

Knowledge and Liberation: Tibetan Buddhist Epistemology in Support of Transformative Religious Experience, by Anne Klein. Ithaca: Snow Lion, 1986; 283 pp.; paper: \$15.95.

Knowing, Naming and Negation: A Sourcebook on Tibetan Sautrāntika, by Anne Carolyn Klein. Ithaca: Snow Lion, 1991; 266 pp.+ unnumbered pages containing Tibetan texts; paper: \$19.95.

These two volumes by Anne Klein provide us with what is arguably the broadest and most detailed Western scholarly treatment of the nature and functioning of direct perception and conceptual thought in Tibetan Buddhist scholasticism. Basing her discussion primarily on the scholastic literature of the dGe lugs pa school of Tibetan Buddhism, she presents us with this school's perspective on the Sautrāntika school of Indian Buddhism, the ostensible source of dGe lugs pa speculation concerning valid cognition.

Her first volume, *Knowledge and Liberation*, is a critical, expository work that discusses the major philosophical issues having to do with the two chief ways of knowing things: direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) and conceptual thought (*kalpanā*). For the Sautrāntikas, it was direct perception, and specifically direct sense perception, that was considered the epitome of valid knowledge. At the same time, Buddhist scholastics were committed to language and reasoning in a way that made it necessary to also justify the communicative ability of language and the epistemic validity of conceptual thought (and more specifically of inference, or *anumāna*). Hence, one of the main philosophical problems for the Sautrāntikas and for those who would follow their epistemological theory was to set both direct perception and

conceptual thought on firm epistemological footing in such a way that neither threatened the validity of the other. Given the Sautrāntikas' emphasis on sense perception, this meant that it was especially the validity of conceptual thought that needed to be validated. Of course, it is precisely because many of these issues were not fully developed in the Indian sources that it became an important object of scholarly attention in Tibet.

In her first book Klein sets forth in lucid fashion the theoretical superstructure that allows the dGe lugs pas to distinguish between sense perception and conceptual thought, while maintaining the epistemic validity of each. Through discussions of Tibetan exegesis on the Sautrāntika notion of "two truths," of the different types of objects and their different functions in perception and thought, and of the process of negation and its role in the functioning of language, she presents us with an accurate and detailed picture of the kind of philosophical underpinnings that allows the dGe lugs pas to create what they consider to be a consistent and plausible epistemology—one that sacrifices neither direct perception nor conceptual thought.

Klein's second book, *Knowing, Naming and Negation*, is principally a collection of trans-

lations of Tibetan texts that deal with the kinds of issues that were the focus of the first volume. Her introduction to this second volume is clear and provides the reader with a brief and lucid synopsis of the major issues in the texts that follow. Each of the three translations that follow the introduction is preceded by a preface that gives a brief biography of the author of the text and further treats major issues. Of the three texts themselves, the first, *bsTan dar lha ram pa's Presentation of Specifically and Generally Characterized Phenomena*, is a thematic work that deals with a specific topic; the second, a selection (on "Positive and Negative Phenomena") from Ngag dbang bkra shis' *Collected Topics* text, belongs to the "Introductory Debate Manual" (*bsdus grva*) genre; and the last, lCang skya's "Sautrāntika" chapter from his *Presentation of Tenets*, belongs to the doxography (*grub mtha'*) genre of Tibetan philosophical literature. While accurate, all of the translations are also readable, a major accomplishment given the complexity of these works.

In what remains of this review, I would like to focus on Klein's discussion of the significance of the Sautrāntika for the dGe lugs pa understanding of the Madhyamaka (*Knowing*, pp. 28-29), a topic which I find especially interesting. There she speaks of three points as being central to understanding the significance of the Sautrāntikas: (1) that their realist position—their claim that all particulars substantially or inherently exist—serves as a foil for the Prāsaṅgika school by providing the latter with an object of critique, (2) that their epistemology forms the basis for the dGe lugs pa formulation of a Madhyamaka theory of knowledge, and (3) that their treatment of negation serves as groundwork for the dGe lugs pa interpretation of the Prāsaṅgika theory of emptiness as non-affirming negation. The first two of these points in particular deserve further discussion.

It is true that the Sautrāntika position regarding the inherent (or perhaps more accurately,

the self-characteristic) existence of particular entities is anathema to the Prāsaṅgikas, at least to the dGe lugs pa formulation thereof. This, however, does not make this Sautrāntika position coextensive with the object to be refuted (*dag bya*) in the Prāsaṅgika critique, for the Prāsaṅgikas end up refuting the Sautrāntika position *and much more*. Klein is well aware of this, and is cautious to add that the Sautrāntika position is only one "aspect of the conception of self which the Prāsaṅgika theory seeks to undermine." (p. 28) but perhaps it would have been interesting to say *exactly how* the Sautrāntika position fails to be coextensive with the Prāsaṅgika object of refutation, given that she is broaching the subject anyway. She seems to begin to do this (p. 29) when she brings up the issue of the so called "innate conception of inherent existence" (*bden 'dzin lhan skyes*), but this is never fully developed, and the relevance of this latter concept to the issue of how the Sautrāntika position fails to be coextensive with the Prāsaṅgika object of refutation is left unresolved.

Klein's second point is of course also true. The dGe lugs pas' own notion that theirs was a system of "Madhyamaka and Pramāṇa like two lions back to back" (*dbu tshad seng ge rgyab sprod*) is proof enough of this. Again, however, it would have been interesting in this setting to have at least mentioned the fact that the dGe lugs pas, as self-identified Prāsaṅgikas, also consider a great deal of Sautrāntika epistemological theory objectionable. For example, the notion that the sense perception of ordinary beings is non-erroneous (*ma 'khrul pa*), a Sautrāntika claim, is anathema to the dGe lugs pas when they are wearing their Prāsaṅgika hats. Granted, the dGe lugs pas did incorporate a great deal of Sautrāntika epistemology into their systematization of Prāsaṅgika philosophy, but not without substantial modification.

Finally, as regards the significance of the Sautrāntika to the general (and not specifically Madhyamaka) synthesis of the dGe lugs pas,

another point comes to mind. In Tsong kha pa's description of what I have elsewhere called the "linguistic formulation" of the Yogācāra doctrine of emptiness the Sautrāntika theory of the workings of perception and conceptual thought plays an important part. In that context, the Sautrāntika becomes a foil for distinguishing the uniqueness of the Yogācāra position. How this is so is beyond the scope of this review (the interested reader might consult my translation, *A Dose of Emptiness*, State University of New York Press, 1992). That it is so, it seems to me, represents a significance of the Sautrāntika to the dGe lugs pa synthesis that is at least as important as any of those mentioned by Klein, though in this case to the dGe lugs pa view of the Yogācāra rather than to their view of the

Madhyamaka.

However, these already minor points, more omissions than anything else, become even more insignificant when viewed in the context of this tremendously complete and exhaustive two volume work. Klein's work represents, it seems to me, the final word on this very important topic in Tibetan scholastic philosophy.

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Zen Dawn: Early Zen Texts from Tun Huang, translated by J. C. Cleary. Boston and London: Shambhala, 1991. 135 pp.; paper: \$11.

Crazy Clouds: Zen Radicals, Rebels & Reformers by Perle Besserman and Manfred Steger. Boston and London: Shambhala, 1991. 200 pp.; paper: \$13.

These two recent books, in popular editions from Shambhala, offer useful contributions to the ongoing assessment of the Zen tradition. Both offer strong polemical viewpoints which evidence a passionate concern for the transmission of Zen to the West; both are very readable and enjoyable.

The last decade or so has seen a rise in the importance within the Buddhist dialog of the socio-historical point of view. The taking of texts at face value as "timeless scriptures," has fallen to a great extent into disrepute; instead authors, particularly scholars, want to build up a social or political context for the texts, using this context as lens through which to examine the text, often reading between the lines with, it would in many cases appear, a great deal of irony, even suspicion. Doctrines tend to be sharply defined, discriminated against other doctrines, and placed within the framework of historical debates, and contests for religious power. Powerful spiritual teachers do not offer eternal truths about things as they are; instead they are seen as religious-political figures, doing and saying what is necessary to uphold their own lineages and traditions against contending forces.

J. C. Cleary, in his introduction to *Zen Dawn*, argues strenuously against this approach. "Filtered through such limiting preconceptions," he writes, "which elevate the mere common sense of today's world to a universal, objective standpoint, the vision of the intent and manner of operation of the Buddhist teaching preserved in the primary sources completely escapes from view (p 5)." He argues that the "core of enlightened teachers is the key to the real vitality of the

religion," and that these teachers and their words over the generations have offered correctives and analyses of the distorting influences on the teachings which worldly ambition and confusion have inevitably produced. However, too great an emphasis on these distortions misses the point (p 8).

Moreover, Cleary argues persuasively that the very structure and intent of the Zen teachings militates against any attempt to mine them for doctrinal tenets which can be pitted against contrary doctrinal tenets in worldly contests for spiritual and intellectual power:

We find that when Buddhist teachers built up conceptual structures marking out the path for students, they did not always aim for static structures, but rather aimed for subtly moving semantic devices designed to interact with and modify the students' conceptual and motivational patterns. This is especially apparent in Zen . . . it is impossible to give a brief summary in terms of a few "philosophical positions" expressed in short phrases: the real semantics are not that simple. (p. 7)

Zen Dawn, subtitled "Early Zen Texts from Tun Huang," consists of translations of three short texts of the so-called Northern School of Ch'an found in the Tun Huang caves in the Twentieth Century (a popular edition, this volume offers absolutely no scholarly discussion of the texts and their specific provenances). Dating from the "first half of the eighth century," (p. 3) they are considerably earlier than the literature of the developed Ch'an schools, so we would expect to find much in them that will shed light on the

development of the school. Titles of the texts are given as (and against Cleary provides no indication of the titles in the original Chinese) "Records of the Teachers and Students of the Lanka," "Bodhidharma's Treatise on Contemplating Mind," and "Treatise on the Sudden Enlightenment School of the Great Vehicle, Which Opens Up Mind And Reveals Buddha-Nature." I want to bring out some key points in the first two texts, which seem to me to be most important.

Not surprisingly, given the scholarship of the last several decades, which has revised almost entirely the impression given by the first wave of transmission of Zen materials to the West, that Ch'an was somehow a radical departure from earlier Buddhism, and that it advocated a hard-and-fast "sudden" approach to enlightenment, these texts show very clearly early Ch'an's faithfulness to the Buddhist canon. Although the school is called initially the "school of the Lanka," many other sūtras are quoted, making it quite clear that from the first the school is grounded firmly in the Mahayana. Furthermore, the dualistic or gradualist approach that one might expect to hear in the Northern School is nowhere in evidence here. These texts seem entirely consistent with the approach and viewpoint of later works (though stylistically they are more discursive, antedating the later terse dialogic/narrative mode).

"Records of the Teachers and Students of the Lanka" is an early version of the later "Transmission of the Lamp" literature. Short biographies and teaching synopses of the teachers in the early Ch'an lineage, the text provides some interesting new information. It lists Gunabhadra, translator of the Lankavatara Sūtra into Chinese, as the first Patriarch of the school (this in contrast to Prajñātāra, a shadowy Indian figure, who is Bodhidharma's teacher in post-Sixth Ancestor Zen lineage charts), and gives, extensive teachings by this master, among them a very interesting re-casting of the six *pāramitās* in terms of meditation practice. Bodhidharma is listed as the Second Ancestor of

the school, and his biography includes, for the first time, mention of a second disciple, Daoyu, who studied alongside Huike, the disciple considered in other texts as the sole heir. The most extensive of the biographies is that of Daoxin, the Fourth Ancestor, about whom little has been known previously. The teachings given by him in this text are quite useful in their own right. In true Ch'an fashion Daoxin sweeps all Buddhist practices aside, reducing them all to "just let it roll along; don't make it go; don't make it stay" (p. 52). The teachings as given here could as easily have been uttered by later, more well known figures of the developed Ch'an periods. In this genealogy, of course, Hui Neng does not appear as the sole Sixth Ancestor. Instead, the lineage breaks into three branches, none of which begins with Hui Neng, and one of which is headed by Shenxiu, who appears as an unrealized, even confused, figure in the polemical and influential Sixth Ancestor Sūtra. Here Shenxiu's teaching is as penetrating and lively as that of any of the teachers in the lineage; his biography concludes with a page of sayings that read like a series of koans, ("Can you pass straight through a wall or not?" "Does this mind have a mind or not? What mind is this mind?" p. 76.) The text concludes with brief mention of teachers in the next generations, listing eight generations in all from Gunabhadra, twenty-four ancestors.

"Bodhidharma's Treatise on Contemplating Mind" is written in the form of a dialog between the Master and Huike. Again, the one practice of "contemplating mind" is given as the sole source and only necessity. The text opens with Huike's question: "If there are people intent on seeking the Path of Enlightenment, what method should they practice, what method is most essential and concise? Bodhidharma answered: Let them just contemplate mind—this one method takes in all practices, and is indeed essential and concise" (p. 81). The remainder of the text proceeds to reinterpret all other practices in the light

of this one practice; such a reinterpretation echoes the basic thrust of the later Sixth Ancestor Sūtra. This approach is, as far as this author is concerned, identical to the approach of teachers throughout the lineage, down to Dōgen (whose famous "taking the backward step to turn the light inward to illuminate the self," given in the "Fukanzazengi," is the essence of Sōtō *shikantaza*, practice, and is identical to "just contemplate mind") and beyond.

Crazy Clouds, subtitled "Zen Radicals, Rebels & Reformers," is a very different type of book. Written by Perle Besserman and Manfred Steger, who have been active in the contemporary American Zen movement, *Crazy Clouds* subordinates a circumspect in-depth look at its materials to an instrumental bolstering of a point of view. Believing that "it is impossible to maintain the Asian authority of a Zen teacher in an egalitarian society (p. 179)," and that feminism, a democratic tradition, a Judeo-Christian heritage of social action, and the influence of householder practice will create the necessity for fundamental changes, in Zen as it is transmitted to the West (The United States in particular), the authors present eight brief biographies of Zen adepts, from the T'ang dynasty to the present, who exemplify the iconoclastic, anti-authoritarian side of Zen. Their thesis is that the rough-and-ready anti-establishment approach of these figures represents the true spirit of Zen, the spirit that will inevitably win the day in the West as the fossilized forms of the Asian tradition are burned away by circumstances.

While I am in sympathy with this viewpoint, and feel that most people involved in the American Zen movement would to a great extent agree, I find the simplicity and ease of the argument here a bit too patent. The transmission of a tradition across centuries and cultures is obviously a complex event, and one can never be sure how much one is objectifying one's own viewpoint in the process. It is important to maintain an open view, to take into account contemporary cultural biases without assuming that the tradition will

necessarily entirely bend itself to these biases; perhaps something of the opposite will also occur.

The eight biographies in *Crazy Cloud* include important figures about whom whole books have been written in recent years. The last five or six years have seen studies of Zen masters Bankei, Ikkyū, and Bassui, accounts of whose lives are included here; before that we have seen studies and translations of teachings by Rinzai, Layman P'ang, and Hakuin, also included here. Several recent volumes have included a great deal of material on the contemporary teachers Nyogen Senzaki and Nakagawa Soen, the last of the eight figures included in this work. So the book adds nothing new to our store of information, although it does do the valuable service of collecting in one place, for a reader relatively new to Zen studies, interesting and readable information on important teachers.

I am critical of the authors' unstated assumption in these life accounts that conventional representatives of the tradition are always, somehow, missing the point, while the anti-establishmentarian heroes are always carriers of the true teaching of Shakyamuni. Again, while my own bias is in exactly this direction, I think the matter is more complicated than this. While railings against off-beat teachers and their off-beat approaches are often cries of annoyance from the dry throats of the small-minded, they can sometimes be useful and accurate clarion calls for balance and sanity. Not all "crazy cloud" teachers are positive influences; the Zen tradition has many examples of teachers who have mistaken the supposed sovereignty of their individuality for the Dharma itself. The passion of the authors' viewpoint, it seems to me, prevents them from striking a balance in this regard.

On the other hand, this is a worthwhile book. Though, as I've said, the biographies are shorter versions of stories that have been told at greater length elsewhere, they do in many cases add an important element that may not be present elsewhere: a key aspect of each of them is a brief

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socio-political synopsis of the context in which each of the teachers taught and lived. These synopses are highly informative, written with verve and accuracy, and evidence, at least to this amateur reader's eye, a thorough knowledge of the history and politics of their respective periods. Taken together, these brief contextual accounts amount to a meditation on the Zen tradition as it has been embedded in Far Eastern culture over several centuries, and this meditation, unlike those that Cleary argues against, does, it seems to me, do justice to the teachings of the protagonists involved. Furthermore, the authors write about each of the figures with the loving and knowing eye of the Zen insider. In addition, the book as a whole is quite entertainingly written. One reads each chapter with great interest, sorry to say good-bye to each appealing figure as he departs, eager to meet the next one as he appears.

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The Art of Happiness: Teachings of Buddhist Psychology by Mirko Frýba. Translated by Michael H. Kohn. Foreward by Claudio Naranjo. Boston, Massachusetts: Shambhala Publications, Inc., 1989. xvi + 301 pp. Paper: \$15.95.

In *The Art of Happiness* clinical psychologist and former Buddhist monk Mirko Frýba maps the territory of Buddhist meditation (an activity he calls "Dharma strategies") with the optimistic expectation that his faithful readers will follow him into the territory these maps describe.

Toward this end, there are some thirty mediation exercises in this self-help book and more than a dozen diagrams aimed at increasing one's happiness and effectiveness in everyday life. Frýba leads his "dear reader," as he often refers to her or him, step by step, through the intricacies of early Buddhist psychology (*abhidhamma*), often drawing on Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhimagga* (English trans., *The Path of Purification*, Shambhala, 1976). He begins with strategies of knowledge (*pañña*), moves on to the foundational bodily anchoring in reality (*yathā-bhutā*), then to strategies of sympathy (*mettā*, kindness; *karunā*, compassion; *muditā*, sympathetic joy; *upekkhā*, equanimity) and ecstasy (*ek-stasis*, the state of having stepped out of oneself), and concludes with "strategies of power" by which the conditioned arising (*paticca-samuppāda*) of suffering (*dukkha*) can be transmuted through wise apprehension (*yoniso manasikāra*) into what the author calls "the conditioned arising of freedom" (274 ff.). His choice of exercises and strategies from among the vast storehouse of *abhidhamma* wisdom, Frýba often stresses, is based on those most likely to be of immediate help in one's everyday life. With this end in view, the reader might want to look at Chapter 4 ("Intelligence of the Body and Joy"), which includes basic exercises in mindfulness of body, before taking on the more theoretical Chapter 3 ("Threefold Knowledge and the Economy of the Mind"), largely concerned with explicating the conditioned arising of suffering.

But in whatever order one proceeds, it's

a long trip (the book is more than 300 pages), and one with several byways and diversions. These include a chapter on "New Age Politics," examples of some of the author's clinical cases, and periodic attempts to relate the views of modern psychologists and social scientists—amount them Carl Rogers, Gregory Bateson, Erich Fromm, J.L. Moreno, Freud and Pavlov—to various aspects of the *abhidhamma*. This latter aspect of the book, while often insightful, will doubtless be of more interest to Frýba's social scientific colleagues than to the reader in search of a practical "guide to being happy" (the original title of the book, which first appeared in 1987, was *Anleitung zum Glücklichsein*).

It should be noted, however, that while Frýba shows the points of contact between selected modern psychotherapies and the *abhidhamma*, it is clearly his view that the latter supersedes the former. Strategies of ecstasy, for him, in the final analysis, require setting new "visionary goals [which] go beyond therapeutic self-realization of frustrated potential" (228).

The early chapters may be tough going for those among Frýba's readers either little informed about the "New Age" movement or unsympathetic to it. For it is the author's intention to take the "New Age" outlook (for an attempt to comprehend this somewhat amorphous designation, see Ted Peter's *The Cosmic Self*, Harper Collins Publishers, Inc., 1991) and to root it firmly in what he calls the "transcultural paradigm" of the *abhidhamma* (22, 24). In this effort, "paradigm" joins other fashionable New Age terminology and preoccupations: what might be called "the cult of experience" ("Dhamma strategies...are empirical and free from all theory...," 18); ecology (the reader is encouraged to become part of the "cosmic ecosystem," 48); and "holism," in general, and

specifically in the form of the author's choice of the science of cybernetics as the closest, though still inadequate, modern analogue to the wisdom of the *abhidamma* (52). In general, however, though addressing himself to "New Age strategists," the author retains a critical attitude toward the movement as a whole which he views as overly concerned with *theoretical* syntheses of East and West and as too often deficient in practical guidance (25-29). Nevertheless, a self-help book which addresses itself so explicitly to New Age practitioners has perhaps needlessly limited its potential audience.

The book is often enlivened by the author's forays into culture criticism and by his gift for simile, the latter often proving more illuminating than his sometimes dauntingly intricate diagrams. Among examples of the former, one might note the following observations:

Here we see the arrogant approach of representatives of the old established academic disciplines, which mainly consist in marketing as "objective truths" subjective statements by scientists concerning objective date (26).

The sexual vices of our civilization are the result of abuse and repression of healthy sensuality, caused by a longing for body-alien ideas and concepts, which are then imposed on the "sex partner" (106).

This Abhidhammic terminology designates precisely what [the reader's] practice has defined as a process and has experientially worked through. In contrast we have the vague slogans of propaganda, advertising, and other means of manipulation, which purvey gullibility as belief, intoxication as ecstasy, and caprice as power (237).

Among Frýba's helpful similes one may mention

his illustration of the way to deal constructively with distractions during meditation by reference to the process by which a reader's attention moves back and forth among less and more interesting newspaper articles (192-93). The way in which a child goes about playing with a toy train serves to illuminate the stages of concentration as well as how a meditator must learn to make transitions between different spheres of experience (200-01). Frýba likens a lapse in mindfulness to the failure vigilantly to guard the gates of a city, enabling potentially harmful new arrivals, *i.e.*, the objects of perception, to make alliances with unwholesome elements within the "city of the mind" (261-62).

Despite its inviting title and New Age trappings, *The Art of Happiness* does not properly belong to the "power of positive thinking" category of self-help books. It is, in essence, an *intermediate* guide to early Buddhist meditational practice which, notwithstanding its congenial, user-friendly tone, presumes a reader seriously devoted to meditation practice and one who is, ideally, under the guidance of an experienced teacher. Consequently, a better place to start might be *The Experience of Insight* by Joseph Glodstein, based on an actual Buddhist retreat and which includes questions and answers. Next one might want to consult *The Heart of Buddhist Meditation* by Frýba's former teacher Nyanaponika Thera (Samuel Weiser, Inc., 1962). This book has the advantage of focusing more narrowly on Buddhist meditational practice than does Frýba and includes, in addition, a translation of the "The Greater Discourse on the Foundations of Mindfulness" (Maha-Satipatthāna-Sutta) and an anthology of Buddhist texts dealing with right mindfulness.

With these or similar basic books as a background, in conjunction with an established meditation practice, one would be in a position to gain valuable insight from Frýba whose advice on meditation increasingly, as the book proceeds, has the authentic sound of someone who has explored the territory of the more subtle regions of the mind

and whose maps, as a consequence, serve as reliable guides to what may be found there. For in spite of its attempt to do a few too many things, *The Art of Happiness* undeniably builds up to a noteworthy climax as Fryba attempts to integrate the visionary "strategies of ecstasy" (Chapter 7) aimed at purifying the mind (*citta-visuddhi*) and heightening consciousness (227), into the fabric of everyday life by means of the "strategies of power" of the concluding chapter.

Narrowly conceived, *The Art of Happiness* is intended as a bridge for "New Age" practitioners from the theoretical works of writers like Ken Wilber and Stanislav Grof to the more experientially based and practically useful model of the *abhidhamma* as conceived and presented by Fryba to a modern Western audience. Yet its title is likely to entice unsuspecting readers in pursuit of "happiness." Can someone be taught to be "happy"? This is a doubtful proposition, however many popular psychology books make the bestseller lists. The very search for "happiness" is, arguably, a symptom of unhappiness. And if, on the other hand, one *is* "happy," there is no reason such a book.

Fryba's faithful reader, whom the author, in his optimistic and familiar way, refers to "just as you are now, as the person experienced in Dharma strategies" (275), will in fact discover near the end of the book that "happiness" as such cannot be taught! Happiness is rather a by-product of a successful meditation practice (282-84). The cat is, so to speak, finally let out of the bag. But any reader who has come so far, diligently experimenting with Fryba's exercises along the way, will have come to understand that "happiness" of the kind meant by the author is not obtained through five-minute exercises in self-affirmation nor is it sought for its own sake. It is rather one result of a peculiarly integrative and pervasive kind of "knowledge" (*paññā*) which combines with "confidence," willpower, concentration, and mindfulness" (44) and which by no means excludes ethical living

(*sīla*) (152-56).

The extraordinary nature of the demands being made upon the reader becomes abundantly clear in the final chapter in which Fryba leads her or him through the four "magical" (*iddhi*) roads to power (*chanda*, intention; *virīya*, will power; *citta*, consciousness; *vimamsa*, investigation). The reader then encounters several realms of *satipathāna-vipassanā* (mindfulness meditation) exercises—including the contemplation of impermanence (*anicca*), the analytical subtleties of distinguishing directly experienced bodily events (*rūpa*) from mental apprehension of them (*nāma*), the process of turning away (*nibbidā*) from suffering, among others—and culminating in the experiences of emptiness (*suññatā*) and freedom (*āsava-khaya*, literally, "dwindling way of influences"). These are indeed subtle and rarefied regions of the mind, not to be confused with popular psychological remedies for personal unhappiness. Few will enter the territory described here, and any practitioner who has come so far will not have done so in pursuit of the bromide of "happiness," nor will such a person, at such a stage, any leading need.

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The Buddhist Priest Myōe: A Life of Dreams, by Hayao Kawai. Translated and edited by Mark Unno. Venice: The Lapis Press, 1992. xxii + 237 pages. Cloth: \$30.00

The editor of *Pacific World* has asked me to comment on the Japanese Jungian psychologist Hayao Kawai's spiritual biography of the early thirteenth century Buddhist monk and saint, Myōe Kōben. It is a biography made possible in large part because Myōe faithfully recorded his dreams over the greater part of his life, and because at least half of his own dream diary, as well as others of his dreams noted in contemporary biographies of Myōe have preserved this dream record to the present day.

The oracular importance of dreams has been recognized in religious traditions throughout the world, and in Myōe's own thirteenth century world both Ippen, the founder of the Pure Land tradition, and Shinran, who founded Shin Buddhism, marked pivotal occasions in the developments of their own spiritual movements with important dreams. Nothing however matched the steady devotion of Myōe over a thirty five year period to the products of his unconscious inner life. It is this taking up of his dream life in a committed fashion as part of his spiritual development toward ultimate freedom and compassion for all being that marks the joining of psychological and religious practice.

Though I am a colleague in Jung's Analytical Psychology with Professor Kawai, and also possess academic credentials as an historian of religious philosophy in the West, I know next to nothing about Japan and Japanese culture, and I understand nearly as little of Buddhism. Yet our urgent need to communicate across the boundaries of specialist disciplines in order to enlarge the scope of our knowledge, and to find vital connections to common meaning, causes us to risk the interdisciplinary venture, in spite of our individual limitations of expertise. Kawai himself notes that "readers familiar with Buddhist thought and history are not likely to know much about dreams and dream analysis, and vice versa." Thus two introductory chapters of his book were necessary, one

on dreams, their history, their role in Japanese culture, and Jung's psychodynamic approach to interpretation of dreams, and a second on Myōe's life in the context of the Kamakura period in which he lived. My own comments can be only in terms of the world I know.

We have a great need for spiritual/psychological biographies which interpret religious behavior in a non-pathologizing manner. A generation ago, Erik Erikson studied the inner dialectic of Martin Luther's revolutionary vocation, discovering in his triumphant doctrine of justification by faith both a re-iteration of the infantile bond of trust with his mother and a partial internalization of father's restrictive, judgmental shaping of his character. Luther solved the problematic of his own life while becoming, as a powerful reformer, a model in whom the masses might find a "rejuvenation of trust." A decade later, in *Gandhi's Truth*, Erikson proposed that Gandhi's technique of freeing his people from their subjugation like the technique of psychoanalysis itself, involves both persistent and "militant probing" of the issues and nonviolent confrontation with one's opponent. Transformation becomes possible "only where man learns to be nonviolent toward himself as well as toward others."¹

Now here is Kawai's psychological interpretation of the inner life of a thirteenth century saint. Like others of its *genre* there is a particular issue in current culture which focuses the author's attention on an historical antecedent. For Kawai that is the relationship between the sexes, and especially the question, how can we envision the quality of a man's relationship with women? No problem of changing culture in Japan is more urgent than this.

Like others of its kind also, the author tests a general hypothesis of human nature which should find validation in the life being studied. The general psychological hypothesis by means of which Kawai studies Myōe is the individuation

process—a lifelong program of inner development and maturation which should result near the end of life, if the process has resulted in increasing self-knowledge, and is accompanied by earnest moral intention, in the achievement of the self. The effect of the self so achieved is described in various ways by modern people. It is “being at last who I really am.” Or one may feel deeply emotionally connected to her/himself as well as to people and things in the world. But there is also a sense of being less painfully conflicted, more accepting of the life in which one finds oneself. There seem to be fewer surprises, although one might expect anything, and there are moments of delight. Clinically there is very much less anxiety than may be observed in people who have worked with less intentionality on their own maturation.

Kawai follows the theories and the technique of the germinal Swiss physician and psychologist C. G. Jung, but when he describes Myōe's life Kawai passes naturally into Buddhist religious vocabulary, there being obvious corollaries between Jung's individuation process and the Buddhist path (and indeed connections to the disciplined, ascetic paths of other religious traditions as well).

The image of Myōe which emerges out of Kawai's working through of the biographical materials and the corresponding, dated records of his dreams is that of an impassioned, faithful and at the same time completely spontaneous devotee of Śākyamuni. Unlike his contemporaries Ippen and Shinran, who founded new forms in which Buddhism would henceforth live in Japan, Myōe was not an innovator. Kawai observes that “the very life which Myōe lived was his ‘thought.’” It was the “quality of his religious life that warrants our attention” (p. 47f).

Myōe lost both his parents at the age of seven, at the beginning of the uprisings of the Kamakura period; at eight he entered the temple. At twelve, after studying earnestly for four years he decided he had lived long enough and went to

a graveyard overnight, expecting to be eaten by the wolves. At fifteen he took the tonsure and was memorizing as many as ten pages daily of the *Abidharmakośa*, a treatise by the Indian master Vasubandhu. He began keeping his *Dream Diary* at eighteen. At twenty-three, during a period of solitary practice in the mountains of Shirakami in Kishū, when he could no longer stand living with other monks of his day whom he felt were violating the precepts, he cut off his right ear as a sign of his own commitment to the Buddha. The following day during meditation, a vision of the great sage Mañjuśrī sitting golden on the lion king appeared in the sky before him, seeming to validate Myōe's sacrificial act and his chosen path.

Twice Myōe determined to make a pilgrimage to India and twice his visions and dreams caused him to reconsider. On the first occasion there were repeated visions of the displeasure of the Kasuga deity, who instructed Myōe that he was already under the protection of various deities and would in any case be born in the Tusita Heaven in his next life, but that there were many humans in the world now who urgently awaited his teaching. (Here is the Mahayana impetus to save the other.) Three years later Myōe again planned to go to India, even calculating how far he could travel on each day of the journey. But he became mysteriously ill and felt plagued by an invisible, irritating genie who pinched him and climbed on his body. When he pulled lots to decide the question all the lots said no. So Myōe abandoned his desire, this time for good.

From the point of view of a psychological observer what is interesting and convincing about Myōe is not the miraculous seeming or extraordinarily virtuous nature of his dreams and his actions, but the fact that he seems to have processed the events of his life with attention and receptivity, that he learned from everything that happened to him, that his conscious ego did not become rigidly encrusted with dignity and position even during the years when his fame was increasing. His

feeling remained open and engaged. One might say psychologically that he accepted and internalized rather than defending against affective states. To a beginner it may appear that remaining emotionally open makes one dangerously vulnerable. The adept, however, learns not to let feeling responses be stopped by the resistances of the ego. Rather, affect is "fed through" to the deeper level of the objectifying self where it is assessed and integrated, actually increasing the strength of the individual and increasing also a sense of unity with the world. There can be no doubt that one of the major problems of life is what to do about the disturbing effects of emotional states, and we must be deeply interested in every genuinely attempted solution.

It is in the light of this felt participatory union with the world that one of the most charming incidents of Myōe's life may be understood—his letter to the beautiful Island of Karumo. Myōe instructed his disciple to carry the letter to the island, declare aloud that a letter from Myōe had arrived, and then toss the letter into the wind and return home. Myōe wrote:

I trust there has been no change since the last time I saw you. After I left I have not been able to find the means to go see you, and I hope you will excuse me for failing to send word. Oh, island, you yourself belong to the realm of desire...

Myōe then goes on in more philosophical vein to declare the identity of all form with the Buddha body, and that he and the island are therefore of one kind (p. 100).

In 1221 Myōe put his own life in immediate danger of a violent end by responding to the plight of the widows of the aristocrats and warriors who were defeated in the Jōkyū Incident. Emperor Goshirakawa planned to regain control from the Shogunate, but the project failed and imperial rule was decisively destroyed. Myōe offered the imme-

diately protection of his temple to the women, and went on to build them a nunnery. But the enraged Kamakura warriors hauled Myōe off to be punished and it was only when the deputy Yasutoki heard Myōe calmly offer his own head if he should in any way have impeded their rule that the situation was saved.

Kawai finds particular evidence for the individuation process in Myōe's dreams of and relationship with women. In the life of a monk who lived 750 years ago Kawai thinks he has a model whose example may serve Japanese men and women today as they begin to move toward relationships of autonomy and free interdependence. In previously published work Kawai has shown that the substrate of Japanese religious life has always been dominated by maternal feminine motifs even while the overt cultural pattern is fiercely patriarchal. Among the monks, chastity was enjoined, but in Japan, even in early periods, the rule was more often broken than kept. Monks typically descended from their temple compounds to stay the night with their mistresses in the village, returning to the temple in the morning. It became traditional for sons to inherit the temple of their fathers (p. 50).

The primary man-woman relationship in Japan has always been mother-son. The mother is conceived as protectress, but always also as potential devourer who would keep the son/man from his autonomy. Thus women have been strictly controlled in roles of mother or sexual partner; genuine relationships of spiritual companionship between equal men and women developed only seldom.

Myōe determined from the beginning to live as a pure monk. He did not however withdraw from connection to the feminine, and there is evidence that his relationship to the image of the feminine changed and matured over the years. At eighteen, in the same year that he began his *Dream Diary*, Myōe received the transmission of the Diamond Realm, and he took as his principle deity

Butsugen-butsuma, the Buddha-eye Mother of All Buddhas. Myōe dreamed of her often; her image is enshrined at Kozanji and beside it this inscription in his own hand at twenty three:

Pity me as I think of you
Oh my enlightened one.
Other than you
No one knows.
Great mother of the earless priest
Grace me with thine compassion
Birth upon birth, age after age
Do not leave me,
Oh great mother, dear mother.

Myōe had the gift to express deep feeling toward the mother goddess even as a young man, and he went on to develop internalized relationships with female figures who might in another life style have been age appropriate partners. The contemporary records state that Myōe received the Sutra on the Essence of Ultimate Reality, an esoteric Shingon scripture, in a dream. This work affirms love between the sexes and states that desire in itself is pure. Myōe at first apparently resisted the sutra by having a hard time remembering it, but then accepted the scripture. The great thing about Myōe is what he did with it. As Kawai remarks, "he neither denied nor suppressed desire, but affirmed it while maintaining the precepts" (p. 75).

Myōe's few extant letters to women are both warm and correct. There were women in his circle of followers. In the decade between 1200 and 1210 there are many dreams of women which seem to show continuing growth, allowing him to draw ever closer in intimate relationship to feminine figures while still keeping clear of physical relationships. Desire became a pathway through which the projective quality of relationships to the feminine could be internalized, resulting gradually in a more general attitude of relatedness to all being. At the climax of this process Myōe had a dream in which a stone statuette of Shan-miao was

transformed into a living maiden through tears and the pitying care of Myōe. His affection for the figure of Shan-miao who appeared in his dream was such that he named the nunnery he built for the widowed refugees of the Jōkyū incident the Temple of Shan-miao.

One problem must trouble everyone who is working in the interdisciplinary field between psychology and religion. That is the question about what kind of reality base should underlie the interpretive scheme being presented. Kawai remarks very wisely at one point that if we take a cosmological stance we can embrace even opposing points of view, because both may be a part of the story we tell about our world. Pursuing an ideal, on the other hand, means excluding whatever contents fail to fit the ideal scheme (p. 47).

Nevertheless it means everything to the psychology student as well as to the religious practitioner to be able to tell one's experience in the language of inmost belief. Myōe identified himself as a follower of the Hua-yen philosophy of the Garland Sutra. So far as I am able to determine, the Hua-yen philosophy seems exactly similar to the monistic physics of ancient Stoicism in the West. Stoic physics admitted two principles for one substance. All is corporeality, but there is an active Principle within it which is reason and form, and a passive principle (matter, or better, prime matter) which receives the formal imprint of the active principle and thus assumes its visible shape. This vision of a unitive, corporeal universe enlivened everywhere by the presence of mind within it has since appeared in the philosophies of Leibniz, Spinoza, and Schopenhauer. In its form as the Doctrine of Sympathy it informed the writings of Paracelsus and other alchemists, and of Gustav Fechner and the psycho-physicists early in the twentieth century. Today it may be found in the process theology of Whitehead, Hartshorne and Cobb.

In his later years Jung, and after his death his pupil Marie-Louise von Franz, adopted much

of this philosophy as part of their defense of the autonomy of the psyche. In Chapter 5 of his book, "Mind and Object," and again in Chapter 7, "Mutual Interpenetration," Kawai discusses several important dreams, as well as some prescient seeming experiences in the life of Myōe. The hagiographical tradition marks these experiences as evidence of increasing fluidity in the subjectobject relation, increasing transcendence, and thus the increasing availability of telepathic and synchronistic events, as Myōe in maturity grew closer to the self. Kawai seems not to separate himself critically from the received texts and identifies with the philosophy of Myōe and with that of the late Jung and von Franz:

Myōe was able to see the common basis of not only humans and animals, but non-sentient existence as well. *Mono* (matter) and *kokoro* (mind) stand in a limitless relation of mutual interpenetration (p. 101).

Here is a view from which the underlying assumptions of modern social science, biology and physics will diverge. After many years of working with these problems I have come to believe that the better path is to acknowledge clearly the boundary between faith and science so that both religionists and social scientists can work more openly together on issues which are of great mutual interest. There is much in the enchanting person of Myōe, who forged a life of autonomy, compassion and grace in the midst of political unrest and familial loss, to interest people with different approaches to the data.

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NOTE

1. Erik Erikson, *Young Man Luther*. (London: Faber and Faber, 1958). Erik Erikson, *Gandhi's Truth*. (London: Faber and Faber, 1970). For a more recent but also "friendly" approach toward western ascetical treatises see my "Translocation of Parental Images in Fourth-Century Ascetic Texts: Motifs and Techniques of Identity." SEMEIA 58. (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1992)

James L. Watson, Evelyn S. Rawski, eds., *Death Ritual in Late Imperial and Modern China*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988. 316pp + index.

Unlike many edited volumes, Watson and Rawski's *Death Ritual in Late Imperial and Modern China* represents the results of an ongoing series of truly collaborative researches in the history, sociology, literature and anthropology of Chinese culture. Other volumes in the series, *Studies on China* include David N. Keightley, ed., *Origins of Chinese Civilization* (Berkeley, 1982); Bonnie S. McDougall, ed., *Popular Chinese Literature and Performing Arts in the People's Republic of China, 1949-1979* (Berkeley, 1984); James L. Watson, ed., *Class and Social Stratification in Post-Revolution China* (Cambridge, 1984); David Johnson, Andrew J. Nathan, and Evelyn S. Rawski, eds., *Popular Culture in Late Imperial China* (Berkeley, 1986); Patricia Buckley Ebrey and James L. Watson eds., *Kinship Organization in Late Imperial China 1000-1940* (Berkeley, 1986); Shuen-fu Lin and Stephen Owen, eds., *The Vitality of the Lyric Voice: Shih Poetry from the Late Han to the T'ang* (Princeton, 1986); and David M. Lampton, ed., *Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China* (Berkeley, 1987).

Reflecting its origin in an ongoing debate, *Death Ritual in Late Imperial and Modern China* opens with two contending introductions. James Watson stresses the observation of ritual in "The Structure of Chinese Funerary Rites: Elementary Forms, Ritual Sequence, and the Primacy of Performance," while Evelyn Rawski details the advantages of "A Historian's Approach to Chinese Death Ritual." For Watson, "it is the unique configuration of ritual elements that makes a funeral acceptably Chinese," (p. 7) and he argues that "the standardization of ritual practice almost always took precedence over efforts to legislate or control beliefs" (p. 10). Rawski cautions, however, that "in addition to the geomancer...the funeral priest...was most likely to have access to written texts of some kind. Even peasant death rituals used a wide variety of written materials. The presence of written texts

signifies direct ties to the elite tradition" (p. 33).

The other ten essays included in the volume align themselves roughly along this methodological fault-line. The historically oriented essays of Susan Naquin, ("Funerals in North China: Uniformity and Variation"), Frederic Wakeman, Jr., ("Mao's Remains"), and Evelyn S. Rawski ("The Imperial Way of Death: Ming and Ch'ing Emperors and Death Ritual") contrast with those used in field work by Stuart E. Thompson ("Death, Food, and Fertility"), Elizabeth L. Johnson, ("Grieving for the Dead, Grieving for the Living: Funeral Laments of Hakka Women"), Myron L. Cohen, ("Souls and Salvation: Conflicting Themes in Chinese Popular Religion"), Martin K. Whyte, ("Death in the People's Republic of China"), Emily Martin, ("Gender and Ideological Differences in Representations of Life and Death"), Rubie S. Watson, ("Remembering the Dead: Graves and Politics in Southeastern China"), and James L. Watson, ("Funeral Specialists in Cantonese Society: Pollution, Performance, and Social Hierarchy"). The contrast which in abstract may seem quite clear, nonetheless blurs in the case of a civilization which has, regardless of its overall literacy rates, made an icon of textuality.

The significance of the history/anthropology debate is, however, overshadowed by new questions arising in the social sciences and the humanities. Foremost of these is awareness of gender. Thus, Watson provides us the basic outline of the funeral (based on *Li chi* and simplified by Chu Hsi):

1. public notification of death by wailing, etc.
2. donning of mourning dress.
3. ritual bathing of the corpse.
4. transfer of food, money, etc. from the living to the dead.
5. preparation and installation of soul tablet.
6. ritual use of money and employment of

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professionals.

7. music to accompany the corpse and settle the spirit.

8. sealing the corpse in an airtight coffin.

9. expulsion of the coffin from the community. (12-15)

This outline is born out by Naquin's fine historical spadework in north China gazetteers, but it is an outline largely indifferent to gender issues. In contrast, Stuart E. Thomson's *tour de force* analysis of food prestations at Taiwanese funerals examines the symbolic taxonomy which pairs rice with men, and pork with women. "While rice is 'substance shared' by members of a family, pork is very much 'substance given,' for it is prototypically the food-stuff for exchange and reciprocity between families—it is the primary banquet food" (p. 97). "In wedding exchanges, the key food is the pig sent by the groom's family to the bride's. A wife is transferred in one direction, a pig in the other" (the head and tail are returned to the groom's side). According to Thompson, ritual offerings of pigs at funerals may constitute both a repayment of a debt and an effort to replace the flesh of the deceased (p. 99). Elsewhere he describes the symbolism of the grave mound as a pregnant woman—a "wombstone" (p. 104) as well as the series of double entendres surrounding the *tou*, the container of rice used in the funeral. At times the symbolism seems so compacted as to strain credulity and tempt us to charge Thompson with overinterpretation. But his interpretations originate with his informants and are well documented.

Emily Martin's exploration of women's views of marriage and death demonstrate the negative affective results of this elaborate coding, while Johnson's work on Hakka women's funeral laments underscores the deep ambivalence concerning the role of women at funerals. A women's role at a funeral is structured around an ideology of male dominance. In contrast to other social events, funerals are appropriate places for women to be

prominent because they, like death, are *yin* (p. 158). Yet the content of "funeral laments demonstrate repeatedly that, besides her children, those family relationships a woman most deeply values are those with her natal family" (p. 157). Martin's work is the first real exploration of the meaning of the laments and as a bonus she presents the texts of two complete laments (pp. 161-163).

Two other articles bear special mention here. Frederic Wakeman's "Mao's Remains" is a fascinating examination of the funerals and memorials both of Mao and of his archrival Chiang kai-shek. Pointing out continuities with earlier burials including those of Sun Yat-sen and Ch'ing and Ming emperors, Wakeman details the remarkable similarity between the services and memorial edifices of Mao and Chiang as well as the political theater of the funeral process. Finally, Martin K. Whyte's article on "Death in the People's Republic of China" begins to delineate continuities and changes in contemporary China, as well as the growing gulf between rural and urban practice and belief.

If there are any weaknesses of the volume they are in the scanty attention payed to religious elites—the Buddhist and Taoist priests. Watson focuses on funeral specialists (*nahm mouh lo*) who are not members of these corporations while Naquin mentions monks and nuns in passing (pp. 59, 61). Perhaps this may become the topic of a future effort in this series.

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The Pacific World

notes with sadness the passing of
several scholars in the fields of Buddhist Studies,
Asian Religions and Buddhist-Christian Dialogue
in the past year:

Leo Marvel Pruden

Anna Seidel

Joseph Kitagawa

Ulrich Mammitzsch

Bimal K. Matilal

Charles Lohman

