find this kind of thing paraded as serious scholarship is a different matter entirely, and one which is to be countered in the terms to which it pretends. The quality of publications from the SUNY Press does fluctuate, but in this case one sincerely hopes that the decision to publish this book was merely a temporary sop to certain prevailing market forces.

The cover blurb gives a clue to the general tenor of the book, and, in the interests of adding a little colour to the grey scholarly day, I shall quote deserving extracts here (I shall not cite the authors of these comments). “Gross has written the *magnum opus* of feminist critique and revisioning of Buddhism. This has great theoretical and practical significance for feminist theology in its global inter-faith dialogue”; “This book surveys both the part women have played in Buddhism historically and what Buddhism might become in its post-patriarchal future”; “The ‘prophetic voice’ that Gross openly brings to the Buddhist tradition is welcome, moving and appropriate”; “I cannot say enough in praise of this book. It is well balanced, balancing [*sic*] creative insightful thinking with solid scholarship, and it is fascinating—a real page-turner (I'm not kidding!).” The gushing, now perpetrated by the author herself, carries over into the acknowledgements, and reaches its climax in the already mentioned travesty of an appendix, which concludes the book. Is there anything in between which merits a kinder judgement?

Apart from the two appendixes (the author blesses us with one on feminism as academic method and social vision, too), the book is divided into four sections: the first is basically an introduction to the book (“Orientations”, pp. 3–14). One wonders how the author would have the reader orientate himself (I gather that is the modern expression) in the history of Buddhism, when such obviously popular and outdated statements about the development of the Buddhist tradition are made as, “[Buddhism] was founded by Siddhartha [*sic*—the book contains not one diacritical mark; even the lowly

Umlaut has no place here] Gautama, an upper-caste male of royal status who abandoned his family, his social position, and his wealth to pursue spiritual liberation”; and, speaking of the differences in the *vinaya* for monks and for nuns, “However, the nuns were required to accept eight special rules as a precondition for their admission to the order; these rules subordinated the nuns’ order to the monks’ order” (p. 9). Actually, although many parts of the *vinaya* reflect a very petty-minded way of thinking which may be regarded as holding almost anything from monkeys to women in an unfavourable light, the basic considerations behind this difference in the relative status of the two orders should not be misconstrued. In those days (and this still applies to much of present Indian society) a woman who had left the life of the household would otherwise have been regarded more or less as a harlot and subjected to the appropriate harassment. By being formally associated with the monks, the nuns were able to enjoy the benefits of leaving the household life without incurring immediate harm. Whilst it is one thing to abhor—as any civilized person must do—the attitudes and behaviour towards women which underlie the necessity for such protection, it is surely misplaced to criticize the Buddha his community for adopting this particular policy. Like Andy Capp, he is dealt the rolling-pin whatever he does. The feminist cannot claim on the one hand that technological advances have given women the opportunity (so, they say, for the first time in the history of the whole wide world) to determine their own destinies to an extent unknown before; and, on the other, lambast social orders of ages past for having sexually discriminatory forms and practices. (One is reminded in this connection of murmurings from other quarters that Confucius was a sexist.) If challenged, I have no doubt that Gross would plead that I have misrepresented her and her fellows on this point, but I am consistently left with the feeling that past ages are too often simply held up to contempt, merely in order to edify the reader who is sympathetic to specifically feminist concerns.

Further howlers in this part of the book, which should alert the reader’s critical faculties in preparation for approaching the second section, include, “Still later, Vajrayana or Tantric Buddhism, which is based one [*sic*] the Mahayana but also goes beyond it, developed in India and then spread to Tibet” (pp. 10f; i.e. forget about the odd century or two of development in Central and East Asia, and in South and Southeast Asia before Tibet came into the picture); and, by a similar token, “Southeast Asia received the older, Theravada form of Buddhism, often considered to be the most conservative towards women” (p. 11). Her comments on China and Japan are equally laughable. Remarks on the history and development of Buddhism are, then, woefully lacking in any acquaintance with, let alone critical appraisal of, serious scholarly work in this field. Lamotte? Bechert? (apart from the excellent *World of Buddhism* collection, which does have pictures in it). Hirakawa? Schopen? Original sources? The regurgitated platitudes on the development of the Mahāyāna and its characteristics (p. 10) are in a sense

quite ironic in the context of this book. I should have thought that an author with Professor Gross' concerns would have been really rather interested in, for example, the findings and suggestions of Gregory Schopen and scholars who have worked on similar materials.

The title of the second section gives a very clear indication of why the author has approached Buddhist history in the way she has: "Toward an Accurate and Usable Past: A Feminist Sketch of Buddhist History". Clearly, anyone who wishes to use the past in such a way is not interested in historical research, although it is pitiful that she would have us believe that she has based her re-working of this past on reliable primary and secondary sources. In this light, her statement that "there has been little, if any, previous *feminist* historical scholarship on Buddhism" (p. 125), which the reader will find in the introductory deliberations to the third part of the work, is rather pathetic.

This third part of the book, which bears the misleading title, "The Dharma is Neither Male nor Female": Feminist Analysis of Key Concepts in Buddhism", is in many ways the central portion of the book, but whilst the author's academic insufficiencies are not so pronounced in the area of doctrine as they are in the historical disciplines (after all, this is the average exiled lama's *forte*, too), I have rather grave doubts about distorting basic Buddhist tenets into a feminist framework. The question is not so much whether one is free to have and to formulate one's own original ideas, but whether it is honest to pass them off as something else in a context where what one writes (and the purpose for which one writes) quite decidedly does not belong. An instructive weakness comes out in her treatment of *tathāgatagarbha* in this context. In a racy entitled section ("Pregnant with Buddha: *Tathāgatagarbha* and Gender", pp. 186–9), we are told that the term *tathāgatagarbha* "is often translated as Buddha-nature, though this is not a literal translation. More literal translations, which have been avoided thus far, would be 'tathāgata-womb' or 'tathāgata-embryo'. ... The obvious feminine and uterine symbolism of the term should not be overlooked, though that feminine symbolism may explain why scholars have preferred the more bland and neuter 'Buddha-nature'" (p. 186). A glance at her note 3 (p. 333), where only two recent books, also published by SUNY, are mentioned, lends weight to the suspicion that she has read different scholars from the rest of us. A general objection to the underlying thrust of this part of the book is that the statement, the Dharma is neither male nor female, has the same status as the assertion that the Dharma is neither hot nor cold. Gross is welcome to make the distortion, but not to pass it off as something in consonance with academic integrity.

The final part is intended as a complement to the third: whereas the previous exposition centred on the Buddhist Dharma's being neither female nor male, these concluding essays attempt to assure us that there is a sense in which the Dharma is *both* female and male. "The Dharma is Both Female

and Male: Toward an Androgynous Reconstruction of Buddhism” constitutes the main part of the prophetic voice which the author has assumed. (Presumably, in reversing “Male” and “Female” in the respective titles of these parts of her book, Gross wishes to indicate some kind of equal weighting of the sexes, though one does wonder whether there is some kind of hidden, esoteric message to the reader here.) In these chapters she is even less tied to scholarly considerations of faithfulness to one’s sources and the like, and the already poor quality of what is presented to the reader takes an abrupt dip. I find it extremely difficult to take seriously her pleas for androgynous thinking in Buddhism and for androgynous institutions; and, perhaps worst of all, her visions of an androgynous Pure Land (“The people who live in the Pure Land will be both women and men—each one of them living out some unique style of androgyny”, p. 224); not to mention her goal: “When we look out our windows, we will see the palace of the deities. When we comfort each other, we will converse with the deities. To become sane, to live in community with each other and our earth, is to experience freedom within the world—the mutual goal of feminism and of (post-patriarchal) Buddhism” (p. 288). To regard conversing with deities as an integral part of the ultimate form of sanity is to my way of thinking hardly part of any adult way of life, and more than anything, perhaps, underlines the rather serious flaws in the author’s approach.

The notes provided do little to disperse the overall impression of a lack of competence and familiarity with Buddhist sources. Indeed, the author’s apparent complete ignorance of substantial scholarship in the field of Buddhist Studies sets its indelible stamp throughout the book. The reader who wishes to be convinced of this need only thumb through the lengthy bibliography (pp. 341–56), where the most cited authors (after Gross herself, whose contributions fill over a page) are Chogyam Trungpa and Anne Klein. No language other than English will be found, and the whole thing reads like a printout of an unfinished database. The publishers, SUNY, have shown that they can do better than this; but even in the light of the above mentioned fluctuations in the quality of their publications, it is difficult (if not frightening) to imagine that they might one day do worse.

(IA)

Brief Notices

Zhongguo daojiao qigong yangsheng daquan [The Great Collection of Qigong [Methods] for Nourishing Life in Chinese Daoism]. General editor, Li Yuanguo. Chengdu: Sichuan cishu chuban she, 1991. pp. 2037+. RMB45.–.

Recent years have seen the publication of a number of Chinese reference works relating to the study Chinese Daoism, including dictionaries of Daoist terms, indexes, and a descriptive catalogue to the *Daozang*, as well as specialized compilations of information on temples, etc. The *Zhongguo daojiao qigong yangsheng daquan*, which is a thematic dictionary on *qigong* and related practices, is a highly useful work. It has been arranged according to topics such as general terms, special *neidan* practices, chants and poems, persons and things, and scriptures. All these topics have been placed in a general entry system based on number of strokes in the characters. It is easy to use, generally well written, and packed with information. Furthermore it contains lengthy entries on each subject with references to the *Daozang*. Highly recommendable.

(HHS)

Zang chuan siyuan bihua [Wall-paintings in Tibetan Temples and Monasteries].

1. *Zhongguo bihua quanji* [The Entire Collection of Chinese Wall paintings]. Tianjin, 1989. *Zang chuan siyuan* [Tibetan Temples and Monasteries]
2. *Zhongguo bihua quanji*, Tianjin, 1991. pp. 254, including numerous colour illustrations, c.200 RMB each.

The books in this series are largely based on the monumental pictorial series on Chinese art, the *Zhongguo meishu quanji* [The Entire Collection of Chinese Art] published between 1985 and 1990, a series of art books containing high-quality colour reproductions of important works of art. As such the *Zhongguo bihua quanji* series focusses on the visual aspects, and only features a brief commentarial text accompanying each plate. The present two volumes are devoted to the Tibetan Buddhist wall-paintings from major temples and *gompas* throughout Tibet.

Most of the material presented in the second volume comes from Western Tibet, notably from Tsaparang. This material is even more interesting than that of Volume 1, because it well complements the classical study by Giuseppe Tucci, i.e. *The Temples of Western Tibet and Their Artistic Symbolism* (Rome, 1935), and for that reason constitutes a highly valuable addition

to our knowledge of Tantric Buddhist art in Western Tibet during the 12th to 15th centuries.

While most of the plates in the two books are of excellent quality, the Chinese text meant to support them is of little value. Generally it abounds in basic mistakes, which reveals that the Chinese editors have a very scant knowledge of Tibetan Buddhist iconography and art. Despite this, the two books are important, and must be considered essential for anybody interested in the art of Tibetan Buddhist painting. In short, they can be warmly recommended.

(HHS)

Andreas Nehring, *Rissho Kosei-kai: Eine neobuddhistische Religion in Japan*. Erlanger Monographien aus Mission und Ökumene, Band 16. Erlangen: Verlag der Ev.-Luth. Mission, 1992. VIII + 350 Seiten.

Das vorliegende Buch ist eine ausführliche Darstellung der modernen buddhistischen Glaubensgemeinschaft Risshō-kōsei-kai, die durch die zahlreichen Schriften des Gründers Niwano Nikkyō, die ins Englische übersetzt und weltweit vermarktet worden sind, auch in verschiedenen Ländern der westlichen Welt bekannt geworden ist. Aus einer eindeutig missionswissenschaftlichen Perspektive geschrieben, bietet das Buch eine umfassende Beschreibung der Geschichte, Lehre und religiöse Praxis und Gemeinschaft dieser Bewegung an. In seiner Einführung (S. 4–18) setzt der Verfasser seinen Forschungsgegenstand in dessen religionsgeschichtlichen Zusammenhang und beschreibt seine Forschungsmethoden. Leider sind diese Abschnitte äußerst spärlich und weisen eine gewisse Naivität des Verfassers auf, was sein religionswissenschaftliches Verständnis und seine allgemeinen Kenntnisse über den Buddhismus und die japanische Religionsgeschichte überhaupt angeht. Diese Mängel prägen das ganze Buch, was schade ist, denn der Verfasser hat sich Mühe gegeben, seinen Gegenstand ausführlich zu beschreiben. Nebenbei darf man hier bemerken, daß es in solchen Arbeiten sehr klar zum Ausdruck kommt, wie wichtig allgemeine Kenntnisse der religionsgeschichtlichen und religionswissenschaftlichen Ansätze für theologische Disziplinen sind, die sich ausdrücklich mit den Religionen anderer Kulturen beschäftigen.

Der auffälligste Mangel ist, daß der Verfasser über keine Japanischkenntnisse verfügt. Außer einigen wenigen Beobachtungen, die keineswegs als formelle Feldforschung betrachtet werden können, beruht das ganze Werk auf hauptsächlich englischsprachigen Primärquellen (d.h. Quellen, die selbst von der Risshō-kōsei-kei oder Sympathisanten übersetzt wurden) und Sekundärliteratur. Aus diesen Gründen läßt sich diese Arbeit nicht mit der ähnlich gelagerten Studie von Hardacre über die Reiyūkai nicht vergleichen. Während die detaillierte Darstellung vieler Aspekte der Geschichte, der Lehre und des Gemeinschaftslebens der Risshō-kōsei-kai zu begrüßen sind, kann

ich aufgrund der oben genannten methodischen, methodologischen und religionswissenschaftlichen Schwächen das Buch leider nur zögernd empfehlen.

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