The *PACIFIC WORLD* — Its History

Throughout my life (now 96 years old), I have sincerely believed that Buddhism is a religion of peace and compassion, a teaching which will bring spiritual tranquillity to the individual, and contribute to the promotion of harmony and peace in society. My efforts to spread the Buddha's teachings began in 1925, while I was a graduate student at the University of California at Berkeley. This beginning took the form of publishing the *Pacific World*, on a bi-monthly basis in 1925 and 1926, and then on a monthly basis in 1927 and 1928. Articles in the early issues concerned not only Buddhism, but also other cultural subjects such as art, poetry, and education, and then by 1928, the articles became predominantly Buddhistic. Included in the mailing list of the early issues were such addressees as the Cabinet members of the U.S. Government, Chambers of Commerce, political leaders, libraries, publishing houses, labor unions, and foreign cultural institutions.

After four years, we had to cease publication, primarily due to lack of funds. It was then that I vowed to become independently wealthy so that socially beneficial projects could be undertaken without financial dependence on others. After founding the privately held company, Mitutoyo Corporation, I was able to continue my lifelong commitment to disseminate the teachings of Buddha through various means.

As one of the vehicles, the *Pacific World* was again reactivated, this time in 1982, as the annual journal of the Institute of Buddhist Studies. For the opportunity to be able to contribute to the propagation of Buddhism and the betterment of humankind, I am eternally grateful. I also wish to thank the staff of the Institute of Buddhist Studies for helping me to advance my dream to spread the spirit of compassion among the peoples of the world through the publication of the *Pacific World*.

Yehan Numata
Founder
Mitutoyo Corporation

Pacific World is an annual journal in English devoted to the dissemination of historical, textual, critical and/or interpretive articles on Buddhism generally and Shinshu Buddhism particularly to both academic and lay readerships.

The journal is distributed free of charge.

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Manuscripts are to be double-spaced, including indented quotations and notes, and should be approximately 20 pages in length. They should be submitted by April 1st. Detailed guidelines for preparation of manuscripts will be sent on request.

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BOOK REVIEWS

NOTICES

The Sectarian Beginnings of Jōdo-shū: An Analysis of Hōnen's *Senjaku Hongan Nembutsu*

by Whalen W. Lai, *University of California, Davis*

Hōnen (1133-1212) left his mountain hermitage at Kurotani in 1175, and going among the people in Kyoto, proclaimed his doctrine of nembutsu (Buddha-name recitation) as the means to *ōjō* (rebirth in Amida's Pure Land). It was then, at the age of forty-three, that Hōnen, for some time devoted to Genshin's *Ōjōyōshū*, discovered Zendō (Chinese: Shan-tao) and experienced a "conversion." Traditionally, this date is regarded as the founding of the Jōdo-shū. The founding of the Jōdo-shū signalled the emergence of the first truly Japanese sect, the ideology of which, like its social organization later, had known no precedence in China or Japan. The nembutsu movement broke away from the recognized eight schools in Heian and set the pace for the Kamakura Buddhist Reformation.[1]

The present paper will analyze this historic breakthrough in the context of Hōnen's life, in relationship with Shan-tao's *Kuan-ching hsüan-i*[2] on which Hōnen "solely relied," and within the social setting of late Heian and early Kamakura. The focus will be on Hōnen's *Senjaku Hongan Nembutsu-shū*[3] (*Senjakushū*) and its relationship with Shan-tao's work and Genshin's *Ōjōyōshū*.[4]

The contention is that the *Senjakushū* was compiled consciously in 1198 so as to define the nature of the new sect, legitimatized by a second dramatic conversion of Hōnen in a trance (*samādhi*) encounter with Shan-tao. This work gave institutional identity to the nembutsu movement and created a *Jōdoshūgaku* outlook that reached beyond Shan-tao's vision. The term *senjaku* (choice, selection, discrimination) underwent a subtle change of meaning: What was probably originally Hōnen's personal choice of nembutsu as his own path, albeit a path among paths, became Amida's Choice (or Election in Calvin's sense) and the choice by all Buddhas. What was *apologetic senjaku* in Hōnen's personal faith became a mature sectarian doctrine, or *dogmatic senjaku*.

The *Senjakushū* was originally a tract that circulated privately within the inner circle of Hōnen's disciples. It was a compilation of scriptural and commentary passages with Hōnen's comments. Only the initial few lines were in Hōnen's own handwriting. The circumstances under which the work emerged were by normal standards rather extraordinary. In 1198, during the first month of Hōnen's 66th year, Hōnen attained *samādhi* in a dream encounter with Shan-tao who appeared to him in a luminous half-golden body. Later in the same year, Hōnen found a patron in Lord Hōjō Kujō at whose urging, the *Senjakushū* was compiled. Soon after, in 1204, Hōnen and his disciples drafted a *Seven-point Article*,[5] urging the following to avoid excesses and disowning evil and foolish elements. In the next year, a counter nine-point critique launched by the Old Heian Schools charged that Hōnen's "private designation of a (new) sect was most inappropriate."[6] Since the *Senjakushū* was the treatise that set the definition of the new sect and since it seemed to have touched off the above charges and countercharges, some modern scholars would see the real beginning of the Jōdo-shū in 1198 and not 1175.[7] The new thesis tends to stress the possible political association between Hōnen and Hōjō but it is not unchallenged by more traditional scholars.[8] After considering the conflicting opinions, I would like to suggest the following compromise.

Hōnen entered the Tendai order at seventeen from a low samurai family. As one of the many conscientious lower clerics dissatisfied with

the hierocratic politics at Mount Hiei, Hōnen retired as a hermit and holy man (*hijiri*) in a common form of protest. The personal conversion at forty-three to the nembutsu path of Shan-tao was genuine and the act of leaving a solitary life and, like other active young monks, mingling with the people in Kyoto, definitely signalled an evangelical zeal to make known his personal choice of the Pure Land path. An amorphous following developed; fellow-monks in the Tendai establishment also chose to cultivate this private devotional practice *without disassociating themselves from the Tendai school.* By one account, Hōnen himself seemed to have remained an "outward Tendai monk, with inward nembutsu faith"[9] as late as his sixties. He was probably in the footstep of a popular living saint like Kūya, known for a "style" more than for an independent philosophical position. It would be reading too much later sectarian self-consciousness into the early Hōnen if one assumes that immediately after his 1175 "conversion," Hōnen intended to found a sect of his own. However, unlike Genshin, something in the nature of Hōnen's appropriation of Shan-tao pointed ahead to an unavoidable break with Tendai.

Preliminary reflection and initial opposition before 1198 necessitated a doctrinal defense.[10] The *samādhi* experience and the social (not necessarily political) support from Hōjō allowed Hōnen the time and energy to spell out, defensively and offensively, the first clear statement on the meaning of nembutsu. The *Senjakushū* so produced did not initiate the nembutsu movement. The nembutsu vogue went back to Heian times before Hōnen, and an amorphous nembutsu following that formed around Hōnen existed before 1198. The *Senjakushū* merely gravitated that loose body of associates and devotees into a self-conscious social and ideological unit. Despite its being a "limited edition for private circulation," the *Senjakushū* provided the first common Jōdo-shū catechism[11] that furthered the sectarian sentiment and the evangelical zeal especially among some extremists. Hōnen himself as late as 1200 was ready to "stoop" to an un-Jōdo-like expediency[12] of praying for Hōjō's health and decried any sectarian conflict in the 1204 *Articles*, desiring only the right for him and his followers to practice their faith in peace.[13] The *Senjakushū*, however, was of such a nature that it had to become the seedbed of "Either/Or" sympathy or antipathy, and the cause for the sectarian dissociation from Tendai, as well as for the initial persecution of 1207 and the reinstatement of Hōnen in 1211.

Therefore, the traditional dating of the origin of the Jōdo-shū at 1175 was not incorrect: Hōnen's private mission began then, even though he could not have anticipated the future sect-formation. The modern revision of the dating, regarding 1198 to be the founding of the Jōdo-shū, is also justified: the *Senjakushū* catapulted the movement into the socio-political arena of hierocratic conflicts. Hōnen consciously founded a *shū* (sect) but even so, he probably did not foresee the radicalization, controversy and Jōdo heresies ahead.

It is possible to see some of these subtle changes in the life and self-understanding of Hōnen in the *Senjakushū* itself. The following analysis of the work will first look into Hōnen's defense of his new "path" or "sect." The main body will analyze how Hōnen synthesized and transcended Genshin and Shan-tao. Finally, the term *senjaku*, selection, will be analyzed in terms of the "self-powered" and the "other-powered" dialectics.

THE SECTARIAN INTENTIONS OF *SENJAKUSHŪ*

The *Senjakushū* was written in classical Chinese-Japanese and was basically a compilation of scriptural and commentary passages. As such, its readership was limited by matters of literacy and secrecy. Being a dissertation defining the philosophical basis for the ongoing nembutsu movement, it was not intended to be a popular tract or even a personal statement, confession or com-

munication.[14] The format—quotations with comments by Hōnen—might have grown out of Hōnen's private instructions or reflections; it was not in the style of a systematic *summa*. The main body dealt with doctrinal issues, but the opening and the closing chapters addressed themselves to current issues. The sectarian intentions were spelled out defensively in the first chapter, but the apologetical tone changed toward the end. The last chapter gave an authoritative, charismatic and revelatory basis to the foundation of the sect.

To establish a school at that time required (a) justification of a path, (b) a tenet-classification scheme to place the school within the multi-levelled teachings, (c) and a patriarchal lineage. Hōnen addressed himself to all three.

The *Senjakushū* began with Tao-cho's distinction of the Pure Land path from the Sage path.[15] The Pure Land path was "qualitatively" easier than the Sage's search for wisdom. The Sage's path was the "harder" path in Nāgārjuna—T'an-luan's classification. Hōnen began with Tao-cho (instead of his favorite Shan-tao) because Tao-cho initiated the "Pure Land path" category and because Tao-cho associated this path with the need in the Age of the Degenerate Dharma.[16] That aeon of corruption and evil commenced, in Tao-cho's calculation, 1500 years after Buddha's *parinirvana* (948 B.C. [sic]), that is, 552 A.D. The same anxiety recurred in late Heian when the date was set at 1052 A.D. instead. The *mappō* or *masse* eschatological mood was prevalent in Hōnen's time[17] and the concern for the "timely" teaching—the Dharma that corresponded to the recipients' disposition (Ch: *chi*; Jpn: *ki*) reappeared in Hōnen's appropriation of Tao-cho.[18] "The Jōdo-shū," said Hōnen, "established itself upon the intention of the teachings of the meditative master, Tao-cho."[19]

But Hōnen was not satisfied with *a path*. Had he designated his faith only as a path, he would not be charged with heresy by the Old Schools. Because Hōnen intended Tao-cho's classification to "encompass all Buddha's teachings," so he looked for and established the tradition of "The Threefold Amida Corpus"[20]—the *Greater* and the *Lesser Amida Sutra* and the *Amida Meditation Sutra*—in conscious imitation of the other sets of Threefold Sutras then current in Japan: the *Lotus*, the *Mahāvairocana*, the *Nation-protecting* and the *Maitreya* collections. The Jōdo *Sanbukyō* category was unknown in China.

Conscious that Tendai and Shingon, the two major schools in Heian, claimed unbroken patriarchal transmission, a hypothetical questioner asked how this teaching of Hōnen came about. In the first chapter of the *Senjakushū*, Hōnen admitted that there were three Pure Land lineages in China.[21] He did not even say that he relied on the Shan-tao lineage, although it is clear from subsequent discussion that he did. Hōnen remained "objective" in so categorizing the various lineages of Pure Land patriarchs in China. This is because his original conversion in 1175 was largely due to his reading Shan-tao's commentary on the *Amida Meditation Sutra*. That intellectual conversion was not, by the standards current in Heian, sufficient to establish a spiritual link with Śākyamuni's teachings.

The question of patriarchal linkage was doubly crucial in late Heian. By this time, the Tendai school had become thoroughly esotericized. *Taimitsu* (Esoteric Tendai) had adopted elements of *Hongaku* thought and the cult of an esoteric passage of teaching from master to master. This secret transmission was "from mouth to mouth," or "from mind to mind," or by way of a secret formula written "on a piece of paper."[22] In that atmosphere, Hōnen picked initially one Shan-tao lineage from three then available in China, but this rational decision was not enough. In the last chapter, Hōnen finally returned once more to this issue and outlined his *esoteric* legitimacy. The following is a précis of an exchange in that chapter:

> Q. Of the many interpretations of Pure Land piety, why do you follow Shan-tao?
> A. Shan-tao alone followed the Pure Land piety

at the exclusion of the Sage Path.
Q. But were there not other Pure Land masters who did the same?
A. True, but only Shan-tao had touched off a *samādhi* (in me, Hōnen).
Q. But a disciple of Shan-tao also had such an experience, why do you not follow him?
A. He, being only a disciple, cannot be followed as his greater master can be.
Q. What then about Tao-cho who was the teacher of Shan-tao?
A. Tao-cho depended on Shan-tao... And Shan-tao had a revelatory experience (as evidenced by a description in his commentary) so that he could declare his commentary to be so sacred that "not one word should be miscopied." (In other words,) his work was inspired and he was a manifestation of Amida on earth, a *nirmanakāya* of Amida.[23]

The implication in this exchange was to lend mystical support to Hōnen's earlier conversion. Hōnen's encounter with Shan-tao's text was not an encounter with an ordinary commentary. Rather, the commentary was sacred, revealed by Amida and authored by Amida incarnate. Furthermore, in 1198, Hōnen had a dream encounter with Shan-tao which touched off a *samādhi* [24] (highest state of enlightenment) in Hōnen, thus verifying his calling. The Jōdo-shū was no creation of man; it was predestined by this esoteric transmission of the Dharma.

Eventually in the official doctrine of the Jōdo-shū, the two attendant bodhi-sattvas of Amida Buddha (Avalokiteśvara and Mahāsthāmaprāpta) were identified with Shan-tao and Hōnen. The mystical status Hōnen saw in Shan-tao, his spiritual "tutor," was similarly extended by Hōnen's followers to Hōnen himself. The skeptic might wonder if the *samādhi* experience in 1198 was nothing more than a legitimation device, but the historian of religion will note that such dream-encounters were not uncommon in medieval hagiography and should be seen at times as genuine forms of inspiration. Just as charismatic authority was claimed in the founding of the first Sinitic Mahayana school, T'ien-t'ai,[25] so a similar "breakthrough" manifested itself in the birth of the first truly Japanese Buddhist sect.[26]

THE *SENJAKUSHŪ* SYNTHESIS OF GENSHIN'S ZEAL AND SHAN-TAO'S FAITH-RELIANCE

Doctrinally speaking, the *Senjakushū* symbolized the synthesis of the two key influences in Hōnen's thinking: Genshin's *Ōjōyōshū* with its fervor for rebirth and Shan-tao's *Kuan-ching hsüan-i* with its definite dependence on Amida. Prior to his acquaintance with Shan-tao's work, Hōnen, a mountain *hijiri*, was impressed primarily by Genshin. Genshin unknowingly pointed him towards Shan-tao. When the *Senjakushū* took shape, Hōnen had digested the two masters and forged his own path.

Genshin's early influence was perhaps retained in the opening couplet of the *Senjakushū*. In Hōnen's handwriting and as a resumé of the movement:

Namu Amida Butsu
Of all works (karma) leading to birth beyond (*ōjō*),
Priority belongs to nembutsu.[27]

The couplet was a virtual citation from the *Ōjōyōshū*.[28] As it stands, it retains a "primitive, naive" phase in Hōnen's piety. The emphasis then was on the act (work, karma) of nembutsu. (The proper shift to faith and total dependence on Amida, forsaking even the last element of *ōjō* by work, came later in Shinran). It made nembutsu the "prior" means, *without ruling out other means or other ends aside from ōjō*, and without making nembutsu explicitly the sole means or even the one basis (*i hon*).[29] This couplet was closest to the

popular teaching of Genshin that Hōnen once followed. The success of the mature Jōdo-shū movement, however, was due to the popularist *ōjō* zeal corrected by Shan-tao's faith-reliance.

Four centuries separated Shan-tao and Hōnen. Shan-tao was an early T'ang figure while Hōnen came at the end of the "High Medieval" Heian period in Japan. In the years in between, two new motifs developed within Far Eastern Buddhism: (1) the *ōjō* genre, and (2) the cosmic optimism of *Hongaku* (Ch: *Pen-chüeh*) thought.

The *ōjō* genre tells of legends of Birth in Pure Land. It began as twenty biographies in the later sections of Chia-ts'ai's *Ching-t'u-lun*,[30] and then became an independent genre by the middle of T'ang, and flourished in Sung China[31] and Japan. As a popular tradition of "miraculous deliverance to Pure Land," it took root only after Shan-tao, who was a young contemporary to Chia-ts'ai.[32] Shan-tao was responsible for making the Pure Land path a "prestigious, sublime" path—Amida's Pure Land, a Reward Land (belonging to the *Saṃbhogakāya* level of reality), was opened, for the first time, to *nien-fo* (nembutsu) commoners.[33] Through his evangelical work, Shan-tao helped to popularize the *ōjō* tradition. Unlike Hōnen though, Shan-tao did *not* know a dynamic ongoing *ōjō* tradition.

Genshin's *Ōjōyōshū* came towards the end of the *ōjō* genre tradition. In late medieval Heian, it attained a popularity second to none. When it is compared to the first Japanese *ōjō* collection (985) *Nihon Ōjō Gokurakuki*,[34] it can be seen that two important new elements had been added. Whereas the old collection was rather elitist (dealing with famous monks and aristocratic devotees like Prince Shōtoku), the later collections were longer, more embellished, dramatic and "democratic." This change reflected the spread of Buddhism and the popularity of nembutsu in Heian. The Heian aristocracy was said to be practicing "(Tendai) Lotus confession in the morning and (Amida) nembutsu in the evening." The extension of *ōjō* to more people led to the advent of *akunin ōjō*, stories of "evil men" gaining birth.[35] For example, a bloodthirsty *samurai* had a change of heart, he practiced nembutsu and was received into Pure Land. Although the salvation of the "evil man" here did not involve the kind of existential self-awareness of evil and the decision to abandon oneself to the saving power of Amida's vow that one finds in Hōnen and Shinran, nevertheless the interest in saving the common people anticipated later Jōdo and Jōdo-Shin sect's popularism. Heian *ōjō* piety, as a whole, however, placed more emphasis on the "descent of the Amida host to welcome the departed soul"[36] than on *ōjō*. There is an aesthetical mystery, an aristocratic melancholia, in Heian Amida piety.[37]

By the second half of Heian, with the rising consciousness of *mappō*, a second element penetrated the *ōjō* genre: the inclusion of the counterpart to paradise, i.e., the torments of hells.[38] The beginning portions of the *Ōjōyōshū* were so devoted to a detailed and awesome description of the various hells. The mood of anxiety lent a darker color to the genre and evoked a more zealous longing for the Pure Land.[39] I suspect the native Shintō notion of purity and pollution ("good" and "evil") added a Japanese touch to the fears. The plebeian aspiration for their "right" to rebirth in lavish paradises might also have instilled a greater sense of worthlessness of the self. *Samurai*, "contaminated by taking life," and commoners segregated from the sanctity of the theocratic elite had always been made to feel their socio-spiritual inferiority. More than Shan-tao, Hōnen showed a sympathy for the handicaps of the lowly.

The *Ōjōyōshū* did not generate a nembutsu sect, and had not Hōnen rediscovered Shan-tao, he would still be part of the Tendai establishment. Despite the emotional dualism of heavens and hells in Genshin's *Ōjōyōshū*, Genshin at heart and in his other works still supported the Tendai monism. The esoteric Genshin lineage, the *Eshinryū*, was especially well-known for its adherence to the

totalistic optimism of *Hongaku*, a faith in the inalienable *a priori* Buddhahood of all men. As long as Genshin was committed to this philosophy, it would be impossible to develop Hōnen's type of utter dependence on Amida. Now Shan-tao was immune to such optimism by virtue of temperament and because the mature *Hongaku* thought in China developed *after* his time. Hōnen's critique of Genshin was therefore based on his returning to a pre-*Hongaku* thinker (Shan-tao) to undermine the presumptuousness of Heian *Taimitsu* thought. The Jōdo-shū movement was built therefore upon a "Late Medieval" (that is, Kamakura) plebeian piety that relied upon an early "High Medieval" realism (Shan-tao). It signalled the collapse of the eternal, changeless sacred canopy that Tendai *Hongaku* thinkers had built for its own aristocratic, High Medieval era in Heian.[40]

An exhaustive analysis of *Hongaku* thought is not possible here and an outline will have to suffice.[41] *Hongaku* (*pen-chüeh*) meant literally "*a priori* enlightenment" or "omnipresent Buddhahood." The statement "All men are Buddhas" can be taken in various degrees of critical, literal, or mystical reading, depending on the degree of *Hongaku* radicalism of the person. As a monistic philosophy, collapsing the distinction between opposites, the formula went back to the *prajñāpāramitā* tradition that "All forms are empty," man as well as Buddha. Nirvana is samsara; samsara is nirvana. That *negativistic* formulation received a more objective and affirmative reinforcement in the T'ien-t'ai (Tendai) appropriation of the Mādhyamika philosophy, namely, in its doctrine that there is an objective harmony of the three aspects of reality. The apparent contradictions of (things being) Empty, Provisionally Real and the Mean can be resolved in a harmonious whole; the Three are ultimately One. Actually both Chih-i (of Chinese T'ien-t'ai) and Saicho (of Japanese Tendai) should be considered *Shikaku* thinkers, upholders of "Incipient Enlightenment."[42] However, in Japan, Tendai was soon esotericized and adopted very strong *Hongaku* sentiments. The following example, from Genshin himself, will show the "mystery" involved. "(In the name A-mi-da), the sound *A* represents the aspect of Emptiness, the sound *Mi* represents the aspect of Provisional Reality and the sound *Da* represents the Mean" (*Kanshinrakuyōshū*).[43] The unity of the name "Amida" therefore represented the Unity of the Three Aspects. Since the Three Aspects were also said (by Chih-i) to belong to the One Mind, the mental representation of Amida (uttered in nembutsu) actually meant the mystical identification of the Mind with All Realities, or Amida and with the basic Unity. The mouth might recite the name "A-mi-da," but the utmost unity should be actualized within the mind.[44] This esoteric understanding of Amida (as Ultimate Reality) and this use of the name as a *mantra* were central to Genshin's faith. Some elements of this also reappeared, perhaps in unguarded moments, in Hōnen's own thinking.[45]

The "objective, affirmative" Unity of Three Aspects could find a still more *Hongaku* expression in a "subjective idealism" which can say that all realities are *immediately* the Mind itself. This idealism was developed more in the camps of Hua-yen (Jpn: Kegon) and Ch'an (Zen). Opposites like good and evil, Suchness (the Buddhist Absolute) and ignorance (its antithesis) could be seen as being *dynamically*[46] fused in the Mind that comprehended and transcended them. At first, the Chinese detailed different levels of sublimating the opposites, but in the Zen tradition of Shen-hui and Tsung-mi, the immediate identity of the Mind with Suchness was taken in mystical seriousness.[47] The phrase: "Suchness *Hongaku*" or "*Hongaku* True-Mind" no longer designated the subjective mind because it is simultaneously the objective (cosmic) Mind. An example, again from Genshin, will afford us the necessary contrast later with Hōnen:

> According to the *Engakukyō* (*Yuan-chüeh-ching, Round Enlightenment Sutra*), it is said in a *gatha*

> that the Beginningless Ignorance of all sentient beings is resting on the basis of the Mind of Perfect Enlightenment of all the Buddhas. Therefore, samsara is nirvana, defilement is enlightenment. Nothing can ever obstruct this mutual penetration; therefore, All is One and Indifferentiable.[48] (*Ōjōyōshū*)

The above Cosmic Mind can further be dramatized in an even more extreme formulation of *Hongaku* mystery, as that mystery drives toward a more immediate, actual, down-to-earth, immanental Monism. The first line from the following citation from Genshin is representative of the final mystery that "Everything, as it is, immediately is Buddha;" a line that has its root in Chih-i's *Mo-ho-chih-kuan*:

> Every color and smell is nothing other than the Middle Path (the "Absolute" in Mahayana).... All the burdens of mental defilements and ignorance are none other than enlightenment.... All the sins of sentient beings are by nature empty and nothing is really there (in sinning).[49]

Every blade of grass is Buddha; even an evil thought is enlightenment. Such mystical statements can be found in Genshin, especially in those *Hongaku* works attributed to him.[50] Genshin's branch (the *Eshinryū* in esoteric Tendai) was especially known for its radicalism. This branch emphasized the immediate immanence of the Transcendental ("in a downward movement" that is, the Whole manifesting itself in every particular; "from result to cause"[51]). When it said, "Every blade of grass is Buddha," the proper reading is not that the flowering grass is *in appearance* a blade of grass while *in essence* it is like the Buddha. It is not that the blade is transformed ("transubstantiated") into a numinal reality, stripped off all mundane substance. The proper reading is that the blade of grass, without being in any way other than what it is (*i.e.*, a blade of grass), is immediately the Buddha. Or, to reverse the order, the Buddha in essence *is* the grass.

Such irrationality (irrational by our everyday, ethical, logical standards) sounds intolerable. Within *Hongaku* thought, such "irrationality" is perfectly permissible and even "rational" because *Hongaku* thought derived its "sense" not from logic, dialectics, or sophistry but ultimately from an intuitive recognition of a supernatural and extremely powerful Reality, sometimes associated with the Cosmic Womb of the Buddha (*tathāgatagarbha*[52]). In this all-encompassing, Absolute Reality, no "second" (no dualities, no other realities) could be. The philosophical refinements of what ultimately was a mystical experience were developed into what is known as *Tendai Hongakuron*, something uniquely Japanese, because it drew upon the primitive Shinto pan-animism emerging then in *ryōbūshintō* speculations, and in the esoteric mysteries of Shingon (Mantrayāna).[53] Incompatible though it might appear, mature *Hongaku* thought developed simultaneously with Hōnen's anti-*Hongaku* thought.[54] Hōnen was the pessimist who revolted against Heian thought, when the threat of the Last Age was hanging in the air.

Even as the few citations from Genshin above can show, Genshin himself had both the monistic *Hongaku* as well as the dualistic *ōjō*-desire. This dissonance did not bother Genshin. To the eclectic minds of Tendai masters, the varying interpretation of reality and the correspondingly different acts of piety, can be harmonized. To pursue *one path* as if it is the *only* path and to insist that everybody else should follow that *one* path and *no* other—that would be the immoderate mark of the "protestant reformer" (like Luther, the later Hōnen, Shinran) and not the character of a broad "catholic mind" (like Aquinas, Genshin, Myōe).[55] Genshin designed two paths: "In words, to recite the name of the Buddha (nembutsu in the sense of verbal praise); in the heart, to meditate on the Buddha (nembutsu in the sense of contemplative

identification, for in the end, all is mind)." Genshin also wrote for different audiences: the *Ōjōyōshū* was his "popular seller" while his "esoteric" treatises were for the inner circle. In the end, Genshin, however condescending to the people, divided the path still according to the Sage-monk path and the Commoner-layperson path. The former's calling contemplation on the True Body of Amida[56] (in its *Dharmakāya* Oneness) remained the superior path. There all dualities would indeed be transcended. That meditative Oneness was not available to Hōnen. Either he had abandoned it or else it had abandoned him.[57] At any rate, he liberated the naive nembutsu, faith-*ōjō* path from the tutelage of the higher nembutsu and initiated the revolt of the laity in Kamakura Japan.[58] In terms of Tendai's Four *Samādhi*, the historic shift was from the second to the fourth: (1) sitting *samādhi*, Zazen; (2) walking *samādhi*, Amida-remembrance; (3) half-sitting, half-walking *samādhi*, Lotus meditation; (4) neither-sitting nor walking *samādhi*, Kannon (Avalokiteśvara) meditation/nembutsu (to be practiced in daily activities). The first three are tailored for clerics, aristocrats, *Dharmatā, Hongaku*, the Tendai meditative vision as the fourth is for laity, plebes, thanksgiving and reliance.

Shan-tao's *Kuan-ching hsüan-i* provided Hōnen with the means to transcend Genshin by effectively eliminating the "higher" Sage path. Space does not allow for a full discussion on the *Kuan-ching* and Shan-tao's commentary such that a resumé again have to suffice.[59] The *Kuan-ching*, the *Amida Meditation Sutra*, listed sixteen *kuan* (objects) which contemplatives could visualize. The last three dealt with the nembutsu birth of the Three Grades of Men. Nembutsu, *buddhanusmṛti*, (buddha-recall), meant originally, in the Sanskrit text (of the *Amida sutra*) a contemplative recall of the Buddha. Strictly speaking then, the sixteen *vipaśyanās* should be considered to be meditational means taught by the Buddha. In that vein, the Chinese masters understood it until Shan-tao broke with tradition and concluded that the first thirteen were orientated towards *samādhi* and that the last three were directed at "elimination of evil." Shan-tao thus considered the *Kuan-ching* to be, firstly, a meditative text and secondly, a nembutsu (by that he meant eventually name-recitation) treatise. He concluded his commentary by insisting that the second was the *real* intention of the sutra. These three last *vipaśyanās* were considered to be freely preached by the Buddha (Śākyamuni) *out of his compassion*. They were for the Three Grades of Men, *all* considered by Shan-tao (again departing from older interpretations) to be grades of commoners. *By relating the nembutsu means taught here for common men's entry into Pure Land* with Amida's vow that he would let "filial and loyal" *men of faith to enter into his own Reward Land*, Shan-tao formulated a doctrine of *nembutsu ōjō* based on the desires of Amida himself. He says:

> This precisely is the superlative nature of the nembutsu path, for its results are not attainable by other miscellaneous means....The person who can perpetually recite the Buddha's name is indeed very rare, incomparably rare....This man would indeed be the good man among men, the saintly man, the highest of the high, the best of all men. Although this sutra teaches two paths (the meditative first thirteen means and the last three means "to remove evil" by Buddha's compassion), in view of the "original wish" (hongan, taken more narrowly by Jōdo-shū in Japan to refer to the 18th vow of Amida), the final intention of the sutra is that all sentient beings (of the Three Grades) call solely upon Amida's name (to regain birth in his Pure Land).[60]

This final statement of Shan-tao could not but impress Hōnen. Shan-tao had no illusion about "the evilness of common men," no illusion about the necessity of "compassion" from above to "eliminate human evil," and no wavering doubt about the efficacy of Amida's vow and the neces-

sity of nembutsu for *ōjō*. Armed with Shan-tao's vision, Hōnen toppled the *Hongaku* presumptions of Heian Buddhism. Having seen Shan-tao, a meditative master of great renown, finally forsaking the meditative path for the path of nembutsu, Hōnen confidently moved beyond the cautious qualifications of Genshin's nembutsu piety. If the sectarian community was not yet a living reality in 1175, the sectarian mentality and the seeds for future controversy were sown in Hōnen's first conversion experience. By way of Shan-tao, Hōnen had transcended the piety of Genshin's *Ōjōyōshū*.

Where Hōnen, who confessed that he solely relied upon Shan-tao, moved beyond Shan-tao is a question much harder to answer. Hōnen was not as systematic a thinker as Shan-tao and did not seem to have passed through a successful, meditative career as did Shan-tao. Some of the crucial doctrinal hurdles that Shan-tao overcame for the future Pure Land tradition were not the ones that Hōnen had to deal with centuries later.[61] However, whereas Shan-tao defended nembutsu on scholarly grounds, passages like the one below show Hōnen reflecting more simply on the necessity of economy and equality in Mahayana universal salvation:

> Because it is the easy path, therefore nembutsu can comprehend all, whereas the harder paths (in hierarchies) necessarily exclude others (lower ones). The Original Vow (*Hongan*) of the Buddha was to forsake the harder paths and to embrace the easy path in his desire that all men shall gain *ōjō* equally. If that vow had been the building of statues, then the poor would be excluded for they could not afford it. And the wealthy are few and the poor many. If wisdom were made the basis of *ōjō*, then, the foolish would be excluded. And the wise are few while the foolish many. If purity in monastic conduct be the key, then the *vinaya*-breakers and people without *vinaya*-ordination would be excluded. And the latter are many ... and so on.[62]

Shan-tao had levelled the Three Grades of man (actually subdivided into nine in the *Kuan ching*) but he still admitted of grades within the commoners.[63] Hōnen (and later Shinran) showed greater sympathy and identification with the lowest grade of "evil commoners." In their self and other concern, they desired the economy of the nembutsu. The passage cited above shows Honen apologetically referring to the path as the *easy* path (a distinction made by Tan-luan). In more confident passages, Hōnen would call it (more appropriately) the *superior* path.[64]

Because Hōnen began his philosophizing where Shan-tao left off, he was more a "purist" nembutsu devotee.[65] Armed with Shan-tao's conclusion and free from working through Shan-tao's initial premises, Hōnen naturally placed greater emphasis on the 18th vow of Amida and referred to this vow explicitly and systematically as the *Hongan*, the original or the basic vow. Inheriting some of the *Hongaku* mysticism (in which any one item in the universe can be said to contain all the other items) Hōnen would refer to the *Hongan* as the vow that included all the other vows.[66] This selectivity of one vow out of forty-eight was never an explicit doctrine in the Chinese Pure Land traditions. It was a Japanese innovation that Yang Wen-hui, in the last century, when he learned of the Jōdo tradition in Japan, felt uncomfortable with. There are two other departures from Shan-tao in the thoughts of Hōnen: the mystique of *senjaku* and the elimination of the *bodhicitta* as the "basic cause" of *ōjō*.

The *bodhicitta* originally implied in Sanskrit the act of arousing a determined mind toward enlightenment, but in China it comes to mean ontologically "the mind of enlightenment." It was regarded by major masters in China and Japan—Hui-yüan, Chih-i, Chi-tsang, Wŏnhyŏ Kūkai, Genshin—to be the necessary "material (basic) cause" for any spiritual achievement. The *bodhicitta* was the innate Buddha-seed (Buddha-nature). In the *Amida Meditation Sutra*, it was clearly stated that even at the last minute the lowest grade of men would still have to arouse this *bodhicitta*.

In order to gain birth in Pure Land one must arouse this aspiration for wisdom. T'an-luan had made it the prerequisite for *ōjō*, but in the Pure Land masters listed below, there was a significant shift.[67]

Tao-cho: Bodhicitta is absent in the Middle and Lower Grade but will be present *upon ōjō*. Ten vows and ten deeds are necessary for *ōjō*.

Shan-Tao: Bodhicitta is the mind that desires rebirth and loathes this world.[68] The deathbed desire of the most evil man can effect *ōjō*.

Hōnen: Bodhicitta is a doctrine of the Sage Path only. The deluded mind itself could and should arouse *nembutsu*.[70]

Shinran: Bodhicitta, Buddha-nature, is natural and in accordance with the Dharma, and is derived from the *Hon-gan*. Power of faith and rebirth are derived from *Amida*.[69]

Of these four positions, Hōnen's eliminated the prerequisite of a seed-nature[71] in man as a basis for entrance into Pure Land. (Shinran reintroduced elements of *Hongaku* thought in his notion of Buddha-nature,[72] but he was also more systematically *tariki* on the matter of "means" for *ōjō*.) For precisely so rejecting the *bodhicitta* doctrine, Hōnen was criticized by Myōe who, as a Kegon monk of the old persuasion, relegated the Buddha-name recitation path to the auxiliary role;[73] the Proper or Major Paths are those based upon the notion of the *bodhicitta*. Hōnen's radical notion, alien to most Chinese, was the result of his being critical of *Hongaku* thought that emphasized the centrality of this mind. The *bodhicitta* ideology had been basic to Japanese Buddhism ever since its Shingon school selected the *Mahāvairocana sutra* as its highest text. The arousal of the *bodhicitta* in esoteric meditation was absolutely indispensable in the Shingon, the Taimitsu and the *Hongaku* traditions. Hōnen erased all that!

SENJAKU: THE DIALECTICS OF SELF-CHOICE AND OTHER-CHOICE

The major distinction between Shan-tao and Hōnen, however, rested with the peculiar fate of the word *Senjaku* in Hōnen's *Senjaku Hongan Nembutsushū*.

The terms *jiriki* and *tariki* ("self- and other-power") had become standard, analytical tools in the study of the Jōdo tradition in Japan, yet they played no significant role in the *Senjakushū*. A forerunner of this distinction was the more moderate, and dialectical concept of *senjaku*, or choice. There is a correspondence between the choice made by men and the Choice made by Amida. If faith is "accepting Acceptance" (in Tillich's framework), Hōnen's faith was choosing the Choice. That the term *senjaku* was a new element in Pure Land thought was recognized by the sect itself. An account said that Hōnen prided himself for founding the *Senjaku Hongan* path whereas Shan-tao (only) founded the *Hongan* path.[74]

Senjaku (pronounced *senchaku* by Jōdo-shū followers) means "choice, selection" and more specifically, "choosing one item while discarding others."[75] Exactly when the term was first used and in what context within the Jōdo-shū is hard to tell,[76] but commonsense would alert us that when Hōnen first used the term, he could not have foreseen the future mystification of it. At least in one Zen text, the act of choosing was seen as the gravest of all flaws,[77] because it meant attachment to one item and regarding that as the absolute. Yet the difference between the "Catholic" (all-embracing) Tendai program—many different paths for the many predispositions of men—and the "reform" nembutsu (single-minded) program laid precisely in staking one's wager on one *chosen* path.[78] From what we said earlier of the life of Hōnen, it would appear that although the choice was made in 1175, it was probably not seen then as The Choice for all men, *sola fide* (better, *sola nembutsu*) of the mature Jōdo-shū dogma. Hōnen probably said in his early

mission days what he put in the beginning of the *Senjakushū*: "Of the (*many*) paths leading to *ōjō*, priority belongs to nembutsu (above and among *other* means)."

Hōnen had chosen one item (nembutsu) while discarding others. It was a subjective choice and acknowledged as such (*senjaku nembutsu*). As late as 1204, Hōnen discouraged his followers from deriding other paths that would only discredit the (total) Dharma taught by Śākyamuni.[79] Men of faith had often made such existential decisions in their lives; the personal, subjective nature of faith is a fact. There is, however, a difference between naively having a "*subjective faith*" in something regarded personally as Truth *for oneself* and writing a conscious treatise on the theme "*Subjectivity is Truth*"—which was what Kierkegaard eventually, upon reflection, wrote of his own private faith.[80] Hōnen did not go to that Kierkegaardian extreme to say, to wit, "*Selectivity is Truth*," but the *Senjakushū* written in 1198 should be considered as a Buddhological reflection on what once was a "personal choice." Before 1198, Hōnen, a Tendai monk in all outward appearance, had chosen to practice nembutsu as his personal calling. In 1198, as Hōnen carved out an independent sect freed from Tendai allegiance, that *choice* turned from apology to dogma. What was once *his* choice was overshadowed increasingly by the Choice made by Amida and by the key scriptures. He only "selected" what Amida, to wit, in his "Divine Election," had chosen for all sentient beings like him.

Included in the *Senjakushū* was the following biographical note telling of his earlier choice: "There are those who made the *bodhicitta* the basis for *ōjō* (Genshin and the *Hongaku* group), but previously I had abandoned acts of charity (*dāna*, first of the six *pāramitās*, most basic act of monk and lay Mahayanists), precept-keeping (*vinaya*, monastic precepts of the Tendai school) and even filial upkeep of parents (the practice of the sixth grade in the Nine Grades of Man, the type Amida actually said he would deliver from this world). I have chosen to take up the praising of the Buddha's name (nembutsu, practicable for even the last three of the Nine Grades)."[81] This passage, I think, reflected the subjective choice made by Hōnen in 1175. He saw himself as an evil, common man in a degenerate age (criminal in body, evil in heart[82]) and chose nembutsu as "the best of all means for *ōjō*." Such selectivity was personal, and the choice was instrumental (means-end).

The Pure Land tenet-classification (*kyōhan*) had always been selective. It did not list a continuous hierarchy of "lower to higher" teachings. Since Tan-luan, it had been a matter of "Either/Or," it was "the Easy versus the Difficult Path" (Tan-luan), "the Pure Land Path versus the Sage Path" (Tao-cho), or "The Major Path versus the Auxiliary Path." In terms of Amida-directed practices, the choice had always been a matter of narrowing down the choices until Shan-tao established "praising the name of the Buddha" to be the Proper Path while the rest of the paths were only supportive. However, only with Hōnen was *selectivity* totally exclusive.[83] And only in Shinran that the instrumentality of the act was totally reversed (end to means, or *tariki* ; it is Amida who empowers nembutsu).

Reflections on the "meanings" of *Senjaku* by Hōnen since 1175 must have become deeper as time went on. Usually, Hōnen is said to have made a threefold choice. The choice was first Pure Land as goal; second, nembutsu as means; and third the choice was of *Hongan nembutsu* —nembutsu based on the Original Vow of Amida. We can see that the first choice was comparable to Genshin's longing for Pure Land; that the second choice was indebted to Shan-tao's notion of the Proper Path, and that the third was Hōnen's interpretative focus on the 18th vow. The third then points ahead to Shinran's *tariki* idea.

The *Amida Sutra* had used the term *senjaku* to describe Bodhisattva Dharmakara's choice of the Pure Land. Dharmakara, the future Amida

among many available Pure Lands in the Mahayana spiritual universe. Amida also *selected* his various vows and made, according to Hōnen's exegesis, the 18th vow *selectively* the *Hongan*. That Hōnen could choose the nembutsu path to gain rebirth in the Pure Land was by virtue of the Hongan of Amida — not by virtue of Shan-tao's interpretation. It is therefore significant that Hōnen never said he "selected" Shan-tao's philosophy; he only used the term "rely" (*yoru*).[84]

The Japanese title of the *Senjakushu* retains precisely this ambivalence, namely, that the Choice was both subjective (Hōnen's) and objective (Amida's).

> *Senjaku Hongan Nembutsushū*: On Choosing to Recite the Buddha-name according to the Original Vow of Amida Buddha (the early reading). *or* On the Practice of Nembutsu Inspired by the Chosen Original Vow of Amida Buddha[85] (the orthodox reading).

Hōnen's three-stepped choice (for Pure Land, Nembutsu, and *Hongan*) was objectively based on the *Longer Amida Sutra*. The following précis of a passage devoted to the nuance of *senjaku* from the last chapter of the *Senjakushū* will show how the final shift towards a *cosmicized senjaku* took place:

> The *Longer Amida Sutra* has three successive *senjaku*: the choice of the Pure land, the choice of the nembutsu practice, and the choice of the *Hongan*. The *Kuan-ching* has also three successive *senjaku*: the selectivity of the light of Amida's grace shining solely upon the nembutsu fellowship and not upon others, the selective act of Amida to appear and welcome those men of "upper birth of the lowest grade" for their having been chosen (or, their having chosen) to practice nembutsu in preference over listening to sutras, and the selective, additional encouragement to pursue nembutsu. The *Shorter Amida Sutra* has one *senjaku*: nembutsu as the proof of sincerity. The *Pan-chou San-mei Sutra* also *senjaku* (selected) the name of Amida ....All the above works are taught selectively (*senjaku*) by Śākyamuni. All the Buddhas of the universe also choose (*senjaku*) the act of nembutsu in praising Amida.[86]

The particularity of an existential choice made by Hōnen during his first conversion and "reliance" on Shan-tao had now been projected into a Cosmic Act, into something akin to a Calvinistic notion of Election.[87] Men do not choose God; God choose men. This reversal of values is common in religious experience. Hōnen recognized that his choice of a path was made possible only by Amida's previous Choice of this path for him. The passage cited above also shows another element in mature Jōdo thought: the tendency toward *henotheism*, that is, the lavishing of all divine attributes onto Amida Buddha, the Pure Land, the *Hongan*, the nembutsu. As all the Buddhas honor Amida Buddha by choosing to praise his name, the whole universe was orchestrated to render one act of devotion to this Supreme Buddha.[88]

SUMMING UP

The above essay has looked into the ideological formation of the Jōdo school. The emergence of the independent Japanese Mahayana schools in Kamakura was a historic event that began with Hōnen's conscious detachment of his own form of piety from the Heian orthodoxy. A personal existential choice of a "means" in 1175 became by 1198 fully the banner of a popular movement. In its equilitarian simplicity, the Jōdo faith evoked a response from people of very divergent background, from lords to peasants, from warriors to prostitutes. By combining the *ōjō* zeal with a sophisticated critique of the *Hongaku* tradition, Hōnen's movement even went beyond the Chinese counterparts.

There were, of course, other more mundane factors in the formation of the Jōdo institution.

Recent famines and droughts around the capital, peasant unrest, political turnovers and intrigues, old Heian hierocrats meddling into politics and so on. Often the ruling powers were more concerned with the possibility of riots in the capital than with Buddhological debates. However, small incidents could touch off grand events. The conversion of two lady attendants by two allegedly charming disciples of Hōnen is usually given as the immediate reasons for the banning of the sect and the exile of the master. And Buddhological debates could be of great significance since in Heian the old assumption about a theocratic state was still alive, sucht that any challenge to the orthodox schools of Heian was a challenge against the ruling class. In the same way too, the rising *samurai* turned a sympathetic ear to the new sects for reasons of spiritual refuge, or political legitimation, or the refinement of a new lifestyle --more simple, spartan—in a new era. The end result was the Kamakura Reformation.

The surviving historical records are, of course, far from being representative of the period. Critical, social historians can wonder if Hōnen and the other saints were really that significant in their times, and whether or not the survival of sectarian histories have not distorted their roles. Despite all these reservations, the paradigm of a Kamakura Reformation is not out of keeping with its founding spirit. Ideas do change history. And Hōnen's personal choice did epitomize one man's choice that changed the religious history of Japan.

NOTES

1. Tamura Enchō, "Hōnen" in *Rekishi Jinbutsu* series (Tokyo, 1959).

2. Collected in the *Taishō Daizōkyō*, vol. 37, pp. 245-278.

3. Basic texts of Hōnen are in Ōhashi Shun'ō, ed., "Hōnen, Ippen" in *Nihon Shisō Taikei* series, vol. 10 (Tokyo, 1971); henceforth referred to as *Genbun* for any citation from Hōnen's original treatise in Classical Chinese-Japanese.

4. Basic text is Isida Mizumaro, ed., "Genshin" in series cited, vol. 6 (Tokyo, 1970).

5. *Genbun*, pp. 283-84.

6. In English, see the translation of the sect's biography of Hōnen by Harper Havelock Coates and Ryūgaku Ishizuka, *Hōnen, The Buddhist Saint: His Life and Teaching* (Kyoto, 1925). See Katsuki Jōki, ed., *Jōdo-shū kaisōki no kenkyū* (Kyoto, 1957) for detailed discussion on the founding of the sect; see p. 289 for matters concerning the charge.

7. See the modernist argument of Shigematsu Akihisa, *Nihon Jōdokyō seiritsu katei no kenkyū* (Kyoto, 1964), pp. 475-99. This is the most thoroughly historical study I know. See also the appendix where he responds to the traditionalists' criticism; especially pp. 655-56. See Review/ Criticism in Katsuki, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-220.

8. On the history of Jōdokyō scholarship with essential bibliographical notes, see Katsuki Jōko, *op. cit.*, appendix 1 and 2, pp. 303-46.

9. The line "For forty years (Hōnen remained) a Tendai monk" is taken by the traditionalists to mean "up to age forty," but interpreted by modernists as "forty years or more after Hōnen's entry into the order at seventeen;" see note 7 above.

10. Ōhashi in *op. cit.*, *Kaisetsu* section, pp. 389-453, describes a "middle period" between Hōnen's early Tendai-nembutsu phase and his mature Hongan-nembutsu faith in 1198. The middle period saw Hōnen's response to early criticism in his exegesis of the *Sanbukyō* in 1190; see p. 405.

11. Compared with the *Senjakushū*, Hōnen's 1190 exegesis seems "academic" and too imitative of Shan-tao.

12. This is subscribing to the old magical Buddhism of Heian; see Tsuboi Shun'ei, "Hōnen Kyōgaku ni okeru kai no mondai," *Bukkyō Daigaku Kenkyū Kiyō*, 39, 213-27.

13. Persecution, however, had the usual effect of radicalizing the persecuted for indirectly it affirmed the eschatological crisis and degeneration of the out-group. See Ōhashi, pp.411-13.

14. This is clear when the *Senjakushū* ("not for public eyes," it says in the end) is compared with Hōnen's correspondences.

15. Following the exegetical style of his commentary on the *Amida Sutra*; see Ōhashi, pp.405-6.

16. *Genbun*, pp. 257b-258a.

17. See interesting short article by Inoue Mitsusada, "Chūkō Tendai to Mappō Tōmyōki" in *Nihon Shisō Taikei Geppō* 30 (1973). Inoue dated this work, attributed to Saichō, to the Sesshō period in Heian.

18. On the Chinese Pure Land tradition, see Mochizuki Shingo, *Jōdokyōrishi* (Tokyo, 1930): I have taken out the Chinese Pure Land section that was in an earlier draft of this paper. On Shan-tao's opinion on *Fa* and *chi* (Jpn: *Hō, ki*) see Li Hsiao-pen, "*Chung-kuo Ching-t'u-tsung shih*" in Chang Chia compiled *Chung-kuo Fo-chiao-shih lun chi* (Taipei, 1956), vol.2, pp. 579-80. The *Fa* (*Dharma*) of faith is Amida, the recipient counterpoint is (man's) evilness. Later in Jōdo-Shinshū, Rennyo developed this correspondence into the idea of *kihō-ittai*.

19. *Genbun*, p. 28a; a loose translation.

20. *Genbun*, p. 258ab; the choice of the three was already made in 1190.

21. *Genbun*, p. 259ab.

22. See Tamura Yoshirō, *et al.*, ed., *Tendai Hongaku Ron* in *Nihon Shisō Daikei*, vol. 9 (Tokyo, 1973), Tamura, *Kaisetsu* section, pp. 519-21; also Ōhashi, *op. cit.*, pp. 409-11.

23. *Genbun*, p. 281ab.

24. The *samādhi* might seem incongruous with Hōnen's rejection of the traditional *śila, samādhi, prajñā* (precepts, trance-meditation, wisdom), but it was a standard Jōdo term even in China. See Itō Yuishin's essay in Katsuki, ed., *op. cit.*, 245-75. Enchō had a *nembutsu sammai* prior to Hōnen!

25. See my "The Emerge of Sinitic Mahayana: T'ien-t'ai," paper written for the AAS conference at Toronto, 1975.

26. That Hōnen's dream might be modelled upon precedences had been noted by Sakai Shun'ei in an essay cited by Ōhashi, p. 435.

27. *Genbun*, p. 257b.

28. Genshin's line was "Among the works leading to *ōjō*, the most superior is nembutsu," cited by *Ōjōden no Kenkyū*, compiled by Kōden Isan no Kai (Tokyo, 1968) p. 84.

29. Scholars generally refer to Hōnen's faith as "*nembutsu ihon*" over against Shinran's "*shinjin ihon*." I think the difference between "priority" (among options) and "basis" (of all) should be kept.

30. *Ōjōden no Kenkyū*, pp. 251-52.

31. *Ibid.*, pp. 253ff.

32. Chia-ts'ai (fl. 627-49) meditated Tao-cho (562-645) and Shan-tao (613-681).

33. The doctrine is known as "commoners entering the land of recompense."

34. See Inoue Mitsusada, ed., *Ōjōden. Hokke Kenki* in *Nihon Shisō Taikei*, vol. 7 (Tokyo, 1974). The *Ōjōyōshū* itself does not include *Ōjō*-legends.

35. *Ōjōden no Kenkyū*, pp. 30-48. "*Akunin Ōjō Hanashi.*"

36. The Welcome is related to vow no. 19 of Amida's 48 vows; see also Ōhashi, pp. 427-432.

37. See Ienaga Saburō, *Jōdai Bukkyō Shisōshi Kenkyū* (Kyoto, 1966). A significant shift in Pure Land art occurred between Heian and Kamakura.

38. See Kobayashi Yasuji, "Ōjōden no Kyōju to sono Kōzō ni tsuite," *Ōjōden no Kenkyū*, pp. 107-8. Concern for deathbed nembutsu also increased.

39. For Shan-tao, the issue of the *Saṃbhoga* (*Ho*) states of the Pure Land was crucial and metaphysical, but Hōnen did not seem to sustain a consistent view on the nature of Amida's *kāya* or land. I suspect that the Pure Land tradition as a whole in Japan had a more naive, naturalistic and immediate perception of Pure Land that had its roots in the old *Taka-no-hara* in Shinto myth, the ancient mountain worship (*cf. Yamaokoshi Mida*), paradises in mountains or in islands or on the sea (*cf.* Heian *yamazato* tradition). For more technical

discussion on Hōnen's view on Amida's body and land, see Asai Jōkai, "Hōnen no Busshinkan" and "Hōnen no Buddōkan," *Shinshūgaku*, vol. 43, pp. 22-42 and vol. 45-46, pp. 137-58.

40. An implicit periodization scheme of my own is being used here with psychological correlations: Early (high) Medieval thought is *clerical* with a *realistic optimism* (Shan-tao); High Medieval or Heian thought is *theocratic* with an *extravagant optimism* out of proportion to reality; Late Medieval (Reform) Kamakura thought is *lay-oriented* with a *renewed pessimism* (Hōnen) that can go to extremes unknown before (Shinran). I cannot defend this thesis in the present essay.

41. See Tamura's *Kaisetsu* essay in *Tendai Hongaku Ron* and (in English) special volume of *Acta Asiatica*, vol. 20 (1971) devoted to Kamakura Buddhism, essay by Tamura Yoshirō, "The New Buddhism and Nichiren," pp. 45-57 and his "The New Buddhism of Kamakura and the Concepts of Original Enlightenment," Tōyō University Asian Studies-I, 61, pp. 73-91.

42. Chih-i (in one debatable text) held the idea that man's nature was evil and therefore elimination of evil leading to (incipient) enlightenment would be his position. Saichō was in that tradition in *Kokugaisho* but moved towards Hongaku in his *Hokke Shuku*. See Hisasita Noboru, "Hōnen shōnin ni okeru Hongaku shisō," in Bukkyō Daigaku, compiled, 300th year memorial volume of the founding of the Jōdo-shū, *Hōnen Shōnin Kenkyū* (Tokyo, 1975).

43. Cited in *Tendai Hongaku Ron*, p. 519.

44. Thus Genshin regarded "meditative recall to be superior, buddha-name recitation to be inferior," see Katsuki, "Hōnen Shōnin no Jōdo Kaishū ni okeru Bukkyō no tankan," *Jōdo-shū Kaisōki no Kenkyū*; Tōdō Kyūjun, "*Jōdo Kaishū no ichirekitei*," *ibid.*

45. Genshin regarded the Trikāya to be present in the one body of Amida, and Hōnen took the three words "A-mi-da" to incorporate the Trikaya; see "Hōnen no Busshinkan" cited; Takahashi Kōji, "Hōnen Shōnin no Busshinkan no Tokuisei," *ibid.*

46. This dynamic quality is derived from Hua-yen's appropriation of Yogācāra; T'ien t'ai is more "static" because of its dependence on non-causative Mādhyamika.

47. See *Tendai Hongaku Ron*, pp. 483-504.

48. Cited from above work, p. 517. This is the only incidence in the *Ōjōyōshū* (understandably the least "*Hongaku*" work of Genshin) where the term *Hongaku* actually appeared. *Engakukyō* is translated by Charles Luk, *Ch'en and Zen Teachings*, III.

49. Cited by Katsuki from Genshin's *Kanjinrakuyōshū*, in Katsuki, *op. cit.*, in his *Jōdo-shū Kaizokuki no Kenkyū*, p. 10. See Chih-i, *op. cit.* (T. 46, 4a).

50. Three such works attributed to Genshin are included in *Tendai Hongaku Ron*.

51. The nuance of relative radicalism within Hongaku thought is hard to translate into English; the issue is somewhat like the relative shades of theological Realism in medieval Europe (not an inappropriate parallel, since the issue for both was "How much of the Universal is present in the particular?") See *ibid.*, pp. 514, 516-17. Shinran appropriated the term "From Result to Cause" to describe the Power of Amida's *Hongan* to "lift" man out of his total fallenness. In this case, *Hongaku* thought merged into *Hongan* thought.

52. I think *power* is an inalienable category in *Hongaku* thought: the *aśūnya* tathāgatagarbha is with infinite *gunas*, and power came into play in Shingon thought through the mysterious power of *adhiṣṭhāna* (*kaji*).

53. *Hongaku* thought degenerated by the Genroku era when its original metaphysical subliminity was finally corrupted by plebeian superstition.

54. Spiritual crisis had often produced both: wishful optimism and acute pessimism.

55. The fault of Luther, from the point of view of a "catholic" mind, was his single-mindedness in emphasizing—not the word faith, *fide*—but the word alone, *sola*.

56. The meditation on the True Body of the Buddha was regarded to be the key *vipaśyanā* taught in the *Kuan-ching* (*Amida-Meditation Sutra*).

57. The mystic always regards the man of faith to be a mystic *mangue* (failure as a mystic).

58. See Shigematsu, *op. cit.*, pp. 288-89, or Ōbayashi's review of it, included in *Ōjōden no Kenkyū*, pp. 229-32.

59. A section of the original draft of this essay has been taken out here, and I will also be brief here on bibliographic details concerning Shan-tao studies.

60. *Taishō* vol. 37, p. 278.

61. Hōnen did echo Shan-tao's basic opinions, especially around 1190. For example, Hōnen had to reclaim Shan-tao's thesis that the Pure Land was no "low" *nirmanakāya* illusion (as held by Japan's Hossō school which denied it). However, I do not think these were crucial issues as Muraoka Tsunetsugu seems to think in his *Nihon Shisōshi Gaisetsu* IV (Tokyo), 1961), p. 358.

62. *Genbun*, p. 263b.

63. Shan-tao's *Kuan-ching Hsüan-i*, when taken as a whole, acknowledged the different "recipient" (*chi*) mode of the Sage and the Commoner. By regarding the Nine Grades to be describing Commoners, Shan-tao actually prevented himself from taking Huiyuan's position that the *chi* for Sage and Commoners (in the nine grades) was continuous and only quantitatively different. Hōnen did talk about the Nine Grades (*Genbun*, pp. 264-266) briefly, but according to Kishi Kakuyū's tabulation in his *Zokuzoku Zendō Kyōgaku no Kenkyū* (Yamaguchi, 1967), Hōnen regarded the Nine Grades to be *myōsetsu*, and expedient division of no great classificatory significance: both good and evil men will be equally saved.

64. Ōhashi, pp. 421-26.

65. This is generally the opinion of Kishi Kakukū, *op. cit.*, and essay on "Hōnen no Zendō Kyōgaku Shuyō to so no Hihan." *Jōdokyō no Shisō to Bunka*, volume dedicated to Prof. Etani (Kyoto, 1972), pp. 209-26.

66. See Muraoka's history cited, pp. 262-63: *Hongan soku betsugan*. Similarly, nembutsu (response to Hongan) also subsumed all deeds within itself.

67. The abbreviated list here is constructed from *Zoku* and *Zokuzoku Zendō kyōgaku no Kenkyū* (Yamaguchi, 1966, 1967), a basic source plus other readings.

68. Or rather: the desiring mind will become the bodhicitta. A possible basis of this is the *Śrīmālā devi sūtra*'s idea that the tathāgatagarbha is that which loathes suffering and desires bliss.

69. *Ibid.* The *Hongaku* optimism returned with Shinran, especially in his *Shō* section of *Kyōgyōshinshō*. See Murakami, "*Zendōtaishi kigonron*," *Shinshūgaku* 17-18, pp. 158176.

70. See "*Hōnen Shōnin ni okeru Hongaku Shisō*" cited earlier; I do not associate this theory of "the arousal of nembutsu from the deluded mind" with the doctrine of Suchness perfumation (in the *Awakening of Faith*) as one Japanese scholar would. There is also an identification of the *Honganshin* (the Mind of Hongan) with the *Ganjōshin* (the Mind desiring ōjō) in Hōnen which anticipated Shinran's idea that the mind of faith itself was generated by the Hongan.

71. Consistency should not be expected of Hōnen at all times. His *Senjakushū* began with Tao-cho's query about why men were unenlightened if they were said to have Buddha-nature; *Genbun*, p. 257b.

72. See Ishida Jushi, "Nihon Jōdokyō no Tokusitsu to Jōdo Shinshū," *Shinshūgaku* vol. 41-42 (1070). Whereas Chinese Pure Land leaned towards a harmonization of Pure Land piety (faith in form) and Zen mysticism (wisdom with the Formless) (p. 22), Shinran's *Hongaku* thought identified the nembutsu path with "*paramārtha*, the One Tao, Reality, Buddha-nature, Dharma, Mind, Wisdom, and the Incomprehensible Ultimate Virtue" all fused in the *Ekayāna* Sea. This *Hongan Ichijō Sea* is "round, perfect, full, sudden, unobstructed, nondual"—in other words, it is the Formless (Zen) Wisdom. From the *Gyō* section of *Kyōgyōshinshō*: "This Sea from time immemorial

has transformed the rivers of the various deeds and merits of the commoner or the sage, as well as the streams of the Mahayana-defaming infidels and of infinite ignorance itself, into the Great Treasured Sea Water of the Compassion, Wisdom, Truth, Infinite Virtue of the Hongan."

73. Myōe is a Kegon master requested by the same Lord Hōjō Kujo to refute Hōnen's treatise. (Hōnen had died and could not reply, but Shinran's work was possibly a reply to Myōe; the *Kyōgyōshinshō*, however, absorbed some of Myōe's *Hongaku* thought.) See Bandō Shōjun trans., "Myōe's Criticism of Hōnen's Doctrines," *The Eastern Buddhist* (new series: vol. 7-1, 1954), pp. 37-54. See Takachiho Tetsuzō, *Hōnen Kyōgaku no Tokusitsu to Dōkō* (Kyoto, 1954), pp. 46-50; this study focused on the bodhicitta issue and its re-emergence in Shinran. Also, see "*Zaijarin* to Shinran Kyōgaku to no Taiō," in *Shinshūgakū*, vol. 38, pp. 47-64.

74. From a Seishū (*seishanha*) recorded cited by Ōhashi, p. 406: this might be a later insertion.

75. *Genbun*, p. 259b.

76. Ōhashi, p. 406, traced it to the 1190 commentary on the *Amida Sutra*. The personalistic interpretation has been given by Matsutani Bun'ō, "*Hōnen Shōnin to Senjaku Hongan Nembutsushū*," Matsutani and Hanayama, ed., *Nihon Bukkyō Shi to Shisō* (Tokyo, 1959), pp. 127-152: subjective choice was contrasted with the old schools' objective tenet-classification. A somewhat philosophical interpretation of the irrational side (the existentialism) of Hōnen is given by Takahashi, "*Senjaku* no seikaku ni tsuite," *Jōdokyō no Shisō to Bunka*, pp. 187ff.

77. *Hsin-hsin-ming* (Essay on Trusting the Mind).

78. Reform faiths are, in my words, characterized by "single-mindedness," "eschatological impatience," and "formula minimalism."

79. *Genbun*, p. 283

80. Kierkegaard's use of Subjectivity was within a different context; he was against the easy-going, bourgeois Christian piety that he saw around him.

81. *Genbun*, p. 263a; I work on the assumption that this reflects an earlier phase.

82. This body/mind division of *tsumi* and *aku* is supposedly Hōnen's; see Yata Ryōshō, "Hōnen ni okeru no Mondai," *Shinshūgakū* vol. 45-46, pp. 181-200. Hōnen did not care for the distinctions of the Nine Grades for all men, either sinful or good, to attain *Ōjō* through nembutsu.

83. Yang Wen-hui was against this *Senjaku* notion; see Ishii Kyōdō, *Senjakushū no Kenkyū* (Kyoto, 1951), I, p. 32. See also Etani work cited below in 88.

84. See *Genbun*, pp. 259a, 281a. But Japanese scholars *repeatedly* confuse *yori* and *senjaku*.

85. The official reading among Jōdo-shū scholars is the second one: Anthology on the Thought of the Buddha in the Selected Main Vow.

86. *Genbun*, pp. 280b-281a.

87. In a footnote on p. 181, Masaharu Anesaki in his *History of Japanese Religion* compared the *Hongan* motif in Jōdo faith with "the Christian doctrine of Predestination;" see *op. cit.* (London, 1930).

88. On the increasing henotheistic tendencies, see Ōhashi, pp. 426-27. This is a natural consequence of the heightened Selectivity; see Etani Ryūkai, "Jōdokyō no hihanseishinshijo ni okeru *Senjakushū* no kachi," *Bukkyō Daigaku Kenkyū Kiyō*, vol. 38 (Special issue no. 1 dedicated to Hōnen studies), pp. 37-56. Myōe also criticized Hōnen for going beyond Shan-tao: "Had Hōnen followed Shan-tao (without establishing a sect of his own on one element in Shan-tao), there would be no
complaint against him." See Myōe's *Zaijarin* cited earlier and "Zendō to Hōnen."
Shinshūgaku, vol. 17-18 (special issue dedicated to Zendō Kyōgaku), pp. 177-187, especially p. 183.

The Ch'an *Tsung* in Medieval China: School, Lineage, or What?

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A perennial problem that confronts the critical study of East Asian Buddhism is what to make of the many distinctions of *tsung* (*shū* in Japanese) that have traditionally been drawn within the religion itself. As Stanley Weinstein has aptly pointed out in an article in the *Encyclopedia of Religion* on "schools of Chinese Buddhism," the term *tsung* is generally translated as "school," but this obscures the fact that in Chinese Buddhist texts it has at least three different primary meanings, depending on the context:

> (1) it [*tsung*] may indicate a specific doctrine or thesis, or a particular interpretation of a doctrine; (2) it may refer to the underlying theme, message or teaching of a text; and (3) it may signify a religious or philosophical school.[1]

Weinstein goes on to argue that

> the term *tsung* should be translated as "school" only when it refers to a tradition that traces its origin back to a founder, usually designated "first patriarch," who is believed to have provided the basic spiritual insights that were then transmitted through an unbroken line of successors or "*dharma* heirs." This definition is derived from the original meaning of *tsung*, which signified a clan that was descended from a common ancestor.[2]

He then observes that

> It is only in the eighth century that we encounter full-fledged schools with founders, lineages, supposedly orthodox transmissions of doctrine, and large numbers of followers. Three such schools made their appearance during the second half of the T'ang dynasty: Ch'an, T'ien-t'ai, and Hua-yen.[3]

Weinstein's analysis of the term *tsung* is helpful as far as it goes, but as he himself notes in discussing these three schools, the modern critical study of the traditional accounts of their founders and lineages of Dharma transmission has revealed in each case a considerable "discrepancy between legend and fact." The problem, in a nutshell, is that the term *tsung* as it is found in Buddhist texts refers to entities that, from a critical historical point of view, belong partly or wholly to the realms of religious ideology and mythology. The study of some ostensibly historical lineage records reveals that they were were fabricated retrospectively as a means of gaining religious authority, political power, and/or patronage. This was clearly the case with the various competing versions of a lineage purported to stem from Bodhidharma (later called the Ch'an *tsung*) that survive in inscriptions and Tun-huang manuscripts dating from the late seventh and eighth centuries. Other lineage formulations layed scant claim to literal historicity, but signalled by their structure that they were using the language of consanguinity in a metaphorical and symbolic way. The Chen-yen (Shingon in Japanese) lineage formulated in the T'ang, for example, posited the eternally present cosmic Buddha Mahāvairocana as its "founding ancestor." Various religious motifs that appear in Buddhist lineage records, such as accounts of Dharma transmission taking place in secret, by proxy, and even in dreams, also alert us to the fact that *tsung* were never conceived as a set of merely historical relationships between masters and disciples, but that they were always understood to have a mysterious, spiritual dimension that lay beyond the ken of the world. *Tsung* were conceived, after all, as

sodalities that comprised a set of ancestral spirits as well as living persons.

Given the ideological, symbolic, and mythological dimensions of most accounts of *tsung* in Chinese Buddhist texts, I think it best to translate the term as "lineage" whenever it refers to a spiritual clan conceived as a group of individuals related by virtue of their inheritance of some sort of Dharma from a common ancestor. This translation has the virtue of being a nearly literal rendering which neither assumes nor implies anything about the historicity or ontological status of the lineage in question, the latter being matters for subsequent historical judgement on a case by case basis. I want to reserve the English word "school" for movements or groups within Chinese Buddhism that were made up of real persons united in a self-conscious manner by a common set of beliefs, practices, and/or social structures. I take it as axiomatic that the sort of entity we would want to call a school of Buddhism, unlike the entities that the Buddhist tradition calls lineages (*tsung*), was constituted at any point in its history exclusively by living persons. In other words, ancestral spirits played a role in the formation of schools only insofar as they occupied the minds of currently living members.

Before turning to the specific topic of this paper, which is the relationship between the mythology of the Ch'an lineage and the historical entity that was the Ch'an school in medieval China, I would like to point out some of the implications of the general distinction that I draw between lineages and schools. In the first place, I would not want to restrict the designation "school" to only those sodalities that identified or sought to legitimize themselves by formulating a lineage of patriarchs. Most schools of Chinese Buddhism from the T'ang dynasty on did in fact embrace some sort of lineage myth, but I would be prepared in principle to recognize the existence of schools that did not. What I want to call a school, to repeat, can be delineated by any shared set of ideas, practices, and/or social arrangements for which there is sufficient historical evidence, and the ideas in question need not have included any belief in a lineage of Dharma transmission.

Conversely, the survival of a lineage record in an ancient Buddhist text certainly raises the possibility that the genealogy in question was produced by a school seeking to delineate its membership, write its history, or stake a claim to orthodoxy, but it is also possible that the lineage was formulated by one person who lacked sufficient fellow believers or followers for us to speak of a school. Hypothetically, we might also expect to find cases in the history of Chinese Buddhism where lineage records survived as literary artifacts even after the schools that formulated them had died out; cases where other, perhaps opposing, schools subsequently appropriated the lineages contained in written records; and even cases where schools were actually founded through the process of appropriating a lineage myth.

Moreover, even if it could be shown that a particular lineage record was preserved in the school that produced it, and even if the school in question was distinguished chiefly by a shared belief in that lineage, it would be a mistake to think of the membership of the school and that of the lineage as somehow coextensive. For one thing, lineages always included dead people, and schools (as I have defined them) did not. Moreover, schools generally included far more members than those few living persons who were recognized within the membership as Dharma heirs in the founder's lineage.

The distinction that I want to draw between lineage and school, needless to say, is not one that was ever drawn in the Buddhist tradition itself. I am *not* arguing that the term *tsung* in medieval China had (when it referred to groups of people) two different meanings, one of which we should translate as "lineage" and the other as "school." On the contrary, I want to render *tsung*

as "lineage" in every case, with the understanding that "lineage" is a complex, ambivalent concept belonging to the normative tradition. My designation "school," on the other hand, is strictly a modern, analytical category with a definition that I have stipulated on the basis of currently accepted principles of critical historiography.

It is sometimes objected that historians, especially intellectual or religious historians, should not impose their own categories on the foreign cultures they study. There is some truth in this, for it is extremely important to bracket one's own linguistically and culturally determined "common sense" and learn to follow the thought processes of the other sympathetically in the other's language. However, when it comes time to explain and interpret what one has learned using one's own language and operating within the constraints of one's own academic discipline, it is manifestly impossible to use only concepts borrowed from the foreign tradition that is the object of study. In plain English, it is absurd to argue that because medieval Chinese Buddhists never drew a distinction between lineages as semi-mythological entities and schools as historical ones we should refrain from imposing that distinction on them.

Indeed, I would argue that a failure to impose the distinction in a clear-cut way has led modern historians of Ch'an to read their own understanding of Buddhist schools or "sects" back into the ancient Chinese term *tsung*. My remarks here are directed chiefly to the very influential and otherwise high quality Japanese scolarship in the field known as *zenshūshi* or "history of the Ch'an *tsung*." In Japan today the term *zenshū* refers, in the first place, to a school of Buddhism (comprising three main denominations: the Sōtō, Rinzai, and Ōbaku) that has an independent institutional structure, as well as a distinctive set of beliefs, sacred texts, and religious practices. Within the contemporary Zen school, the religious belief in a lineage of Dharma transmission stemming from the first patriarch Bodhidharma is still very much alive, and this too is called the *zenshū*. Japanese Buddhists today, in short, understand and use the term *zenshū* in a multivalent way that clearly justifies an English translation as "Zen school" in some cases and "Zen lineage" in others. However, this distinction is only implicit in the modern Japanese usage; no one feels a need draw it out explicitly because the intended meaning is generally understood from the context. Moreover, the very ambiguity of the term *zenshū* has certain benefits: it lends an air of sanctity to the existing Zen institution by suggesting that it is the vehicle for the preservation of a mysterious Dharma (namely *satori*) inherited from the Buddha and Bodhidharma, and it imparts a sense of historicity to the lineage myth by suggesting that the ancient patriarchs were real people just like the Zen school masters of today. It is only in the Japanese scholarship on the history of Zen (Ch' an) in China that the failure to draw an explicit distinction between school and lineage creates problems, for it leads to the unwarranted assumption that whenever ancient Chinese texts speak of the "Ch'an *tsung*" (*zenshū* in Japanese), the reference necessarily implies, in addition to the existence of a lineage scheme, the existence of some sort of institutional entity or social grouping similar to the Japanese Zen school. For example, Ui Hakuju, a prominent historian of Zen, assumed that because the monk Tao-hsin (580-651) was identified in eighth century records as the "fourth patriarch" in a Dharma lineage extending from Bodhidharma, the monastic community he headed on East Mountain in Huang-mei must have been a Ch'an school monastery.[4] As I have shown elsewhere, however, even the concept of a sectarian "Ch'an monastery" does not appear in any historical records until the late tenth century.[5]

Having explained my approach to the study of *tsung*, or lineages in the history of Chinese Buddhism in general terms, let me turn now to the specific case of Ch'an. What I shall do in the limited space available here is sketch out what I

take to be the history of the so-called Ch'an lineage—that is, the development from the T'ang through the Sung of the various quasi-genealogical records that purport to trace the transmission of Dharma from a first patriarch Bodhidharma—and correlate that development with what I take to be the history of the Ch'an school, an entity which in my view first took shape in the mid-tenth century.

The story of Bodhidharma's lineage begins in (or, at least, cannot be traced any further back than) the late seventh century, when the followers of a monk named Fa-ju (638-689), who had resided at the Shao-lin Monastery near the eastern capital Lo-yang, wrote an epitaph claiming that he was the recipient of secret oral teachings (*tsung*) transmitted from the Buddha through a line of Indian teachers to the *Tripiṭaka* master Bodhidharma. The epitaph states that Bodhidharma brought the teachings to China and transmitted them to Hui-k'o, after which they were passed down to Seng-tsan, Tao-hsin (580-651), Hung-jen (600-674), and finally Fa-ju.[6] It is likely that Fa-ju's followers simply invented this lineage, selecting the figures of the Indian monk Bodhidharma and his disciple Hui-k'o out of the *Hsü kao-seng chuan*,[7] a collection of biographies of eminent monks that had been compiled a few decades earlier (in 644), and using them as a convenient link to India. Fa-ju may have been a disciple of Hung-jen, who is mentioned in the *Hsü kao-seng chuan* as Tao-hsin's disciple,[8] but the connections between Hui-k'o, Seng-ts'an and Tao-hsin were almost certainly fabricated as a means of linking Fa-ju back to Bodhidharma. Fa-ju's followers put together a set of six biographies commemorating their teacher and his five predecessors in the putative lineage.[9] In it they placed Bodhidharma and Hui-k'o in the Shao-lin Monastery, the place where Fa-ju resided, although the *Hsü kao-seng chuan* account of Bodhidharma and Hui-k'o that they relied on for most of their information made no mention of that monastery.[10] Unfortunately, we know almost nothing about Fa-ju and his followers at the Shao-lin Monastery, apart from the fact that they invented a lineage of secret oral teachings going back to India. Given the paucity of concrete evidence, I would hesitate to describe them as constituting a distinct school. If they had a special name for themselves or some particular approach to Buddhist thought or practice that served to identify them, those things have been lost from the historical record.

The next phase in the formulation of the myth of Bodhidharma's lineage occurred when the followers of a monk named Shen-hsiu (606?-706), who had flourished in the province of Ching-chou before he moved to the capitals Loyang and Ch'ang-an in the last six years of his life and gained the support of Empress Wu, succeeded in claiming that he too, like Fa-ju, had been a Dharma heir in the sixth generation in the lineage of Bodhidharma. One follower of Shen-hsiu in particular, a monk named P'u-chi (651-739), is said to have gone to the Shao-lin Monastery and set up a "hall of the seven patriarchs" *(ch'i-tsu-t'ang)* honoring the six patriarchs of Fa-ju's lineage and one more—his own teacher Shen-hsiu.[11] P'u-chi also arranged for the collection of six biographies originally compiled by Fa-ju's followers to be edited to include the biography of his teacher Shen-hsiu in the sixth generation alongside Fa-ju. The resulting text, entitled the *Ch'uan fa-pao chi*, survives, having been discovered at Tun-huang in the early part of this century. Whereas the older core of the text—the first six biographies (Bodhidharma through Fa-ju)—was evidently composed to validate the lineage outlined in Fa-ju's epitaph and to establish the Shao-lin Monastery as the ancient and legitimate home of that lineage, [12] the edited version that we have today is at pains to put Shen-hsiu on an equal footing with Fa-ju and to make a case that Shen-hsiu took over Hung-jen's lineage after Fa-ju died.[13] A subsequent formulation of Shen-hsiu's lineage, found in another Tung-huang text, the *Leng-chia shih-tzu chi*, highlighted Shen-hsiu as Hung-jen's leading disciple and relegated Fa-ju to

obscurity.[14]

The followers of Shen-hsiu, represented after his death by P'u-chi and other leading disciples, did constitute what I would call a school of Buddhism with a distinctive set of doctrines. P'u-chi claimed that those doctrines had been inherited from Hung-jen and called them the "East Mountain teaching" (*tung-shan fa-men*), a name that made reference to the mountain in Huang-mei where Hung-jen's monastery was located.[15] P'u-chi, it seems, also used the name "Southern lineage" *(nan-tsung)* for Shen-hsiu's line of Dharma transmission.[16] The school of Shen-hsiu and P'u-chi, however, was fated to go down in history as the "northern lineage" *(pei-tsung)*, a derogatory label that was first attached to it by a vociferous contemporary critic, Ho-tse Shen-hui (684-758), who appropriated the name "southern lineage of Bodhidharma" for his teacher Hui-neng and himself. Scholars today commonly refer to Shen-hsiu's school as the Northern School of Ch'an—a designation that I am content to follow. The distinctive doctrines and religious metaphors employed by the school have been well elucidated in John McRae's book, *The Northern School and the Formation of Early Ch'an Buddhism*, and need no further discussion here. I would simply stress, as McRae himself notes, that there is no evidence other than that found in the texts of the Northern School itself to support the attribution of the school's doctrines to the fourth and fifth patriarchs in Shen-hsiu's putative lineage, Tao-hsin and Hung-jen.[17] In other words, we must be careful to distinguish Shen-hsiu's mythological lineage (later called the "northern lineage"), which posits a transmission of teachings from Bodhidharma through Tao-hsin and Hung-jen to Shen-hsiu, and the historical entity we call the Northern School. That school is identifiable by its distinctive doctrines and by its lineage myth, the last of which, as I explained above, it simply stole from the monk Fa-ju and his followers at the Shao-lin Monastery. Needless to say, the fact that the Northern School appropriated Fa-ju's genealogical credentials does not mean that it necessarily derived any other aspects of its teachings or practices from Fa-ju.

The next phase in the formulation of the myth of Bodhidharma's lineage is one that is familiar to all western students of Chinese Buddhism, thanks to Philip Yampolsky's translation of the *Platform Sūtra* and summary of Hu Shih's pioneering research on the aforementioned critic of the Northern School, Shen-hui.[18] Shen-hui, as is well known, argued that it was not Shen-hsiu of the Northern School who was the true sixth patriarch in the "southern lineage of Bodhidharma," but his own teacher Hui-neng. What is not generally understood is that Shen-hui must have been aware of the Northern School's appropriation of Fa-ju's lineage and modeled his own grab for genealogical legitimacy after it. Shen-hui criticized P'u-chi for editing the *Ch'uan fa-pao chi* in such a way that there were two patriarchs in the sixth generation (Fa-ju and Shen-hsiu) and for setting up the "hall of the seven patriarchs" at Shao-lin Monastery,[19] so he evidently realized that the reworking of the text and the establishment of the portrait hall had been ploys to wrest the prestige of Bodhidharma's lineage from Fa-ju. However, it did not serve his interests to refute the claims of Shen-hsiu's followers by reasserting Fa-ju's status as sole patriarch in the generation after Hung-jen. Instead, Shen-hui drew attention to the self-contradictory nature of the lineage claims made in the *Ch'uan fa-pao chi* and seized the opportunity to argue that the true sixth patriarch was neither Shen-hsiu nor Fa-ju but Hui-neng.

As John Jorgensen has pointed out, Shen-hui's criticism of the *Ch'uan fa-pao chi* was based in part on the principle that the lineage of Bodhidharma could have only one legitimate Dharma heir per generation,[20] just as the system of succession in the imperial clan could allow only one reigning emperor at a time. "Shen-hui," he writes,

> used the literati ideal of the orthodox lineage, or rather the idea of the legitimate imperial

> clan lineage, to try to convince his audience that his was the legitimate line of succession, and that the leading lights of Northern Ch'an were pretenders to the "throne" of Ch'an.[21]

Shen-hui refused to countenance more than one patriarch per generation because

> he was creating an "imperial lineage" for "Southern Ch'an," that is, himself. He wanted one visible centre of authority just as an imperial lineage has in the person of the emperor.[22]

In short, Jorgensen argues, Shen-hui worked to enhance the prestige of Bodhidharma's lineage by portraying it as a spiritual genealogy analogous to the line of emperors and tried to appropriate that prestige by presenting Hui-neng and himself as the sole rightful heirs to the lineage in the sixth and seventh generations, respectively. Jorgensen asserts that the idea of a strict patriarchal succession was the invention of Shen-hui,[23] but this is not necessarily true: it could have been invented by the disciples of Fa-ju and merely reasserted by Shen-hui as a polemical device to neutralize the machinations of Shen-hsiu's followers.

Shen-hui, much as P'u-chi before him had done, backed up his claim to Bodhidharma's lineage by erecting a mortuary portrait hall (*chen-t'ang*) memorializing six generations of patriarchs in China.[24] Unlike P'u-chi, however, Shen-hui built the portrait hall at his own monastery, the Ho-tse Monastery in Lo-yang, and allowed only one patriarch per generation. The figure enshrined in the sixth generation, of course, was Hui-neng. The text of the stele marking the portrait hall was written by Sung Ting, a high official in the Bureau of Military Appointments, with a preface by Shen-hui himself which detailed the "bloodlines" of the lineage (*tsung-me*) from the Buddha down through the various Indian patriarchs and the six generations of patriarchs in China. Images (*ying*) were drawn for each of the six patriarchs and placed in the hall,[25] and the Defender-in-Chief Fang Kuan (697-763) produced a "preface to the portraits of the six generations" to accompany them. It is significant that the myth of Bodhidharma's lineage first took on a concrete, institutional form through the building of mortuary halls along the lines of Confucian clan shrines and the performance of death anniversary rites for the ancestral teachers (*tsu-shih*) whose portraits were enshrined therein. Such halls and rites clearly had a political as well as a devotional side to them, for they held up a lineage for public display and affirmation. The mortuary portrait halls built by P'u-chi and Shen-hui were high-profile facilities that were aimed not only at establishing quasi-genealogical credentials within the Buddhist order, but at gaining recognition and support for their schools from high ranking government officials.

According to the Ch'an historian Tsung-mi (780-841), a self-avowed heir in Ho-tse Shen-hui's lineage,[26] five years after Shen-hui died in 758 the emperor had a monastery (the Pao-ying Monastery) built at the master's *stūpa* site at Lung-men in the eastern capital (Loyang). In 770 the patriarchs hall (*tsu-t'ang*) at the monastery was granted a doorway plaque by the emperor Tai-tsung which read, "Hall of the True Lineage which Transmits the Dharma of *Prajñā* (Wisdom)." In 772 the *stūpa* itself was granted an imperial plaque which read, "*Stūpa* of the Great Teacher *Prajñā* (Shen-hui's posthumous title)." In 796, furthermore, various Ch'an masters were summoned by the crown prince at imperial behest to determine the orthodox Ch'an teachings, and this commission formally ratified Shen-hui's status as seventh patriarch in Bodhidharma's lineage. The event was recorded on a stele set up by imperial order inside the Shen-lung Monastery (Tsung-mi remarked that it was "still there"), and the emperor wrote a eulogy for the seventh patriarch.[27] A memorial stele written in 806 for Hui-chien (719-792), a disciple of Shen-hui, also called Shen-hui the seventh patriarch and stated that Hui-chien used money donated from the imperial treasury to build

a Kuan-yin hall that featured portraits of the seven patriarchs.[28] It is evident from all of this that Shen-hui and his followers enjoyed considerable success in their bid for official sanction and patronage in the eighth and early ninth centuries.

Luis Gómez has pointed out that Shen-hui's doctrinal stance, which stressed the principle of sudden enlightenment (*tun-wu*), was riddled with inconsistencies which resulted from the fact that "his position was critical rather than constructive: it was formed by a set of objections to his opponents, not by a structured system."[29] Nevertheless, Shen-hui's "sudden enlightenment" rhetoric was distinctive in its polemical tone and stridency, and was evidently very effective in attracting mass audiences and gaining converts and patronage. John McRae describes Shen-hui as a proselytizer whose "chosen role of inspiring conversion to the Buddhist spiritual quest was combined with an overriding concern with the initial moment of religious inspiration."[30] In other words, Shen-hui was a sort of Buddhist evangelist who used the rhetoric of sudden enlightenment to deny the necessity of a long and difficult regimen of meditation and other forms of monastic discipline, and to excite a quick and fervent acceptance by his audiences of the notion that enlightenment was at hand—that they were already, as it were, saved. Shen-hui and his followers may have defined their approach to Buddhist teachings and practice largely in contradistinction to the Northern School, but their success in appropriating that school's genealogy and wresting away a good deal of its prestige and patronage over the course of the half century following Shen-hui's death is sufficient evidence that they constituted a distinct school within the Buddhist order.

Shen-hui's school had plenty of competition from other claimants to Bodhidharma's lineage in the late eighth and early ninth centuries, however. Some of them, like Shen-hui himself and P'u-chi before him, chose to stake their claim to the lineage on the basis of putative connections between their ancestral teachers and the fifth patriarch Hung-jen. Tsung-mi, who compiled a list of lineages deriving from Bodhidharma in his *Chan-yüan chu-ch'üan-chi tu-hsü*, noted three that fell into this category: (1) the lineage of Chih-hsien (609-702), represented in succeeding generations by his immediate disciple Chu-chi (669-732) and Chu-chi's disciple Kim Ho-shang (also known as Wu-hsiang) of the Ching-chung Monastery in Cheng-t'u; (2) the lineage of Wu-chu (714-775) of the Pao-t'ang Monastery in Szechuan, a disciple of Kim Ho-shang who taught much the same doctrines as his master but took a radically different approach to practice; and (3) the lineage of Kuo-lang Hsüan-shih, which was also centered in Szechuan.[31] Other lineage formulations, evidently produced after Shen-hui's attack on the Northern School, accepted Hui-neng as the sixth patriarch and sought to provide themselves with genealogical credentials by linking their leaders to him as his spiritual descendants, brushing aside Shen-hui's claim to the position of seventh patriarch in the process. Followers of what Tsung-mi called the Hung-chou lineage promulgated a genealogy which extended from the sixth patriarch Hui-neng through an obscure monk named Nan-yüeh Huai-jang (677-744) to their own teacher Ma-tsu Tao-i (709-788), who was closely associated with the Kai-yüan Monastery in Hung-chou. Various followers of Shih-t'ou Hsi-ch'ien (700-790), meanwhile, traced their lineages back to Hui-neng through Shih-t'ou's teacher Ch'ing-yüan Hsing-ssu (d. 740). The latter two lineages came to be celebrated in the Sung dynasty as the main bloodlines through which all living Ch'an masters inherited the Dharma from Bodhidharma and Hui-neng, and vast collections of hagiographical lore grew up around them. However, apart from Tsung-mi's sketchy accounts of the characteristic doctrines and practices associated with each of the various lineages he lists, there is very little in the way of contemporaneous evidence that would allow us to determine the true scope and character of the schools that produced those competing genealogical records.

One thing that is amply clear from Tsung-

mi's writings and all the other documents at our disposal, however, is that in the T'ang dynasty there was never any sort of unified movement with a commonly held set of teachings or practices or social structures that we could justifiably label the "Ch'an school" of Buddhism. On the contrary, there were numerous and diverse schools, some centered on the capitals and some located in distant regions such as Szechuan, some in direct competition for imperial recognition and patronage and some so widely separated as to be ignorant of each other's existence, which held only one thing in common: a concern with spiritual genealogy as a strategy of legitimation and an investment in the mythology of the lineage of a conveniently vague Indian *dhyāna* master by the name of Bodhidharma. Until the early ninth century, when Tsung-mi attempted to pull together and compare the doctrines of all the schools that linked themselves in some way with Bodhidharma's lineage, the concept of a single broadly extended, multi-branched "Ch'an lineage" did not exist. Tsung-mi struggled to harmonize the teachings of what he conceived as the various branches of the Ch'an lineage, portraying them as opposite but ultimately complementary aspects of one profound, ineffable truth transmitted by Bodhidharma. His ecumenical vision and sense of community was shared by few if any other claimants to Bodhidharma's lineage in the T'ang, however, so this was a case of a lineage produced by an individual rather than a school. In plain words, there was a Ch'an lineage mentioned in a few texts (all Tsung-mi's) prior to the mid-tenth century, but there was no real Ch'an school that corresponded to it or adopted it as a genealogy. Nor was there any historically verifiable transmission of concrete doctrines or practices along any of the lines of Dharma transmission that ostensibly linked Bodhidharma with his various putative spiritual heirs in the sixth generation and beyond.

The Ch'an school, in my view, emerged as a real entity with an identifiable social structure, ideology, and body of sacred texts sometime around the middle of the tenth century. The process through which it arose was gradual and complex, but may be viewed as having three basic phases: (1) the formation and widespread acceptance among Buddhists of a mythical genealogy very similar to (and clearly influenced by) Tsung-mi's ecumenical conception of a multi-branched lineage stemming from Bodhidharma; (2) the ritual reenactment of that mythical genealogy in a way that gave rise to an elite class of Ch'an masters (*ch'an-shih*) within the Buddhist order; and (3) the ratification by the state of both the lineage myth and the social hierachy it fostered, resulting in the creation of Ch'an school monasteries.

In order to understand how this process—the institutionalization of the Ch'an lineage myth—unfolded, it is necesary to review the circumstances that had befallen Chinese Buddhism over the course of the previous two centuries, from the time of the An Lu-shan rebellion (755-763) in the middle of the T'ang down through the period of the Five Dynasties (907-959). Prior to the An Lu-shan rebellion, imperial patronage had played a decisive role in supporting the Buddhist order and in determining which schools within it would flourish. Although the court was probably motivated as much by a desire to control Buddhism as to promote it, Buddhism was nevertheless afforded the status of a national religion. Various schools within it, including those which claimed to represent Bodhidharma's lineage, vied vigorously for official recognition as legitimate representatives of the religion. Following the An Lu-shan rebellion, however, there was a gradual decentralization of political and economic power that led a growing number of Buddhist clergy to seek patronage among provincial bureaucrats and military governors.

The systematic suppression of Buddhist institutions that was instigated by imperial decree in the Hui-ch'ang era (841-846) greatly increased the role that provincial patrons played in the survival and subsequent development of Chinese Buddhism. The suppression resulted in the whole-

sale defrocking of Buddhist clergy, the closing or destruction of Buddhist monasteries, and the seizure of their wealth. These measures were carried out wherever the power of the central T'ang government still extended, and the schools of Buddhism that had enjoyed imperial patronage in the vicinity of the capitals, including the Northern School of Shen-hsiu and the school of Shen-hui, were greatly effected. There is evidence, however, that in some regions such as Kiangsi in the south (where the Hung-chou school of Ma-tsu was flourishing) and Hopei in the north (where the school of Lin-chi was supported by a local warlord), the imperial edicts proscribing Buddhism were carried out half-heartedly, or even ignored.[32] The fact that certain schools claiming to represent Bodhidharma's lineage came through the Hui-ch'ang suppression unscathed was probably due in large part to their distance—both in terms of geography and of patronage—from the T'ang court.

With the end of the Hui-ch'ang era and the ascension of a new emperor more favorably disposed towards Buddhism, the official policy of suppression was rescinded and some imperial patronage was restored, but that patronage became less and less significant as the empire finally disintegrated completely into local regimes in the final decades of the T'ang. The late T'ang and Five Dynasties, a period of political fragmentation, saw the development of what were later called the "five houses (*wu-chia*) of Ch'an" under the protection of various local officials in areas that were relatively free from strife. Among these, the Wei-yang school was the first to flourish.[33] The Emperor Wu-tsung, who had presided over the supression, died in 846 and was succeeded by Hsüan-tsung, who was sympathetic to Buddhism. P'ei-hsiu (797-870), a powerful advisor in Hsüan-tsung's court, restored the T'ung-ch'ing Monastery on Mt. Wei in Hunan province where Wei-shan Ling-yu (771-853) had resided before the suppression, and many disciples gathered there under that master once again. Another monastic center revived with P'ei-hsiu's patronage soon after the suppression was Mt. Huang-po in Kiangsi province, where Huang-po Hsi-yün (d. ca. 856) flourished.[34] Meanwhile, the Lin-chi school began to thrive in far off Hopei with the support of non-Chinese warlords. The Yün-men school flourished in the area of Ling-nan, patronized by the rulers of the state of Nan Han. The Fa-yen school was centered in the Nan T'ang, a state made up of parts of the older kingdoms of Wu in Kiangsi and Min in Fukien. Each of these schools developed its own distinctive approach to Buddhist thought and practice in relative isolation from the others. Together with the Tung-shan school, they have been regarded since the Sung as the major streams of the Ch'an lineage in the late T'ang and Five Dynasties. It was only retrospectively, however, in the mid-tenth century, that the genealogies handed down in these schools were collated and referred to collectively as the "Ch'an lineage." As Yanagida Seizan suggests, moreover, there must have been numerous other similarly localized new developments in the Buddhism of this period.[35] The so-called "five houses" just happened to be schools for which records survived.

It was during the first half of the tenth century, while much of northern China was torn by strife, that a new conception of Bodhidharma's lineage similar to the one held earlier by Tsung-mi began to gain acceptance in the kingdoms of the southeast. As Yanagida has pointed out, those kingdoms were havens of relative peace and prosperity in a troubled age, and because their rulers were generally sympathetic to Buddhism, many monks from more strife-torn regions took refuge there.[36] In this setting, where monks from all over China congregated and brought with them the lineage claims and hagioraphical lore of numerous regional schools, a consensus arose that granted membership in a broadly conceived Ch'an lineage to anyone who could trace his spiritual heritage back to Bodhidharma through the sixth patriarch

Hui-neng. The principle of unilinear Dharma succession that Shen-hui had stressed earlier survived to the extent that the "trunk" of the Ch'an family tree was envisioned as a line of thirty-three Indian and Chinese patriarchs (one per generation) culminating in Hui-neng, but two main branches (the lineages of Ch'ing-yüan and Nan-yüeh) and multiple sub-branches were accepted as equally legitimate in the generations after Hui-neng. It was also allowed that the lineage had anciently included "collateral" branches, such as the lineages of Niu-t'ou (594-657) and Shen-hsiu, stemming from the fourth and fifth patriarchs, respectively.

The oldest extant text to embody such a multi-branched Ch'an lineage is the *Tsu-t'ang-chi* or "Patriarchs Hall Collection."[37] It was compiled in 952 by two monks who were followers in the third generation of the eminent Ch'an master Hsüeh-feng I-ts'un (822-908).[38] The compilers resided at the Chao-ch'ing Cloister in Ch'üan-chou (in present Fukien). At the time, Ch'üan-chou was under the rule of the Nan T'ang but previously it had fallen within the boundaries of the kingdom of Min. The Chao-ch'ing Cloister had been built in 906 for a disciple of Hsüeh-feng I-ts'un (822-908) by the Wang family, the rulers of Min who had patronized Hsüeh-feng and many of his followers. The port cities of Ch'üan-chou and Fu-chou, where the Wangs were based, were relatively prosperous and free from turmoil. Because patronage from the sympathetic local rulers was available there, monks flocked from all over, and the number of Hsu-feng's disciples grew to some 1,700.[39]

Like many of the independent kingdoms in both north and south China that competed for territory and economic and political influence during the tenth century, Nan T'ang fancied itself an "empire" along the lines of the great T'ang dynasty. Because the T'ang emperors before them had patronized the Buddhist order and built monasteries dedicated to the protection of the nation, it was deemed fitting by the rulers of these states that they should follow suit. The compilers of the *Tsu-t'ang-chi*, with their implicit claim to represent not just a single line of orthodox Buddhism, but rather a great many lines that had thrived all over China in the T'ang, created a document that played nicely to this conceit: they made the Ch'an lineage in Fukien seem like the repository of all the glories of the past, and the true guardians of the flame of T'ang Buddhism. At this point, I think, it is fair to speak of a nascent Ch'an school in southeast China, identifiable by: its newly forged genealogical records; its conception of itself as a lineage which conveyed the Buddha Śākyamuni's formless Dharma of enlightenment in a "mind-to-mind" transmission from master to disciple, apart from the scriptural tradition; and its success in gaining the patronage of kings, which was manifested concretely in the building of "Ch'an (lineage) monasteries" (*ch'an-ssu*)—something that had never existed before.

Nan T'ang, as it happened, was not the state to succeed in reunifying China and turning the rhetoric of empire into reality. That distinction (though never fully realized, due to the existence of the powerful Khitan state to the north) belonged to the Sung. Nor did the *Tsu-t'ang-chi* survive long in China: as fate would have it, the text was lost within about 150 years of its publication, being preserved in its entirety only in Korea. Nevertheless, the conception of the Ch'an lineage reflected in the *Tsu-t'ang-chi* soon found expression in other collections of Ch'an biographies known generically as records of transmission of the flame (*ch'uan-teng lu*), and those succeeded in gaining the official approval of the Northern Sung court. The oldest and most influential of the texts in question is the *Ching-te ch'uan teng lu*, which was completed 1004 and subsequently included in all imperial editions of the Buddhist canon. It seems that with the political reunification of China, the Buddhist order in general had an opportunity to regain its erstwhile status as an imperially sanctioned national religion. It was the nascent Ch'an school in particular, however, armed with its ancient yet open-ended genealogy and its claim to transmit no particular doctrine or practice but only

the "Buddha mind" (*fo-hsin*, i.e. enlightenment) itself, that was able to bring the greatest number of regional movements under its wing and present itself at the Sung court as the legitimate standard bearer of the Buddhist tradition as a whole.

The Ch'an lineage in the Sung was essentially a mythological entity, that is, a collection of stories about how the sacred (enlightenment) manifested itself in the world of human beings from ancient times down to the present. Yet, because the mythology was not only transmitted verbally and in written form, but was also reenacted in concrete rituals that were recognized by the government as well as the Buddhist community at large, the Ch'an lineage did in fact take on a certain social and institutional reality. That is to say, there was in the Sung an elite group of Buddhist monks (and a few nuns and lay persons) who were regarded as living members of the Ch'an lineage by virtue of the fact that they had formally inherited the Dharma from another recognized member of the lineage in a ritual of Dharma transmission.

In earlier accounts of Bodhidharma's lineage in China (beginning with Shen-hui) we find the patriarchs handing over robes and bowls to their disciples as proof of Dharma transmission—visible signs that the formless Dharma had indeed been vouchsafed. In the Sung, however, it was only by the possession of an "inheritance certificate" (*ssu-shu*), a kind of diploma received in the ritual of Dharma transmission, that a person was recognized as a member of the Ch'an lineage. When one recalls the image of the iconoclastic Ch'an master that is projected in the hagiographical literature, the key role played in Sung Ch'an by such regalia might seem strange. It was precisely because the Ch'an lineage was defined in terms of the transmission of something utterly signless and ineffable, however, that certification was necessary. It is easy to assume that the mark of a Ch'an master (*ch'an-shih*) in the Sung would have been skill in meditation. The term *ch'an-shih* does in fact mean "meditation master" in texts dating from the T"ang and earlier, but many proponents of the Ch'an lineage in the Sung vigorously denied that the name Ch' an signified any particular reliance on the practice of *dhyāna* (*ch'an-na*, commonly abbreviated as *ch'an*). The Ch'an master Chueh-fan Hui-hung (1071-1128), for example, stressed that Bodhidarma himself had not been a mere practitioner of *dhyāna* (*hsi-ch'an*), but a great sage who mastered the full range of Buddhist practices.[40] What the term "Ch'an lineage" really meant in the Sung was not the lineage of meditation, but the lineage of enlightenment. Masters in the Ch'an lineage could not be readily distinguished from other Buddhist monks on the basis of their ordinations, the practices they engaged in, or the arrangement of the monasteries they lived in. The elite ranks of Ch'an masters in the Sung included not only meditation specialists but also Pure Land devotees, tantric ritualists, experts on monastic discipline, exegetes of *sūtra* and philosophical literature, poets, artists, and even monks with leanings to Neo-Confucianism. Thus, apart from a familiarity with the mythology of the Ch'an lineage and an ability to mimic its rhetorical style in certain ritual settings, the only indispensable external marks of a Ch'an master in the Sung were the regalia of Dharma transmission, chief among them his inheritance certificate.

It should be clear from this that the majority of the members of the Ch'an lineage as it was conceived in the Sung were ancestral figures whose sacred words and deeds were preserved in the "records of the transmission of the flame." Only the most recent heirs to the lineage were living, and even they were revered as ancestor-like personages who in a certain sense had already departed the world of ordinary human beings and joined their predecessors.[41] The entity I want to call the Ch'an school included far more members than the few who were recognized as Dharma heirs, although the latter were clearly the leaders. The school consisted of everyone who believed in the

Ch'an lineage, gained inspiration from its lore, worshipped its patriarchs, and followed or supported the Ch'an masters who were its living representatives.

The Sung court favored the Ch'an school, mainly by granting canonical status to the hagiographical collections that elaborated its conception of an extended, multi-branched Ch'an lineage, and by designating large state-supported ("public") monasteries as places where only monks who were Dharma heirs in that lineage could serve as abbot. It is important to note that many of the monasteries so designated in the early Sung had been in existence from T'ang times or even earlier and had often enjoyed some sort of imperial recognition or patronage in the past, but without any particular association with the lineage of Bodhidharma. The sudden conversion of those establishments to "Ch'an monasteries" (*ch'an-ssu* or *ch'an-yüan*) by imperial proclamation in the Sung, in fact, was usually accomplished by simply renaming the institution, issuing an imperial plaque bearing the new name for display above the main gate, and appointing a new abbot (regarded as "founding abbot," *k'ai-shan*) who belonged to the Ch'an lineage. The one other change that was absolutely necessary was a refurbishing of the mortuary halls with the portraits of Ch'an patriarchs.

Much has been made in the scholarly literature about the characteristic features of Ch'an monasteries in the Sung, but as I have shown elsewhere, they were in fact largely indistinguishable in their organization and operation from other large, public monasteries.[42] The Ch'an school claimed to have invented many features of the monastic institution that it came to dominate in the Sung, attributing them to the T'ang patriarch Pai-chang (749-814). Those claims do not stand up to historical criticism, however, and so must be interpreted as just another aspect of the Sung Ch'an mythology. It is clear, moreover, that the vast majority of the monks, nuns, novices, postulants, and lay patrons who lived and trained in Ch'an monasteries in the Sung were not members of the Ch'an lineage (as the term was understood at the time) because only a select few ever received Dharma transmission. Many persons at all levels in the monastic hierarchy did, however, have various connections with members of the Ch'an lineage, who were usually senior officers, abbots, or retired abbots.

The overall picture of the Sung Ch'an school that emerges is that of individual members of an elite, highly prestigious, mythologically charged fraternity (the Ch'an lineage) holding high monastic office and having around them a wide circle of followers of varying ranks and social standings.[43]

NOTES

1. Mircea Eliade, et al., eds., *The Encyclopedia of Religion*, 2:482.

2. Ibid., 2:484.

3. Ibid., 2:485.

4. Ui Hakuju, *Zenshū shi kenkyū* (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1935), 81-90.

5. T. Griffith Foulk, "Myth, Ritual, and Monastic Practice in Sung Ch'an Buddhism," Peter N. Gregory and Patricia Ebrey, eds., *Religion and Society in T'ang and Sung China, 700-1300* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, forthcoming).

6. John R. McRae, *The Northern School and the Formation of Early Ch'an Buddhism*, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1986), 85-6.

7. *Taishō shinshū daizokyō* (hereafter abbreviated T) 50.551b-552c.

8. T 50.606b.

9. The text does not survive as an independent work, but is preserved as the first six biographies in the *Ch'uan fa-pao chi*. For a critical edition of the text see Yanagida Seizan, ed., *Shoki no zenshi I* (Tokyo: Chikuma, 1971).

10. Sekiguchi Shindai, *Daruma no kenkyū* (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1967), 133.

11. This is reported in a Tun-huang text, Shen-hui's *P'u-t'i-ta-mo nan-tsung ting shih-fei lun*, edited by Hu Shih in *Shen-hui ho-shang i-chi* (Taipei: Hu Shih chi-nien kuan, 1968), 289.

12. The core of the *Ch'uan fa-pao chi*, in the section devoted to Hung-jen's biography, states explicitly that Hung-jen transmitted the Dharma to his disciple Fa-ju, but it makes no mention at all of Shen-hsiu (Yanagida, ed., *Shoki no zenshi I*, 386). In Fa-ju's biography, as well, Fa-ju's receipt of the Dharma from Hung-jen is repeated in no uncertain terms (Ibid., 390). It is inconceivable that anyone wishing to establish Shen-hsiu as Hung-jen's chief disciple would have singled out and honored Fa-ju in this way or gratuitously forged a link between Bodhidharma and Fa-ju's Shao-lin Monastery.

13. In his introduction, the editor of the *Ch'an fa-pao chi*, Tu Fei, reiterates the lineage of Dharma transmission from Bodhidharma to Fa-ju just as it appears in Fa-ju's epitaph, only adding a line that reads "and Fa-ju ceded it to Ta-t'ung (Shen-hsiu)" (Yanagida, 337; translation from McRae, *The Northern School*, 257). The claim here, significantly, is not that Fa-ju "transmitted" (*ch'uan*—the verb used in every other case) the Dharma to Shen-hsiu, but that he "ceded" it. What Tu Fei means by this becomes clear in Fa-ju's biography, where the master is quoted as proclaiming to his disciples just before his death that "After [my death] you should go study under *Dhyāna* Master Shen-hsiu of Yü-ch'üan ssu in Ching-chou" (Yanagida, 390; translation from McRae, 265). It is likely that Tu Fei simply tacked this quote on to the end of Fa-ju's biography (the end of the core text) in order to provide a justification for and smooth transition to the biography of Shen-hsiu that he was appending. He still had a problem, however, for Shen-hsiu had to be portrayed as a Dharma heir in the lineage, and that meant forging a connection with Hung-jen. This Tu Fei managed, not by adding a reference to Shen-hsiu into Hung-jen's biography, but by stating circumspectly in Shen-hsiu's own biography that "when *Dhyāna* Master [Hung]-jen was about to die, it was said [by Hung-jen? or someone else?] that [Shen-hsiu] already had Dharma transmission" (Yanagida, 396). This clearly implies that Shen-hsiu received Dharma transmission from Hung-jen, but it uses hearsay as a device and avoids a direct statement of fact. I conclude from all of this that Tu Fei went as far as he could to turn the *Ch'uan fa-pao chi* into a text that was supportive of the claims of Shen-hsiu's followers, but that he was constrained by the preexisting account of Fa-ju's lineage and was not at liberty to reject that account out of hand or meddle too much with the core six biographies.

14. The *Leng-chia shih-tzu chi* places Shen-hsiu's biography immediately after Hung-jen's, states explicitly in Hung-jen's biography that Shen-hsiu was his Dharma heir, and mentions "Fa-ju of Lu-chou" only once in passing as one of three disciples whom Hung-jen proclaims "fit to teach people, but just in their local regions" (Yanagida, 273).

15. McRae, 8-9.

16. Suzuki Tetsuo, "Nanshū tōshi no shuchō," 77-79.

17. McRae, 10.

18. Philip B. Yampolsky, trans., *The Platform Sūtra of the Sixth Patriarch* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967).

19. *P'u-t'i-ta-mo nan-tsung ting shih-fei lun*, in Hu Shih, ed., *Shen-hui ho-shang i-chi*, 284, 289.

20. John Jorgensen, "The 'Imperial' Lineage of Ch'an Buddhism: The Role of Confucian Ritual and Ancestor Worship in Ch'an's Search for Legitimation in the Mid-T'ang Dynasty," *The Australian National University Department of Far Eastern History Papers on Far Eastern History* 35 (March, 1987): 114. Jorgensen draws on Yang Hung-fei, "Jinne no dentōsetsu to Juka shisō to no kōshō," *Ryūkoku shidan* 56/57, 1967 .

21. Jorgensen, 96.

22. Jorgensen, 104.

23. Jorgensen, 90.

24. This portrait hall is described in the *Sung kao-seng chuan*, T 50.755b; reference given in Jorgensen, 121 (note 141).

25. It is not clear from the text of the *Sung kao-seng chuan* (T 50.755b.11-13) whether images for the various patriarchs in India were also included or whether there were only portraits for the six patriarchs in China.

26. For a discussion of Tsung-mi's affiliation with Shen-hui's line and religious training, see Peter N. Gregory, *Tsung-mi and the Sinification of Buddhism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 34-52.

27. The preceding data in this paragraph all derives from the *Yüan-chüeh-ching ta-shu ch'ao*, written by Tsung-mi sometime between 833 and 841; *Dainippon sokusōkyō* (hereafter abbreviated as ZZ) 1-14-3.277c. Cited in Jorgensen, 118.

28. Jorgensen, 119-29. Jorgensen's note 136 (p. 129): "This stele is preserved in the Forest of Steles in Hsi-an. It is titled *T'ang ku Chao-sheng ssu Ta-te Hui-chien Ch'an-shih p'ei.* Can be found in Tsukuda Yasunobu, *Seian hirin no kenkyū* (Tokyo, 1983), p.124."

29. Luis O. Gómez, "Purifying Gold: The Metaphor of Effort and Intuition in Buddhist Thought and Practice," Peter N. Gregory, ed. *Sudden and Gradual: Approaches to Enlightenment in Chinese Thought*, Kuroda Institute Studies in East Asian Buddhism, no. 5 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), 86.

30. John R. McRae, "Shen-hui and the Teaching of Sudden Enlightenment in Early Ch' an Buddhism," Gregory, ed. *Sudden and Gradual*, 254.

31. ZZ 1-4-3.278b-279a.

32. Yanagida Seizan, "Tō matsu godai no kahoku chihō ni okeru zenshū no rekishiteki shakaiteki jijō ni tsuite," *Nihon bukkyō gakkai nenpō* 25 (March, 1959):171-186; Edwin O. Reischauer, *Ennin's Travels in T'ang China* (New York: Ronald Press, 1955), 270.

33. Yanagida Seizan, "Chūgoku no zenshūshi," Nishitani Keiji, ed., *Kōza zen 3, Zen no rekishi: Chūgoku* (Tokyo: Chikuma, 1974), 68-70; Jeffrey Lyle Broughton, *Kuei-feng Tsung-mi: The Convergence of Ch'an and the Teachings* (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1975), 35.

34. Yanagida, "Chūgaku no zenshūshi," 69.

35. Ibid., 80.

36. Yanagida Seizan, ed., *Sodōshū. Zengaku sōsho* 4 (Kyoto: Chūbun, 1984) 1-5.

37. Yanagida, ed., *Sodōshū;* see Yampolsky, *The Platform Sūtra, 51*, note 177, for other editions.

38. Ching (n.d.) and Yün (n.d.) by name. Both were disciples of Fu-hsien Wen-teng (n. d.), who wrote a preface for the *Tsu-t'ang chi.* Wen-teng was a disciple of Pao-fu Ts'ung-chan (867-928), who in turn was a disciple of Hsüeh-feng. See Yanagida, ed., *Sodōshū*, 1.

39. Ibid., 1. For a history of this area during the Five Dynasties see Edward H. Schafer, *The Empire of Min;* at the end of his section on Buddhism (91-96), Schafer notes that "it is clear that Fukien was an important center of the Zen sect in this period."

40. *Lin-chien-lu*, ZZ 2B-21-4.295d.

41. This status was symbolized in a number of ways, including the production and distribution of funerary portraits of eminent masters while they were still alive, and the practice of masters retiring to memorial cloisters in which their own stūpas were already enshrined.

42. Foulk, "Myth, Ritual, and Monastic Practice in Sung Ch'an Buddhism."

43. The size and composition of this following was considered a measure of a Ch'an master's success in the Sung. The epitaphs of Ch'an masters usually told how many people they gave bodhisattva precepts to, how many novices they ordained, how many personal disciples they had, and how many Dharma heirs they recognized.

Shin Buddhist Studies and Secularization

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I

The year 1989 marked the 350th anniversary of the founding of Ryukoku University in Kyoto, Japan. Among the various activities and events which were held at Ryukoku to celebrate that occasion was an international symposium on Shin Buddhist Studies entitled, "Shinran and the Contemporary World." Three scholars from Harvard University, which also has a history spanning 350 years, were invited to be the guest speakers at the symposium. A keynote lecture on "Internationalization of Shin Buddhist Studies" was presented by Dr. Masatoshi Nagatomi, who is also the president of the International Association of Shin Buddhist Scholars.

Nagatomi's address contained many important suggestions. In particular, he raised questions regarding the very foundation of Shin Buddhist Studies (*shinshugaku*) itself—questions which are required in this contemporary world. He stated,

> Is *shinshugaku* a "theological" enterprise intent on unfolding the significance of Shinran's religious insight not only within the context of its roots in Buddhist and cultural history but also from the perspective of the religiously plural world of today? Or is *shinshugaku* primarily an exegetical discipline within the boundaries of sectarian dogmatic orthodoxy? If it happens to be both, then how are they reconciled and mutually integrated?

The tasks which challenge Shin Buddhist Studies today lie not only in its methodological procedures, but also in its perspectives on religious insight. Traditional Shin Buddhist Studies has to some extent incorporated into its methodological procedures certain objective and pragmatic approaches, such as those found in modern historical science and philology. However, it must be said that the study of Shin Buddhism is more than a mere objective or pragmatic investigation. The main purpose of Shin Buddhist Studies is to manifest Shinran's original experience; that is, it is to delve into the essential meaning of the Shin Buddhist teachings which gave rise to various historical occurrences, as well as to textual compositions. Moreover, it is necessary for those who are engaged in such research to approach the teaching subjectively and also participate in that basic religious experience themselves, in the midst of today's religiously plural world.

In this sense, I believe Shin Buddhist Studies should not be limited to dogmatic sectarian orthodoxy; thus I take the stance of integrating positions one and two as set forth by Nagatomi. But his question remains: *How* are they to be reconciled and mutually integrated? I will attempt to address that question now in the context of the issue of secularization. First, I will look at the secularization of contemporary society and the meaning it holds for Shin Buddhist Studies. Next, I will examine the present condition of Shin Buddhist Studies and make a few methodological suggestions.

II

Secularization is a common problem faced by all religions in the world today. There is, however, no agreement among them as to how it should be defined. In other words, it is a term used with various implications and no precise definitions.

The term "secular" itself first appeared in the Agreement of Westphalia in 1648, where it was used in reference to the transfer of church property

to the government. Its initial usage, therefore, was in the context of the political relationship between church and state. Traditionally, religion in the West interpreted this relationship as that existing between the sacred and the secular. In the eighteenth century, under the influence of the philosophy of the enlightenment, the term "secularization" came to refer to nonreligious authority. By the nineteenth century, it had expanded beyond the political sphere to include both culture and philosophy. What this signaled was the end of religious dominance of church and theology over human affairs—a trend of thought often referred to as "secularism."

In the twentieth century, "secularization" became a convenient term for sociologists, who focused on the relationship between religion and society when analyzing changes in the social structure. Here, secularization became a key-concept in explaining those changes which had taken place. That is, the implication of contemporary socio-cultural changes on man's religious aspirations and expressions were formulated in terms of secularization.[1] At this point, religion was no longer viewed as the force shaping society, but rather as one of the many forces in society. Furthermore, the territorial sphere of religion was seen as being limited to an individual's inner spiritual life. Thomas Luckmann, an American sociologist, labeled this phenomenon, "invisible religion." While sociologists looked upon secularization as being indicative of the progress of society, traditional religious institutions, on the other hand, tended to view it negatively. The Christian church regarded it as a crisis, equating it with the decline of religion (i.e., Christianity) and the advent of an atheistic world.

Rudolph Bultmann, a German Protestant theologian, approached the issue of secularization from a different (a theological) perspective. According to Bultmann, secularization is a result of man's objectification of the world through reason and rational thinking. He called secularization man's rational interpretation and control of the world by means of modern technology and the accumulation of historical knowledge. Through secularization, man has been liberated from superstitions and fatalistic views of life. But at the same time it has given rise to man's arrogance, that is, to his attempt to control the world as he wishes. The former is a positive aspect of secularization whereas the latter is negative. Based on such an understanding, he examined Christian faith in modern contemporary society.

God, in Bultmann's eyes, remained a transcendental existence. However, Bultmann stressed that God's transcendental quality is not found in another world, as was the usual, traditional Christian understanding, but in this world. He saw this as an inevitable consequence of a Christian faith centered on the Bible in a time of secularization. It is not the Bible, according to Bultmann, that provides us with answers; rather, the Bible constantly asks us to raise questions. The answers, he said, come from none other than ourselves. Christian faith, centered on the Bible, was seen as being based on a continuous dialogue between the Bible and its reader.

Here, Bultmann advocated the demythologization of the Bible. Myth-like expressions found in the Bible do not represent fact, he said, but rather manifest man's understanding of the world. Thus, these expressions ask each person in every period to reinterpret existentially their meaning. However, Bultmann pointed out, the hermeneutical ground does not lie within human reason, for such reasoning would lead to nihilism. In other words, the hermeneutical ground extends beyond mere human reason and lies in the dialectical relationship between human reason and the Bible. Bultmann's theory caused a sensation in the Christian world, for it shook the core of traditional Christian faith.

The above is just a brief summary of the various, and at times conflicting, meanings given to the term "secularization" in the West. We have

seen that Bultmann viewed secularization positively, compared to the negative view held by traditional Christians. Also, in contrast to sociologists who tended to view secularization in the context of changes in the social structure, he understood it in terms of the relationship between the ultimate and the secular, or that is, the relationship between religious and mundane life.

But, regardless of whether secularization is judged positively or negatively, it is a crucial problem for all religions in civilized society, including Shin Buddhism. The question remains: How will Shin Buddhist Studies deal with this issue? Before I give some suggestions on the matter, I will examine the issue of secularization as it applies to Japan.

Careful attention must be given to the fact that, in medieval Japan, religion never developed to the point where it held any authority which transcended that of the state, as was the case with Christianity in the West. Instead, we find in the Japan a situation in which religion was made subordinate to the state. Accordingly, religious ultimacy and the secular realm never stood in the same sharp, mutual opposition as they did in the West. In particular, under the feudal system of the Edo period, religion was subject to strict controls and, in many cases, the ultimate realm of religion was limited to the inner sphere of individual, spiritual life. It did not impart any decisive influence upon the secular realm. One can note, for instance, that the Shin Buddhist notion of "the two truths of the ultimate and the worldly (*shinzoku nitai*)" was also formulated from these circumstances.

We can see, therefore, that the limitation of religion to the realm of the individual's inner spiritual life occurred quite early in Japan. Yet, although this bears superficial similarity to a characteristic of secularization in the West, it is of clearly different origin. That is to say, the essential reason why this arose in Japan was not because of any change in the structure of society. Rather, the essential reason why it arose was because the role of religion there was to support and maintain the prevailing social structure. Thus, there is some question as to whether the Western concept of secularization can be applied, just as it is, to the case of Japan.

However, it can also be said that, when Western culture and thought were introduced to Japan after the Meiji Restoration, the social structure of Japan underwent change and a condition similar to that of secularization in the West came about. Thus, in effect, the westernization of Japan played an essential role in bringing about a condition which can be called "secularization." A detailed analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper and so I point it out now only in passing.

I would like to note, however, that changes in the structure of Japanese society which were brought about by the westernization process also gave rise to great changes in the bases upon which the Shin Buddhist sectarian organizations had been established. In particular, during the Edo period, the social basis supporting Shin Buddhist orders was the family system. However, with westernization, the family itself gradually lost its previously assigned meaning or role. Furthermore, the relationship between the Shin Buddhist sect and the general populace centered around rituals, such as services for ancestor worship and funerals. The process of westernization brought about the formalization of this relationship and gradually it became impossible to find any religious significance in it. It can be said that such "secularization" of Japanese society shook the foundations upon which traditional Buddhist sects, including Shin Buddhism, had been built.

Thus, we can see the unique character of secularization in Japan. At the same time, however, aspects of it can be said to be universal and common to all secular societies. For instance, due to westernization, many Japanese have come to hold views of the world or humanity based in natural science. However, such world views con-

flict on various points with religious views of those matters. This poses a huge problem for the question of religious truth, which is explained on the basis of such religious views. In other words, the fundamental question for religion is "What meaning does religion hold for us, who are living in secularized society?" In one sense, Bultmann can be understood as having tried to tie the two together theologically.

For Shin Buddhism as well, this remains a great task. That is to say, the problem of secularization demands a thorough-going examination of the operation of orthodox religious organizations, including that of Shin Buddhism. At the same time, it asks us the essential question, "Just what is religion for a human being?" How will Shin Buddhist Studies be able to answer this question?

III

As I have stated thus far, religion, particularly traditional religions, are squarely facing a host of problems with regard to the issue of secularization. When secularization is interpreted literally, as representing a change in the structure of society, then the role that religion traditionally carried out in society, that is, the function of religion, as well as the operation of the religious organization, both become problematical. Concretely, the relationship between religion and such things as secular authority, the state, ethics and civil society all become problems.

Moreover, secularization involves more than just a change of the social structure. It has in fact been deeply tied to modern rationalistic and positivist thinking. Secularization, in other words, has brought into question the meaning of the religious world view and, ultimately, it raises the question of the very meaning of religious truth itself.

How has Shin Buddhism responded to these kinds of questions? I would like to suggest that two levels of attitudes exist in orthodox Shin Buddhist Studies. That is to say, the problem in the relationship between Shin Buddhist Studies and modern man has been apprehended as existing at either 1) a linguistic or 2) an existential level.

According to the linguistic approach, the reason why modern man has difficulty in understanding Shinran's teaching lies not so much in the teachings themselves, as in the manner in which they are explained. Thus, it is said, the problem can be solved with the use of words and expressions which are more understandable to modern people. On the other hand, the existential standpoint places great importance upon the existential question of how I, an individual in the modern world, receive the teachings of Shinran. That is to say, it attempts to understand those teachings in one's present existence.

These two levels are tied together and are very difficult to separate in the condition of secularization. Yet, it can be said that the more "conservative" traditions of doctrinal studies have tended to emphasize the former level, while the latter can be more often seen within the more "liberal" viewpoints, as well as those who approach Shin Buddhist Studies from the standpoints of philosophy or other "outside" schools of thought.

The traditional view has been that the teachings of Shinran or the Shin Buddhist teachings as presented in doctrinal studies, are already complete and perfected. That being the case, the modern doctrinal task is considered to be a matter of determining how to transmit the content of doctrinal studies to people using modern language. In other words, the issue for us is not the doctrine itself; rather, it becomes the way in which that doctrine should be explained.

In contrast to that, the position which considers the problem of secularization from an existential standpoint focuses in upon the existential question which the self apprehends, as well as the various problems of society. It might be said that Bultmann's idea of demythologization repre-

sented a compromise which attempts to solve the problem of secularization by taking it to be this kind of existential problem.

Needless to say, the problems facing Shin Buddhism are more than mere problems of linguistics. The reason is that, as I have indicated previously, religious truth, which religious language is trying to transmit, is based upon certain religious views of the world or humanity. Within the condition of secularization, however, people come to find these views difficult to accept. This is not simply a question of language or method of explanation. Rather, it is a problem of the transmission of religious truth—a question of what is truly meaningful for modern people today.

Moreover, it is characteristic of secularization that the significance of Shin Buddhist Studies itself is no longer as self evident as it once was. For instance, in actuality, Shin doctrinal studies are in no way perfect or complete. They always exist within history and possess their own history; they can exist apart from neither the history of the religious organization nor the history of doctrinal development. Even the more dogmatic approaches which consider doctrinal studies to be complete in themselves have a side to them which is historical in origin and relative in meaning. Thus, by apprehending the problems which Shin Buddhist Studies faces today as simply questions of linguistics or methods of explanation, one will overlook the essence of those problems.

What about the standpoint which considers those problems to be existential in nature? I have mentioned previously that the background out of which the condition of secularization arose was that of a change in modern man's perception of the world. However, it cannot be said that religious concern in the modern era has been lost, as it had been before. The reach of the secular realm has expanded within human life, with the diminution of the ultimate realm. However, human life itself has not become completely secularized as a result. Rather, religious concern continues to exist, as the inner spiritual reality of each individual. The question has become how this concern can be fulfilled; and the answer reveals the kind of life that can be realized by that individual. In this sense, the point of view which understands secularization to be an existential problem is important. Further, it allows us to gain a positive understanding of secularization, which, as an existential problem, refers to an era defined by a perception that, "One must become a truly religious person in order to be a full member of society."

However, lying in wait here is the great danger of deviating from the fundamental, religious viewpoint. That is, when the ultimate realm, within the condition of secularization, does not give rise to an intense confrontation with the secular realm, the ultimate becomes totally dissolved into the secular. This means that here lies the danger that the doctrine itself will be dragged down into the situation and lose its fundamental significance. In particular, this must be given careful attention when one seeks to study the relationship between Shin Buddhism and secular society, the state, ethics, or civil society. Traditionally, in doctrinal studies, this issue had been taken up as the problem of "the two truths of the ultimate and the worldly." I will not go deeply into the content of that problem here other than to say that it contains many problem areas.

In that sense, the standpoint which apprehends secularization as an existential problem must hold within itself a critical moment. That is to say, more than anything else, doctrinal studies must be critical of doctrinal studies themselves; and at the same time, they must engage in an epochal criticism of present day society. In terms of the framework set forth by Nagatomi, this could be said to be the entry into a third standpoint which integrates and critically utilizes the positions of both traditional orthodoxy and doctrinal studies which seek to respond to modern day questions.

It can be asserted that this attitude was an important and essential element in the formation of

Shinran's teachings. In particular, it can been observed in his fundamental doctrinal standpoint, which is captured by his phrase, "neither a monk nor one in worldly life (*hiso hizoku*)."

IV

We find the phrase, "neither a monk nor one in worldly life" in the postscript of the *Collection of Passages Revealing the True Teaching, Practice and Realization of the Pure Land Way*, where Shinran records the Jogen religious persecution. He states,

> The emperor and his ministers, acting against the dharma and violating human rectitude, become enraged and embittered. As a result, Master Genku—the eminent founder who had enabled the true essence of the Pure Land Way to spread vigorously (in Japan)—and a number of his followers, without receiving any deliberation of their (alleged) crimes, were summarily sentenced to death or were dispossessed of the monkhood, given (secular) names, and consigned to distant banishment. I was among the latter.[2]

Then, he declares,

> Hence, I am now neither monk nor one in worldly life. For this reason, I have taken the term "Toku" (stubble haired) as my name.[3]

Usually, Shinran's declaration that he was "neither a monk..." is said to refer to his protest against the persecution of the Buddhadharma by the secular authorities and the imperial law. At the same time, it is also said to be an expression of his intention to part from the conventional Buddhist religious orders which were being protected by those secular authorities. "Nor one in worldly life" can be understood to be his declaration that, even while existing within worldly life, his life was based in the Buddhadharma.

However, it is not enough simply to interpret these words as being a mere statement of opposition to the historical event of governmental suppression. It has also been said that they point to a backdrop of problems which Shinran faced existentially, such as his inability to uphold the precepts, failure to abstain from eating meat, or taking of a wife. Yet, these words also speak of something beyond even this kind of introspective viewpoint. In other words, they do not simply point to the life of a priest who was "neither a monk" since he ate meat and took a wife, "nor one in worldly life" because he performed religious rituals while living in a temple.

Rather, what we find expressed in these words is none other than Shinran's own way of life, chosen by himself as he descended Mr. Hiei and settled upon the Nembutsu which he learned from his teacher, Hōnen. This was a way of life supported by a profound realization of himself as a person who was without repentance or shame, as well as by the joy over having encountered the true and real teaching. In this way, Shinran's phrase is a reference to Shan-tao's "two kinds of deep entrusting." The first is "deep entrusting as to the self," which is stated as,

> believe deeply and decidedly that you are a foolish being of karmic evil caught in birth-and-death, ever sinking and ever wandering in transmigration from innumerable kalpas in the past, with never a condition that would lead to emancipation.[4]

The second, "deep entrusting as to the Buddha's Vow," is set out as follows,

> believe deeply and decidedly that Amida Buddha's Fortyeight Vows grasp sentient beings, and that, allowing yourself to be carried by the power of the Vow without any doubt or apprehension, you will attain birth.[5]

Shinran gave concrete expression to this very profound religious spirit of the Pure Land Way in the sphere of actual life. This can also be seen in his understanding that the governmental oppression of the Nembutsu teaching was not a simple intervention of politics into religion, but also constituted the problem of religion compromising itself with secular authorities.

> Reflecting within myself, I see that in the various teachings of the Path of Sages, practice and enlightenment died out long ago, and that the true essence of the Pure Land way is the path to realization now vital and flourishing.
>
> Monks of Śakyamuni's tradition in the various temples, however, lack clear insight into the teaching and are ignorant of the distinction between true and provisional; and scholars of the Confucian academies in the capital are confused about practices and wholly unable to differentiate right and wrong paths. Thus, scholar-monks of Kofukuji presented a petition to the retired emperor in the first part of the second month, 1207.[6]

Furthermore, in the passage following the statement of his standpoint of being "neither a monk nor one in worldly life," Shinran continues,

> I, Gutoku Shinran, disciple of Sakyamuni, discarded sundry practice and took refuge in the Primal Vow in 1201.[7]

Here Shinran appends the character "Gu" onto the name "Toku," which he had said was a expression of "neither a monk nor one in worldly life," thereby calling himself "Gutoku". He also refers to himself as a "true disciple of the Buddha" and relates his own "turning of the mind" in 1201. In addition, he speaks of having been able to receive the transmission of Hōnen's work, *Passages on the Nembutsu Selected in the Primal Vow*,

> I was in fact able to copy it and to paint his portrait. This was the virtue of practicing the right act alone, and the manifestation of the decisive settlement of birth.[8]

We can begin to see in these passages the religious content of Shinran's declaration that he was "neither a monk nor one in worldly life." The words originated in a profound religious attainment that he expressed as "Gutoku" and which takes the form of a "true disciple of the Buddha" who dwells in the decisive settlement of birth even in the midst of the secular world. This way of life —being "neither a monk nor one in worldly life"— is founded upon the realization that "only the Nembutsu is true and real"—a realization which Shinran called the awakening of *shinjin*.

However, we must take note of an important point here. For Shinran, the human character in all of this was found in the self-realization that one is "foolish, stubble-headed." That is to say, the position of being "neither a monk nor one in worldly life" in the midst of the secular world is not based in the side of human beings, nor in human reason. Rather, it arises from the reality of living thoroughly within the ultimate world, while being in the very midst of the secular world. Thus, being "neither a monk nor one in worldly life" is to live a life in which the ultimate and the secular arise in tension, within the midst of the actual world. The Epilogue to the *Tannisho* states,

> I do not know what the two, good and evil, really mean. I could say that I know what good is, if I knew good as thoroughly and completely as the Tathāgata; and I could say I know what evil is, if I knew evil thoroughly and completely as the Tathāgata. But, in this foolish being full of blind passion, *and* in this world that is a flaming house of impermanence, all matters without exception are lies

and vanities, totally without truth and sincerity; the nembutsu alone is true and real.[9]

According to this passage, the negation of secular values takes place in relation to the Tathāgata. That is, it arises from the realization that "the nembutsu alone is true and real" in the midst of this present reality. This is no transcendental conception of the tension between the ultimate and the secular. Rather, the basis for that tension is said to lie in the nembutsu within this actual world—in that religious way of life, having the "two kinds of deep entrusting" as its inner reality and finding expression in the phrase "neither a monk nor one in worldly life."

That being the case, within the condition of secularization, the mission of Shin Buddhist practicers lies in clarifying the content of Shinran's words, "neither a monk nor one in worldly life," as living reality. It is constantly to ask oneself what it means to be a "true disciple of the Buddha" in the midst of this secular world. If, in the future, Shin Buddhist doctrinal studies should be conducted in the absence of this kind of tension between the ultimate and the secular, then our religious organization will gradually come to lose the dynamism of the religious life in which Shinran discovered the ultimate in the midst of the secular.

NOTES

1. Jan Swyngedouw, "Secularization in a Japanese Context," *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies*, vol. 3/4.

2. *The True Teaching, Practice and Realization of the Pure Land Way, A Translation of Shinran's Kyogyoshinsho*, 4 vols. , Ueda, Y., general ed., Shin Buddhist Translation Series, (Kyoto: Hongwanji International Center), 1990, IV.613-4.

3. Ibid., IV.614.

4. Ibid., II.213.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid., IV.613.

7. Ibid., IV.614.

8. Ibid., IV.616.

9. *Shinshu Shogyo Zensho*, vol. II, pp. 792-3. This translation is based on those found in *Tannisho, A Shin Buddhist Classic*, Unno, T., tr., (Honolulu: Buddhist Study Center Press), 1984, p. 36, and *Tannisho, A Primer*, Hirota, D., tr., (Kyoto: Ryukoku University), 1982, p. 44. Emphasis has been added by the author.

Modern Buddhist Ethics in Asia and America

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Needless to say, ethical concerns are at the very forefront of modern Buddhism. Yet, to my knowledge, there is not a single study in print that provides a cross-cultural and/or cross-traditional approach to an investigation of Buddhist ethics. Moreover, as is well known, almost no volumes have appeared in print over the years that treat the general subject of Buddhist ethics either effectively or even ineffectively. S. Tachibana's *The Ethics of Buddhism* was published in 1926 (and reprinted in 1975). Winston King's fine work *In the Hope of Nibbana* was published in 1964, and is now rather outdated. H. Saddhatissa's Theravāda study *Buddhist Ethics* was published in 1970 (and reprinted in 1987). Nonetheless, each of these volumes, valuable in its own right, treats only a small aspect of the Buddhist ethical tradition.

The above does not mean to say that there is no interest in the ethical tradition of Buddhism. Although ethics may never have quite the widespread readers' appeal that the meditative or philosophical traditions garner, it is nevertheless one of the foundations of the Buddhist canon. As such, a number of important articles on the ethical tradition in Buddhism, cross-cultural and cross-traditional in scope, have begun to appear in journals in recent years. Additionally, several very important chapters in various books have also appeared in print recently.

It is my contention that if a quantity of these individual publications in Buddhist ethics were collected and prudently synthesized, a careful survey of the modern Buddhist ethical landscape would emerge that would amply meet the needs of both the scholarly and practicing Buddhist communities. To be sure, such a study could not focus on just *one* tradition or culture, but would need to address the broad scope of modern Buddhist cultures *and* pertinent issues. In other words, while it would be necessary to consider issues of special concern for the Theravāda tradition, it would also be necessary to address Zen ethics, ethical concerns in Tibetan Buddhism, and Chinese Buddhist ethics. Equally, Buddhism in the Western world, particularly Europe and North America, must be included. This is what I propose do here, albeit in preliminary fashion ... and continue in my book *Buddhist Ethics: A Cross-Cultural Approach* (Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1992).

Until very recently, scholars interested in the ethical dimension of Buddhism had to rely on three basic sources of input for their studies in this area. The first encompasses a rich heritage of monastic disciplinary texts. Although much progress has been made in the last half-century, very few of these texts have been critically edited, and fewer still have been translated into Western languages. I have in mind here such studies as Nathmal Tatia's critical edition of the *Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravādin Prātimokṣa-sūtra*, Gustav Roth's edition *Bhikṣuṇī-Vinaya* (which considers the nun's rules in the same nikāya), or my own *Buddhist Monastic Discipline*, which includes translations of two primary Sanskrit *Vinaya* texts. There are even a few secondary works in this area, such as Erich Frauwallner's *The Earliest Vinaya and the Beginnings of Buddhist Literature*, Akira Hirakawa's *A Study of the Vinayapiṭaka*, and John Holt's *Discipline: The Canonical Buddhism of the Vinayapiṭaka*, but these volumes are few and far between. The problem with these texts, apart from philological issues, is that they reveal very much about ancient Buddhism, but very *little* about the way in which Buddhist ethics adapted to

changing times, circumstances, and cultures. To some degree, the second source of input for scholars alleviated this difficulty, for it provided us with a wealth of commentarial literature.

The commentarial tradition in Buddhist disciplinary literature, however, was vibrant for only a short period, and it is virtually silent in modern times. Additionally, while most of the major Theravādin ethical commentaries have been translated into languages, the larger corpus of texts, in Chinese, Japanese, and especially Tibetan, remains largely untouched and unexplored. Finally, the third source of input for scholars is information concerning the Buddhist laity, but not only is this source utterly scanty, it rests on an ethical framework that has been only minimally reconsidered in the past two thousand years. Thus, as we move into a consideration of Buddhist ethics in the modern world, our scholarship is seriously handicapped.

No doubt, a few scholarly, but general books on Buddhism in the *modern* world have appeared in recent years, such as *Buddhism in the Modern World*, edited by Heinrich Dumoulin and John Maraldo (1976) and *The World of Buddhism*, edited by Heinz Bechert and Richard Gombrich (1984), but these books basically ignore the problem of Buddhist ethics. In fact, even those books on modern Buddhism which are case specific to a particular culture and/or heritage basically avoid a consideration of the ethical tradition. Nonetheless, in the aftermath of the Tibetan Holocaust and the Vietnam war, Buddhists across the face of the globe are slowly beginning to reconsider their ethical tradition in the context of modernity. In so doing, Buddhism has been forced to confront such vital issues as runaway technology, medical discoveries that require a redefinition of human life and its meaning, political scandal, drug abuse, a pluralistic and highly secularized society, and a host of other variables that demand a reassessment of traditional ethical positions.

Furthermore, Asian Buddhism has begun to rapidly expand its sphere of influence, and now attracts a large and significant following in Europe and America. To be sure, such an endeavor leads to curious and interesting problems of cultural translocation ... an issue I explored in my (1979) book *American Buddhism*. One profound item that I have found in my continuing research is that some of Buddhism's difficulties in acculturating to America are exacerbated by the rather nebulously defined ethical guidelines of the Buddhist tradition.

Although Buddhism entered America as early as the mid-nineteenth century, it made its greatest advances, numerically and otherwise, in the period from 1950 onward. Indeed, in the 1960s, the entire religious situation in America was in turmoil, prompting Robert Bellah to note: "I would thus interpret the crisis of the sixties above all as a crisis of meaning, a religious crisis, with major political, social, and cultural consequences to be sure."[1] Given the intensified secularization of the 1960s, and its attendant pluralism, America was ripe for Buddhism to advance more fully than it had before. As sociologist Peter Berger notes, "secularization brings about a de-monopolization of religious traditions and thus, *ipso facto*, leads to a pluralistic situation."[2] This situation was for Berger, and for Buddhism in America, above all a market situation. If the decade of the 1960s can be characterized as perplexing for religion in America, the 1970s and 1980s were no less unusual. Amidst persistent inflation, eroding values, and a growing social anomie, many Americans were faced with a pervasive loss of wholeness, struggling against polarizing forces in virtually every aspect of life. To be sure, the problem is no less severe today. Consequently, as America flexed its collective muscles in the search for human wholeness amidst Theodore Roszak's projected "Wasteland," an overwhelming variety of alternatives appeared in the social, cultural, and religious spheres. In this environment, American Buddhism, despite its apparent ethical insufficiencies, grew

and prospered.

Nonetheless, the above notwithstanding, until quite recently Buddhism's incipient lack of willingness to confront modernity, and its disinclination to redefine its ethical position in the context of rapid social change, has led to serious problems in its Asian homeland. Faced with applying a somewhat outdated and outmoded ethical tradition to modern circumstances or innovating a genuinely new framework which integrates appropriate aspects of its once rich tradition, Buddhists have vacillated. While many religious traditions have taken a long, hard look at the changing face of modern society, and offered to confront the chief ethical issues directly and forthrightly, if not altogether effectively, Buddhists have done neither. Were Buddhists to offer an innovation of the magnitude of Joseph Fletcher's now somewhat outdated situation ethics, it would be hailed as a monumental event. It is my hope that my research in this area will provide modern Buddhists with the information and perspective necessary to achieve that significant and essential goal.

Most modern scholars of Buddhism have argued that salvation in Buddhism is only attainable through the eradication of the defilements (*kleśas*) and focusing especially on greed, hatred, and delusion (*rāga, dveṣa,* and *moha*). Noted *Vinaya* scholar G. S. P. Misra, following F. H. Bradley's *Ethical Studies,* claims that religion is basically doing what is moral, and when applied to Buddhism, concludes that it is only through the discipline inherent in the *Vinaya* and *śīla* tradition that this becomes possible.[3] The ethical legacy embodied by the *Vinaya* codes and *śīla* guidelines has always been almost exclusively applied to the members of the monastic tradition. This has caused at least one scholar of Buddhist ethics to comment that some scholars "have asserted that the normative ethic of Theravāda Buddhism is one of withdrawal from society and abstention from social involvement."[4] Additionally:

> Some scholars tend to regard the traditional exposition of the teachings in the *Visuddhimagga* (the Path of Purification), authored by Buddhaghosa in the fifth century C. E., as the standard summary of Theravāda Buddhist ethics. The *Visuddhimagga,* however, is a standard text only for the *yogi,* or the monks, who are engaged in spiritual endeavor. Used exclusively, it provides an incomplete and misleading picture of Buddhist ethics. To avoid such misunderstandings, it is best to begin by remembering that the whole of Buddhist ethics is contained in the doctrine of the Middle Way and its prerequisites. This doctrine of the Middle Way teaches that both the extreme of asceticism and the extreme of sensual indulgence are to be avoided .... In avoiding these two extremes, the extent of the Middle Way is vast, wide, and very flexible, depending on such circumstances as one's point on the path and stage of maturity.[5]

In other words, we must always be cognizant of the fact that the monastic tradition in Buddhism, however important in its capacity as role model for the laity, has never included the majority of Buddhist practitioners. Furthermore, as Phra Rājavaramuni asserts:

> The most basic point to be made about Buddhist social ethics is that in keeping with the Buddhist doctrine of dependent co-arising, individual betterment and perfection on the one hand and the social good on the other are fundamentally interrelated and interdependent.[6]

Thus, we must focus clearly on what Ken Jones calls "socially engaged Buddhism."[7] Socially engaged Buddhism emphasizes alternative societal models, social helping, service, welfare, and radical activism which, according to Jones, culminates

in "societal metamorphosis."[8] And it is obviously a network composed predominantly of lay Buddhists.

Unquestionably, we must ask whether such a model for socially engaged Buddhism has ever existed in the history of the Buddhist tradition. Winston King thinks not. He says unconditionally that:

> To tell the truth the Buddha had little, either concern for society as such or of firm conviction of its possible improvability. . . . This means that Buddhism on the whole has surveyed political forms with supreme indifference. Or perhaps it might be stated better: Buddhism took the monarchical form of secular society that it found in India for granted and was not concerned enough to worry about changing it.[9]

Professor Robert Thurman, however, suggests that such a model has existed at least since the reign of the Indian King Aśoka, as evidenced by his various Rock Edicts. He groups the Edicts under five major headings:[10]

1. Individual transcendentalism
2. Non-violence
3. Emphasis on education and on religious pluralism
4. Compassionate welfare policies
5. Political decentralization.

Thurman also sees the same model emerging from Nāgārjuna's *Jewel Garland of Royal Counsels,* approximately five centuries after Aśoka.[11] What is significant in the above is that we find parallel patterns in both the early Buddhist and Mahayana delineations of personal and political normative behavior. Further, it is possible to read this progression with clear optimism, as does George Rupp, when he concludes that historical change in Buddhism represents a positive movement, a progression of saṃsāra moving toward nirvana.[12] Such statements make it possible to propound, as James Whitehill does for the Zen tradition, that ethics *can be* "a pluralistic process of inquiry into the moral consequences of Zen practice, liberation, and insight ...."[13] As such, Whitehill, also hypothesizes that:

> While participating in pan-Buddhist ethical dialogue, Zen ethics can consult its own special tradition for confirmed as well as latent ethical insights, offering these insights to the communities where Zen finds itself in the modern world, especially in East Asia and in the Western industrialized world.[14]

Needless to say, the issue of how to determine the question of authority is critical. In other words, is it possible to continue to utilize the *Vinaya* and other texts relevant to *śīla* as the basis for determining standards of exemplary, contemporary ethical propriety?

If we acknowledge that the monastic tradition, irrespective of precise location and time, remains almost exclusively an eremitical convention, then we must also acknowledge that the codified texts of the *Vinaya,* with its accompanying commentaries, remain a viable means for effecting ethical correctness in the various communities that define themselves by their isolation from society. Consequently then, we can focus our attention on the laity ... those hundreds of millions of Buddhist individuals who *do not* remove themselves from society and must necessarily confront complex ethical issues and dilemmas on a virtually daily basis.

It is also necessary to concede that modern Buddhism is becoming increasingly urban, even throughout its Asian homeland. This is important to understand, for as Harvey Cox points out:

> The religion of *homo urbanitas,* the dweller in the city, is a special kind of religion. Regardless of his or her religious past, once the city really makes its impact on the psyche, any city

> person's religion begins to have more in common with that of other city people than it does with the faith of people of his own tradition who still live, either physically or spiritually, in the countryside or small towns.[15]

This latter point obviously complicates the entire matter considerably, for it forces modern Buddhist ethics to confront the radical pluralism, and attendant social anomie, that predominates in the city life of its vast majority of adherents.

Whether one considers the nikāya Buddhist, Mahayana, or Vajrayāna traditions, and within these either the way of the mendicant (*bhikṣu* or *bhikṣuṇī*), householder (*upāsaka* or *upāsikā*), or bodhisattva, the operative word in a consideration of Buddhist ethics is *śikṣā*, variously rendered as "training," "discipline," or even "morality." On the monastic level, the emphasis on *śikṣā* is evidenced by the inclusion in each version of the *Prātimokṣa-sūtra* extant of a section known as the *Śaikṣā* precepts, or those practices (ranging from 66 to 113 in number depending on the text version) aimed at describing and prescribing public, social morality for monks and nuns. On the householder level the laity is conjoined to observe the famous five precepts: (1) to abstain from taking life, (2) not to take that which is not given, (3) to abstain from misconduct in sexual issues, (4) to abstain from incorrect speech, and (5) to abstain from liquor and other intoxicating substances. In each case, the statement of abstention from illicit practice is recorded in a stylized formula that includes the phrase (in Pāli) *sikkhāpadaṃ samādiyāmi*, usually rendered as "I undertake the precept ...." For the bodhisattva, the clearest statement of and emphasis on *śikṣā* can be found in Śāntideva's famous text known as the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, a compendium of ethical items focusing on the explication of twenty-seven *kārikās* that provide the framework or superstructure for this entire volume devoted to Mahayana morality.

Were each of the above groups to focus solely on the notion of *śikṣā* as *precepts*, they would miss the point entirely. In the case of each of the three major traditions of Buddhism, the ethical emphasis is informed by much additional input. In the Theravāda *nikāya*, three additional texts are almost universally cited when dealing with ethical concerns: (1) the *Maṅgala-sutta* of the *Khuddaka Nikāya*, (2) the *Metta-sutta* of the *Suttanipāta*, and (3) the *Sigālovāda-sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya*. Of these, the latter offers the most potential input for modern Buddhists. It describes not only the four motives which are inappropriate as bases for action, *i.e.*, impulse (*chanda*), hatred (*dveṣa*), fear (*bhaya*), and delusion (*moha*), but more importantly, it outlines and comments upon specific proper conduct in six types of relationships which predominate in the life of each member of the laity: children and parents, teacher and pupil, husband and wife, friends (*i.e.*, equals), servants and work-people, and monastic and layperson. While the specifics of this text may be rather dated, outmoded, and perhaps too case specific to the ancient Theravāda tradition, the majority of the relationships and motives for action are not. They are truly trans-temporal and transcultural. Unfortunately, they have *not* been utilized as the vehicle for updating and keeping current the mainstream of modern Theravāda ethics, but we shall say more about this later.

In the Mahayana, there is a series of other texts which augments and enhances a purely mechanical exposition of ethics. Here we can cite Śāntideva's additional great work, the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* (sometimes called the *Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra*). Lal Mani Joshi refers to this text as a "manual of Buddhist ethical and spiritual culture."[16] Also noteworthy is the *Bodhisattva-prātimokṣa-sūtra* and the *Upāliparipṛcchā-sūtra*, each of which serves the Mahayana tradition as the *Sigālovāda-sutta* serves the Theravāda. Nonetheless, despite their nature as compendiums of Maha-yana ethical life, these texts too have not been fully utilized in bringing

Mahayana ethics into the modern age. Where, then, does this lack up to date textual and/or popular lore leave us in addressing the issue of modern Buddhist ethics in Asia and America, and what is the concomitant prognosis?

In a 1987 paper entitled "The Future of American Buddhism," author Rick Fields (*How the Swans Came to the Lake: A Narrative History of Buddhism in America*) commented to a conference on Buddhist-Christian dialogue that Buddhism's future in America was intimately tied up with its ability to develop a *Vinaya* for lay people, its concern for promoting a just and compassionate society, and its regard for identifying an ethical pattern for women.[17] Now Fields is certainly not the first to suggest the above prescriptions,[18] but he is absolutely correct in his assertions. Indeed, his comments *could be* applicable to the *world* Buddhist situation.

In searching for a contextual basis from which to expand Fields' suggestion into a full-fledged plan of action, one does not have far to look. The *Buddhist tradition itself* offers the most workable methods, needing only some informed synthesis for the production of a viable model. Here I have in mind reliance on two of the most ancient doctrines in the tradition, doctrines that have application across the face of Buddhism, irrespective of cultural and/or sectarian distinctions: the four sublime states and the six perfections. Regarding the former, in 1979 I said (in a slightly different framework) that the Buddhist tradition:

> ... must more actively incorporate those formulations in the traditional doctrines that are still relevant — or might be made relevant — in the modern world. I have in mind here a return to the practices known as the Brahmavihāras or the "divine abodes." These four practices, usually identified as love (*maitrī*), compassion (*karuṇā*), sympathetic joy (*muditā*), and equanimity (*upekṣā*), when explicated in their totality, are the highest expression of the Buddhist ethical domain.[19]

The precise explication of each of these terms is managed admirably elsewhere.[20] However, what is especially worth noting is Harvey Aronson's contention that many scholars have misunderstood the true implications of the term *equanimity*. He says:

> ... they have assumed that the traditional praise of the *psychological* virtues of the sublime attitude equanimity in meditation prescribe an ethic of neutrality outside of meditation. However, once we have understood that practitioners maintain the practice of all four sublime attitudes even after their enlightenment, it is important to explore just how these attitudes carry over to daily life.[21]

In other words, Aronson criticizes the general scholarly position that equanimity represents some sort of final *detachment, i.e.*, the destruction of emotion. In its place, he maintains that an accurate reading of equanimity leads to an altogether different conclusion:

> For, although fully liberated beings have abandoned all the negative emotions of attachment, hatred, and delusion, they have not destroyed *all* emotion and feeling. They have the ability to develop a whole range of rich and satisfying emotions and are encouraged in scripture to do so.[22]

As such, we have a powerful ethical tool that stands outside of time and culture.

Just as the *Brahmavihāras* are more generally applied to nikāya Buddhist thought, but with *relevance* for Mahayana, the perfections (*pāramitās*) are more generally applied to Mahayana, but with relevance for early Buddhism. Thus, it is possible to emphasize the practice of giving (*dana*), morality (*śīla*), patience (*kṣānti*), vigor (*vīrya*), medita-

tion (*samādhi*), and wisdom (*prajñā*) not only for those on the bodhisattva path, but for all Buddhists. Recognizing that skillful means (*upāya*) emerges from wisdom:

> ... we should know that an ethic, especially an ethic viewed as a process of inquiry and as an exercise of humility, is a skillful means, *upāya*. As a tool of wisdom and compassion, an ethic is capable of pointing to special truths, of teasing the ego away from greed and fear, and of drawing us into dialogue and community. An ethic can be a means for directing will and institutions to the issues and realities of suffering.[23]

In suggesting the application of the above two doctrines in configuring a *modern* Buddhist ethics, it must be understood that much traditional material must be *reinterpreted* if the resultant product is to also be new and constructive. As a corollary to the reinterpretation of traditional materials, it is also critical that *completely new commentaries* be forged that will pave the way for the emergence and shaping of a flexible but paradigmatic model of Buddhist ethics. Only then can we say, with John C. Holt, that *Vinaya* texts "reflect a blueprint for transcendence of this world and a strategy for order within this world."[24]

NOTES

1. Robert N. Bellah, "The New Consciousness and the Crisis in Modernity," in Charles Y. Glock and Robert N. Bellah, *The New Religious Consciousness* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. 339.

2. Peter L. Berger, *Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1966), p. 134.

3. G. S. P. Misra, *The Age of Vinaya* (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1972), pp. 79-104.

4. Harvey Aronson, *Love and Sympathy in Theravāda Buddhism* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980), p. 2.

5. Phra Rājavaramuni, "Foundations of Buddhist Social Ethics," in Russell F. Sizemore and Donald K. Swearer (eds.), *Ethics, Wealth, and Salvation* (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1990), p. 30.

6. *Ibid.* p. 31.

7. Ken Jones, *The Social Face of Buddhism* (London: Wisdom Publications, 1989), pp. 216-217.

8. *Ibid.*

9. Winston King, *In the Hope of Nibbana* (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court, 1964), pp. 177-178.

10. See Robert A. F. Thurman, "The Politics of Enlightenment," *Lindisfarne Newsletter* 8 (Lindisfarne Association, New York). Some of this material is reprinted in Fred Eppsteiner and Dennis Maloney (eds.), *The Path of Compassion: Contemporary Writings on Engaged Buddhism* (Buffalo: White Pine Press, 1985), pp. 66-72. Also see Jones, *The Social Face of Buddhism*, pp. 228-231.

11. See Robert A. F. Thurman, "Guidelines for Buddhist Social Activism Based on Nagarjuna's *Jewel Garland of Royal Counsels*," *The Eastern Buddhist*, NS 16, 1 (Spring, 1983), pp. 19-51.

12. George Rupp, "The Relationship between Nirvana and Samsara: An Essay on the Evolution of Buddhist Ethics," *Philosophy East and West*, 21 (January, 1971), pp. 61-63.

13. James Whitehill, "Is There a Zen Ethic?" *The Eastern Buddhist*, NS 20, 1 (Spring, 1987), p. 19.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

15. Harvey Cox, *The Seduction of the Spirit* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973), p. 56.

16. Lal Mani Joshi, *Studies in the Buddhis-*

tic Culture of India (2nd revised edition; Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1977), p. 99.

17. For the published version of this paper, see Rick Fields, "The Future of American Buddhism," *The Vajradhatu Sun*, 9, 1 (October/November, 1987), pp. 1, 22, 24-26.

18. See, for example, Robert Aitken, *The Mind of Clover: Essays in Zen Buddhist Ethics* (San Francisco: North Point Press, 1984) and Charles Prebish, "Karma and Rebirth in the Land of the Earth-Eaters," in Ronald W. Neufeldt (ed.), *Karma and Rebirth: Post Classical Developments* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986).

19. Charles S. Prebish, *American Buddhism* (North Scituate, Massachusetts: Duxbury Press, 1979), p. 46.

20. See, for example, Aronson, *Love and Sympathy in Theravāda Buddhism*, pp. 60-77.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 90.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 95.

23. Whitehill, "Is There a Zen Ethic?," p. 20.

24. John C. Holt, *Discipline: The Canonical Buddhism of the Vinayapiṭaka* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1981), p. 16.

Mādhyamaka, Tantra and "Green Buddhism"

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My first encounter with the term "Green Buddhism" was in a book published in 1990 called *Dharma Gaia.*[1] It primarily is made up of writings from the late '80s. These writings cover a range of topics and attitudes, but what they make quite apparent is that there is a tremendous similarity between dharmic and ecological attitudes.[2] In fact, from reading the articles in the book, one could easily come to the conclusion that a sort of nonpersonified concept of Gaia was prefigured in the Dharma, though the dharmic sense of living systems seems not to actually articulate a specific "organism" of the whole (*i.e.*, Gaia) nor does it postulate any notion of "self-regulation."

In this article I will be developing this notion that a sort of Gaian consciousness exists in the Dharma by looking at some concepts and practices articulated during the early and middle periods of Buddhism which might form the doctrinal foundations for Green Buddhism. I believe that not only does such an exercise have some merit on its own as part of the development of a Green Buddhism, but also such an exercise has a broader value. This is because I believe that the ecologically oriented teachings in the Dharma will form an important aspect of the American Buddhism which is still in the early stages of its unfoldment.[3]

Some preliminary work in this direction can be found in *Dharma Gaia.* Joanna Macy has written what I consider the key article in the collection: "The Greening of the Self." She links the concepts of selflessness and dependent origination (or interdependence) with the systems theoretical view which stands at the heart of ecological thinking. In this approach I believe that she has begun to articulate the two key theoretical points of juncture between the Dharma and ecology: dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) as the ontological basis of linkage between the two world views and selflessness (*anātman*) as the psychological basis of linkage between the two world views.[4] What is missing in her article is transformative practice. In other writings she articulates practice in the form of compassion and social action (for example, throughout *World as Lover, World as Self*) but does not suggest a program for the transformation of mind and perceptions. I will present such a program in the course of this article.

As a point of emphasis, to indicate the significance of the concept of "selflessness" for linking Dharma and ecology, let us note Macy's quoting of Gregory Bateson, who has said that the conventional notion of the self is the "epistemological error of Occidental civilization."[5] I would expand this statement to say that the Western emphasis on competitive individuality under the power of the false reification of the self and belief in the independence of the self has led us directly into the ecological crisis. I would also propose that this notion of "false reification of the self" to which Bateson refers in his writings is equivalent to the Buddhist notion of "grasping at selfhood."

Reification is, of course, taking a concept for a thing; and no-thing-ness, which is a meaning of selflessness, is what Mādhyamaka seeks to demonstrate. "Self" is the generic concept for entityness, or thingness, so no-self means no-thing. The Tibetan Mādhyamaka argument for selflessness is that no self-nature can he found in any phenomenon because all phenomena exist in dependence on causes, in dependence on constituent parts and particles, and in dependence on imputation by a name. More specifically, this latter

refers to underestimating or overestimating the characteristics of phenomena, that is, seeing phenomena as more or less than what they are. The "more" or "less," in regards to "the false reification of the self," is cognizing permanent, independent entities rather than transitory interdependent appearances merely created by a conceptual process which cuts a pattern out of its background and imputes or projects qualities onto it (such as "thingness") which emerge from the cognizing subject rather than the cognized object. This is false reification, and while the Buddha indicated the danger of this process in creating suffering, Bateson has pointed out how the process has endangered the very earth itself. Here I add the problem of competitive individuality rooted in a belief in the fundamental independence of self because it is the linking of competitiveness to the false reification of the self (and the resultant exploitation of resources) which has transformed mere self-destruction into planetary destruction.

As Macy says, "The crisis that threatens our planet, whether seen from its military, ecological, or social aspect, derives from a dysfunctional and pathological notion of the self. It derives from a mistake about our place in the order of things. It is a delusion that the self is so separate and fragile that we must delineate and defend its boundaries, that it is so small and needy that we must endlessly acquire and endlessly consume, and that it is so aloof that as individuals, corporations, nation-states, or species, we can be immune to what we do to other beings."[6]

The less one cognizes selfhood, *i.e.*, independence, in the phenomenal world, the more one begins to cognize dependence or interdependence in the phenomenal world. That is, those patterns of relationships which are in the background when self-nature is in the foreground emerge to the foreground of consciousness when selflessness is recognized. These patterns of relationship are what is referred to in Buddhist language as *pratītyasamutpāda*, dependent origination or interdependence.

Here is the obvious linkage with ecological thought, which stresses relationships of life forms as living systems. As Macy says, referring to the ecological view, "life is seen as dynamic ... patterns that are sustained in and by their relationships."[7] This is precisely *pratītyasamutpāda*, dependent origination.

The Buddha has said that whoever sees dependent origination sees Dharma, whoever sees Dharma sees dependent origination;[8] and that whoever sees the Buddha sees Dharma, whoever sees Dharma sees the Buddha,[9] thus characterizing *pratītyasamutpāda* as basic to his Dharma and his own nature. So in this way the basic teachings of the Buddha are precisely conceptually aligned with those of ecology. From this basic doctrinal stance comes the elaboration of all other Buddhist teachings and attitudes which even historically can he called "Green Buddhism."

This elaboration, especially in Mādhyamaka, follows the course of articulating the identity of dependent origination and emptiness of self-nature. All ethics, compassion and altruism arise from this identity.

For example, it is shown in Mādhyamaka that self and other exist in mutual dependence because without the experience of selfhood, a being would never be able to experience other beings as non-self, which is the definition of "other."[10] This is not mere logical sleight-of-hand; this is cognitive, emotional, and experiential. Wrong belief in selfhood is called ignorance (*avidyā*) and is said to be the root cause for beings cycling through existence in the six realms. Not understanding that experience of self can only occur when there is experience of other, fundamentally leads to a devaluation of other and an inflation of importance of self. Ultimately, under the influence of grasping desires and aversions, other becomes experienced as unrelated to self at all; other becomes something to be used, exploited, feared, ignored, *etc.*

When the dependence or interrelatedness of the concepts of self and other is ascertained, one

can then ascertain the *fact* of the interrelatedness of self and other. This is because it is only the belief that self and nonself/other have no fundamental interdependence which prevents one from experiencing the fact that beings can exist only because of their relatedness.

For example, no being can exist without parents, who provide at least the causes for the physical body of the being. We each arise in dependence on a mother and father.

Moreover, each moment of a being's activity is a result of a metabolic process, a process which depends on food, water, air and so forth. It takes people to grow that food and transport it to market so that it may be purchased and eaten. If the system breaks down, if there is a drought, or if one loses one's financial resources, and there is no food to eat, metabolism ceases. So we depend on farmers, truck drivers, bankers, *etc.*, in order to live, exist and act. We exist in dependence on them, and they exist in dependence on our purchasing their food and services.

Thus, cognitively and in fact, each being exists in dependence on other beings, and were those others not to exist then we would not exist. This is indeed the classic definition of dependent arising.[11]

All ethical behavior arises from the recognition of this fact; this is the source of the dharmic attitude toward the other, which is in actuality never out of relation with self.

Since there is but one self (to any subjective experience) and an infinite number of others, so mutual dependence must apply to all of those others. This is the source of the attitude called compassion.[12]

When the world is experienced as a web of interrelationships, then what affects the other is seen as also affecting oneself *via* that relationship. So, when the forests of the Amazon are burned and suffer, we suffer along with them because we are in fundamental relation with them. This is the literal meaning of the English word "compassion," from *com+pati:* to suffer with. Of course we know how Buddhist teaching is rooted in the recognition of the suffering nature of things. And we know that the entire Buddhist enterprise of the Mahayana is based on this notion that our interconnectedness is so profound that although an individual may seek liberation (nirvana) for him/herself, enlightenment can only be gained when one's motivation is the attainment of enlightenment for the sake of all beings. Perhaps we may say that from a Mahayanist point of view, seeking freedom for oneself is simply another kind of delusion of self-reification, of seeing self out of relation to others, independent of others, and that enlightenment must be sought for the sake of all beings or else the motivation for liberation itself will not weaken the habit of self-reification and weaken the delusion of disconnectedness and independence. We may also say that if the fundamental sense of disconnection between self and other is mentally created and maintained by habit *(saṃskāra)* and if enlightenment-consciousness transcends the ultimacy of this self/other duality, then the enlightenment sought and found cannot, in an ontological sense, be for a nonexistent independent self but only for a relatively existent, interdependent, multibeing field.[13]

Here we see how the doctrine of the six realms of cyclic existence takes on a new significance and implies an attitude of equality with all beings, as not only are all the beings of this planet, human and non-human, conscious but, moreover, we are not independent of those beings of the six realms. Rather, we all exist as an interdependent multibeing metapattern. The Mahayana way is to seek liberation for this total multibeing metapattern.

In this sort of context, even the notion of the Sangha changes, and the jewel of the dharmic community, the Sangha, extends out beyond the human into the total biosphere, into the Gaian community.

The Buddhist sense of connectedness to the Gaian community, the web of nature, can also be seen when we look at biographies of the Buddha

and at early Buddhist sculptures. The oldest extant sculptures adorn the stupas. In these sculptures we find the most extraordinary profusion of vegetative imagery woven into scenes from the lives of the Buddha. One may suppose that the plant life is mere decoration or even that since so much Indian life was lived outdoors that such background is literally quite natural. However, there are important messages associated with the plants in the narratives of the Buddha's lives which point at a Gaian community through a mythic language.

For example, the legend of the Buddha's birth is frequently portrayed. His mother Queen Māyā, is shown giving birth to him out of her right side as she stands up, her right hand grasping the branch of a sal tree, her left leg crossed in front of her right, toes on the ground and heel facing out.[14]

Since this pose is so obviously peculiar for parturition, we may reasonably assume that it is symbolic of something. The pose is mirrored, for example, on the gates of Sanchi stupa by the figure of the yakṣi, the vegetative goddess, a spirit of fecundity, who kicks the tree from which she hangs by her hands to induce it to bear fruit.[15]

Presumably this is the deeper, symbolic message in Queen Māyā's posture: she is not only human giving birth to human, but fertility goddess giving birth to the great fruit, the Bodhisattva. Of course this fruit encloses the seed for the greatest fruit of all, which is produced under the bodhi tree — the Buddha.

The theme is further embellished by the legends. Queen Māyā specifically sought out a grove of sal trees when the time for birth came.[16] Sal trees were sacred, and indeed the city of Kathmandu is said to take its name from, and be built around, a temple called *Kasthamandap*, which is reputed to have been constructed from the wood of a single sal tree.[17] Legend also has it that the bodhi tree sprouted on the day of Śākyamuni's birth.[18] After his birth he took seven steps and lotuses sprang up in his footsteps. While sitting under the bodhi tree Śākyamuni is "attacked" by Māra and, touching the earth with his right finger tips, he calls on the Earth Goddess. In the earliest iconography his presence was often represented by an empty cushion under the bodhi tree. And finally, at the end of his life, Buddha sought out a grove of sal trees at Kusinārā, where he lay on his right side to pass into parinirvāṇa.

The spirits of the vegetable world make regular appearances in the sutras, and the Buddha preaches to them along with humans and gods. As Thurman says in his translation of the *Vimalakirtinirdeśa:* besides Brahma, the creator god and Indra, the king of the gods of the desire realm, there are also always present at the Buddha's discourses the lokapālas, which are the gods of the directions and quarters, as well as the eight kinds of supernatural beings — *devas* (gods), *nāgas* (dragons), *yakṣas* (forest-demons, the same as the fecundity deities mentioned above), *gandharvas* (fairies), *asuras* (titans), *garuḍas* (magical birds), *kinnaras* (horse-headed mountain dwelling humanoids) and *mahoragas* (serpent bodied humans).[19]

During the middle period of Buddhism, these philosophical and mythic roots were developed and elaborated in many ways. The Mahayana tradition explored the notion of enlightenment and defined it as meaning, among other things, omniscience. Omniscience was explained as meaning that the Buddha's consciousness was unimpeded, that it was everywhere.[20] This follows from Mādhyamaka logic, for if no thing is "finally" or "ultimately" non-other than anything "else" (the Ultimate Truth of things, *paramārthasatya*, in contrast to the appearances or Relative Truth of things, *saṃvṛtisatya*) then no consciousness is actually other than the Buddha consciousness, and the Buddha's consciousness is every consciousness, everywhere. The Mahayana sutra and Mahayana tantra streams elaborated the implications of this perspective in somewhat different ways. The sutra stream focused on the omniscient Buddha as dwelling in a pure land apart from this defiled world, a land to be contemplated through sutra recitation and devotionalism. The tantra stream, attending to the interdependence and non-oth-

erness of samsara and nirvana focused on the omniscient Buddha as not only being here in this apparently defiled world, but as being non-other than the beings of this world.

The sutra stream attains its supreme elaboration in such works as the *Lotus Sutra* and the *Avataṃsaka Sutra*. Here we find stories which stress not only the pervasiveness of the Buddha (*e.g.*, worlds on the tips of his hairs) — or the Buddha-nature — but also direct metaphors for interconnectedness such as that of the "Jewel Net of Indra," in which everything is reflected in everything else.

This heritage passes to Zen where at the end of the middle period of Buddhism we find the Zen master Dōgen saying that "the entire Earth is not our temporary appearance, but our genuine human body"[21] and that "Reality is a spiritual activity — the world practices Buddhism."[22]

In the tantric stream, as it was initially developed in India and later preserved in Tibet and Japan, the extensiveness of the Buddha and the fundamental interconnectedness of all beings in the web of existence takes tangible form in ritual activity.

According to the Tibetan description, both the sutra and tantra streams are Mahayanist in that they have enlightenment for the sake of all sentient beings as their goal. However, sutra is said to be limited in that its fruit is the mind of a Buddha, while tantra is said to be unlimited in that its fruit is both the mind and the body of a Buddha. This is because both sutra and tantra agree that while wisdom is required to produce the mind of a Buddha, merit is required to produce the body of a Buddha. Sutra is said to articulate in a limited way the specific techniques for producing the requisite merit, while tantra is said to articulate in an unlimited way the specific techniques for producing the requisite merit on which the body of a Buddha depends. Thus, tantra is said to be especially efficient and powerful for obtaining Buddhahood which includes both the mind and body of a Buddha.[23]

It is these techniques for the creation of the body of a Buddha through the acquisition of merit that are of particular interest in this article's articulation of Green Buddhism. This is not only because the embodiment of a Buddha (the *rūpakāya*, the form body) is achieved for the benefit of the beings of the world, that is, for the biosphere, but also because the acquisition of merit is in fact a compassionate activity, an activity which is founded on the recognition of the interdependence of beings and a desire to reduce the suffering and increase the happiness of all the beings of the interdependent multibeing field of the biosphere.

Since tantra has unlimited means for the acquisition of merit in the creation of the body of a Buddha, so it has unlimited means (techniques) for benefiting beings. These are the techniques which Buddhas and those on the path to Buddhahood can employ for the benefit of the biosphere. The way to understand how these means can be effective is to examine a single concept/description which, though deceptively simple, has profound implications.

In tantric psychology, consciousness is not described as an energetic phenomenon, but it is said that wherever consciousness is found, so also energy is found. This energy is called "wind." It is not usually asserted that consciousness and wind are two aspects of the same phenomenon, but that they are separate phenomena which exist in dependence on each other. A metaphor is used to describe this relationship: that of a horse and rider. The horse, energy, is the mount of the rider, consciousness. Energy, thus, is described as "carrying" consciousness about, while consciousness "directs" the movement of energy.

The energy or wind is described as pervading the entire human body; the patterns of its flow throughout the body are dependent on the activity of consciousness. For Buddhas, at any rate, this pattern of energy in the body is also described as an energy body itself, *e.g.*, a "light body" or "rainbow body" or "illusory body."

In fact, this wind/energy actually pervades

the whole of space. This follows from the sutra and tantra definition of Buddhahood as "omniscience," meaning, among other things, that the Buddha's mind is "unimpeded." That is, a Buddha's consciousness extends everywhere, without impediments. Since a Buddha's consciousness is also a rider on the mount of wind/energy, and since energy and consciousness are interdependent, this means that a Buddha's energy body must also extend throughout space without impediment. That is, a Buddha's energy body is ubiquitous, it is everywhere in the universe.[24]

Thus, by analogy, as ordinary human consciousness must extend into space to some degree or there would be no perceptual activity, and as the ordinary human body has an energetic aspect,[25] so ordinary human energy must extend into space to some degree. As ordinary human consciousness develops towards Buddha consciousness through Dharma practice, so ordinary human consciousness must pervade space more extensively, with fewer impediments.

It is probably easier for the modern mind to see the implications of these doctrines by translating them into the contemporary languages of physics or living systems theory and, thus, to think of energy patterns that persist over time rather than to think about energy bodies. But whether contemporary scientific language is used or traditional Buddhist language is used, what is named is identical.[26] If we mix languages and think of consciousness as mounted on an energy field, the implications of this doctrine will be more readily comprehensible, for we understand that energy fields are essentially boundless and mutually interpenetrating. Thus, all human consciousnesses mounted on their energy fields must also be mutually interpenetrating. In fact, the consciousnesses of all sentient beings must be mutually interpenetrating.

By this we realize how the philosophical doctrine of dependent origination (interdependence) translates ontologically into interdependence of energetic fields or forms and is not just "causal" interdependence.

By the same token, we can now see how the Buddhist meditation practitioner can *directly* influence the biosphere. That is, since all energy fields interpenetrate and mutually influence each other, so the alteration of one energy field affects others. And since one of the purposes of tantric meditation practice is to induce such alterations (for example, in the creation of an "illusory body" out of wind/energy) so such practices must affect the biosphere.

The most effective activity is that of a Buddha, since a Buddha is omniscient, and since a Buddha's energy body is coextensive with the entire biosphere (actually all the biospheres of all the planets) so a Buddha's ecological concerns are the most potent and effective. Another way of saying this is that the altruistic attitude of a Buddha *in its nature* as a pattern of consciousness wholesomely affects the energy structure of the biosphere. This is the tantric rendering of what we might call "ecological bodhicitta:" the most effective way to positively influence the ecology of the planet is to become a Buddha; that is, to become the energy system of the planet! True Mahayana!

There is another feature of living systems language that will help us understand how specific Buddhist meditation techniques can influence the biosphere and how practitioners on the path can positively influence the biosphere without waiting to become Buddhas.

Living systems, *i.e.*, the type of systems which in aggregate compose the biosphere, have the characteristic of being negatively entropic because they are "open systems far from equilibrium." Entropy is the running down or disorganization of energy systems, thus negatively entropic systems are systems which do not run down, at least over some period of time. This negative entropy is, in fact, a definition of life. Negative entropy is achieved by living systems' ability to self-organize, take in energy from the environ-

ment, and dissipate entropy (waste) back to the environment.

Now, *if* in fact the energy organized by living systems into negative entropic patterns is the same energy called "wind" in tantra we can use what we know about living systems and what we know about tantric doctrines to understand how specific tantric techniques can directly influence the biosphere in specific ways.

Consciousness directs wind/energy. How does it do this? The forms/patterns consciousness takes will in an isomorphic sense determine the patterns wind/energy takes. We know these patterns from basic *abhidharma*: there are six consciousnesses, each associated with a sense organ — one of which is mind-sense consciousness (*manovijñāna*). Thoughts, such as words and images, are patterns in mind-sense consciousness. Since consciousness affects wind, so thought patterns will have an isomorphic effect on wind/energy. Thoughts are of many types, but are generally categorized in Tibetan systems as "mental images" which are either word-based or sense experience-based.[27]

In other words, our mental images can affect our energy bodies, and because of the interpenetration of energy bodies, our mental images affect the biosphere. Obviously, if there are systematic relations between mental image and energy, then the intentional cultivation of specific mental images will have specific effects on the biosphere.

Tantra includes the cultivation of mental imagery for the production of Buddhahood. Thus, we need only examine the extant "vocabulary" and "syntax" of mental images utilized in tantric sadhanas to see how we can directly impact the biosphere. There are three features of such sadhana "vocabularies" that I would like to focus on. These are the "divine pride" of the practitioner, the emission of rays of light and making offerings.

The key element of any tantric sadhana is the practitioner visualizing an image of a Buddha or *yidam* and identifying him/herself as being that Buddha or *yidam*. In practice this means superimposing a mentally created image of a Buddha on one's ordinary human body with the attitude that "I am so-and-so Buddha." This attitude is what is called "divine pride." The image identified with is of the nature of light, not matter, and identifying with this light body of a Buddha is identifying with the energy body of a Buddha. This is because in tantric sadhanas light (which in actuality is energy) is an image which represents wind/energy, which otherwise couldn't be imagined as such.[28]

The identification with this light body of a Buddha is called the practice of an effect vehicle and is possible because all humans are potential Buddhas. Thus, imagining oneself as what one potentially is, is a way of becoming that thing because it establishes the identity and activates the thought "I am a Buddha," thus developing the very merit and mental habit patterns (*saṃskāras*) which achieve Buddhahood.[29]

From the point of view of living systems theory, we would say that a specific self-organizing pattern is being cultivated — that of a Buddha. In the process of this cultivation the energy field or pattern of the living system which is a human being is altered. Since consciousness directs the flow of wind, so a conscious image of Buddhahood organizes the energy of the living system into the energy body of a Buddha.

But an organizing pattern is not enough, for beyond the self-organizing pattern, living systems maintain themselves by taking in energy and shedding entropy.

For example, plants absorb carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and water and other nutrients from the soil, binding them with light energy through the process of photosynthesis. Oxygen is a waste product of this process. Animals eat the plants and breathe the plants' waste products (oxygen), releasing the energy bound in the plants to maintain their own metabolic energy systems. They in turn pass on the wastes of their metabolic processes in the form of carbon dioxide, urine, feces and so forth. These in turn are nutrients for

plants. Thus plants and animals represent two types of open systems which nurture each other through their respective waste products and through mutual consumption, binding, releasing and transforming energy in the process.

In the tantric sadhana this type of mutual nurturing and sharing of energy is represented by the emission of light rays, which link deities and ordinary beings, as well as through the process of making offerings. Not surprisingly, these processes are considered methods of acquiring merit *via* the sadhana. It is said that it is the merit acquired by these forms of sharing which creates the form body of a Buddha (*rūpakāya*) and it is the actual exchange of energy among living systems which sustains the systems (*i.e.*, maintains their energy patterns—negative entropy—as well as their actual substantial bases). Again—isomorphism.

In the sadhana the practitioner identifies him/herself with a Buddha or *yidam* and at various points of the sadhana absorbs the light beams emanating from other Buddhas or emits light beams to other Buddhas and sentient beings. As light represents energy associated with the consciousness of the practitioner, so the movement of light is the movement of energy and the transmission of light between Buddhas and other beings is analogous to living systems sharing energy. Here the energy shared is not "waste," but is a gift, an offering. That is to say, the visualized transmission of light between beings is a practice of the *pāramitā* of "giving," one of the practices which lead to Buddhahood in both sutra and tantra.

This kind of giving or offering of substance for nurturing beings is more literally acted out ritually and imaginally through what are called "inner offerings." In the case of some sadhanas of the *Anuttarayoga* class, such as Vajrabhairava and Vajradākinī, the inner offering is made in a skull bowl. It consists of five kinds of flesh, such as that of a bull, and five kinds of fluids, such as urine. These ten substances have symbolic meanings, but at the level of image, the practitioner is offering his/her substance and wastes to other Buddhas and their entourages. When this practice is seen as linked with the emission of light rays, we can interpret both as symbolic offerings of nutrition/substance and energy by one living system to another.

But it is not just a symbolic offering, though the contemporary Western mind has tended to interpret the process in this limited fashion. Because mental images and energy exist in dependence on each other (consciousness is mounted on wind), offering the image of something to another being/system is also offering the energy which is associated with the image. Thus, beings *literally* nourish each other's energy bodies when, in the sadhana, they make imagined offerings.

This new perspective which arises from linking systems theory and Dharma clarifies the statement made earlier that tantra has special techniques for producing the form body of a Buddha. One of these special techniques is the giving of mentally created offerings to infinite beings (*viz.*, biosphere) in the dramatic ritual of the sadhana which is claimed to accumulate "inconceivable" amounts of merit and to accelerate the acquisition of a form body of a Buddha. We can now understand this statement because we can see the mentally created offerings in the sadhana as not mere fantasy but as actual energies shared by beings, energies which are necessities of life. Since it is possible to radiate light to inconceivable numbers of beings, so it is possible to accumulate inconceivable amounts of merit; precisely the amount of merit required to create the form body of a Buddha.

Through this new perspective we can also see the significance of generating divine pride. In the sadhana the practitioner first generates the image of a Buddha superimposed over his/her own body and then invites that Buddha to enter the image visualized. Here, we can see one self-organizing system reorganizing itself around a prototypical image (a Buddha or *yidam*) and becoming a container for the greater energy, that

very Buddha, another system. In this way, the practitioner's actions are made more effective because they are systematically linked to the form and energy of a Buddha or *yidam*.

But, here we are talking about the drama of the tantric sadhana which is practiced for the purpose of achieving Buddhahood. Beyond what has already been said, how would this practice positively affect the environment?

For one thing, tantra is a Mahayana practice. That is, one seeks Buddhahood for the benefit of all sentient beings. As we have seen above, the consciousness and energy body of a Buddha are coextensive with and pervade the biosphere, so the intentions of a Buddha directly manifest in the energy system of the biosphere. Thus, achieving Buddhahood is one way to affect the biosphere and maintain its integrity: the thoughts of a Buddha are the thoughts of the biosphere, the self-organization of the biosphere is no different from the self-organization of a Buddha. Or, as Dōgen said, " ... the world practices Buddhism."[30]

For practitioners on the path to Buddhahood, *i.e.*, non-buddhas, tantric practice also offers a way to impact the biosphere directly and favorably. This is because the very sadhana itself, as practiced by an ordinary human being, dramatizes the essential sharing of substances and energies between living systems within the context of the intention to be of benefit to those systems and beings: the ritual of making offerings and radiating light. In this fashion the practitioner positively transforms other systems on the planet through meditation practice, *via* the *pāramitā* of giving.

Moreover, the sadhana is the creation of a "pure land," for not only is the image of a Buddha created and invoked in the sadhana, but the environment of a Buddha is also created, *i.e.*, the palace in the pure land of the visualized Buddha is created. This palace is also called a maṇḍala.[31] Here, the process of mentally creating and invoking a pure land of a Buddha implies the direct purification of the entire biosphere, the conversion of the biosphere to a pure land, not just as an ultimate goal of practice, but as a fact for each moment of practice where the practitioner has suspended "ordinary appearances" and exists as a Buddha in a maṇḍala. Again, this is because wind/energy is organized by consciousness; therefore, each moment of creating a pure land and resident Buddha during the sadhana is, in fact, a modification of the very energy field of the biosphere, albeit minutely, at that moment. Thus, the practitioner moving along the path to Buddhahood is in fact also affecting the entire biosphere, is in fact carrying the entire biosphere along the path to Buddhahood. This is the ecological rendering of the bodhisattva vow, ecological bodhicitta!

Since the pure land of a Buddha, by the definition of "pure," must be a perfectly healthy biosphere, so the incremental practice of tantra, as a Mahayana practice, incrementally improves the health of the biosphere by incrementally converting it into a pure land of a Buddha. All tantric Buddhist consciousness is ecological consciousness!

APPENDIX: "DOUBLE DESCRIPTION"

What is the value of linking Dharma with systems theory or any other modern philosophical, psychological or scientific world view?

For those who believe in the discernibility of an "original Buddhism" the enterprise must seem useless, if not perverse! From this point of view, the teachings of Śākyamuni Buddha in the 6th-5th century BCE are perfect in themselves and any apparent divergence or conflict of view or practice articulated in the scriptures (or commentaries) is a result of post-Śākyamuni distortions, forgeries, mistranslations and so forth. From this point of view anything other than the (supposedly discernible) word of the historic Buddha is a symptom of a process of degeneration. That is, cultural accretions to the Dharma are degenerations, and the linking of Dharma to systems theory is only the most recent degeneration in the process.

An alternative view is that humanity changes

over time (for better or worse is not relevant) and therefore the forms of the Dharma's expression change to meet these changed circumstances or types of humanity. While this may be presumed to be some sort of modern hermeneutic, in fact it is venerable in Buddhist tradition. Two examples from the sutras should he sufficient.

At the time of the Buddha's enlightenment he observed the beings of the world to be like variously colored lotuses in a pond, some buds below the surface, some above the surface tightly closed and others ready to open. The meaning of this vision as explained by the Buddha is that beings are in different stages of growth and require different teachings to further their "development."

In the sutras the Buddha is also described as being like a physician who has different medicines for different types of beings suffering from different afflictions. His differing teachings are thus the medicines appropriate for differing afflictions. By this sort of traditional hermeneutic, the different sorts of (apparently contradictory) teachings in the scriptures are explained as being not, in fact, contradictory, but rather as being expounded for the benefit of different sorts of persons.

This, of course, is the underlying rationale in the hermeneutic of the "three turnings of the wheel of the law." And this is the point. Throughout Buddhist history the Dharma has been clothed in a language suitable to the time and location. It has provided the medicine appropriate for the ills of the times. Depending on one's perspective, this propounding of differing medicines for differing times is either the essence of the degeneration process (for it presumes that it is not the Buddha who is making the new prescriptions) or it shows the Dharma's essential truth-nature. It is this truth-nature which allows it to adopt new languages to express unchanging truths and so be the right remedy for the times — *i.e.*, there is a kind of compassionate *praxis* inherent in the very truth of the dharmic analysis of Reality.

Taking this later view, we can position ourselves within a venerable tradition when we seek to develop a contemporary language for Dharma and insight into its truths. That language will of necessity, if it is to work, embrace what is central to the contemporary view of life. It will have to be a language which incorporates the best features of modern learning. This means that such a language will need to not only embrace science, which predominates in the modern world, but it will also have to be self-conscious about history, culture and language itself if it is to incorporate postmodern humanistic learning.

Thus, the postmodern articulators of Dharma, and Dharma itself, will have to take into account not only its own history, as it has done in the past (*e.g.*, three turnings of the wheel of the law) but also its differing cultural manifestations and even the mistakes of previous articulations, translations and cultural manifestations.

For example, we know a lot about the initial translating of scriptures into Chinese and Tibetan and know some of the problems which arose in the process. Translating "Dharma" as "Tao" created some real problems for the Chinese. Contemporary translations, literally and figuratively, are prone to similar problems. But, no translation, no communication!

Here we find the writing of Gregory Bateson of real value. An anthropologist with a keen interest in Epistemology, the work of the last decades of his life is especially useful for those dealing with multicultural translation in the broadest sense. We also know that Bateson was interested in Buddhism, perceiving some sort of linkages with his own explorations into general systems theory. Though his writings are remarkably broad and have been quoted above by Macy, in this section I wish to focus on a simple epistemological concept, which he calls "double description."[32]

Double description refers to the "bonus" in information acquired by utilizing multiple descriptions of reality. Bateson employs a metaphor to explain what he means: parallax vision. In animals, parallax is the phenomenon created by having two eyes separated by a bit of space. Each eye encom-

passes a slightly different sector of the field of vision. In fact, if the image falling on one retina were to be placed over the image on the other, they would not be identical. But not only does this not create a problem for the animal who creates a single "representation" in consciousness, but it is in fact the source of the ability to perceive a third dimension of "depth" beyond the flat two dimensions of height and width. Depth of field is the "bonus" of information created by the double description which is the result of having two eyes.

Bateson also asserts that double descriptions which do not literally produce new information are still valuable, still produce some sort of bonus. Here he gives the example of the algebraic and geometric double descriptions of binomial theory. Both describe the same thing, and neither produces information not contained in the other, yet he believes that something is gained for consciousness simply from the ability to apply successfully different descriptions/solutions to the problem.

Though Bateson does not say this (though he does talk about "insight"), we may conclude that in this sort of case the bonus from double description is in the nature of increased self-reflectivity, improved understanding of how the descriptive process itself works.

Bateson's analysis shows why it can be of value to use systems language to explicate Dharma in the contemporary context. If we can consider the language of Dharma and systems language as both being valid descriptions of one phenomenon — life — then there are three possible outcomes: 1) the double description provides a new "dimension" of information (like depth), or 2) the double description generates new insight into each individual language/description, or 3) both. Either way, the exercise is of value.

In this article I have been pursuing the second outcome, that is, seeking insight into Dharma for contemporary people who basically have a scientific view of Reality and for whom an explanation utilizing modern scientific language provides a bonus of "insight" into Dharma and its world-transforming techniques.

Here we may also ask why should one look into dharmic language if systems language can describe the same thing as Dharmic language? The answer is that they do not describe precisely the same thing. In particular, systems theory does not address what is called "practice" in Dharma. That is, while dharma is descriptive, it is also transformative and liberative. Systems theory is descriptive but lacks liberative technique, it lacks a practice for transforming either what is being described or for transforming the one employing the description.

NOTES

1. Badiner, Allan H., ed., *Dharma Gaia* (Berkeley: Parallax Press, 1990).

2. Of course, interpreting Dharma from any contemporary conceptual framework poses dangers, and using ecology is no exception. See for example, the kind of reinterpretation (distortion?) found in the creation of 20th century Indian Buddhism by B. R. Ambedkar in Macy; *World As Lover, World As Self* (Berkeley: Parallax Press, 1991). Nevertheless, I will run the risks in articulating a "Green Buddhism." My rationale for this method of interpretation will be found in the Appendix. In fact, the very use of the term "Green Buddhism" already indicates an engagement with convergent, though differing, world views and a specific, if unarticulated, epistemology. The Appendix is simply a brief articulation of my methodology and its epistemological foundations.

3. See my article "The Emergence of American Buddhism," *The Pacific World*, New Series, No. 6, 1990, pp. 1–4.

4. It is necessary to ask why we need to link two world views. Cannot the Dharma stand on its

own? What is the merit of a linkage to systems theory, if this is even possible? Again, this issue is addressed in the Appendix. For Macy's views, see her book *Mutual Causality in Buddhism and General Systems Theory* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991).

5. Badiner, p. 53.

6. Badiner, p. 57.

7. Badiner, p. 56.

8. *Majjhima-nikāya* I, 190-91.

9. *Samyutta-nikāya* III, 120.

10. See for example, Nāgārjuna; *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā,* chapter XV and *Śūnyatāsaptatikārikānama,* stanzas 27 and 28.

11. "When this is present, that comes to be; from the arising of this, that arises. When this is absent, that does not come to be; on the cessation of this, that ceases." *Majjhima-nikāya* I, 262.

12. This is nicely elaborated by Kensur Lekden in *Meditations of a Tibetan Tantric Abbot* (Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1974), p. 4-5. In the Tibetan tradition, following the Indian prototypes, this view is developed into an entire program of mental and emotional transformation. There are two typical approaches, called "the equalizing of self and other" and "the sevenfold quintessential instructions of cause and effect."

13. Another way of saying this is that the apparent striving for enlightenment by any individual is actually the world becoming slightly more enlightened through the agency of a particular human body. Utilizing this language, Mahayana can be conceptually linked to the philosophies of Teilhard de Chardin and Thomas Berry who read evolution as a process in which the universe utilizes human beings as the medium through which it becomes conscious of itself. Grafting de Chardin and Berry onto the Mahayana, we could say that enlightenment is the universe becoming conscious of all of itself in all of its aspects, something beyond ordinary human consciousness of limited areas of space, of particular times, and distorted by both historical/cultural/linguistic parameters and specific personal needs and habits.

14. See for example, photographs in A. Foucher; *The Life of the Buddha* (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1963), p. 27.

15. See Hugo Munsterberg, *Art of India and Southeast Asia* (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1970), p. 30 for a fine image of the yakṣi.

16. *Nidānakatha,* as quoted by E. F. Thomas; *The History of Buddhist Thought* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1971), p. 32.

17. Trilok Chandra Majupuria, *Religious and Useful Plants of Nepal and India,* (Bangkok: Craftsman Press, 1989), p. 124.

18. Foucher, p. 35.

19. R. A. F. Thurman; *The Holy Teaching of Vimalakirti* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1976), pp. 108-9.

20. Oral instruction from Tara Tulku Kensur Rinpoche, Bodh Gaya, India, January 1989.

21. As quoted in Badiner, p. 108.

22. As quoted in Badiner, p. 97.

23. Oral instruction from Tara Tulku Kensur Rinpoche, Bodh Gaya, India, January 1989.

24. Oral instruction from Tara Tulku Kensur Rinpoche, Bodh Gaya, India, January 1989.

25. It is a fundamental tenet of Mādhyamaka that cause and effect must be of the same nature. Thus, an effect such as a Buddha, must depend on a cause (actually, innumerable causes). Since a Buddha has an energy body, this energy body must be dependent on causes of like nature. And since human existence is one of the many sorts of existence in the stream of lives of a Buddha which serve as causes, so human existence must include the possession of an energy body as one of the many causes for the Buddha's energy body. So, too, must an energy body be possessed by animals, *etc.*, throughout the six realms of sentient beings on the wheel of life, for Buddhas lead all sorts of existences prior to enlightenment.

26. The methodological rationale for this approach is articulated in the Appendix.

27. *Cf.*, David Komito; *Nāgārjuna's* Seventy Stanzas: A *Buddhist Psychology of Emptiness* (Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 1987), pp. 42-3.

28. Oral instruction from Tara Tulku Kensur Rinpoche, Muir Beach, California, August 1990.

29. See note 25 on the causal relationship between Buddhahood and other beings.

30. As quoted in Badiner, p. 97.

31. R. A. F. Thurman has exemplified the identity of the pure land with the maṇḍala palace of the Buddha in *Wisdom and Compassion: The Sacred Art of Tibet* (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1991).

32. A detailed rendering of Gregory Bateson's concept of double description, and the source of the examples which follow is *Mind and Nature* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1979), Chapter III. Joanna Macy's book *Mutual Causality in Buddhism and General Systems Theory* is in fact an example of double description (*cf.* note 4). Her point of linkage is *pratītyasamutpāda*, but she does not venture into tantra.

The Hasshū-Kōyō by the Scholar-Monk Gyōnen (1240-1321) Part Two: Jōjitsu, Ritsu and Hossō Traditions

translated by Leo Pruden, *deceased, formerly: College of Oriental Studies, Los Angeles*

EDITOR'S NOTE:

In this issue we continue the publication of Leo Pruden's translation of this very important work on the history of Buddhism from the Japanese tradition. In the previous issue the translator's preface appeared together with the author's preface and the first chapter on the Kusha, or Abhidharmakośa, Tradition. The entirety of the translation will appear in subsequent volumes. This work will also appear as a part of the *Tripiṭaka Translation and Publication Project* of the Bukkyo Dendo Kyokai. For further information concerning this project, see the closing pages of this issue.

THE JŌJITSU TRADITION

[1.] Question: Why is this Tradition called the Jōjitsu Tradition?

Answer: It is called the Jōjitsu Tradition because the *Jōjitsu-ron* is its basic, authoritative text. The word *Jōjitsu* (Skt: *Tattva-siddhi*, or *Satya-siddhi*) signifies an exposition of all of the truths within the *Three Piṭakas* as spoken by the Tathāgata. The author of this Commentary says, in a passage where he narrates his intention, " ... for I wish to truly expound on the truths within the *Three Piṭakas*."

[2.] Question: This Commentary was composed by whom, how many years after the Extinction of the Tathāgata?

Answer: In a period some nine hundred years after the Extinction of the Tathāgata, a scholar of the Sarvāstivādin School, Kumāralabtha, had a chief disciple by the name of Harivarman. Harivarman despised his teacher's views and understanding as being very shallow and inferior, and so he took the outstanding points from the various sectarian traditions, brought them together and formed one Tradition out of them.

During the Yao-Ch'in Dynasty, the Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva translated this work, and disseminated it. This work consists of sixteen folio volumes and is made up of some two hundred and two chapters. Chinese masters composed many commentaries on this work, and it was also studied in Japan.

[3.] Question: The Jōjitsu Tradition is primarily included within which one of the twenty different Hīnayāna groups? And what are the outstanding principles of these various groups?

Answer: Various opinions differ with respect to determining the original affiliation of the *Jōjitsu-ron*. Some say that it relies on the Bahuśrutiyas; some say that it relies on the Sautrāntikas; some say that it searches for (= tends to) the Mahayana in its commenting on the Hīnayāna; some say that it relies on the Dharmaguptakas; some say that it adopts the outstanding points of all of these various groups, that is, the best points of the Hīnayāna; and some say that it relies on the Mahīśāsakas.

Also the Three Great Dharma Masters of

the Liang Dynasty, that is: the Dharma Master Fa-yün of the Kuang-che-ssu Monastery, the Dharma Master Chih-tsang of the K'ai-yuan-ssu Monastery, and the Dharma Master Wen-min of the Chuang-yen-ssu Monastery, these three masters all said that the *Jōjitsu-ron* is Mahayana .... The T'ien-t'ai Master Chih-i, and the (San-lun) Master Chi-tsang both judged this work to be Hīnayāna. The Nan-shan (Vinaya) Master Tao-hsüan, and the Ling-chih (Vinaya) Master Yüan-chao both said that the work is "partial Mahayana," which was the same opinion that they held for the *Dharmaguptaka Vinaya*. Thus the various opinions of these masters were all different.

After the time of the Ching-yen-ssu Master Hui-yuan, and the T'ien-t'ai Master Chih-i, many shared the opinion that judged this work saying, "The *Jōjitsu-ron* is the best of the Hīnayāna ...." However the Nan-shan (Vinaya) Master Tao-hsüan held that in its teaching the work was Hīnayāna, but that its principles had points in common with the Mahayana .... Many say that within the Hīnayāna, the *Jōjitsu-ron* relies in many points on the Sautrāntikas ..., or that it belongs to the Dharmaguptakas ....

As for its best points, this Tradition fully elucidates two types of Emptiness, and thus it posits two types of Meditational Insight. First, there is the Meditation into Emptiness: in the way that there is no water within a pot, in this way there is no soul (Skt: *pudgala*, or *ātman*) within the Five *Skandhas*. This then is the Meditation into the Emptiness of a Soul. Second, there is the Meditation into Soullessness: in the way that there is no substantial reality in the nature of the pot, in this way all of the dharmas of the Five Skandhas are only Provisional Names. This then is the Meditation into the Emptiness of the dharmas. These are its outstanding points, since it elucidates these two Emptinesses.

[4.] Question: If this is the case, it cuts off the two clingings, and so reveals the two Emptinesses.

Answer: This is not so. Although it discusses the two Emptinesses, it only cuts off (the delusions of) views and of thoughts, but it does not cut off the hindrance of intellectualization (Skt: *jñeya-āvaraṇa*). It has only a very profound intellectual understanding.

This Commentary elucidates some twenty-seven stages of the Wise and the Saintly in embracing all of the stages of the Wise and the Saintly. These twenty-seven are: 1. the practice of following through faith lies in the stage of (obtaining wisdom) by hearing and by (discursive) thought; 2. the practice of following the Dharma lies in the stage of the Four Roots of Good; 3. the practice of no-characteristics: the above two persons have now entered into the Path of Insight (Skt: *darśana-mārga*), and now all three of these persons practice the approach to the state of *Srotāpanna*; 4. the fruit of *Srotāpanna*; 5. the practice which approaches the state of *Sakṛdāgāmin*; 6. the fruit of *Sakṛdāgāmin*; and 7. the practice which approaches the state of *Anāgamya*.

Within the state of *Anāgamya* there are some eleven types of persons: 1. one who attains the state of *Anāgamya* in the interval (Skt: *antarā-bhava*) between death (in *Kāmadhātu*) and birth (in *Rūpadhātu*); 2. one who attains the state of *Anāgamya* soon after birth (in *Rūpadhātu*); 3. one who attains the state of *Anāgamya* upon its practice (in *Rūpadhātu*); 4. one who attains the state of *Anāgamya* (in *Rūpadhātu*) not after practice (but only after the elapse of time); 5. one who attains *Anāgamya* by desiring *prajñā* (= within the fourth, or highest, stage of *Rūpadhātu*); 6. one who attains *Anāgamya* by desiring *samādhi* (= after being reborn in the highest stage of *Ārūpyadhātu*); 7. one who attains *Anāgamya* after being often reborn (in *Kāmadhātu*, and without being reborn in either *Rūpadhātu* or *Ārūpyadhātu*); 8. one who attains *Anāgamya* in this life; 9. one who attains *Anāgamya* after hearing the teaching and practicing the Way; 10. one who attains *Anāgamya* through his own understanding; and 11. one who attains *Anāgamya* in his present physical body. Together with the above seven types of persons, these make

in all some eighteen types of persons, and these are all called Learners (Skt: *Śaikṣas*).

The following nine types of persons are all Non-Learners (Skt: *Aśaikṣas*): 1. one who still has the possibility of regression (from the fruits of enlightenment); 2. one who protects himself (so that there is no possibility of falling away); 3. one who seeks death (so as not to lose the fruits of enlightenment); 4. one who attains a nature that cannot regress; 5. one who feels he must advance; 6. one who has a nature that cannot be destroyed; 7. one who is liberated through *prajñā*; 8. one who is liberated from both (the hindrance of the defilements and the hindrance of intellectualization); and 9. one who attains the state of non-regression. Together with the above eighteen, these form the twenty-seven stages of the Wise and the Saintly.

Some eighty-four dharmas embrace all of the various dharmas. Although this Tradition has not yet progressed into the Mahayana, it is the most outstanding of the Hīnayāna. This is truly to be marvelled at! Perhaps this *is* Mahayana! All of the various dharmas are only subsumed into the One Truth of Extinction. The principle of Emptiness is quiescent, but all of the various dharmas are posited with respect to it. A firm attachment to the substantial dharmas dissolves away like ice, and all of the many phenomenal images—provisional existence—are as profuse as a forest. (Emptiness and Existence) fuse together like space, and marvellously interpenetrate: these teachings are profound!

THE RITSU TRADITION (RISSHŪ)

[1.] Question: Why is this Tradition termed the Ritsu (= Vinaya) Tradition?

Answer: The *Vinaya Piṭaka* (= *Ritsu-zō*) is its basic, authoritative text, so it is termed the Ritsu Tradition.

[2.] Question: How many sectarian divisions are there with regard to the *Vinaya Piṭaka*?

Answer: There are various sectarian divisions to the *Vinaya Piṭaka*. There is a two-fold division, a five-fold division, an eighteen divisions, and a five hundred-fold division.

In the fifty-odd years during which the Tathāgata was in the world, He preached in a dispersed manner to fit the variety of human capacities. After He entered into Extinction, His disciples assumed the leadership (of the *Saṃgha*), and they compiled (the *Piṭaka*), and this compilation is termed the single work. This is the Great *Vinaya Piṭaka*, recited in eighty sections.

For one hundred years after the Extinction of the Buddha, the five masters, one after the other, faithfully transmitted the *Vinaya Piṭaka*. It was of one flavor, and there was not yet any divisions of it into differing views.

After a period of one hundred years, this text gradually came to be divided into two sectarian divisions, five divisions, twenty divisions, and even into five hundred divisions. These differing views arose in contention, like stormy waves. Such was also the case with the scriptures and commentaries.

As the *Tripiṭaka's* teachings radically divided, so too did its *Vinaya Piṭaka* come to form differing collections according to these differing views. Thus did the *Piṭakas* divide, forming various literary corpora. In this way the number of the divisions is very many, but they do not exceed in scope the twenty sectarian groups. Thus with regard to the *Vinaya* there are also twenty sectarian divisions. Each of these various sectarian groups were diffused widely throughout all of India. However, there were in all only four *Vinaya Piṭakas* and five commentaries on them which were transmitted into China.

The four *Vinayas* are: 1) the *Vinaya in Ten Recitations*, which make up sixty-one fascicules in its Chinese translation. This is the *Vinaya Piṭaka* of the Sarvāstivādins; 2) the *Four-fold Vinaya* which makes up sixty fascicules. This is the *Vinaya Piṭaka* of the Dharmaguptakas; 3) the *Mahāsāṅghika Vinaya* which in Chinese translation comprises forty fascicules. This is the *Vinaya Piṭaka* of the

Sthaviravādins, those who, of the two original divisions within the Sangha were inside the cave, since the name "Mahāsāṅghika" is common to both groups; and 4) the *Five-fold Vinaya* which in translation comprises thirty fascicules. This is the *Vinaya Piṭaka* of the Mahīśasakas. Only the *Prātimokṣa* section of the *Vinaya Piṭaka* of the Kāśyapīyas was transmitted to China; the full text has not yet been introduced to China. All these four *Vinaya Piṭakas* were translated into Chinese, and all of them were circulated in China, but the only one that was to be carried on in later ages was the *Four-fold Vinaya* tradition of the Dharmaguptakas.

The five commentaries are: 1) the *Vinaya-mātṛkā* and 2) the *Mātṛkā*, these are Sarvāstivādin works; 3) the *Clear-Sighted Commentary* which explains the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya Piṭaka*; 4) the *Sarvāstivāda-śāstra* which comments on the *Vinaya Piṭaka* of the Sarvāstivādins; and 5) the *Commentary of Clear Understanding* which is a commentary on the *Vinaya Piṭaka* of the Saṁmitīyas.

In addition to the above, various other Vinaya works of the Mūla-Sarvāstivādins, such as the *Pi-na-yeh Lü*, in the New Translations (of *I-ching*), have also been transmitted to China. Nevertheless, it was the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya Piṭaka* that had the deepest ties with this land, China.

In ancient times, before the time of the Vinaya Master Chih-shou (566-635), all of the various *Vinayas* were in confusion, and there was not one that was exclusively studied to the exclusion of all others. Chih-shou composed the *Wu-pu ch'ü-fen ch'ao* ("On the Differences between the Five *Vinaya Piṭakas*"), and the Vinaya Master of Mt. Chung-nan, Tao-hsüan (595-667) wrote the *Chieh-shu*, the *Yeh-shu*, and the *Hsing-shih-ch'ao*, wherein both these masters examined the circumstances of first ordination in China; both of these masters relied exclusively on the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya Piṭaka* in their examinations of the nature of this ordination, and they also relied on this same *Vinaya Piṭaka* in discussing the practices subsequent to ordination. From that time up to the present, it has only been this school of Vinaya practice and study that has been transmitted to Japan. It is for this reason that we shall narrate the essentials of the arising of but this one Vinaya tradition, that of the Dharmaguptakas, and so explain the history of its transmission and diffusion.

[3.] Question: At what period did this Dharmaguptaka Vinaya tradition first begin to flourish?

Answer: Before the various sects divided one from another, only one flavor of the doctrine was faithfully transmitted. While the Tathāgata was still in the world, He preached the Dharma in a dispersed manner, to suit the variety of individual capacities. One hundred years after the Extinction of the Buddha, the scriptures were compiled, and were widely circulated. In a period one hundred-odd years after the Extinction of the Buddha, the Arhat Dharmagupta narrated (a new *Vinaya Piṭaka*) which accorded with his views, thus creating a separate sectarian group. It was at this time that this *Vinaya Piṭaka* first appeared.

[4.] Question: When was this tradition transmitted to China, and to Japan?

Answer: During the Ts'ao Wei dynasty the Venerable Dharmakāla first carried out an ordination ceremony. During the Yao Ch'in dynasty, the Tri-piṭaka Master Buddhayaśa first (translated and) transmitted the complete text of a *Vinaya Piṭaka*. This is the history of the transmission of the precepts into China.

As for Japan, in the past, during the Tempyō period, two Japanese masters, Yōei and Fushō travelled to T'ang dynasty China, and there they requested the Preceptor (Skt: *mahā-upadhyāya*) Chien-chen (Jpn: Ganjin) of the Ta-ming-ssu Monastery (to come to Japan). He promptly acceded to their request and began on his journey to Japan. The calamities encountered on his way were extremely numerous, yet he regarded them as nothing. For some twelve years he bore the difficulties of the open sea, being thrown back to shore

by heavy waves six times. His will remained totally unwearied, and on the sixth occasion (*sic*) he finally reached Japan. He was requested to reside as abbot in the Tōdaiji Monastery.

The joy of the Emperor Shōmu, the princes, and of all the court officials was unbounded. They had an ordination platform erected in front of the sanctuary of the main image, Vairocana, and there an ordination ceremony was carried out. The Emperor, the Empress, in all some four hundred persons, all received the precepts. Later (this ordination platform) was moved to the west of the Great Buddha Sanctuary, and there it was constructed separately in the Kaidan'in (= the Chapel of the Ordination Platform). From that time forward until the present, these ordinations have been performed yearly, without interruption.

In all of the provinces of Japan, the teachings of the precepts and of the *Vinaya Piṭaka* were at this time very widely practiced, and there was no one who did not study them. In addition the Tōshōdaiji Monastery was constructed, from whence the precepts and the *Vinaya Piṭaka* were transmitted and propagated. This has continued without interruption up to the present day. The transmission of the teaching of the precepts and the *Vinaya Piṭaka* to Japan is solely due to the efforts of the Great Preceptor Chien-chen.

[5.] Question: How many patriarchal masters does this Tradition recognize?

Answer: From the Venerable Kāśyapa up to the recent Sung dynasty, their numbers have been many, both in general enumeration, and in their more specific enumeration. They are as follows.

The Buddha is the Master of the Teaching, needless to say (so He is not counted); then there is the Venerable Kāśyapa; Ānanda, Madhyāntika, Śāṇāvasa, Upagupta, Dharmagupta, and Dharmakāla; the Vinaya Masters Fa-ts'ung, Tao-fu, Hui-kuang, Tao-yün, Tao-hung; the Vinaya Masters Chih-shou, the Mt. Chung-nan Master Tao-hsüan, Chou-hsiu, Tao-heng, Hsing-kung, Hui-ch'eng, Fa-pao, Yuan-piao, Shou-yen, Wu-wai, Fa-ying, Ch'u-heng, Ts'e-wu, Yün-k'an, Ts'e-ch'i, and Yuan-chao.

If, however, we count the patriarchs starting from the origins of this specific (Dharmaguptaka) school to the master Tao-hsüan, we find that there are nine patriarchs, since we take the count starting with the Venerable Dharmagupta. The order after Tao-hsüan is as given above. If we look to the Japanese transmission, we will have the Vinaya Masters Tao-hsüan, Hung-ching, Ganjin (=Chien-chen) *Daisōjo*, Hōshin (=Fa-chin) *Daisōzu*, Nyohō (= Ju-pao) *Shōsōzu*, Buan *Sōjō*, and others.

[6.] Question: Does the Dharmaguptaka Vinaya Tradition have many variant schools within it?

Answer: There were in the T'ang dynasty. Each of the Vinaya Masters—the Vinaya Master Fa-li of the Hsing-chou school, Tao-hsüan of Mt. Chung-nan, and Huai-su of the Eastern Pagoda (*Ch: tung-t'a*) of Ta-yuan-ssu Monastery—set up differing interpretations, and their disciples and followers contended one with another. These are termed the three schools of the Vinaya Tradition.

Ganjin *Wajō* (Skt: *upādhyāya*) brought both the *Ta-shu* ("The Great Commentary") of Fa-li and the fine works of Tao-hsüan to Japan, where all of the various temples and monasteries sponsored lectures on these three T'ang dynasty schools. Later however, it was only the school of Tao-hsüan that survived. All the other schools ceased to be cultivated, having fallen into disuse.

For truly in the teachings of Nan-shan Vinaya school (= the School of Tao-hsüan), the precepts and their subsequent practice are in mutual harmony; the practice of the precepts and their external features are both perfect. The Mahayana and the Hīnayāna paths are harmonized, and learning and practice are in perfect union.

Various masters in both the past and the present have vied one with another in praising this

school, and the worthies and scholars of all Traditions studied and practiced (this Tradition's teachings). In the case of Tao-hsüan's *Hsing-shih-ch'ao*, there were some seventy-three scholars who wrote commentaries on it. Those of this same Tradition, and those in other places both held Tao-hsüan in the highest esteem. Who is like unto this patriarchal master! What other person has been so praised by worthies and by saints!

Speaking in broadest terms, from the time of the translation of the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya Piṭaka*, the number of the various masters who composed commentaries on it approach some twenty persons. However, the most essential of these commentaries are only three: 1) the *Lüeh-shu* ("The Abbreviated Commentary"), in three *chüan*, by Hui-kuang; 2) the *Chung-shu* ("The Medium Length Commentary"), in ten *chüan*, by Fa-li; and 3) the *Kuang-shu* ("The Extended Commentary") in twenty *chüan*, by Chih-shou. These are termed the "Three Essential Commentaries." Now the teachings of the three T'ang dynasty schools—those of Fa-li, Tao-hsüan, and Huai-su—are largely embraced within these three works.

The Master Ting-pin composed a commentary on the Commentary of Fa-li, the *Shih-tsung i-chi* in ten *chüan*. Tao-hsüan upheld and maintained the Commentary of Chih-shou, and so (the teachings of Chih-shou) are one with the teachings of Tao-hsüan. The *Ssu-fen K'ai-tsung chi*, in ten *chüan*, by Huai-su circulated alone throughout the world (= without benefit of commentary). Each of these works can be said to have exhausted the glories (of the Vinaya Tradition), and all have come to serve as reputable guides. Towards the end of the T'ang dynasty (all these works) flourished in the capital, Loyang. In addition there is the *Pi-ni T'ao-yao*, in three *chüan*, of the Master Tao-shih, which differs only slightly from the other commentators.

The major and minor commentaries on the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya Piṭaka* are all of them in large measure identical (in content) with those of Tao-hsüan. All of the commentaries of these six masters were transmitted to Japan, but now those which are popularly studied are those of the school of Tao-hsüan, with the new principles of Ting-pin also occasionally being studied. We shall not narrate the differences in the Vinaya teachings of these three schools, for fear of being prolix.

There are five major works among Tao-hsüan's literary corpus: 1. the *Hsing-shih-ch'ao*, in three *chüan*, but now in twelve *chüan*; 2. the *Chieh-shu*, in four *chüan*, but now in eight *chüan*; 3. the *Yeh-shu*, in four *chüan*, but now in eight *chüan*; 4. the *Shou Pi-ni i-ch'ao* in three *chüan*: originally in three *chüan*, the last *chüan* has been lost; there is now only the first and second *chüan*, and these are now divided into four *chüan*; and 5. the *Pi-ch'iu-ni ch'ao*, in three *chüan*, but now in six *chüan*.

Tao-hsüan composed his own commentaries to his *Chieh-shu* and *Yeh-shu*, and these together with his minor works on Vinaya, and with his other literary compositions, form a voluminous corpus, which cannot be listed in detail here. The Nan-shan Vinaya Tradition primarily studies these five major works. But its basic text is the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya Piṭaka*, in sixty *chüan*, and its commentary, the *Clear-Sighted Commentary*.

[7.] Question: What are the teachings elucidated by this Tradition?

Answer: This Tradition elucidates the precepts, of which there are two types. First are the prohibitive precepts, the five groups (of rules in the *Vinaya Piṭaka*) that put an end to evil; second are the injunctive precepts, the various practices of good, such as the *Poṣadha* ceremony, *etc.* All of the precepts taught by the Tathāgata are completely embraced by these two types of precepts. Thus the principles expressed by this Ritsu Tradition are nothing more than these two, the prohibitive and the injunctive precepts.

(In the *Vinaya Piṭaka*,) first, the two *pratimokṣas* are termed the prohibitive precepts, and then the following twenty *Skandhakas* are the injunctive precepts. The two *pratimokṣas* are those for monks and for nuns. The precepts that bhiksus

and bhikṣuṇīs uphold are termed "the full number of precepts."

If we first explain the precepts for the monks, from among those precepts taught in the *pratimokṣa*, then there are 250 precepts for monks, and these are divided into some eight divisions.

First (of the eight divisions) are the *pārājikā* precepts, which are four in number: the precepts against unchastity, against robbery, against murder, and against bragging (about having attained *ṛddhi*).

Second are the *saṅghādiśeṣa* precepts, which are thirteen in number: the precepts against 1) intentional emission of semen; 2) touching a woman; 3) harsh language; 4) praising oneself in order to receive *pūja*; 5) acting as a marriage go-between; 6) building a dwelling too large; 7) receiving a building that is too large from a donor; 8) slandering another without cause; 9) indicting another with having committed transgressions greater than he actually committed; 10) encouraging schism in the *saṃgha*; 11) aiding someone in creating schism in the *saṃgha*; 12) not heeding a charge of defiling the donations of laymen; and 13) not heeding the admonitions of the *saṃgha* through obstinacy.

Third are the indeterminate (Skt: *aniyatā*) precepts, which are two in number: the precepts against 1) being with a woman in a secluded place, and 2) being with a woman in a public place.

Fourth are the *nissagiya-prāyaścittika* precepts, which are thirty in number: these precepts concern extra robes, not wearing the robes, extra bowls, and going on the begging rounds, *etc.*

Fifth are the *prāyaścittika* precepts, which are ninety in number: these precepts concern lying, disruptive speech, digging the earth, destroying vegetation, drinking alcoholic beverages, eating at forbidden times, *etc.*

Sixth are the four *pratideśanīya* precepts, which concern receiving donations of food within the monastery (and not on begging rounds), and receiving donations of food from laymen who are Śaikṣas.

Seventh are the one hundred rules of training (Skt: *śikṣa-karaṇīya*), which concern the proper wearing of the robes, laughing loudly, jumping around, *etc.*

Eighth are the seven methods of settling disputes (Skt: *adhikaraṇa-śamatha*): litigation based on what one has seen, and litigation based on what one remembers, *etc.*

These eight divisions embrace all of the two hundred and fifty precepts.

These eight divisions which embrace all the precepts can also be divided into five sections: 1. the *pārājikās* and 2. the *saṅghādiśeṣa* precepts embrace the two types of transgressions as given above; 3. the *prāyaścittika* combine with the *nissagiya-prāyaścittika* and the *prāyaścittika* precepts to form one section, embracing in their number one hundred and twenty precepts; 4. the *pratideśanīya* precepts, as above; 5. the *duṣkṛta* precepts, which combine with the two indeterminate precepts, the one hundred rules of training, and the seven methods of settling disputes, forming one section, and embracing a total of one hundred and nine precepts.

And again, all these transgressions can be included in six groups: 1. the *pārājikās*, 2. the *saṅghādiśeṣas*, 3. the *sthulatyayas*, 4. the *prāyaścittikas*, 5. the *pratideśaniyas*, and 6. the *duṣkṛtas*. These are the six groups.

If we were to elaborate upon the *duṣkṛtas*, then there are seven groups. Five are all as above; sixth is evil actions (the *duṣkṛtas* proper), and seventh is evil speech (Skt: *durbhāṣitas*).

Of these seven groups, the *pārājikās*, the *saṅghādiśeṣas*, the *prāyaścittikas*, and the *pratideśanīyas* are identical to the above divisions. The category of *sthulatyayas* embraces all of the major and minor transgressions not included in the *duṣkṛtas* with reference to them either as cause or as result. The *duṣkṛtas* of the above groups and all the other major and minor *duṣkṛtas* are embraced within "evil actions" and "evil speech."

Thus apart from these seven groups, there are no further transgressions, because the six

groups, and the seven groups completely embrace all the transgressions.

Next, we shall explain the nuns' precepts. The precepts of the *bhikṣuṇīs* are, as itemized in the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya Piṭaka*, three hundred and forty-one precepts, grouped into six divisions; 1. eight *pārājikās*, 2. seventeen *saṅghādiśeṣas*, 3. thirty *nissagiya-prāyaścittikas*, 4. one hundred and seventy-eight *prāyaścittikas*, 5. eight *pratideśanīyas*, and 6. one hundred rules of training. The nuns' precepts do not have the two indeterminate precepts.

There has traditionally been a debate concerning the seven methods of settling disputes, (concerning whether they are included within the nuns' precepts or not): some say that they are, and some say that they are not. Now then, according to Tao-hsüan, they are there in principle, but are not in fact in the *Vinaya Piṭaka*, since that section of the text is abbreviated. Thus there may be seven divisions (to the nuns' precepts). If one were to add the seven methods of settling disputes, then there would be a total of three hundred and forty-eight precepts. These precepts also do not exceed the five sections, which may be known by referring to the monks' precepts. These form the two parts of the full *Vinaya Piṭaka* text. The classification of the teachings as presented in the first half of the *Vinaya Piṭaka* is as given above. These are the prohibitive precepts.

Next, the twenty *skandhakas* of the last half of the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya Piṭaka* are the injunctive precepts. They are: 1. "On Receiving the Precepts" (*Pravyajyā-skandhaka*); 2. "On Reciting the Precepts" (*Poṣadha-skandhaka*); 3. "On Retreats" (*Varṣa-skandhaka*); 4. "On the End of the Retreats" (*Pravāraṇā-skandhaka*); 5. "On Leather Goods" (*Carma-skandhaka*); 6. "On Robes" (*Cīvara-skandhaka*); 7. "On Medicine" (*Bhaiṣajya-skandhaka*); 8. "On the Kathina Robes" (*Kaṭhina-skandhaka*); 9. "On the Monks in Kosambi" (*Kośāmbaka-skandhaka*); 10. "On the Monks in Campa" (*Campa-skandhaka*); 11. "On Censuring" (*Pāṇḍulohitaka-skandhaka*); 12. "On Persons" (*Pudgala-skandhaka*); 13. "On Hidden Faults" (*Pārivāṣika-skandhaka*); 14. "On Suspending the Pratimokṣa" (*Poṣadhasthāpana-skandhaka*); 15. "On Schism" (*Saṁghabheda-skandhaka*); 16. "On Eliminating Disputes" (*Adhikaraṇa-śamatha-skandhaka*); 17. "On Bhikṣuṇīs" (*Bhikṣuṇī-skandhaka*); 18. "On Dharma" (*Dharma-skandhaka*); 19. "On Dwellings" (*Śavana-āsana-skandhaka*); and 20. "Miscellaneous" (*Kṣudraka-skandhaka*). These are what are called the twenty *Skandhakas*, and these are, all of them, the injunctive precepts.

However, these two halves of the *Vinaya Piṭaka* mutually interpenetrate one with another: the prohibitive precepts contain injunctive precepts, and the injunctive precepts contain prohibitive precepts. Although they mutually interpenetrate, it is with reference to their respective primary teachings that the two halves have been judged and have been assigned to either the prohibitive precepts, or to the injunctive precepts.

If we view these precepts with reference to Tao-hsüan's Five Major Works—the *Hsing-shih-ch'ao*, the *Chieh-shu*, and the *Yeh-shu* are called the Three Major Works—then we may say that the *Chieh-shu* contains the details of the practice of the prohibitive precepts, and the concomitant actions that aid these prohibitive precepts; the *Yeh-shu* narrates with great clarity the practice of the injunctive precepts, the official legislative actions of the *saṃgha*, by any of the three types of groups, that is, of four monks or more, of one monk, or of two or three monks; the *Hsing-shih-ch'ao* explains both the prohibitive precepts and the injunctive precepts to equal perfection; his *Pi-ch'iu-ni-ch'ao* specifically elucidates both the prohibitive precepts and the injunctive precepts of the bhikṣuṇīs; and the *Shou Pi-ni i-ch'ao* largely explains the prohibitive precepts.

Thus, all of these works of the Master Tao-hsüan rest on these two types of precepts: the prohibitive precepts and the injunctive precepts. These two types of precepts have both general and specific characteristics. Generally speaking, all good actions are embraced in these two types of

precepts, but speaking specifically, they are as explained only by reference to this Vinaya Tradition. Now then, the two types of precepts spoken of here are those referred to in the Vinaya Tradition, but even so there is some reference to their more general characteristics.

[8.] Question: Are the total number of precepts of the monks and nuns limited to these (mentioned above)?

Answer: No, they are not. The total number of monks' and nuns' precepts are numberless and limitless. To have decided on a definitive number was due to the fact that these precepts were legislated according to circumstances.

Both the number of monks' and nuns' precepts have three levels (of understanding): in their broadest form, (the monks' precepts) are numberless; in their median form, they consist of three thousand rules of discipline (Skt: *saṁvara*) with their sixty thousand minute rules; and in their most abbreviated form, they consist of the two hundred and fifty precepts.

The precepts of the nuns have three levels (of understanding): in their broadest form they are innumerable; in their median form, they consist of eighty thousand rules of conduct, with their one hundred and twenty thousand minute rules; and in their most abbreviated form, they consist of the three hundred and forty-eight precepts.

A scripture speaks of "the five hundred precepts," but this is merely a name, having no specific characteristics. As the Master Yuan-chao says, "If we speak with reference to (the Absolute) Realm, the precepts are without number; nevertheless, the number two hundred and fifty serves as a guide to conduct." Such is also the case for the nuns' precepts.

Thus, when the two congregations—monks and nuns—receive the full number of precepts in ordination, they both receive these numberless, limitless number of precepts. The precepts are equal in number to space, and their sphere permeates the *Dharmadhātu*. There are no precepts that are not Perfect, and so they are termed "all the (Perfect) precepts."

The Five Precepts (Skt: *pañca-śīla*), the Ten Precepts (Skt: *daśa-śīla*), and the Six Rules, are extracted from out of the total number of (two hundred and fifty) precepts, for the gradual inducement of people of various capacities; these form an *upāya* (an expedient means) leading to the total number of precepts. One gradually progresses and advances with them, until one finally attains to the uncommitted stage, which (naturally) possesses all the precepts. Because of this there are said to be in all four ranks of precepts: the Five Precepts, the Eight Precepts (Skt: *aṣṭāṅga-samanvāgatopavāsa*), the Ten Precepts, and the full number of precepts. If we add the Six Rules, then there is a total of five ranks.

There are seven groups of persons within Buddhadharma, which groups are set up (by these five types of precepts). These seven are: 1. *bhikṣu*, and 2. *bhikṣuṇī*: these two groups of persons have both undertaken the full number of precepts; 3. *śikṣamaṇa*, who undertakes the Six Rules of Training; 4. *śrāmaṇera* and 5. *śrāmaṇerikā*, who both undertake the Ten Precepts; 6. *upāsaka* and 7. *upāsikā*, who both undertake the Five Precepts. The first five groups of persons are those who have left the householders' life (= clerics), and the last two are still in the householders' life (= laymen).

Although the precepts of the *śikṣamaṇas*, the *śrāmaṇeras*, and the *śrāmaṇerikās* are in number the Ten Precepts, *etc.*, when it comes to the actual upholding of them, they are like unto a fully ordained monk (or nun). The Eight Precepts of Abstinence are clerical precepts undertaken by the laity. Nevertheless, these precepts are included in those precepts kept by the laity, the *upāsakas* and the *upāsikās*. There are no other groups of persons (within Buddhism) outside of these seven.

The Five Precepts are: 1. the precept against the taking of life; 2. the precept against stealing; 3. the precept against illicit sexual practices; 4. the precept against lying; and 5. the precept against drinking liquor. The Eight Precepts of Abstinence

are: the first five are as above, except that the precept against illicit sexual practices becomes a precept against all sexual activity; 6. the precept against putting perfumes or oils on the body; 7. the precept against seeing or listening to songs and dances; 8. the precept against using high and broad beds; and 9. the precept against eating at forbidden times. The *Sarvāstivāda-śāstra* says, "Eight are precepts, the ninth is abstinence; when counted together there are then nine." The Ten Precepts are: the first nine are as above; and 10. the precept against grasping gold, silver, and jewels.

The Six Rules of Training are: 1. the rule against killing any living thing; 2. the rule against stealing even three coins; 3. the rule against touching (a man); 4. the rule against lying; 5. the rule against drinking liquor; and 6. the rule against eating at forbidden times.

Of these seven groups of persons within the Buddhadharma, there are three groups for men: *bhikṣu*, *śrāmaṇera*, and *upāsaka*; and four for women, namely, the other four.

[9.] Question: How many teachings does this Tradition set up to embrace all of the various teachings?

Answer: The Master Tao-hsüan sets up two types of teachings, that of converting and that of legislating, in order to embrace the full lifetime teaching of the Buddha. These are also termed the teaching of converting and the teaching of practice. The teaching of converting is the teachings of *samādhi* and *prajñā* as taught in the Scriptures and in the Commentaries, the *Four Āgamas, etc.* The teaching of legislating is the teaching of the precepts as taught in the *Vinayas*, such as the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya Piṭaka*.

Now then, this Tradition is a teaching based on the *Vinaya Piṭaka* and so it regards the precepts as primary. If the practice of the precepts is purified, then *samādhi* and *prajñā* arise automatically. Thus, if one first upholds the precepts, and guards against faults in one's actions, *samādhi* and *prajñā* then, and only then, put down and cut off mental defilements and errors.

It is for the purpose of obtaining *bodhi* that the precepts are legislated; it was never for any worldly benefit. The path to holiness of all the Three Vehicles cannot be established in the absence of the precepts, so herein lay the reason that the Tathāgata initially legislated the precepts. [This is the explanation of Tao-hsüan].

[10.] Question: It is popularly said, "(Keeping) the Five and the Eight Precepts brings retribution in either human or *deva* realms. The Ten Precepts and the full number of precepts bring forth arhatship." What does this signify?

Answer: This is not necessarily true. If one keeps the Five of the Eight Precepts, one will then receive—as a retribution based on such as a cause—rebirth as a human or as a *deva*. If one keeps the Ten Precepts, or the full number of precepts, one will then receive—as a retribution based on such as a cause—the end result of arhatship, that is Hīnayāna arhatship. It is based on this that the popular saying is as given above.

If, however, one views this from the point of view of the intention (Skt: *āśaya*) of the person undertaking the precepts, this is not the case. As the Master Yuan-chao says, "There are four groups of precepts: the Five, the Eight, the Ten, and the full number of precepts. Now if any of these are undertaken by one of dull capacities, they will all lead to worldly good. If they are undertaken by one of superior understanding, then they will form the basis for Enlightenment." Thus, we should remember that the precepts differ according to the individual's capacities. This is the teaching of this Tradition, the purport set forth by Tao-hsüan.

[11]. Question: To which of the two, the Mahayana or the Hīnayāna, does the *Shibun* (= Dharmaguptaka) Ritsu Tradition belong?

Answer: The judgments of the various masters of the Ritsu Tradition differ with respect to this. The Master Hui-kuang said, "The Dharmaguptaka Vinaya Tradition is Mahayana ...." The

Masters Fa-li and Hsüan-yün both said that this Tradition " ... is purely Hīnayāna." The Master Tao-hsüan said, "This Dharmaguptaka Tradition is, in its principles, Mahayana." Now then, this latter judgment has in large measure become authoritative.

The *Yeh-shu* sets up five points in which the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya Piṭaka* is Mahayana. These are: 1. the Arhat Dabba searched for a higher goal; 2. Buddhahood was bestowed on all creatures with the phrase, "May all sentient beings together attain Buddhahood!"; 3. the *vijñāna* perceives external phenomena; 4. monks were addressed as "Sons of the Buddha"; and 5. the penalties for infractions of the precepts were determined according to the intention of the transgressor. In these points, the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya Piṭaka* far surpasses all other Vinaya works. It is truly profound.

Each one of all of the above various precepts has four aspects: 1. the precept itself, for precepts legislated by the Tathāgata apply to all situations; 2. the nature of the precepts: the person receiving the precepts generates this, and it becomes absorbed into the consciousness. This Dharmaguptaka Tradition, relying upon the *Jōjitsu-ron* (= the *Ch'eng-shih lun*), holds that an element neither physical matter nor mental constitutes this nature; 3. the practice of the precepts: upon receiving the precepts, they are carried out, and the three actions—of body, speech, and mind—are thus formed; and 4. the external aspect of the precepts: these virtues are manifested outwardly, and so become a model of conduct for others. Each one of the many precepts possesses all of these four aspects.

[12.] Question: Be they Mahayana or Hīnayāna, what are the basic practices and the resultant attainment posited in the doctrines of this Tradition and in the ideas of Tao-hsüan?

Answer: The teachings of this Tradition are basically Hīnayāna, as the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya Piṭaka* is concerned with those persons of Hīnayāna capacities. Nevertheless, in principle it is Mahayana, as it obliges persons of such capacities to gradually progress (to the Mahayana). It is Hīnayāna, because as Hīnayāna there is nothing that it does not include. And it is partially Mahayana, since as Mahayana there is nothing that it does not anticipate. This is the purport of the teachings of this Tradition.

According to Tao-hsüan, the lifetime teaching of the Tathāgata, both Mahayana and Hīnayāna, is divided into Three Teachings: 1. the teaching of the Emptiness of Nature (Skt: *svabhāva-śūnyatā*); this includes all Hīnayāna teachings; 2. the teaching of the Emptiness of External Characteristics (Skt: *lakṣaṇa-śūnyatā*); this includes all shallow Mahayana teachings; and 3. the Perfect Teachings of Cognizing-Only (Skt: *vijñapti-matratā*); this includes all profound Mahayana teachings.

Now then, this Dharmaguptaka Vinaya Tradition is but one aspect of the teaching of the Emptiness of Nature. Nevertheless, Tao-hsüan's heart lay in the Perfect Teaching of Cognizing-Only, which he regarded as a perfect interfusion of the Three Learnings, the unimpeded perfect practice. In his *Yeh-shu*, Tao-hsüan elucidates the essences of the precepts as discussed in various schools, and he presents the significance of three schools; the School of Existence and the School of Emptiness are both included in the teaching of the Emptiness of Nature. And the teaching of the nature of the precepts is that of the teaching of Cognizing-Only.

Both the Mahayana and the Hīnayāna each recognize the Three Learnings (Skt: *triṇi śikṣāṇi*). But in the Three Learnings of the Perfect Teaching of the Mahayana, the Learning of the Precepts refers to the keeping of the three-fold pure precepts, and a seed (Skt: *bīja*) in the *ālayavijñāna* is held to constitute its nature. *Samādhi* and *prajñā* are the practice of Cognizing-Only. *Śamatha* ("stilling") and *vipaśyana* ("insight") carried out together are held to constitute its characteristics. The precepts (Skt: *śīla*) are none other than *samādhi* and *prajñā*; there is not one precept that is not *samādhi* and *prajñā*. *Samādhi* and *prajñā* are none

other than the precepts; there is no aspect of these that is not of the precepts. This is termed the practice, and the characteristics, of the perfect interfusion of the Three Learnings.

The three-fold pure precepts mentioned above are: 1. the precept that embraces all rules of conduct, which cuts off all evil; 2. the precept that embraces all good dharmas, which is the practice of all good; and 3. the precept that embraces all creatures, which means to bear (the sufferings of) all creatures, and to bestow the Ultimate Benefit (of Enlightenment) upon them. These three-fold pure precepts are also a practice that perfectly interfuses, so that these three precepts, each one of them, perfectly and totally embraces all of the various precepts. For instance, the precept against taking life embraces the three-fold pure precepts, and such is the case for all of the precepts. And so it follows that if one upholds one precept, all of the three-fold pure precepts are then totally upheld.

Although this is the practice of but one precept, yet it broadly embraces all (lit: "the ten thousand") precepts; although this may be of the duration of one moment of thought, yet it instantly spans three *asaṁkhyeya kalpas*. The three *asaṁkhyeya kalpas* are not negated, and yet this one moment of thought is recognized; this one moment of thought is not ignored and yet the three *asaṁkhyeya kalpas* are really spanned. Long and short are unhindered; creatures and the Buddha are the same; all phenomena mutually interpenetrate, and all the various external characteristics are identical one with another without end. How can this not be profound and marvellous!

Now then, for the purpose of abbreviation, we shall not discuss either the precept that embraces all good dharmas, nor the precept that embraces all creatures.

There are three categories to the precept that embraces all the rules of discipline: 1. the precepts that lead to separate liberation (Skt: *pratimokṣa-śīla*); 2. the precepts that (necessarily) accompany *samādhi*; and 3. the precepts that (necessarily) accompany Enlightenment.

Within the first of these, the precepts that lead to separate liberation, there are three aspects to its activities, namely, the precepts as upheld by one's body, one's speech, and one's mind. Whereas the precepts upheld by one's body and one's speech have two aspects—those precepts upheld by both Mahayana bodhisattvas and Hīnayāna *śrāvakas*, and those precepts not upheld by the Hīnayāna *śrāvakas* but only by Mahayana bodhisattvas—the precepts relating to mental action are precepts upheld only by Mahayana bodhisattvas. For this reason, the precepts received by Hīnayāna *śrāvakas* are merely one part of those precepts relating to the actions of the body and speech held by both Hīnayānists and Mahayanists. The precepts taught in the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya Piṭaka* are these precepts. Nevertheless, the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya Piṭaka* partially corresponds to the Mahayana precepts relating to mental activity. Because of this (the Mahayana precepts) contain the Hīnayāna precepts.

Now then, this Mahayana Tradition regards the precepts held in common by both the Hīnayāna and the Mahayana as being included within the three-fold pure precepts, in order to reconcile and to subsume them all within the Mahayana.

The precepts taught in the Hīnayāna *Vinaya Piṭaka* are, all of them, the greater, perfect, and sudden (Mahayana) precepts, and have no separate characteristics apart from them. Being pure, one, and of greatest perfection, these rules for the seven groups of persons are totally identical to those of the Hīnayāna *Vinaya Piṭaka*, because these are as recognized within the first of the three-fold pure precepts, the precept that embraces all the rules of discipline.

This is the purport of the teaching concerning the Teaching and its resultant insight of Tao-hsüan, the disposition of those followers who receive, follow, understand, and practice the precepts. However, in the receiving of the three-fold pure precepts, there is a general receiving (of all the three) and a separate receiving. When all of the three precepts are received, this is termed the

general receiving. The receiving of only the first of these three precepts, the precept that embraces all the rules of discipline, is termed the separate receiving.

Now then, as maintained by Tao-hsüan, the perfect precepts relating to mental activity as transmitted in a correct, Hīnayāna *karma-vacana* ceremony, are what correspond to this separate receiving of the precept that embraces all the rules of discipline. When one then later receives the Bodhisattva Precepts, this is what corresponds to the general receiving of all of the three-fold pure precepts.

The followers of this Ritsu Tradition receive both the general receiving and the separate receiving (of the three-fold pure precepts) within a ritual enclosure (Skt: *sima*) and the precepts of both the (Hīnayāna) *Vinaya Piṭaka* and the (Mahayana) *Bommō-kyō* (Ch: *Fan-wang ching*) are all upheld. The two terms, "general receiving" and "separate receiving" originated with scholars of the Hossō (= Yogācāra) Tradition, but its principles lie within the sphere of the Nan-shan Vinaya Tradition of Tao-hsüan.

The legislation of the five sections and those for the seven groups in the *saṃgha* arose from among the *śrāvakas*, and yet its practice spans the Mahayana. Clear are the true teachings of the *Yuga-ron* (= *Yogācāra-bhūmi*), and the judgments of Tao-hsüan.

If the disposition of the devotee but resides in this Tradition, how can the marvellous result which is Buddhahood be far away!

THE HOSSŌ TRADITION

[1.] Question: Why is this Tradition termed the Hossō Tradition?

Answer: It is termed the Hossō (tangible characteristics of the dharmas, Skt: *dharma-lakṣaṇa*) Tradition because it determines the characteristics and the nature of all of the various dharmas. Broadly speaking this Tradition has some four names.

First, it is called the Tradition of Cognizing-only (*Yuishiki-shū*, Skt: *Vijñapti-mātratā*) because the major purport of this Tradition is to elucidate the fact that there is only (*yui-*; *-mātratā*) mental concepts (*-shiki*; *vijñapti-*). Second, it is called the Perfect and True Tradition which is in Accord with Reason (Jpn: *Ōri-enjitsu-shū*) because all of its teachings are in accord with the Truth. Third, it is called the Teaching which is Universally for all Vehicles (Jpn: *Fūijō-kyō*) because it embraces all of the Five Vehicles. Fourth, it is called the *Hossō-shū* because of the reason given above. We now present only one of these names.

[2.] Question: Which scriptures and commentaries does this Tradition rely upon for its authority?

Answer: There are some six scriptures and eleven commentaries which are quoted in the *Jō-yuishiki-ron*. The six scriptures are: the *Kegon-gyō*, the *Gejin-mikkyō*, the *Nyorai-shutsugen-kudoku-shōgon-kyō*, the *Abidatsuma-kyō*, the *Ryōga-kyō*, and the *Kōgon-kyō*. The eleven commentaries are: the *Yuga-ron*, the *Ken'yō-shōkyō-ron*, the *Shūryō-ron*, the *Shō-daijō-ron*, the *Jūji-kyō-ron*, the *Fumbetsu-yuga-ron*, the *Ben-chū-ben-ron*, the *Nijū-yuishiki-ron*, the *Kan-sōen-ron*, and the *Zōshū-ron*.

Speaking generally however, some five major commentaries, or ten subsidiary commentaries are all the textual authorities of this Tradition. Nevertheless the *Gejin-mikkyō* Scripture, and the *Yuga-ron* and the *Jō-yuishiki-ron* Commentaries especially serve as a guide to the study (of this Tradition).

[3.] Question: Who does this Teaching regard as its patriarchal masters?

Answer: The various generations of the lineal succession of this Teaching in the three countries is clear.

Some nine hundred years after the Extinction of the Tathāgata, the Bodhisattva Maitreya

descended from Tuṣita Heaven, down to the country of Ayodhya in India, and there in the Lecture Hall of Ayodhya he preached the five major commentaries. The spiritual stage of the Bodhisattva Maitreya was that of the Tenth *Bhūmi*, and he was transmitting that which he had personally heard when the Tathāgata was in the world. The marvelous truth of the Middle Way, which is neither emptiness nor existence, is truly a clear mirror within all of the various teachings.

The *Yuga-ron*, in its one hundred scrolls of text, evaluates all of the various teachings. For this reason it is called the Commentary which Broadly Comments on All the Various Scriptures (Jpn: *kōshaku shūkyo ron*).

Next, there was the Bodhisattva Asaṅga, whose spiritual stage was that of the First *Bhūmi*. He succeeded upon the Bodhisattva Maitreya, and he widely disseminated this Tradition. Asaṅga made detailed commentaries on all of the writings of the Bodhisattva Maitreya, and he composed commentaries upon the teachings of the Buddha Śākyamuni.

Next, in a period some nine hundred years (after the Extinction of the Tathāgata), there was the Bodhisattva Vasubandhu, the younger brother of Asaṅga. He was a bodhisattva who had clearly attained the four roots of good. He succeeded upon the Bodhisattva Asaṅga and widely disseminated this Tradition.

Vasubandhu composed explanatory commentaries based upon Maitreya's Commentary (= the *Yuga-ron*). Initially, Vasubandhu had studied the Hīnayāna, and had composed some five hundred commentaries upon it. Later, he disseminated the Mahayana, and again he composed some five hundred commentaries on it. He thoroughly penetrated the teachings of all of the texts of the whole lifetime teachings of the Tathāgata.

Next, there was the Bodhisattva Dharmapāla, who profoundly understood the commentarial literature of Vasubandhu, and who widely disseminated the teachings of Maitreya. Being a Buddha of this, the *Bhadra Kalpa*, he gave an explanatory revelation from out of the sky. All the non-Buddhists with their perverse clinging, closed their mouths and were as dumb. The various sectarian traditions of the Hīnayāna all folded in their tongues and were as stammerers. Thus did the non-Buddhists and the Hīnayānists of India all say, "The Mahayana has only this one man ...."

Next, there was the Commentary Master Śīlabhadra, who was as a great general in the Transmission of the Buddhadharma. During his age, he far transcended ordinary persons. He transmitted all of the teachings of the Hossō, and commented upon the whole lifetime teachings of the Tathāgata.

These five great commentary masters were all of them great masters, transmitters of the Dharma in India.

Next, in the early years of the Great T'ang Dynasty in China, there was the Tripiṭaka Master Hsüan-tsang. He traversed the distant, shifting sands on his journey to far away India. There he eventually met the commentary master Śīlabhadra, who was widely disseminating this Tradition. The master Śīlabhadra has waited long for Hsüan-tsang, and he transmitted to him all of the teachings of the Hossō, that is, the Five Major Commentaries, and the Ten Subsidiary Commentaries, omitting nothing. Finally, Hsüan-tsang returned to China, where he widely propagated this Tradition.

Hsüan-tsang had some three thousand students, seventy disciples who were spiritually advanced, and four chief disciples. Indeed, the whole realm went to him in allegiance, and the whole country within the four seas paid court to him. He translated an exceedingly large number of the various scriptures, *Vinayas*, and commentaries, both of his own Tradition and those of other Traditions. Hsüan-tsang is the first of the patriarchal masters of the Tradition in China, and he is the sixth patriarchal master in the Indian lineage of succession.

Next, there was the Dharma Master K'uei-chi. He was the chief disciple of the Tripiṭaka Master Hsüan-tsang. His wisdom and his under-

standing far surpassed the ordinary. Succeeding upon the Tripiṭaka Master Hsüan-tsang, he widely transmitted this Tradition. K'uei-chi was "the master of the one hundred volumes of commentaries," a manifestation of a Bodhisattva of the Tenth *Bhūmi*, a master whose outstanding qualities stand out as a flower among weeds. The whole world looked to him in allegiance. He was given the honorific posthumous title of "the Great Master of the Tz'u-en Monastery" (= *Jion-daishi*).

Next, there was the Great Master Hui-chao of Ssu-chou, who succeeded upon the Great Master of the Tz'u-en Monastery, K'uei-chi. He widely disseminated this Tradition.

Next there was the Great Master Chih-chou of P'u-yang, who succeeded upon the Great Master of Ssu-chou, Hui-chao. He broadly transmitted this Tradition.

These then are the generations of the lineage succession in the land of the Great T'ang Dynasty.

There have been some three transmissions of this Tradition into Japan. First, the two monks, Chih-t'ung and Chih-ta received these teachings from the Tripiṭaka Master Hsüan-tsang. Second, the Dhyāna Master Chih-feng, of the Kingdom of Silla, received these teachings from the Tripiṭaka Master Hsüan-tsang, and initially transmitted them to the monk of *Sōjō* rank Gishin, of Japan. He propagated this Hossō Tradition in the Yuima-dō (of the Kōbukuji Monastery). Third, the monk of *Sōjō* rank Gembō, of Japan, went to T'ang Dynasty China, where he studied under the guidance of the Great Master of P'u-yang, Chih-chou. Returning to Japan, he transmitted the teachings to the monk of *Sōjō* rank, Zenjū.

From that time to the present there has been a continuous transmission of these teachings; the monasteries have been filled with those who cultivated this study up to the present day, with no interruption. All of these masters were a multitude like unto dragons and elephants, and the spears of their wisdom and their eloquence were truly sharp; all of them had the outstanding qualities of lions, and the roar of their determining (truth from error) was exceedingly loud and fierce. The whole land of Yamato (= Japan) was widely spread about with the Hossō teachings. What other Tradition can match this?

In the above narration nothing has been omitted with respect to the lineage succession of this Tradition in the three countries.

[4.] Question: How many periods of the teaching does this Tradition posit in order to embrace the whole lifetime teachings of the Tathāgata?

Answer: This Tradition posits some three periods of the teaching in order to embrace all of the lifetime teachings of the Tathāgata. This is the clear teaching of the *Gejin-mikkyō*.

First, there is the teaching of existence. During the first of these chronological periods the Buddha elucidates, for those who aspire after the Vehicle of the Śrāvakas, the teaching of the emptiness of the self and the existence of the dharmas, thus destroying the clingings of the non-Buddhists for a substantial self. All of the various Hīnayāna groups are included within this teaching. For now however, we shall speak of this teaching from the point of view of its teaching of existence, and all of the other (Hīnayāna) groups may be subsumed within this.

Second, there is the teaching of emptiness. The Buddha, in this the second chronological period of His teachings, elucidates, for those who aspire after the Mahayana, the teaching that all of the various dharmas are empty, in order to destroy the above clinging after substantial dharmas.

Third, there is the teaching of the Middle Way. In this, the third of the chronological periods, the Buddha taught the teaching of neither emptiness nor existence, in order to destroy the above one-sided clingings to existence or to emptiness.

Nevertheless, the first period teaches existence with reference to its temporary, dependent (Skt: *paratantra*) nature (Jpn: *etakishō*). The second period teaches emptiness with reference to clinging to (false concepts of) a self. It is not yet

the fully revealed teaching of the Three Natures, or of the Three Non-natures. Thus, these first two periods are "the not yet fully revealed teachings," for they are philosophical positions easily leading to argumentation. In the third period, the Three Natures and the Three Non-natures are fully taught. Because of the illusory (Skt: *parikalpita*) nature of existence (Jpn: *henge-shoshū-shō*), there is no existence. But because of the temporary, dependent (Skt: *paratantra*) nature (Jpn: *etakishō*) of things, there is no non-existence. This is the marvelous truth of the Middle Way, neither emptiness nor existence. It is from its very beginnings apart from the two extremes, and immediately enters on to the right path. This is the most profound of the whole lifetime teachings of the Tathāgata, and especially the most marvelous of all of the eighty(-four) thousand teachings. All of the most profound Mahayana scriptures, such as the *Kegon-gyō*, the *Gejin-mikkyō*, the *Kongō-myō-saishō-ō-kyō*, the *Hokke-kyō*, the *Nehan-gyō*, *etc.*, are included within this period. All of the *Prajñāpāramitā* scriptures are included within the second period. All of the various Hinayāna groups are included within the second period.

[5.] Question: Are these three periods a chronological sequence, or are they an ideational sequence?

Answer: Scholars differ in their opinions with respect to this. Some say that the three periods are a chronological sequence, some others say that the three periods are an ideational sequence of different teachings, and some others say that the three periods are a combination of both ideational and chronological sequences.

[6.] Question: Is the Middle Way, which is taught within these three periods, posited with respect to the Three Natures? Or is the Middle Way elucidated with respect to one dharma (= with respect to any one of the Three Natures)?

Answer: There are two teachings with respect to this. The first one says that the Three Natures are seen with respect to the Middle Path. The second one says that the Middle Path is one of these dharmas. Many, however, hold that the Three Natures are given with respect to the Middle Path, and that the Middle Path is also one of these dharmas.

[7.] Question: How is emptiness taught in the second period?

Answer: There are two teachings in this. The first holds that emptiness is taught based on the teaching of the illusory nature of things, and that it teaches only in its hidden meaning that all things are empty. The second holds that emptiness is taught based on the Three Non-Natures.

[8.] Question: How many different types of Vehicles does this Tradition posit?

Answer: The teachings of this Tradition posit some Three Vehicles and Five Natures. The Five Natures are: first there are those with the definitive nature of a *śrāvaka*; second, those with the definitive nature of a *pratyekabuddha*; third, those with the definitive nature of a bodhisattva; fourth, those with no set nature; and fifth, those sentient beings without any natures.

Those beings of the Two Vehicles with their definitive natures attain to the fruit taught within their own vehicles, and in addition they attain an entry into extinction without any residue. Those who have the nature of a bodhisattva perfect the practice of the two benefits (= benefitting oneself and others), and are awakened to the Greatest Bodhi. Those sentient beings without any natures are by their natures without any undefiled seeds (Jpn: *shūji*; Skt: *bījas*); they have only defiled seeds. If they do progress, then they shall be reborn among humans or devas, but this is as high as they shall advance.

[9.] Question: Do those beings of the Two Vehicles (= *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas*) who

enter into extinction, ever return to the round of birth and death?

Answer: Not for those who have entered into (extinction) without residue, for their bodies are reduced to ashes and their intellects are extinguished, and all of their cognizing consciousnesses are extinguished. How can there be for them any return to the round of birth and death? Those persons with no definitive natures will certainly convert to the Mahayana, and they shall not enter into this extinction. When they do convert (to the Mahayana), they enter into the first mental stage of the Ten Stages of Faith. And from the First Abode, they enter into the stage of the *asaṁkhyeya kalpas*, and attain to buddhahood.

By nature there is within the capabilities of all sentient beings these five different natures. For this reason then the Buddha gives an appropriate dharma to each one of these capacities or faculties. Thus, there is by necessity some Five Vehicles. Those sentient beings without any natures are those beings of the Vehicles of Humans and Devas; those beings with definitive natures of the Three Vehicles constitute those beings of the Three Vehicles. Those with no definitive natures are those beings common to any of the Three Vehicles, as is appropriate. In this manner then there are some Five Vehicles. However, if we speak with reference to those Vehicles which are trans-worldly, then this Tradition posits only some Three Vehicles. Truly the reason why this Tradition is also called "the Teaching which is for All Vehicles, Universally" is truly based on this.

[10.] Question: The *Hokke-kyō*, and other texts, teach that there is only One Vehicle, and for this reason those beings who have the definitive natures of the Two Vehicles can all attain buddhahood. Why must this Tradition maintain some Five Natures?

Answer: The teachings of the *Hokke-kyō*, and of other scriptural texts, are teachings with a hidden meaning. They speak of the One Vehicle with respect to those beings with no definitive natures; these texts do not say that all beings with the five different natures can all attain to Buddhahood. But when (these scriptures) say "all," this means the "all" of one small portion. It is in the nature of things that these Five Natures have been distinct one from the other from the beginning of beginningless time, and they cannot be changed.

[11.] Question: What are the characteristics of the cultivation of religious practices by beings of the Three Vehicles, and of their attainment of the fruits?

Answer: *Śrāvakas* traverse some three lifetimes (at a minimum), or sixty *kalpas* (at a maximum) and attain the fruit of arhatship. *Pratyekabuddhas* traverse some four lifetimes or one hundred *kalpas*, and attain to his fruit. Bodhisattvas traverse three *asaṁkhyeya kalpas* and attain the fruit of Great Awakening.

[12.] Question: How many different bodhisattva stages does this Tradition posit?

Answer: In discussing this from the point of view of both the cause and the effect of this path, there is posited in all some forty-one stages. These are: the Ten Abodes, the Ten Practices, the Ten Transfers of Merit, the Ten *Bhūmis*, and Buddhahood.

If the stage Almost Equal to Enlightenment (Jpn: *tōgaku*) is also delineated, then there are some forty-two stages. However, this is included within the (tenth) *Bhūmi*, "Cloud of the Dharma" (Skt: *dharma-megha bhūmi*). Also, if the Ten Stages of Faith are delineated, then there are some fifty-one stages. However, the Ten Stages of Faith are included in the First *Bhūmi*.

The Great Master of the Tz'u-en Monastery, K'uei-chi, also posits some forty-one stages. The Dharma Master of the Hsi-ming Monastery, Yuan-ts'e, posits in all some fifty-two stages. These forty-one stages are grouped into five stages.

First is the Stage of Preparation (Skt: *saṁbhara*). This is the thirty stages before the Bhūmis. Second is the Stage of Additional Reli-

gious Practice (Skt: *prayoga*). After the ten stage of the Transfer of Merit, the four roots of good are delineated, and they come to make the expedient (Skt: *upāya*) additional religious practice (Skt: *prayoga*) leading to the Path of Views (Skt: *darśana-mārga*). Third is the Stage of Penetration. This is the mental state of entering into the First *Bhūmi*, the Stage of the Path of Views (Skt: *darśana-mārga*). Fourth is the Stage of Cultivation (Skt: *bhāvanā-mārga*). This is the stages from the mental state which abides in the First *Bhūmi* to the end of the Tenth *Bhūmi*. Fifth is the Stage of the Ultimate. This is buddhahood. These are termed the five stages of religious cultivation.

[13.] Question: What hindrances do persons in the Three Vehicles cut off?

Answer: Beings in the Two Vehicles cut off only the hindrance of the defilements (Skt: *kleśa-āvaraṇā*). Beings who are Mahayana bodhisattvas cut off both of the hindrances. The two hindrances are: first, the hindrance of the defilments; and second, the hindrance of intellectualization (Skt: *jñeya-āvaraṇā*). Each of these two hindrances is two-fold: that is, those that are acquired and those which are with a person from birth.

Bodhisattvas before the First *Bhūmi* put down the outward manifestations of the two acquired hindrances. In the First *Bhūmi* they cut off the seeds (Jpn: *shūji*; Skt: *bījas*) of these two defilements. From the Second *Bhūmi* onwards, up to (but not including) the Tenth *Bhūmi*, in each *Bhūmi* they gradually cut off the hindrance of intellectualization which has been with them since birth. When they reach the Tenth *Bhūmi* they cut off the seeds of the hindrance of the defilements which have been with them since birth. The influences of these two hindrances are gradually cut off in this same order, from the Second *Bhūmi* onwards. When one reaches the state of buddhahood, all of these hindrances are totally cut off at once.

[14.] Question: How many stages are traversed during the period of the three *asaṁkhyeya kalpas*?

Answer: The three stages of the Wise, and the four roots of good are traversed in the First *Asaṁkhyeya Kalpa*. The First *Bhūmi* to the Seventh *Bhūmi* is traversed during the Second *Asaṁkhyeya Kalpa*. The Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth *Bhūmis* are traversed during the Third *Asaṁkhyeya Kalpa*. After one has traversed the three *asaṁkhyeya kalpas*, one attains to buddhahood.

The forty-one stages of the bodhisattva are divided into the Four Reliances. The stages before the *Bhūmis* are the First Reliance. At this time the bodhisattva makes *pūja* offerings to buddhas as numerous as the sands of five Ganges Rivers. The stages from the First *Bhūmi* to the Sixth *Bhūmi* are the Second Reliance. Now the bodhisattva makes *pūja* offerings to buddhas as numerous as the sands of six Ganges Rivers. The stages of the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth *Bhūmis* make up the Third Reliance. Now the bodhisattva makes *pūja* offerings to buddhas as numerous as the sands of seven Ganges Rivers. The Tenth *Bhūmi* is the Fourth Reliance. Now the bodhisattva makes *pūja* offerings to buddhas as numerous as the sands of eight Ganges Rivers. For these three *asaṁkhyeya kalpas* the bodhisattva makes *pūja* offerings in all to buddhas as numerous as the sands of twenty-six Ganges Rivers.

During these three *asaṁkhyeya kalpas* all of the various practices are cultivated, and the six *pāramitās* are perfected. Before the *Bhūmis*, cognizing-only with respect to external characteristics is cultivated, and within the *Bhūmis* the cognizing-only aspect of internal nature is revealed.

[15.] Question: How many categories of dharmas does this Tradition posit, in order to embrace all of the dharmas?

Answer: It posits one hundred dharmas in order to totally embrace all of the various dharmas.

[16.] Question: What are the one hundred dharmas?

Answer: They are divided into some five groups.

First is the mind itself (*citta*), which is eightfold: the eight consciousnesses (*vijñāna*), which are eye-(consciousness), ear-(consciousness), nose-(consciousness), tongue-(consciousness), body-(consciousness), the mind, *mano*-consciousness, and the *ālaya*-consciousness. Second are the dharmas which are mental states (Skt: *caitasika dharmas*). There are some fifty-one of these, and together they are divided into some six groups: First are the five ever-present (Skt: *sarva-traga*) dharmas: attention (Skt: *manaskara*), contact (Skt: *sparśa*), impressions (Skt: *vedanā*), thoughts (Skt: *samjñā*), and volitional thought (Skt: *cetanā*). Second are the five mental conditions which may or may not be conjoined with the mind (Skt: *viniyata-dharmas*): desire (Skt: *chanda*), resolve (Skt: *adimokṣa*), remembrance (Skt: *smṛti*) *samādhi*, and *prajnā*.

Third are the thirty-one good dharmas (= good mental states): trust (Skt: *śraddhā*), energy (Skt: *vīrya*), shame (Skt: *hrī*), bashfulness (Skt: *apatrāpya*), absence of greed (Skt: *alobha*), absence of animosity (Skt: *adveṣa*), absence of ignorance (Skt: *amoha*), well-being (Skt: *prasrabdhi*), vigilance (Skt: *apramada*), equanimity (Skt: *upekṣā*), and non-injury (Skt: *ahimsā*).

Fourth are the six mental defilements (Skt: *kleśas*): greed (Skt: *rāga*), animosity (Skt: *pratigha*), ignorance (Skt: *mūdhī*), pride (Skt: *māna*), doubt (Skt: *vicikitsā*), and wrong views (Skt: *dṛṣṭi*). Wrong views can be expanded into some five views: the view that (the five *skandhas*) constitute a self (Skt: *satkāyadṛṣṭi*), the view of the (two) extremes (Skt: *anta-dṛṣṭi*), perverse views (= not believing in karmic retribution, Skt: *kudṛṣṭi* ?), the view that holds to (the above) views, and the view that there is efficacy in (non-buddhist) precepts and in (non-buddhists) ascetic practices (Skt: *śila-vrata-paramarśa dṛṣṭi*).

Fifth are the twenty minor defilements (Skt: *upakleśas*): anger (Skt: *krodha*), enmity (Skt: *upanāha*), concealing one's misdeeds (Skt: *mrakṣa*), anguish (Skt: *pradāsa*), stinginess (Skt: *mātsarya*), envy (Skt: *īrsyā*), deception (Skt: *māyā*), fraudulence (Skt: *sāṭhya*), injury (Skt: *vihimsā*), pride (Skt: *mada*), shamelessness (Skt: *āhrīkya*), non-bashfulness (Skt: *anapatrāpya*), restlessness (Skt: *auddhatya*), melancholy (Skt: *styāna*), lack of confidence (Skt: *āśraddhya*), laziness (Skt: *kausidya*), negligence (Skt: *pramāda*), forgetfulness (Skt: *muditasmṛtitā*), distraction (Skt: *vikṣepa*), and incorrect understanding (Skt: *asaṁprajanya*).

Sixth are the four indeterminate (Skt: *aniyatā*) mental states: repentance (Skt: *kaukṛtya*), drowsiness (Skt: *middha*), reflection (Skt: *vitarka*), and investigation (Skt: *vicāra*). These six groups of dharmas make up a total of fifty-one dharmas. [This ends the sublist of *caitasika dharmas*, returning to the main list of five groups of dharmas. Ed.]

Third are the eleven material (*rūpa*) dharmas: the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body; forms, sounds, smells, tastes, and tangibles; and the physical matter included within the *dharma-āyatana* (Skt: *dharmāvatanikāni rūpāṇi*). There are five kinds of this physical matter: exceedingly small matter, exceedingly unstable matter, matter that is drawn out by receiving (the precepts), matter which is generated in *samādhi*, and matter which arises through the illusory nature of existence. These are all physical matter which is included within the *dharma-āyatana*.

Fourth are the twenty-four types of objects not (necessarily) associated with the mind (Skt: *citta-viprayukta-samskāra*): acquisition (Skt: *prapti*), life (Skt: *jīvitendriya*), similarity (Skt: *nikāyasabhāga*), difference (Skt: *visabhāga*), the thoughtless absorption (Skt: *asaṁjñī-samāpatti*), the absorption of extinction (Skt: *nirodha-samāpatti*) being in the thoughtless absorption (Skt: *asaṁjñika*); names (Skt: *nāma-kāya*), words (Skt: *pada-kāya*), sentences (Skt: *vyañjana-kāya*); birth (Skt: *jāti*), old age (Skt: *jarā*), stability (Skt: *sthiti*), impermanence (Skt: *anityatā*), progress (Skt: *pravṛtti*), distinction between cause and effect (Skt: *pratiniyama*), union (Skt: *yoga*), constant change (Skt: *jāva*), orderly progression within change (Skt:

anukrama), direction (Skt: *deśa*), time (Skt: *kāla*), number (Skt: *saṁkhyā*), harmony (Skt: *sāmagrī*), and disharmony (Skt: *anyathātva*).

Fifth are the six uncompounded (Skt: *asaṁskṛta*) dharmas: space (Skt: *ākāśa*), extinction through conscious effort (Skt: *pratisaṁkhyā-nirodha*), extinction not obtained through conscious effort but through natural causes (Skt: *apratisaṁkhyā-nirodha*), extinction obtained through a motionless state of heavenly absorption (Skt: *āniñjya-nirodha*), and extinction obtained through the cessation of ideas and of sensations of an *arhat* (Skt: *saṁjñā-vedayita-nirodha*), and the Absolute (Skt: *tathatā*). These are the one hundred dharmas. This is nothing other than a systematization of all of the various dharmas.

[17.] Question: What is the relationship of the three groups, the *skandhas*, the *āyatanas*, and the *dhātus*, which include all of the dharmas of mind and of matter, with this present schema of one hundred dharmas?

Answer: Of these one hundred dharmas, the mind, mental states, and the dharmas of physical matter, are divided into the five *skandhas*. The *skandha* of physical matter (*rūpa skandha*) is the dharma of physical matter (*rūpa dharma*), and the two *skandhas* of sensation (Skt: *vedanā-skandha*) and thoughts (Skt: *aṁjñā-skandha*) are mental states.

The *skandha* of consciousness (Skt: *vijñāna-skandha*) is the mind (*citta*), made up of the eight consciousnesses. All of the other mental states are included within the skandha of mental formations (Skt: *saṁskāra-skandha*). Uncompounded dharmas (Skt: *asaṁsākṛta dharma*) are not included among the *skandhas*.

As for the twelve *āyatanas*: the twelve *āyatanas* are a full elaboration on physical matter, and is an abbreviated explanation of the mind. It may be known on the basis of the above *skandhas*. The eighteen *dhātus* are a full elaboration on both physical matter and the mind, and they also include uncompounded dharmas.

The main purport of this Tradition is only to elucidate "cognizing-only" (Jpn: *yuishiki;* Skt: *vijñapti-mātra*). All of the various dharmas are cognizing-only, and there is not one dharma which exists outside of the mind. Thus did the Great Master of the Tz'u-en Monastery, K'uei-chi, say, "If there are dharmas outside of the mind, then there is transmigration in the round of birth and death; if one is awakened to the one mind, then birth and death will be eternally cast off." However, if there is differentiation within the various dharmas, this is only the permutations of cognizing-only. Apart from the consciousness there are no separate dharmas. All spheres and realms of the mind (*viṣayas* and *dhātus*) are all subsumed within mind and consciousness (= *citta* and *vijñāna*).

In elucidating this teaching, there are some five levels of cognizing-only. The first is the consciousness which rejects non-existence (= *parikalpita* views) and which resides in the actual (Jpn: *kenko zonshitsu shiki*). This consciousness rejects *parikalpita* views, which are empty, and abides in the truths of *paratantra* and *pariniṣpanna*, which are real.

The second is the consciousness which rejects the mixed, and which abides in the pure (Jpn: *sharan rujun shiki*). In this consciousness the inner realm of *paratantra* perception mixes with the external world. For this reason it is cast aside, and it is only termed consciousness.

The third is the consciousness which subsumes the peripheral layers of the mind into the basic consciousness (Jpn: *shōmatsu kihon shiki*). The two subsidiary aspects (of the consciousness), the mind as the viewing agent (Skt: *darśana-bhaga*) and objective reality as the consciousness (Skt: *lakṣaṇa-bhaga*) are embraced and are subsumed into the more fundamental mind functioning as a self witness (Skt: *sakṣatkari-bhaga*).

The fourth is the consciousness which hides the inferior and which manifests the superior (Jpn: *onretsu-kenshō-shiki*). This consciousness hides the interior mental states (Skt: *caitasika dharmas*) and manifests the superior mind (*citta dharma*).

The fifth is the consciousness which rejects external characteristics and which becomes enlightened to (the mind's) real nature (Jpn: *kensō-shōshō-shiki*). This consciousness rejects the characteristics of phenomenal, *paratantra* events, and is awakened to the true nature of cognizing-only. The first four of the above is the teaching of the cognizing-only of external characteristics, and the fifth is the cognizing-only of internal nature.

In all there are four aspects to the functions of the mind: first is the external phenomena as perceived by the consciousness; second is the consciousness as perceiver; third is the consciousness as self aware; and fourth is the consciousness that affirms its self awareness. The *Bunryō-ketsu* says, "The functional limits of the mind are of four distinct types. It is thus called 'the four-fold division'."

However, four masters differ in their teachings with respect to this. First, the Bodhisattva Sthiramati posits only one functional aspect (to consciousness), that is, as the consciousness that affirms its own self awareness. Second, the Bodhisattva Nanda posits some two functional aspects, that is, as external phenomena and as perceiver (of this phenomena). Third, the Bodhisattva Dignāga posits some three functional aspects, as external phenomena, as perceiver, and as self aware. Fourth, the Bodhisattva Dharmapāla posits some four functional aspects, that is, as given above. Now it is the teaching of Dharmapāla which exhausts the Truth (= is orthodox), and so the four functional aspects of the consciousness are posited (in the Hossō Tradition).

(External) characteristics in all their multiplicity are conditioned by the mind, and so (this aspect of the consciousness) is termed "the portion of characteristics" (Skt: *lakṣaṇa-bhaga*). As it is the object which conditions the above sphere (of perception), it is called "the seeing portion" (Skt: *darśana-bhaga*). As it is able to condition this seeing portion, it is termed "the portion which is self aware" (Skt: *sakṣatkari-bhaga*). As it is able to condition this portion of its self nature, it is termed "the portion that is aware of self awareness." Of these four, only "the portion of characteristics" is that which is conditioned, and it is without any thought of conditioning (something else).

The next three portions are both conditioned and conditioner (= both subject and object of the conditioning). This is none other than the mind (*citta*) with its eight consciousnesses, and mental states (Skt: *caitasika dharmas*), each one of which has these four portions. Even though each of the eight consciousnesses has its own nature, they each have these four portions with respect to their functions. For this reason then each of the eight consciousnesses has these four portions.

In its elucidation of the principles of Truth and of Error, this Tradition posits in all some Three Natures. First is the *Parikalpita* Nature. This is the appearance of the characteristics of present, actual defilements. This is also divided into three parts: the person who generates the deluded thought, the object of the deluded thought, and the delusion itself. The former two are included in *paratantra*, while the last one, the deluded clinging itself, is the appearance of the characteristics of present, actual defilements. (The mark of this is that) one terms a non-existent thing to be existent. This is empty, deluded clinging.

Second is the *Paratantra* Nature. All of the various dharmas which arise from out of the four conditions exist by the harmonious coming together of causes and conditions, and so there is existence.

Third is the *Pariniṣpanna* Nature. The true nature of all of the dharmas are possessed in the three principles of Perfection, Attainment (Jpn: *jōjū*; Skt: *siddhi*), and True Reality (Jpn: *shinjitsu*).

Of these Three Natures, *parikalpita* is erroneous existence, *paratantra* is provisional existence, and *pariniṣpanna* is true existence. *Parikalpita* is deluded clinging, and *paratantra* and *pariniṣpanna* are the marvelous truth. These Three Natures are separate one from the other, and they are not confused with one another. Nevertheless, the phenomenal dharmas of *paratantra* existence

are not one with, nor different from, the true nature of *parinişpanna* existence. Its characteristics are not apart from its nature, and its nature is not apart from its characteristics.

As a *Gāthā* of the *Sanjū-jū* (= the *Triṁśika*) says, when speaking of these Three Natures,

> Because there is *parikalpita* (discrimination) about this and that,
> there is *parikalpita* thought about many and various different types of things.
> The self nature of *parikalpita* clinging
> is nothing at all,
>
> but is generated by the conditions of discrimination of the self nature of *paratantra* (discrimination).
> *Parinişpanna* Nature is always far apart in its nature from that (*i.e.*, the *parikalpita*),
> and so because of this it is not different from, nor not different from, *Paratantra* Nature,
> as the nature of impermanence, *etc.*, is not without being seen in this and that.

In opposition to these Three Natures, this Tradition elucidates some Three Non-Natures, which are none other than the opposites of the *Parikalpita*, *Paratantra*, and *Parinişpanna* Natures. In this order these reveal the Three Non-Natures of Characteristics, of Arising, and of the Absolute Truth. As the *Sanjū-jū* says:

> Because there are these Three Natures,
> the Three Non-Natures are posited.
> The Buddha taught, in His hidden meaning,
> that all of the dharmas are without any natures.
>
> First there is no nature to Characteristics;
> next there is no nature through the process of Arising;
> and lastly there is a nature because it is far apart from the above mentioned
> clingings to self and to dharmas.

These above Three Natures are also not apart from consciousness, and so the Three Non-Natures are posited based upon the Three Natures.

The *Jō-yuishiki-ron* says, "Know then that the Three Natures are also not apart from consciousness." It also says, "Because there are the Three Natures that we have spoken of previously, later to them there is established the three types of Non-Nature."

All the cultivation of religious practice in all of the various stages is to develop insight meditation into cognizing-only. The awakening attained in buddhahood is only awakening to cognizing-only. Thus, all of the various religious practices arise from out of cognizing-only, and the myriad of qualities are perceived based on cognizing-only.

This Tradition teaches the permutation of the eight consciousnesses and the forming thereby of the four wisdoms. These four wisdoms are: first, the great, perfect, mirror-like wisdom (Skt: *ādarśa-jñāna*); second, the wisdom that sees that all things are the same in nature (Skt: *samatā-jñāna*); third, the wisdom of marvelous insight (Skt: *pratyavekṣanā-jñāna*); and fourth, the wisdom that accomplishes the work that is to be done (Skt: *kṛtyānusthāna-jñāna*).

When one enters into the First *Bhūmi*, one brings about a change in the sixth and the seventh consciousnesses and attains the wisdom of marvelous insight and the wisdom that all things are the same in nature. When one attains to buddhahood, one brings about a change in the fifth and the eighth consciousnesses, and attains the great, perfect, mirror-like wisdom and the wisdom that accomplishes the work that is to be done. At this time the four wisdoms are perfected, and the marvelous fruit of the two permutations becomes clearly apparent.

There are four *nirvanas* in the truth to which one is awakened. First is the *nirvana* which is inherent in one's basically pure nature. Second is the *nirvana* with residue. Third is the *nirvana* without residue. Fourth is the *nirvana* in which

there is no abode.

The first of these four is also possessed by an ordinary person. The second and the third are also attained by *śrāvakas* and by *pratyekabuddhas*. Only a Tathāgata in the state of buddhahood fully possesses all four of these. These four are altogether called the realm (Skt: *dharmadhātu*) of purity. When the four wisdoms are added on to this, these go to make up the five dharmas. The five dharmas and the three modes of existence (= bodies of the buddha, *kāya*) mutually embrace one another. In the *Jō-yuishiki-ron*, there are the opinions of two masters with respect to this.

In the opinion of the first master, the realm of purity and the great, perfect, mirror-like wisdom go to make up the *Dharmakāya*; the wisdom which sees that all things are same in nature and the wisdom of marvelous insight constitute the *Saṁbhogakāya*; and the wisdom that accomplishes the work that is to be done constitutes the *Nirmāṇakāya*.

In the opinion of the second master, the realm of purity is itself the body pure in nature; the tangible characteristics on the surface of the four wisdoms is the body experienced for the benefit of oneself; the mode of existence manifested by the wisdom that sees that all things are the same in nature is the body experienced for the benefit of others. The mode of existence manifested by the wisdom that accomplishes the work that is to be done is the body of transformations. The wisdom of marvelous insight is the wisdom of the preaching of the Dharma which cuts off all doubts. The orthodox teaching of this Tradition regards the understanding of the second master as an authoritative guide.

Know then that the cultivation of the practice of the five grades is gradually plumbed to its utmost, and that the two types of hindrances as well as their influences are totally cut off and extinguished. During three long *asaṁkhyeya kalpas* all of the myriad of virtuous deeds are perfected, and are embraced within one moment of thought; in the swiftness of buddhahood the eight defiled consciousnesses are changed and the four wisdoms are obtained. The marvelous result of the two permutations, and the three bodies are perfected. They are quiescent and yet shining brightly, brightly shining and yet clear. Further, all of the five vehicles are included (within this teaching), and each of the three vehicles are carried to their ultimate. The One Vehicle Teaching is an expedient teaching, and the Three Vehicle Teaching is the Truth. Before the attainment of the wisdom of this true nature (= basic wisdom), the Truth is quiescent; within the wisdom that is gained later, all sentient beings are universally converted.

In the presentation of this teaching which relies on words, the Three Natures and the Three Non-Natures are as a suspended mirror (= clear for all to see). In the teaching that dispenses with words, the Four Sentences and the One Hundred Negations put an end to all discursive thoughts. In its evaluation of the internal nature and the external characteristics (of the dharmas), there is no Tradition which is like unto this one. In the ultimate perfection of its principles, what Teaching can match this one?

The full moon of the three bodies and of self awareness, and the light of the five vehicles which work for the conversion of others, is ever bright and clear. Both self awareness and the conversion of others is vast and profound. The teachings of the highest vehicles are perfect in its principles and in its truth. The teachings of the Hossō Tradition are in outline thus.

Through Each Other's Eyes: A Shin Buddhist-Catholic Dialogue[1]

by Kenneth Paul Kramer, *San Jose State University, San Jose*

Since we have been a dialogue
And can hear each other.
(Hölderlin)

If I could introduce you to a practice that Jodo Shin Priest Shōjun Bandō calls "eternally enlightening,"[2] and Catholic Professor of Japanese Religions (at Sophia University) Ernest Piryns calls "the way to greater salvation,"[3] would you be at all interested? This presentation will address what I take to be the *future presence* of the Shin Buddhist-Catholic dialogue by focusing on a specific method to facilitate that encounter, the *interview-dialogue*, and then by reporting instances of such exchanges which occurred during a recent trip to Japan (1991). My purpose in the conducted dialogues was to travel beyond the usual discussion of epistemological, teleological and metaphysical categories of comparison (not that these are unimportant), in order to inquire into a more fundamental question: Who is Buddhist and who is Christian when looking through each other's eyes?

Of course, even that question may not be fundamental enough. I recall an encounter with Gishin Tokiwa (Professor of Liberal Arts at Hanazono College, Kyoto) in which the topic being discussed was Zen practice:

Tokiwa In Zazen there is no point to reach. Outside of Zazen, however, there seems to be a point to reach. I would not call myself a Zen Buddhist. Priests call themselves persons of Zen.
Kramer Do you call yourself anything? Just Tokiwa?
Tokiwa About that, also, I am very vague. I respond to your questions with the name Tokiwa. That is my responsibility in this world.

BEING A DIALOGUE

I began the series of dialogues with two assumptions, the first of which needed immediate correction, namely that Buddhists are not as interested in the dialogue as Christians are. Michio Shinozaki (Dean of the Risshō Kōsei-Kai Seminary in Tokyo) told me in an interview that when he was sent to America by President Niwano, he was told first to see Christianity from the point of view of *The Lotus Sutra*, and then to see *The Lotus Sutra* from the point of view of Christianity. To this President Niwano added, "If you become converted to Christianity, that's OK!"

A day later, Jodo Shin Priest, Kōshin Yamamoto (of the Myōenji Buddhist Temple in Kawasaki), expressed his deep interest in Buddhist-Christian dialogue.

Yamamoto From a cause and effect point of view, my existence is affected by your existence. To deepen one's religious faith, unless you respect the other's point of view (and one's own also), we will never come to a platform of mutuality. To come to grips with my faith, I must respect your faith, and come to know it. To be in the *other* person's shoes is to discover who *we* are. Mutual respect and

understanding are necessary for this to happen.

Kramer Is there a teaching or practice in Jodo Shin which specifically addresses this issue of mutuality?

Yamamoto Yes, *listening*. There is no prayer in Jodo Shin, just listening. We listen to the teaching of the historical Buddha and to the teaching of the Patriarchs. All are in the sphere of the *dharma*, or faith. There cannot be several faiths. Saint Shinran said: "To hear is to receive truth." But listening is more than hearing with one's ears. It can be reading, or seeing one's body language. It is on all levels — from the heart. And it is more than just listening to Buddhist teachings.

Kramer Let me reflect back to you what I heard to make sure I have it right. Listening, first of all to one's own tradition, deepens the listener's knowledge of that tradition (so that he or she understands more exactly what is to be brought into a dialogue). Then, one's listening may be broadened to include other traditions (so that one more clearly understands the other's point of view). If that is correct, might there not be a third way of listening — a listening (or a re-listening) to my own faith-expression through the eyes of the other?

Yamamoto I would call that part of the second listening, because when I listen to the other, my own viewpoint broadens. Doors are opened more widely, and there comes a point where religious squabbling should be *passé*.

Exchanges such as these convinced me that some Buddhists are far more willing to engage in cross-traditional dialogue than I had supposed. At the same time, in each case it was necessary for me to initiate the dialogue, a fact which highlighted the necessity of developing a *skillful means* to best facilitate such exchanges.

My second assumption, however, proved more valid, namely that to become interactively involved with each other (*i.e.*, from within the heart of each tradition), it was necessary for Buddhists and Christians to shift the basis of their encounter from *having* a dialogue (in which two or more people are speaking *at* each other), to *being* a dialogue (in which two or more people speak *with* each other). Thinkers as diverse as Martin Buber and Hans-Georg Gadamer attest to this by discussing, in some detail, two mutually related distinctions. First, they agree that a demarcation can, and should, be made between monologue, dialectic and dialogue. Whereas in a monologue, the other is objectified, typified and kept at a distance (if not dismissed completely), and in a dialectical exchange, the claim-counterclaim between self and other is finally a form of self-relatedness (with the other remaining within the role of "counterclaimest"), in genuine dialogue two unique persons, or more, converse in an I-Thou structure of honest openness which both preserves, yet dynamically overcomes, their separateness. And second, each uses words such as "genuine," or "authentic," or "true," or "real" adjectivally with the word "dialogue" to point the reader beyond what is ordinarily meant by the term (*i.e.*, *having* a dialogue), to a more inter-participatory meaning (*i.e.*, *being* a dialogue).

As is well known, Buber's philosophy of dialogue finds its classic expression in *I and Thou*[4] where he contrasts two primary relational attitudes — "I-it" (the primary word of experiencing and using which occurs entirely within the "I" and lacks mutuality), and "I-thou" (the primary word of relationship which is characterized by directness and mutuality). In a later work, *Between Man and Man*,[5] Buber developed his philosophy of dialogue by emphasizing both 'the primal setting at a distance' and the 'entering into relation'. The first presupposes the second, and the second is the act by which one becomes fully human .

For Buber, genuine dialogue cannot be located in either of the participants, but is found in their "betweeness," in what he calls the "interhuman." The basic movement of genuine dialogue is a *turning* of one's *being* to allow the other to be present as a whole, unique person. It is a process,

Buber writes, of "the making present of another self and in the knowledge that one is made present in his (or her) own self by the other — together with the mutuality of acceptance, of affirmation and confirmation."[6] For Buber, the mutual "making present" is a process which not only accepts and affirms the other, but as well confirms the other, even through disagreement.

According to Gadamer, who bases his theoretical remarks on the Platonic dialogues, to experience the other truly as a Thou, is to remain completely *open* to the other, even if "I myself must accept some things that are against me, even though no one else forces me to do so."[7] To engage in an authentic dialogue, from his point of view, the partners must not "talk at cross purposes;" rather, they must allow themselves "to be conducted by the subject matter to which the partners in the dialogue are oriented."[8] In this way, not only do each of the participants in the dialogue have a voice, but the dialogue itself has a voice so to speak, especially when each person is skilled in what Gadamer terms the "inner logic" of questioning. Rather than asking questions in order to establish a pre-existing opinion, to genuinely understand the other, one must "go back *behind* what is said" by asking "questions *beyond* what is said."[9] The more genuine the dialogue, the less is it directed by the will of either participant. More correctly, he suggests, we "fall into conversation."

As striking as it is, the similarity of Buber and Gadamer's distinction between what might be called pre-authentic and authentic dialogue, is not the primary concern here. Rather, I am interested in the application of this distinction to inter-religious dialogue.

In each of the following encounters, whether self-consciously or not, in one way or another my partners seemed to be keenly aware of this distinction. For example, while meeting with Eiko Kawamura (Professor of Theology at Hanazono College in Kyoto), I asked her if enlightenment was once and for all, and/or whether it included unenlightenment.

Kawamura Enlightenment is self awareness of true self. At the instant of enlightenment we have no words, no consciousness. We are consciousness itself! Later, after we lose all things in emptiness, all things return. The true self is from the beginning, but I am not aware of it. Buddha-Nature is aware of it. From the beginning both selves exist, but until enlightenment these two selves are separated. I am always sitting on the one hand, yet I am I in the speaking.

Kramer Perhaps this is like the difference between *having* a dialogue (two monologues: no meeting) and *being* a dialogue (in which my speaking and listening and your speaking and listening together form the dialogue that we are). Martin Buber pointed to the realm of the *between*. For me, I am the dialogue that we are, and you are the dialogue that we are. I am no longer just I. You are no longer just you.

Kawamura The conversation speaks for itself.

Kramer Yes, it has a voice, and its voice speaks through us. This is interpenetration. In a short essay, with the poem's line as its title, Buber quotes Hölderlin: "Since we have been a dialogue."[10] In that essay, commenting on Hölderlin he suggests that "we ourselves are the dialogue," and "our being spoken is our existence." This to me is the Buddhist-Christian encounter at its depths — when I can, while being Christian, *be* a dialogue with you as a Buddhist such that my being Christian in a sense, temporally, falls away. I become, in Rinzai's sense, like a person of no title.

As I reflect upon this and other dialogues with Jodo Shin and Zen Buddhists, as well as with Christians involved in the inter-religious encounter, it becomes clear that the method (or skillful means) which guided the conversations might be called the interview-dialogue. That is, while I approached each encounter with several pre-planned questions in mind — *e.g.*, 1. In what ways has your dialogue with Christians clarified or enriched your own faith? 2. Does the Christian perspective in any way affect your practice? and 3. What would you

like to ask a Catholic who views Christianity through Buddhist eyes? — after the conversation was underway, I turned the conduct of the dialogue over to the conversation itself.

Based on my experience in Japan, I would characterize these interview-dialogues as a differentiated listening, and a differentiated questioning. In ordinary conversations, we listen to identify, to judge, to agree or to disagree, and our questions are motivated by attempts to establish our point of view as the correct one. Being a dialogue, on the other hand, involves the co-occurrence of two processes: *Discernment Listening* (listening past judgments and associations to hear both what is said, and what is underneath the spoken words); and *Interactive Questioning* (formulating questions which open up new questions by allowing the dialogue itself to have a voice). Each can be described in a sentence. Discernment Listening (*with* and *as* rather than *to* and *for*) allows new possibilities to suggest themselves both in, and underneath, the words spoken, so that each person can listen into that opening. For its part, Interactive Questioning does not seek what is typical (which denies reciprocity) but, because the dialogical relationship between self and other has its own voice (which in turn generates new questions), recognizes that relationship to be as important as either of the participants in the dialogue.

With this as a backdrop, the following discussion is a portion of an interview-dialogue with Shōjun Bandō on the afternoon of June 17, 1991, at the Bandō Temple in Tokyo. Though I came with questions in mind, it was as if the dialogue conducted us. Since *inter*-religious dialogue always includes one's *intra*-religious ponderings, which at times occur in the midst of the actual dialogue, I include (as best as I remember them) thoughts and associations which occurred during the conversation itself, and which provide the reader the associative contexts from which my questions arose.

ETERNALLY ENLIGHTENING

Kramer In my own life, my understanding, my practice and my expression of Catholicism has been challenged, vitalized and clarified by my encounter with various forms of Buddhism. In your own life and practice, in what way, if any, has your faith been clarified or deepened or affected by your encounter with Christianity?

Bandō Yes, I have had many such experiences. For example in the Autumn of 1960, Dr. Paul Tillich came to Japan for the first time, and he had dialogues with Buddhists. I attended four or five of his lectures which he gave at Kyoto University. As a student, I was deeply impressed with him, more so than with, for example, Karl Barth. And I had the opportunity to take Dr. and Mrs. Tillich around in Tokyo and Kyoto, and had a chance to hear him speak many times. Since then, I have been very interested in his writings, especially with his emphasis on the significance of religious symbols. When I was reading his views on religious symbols, all the time I was reminded of its significance for Jodo Shin. When he said that symbols are different from signs, that symbols are born while signs are made, that the symbol has something eternal in it while the sign does not, and that a symbol can open up levels of consciousness that cannot be opened by signs, I was always thinking of the significance of Nembutsu.

I recalled Professor Masao Abe's words a few days earlier in the Palace Side Hotel Coffee Shop in Kyoto. "When I studied at Union Theological Seminary in 1957," Abe remarked, "Paul Tillich emphasized that love without justice is not true love, and justice without love is not true justice. In Buddhism, compassion is always seen with wisdom. Compassion without wisdom is not true compassion and wisdom without compassion is not true wisdom. But in the Buddhist tradition, the notion of justice is weak, not lacking, but weak.

Buddhism has been too indifferent to justice. So through the dialogue I came to realize the importance of integrating justice with Śūnyatā. *That is a very urgent issue."*

That is one example. Another is D.T. Suzuki's lectures which open up a very deep meaning of enlightenment. For example, he always maintained the synchronicity of the crucifixion and the resurrection. He always said that according to the Bible, after three days Christ arose. But in Buddhist eyes, that three days is in an instant. There is no distance between these two happenings (crucifixion and resurrection).

Also, I was impressed with Erich Fromm's interpretation of "I am that I am!" According to him, that expression means, "I am becoming that which I am becoming."[11] It signifies eternal becoming and not physical, substantial existence. God's essence then is the eternal movement of love. That statement helped me to see that God is not a noun but a verb, even though we take the word as a noun.

Kramer How interesting that you would bring up Tillich. When I spoke with Masao Abe a few days ago, he also referred to Paul Tillich. Beyond Tillich's influence through his encounter with Buddhists, what do you feel is missing in the contemporary dialogue between Buddhists and Christians, the presence of which would deepen the exchange? What do you think needs to be included in such dialogues which is often missing?
Bandō Absence of mind!

His spontaneous and instanteous response hit me like a Zen clout! I felt the dynamics of the dialogue immediately deepen.

Kramer Such a simple thing. Can you say bit more about this?
Bandō In the depth of emptying our mind, then mutual understanding will more naturally arise. I think that seems to be the core.

Kramer You speak of "mutual understanding." Is there anything beyond mutual understanding that Buddhist-Christian dialogue leads to? For instance, John Cobb speaks of mutual transformation as well.[12]
Bandō Yes, I agree with him. It is an eternal process. There is no end to it.
Kramer Yes. You spoke previously of "eternally enlightening."
Bandō I spent five months with Cobb once in Honolulu, and whenever he came to Tokyo we met.

For some reason this reminded me of my meeting at Nanzan University in Nagoya with Professor Roger Corless. He had used the phrase "mutually fulfilling" to characterize Buddhist-Christian dialogues. I recalled being surprised by his statement that he was the host of two practices — Buddhist and Catholic — because each is fully true for him, and each expresses truth in ways which cannot be reconciled. In his vision, the next step in the Buddhist-Christian dialogue will be taken by those who will practice what he calls "co-inherent meditation."

Kramer Can you give me an example of this mutual transformation from your side? How are you transformed?
Bandō Through a decreasing of misunderstanding. Always our mind gives rise to many misunderstandings. Very often we are not aware of this and on the basis of that misunderstanding, we unknowingly continue in that misunderstanding. Our own way of understanding is not quite in accord with the other's way of understanding.
Kramer: So in that sense, the mutual understanding and the mutual transformation go hand in hand.
Bandō Yes.
Kramer Are you open to being changed in the dialogue?
Bandō Both exclusivism and relativism are not religious. Religion equals a person's whole existence. My attitude toward the other is a result of

spiritual influences and the possibility of change. I just *listen* to convictions of others. If their truth is convincing, then I will nod and even I will praise it.

Kramer Does it become part of your faith?

Bandō In most cases, I find similarities in Jodo awakened. The truth of the other directs me to its place in my own tradition.

Kramer Since I have been asking you questions, let me ask you what question you would most like answered from the Christian standpoint. As you look at the structure of the Christian faith, what question arises which puzzles you, or that you wonder about?

I recalled how Professor Gishin Tokiwa had responded to the same question a few days earlier — "How is the death of Jesus understood in light of the relationship between religion and history?"

Bandō Televangelism! Coercion! That remains a constant question. Can it be religious? Can a fundamentalist interpretation in any tradition be religious? Also, I realize that the way Buddhism was transmitted, not by missionaries but by those who heard and shared the knowledge, that kind of transmission is most ideal. You may wonder why Buddhism and Shintoism co-exist in the minds of Japanese.

Kramer Yes, I have.

Bandō It's very strange, even for us Japanese.

Kramer Yes. On the Shinkansen from Kyoto I asked a woman what tradition she practiced. She said: "Wherever I am, that's what I practice." I asked her if she had one central practice? "No," she responded. "Just wherever I am!" But now I want to be more specific about Jodo Shin. How does Shinran describe listening? I have here in mind the ending of *The Hymn of True Faith*.[13]

I was recalling an earlier conversation I had had with Reverend Kōshin Yamamoto. He had explained to me that the last line of the Hymn of True Faith *speaks of "believing " and that this believing is also "listening."*

Bandō Just believe in the teaching of these masters.

Kramer Does the word *believe* also mean to listen?

Bandō Yes.

Kramer It's a believing-listening?

Bandō Yes. Very often believing and listening are equated.

Kramer This helps me immensely because it seems to me to be very close to one way of understanding prayer. For a Christian, prayer is sometimes seen as listening to God. If I take the position of Jodo Shin (*i.e.*, already believing what I am listening to), what's the purpose of the listening? Or better, how does one listen?

Bandō It's mysterious ... Just spontaneous ... It is an urging which just arises ... That kind of urging. Shinran's definition of faith is very characteristic. Faith is the absence of calculation, the absence of doubt. So if I want to listen to the teaching, then there is no obstruction between teaching and myself. That is faith.

Kramer Interesting, because Tillich wrote in *The Dynamics of Faith*[14] that faith must include doubt. Of course Tillich does not mean skeptical doubt but what he calls "existential doubt," an element of insecurity which it takes an act of courage to overcome. So there is a difference here?

Bandō Yes. Shinran's definition of faith is negative — not to believe in something. That interests me very much. Gradually I came to realize that in this world there are things which can only be expressed in mythical terms. If it is accepted in this way, that is faith.

Kramer Could it be said, then, that this listening includes hearing not only the explanations of one's own tradition, but also explanations of other traditions?

Bandō Yes. Shinran defines listening as one's hearing the whole story of Amida and having no

doubt. So, listening! I was wondering about the range of meaning. If we can listen, that is already an expression of faith. Like Dōgen said, a person who is sitting in meditation is not a real man, but a Buddha. That is the posture of sitting. It is Buddha. Likewise, when I recite Nembutsu, Buddha is doing this work. There are moments when we can say this. Not always, but in moments.

I recalled Professor Keiji Nishitani's understanding of Shinjin as the true instant when "the past which is further back in the past than any point in the past — that is, the past before any past whatsoever — becomes simultaneous with the present and is transformed into the present."[15] I also recalled a similar practice in Haisidic Judaism of chanting the "Shema," and then drawing out the "d" of the last ekad — in order to draw the past-past (the emanation of Eternal Light) into the present.

Kramer This leads me to a fundamental question. When you recite the Nembutsu, are you also listening?
Bandō To Amida's calling. Our recitation is responding to Amida's calling.
Kramer So, it is not I who recites Nembutsu.
Bandō Amida recites Nembutsu in me.
Kramer Yes. "It is not I, but Christ in me!"
Bandō Yes. As Ippen once said: "There is no distinction between Buddha and myself!"
Kramer But can one say: "God and Amida are one?"
Bandō At the level of Godhead, yes! After that, there are only distinctions.

I recalled echoes of what Jodo Shu Priest Tesshō Kondō of the Shōrin-in Temple in Kyoto, had said: "Yes, I can understand Christianity as almost the same as Buddhism in its deep groundless ground."[16]

CO-CREATIVE TRANSLATION

Reflecting on these various conversations, I at first wondered if there is any way in which Shin Buddhist and Catholic teachings and practices can be reconciled? But is "reconciled" the correct word? If by reconciled one means "to restore to harmony or communion," or to "overcome differences," then it does not appropriately describe my encounters with Jodo Shin. What is missing from the notion of reconciliation is a sense of confrontation and difference, or as Professor Piryns expressed it: "The direct encounter of religious messages produces a clash and agreement."[17] A better way to express the question with which I was left — one which more accurately reflects my initial concern: "Who is Buddhist and who is Christian when looking through each other's eyes?" — is this: How does Jodo Shin and Catholic Christianity *implicate* each other?

I choose the word "implicate" for two specific reasons. First, it does not suggest that Jodo Shin and Catholicism are complementary, or in some way different versions of the same truth. Each tradition is unique and each, in its own way, claims to be absolutely true, redemptively salvific and universally applicable. For at the heart of Jodo Shin is the formless, colorless Amida, while at the heart of Christianity is an historic person, Jesus, the Christ. No amount of intellectual acumen or verbal gymnastics can reconcile, or harmonize, these unique expressions. But second, while not complementary, each tradition co-inherently contains unique elements of the other which relativizes its autonomy, or as Brother David Steindl-Rast (of the Immaculate Heart Benedictine Hermitage in Big Sur) has suggested, each is "interdimensional."[18]

Etymologically, the word "implication" means "being folded within," and suggests a spatial relation of mutual *interiority*. This more

accurately describes what I discovered to be the case in my personal encounters with practicing members of Jodo Shin, namely that our dialogue was more than an exchange between two different ways of believing, or of practicing beliefs. What became obvious, at least from my side of the dialogue, was a stirring of Jodo's truth *within* me. While aware of the otherness of Jodo's message, by implication I became aware, at the same time, of its withinness. By being a dialogue with Jodo Shin, the touchstones of my own faith were challenged, and even more significantly, directed to inherent references and meanings which, prior to the dialogues, remained unnoticed. The implication of Jodo's "listening," for instance, awakened and renewed my understanding, and practice, of prayer. Not only can the action of contemplative prayer be described as not-me-praying, but in another sense, there is nothing to pray for.

I am left then with one question — How can the way Jodo Shin and Catholic Christianity implicate each other be characterized? In my travels through Japan, I encountered two possible answers — "mutual fulfillment" or "mutual transformation." Mutual fulfillment suggests, to me, a movement or shift in thought which brings one's initial efforts to a conclusion. It implies the conclusion of a process in which a missing dimension is added to one's understanding such that what was hithertofore insufficiently perceived comes to completion (*e.g.*, a fuller self-understanding). Mutual transformation suggests that, by virtue of one's encounter with the other, each person is changed from within. It implies a from-the-center-out reanimation of one's understanding of self and of the other which was, in a way, always, already present.

Pondering these two possibilities. I wonder whether there might be a third way to express this mutuality. Perhaps the term mutuality itself prejudges what takes place in genuine inter-religious dialogue. While fulfillment and/or transformation may occur on *one* side of such dialogues, it does not necessarily occur on the other. Could there, therefore, be another term which accounts for notions of mutuality and individuality on the one hand, and notions of fulfillment and transformation on the other?

For me, the best way to characterize what occurs between Buddhists and Christians is this: a co-creative (or cooperative) translation of one's self-understanding (and of one's understanding of the other) from a self-referential language into a *reciprocal*, or *co-inherent*, language (made possible by the dialogical process). By this I mean to suggest that a double translation occurs: from a dialogue generated by ordinary listening and questioning, to one made possible by discernment listening and interactive questioning; and from a dialogue between two different voices speaking irreconcilably different points of view, to a truly open dialogue in which each reciprocally challenges, accepts and highlights the other's position. This is what *being* a dialogue can mean — it neither presupposes fulfillment or transformation, nor does it disallow them. For me, the greatest opportunity afforded by inter-religious dialogue (in this case with Buddhists) is not to teach others how I think or understand (though I hope this occurs), but as Zen Master Keidō Fukushima of the Tōfukuji-Monastery in Kyoto put it, to come to understand my own *starting point* more clearly, more profoundly.[19]

To conclude, I recall being told by Jeff Shore of Hanazono College in Kyoto what Jodo Shu priest Jikai Fujiyoshi (of Kamakura) once said about his relationship with Shin'ichi Hisamatsu: "I and Hisamatsu walk through the world as in a three-legged race (one leg together, one separate)."[20] Borrowing this image, I would say that a Buddhist and a Catholic, as well, dialogue as if in a three-legged race. What carries them forward are their legs outside the bag (even though they may step in different directions). What keeps them together are their legs inside the bag (especially when they step with a co-creative intention). A

consequence of this proposal is not that one necessarily needs to learn how to speak the language of the other, but instead, to unlearn the practice, no matter how cleverly executed, of unilateral monologue on the one hand, and self-referential dialectic on the other.

NOTES

1. A version of this paper was originally presented at the Fifth Biennial Conference of the International Association of Shin Buddhist Studies whose focus was "The First Decade: Retrospect and Prospect," at the University of California, Berkeley (August, 1991).

2. Shōjun Bandō, in a conversation at the Bandō Temple in Tokyo on June 6, 1991.

3. Ernest Piryns, in a conversation at Sophia University in Tokyo on June 3, 1991. See also "The Church and Interreligious Dialogue: Present and Future," *The Japan Missionary Bulletin* (1978).

4. Martin Buber, *I and Thou*, translated by Ronald Gregor Smith (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938, 1958), especially Part One.

5. Martin Buber, *Between Man and Man*, translated by Ronald Gregor Smith (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1948), Part One.

6. Martin Buber, *The Knowledge of Man*, translated by Maurice Friedman and Ronald Gregor Smith (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 71.

7. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, Second Edition, translated by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald Marshall (New York: Crossroad, 1989), 361.

8. *Ibid.*, 367.

9. *Ibid.*, 370.

10. Hölderlin, quoted by Martin Buber in *A Believing Humanism*, translated by Maurice Friedman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967), 85. These are the concluding lines of the poem "Reconciler, you, never believed," the third version.

11. Erich Fromm, quoted by Shōjun Bandō in a conversation at the Bandō Temple in Tokyo on June 17, 1991.

12. See John Cobb's *Beyond Dialogue: Toward a Mutual Transformation of Buddhism and Christianity* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982).

13. Shinran, "The Gatha of True Faith in the Nembutsu" in *Shinshu Seiten* (Japan: Buddhist Churches of America, 1978), 151-156.

14. Paul Tillich, *The Dynamics of Faith* (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1957), see 16-22.

15. Keiji Nishitani, "The Problem of Time in Shinran," *The Eastern Buddhist*, 11/1 (May, 1978), 20-21.

16. Tessho Kondō, conversation in The Palace Side Hotel in Kyoto on June 13, 1991.

17. Ernest Piryns, *op. cit.*

18. David Steindl-Rast, unpublished talk entitled "Christian Confrontation with Buddhism and Hinduism."

19. Keidō Fukushima, in a conversation at the Tōfukuji-Monastery in Kyoto on June 12, 1991. Jeff Shore, of Hanazono College in Kyoto, was the translator.

20. Jikai Fujiyoshi, as reported to me by Jeff Shore in a conversation at Hanazono College in Kyoto on June 11, 1991.

Problematics of Buddhist Christian Dialogue

by Alfred Bloom, *Institute of Buddhist Studies, Berkeley, California*

In every area of contemporary society dialogue is considered the way to solve all problems of human relations. Without doubt it is necessary to talk out our problems together in order to resolve important issues. No theology or philosophy of universal scope will be complete or truly convincing unless it deals accurately, and empathetically with alternative faiths. Religious thought must keep pace with developments in contemporary thinking and awareness. This is a challenge for all of us in a time when we are faced with innumerable obligations and demands.

Nevertheless, there is a tendency to think that simply by dialoguing, we have solved the problem of interfaith relations within society. Consequently, there is a lot of talk, with little actual resolution of the considerable ignorance and prejudice which exists in our communities. We must be aware of the requirements and the limitations of fruitful dialogue.

It is very important, however, that we be realistic and not engender too great expectations that interfaith dialogue will produce immediate results in society. We need only remember that ecumenical dialogue has proceeded slowly for decades among Protestant denominations and between Catholics and Protestants. The road has been difficult even with a common basis in scriptural and cultural traditions. It is even more difficult when there are cultural, social, linguistic and religious differences.

This qualification by no means lessens the need for dialogue among the religious traditions. Without going into detail, it is important for the various traditions to deal in concert with the problem of the collapse of meaning in American society. Peter Berger has called attention to the issue of modern pluralism and the process of secularization which signal "the weakening of religious institutions and the weakening of religious symbols in human consciousness." There is widespread "uncertainty of identity and uncertainty of meanings" in America and other areas of the world.[1] In the context of uncertainty the ideal dialogue is a common search for truth.

This collapse of meaning has its ramifications in various areas such as strident religious dogmatism, the resort to empty nationalism, virulent racism, and the drug problem, which, complicated though it is, has its roots in the economic and social despair of large hosts of people for whom life and meaning are empty terms.

We must recognize that, despite triumphalism in many quarters, interfaith dialogue has proceeded and progressed since the World Parliament of Religion in 1893. We will soon be celebrating its centennial. While efforts at interfaith activity continued over the decades of this century, it has gradually broadened and deepened in recent years following the second world war and Vatican II. Up to the present the major foci of dialogue have been between Christians and Jews and Buddhists and Christians. It is clear that the political changes following WWII and the demise of western imperialism have made it necessary to deal with other peoples on a more equal basis, including their spiritual traditions.

Buddhist-Christian Dialogue has been inspired by statements of such noted people as Arnold Toynbee that the most significant development of this century is the encounter of Buddhism and Christianity at their deepest levels.[2] The urgency of the matter results from the wide attraction that non-western traditions have had among youth and the broad permeation of western society by the Zen and Tibetan traditions. There probably has never been such a deluge of religious movements since later Hellenistic times. Professor Tillich just

entered this arena at the latter end of his career, following a tour of Japan. Despite his short exposure, Dr. Tillich caught major issues that are basic to Buddhist-Christian dialogue. He states:

> The discussions with Buddhist have shown me that the main points of difference are always: The different valuation of the individual person, of religious and social reformation, of the meaning of history, of interpersonal relations, of finitude and guilt. It is the contrast between the principle of identity and the principle of participation. It seems to me that, although the principles are exclusive, the actual life of both Christianity, especially in its Protestant form, and Buddhism especially in its monastic form, could receive elements from each other without losing their basic character.

While Dr. Tillich had insight and openness, it may appear that he was a bit optimistic in dealing with the complexity of such interaction.

While not wishing to be pessimistic concerning the nature and future of dialogue, we must be realistic as to what we can expect from such interaction. I speak from my own background in Christianity, as well as my experience and involvement with one segment of the Buddhist tradition.

There are a variety of problems confronting Buddhist-Christian dialogue which should be given serious consideration.

1. The people who participate in such dialogues are in many ways an elite group, usually representing the more liberal segment of their respective traditions. This means that the results of dialogue are usually confined to a coterie of scholars, publishing in journals largely concerned with scholarly research. While we may expect that such reflection will eventually reach the people and contribute to the transformation of society and the religious community to a broader perspective, it presently does not seem to be happening.

2. The majority religious environment appears to be reactionary and fundamentalist. The attack on the First Amendment, flag issues, calls for a "Christian Nation", abortion issues, the political use of religion, etc., bespeak an environment virtually opposed to dialogue. Major liberal-oriented denominations have suffered considerable losses in membership over the last few years.

3. Buddhists who are primarily Asian in background are experiencing a rising tide of racism and bigotry. Their religions are viewed as curiosities and sometimes regarded as un-American. The ideal of American society is assimilation. Those who do not assimilate are regarded as suspect.

4. On the background of Asian problems in American society, dialogue is viewed by many as covert efforts at proselytism. With the stress on evangelism that permeates society and the perception of Christian exclusivism, Buddhists generally are reticent about entering into reciprocal relations with Christians. Even the relationship of the IBS with GTU has been questioned by some members who have their own memories of discrimination in our society.

5. There is a clear culture gap between virtually all Asian communities, particularly more recent arrivals, and the larger society. With group cohesion a major value in the native environment, it becomes more so in the foreign situation they have entered. The Chinese and Japanese have done this earlier, and now the South Asians must do the same in order to establish themselves firmly in the new environment.

However, maintaining group cohesion is complex when members of the group attain higher levels of education and achievement in society. It is often the case that the religious leadership cannot speak English or adequately understand the western culture enough to deal with the complex issues of an intercultural and interreligious nature. In addition, lay people in these traditions are not

generally well informed on the details of their belief system, since the tradition has largely been communal. Doctrinal understanding beyond the beliefs needed to satisfy their spiritual needs has not been required. The religious elite have always cared for such matters but now have difficulty communicating with the more highly educated or younger generations.

6. It is frequently pointed out that Christians are more interested in dialogue than Buddhists. Winston King in the preface to a discussion between Professors Abe, Cobb and Long, summarizes the situation of Buddhist-Christian dialogue in 1981. He indicates that the dialogue has largely been a monologue, with Christians questioning Buddhists; there is considerable Buddhist complacency and disinterest in Christianity. He traced this complacency in part to the attitude of the superiority of Voidness over God as a representation of ultimate reality. There is thus a two level discussion where Christians are concerned and Buddhists only superficially interested.[3] King followed up the short preface with an essay "Dialogue Reconsidered," recounting some of his own experiences, and reviewing a variety of possible avenues of dialogue. He concludes the essay:

> ....To repeat myself: Buddhists on the whole seem largely uninterested in Christian doctrine and experience. I lament this, not for sectarian reasons, but because of the impoverishment of encounter and experience which will inevitably result if all the spiritual traffic is merely one way.[4]

It may be helpful to recall briefly at least the historical context of Buddhist Christian relations in Japan preceding the current efforts at dialogue. The confrontation of Buddhism and Christianity in the Meiji period (1868-1912) placed Buddhism at a great disadvantage due to nationalist reactions among Japanese who considered Buddhism as foreign and attacks from Christians that it was heathen. Buddhism became defensive and more nationalistic, attempting to prove its Japaneseness and contribution to Japanese culture. Critical Buddhist scholarship which also emerged in this age undermined traditional modes of Buddhist beliefs, as well.

Serious discussion concerning Christianity and Buddhism could only take place in the atmosphere of freedom and equality in the postwar period. It has been growing in momentum and interest in Japan. Nevertheless, degrees of complacency arise from the contemporary success of Japan in the international scene and a rising national sentiment concerning the validity and value of Japanese culture, including Buddhism. Even Shintō religion shows more strength and is evidenced in the establishment of a new Shintō shrine in Stockton, California. There is more self-confidence with respect to traditional modes of thought.

There is , however, no question but that these comments by Professor King are in some measure still true. Part of the problem is due to the circumstances outlined above, but also due to the nature of Buddhist teaching itself. Buddhist teaching, like Hinduism, has generally been more relativistic in its outlook. There are specific theories such as *upaya* (tactful device) which holds that people more or less find themselves on the spiritual level that their karmic or cultural and social heritage place them. It is also pointed out in Buddhist symbolism that there are 84,000 dharma, suggesting that there is teaching to suit everyone. Buddhism incorporates other faiths as manifestations of the total embracing reality, be it the Eternal Śakyamuni of the *Lotus Sutra*, the Great Sun Buddha of the Esoteric tradition, or Amida Buddha as interpreted by Shinran. We can see it most readily in the principle that the three teachings are one in Chinese thought (Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism) and the theory of *Honjisuijaku* (Original Ground and Trace or Manifestation) in Japanese tradition in which the Shintō deities were

viewed as expressions of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. Consequently, on the relative level there is no issue of right or wrong in some absolute fashion. Rather, such manifestations are correlated to time, place, spiritual level and need of the people involved, as we have noted above. Buddhism, therefore, has not been as disposed to position or explain itself in relation to other faiths in its historical context. Buddhism easily assumed its superiority to Confucianism and Taoism which were seen as thisworldly faiths, while Buddhism treated both worlds, this and the next.

In this regard, it should be noted, that in a sense, Buddhism is final since the ultimate truth one arrives at would be the truth of Voidness or Nirvana or realizing Buddha-nature. The reason is that these verbal symbols are essentially indefinable because they point to reality which lies beyond the realm of language and intellectual analysis as the ultimate goal of all spiritual experience from whatever sources.

Buddhism, particularly the Mahayana, holds to theories of two levels and three levels of truth. Therefore, on conventional levels disputes over terminologies are useless. In the estimation of this writer, the fundamental issue between Buddhism and other religions, particularly Christianity, lies in the realm of epistemology and the nature of consciousness, rather than in specific doctrinal comparisons.

Further, Buddhism, according to my perspective, cannot be discussed in the same fashion as one might discuss theology in the West. As perhaps an example, in Christianity one might discuss the existence of God. However, it is unthinkable to discuss the existence of Amida Buddha. Although scholars discuss at great length the meaning and significance of the principle of Anatman (non-soul of the Theravada tradition) or voidness (which underlies all of Mahayana Buddhist philosophy), for Buddhists it is not a question of the constitution of the Universe or a metaphysical reality. The concepts serve to underscore the inconceivability and inexpressibility of whatever reality may be. Such concepts are designed not to make statements about reality but to focus one's attitudes and efforts to become free from the spiritual bondages that create our sufferings in this world. They have a functional role to play, in Buddhist terms as *upaya* (tactful devices) to guide a person along the path of spiritual evolution and ultimate enlightenment which itself is left undefined. However, its ideal expression on the level of behavior and attitude is that of non-attachment and egolessness. If these qualities could be achieved perfectly, one would have reached Nirvāṇa, a condition beyond expression but characterised as ultimate liberation.

When we consider Amida Buddha, which represents one of the highest ideals of spiritual realization and motivation, the intention of the symbolic expression, not taken as literal existence, aims to highlight the fact that our own salvation lies in the recognition of our interdependence we have with all other beings and within Nature itself. Amida is a mythic expression of the principle of interdependence. Other Power is not an "objective reality" except as it is Power through Others realized in the context of everyday life. As a devotional ideal and figure, it inspires inner awareness and deeper understanding of our interdependent reality.

Of course, some people in the tradition who have limited educational background and spiritual development will inevitably take such symbols literally. Buddhism understands this problem and accepts that there are various levels of insight through which Buddhist compassion and wisdom may be expressed so that hope for ultimate fulfillment can be available to all beings and not merely to an elect.

Buddhist educational philosophy involves a process of growth in insight and a deepening awareness of the central issues of human existence. Egoistic concerns for personal survival are affirmed at one level but are overcome as one

progresses on the path. In Mahayana teaching the ultimate goal of all religious endeavor is eventually to realize that I cannot be saved or liberated unless all others are liberated with me. When all beings become Buddha, final emancipation will be attained. In essence the only reality we can speak about is the depth of compassion and wisdom we experience in our lives and which we share with others in the spirit of interdependence.

7. Another aspect that makes dialogue difficult is the variety of forms of Buddhism, as well as the varieties of Christianity. Dialogue has generally been with Theravada and Zen Buddhists up till now with some entry of Shinshu Buddhism becoming more prominent. There has been some with Tibetan teachers, but none with the Nichiren, which is a very important Japanese form of Buddhism.

This variety makes it difficult to talk about Buddhism as a whole except with respect to some basic philosophical concepts and religious principles. However, these do not yield an understanding of specific traditions as they have taken shape or are active in the world.

There is a question how much a participant in dialogue should know about a tradition other than his/her own in order to get at real issues for that tradition. Buddhism is more complex here because there is no well defined body of literature that is regarded by all Buddhists to be authoritative for their religious lives. The Nichiren school will emphasize the *Lotus Sutra*; the Zen puts texts in a secondary position no matter what they are, and the Pure Land hold only to the Pure Land sutras. The Theravada have a body of literature such as the Pali texts which are authoritative, but only regarded by Mahayanists generally as an elementary expression of Buddhism according to their view of Buddhist history.

Donald Swearer has pointed out the variety of elements in a religious system such as texts, myths, symbols, rituals and religious actors. Religions express the "genius of a particular culture." He states: "To understand a religion, even our own, calls for analytical skills, dramatic and poetic imagination, and perceptive awareness. More importantly, it necessitates that we understand any particular religious expression within its broader contexts in order to avoid risks of reductionism and blatant distortion; furthermore it provokes intellectual humility about the possibility of arriving at an exhaustive understanding of a religion."[5]

8. We should be clear what it means to understand another religion. As Swearer suggests, we should recognize that we can never fully understand another faith, just as we do not always understand people from our same tradition. We do not always understand ourselves interiorally. The term understanding is used loosely, but is really a more complex issue.

There can be no dialogue or comparison of religions that does not take into account the intentionality, interiority, integrality and interactive character of a faith. Every major religious faith seeks some form of liberation, emancipation, freedom, or resolution of the human problem, however defined. They all work in some way to neutralize, if not abolish, the limitations of finite existence. No faith intends to foster indifference, passivity or ignorance in the face of the evils threatening life. Salvation is always a response to an "evil" condition.

The *Intentionality* of a faith indicates what its supreme goal is and the values and methods which will lead to that goal. It is, in a way, its self-understanding. For Theravada Buddhism it is termed Nirvana, not a negative goal, despite the use of a negative word form. In Mahayana tradition it is called attaining Buddhahood, emphasizing the soteriological elements of wisdom and compassion by which the Buddha saves all beings. It suggests becoming part of the salvific process and is altruistic.

The *Interiority* of a faith presents a

paradox for comparison since the observer must always be outside. This is not to prevent comparison and questioning, but to recognize that we frequently deal with caricatures of the faith we are comparing. From the outside Karma and Predestination may appear to have invidious religious and social consequences. However, as they are appropriated in interior faith, they qualify human attitudes and understanding. Karma, as an interior realization, allows me to understand my limits and keeps my expectations realistic. Predestination makes me aware that what I may be able to achieve has a basis in a wider spiritual realm. Neither teaching, in offering a context for human action, was meant to negate freedom or to encourage passivity socially, though we must recognize that political forces have so used them. They are meant in their deepest meaning to provide a background or basis for spiritual freedom.

Integrality alerts us to the danger of merely seeing one doctrine in terms of another in the comparison of systems. There is a tendency to use the teaching of a faith as a foil to highlight the uniqueness or adequacy of one's own faith. Systems are a totality, and they guide attitudes and behavior as a whole. There is frequently a contrast between the problems raised by partial comparisons and what can sometimes be observed in the religious lives of people immersed in the totality of their faith.

I would call attention here to a review of Harvey Cox's text *Many Mansions* in which the particularity of religious faith is highlighted, since it is the particularity of a faith that gives it its meaning for the believer. Dialogue must provide a forum to discuss differences openly and not merely seek for a bland commonality.[6]

The *Interactive* aspect of a faith highlights the historical character of religion or a social-personal level. We must take seriously the historical diversity in a faith and the personal diversities among its interpreters. In the comparison of religions and dialogue the issue becomes what model of religion will we compare? Whose interpretation shall we employ from among the historical diversity of a tradition? Is it enough to say that the Four Noble Truths and the Eightfold Noble Path, Twelve Link Chain or Voidness speak for Buddhism in view of the proliferation of additional teachings and practices over the ages?

If we look at the case of Buddhism, we have a 2,500 year old tradition that has spanned several cultures, Southeast Asia, South Asia, China, Tibet, Korea, Mongolia, Japan and now the West. During this long period distinctive forms of Buddhism with varying emphases have developed, many of them now converging in the West. While there are unifying strands of thought and practice that indicate that one is dealing with Buddhism, it is the significant variations and applications of those unifying features which must also be considered and understood.

The question, however, for Buddhists is whether one may be inspired on any level to seek more deeply and ultimately come to the truth. Naturally, dialogue would be a function to aid this growth, and in the tradition there are texts written in the form of dialogue as question and answer, for example, the *Questions of King Milinda* and various collections of Zen *mondo*.

There is no question about the significance and importance of dialogue between religious faiths. In this essay we have discussed the historical, social and philosophical issues and problems involved in Buddhist-Christian dialogue and the reasons that Buddhists have sometimes appeared reluctant to engage in such efforts.

Confronting these issues in a positive manner will contribute to the effectiveness of dialogue for religious understandingand for developing a broad common front to meet the challenges to faith in contemporary society. We have, therefore, suggested the requirements for productive dialogue.

While these reflections are by no means exhaustive, we hope that they will encourage

meaningful dialogue by stimulating all of us to deeper study of the issues and sensitize us to the conditions which establish fruitful dialogue.

1. Peter Berger, "The Pluralist Situation," *Buddhist Christian Studies*, vol. 1 (1981), pp. 32-3.

2. Joseph J. Spae, *Pro Mundi Vita Bulletin*, no. 67 (July-August, 1977), p. 16.

3. Winston King, ed., preface to "Buddhist-Christian Dialogue: Past, Present and Future," *Buddhist-Christian Studies*, vol. 1 (1981), p. 12.

4. Winston King, "Dialogue Reconsidered," *Buddhist Christian Studies*, vol. 2 (1982), p. 11.

5. Donald Swearer, "A Framework for Buddhist-Christian Dialogue," *Buddhist Christian Studies*, vol. 1 (1981), p. 9.

6. P. Pratap Kumar, review of Harvey Cox, *Many Mansions: A Christian's Encounter with other Faiths, in Bulletin of the Center for the Study of World Religions*, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 67-74.

Knowledge and Liberation: Tibetan Buddhist Epistemology in Support of Transformative Religious Experience, by Anne Klein. Ithaca: Snow Lion, 1986; 283 pp.; paper: $15.95.

Knowing, Naming and Negation: A Sourcebook on Tibetan Sautrāntika, by Anne Carolyn Klein. Ithaca: Snow Lion, 1991; 266 pp.+ unnumbered pages containing Tibetan texts; paper: $19.95.

These two volumes by Anne Klein provide us with what is arguably the broadest and most detailed Western scholarly treatment of the nature and functioning of direct perception and conceptual thought in Tibetan Buddhist scholasticism. Basing her discussion primarily on the scholastic literature of the dGe lugs pa school of Tibetan Buddhism, she presents us with this school's perspective on the Sautrāntika school of Indian Buddhism, the ostensible source of dGe lugs pa speculation concerning valid cognition.

Her first volume, *Knowledge and Liberation*, is a critical, expository work that discusses the major philosophical issues having to do with the two chief ways of knowing things: direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) and conceptual thought (*kalpanā*). For the Sautrāntikas, it was direct perception, and specifically direct *sense* perception, that was considered the epitome of valid knowledge. At the same time, Buddhist scholastics were committed to language and reasoning in a way that made it necessary to also justify the communicative ability of language and the epistemic validity of conceptual thought (and more specifically of inference, or *anumāna*). Hence, one of the main philosophical problems for the Sautrāntikas and for those who would follow their epistemological theory was to set both direct perception and conceptual thought on firm epistemological footing in such a way that neither threatened the validity of the other. Given the Sautrāntikas' emphasis on sense perception, this meant that it was especially the validity of conceptual thought that needed to be validated. Of course, it is precisely because many of these issues were not fully developed in the Indian sources that it became an important object of scholarly attention in Tibet.

In her first book Klein sets forth in lucid fashion the theoretical superstructure that allows the dGe lugs pas to distinguish between sense perception and conceptual thought, while maintaining the epistemic validity of each. Through discussions of Tibetan exegesis on the Sautrāntika notion of "two truths," of the different types of objects and their different functions in perception and thought, and of the process of negation and its role in the functioning of language, she presents us with an accurate and detailed picture of the kind of philosophical underpinnings that allows the dGe lugs pas to create what they consider to be a consistent and plausible epistemology—one that sacrifices neither direct perception nor conceptual thought.

Klein's second book, *Knowing, Naming and Negation*, is principally a collection of trans-

lations of Tibetan texts that deal with the kinds of issues that were the focus of the first volume. Her introduction to this second volume is clear and provides the reader with a brief and lucid synopsis of the major issues in the texts that follow. Each of the three translations that follow the introduction is preceded by a preface that gives a brief biography of the author of the text and further treats major issues. Of the three texts themselves, the first, bsTan dar lha ram pa's *Presentation of Specifically and Generally Characterized Phenomena*, is a thematic work that deals with a specific topic; the second, a selection (on "Positive and Negative Phenomena") from Ngag dbang bkra shis' *Collected Topics* text, belongs to the "Introductory Debate Manual" (*bsdus grva*) genre; and the last, lCang skya's "Sautrāntika" chapter from his *Presentation of Tenets*, belongs to the doxography (*grub mtha'*) genre of Tibetan philosophical literature. While accurate, all of the translations are also readable, a major accomplishment given the complexity of these works.

In what remains of this review, I would like to focus on Klein's discussion of the significance of the Sautrāntika for the dGe lugs pa understanding of the Madhyamaka (*Knowing*, pp. 28-29), a topic which I find especially interesting. There she speaks of three points as being central to understanding the significance of the Sautrāntikas: (1) that their realist position—their claim that all particulars substantially or inherently exist—serves as a foil for the Prāsaṅgika school by providing the latter with an object of critique, (2) that their epistemology forms the basis for the dGe lugs pa formulation of a Madhyamaka theory of knowledge, and (3) that their treatment of negation serves as groundwork for the dGe lugs pa interpretation of the Prāsaṅgika theory of emptiness as non-affirming negation. The first two of these points in particular deserve further discussion.

It is true that the Sautrāntika position regarding the inherent (or perhaps more accurately, the self-characteristic) existence of particular entities is anathema to the Prāsaṅgikas, at least to the dGe lugs pa formulation thereof. This, however, does not make this Sautrāntika position coextensive with the object to be refuted (*dgag bya*) in the Prāsaṅgika critique, for the Prāsaṅgikas end up refuting the Sautrāntika position *and much more*. Klein is well aware of this, and is cautious to add that the Sautrāntika position is only one "aspect of the conception of self which the Prāsaṅgika theory seeks to undermine," (p. 28) but perhaps it would have been interesting to say *exactly how* the Sautrāntika position fails to be coextensive with the Prāsaṅgika object of refutation, given that she is broaching the subject anyway. She seems to begin to do this (p. 29) when she brings up the issue of the so called "innate conception of inherent existence" (*bden 'dzin lhan skyes*), but this is never fully developed, and the relevance of this latter concept to the issue of how the Sautrāntika position fails to be coextensive with the Prāsaṅgika object of refutation is left unresolved.

Klein's second point is of course also true. The dGe lugs pas' own notion that theirs was a system of "Madhyamaka and Pramāṇa like two lions back to back" (*dbu tshad seng ge rgyab sprod*) is proof enough of this. Again, however, it would have been interesting in this setting to have at least mentioned the fact that the dGe lugs pas, as self-identified Prāsaṅgikas, also consider a great deal of Sautrāntika epistemological theory objectionable. For example, the notion that the sense perception of ordinary beings is non-erroneous (*ma 'khrul pa*), a Sautrāntika claim, is anathema to the dGe lugs pas when they are wearing their Prāsaṅgika hats. Granted, the dGe lugs pas did incorporate a great deal of Sautrāntika epistemology into their systematization of Prāsaṅgika philosophy, but not without substantial modification.

Finally, as regards the significance of the Sautrāntika to the general (and not specifically Madhyamaka) synthesis of the dGe lugs pas,

another point comes to mind. In Tsong kha pa's description of what I have elsewhere called the "linguistic formulation" of the Yogācāra doctrine of emptiness the Sautrāntika theory of the workings of perception and conceptual thought plays an important part. In that context, the Sautrāntika becomes a foil for distinguishing the uniqueness of the Yogācāra position. How this is so is beyond the scope of this review (the interested reader might consult my translation, *A Dose of Emptiness*, State University of New York Press, 1992). That it is so, it seems to me, represents a significance of the Sautrāntika to the dGe lugs pa synthesis that is at least as important as any of those mentioned by Klein, though in this case to the dGe lugs pa view of the Yogācāra rather than to their view of the Madhyamaka.

However, these already minor points, more omissions than anything else, become even more insignificant when viewed in the context of this tremendously complete and exhaustive two volume work. Klein's work represents, it seems to me, the final word on this very important topic in Tibetan scholastic philosophy.

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Zen Dawn: Early Zen Texts from Tun Huang, translated by J. C. Cleary. Boston and London: Shambhala, 1991. 135 pp.; paper: $11.

Crazy Clouds: Zen Radicals, Rebels & Reformers by Perle Besserman and Manfred Steger. Boston and London: Shambhala, 1991. 200 pp.; paper: $13.

These two recent books, in popular editions from Shambhala, offer useful contributions to the ongoing assessment of the Zen tradition. Both offer strong polemical viewpoints which evidence a passionate concern for the transmission of Zen to the West; both are very readable and enjoyable.

The last decade or so has seen a rise in the importance within the Buddhist dialog of the socio-historical point of view. The taking of texts at face value as "timeless scriptures," has fallen to a great extent into disrepute; instead authors, particularly scholars, want to build up a social or political context for the texts, using this context as lens through which to examine the text, often reading between the lines with, it would in many cases appear, a great deal of irony, even suspicion. Doctrines tend to be sharply defined, discriminated against other doctrines, and placed within the framework of historical debates, and contests for religious power. Powerful spiritual teachers do not offer eternal truths about things as they are; instead they are seen as religious-political figures, doing and saying what is necessary to uphold their own lineages and traditions against contending forces.

J. C. Cleary, in his introduction to *Zen Dawn*, argues strenuously against this approach. "Filtered through such limiting preconceptions," he writes, "which elevate the mere common sense of today's world to a universal, objective standpoint, the vision of the intent and manner of operation of the Buddhist teaching preserved in the primary sources completely escapes from view (p 5)." He argues that the "core of enlightened teachers is the key to the real vitality of the religion," and that these teachers and their words over the generations have offered correctives and analyses of the distorting influences on the teachings which worldly ambition and confusion have inevitably produced. However, too great an emphasis on these distortions misses the point (p 8).

Moreover, Cleary argues persuasively that the very structure and intent of the Zen teachings militates against any attempt to mine them for doctrinal tenets which can be pitted against contrary doctrinal tenets in worldly contests for spiritual and intellectual power:

> We find that when Buddhist teachers built up conceptual structures marking out the path for students, they did not always aim for static structures, but rather aimed for subtly moving semantic devices designed to interact with and modify the students' conceptual and motivational patterns. This is especially apparent in Zen . . . it is impossible to give a brief summary in terms of a few "philosophical positions" expressed in short phrases: the real semantics are not that simple. (p. 7)

Zen Dawn, subtitled "Early Zen Texts from Tun Huang," consists of translations of three short texts of the so-called Nortern School of Ch'an found in the Tun Huang caves in the Twentieth Century (a popular edition, this volume offers absolutely no scholarly discussion of the texts and their specific provenances). Dating from the "first half of the eighth century," (p. 3) they are considerably earlier than the literature of the developed Ch'an schools, so we would expect to find much in them that will shed light on the

development of the school. Titles of the texts are given as (and again Cleary provides no indication of the titles in the original Chinese) "Records of the Teachers and Students of the Lanka," "Bodhidharma's Treatise on Contemplating Mind," and "Treatise on the Sudden Enlightenment School of the Great Vehicle, Which Opens Up Mind And Reveals Buddha-Nature." I want to bring out some key points in the first two texts, which seem to me to be most important.

Not surprisingly, given the scholarship of the last several decades, which has revised almost entirely the impression given by the first wave of transmission of Zen materials to the West, that Ch'an was somehow a radical departure from earlier Buddhism, and that it advocated a hard-and-fast "sudden" approach to enlightenment, these texts show very clearly early Ch'an's faithfulness to the Buddhist canon. Although the school is called initially the "school of the Lanka," many other sūtras are quoted, making it quite clear that from the first the school is grounded firmly in the Mahayana. Furthermore, the dualistic or gradualist approach that one might expect to hear in the Northern School is nowhere in evidence here. These texts seem entirely consistent with the approach and viewpoint of later works (though stylistically they are more discursive, antedating the later terse dialogic/narrative mode).

"Records of the Teachers and Students of the Lanka" is an early version of the later "Transmission of the Lamp" literature. Short biographies and teaching synopses of the teachers in the early Ch'an lineage, the text provides some interesting new information. It lists Gunabhadra, translator of the Lankavatara Sūtra into Chinese, as the first Patriarch of the school (this in contrast to Prajñātāra, a shadowy Indian figure, who is Bodhidharma's teacher in post-Sixth Ancestor Zen lineage charts), and gives, extensive teachings by this master, among them a very interesting re-casting of the six *pāramitās* in terms of meditation practice. Bodhidharma is listed as the Second Ancestor of the school, and his biography includes, for the first time, mention of a second disciple, Daoyu, who studied alongside Huike, the disciple considered in other texts as the sole heir. The most extensive of the biographies is that of Daoxin, the Fourth Ancestor, about whom little has been known previously. The teachings given by him in this text are quite useful in their own right. In true Ch'an fashion Daoxin sweeps all Buddhist practices aside, reducing them all to "just let it roll along; don't make it go; don't make it stay" (p. 52). The teachings as given here could as easily have been uttered by later, more well known figures of the developed Ch'an periods. In this genealogy, of course, Hui Neng does not appear as the sole Sixth Ancestor. Instead, the lineage breaks into three branches, none of which begins with Hui Neng, and one of which is headed by Shenxiu, who appears as an unrealized, even confused, figure in the polemical and influential Sixth Ancestor Sūtra. Here Shenxiu's teaching is as penetrating and lively as that of any of the teachers in the lineage; his biography concludes with a page of sayings that read like a series of koans, ("Can you pass straight through a wall or not?" "Does this mind have a mind or not? What mind is this mind?" p. 76.) The text concludes with brief mention of teachers in the next generations, listing eight generations in all from Gunabhadra, twenty-four ancestors.

"Bodhidharma's Treatise on Contemplating Mind" is written in the form of a dialog between the Master and Huike. Again, the one practice of "contemplating mind" is given as the sole source and only necessity. The text opens with Huike's question: "If there are people intent on seeking the Path of Enlightenment, what method should they practice, what method is most essential and concise? Bodhidharma answered: Let them just contemplate mind—this one method takes in all practices, and is indeed essential and concise" (p. 81). The remainder of the text proceeds to reinterpret all other practices in the light

of this one practice; such a reinterpretation echoes the basic thrust of the later Sixth Ancestor Sūtra. This approach is, as far as this author is concerned, identical to the approach of teachers throughout the lineage, down to Dōgen (whose famous "taking the backward step to turn the light inward to illuminate the self," given in the "Fukanzazengi," is the essence of Sōtō *shikantaza*, practice, and is identical to "just contemplate mind") and beyond.

Crazy Clouds, subtitled "Zen Radicals, Rebels & Reformers," is a very different type of book. Written by Perle Besserman and Manfred Steger, who have been active in the contemporary American Zen movement, *Crazy Clouds* subordinates a circumspect in-depth look at its materials to an instrumental bolstering of a point of view. Believing that "it is impossible to maintain the Asian authority of a Zen teacher in an egalitarian society (p. 179)," and that feminism, a democratic tradition, a Judeo-Christian heritage of social action, and the influence of householder practice will create the necessity for fundamental changes, in Zen as it is transmitted to the West (The United States in particular), the authors present eight brief biographies of Zen adepts, from the T'ang dynasty to the present, who exemplify the iconoclastic, anti-authoritarian side of Zen. Their thesis is that the rough-and ready anti-establishment approach of these figures represents the true spirit of Zen, the spirit that will inevitably win the day in the West as the fossilized forms of the Asian tradition are burned away by circumstances.

While I am in sympathy with this viewpoint, and feel that most people involved in the American Zen movment would to a great extent agree, I find the simplicity and ease of the argument here a bit too patent. The transmission of a tradition across centuries and cultures is obviously a complex event, and one can never be sure how much one is objectifying one's own viewpoint in the process. It is important to maintain an open view, to take into account contemporary cultural biases without assuming that the tradition will necessarily entirely bend itself to these biases; perhaps something of the opposite will also occur.

The eight biographies in *Crazy Cloud* include important figures about whom whole books have been written in recent years. The last five or six years have seen studies of Zen masters Bankei, Ikkyu, and Bassui, accounts of whose lives are included here; before that we have seen studies and translations of teachings by Rinzai, Layman P'ang, and Hakuin, also included here. Several recent volumes have included a great deal of material on the contemporary teachers Nyogen Senzaki and Nakagawa Soen, the last of the eight figures included in this work. So the book adds nothing new to our store of information, although it does do the valuable service of collecting in one place, for a reader relativly new to Zen studies, interesting and readable information on important teachers.

I am critical of the authors' unstated assumption in these life accounts that conventional representatives of the tradition are always, somehow, missing the point, while the anti-establishmentarian heroes are always carriers of the true teaching of Shakyamuni. Again, while my own bias is in exactly this direction, I think the matter is more complicated than this. While railings against off-beat teachers and their off-beat approaches are often cries of annoyance from the dry throats of the small-minded, they can sometimes be useful and accurate clarion calls for balance and sanity. Not all "crazy cloud" teachers are positive influences; the Zen tradition has many examples of teachers who have mistaken the supposed sovereignty of their individuality for the Dharma itself. The passion of the authors' viewpoint, it seems to me, prevents them from striking a balance in this regard.

On the other hand, this is a worthwhile book. Though, as I've said, the biographies are shorter versions of stories that have been told at greater length elsewhere, they do in many cases add an important element that may not be present elsewhere: a key aspect of each of them is a brief

socio-political synopsis of the context in which each of the teachers taught and lived. These synopses are highly informative, written with verve and accuracy, and evidence, at least to this amateur reader's eye, a thorough knowledge of the history and politics of their respective periods. Taken together, these brief contextual accounts amount to a meditation on the Zen tradition as it has been embedded in Far Eastern culture over several centuries, and this meditation, unlike those that Cleary argues against, does, it seems to me, do justice to the teachings of the protagonists involved. Furthermore, the authors write about each of the figures with the loving and knowing eye of the Zen insider. In addition, the book as a whole is quite entertainingly written. One reads each chapter with great interest, sorry to say good-bye to each appealing figure as he departs, eager to meet the next one as he appears.

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The Art of Happiness: Teachings of Buddhist Psychology by Mirko Frýba. Translated by Michael H. Kohn. Foreward by Claudio Naranjo. Boston, Massachusetts: Shambhala Publications, Inc., 1989. xvi + 301 pp. Paper: $15.95.

In *The Art of Happiness* clinical psychologist and former Buddhist monk Mirko Frýba maps the territory of Buddhist meditation (an activity he calls "Dharma strategies") with the optimistic expectation that his faithful readers will follow him into the territory these maps describe.

Toward this end, there are some thirty mediation exercises in this self-help book and more than a dozen diagrams aimed at increasing one's happiness and effectiveness in everyday life. Frýba leads his "dear reader," as he often refers to her or him, step by step, through the intricacies of early Buddhist psychology (*abhidhamma*), often drawing on Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhimagga* (English trans., *The Path of Purification*, Shambala, 1976). He begins with strategies of knowledge (*paññā*), moves on to the foundational bodily anchoring in reality (*yathā-bhutā*), then to strategies of sympathy (*mettā*, kindness; *karunā*, compassion; *muditā*, sympathetic joy; *upekkhā*, equanimity) and ecstasy (*ek-stasis*, the state of having stepped out of oneself), and concludes with "strategies of power"by which the conditioned arising (*paticca-samuppāda*)of suffering (*dukkha*) can be transmuted through wise apprehension (*yoniso manasikāra*) into what the author calls "the conditioned arising of freedom" (274 ff.). His choice of exercises and strategies from among the vast storehouse of *abhidhamma* wisdom, Frýba often stresses, is based on those most likely to be of immediate help in one's everyday life. With this end in view, the reader might want to look at Chapter 4 ("Intelligence of the Body and Joy"), which includes basic exercises in mindfulness of body, before taking on the more theoretical Chapter 3 ("Threefold Knowledge and the Economy of the Mind"), largely concerned with explicating the conditioned arising of suffering.

But in whatever order one proceeds, it's a long trip (the book is more than 300 pages), and one with several byways and diversions. These include a chapter on "New Age Politics," examples of some of the author's clinical cases, and periodic attempts to relate the views of modern psychologists and social scientists—amount them Carl Rogers, Gregory Bateson, Erich Fromm, J.L. Moreno, Freud and Pavlov—to various aspects of the *abhidahamma*. This latter aspect of the book, while often insightful, will doubtless be of more interest to Frýba's social scientific colleagues than to the reader in search of a practical "guide to being happy" (the original title of the book, which first appeared in 1987, was *Anleitung zum Glücklichsein*).

It should be noted, however, that while Frýba shows the points of contact between selected modern psychotherapies and the *abhidhamma*, it is clearly his view that the latter supersedes the former. Strategies of ecstasy, for him, in the final analysis, require setting new "visionary goals [which] go beyond therapeutic sel-realization of frustrated potential" (228).

The early chapters may be tough going for those among Frýba's readers either little informed about the "New Age" movement or unsympathetic to it. For it is the author's intention to take the "New Age" outlook (for an attempt to comprehend this somewhat amorphous designation, see Ted Peter's *The Cosmic Self*, Harper Collins Publishers, Inc., 1991) and to root it firmly in what he calls the "transcultural paradigm" of the *abhidhamma* (22, 24). In this effort, "paradigm" joins other fashionable New Age terminology and preoccupations: what might be called "the cult of experience" ("Dhamma strategies...are empirical and free from all theory...," 18); ecology (the reader is encouraged to become part of the "cosmic ecosystem," 48); and "holism," in general, and

specifically in the form of the author's choice of the science of cybernetics as the closest, though still inadequate, modern analogue to the wisdom of the *abhidamma* (52). In general, however, though addressing himself to "New Age starategists," the author retains a critical attitude toward the movement as a whole which he views as overly concerned with *theoretical* syntheses of East and West and as too often deficient in practical guidance (25-29). Nevertheless, a self-help book which addresses itself so explicitly to New Age practitioners has perhaps needlessly limited its potential audience.

The book is often enlivened by the author's forays into culture criticism and by his gift for simile, the latter often proving more illuminating than his sometimes dauntingly intricate diagrams. Among examples of the former, one might note the following observations:

> Here we see the arrogant approach of representatives of the old established academic disciplines, which mainly consist in marketing as "objective truths" subjective statements by scientists concerning objective date (26).

> The sexual vices of our civilization are the result of abuse and repression of healthy sensuality, caused by a longing for body-alien ideas and concepts, which are then imposed on the "sex partner" (106).

> This Abhidhammic terminology designates precisely what [the reader's] practice has defined as a process and has experientially worked through. In contrast we have the vague slogans of propaganda, advertising, and other means of manipulation, which purvey gullibility as belief, intoxication as ecstasy, and caprice as power (237).

Among Frýba's helpful similes one may mention his illustration of the way to deal constructively with distractions during meditation by reference to the process by which a reader's attention moves back and forth among less and more interesting newspaper articles (192-93). The way in which a child goes about playing with a toy train serves to illuminate the stages of concentration as well as how a meditator must learn to make transitions between different spheres of experience (200-01). Frýba likens a lapse in mindfulness to the failure vigilantly to guard the gates of a city, enabling potentially harmful new arrivals, *i.e.*, the objects of perception, to make alliances with unwholesome elements within the "city of the mind" (261-62).

Despite its inviting title and New Age trappings, *The Art of Happiness* does not properly belong to the "power of positive thinking" category of self-help books. It is, in essence, an *intermediate* guide to early Buddhist meditational practice which, notwithstanding its congenial, user-friendly tone, presumes a reader seriously devoted to meditation practice and one who is, ideally, under the guidance of an experienced teacher. Consequently, a better place to start might be *The Experience of Insight* by Joseph Glodstein, based on an actual Buddhist retreat and which includes questions and answers. Next one might want to consult *The Heart of Buddhist Meditation* by Frýba's former teacher Nyanaponika Thera (Samuel Weiser, Inc., 1962). This book has the advantage of focusing more narrowly on Buddhist meditational practice than does Frýba and includes, in addition, a translation of the "The Greater Discourse on the Foundations of Mindfulness" (Maha-Satipatthāna-Sutta) and an anthology of Buddhist texts dealing with right mindfulness.

With these or similar basic books as a background, in conjunction with an established meditation practice, one would be in a position to gain valuable insight from Frýba whose advice on meditation increasingly, as the book proceeds, has the authentic sound of someone who has explored the territory of the more subtle regions of the mind

and whose maps, as a consequence, serve as reliable guides to what may be found there. For in spite of its attempt to do a few too many things, *The Art of Happiness* undeniably builds up to a noteworthy climax as Frýba attempts to integrate the visionary "strategies of ecstasy" (Chapter 7) aimed at purifying the mind (*citta-visuddhi*) and heightening consciousness (227), into the fabric of everyday life by means of the "strategies of power" of the concluding chapter.

Narrowly conceived, *The Art of Happiness* is intended as a bridge for "New Age" practitioners from the theoretical works of writers life Ken wilber and Stanislav Grof to the more experientially based and practically useful model of the *abhidhamma* as conceived and presented by Frýba to a modern Western audience. Yet its title is likely to entice unsuspecting readers in pursuit of "happiness." Can someone be taught to be "happy"? This is a doubtful proposition, however many popular psychology books make the bestseller lists. The very search for "happiness" is, arguably, a symptom of unhappiness. And if, on the other hand, one *is* "happy," there is no reason such a book.

Frýba's faithful reader, whom the author, in his optimistic and familiar way, refers to "just as you are now, as the person experienced in Dhamma strategies" (275), will in fact discover near the end of the book that "happiness" as such cannot be taught! Happiness is rather a by-product of a successful medatation practice (282-84). The cat is, so to speak, finally let out of the bag. But any reader who has come so far, diligently experimenting with Frýba's exercises along the way, will have come to understand that "happiness" of the kind meant by the author is not obtained through five-minute exercises in self-affirmation nor is it sought for its own sake. It is rather one result of a peculiarly integrative and pervasive kind of "knowledge" (*paññā*) which combines with "confidence," willpower, concentration, and mindfulness" (44) and which by no means excludes ethical living (*sīla*) (152-56).

The extraordinary nature of the demands being made upon the reader becomes abundantly clear in the final chapter in which Frýba leads her or him through the four "magical" (*iddhi*) roads to power (*chanda*, intention; *viriya*, will power; *citta*, consciousness; *vimamsa*, investigation). The reader then encounters several realms of *satipatthāna-vipassanā* (mindfulness meditation) exercises—including the contemplation of impermanence (*anicca*), the analytical subtleties of distinguishing directly experienced bodily events (*rūpa*) from mental apprehension of them (*nāma*), the process of turning away (*nibbidā*) from suffering, among others—and culminating in the experiences of emptiness (*suññatā*) and freedom (*āsava-khaya*, literally, "dwindling way of influences"). These are indeed subtle and rarefied regions of the mind, not to be confused with popular psychological remedies for personal unhappiness. Few will enter the territory described here, and any practitioner who has come so far will not have done so in pursuit of the bromide of "happiness," nor will such a person, at such a stage, any leading need.

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The Buddhist Priest Myōe: A Life of Dreams, by Hayao Kawai. Translated and edited by Mark Unno. Venice: The Lapis Press, 1992. xxii + 237 pages. Cloth: $30.00

The editor of *Pacific World* has asked me to comment on the Japanese Jungian psychologist Hayao Kawai's spiritual biography of the early thirteenth century Buddhist monk and saint, Myōe Kōben. It is a biography made possible in large part because Myōe faithfully recorded his dreams over the greater part of his life, and because at least half of his own dream diary, as well as others of his dreams noted in contemporary biographies of Myōe have preserved this dream record to the present day.

The oracular importance of dreams has been recognized in religious traditions throughout the world, and in Myōe's own thirteenth century world both Ippen, the founder of the Pure Land tradition, and Shinran, who founded Shin Buddhism, marked pivotal occasions in the developments of their own spiritual movements with important dreams. Nothing however matched the steady devotion of Myōe over a thirty five year period to the products of his unconscious inner life. It is this taking up of his dream life in a committed fashion as part of his spiritual development toward ultimate freedom and compassion for all being that marks the joining of psychological and religious practice.

Though I am a colleague in Jung's Analytical Psychology with Professor Kawai, and also possess academic credentials as an historian of religious philosophy in the West, I know next to nothing about Japan and Japanese culture, and I understand nearly as little of Buddhism. Yet our urgent need to communicate across the boundaries of specialist disciplines in order to enlarge the scope of our knowledge, and to find vital connections to common meaning, causes us to risk the interdisciplinary venture, in spite of our individual limitations of expertise. Kawai himself notes that "readers familiar with Buddhist thought and history are not likely to know much about dreams and dream analysis, and vice versa." Thus two introductory chapters of his book were necessary, one on dreams, their history, their role in Japanese culture, and Jung's psychodynamic approach to interpretation of dreams, and a second on Myōe's life in the context of the Kamakura period in which he lived. My own comments can be only in terms of the world I know.

We have a great need for spiritual/psychological biographies which interpret religious behavior in a non-pathologizing manner. A generation ago, Erik Erikson studied the inner dialectic of Martin Luther's revolutionary vocation, discovering in his triumphant doctrine of justification by faith both a re-iteration of the infantile bond of trust with his mother and a partial internalization of father's restrictive, judgmental shaping of his character. Luther solved the problematic of his own life while becoming, as a powerful reformer, a model in whom the masses might find a "rejuvenation of trust." A decade later, in *Gandhi's Truth*, Erikson proposed that Gandhi's technique of freeing his people from their subjugation like the technique of psychoanalysis itself, involves both persistent and "militant probing" of the issues and nonviolent confrontation with one's opponent. Transformation becomes possible "only where man learns to be nonviolent toward himself as well as toward others."[1]

Now here is Kawai's psychological interpretation of the inner life of a thirteenth century saint. Like others of its *genre* there is a particular issue in current culture which focuses the author's attention on an historical antecedent. For Kawai that is the relationship between the sexes, and especially the question, how can we envision the quality of a man's relationship with women? No problem of changing culture in Japan is more urgent than this.

Like others of its kind also, the author tests a general hypothesis of human nature which should find validation in the life being studied. The general psychological hypothesis by means of which Kawai studies Myōe is the individuation

process—a lifelong program of inner development and maturation which should result near the end of life, if the process has resulted in increasing self-knowledge, and is accompanied by earnest moral intention, in the achievement of the self. The effect of the self so achieved is described in various ways by modern people. It is "being at last who I really am." Or one may feel deeply emotionally connected to her/himself as well as to people and things in the world. But there is also a sense of being less painfully conflicted, more accepting of the life in which one finds oneself. There seem to be fewer surprises, although one might expect anything, and there are moments of delight. Clinically there is very much less anxiety than may be observed in people who have worked with less intentionality on their own maturation.

Kawai follows the theories and the technique of the germinal Swiss physician and psychologist C. G. Jung, but when he describes Myōe's life Kawai passes naturally into Buddhist religious vocabulary, there being obvious corollaries between Jung's individuation process and the Buddhist path (and indeed connections to the disciplined, ascetic paths of other religious traditions as well).

The image of Myōe which emerges out of Kawai's working through of the biographical materials and the corresponding, dated records of his dreams is that of an impassioned, faithful and at the same time completely spontaneous devotee of Śākyamuni. Unlike his contemporaries Ippen and Shinran, who founded new forms in which Buddhism would henceforth live in Japan, Myōe was not an innovator. Kawai observes that "the very life which Myōe lived was his 'thought.'" It was the "quality of his religious life that warrants our attention" (p. 47f).

Myōe lost both his parents at the age of seven, at the beginning of the uprisings of the Kamakura period; at eight he entered the temple. At twelve, after studying earnestly for four years he decided he had lived long enough and went to a graveyard overnight, expecting to be eaten by the wolves. At fifteen he took the tonsure and was memorizing as many as ten pages daily of the Abidharmakośa, a treatise by the Indian master Vasubandhu. He began keeping his *Dream Diary* at eighteen. At twenty-three, during a period of solitary practice in the mountains of Shirakami in Kishū, when he could no longer stand living with other monks of his day whom he felt were violating the precepts, he cut off his right ear as a sign of his own commitment to the Buddha. The following day during meditation, a vision of the great sage Mañjuśrī sitting golden on the lion king appeared in the sky before him, seeming to validate Myōe's sacrificial act and his chosen path.

Twice Myōe determined to make a pilgrimmage to India and twice his visions and dreams caused him to reconsider. On the first occasion there were repeated visions of the displeasure of the Kasuga deity, who instructed Myōe that he was already under the protection of various deities and would in any case be born in the Tusita Heaven in his next life, but that there were many humans in the world now who urgently awaited his teaching. (Here is the Mahayana impetus to save the other.) Three years later Myōe again planned to go to India, even calculating how far he could travel on each day of the journey. But he became mysteriously ill and felt plagued by an invisible, irritating genie who pinched him and climbed on his body. When he pulled lots to decide the question all the lots said no. So Myōe abandoned his desire, this time for good.

From the point of view of a psychological observer what is interesting and convincing about Myōe is not the miraculous seeming or extraordinarily virtuous nature of his dreams and his actions, but the fact that he seems to have processed the events of his life with attention and receptivity, that he learned from everything that happened to him, that his conscious ego did not become rigidly encrusted with dignity and position even during the years when his fame was increasing. His

feeling remained open and engaged. One might say psychologically that he accepted and internalized rather than defending against affective states. To a beginner it may appear that remaining emotionally open makes one dangerously vulnerable. The adept, however, learns not to let feeling responses be stopped by the resistances of the ego. Rather, affect is "fed through" to the deeper level of the objectifying self where it is assessed and integrated, actually increasing the strength of the individual and increasing also a sense of unity with the world. There can be no doubt that one of the major problems of life is what to do about the disturbing effects of emotional states, and we must be deeply interested in every genuinely attempted solution.

It is in the light of this felt participatory union with the world that one of the most charming incidents of Myōe's life may be understood—his letter to the beautiful Island of Karumo. Myōe instructed his disciple to carry the letter to the island, declare aloud that a letter from Myōe had arrived, and then toss the letter into the wind and return home. Myōe wrote:

> I trust there has been no change since the last time I saw you. After I left I have not been able to find the means to go see you, and I hope you will excuse me for failing to send word. Oh, island, you yourself belong to the realm of desire...

Myōe then goes on in more philosophical vein to declare the identity of all form with the Buddha body, and that he and the island are therefore of one kind (p. 100).

In 1221 Myōe put his own life in immediate danger of a violent end by responding to the plight of the widows of the aristocrats and warriors who were defeated in the Jōkyū Incident. Emperor Goshirakawa planned to regain control from the Shogunate, but the project failed and imperial rule was decisively destroyed. Myōe offered the immediate protection of his temple to the women, and went on to build them a nunnery. But the enraged Kamakura warriors hauled Myōe off to be punished and it was only when the deputy Yasutoki heard Myōe calmly offer his own head if he should in any way have impeded their rule that the situation was saved.

Kawai finds particular evidence for the individuation process in Myōe's dreams of and relationship with women. In the life of a monk who lived 750 years ago Kawai thinks he has a model whose example may serve Japanese men and women today as they begin to move toward relationships of autonomy and free interdependence. In previously published work Kawai has shown that the substrate of Japanese religious life has always been dominated by maternal feminine motifs even while the overt cultural pattern is fiercely patriarchal. Among the monks, chastity was enjoined, but in Japan, even in early periods, the rule was more often broken than kept. Monks typically descended from their temple compounds to stay the night with their mistresses in the village, returning to the temple in the morning. It became traditional for sons to inherit the temple of their fathers (p. 50).

The primary man-woman relationship in Japan has always been mother-son. The mother is conceived as protectress, but always also as potential devourer who would keep the son/man from his autonomy. Thus women have been strictly controlled in roles of mother or sexual partner; genuine relationships of spiritual companionship between equal men and women developed only seldom.

Myōe determined from the beginning to live as a pure monk. He did not however withdraw from connection to the feminine, and there is evidence that his relationship to the image of the feminine changed and matured over the years. At eighteen, in the same year that he began his *Dream Diary*, Myōe received the transmission of the Diamond Realm, and he took as his principle deity

Butsugen-butsoma, the Buddha-eye Mother of All Buddhas. Myōe dreamed of her often; her image is enshrined at Kozanji and beside it this inscription in his own hand at twenty three:

> Pity me as I think of you
> Oh my enlightened one.
> Other than you
> No one knows.
> Great mother of the earless priest
> Grace me with thine compassion
> Birth upon birth, age after age
> Do not leave me,
> Oh great mother, dear mother.

Myōe had the gift to express deep feeling toward the mother goddess even as a young man, and he went on to develop internalized relationships with female figures who might in another life style have been age appropriate partners. The contemporary records state that Myōe received the Sutra on the Essence of Ultimate Reality, an esoteric Shingon scripture, in a dream. This work affirms love between the sexes and states that desire in itself is pure. Myōe at first apparently resisted the sutra by having a hard time remembering it, but then accepted the scripture. The great thing about Myōe is what he did with it. As Kawai remarks, "he neither denied nor suppressed desire, but affirmed it while maintaining the precepts" (p. 75).

Myōe's few extant letters to women are both warm and correct. There were women in his circle of followers. In the decade between 1200 and 1210 there are many dreams of women which seem to show continuing growth, allowing him to draw ever closer in intimate relationship to feminine figures while still keeping clear of physical relationships. Desire became a pathway through which the projective quality of relationships to the feminine could be internalized, resulting gradually in a more general attitude of relatedness to all being. At the climax of this process Myōe had a dream in which a stone statuette of Shan-miao was transformed into a living maiden through tears and the pitying care of Myōe. His affection for the figure of Shan-miao who appeared in his dream was such that he named the nunnery he built for the widowed refugees of the Jōkyū incident the Temple of Shan-miao.

One problem must trouble everyone who is working in the interdisciplinary field between psychology and religion. That is the question about what kind of reality base should underlie the interpretive scheme being presented. Kawai remarks very wisely at one point that if we take a cosmological stance we can embrace even opposing points of view, because both may be a part of the story we tell about our world. Pursuing an ideal, on the other hand, means excluding whatever contents fail to fit the ideal scheme (p. 47).

Nevertheless it means everything to the psychology student as well as to the religious practicant to be able to tell one's experience in the language of inmost belief. Myōe identified himself as a follower of the Hua-yen philosophy of the Garland Sutra. So far as I am able to determine, the Hua-yen philosophy seems exactly similar to the monistic physics of ancient Stoicism in the West. Stoic physics admitted two principles for one substance. All is corporeality, but there is an active Principle within it which is reason and form, and a passive principle (matter, or better, prime matter) which receives the formal imprint of the active principle and thus assumes its visible shape. This vision of a unitive, corporeal universe enlivened everywhere by the presence of mind within it has since appeared in the philosophies of Leibniz, Spinoza, and Schopenhauer. In its form as the Doctrine of Sympathy it informed the writings of Paracelsus and other alchemists, and of Gustav Fechner and the psycho-physicists early in the twentieth century. Today it may be found in the process theology of Whitehead, Hartshorne and Cobb.

In his later years Jung, and after his death his pupil Marie-Louise von Franz, adopted much

of this philosophy as part of their defense of the autonomy of the psyche. In Chapter 5 of his book, "Mind and Object," and again in Chapter 7, "Mutual Interpenetration," Kawai discusses several important dreams, as well as some prescient seeming experiences in the life of Myōe. The hagiographical tradition marks these experiences as evidence of increasing fluidity in the subjectobject relation, increasing transcendence, and thus the increasing availability of telepathic and synchronistic events, as Myōe in maturity grew closer to the self. Kawai seems not to separate himself critically from the received texts and identifies with the philosophy of Myōe and with that of the late Jung and von Franz:

> Myōe was able to see the common basis of not only humans and animals, but non-sentient existence as well. *Mono* (matter) and *kokoro* (mind) stand in a limitless relation of mutual interpenetration (p. 101).

Here is a view from which the underlying assumptions of modern social science, biology and physics will diverge. After many years of working with these problems I have come to believe that the better path is to acknowledge clearly the boundary between faith and science so that both religionists and social scientists can work more openly together on issues which are of great mutual interest. There is much in the enchanting person of Myōe, who forged a life of autonomy, compassion and grace in the midst of political unrest and familial loss, to interest people with different approaches to the data.

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NOTE

1. Erik Erikson, *Young Man Luther.* (London: Faber and Faber, 1958). Erik Erikson, *Gandhi's Truth.* (London: Faber and Faber, 1970). For a more recent but also "friendly" approach toward western ascetical treatises see my "Translocation of Parental Images in Fourth-Century Ascetic Texts: Motifs and Techniques of Identity." SEMEIA 58. (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1992)

James L. Watson, Evelyn S. Rawski, eds., *Death Ritual in Late Imperial and Modern China.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988. 316pp + index.

Unlike many edited volumes, Watson and Rawski's *Death Ritual in Late Imperial and Modern China* represents the results of an ongoing series of truly collaborative researches in the history, sociology, literature and anthropology of Chinese culture. Other volumes in the series, *Studies on China* include David N. Keightley, ed., *Origins of Chinese Civilization* (Berkeley, 1982); Bonnie S. McDougall, ed., *Popular Chinese Literature and Performing Arts in the People's Republic of China*, 1949-1979 (Berkeley, 1984); James L. Watson, ed., *Class and Social Stratification in Post-Revolution China* (Cambridge, 1984); David Johnson, Andrew J. Nathan, and Evelyn S. Rawski, eds., *Popular Culture in Late Imperial China* (Berkeley, 1986); Patricia Buckley Ebrey and James L. Watson eds., *Kinship Organization in Late Imperial China 1000-1940* (Berkeley, 1986); Shuen-fu Lin and Stephen Owen, eds., *The Vitality of the Lyric Voice: Shih Poetry from the Late Han to the T'ang* (Princeton, 1986); and David M. Lampton, ed., *Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China* (Berkeley, 1987).

Reflecting its origin in an ongoing debate, *Death Ritual in Late Imperial and Modern China* opens with two contending introductions. James Watson stresses the observation of ritual in "The Structure of Chinese Funerary Rites: Elementary Forms, Ritual Sequence, and the Primacy of Performance," while Evelyn Rawski details the advantages of "A Historian's Approach to Chinese Death Ritual." For Watson, "it is the unique *configuration* of ritual elements that makes a funeral acceptably Chinese," (p. 7) and he argues that "the standardization of ritual practice almost always took precedence over efforts to legislate or control beliefs" (p. 10). Rawski cautions, however, that "in addition to the geomancer...the funeral priest...was most likely to have access to written texts of some kind. Even peasant death rituals used a wide variety of written materials. The presence of written texts signifies direct ties to the elite tradition" (p. 33).

The other ten essays included in the volume align themselves roughly along this methodological fault-line. The historically oriented essays of Susan Naquin, ("Funerals in North China: Uniformity and Variation"), Frederic Wakeman, Jr., ("Mao's Remains"), and Evelyn S. Rawski ("The Imperial Way of Death: Ming and Ch'ing Emperors and Death Ritual") contrast with those used in field work by Stuart E. Thompson ("Death, Food, and Fertility"), Elizabeth L. Johnson, ("Grieving for the Dead, Grieving for the Living: Funeral Laments of Hakka Women"), Myron L. Cohen, ("Souls and Salvation: Conflicting Themes in Chinese Popular Religion"), Martin K. Whyte, ("Death in the People's Republic of China"), Emily Martin, ("Gender and Ideological Differences in Representations of Life and Death"), Rubie S. Watson, ("Remembering the Dead: Graves and Politics in Southeastern China"), and James L. Watson, ("Funeral Specialists in Cantonese Society: Pollution, Performance, and Social Hierarchy"). The contrast which in abstract may seem quite clear, nonetheless blurs in the case of a civilization which has, regardless of its overall literacy rates, made an icon of textuality.

The significance of the history/anthropology debate is, however, overshadowed by new questions arising in the social sciences and the humanities. Foremost of these is awareness of gender. Thus, Watson provides us the basic outline of the funeral (based on *Li chi* and simplified by Chu Hsi):

1. public notification of death by wailing, etc.
2. donning of mourning dress.
3. ritual bathing of the corpse.
4. transfer of food, money, etc. from the living to the dead.
5. preparation and installation of soul tablet.
6. ritual use of money and employment of

professionals.
7. music to accompany the corpse and settle the spirit.
8. sealing the corpse in an airtight coffin.
9. expulsion of the coffin from the community. (12-15)

This outline is born out by Naquin's fine historical spadework in north China gazetteers, but it is an outline largely indifferent to gender issues. In contrast, Stuart E. Thomson's *tour de force* analysis of food prestations at Taiwanese funerals examines the symbolic taxonomy which pairs rice with men, and pork with women. "While rice is 'substance shared' by members of a family, pork is very much 'substance given,' for it is prototypically the foodstuff for exchange and reciprocity between families—it is the primary banquet food" (p. 97). "In wedding exchanges, the key food is the pig sent by the groom's family to the bride's. A wife is transferred in one direction, a pig in the other" (the head and tail are returned to the groom's side). According to Thompson, ritual offerings of pigs at funerals may constitute both a repayment of a debt and an effort to replace the flesh of the deceased (p. 99). Elsewhere he describes the symbolism of the grave mound as a pregnant women—a "wombstone" (p. 104) as well as the series of double entendres surrounding the *tou*, the container of rice used in the funeral. At times the symbolism seems so compacted as to strain credulity and tempt us to charge Thompson with overinterpretation. But his interpretations originate with his informants and are well documented.

Emily Martin's exploration of women's views of marriage and death demonstrate the negative affective results of this elaborate coding, while Johnson's work on Hakka women's funeral laments underscores the deep ambivalence concerning the role of women at funerals. A women's role at a funeral is structured around an ideology of male dominance. In contrast to other social events, funerals are appropriate places for women to be prominent because they, like death, are *yin* (p. 158). Yet the content of "funeral laments demonstrate repeatedly that, besides her children, those family relationships a woman most deeply values are those with her natal family" (p. 157). Martin's work is the first real exploration of the meaning of the laments and as a bonus she presents the texts of two complete laments (pp. 161-163).

Two other artcicles bear special mention here. Frederic Wakeman's "Mao's Remains" is a fascinating examination of the funerals and memorials both of Mao and of his archrival Chiang kai-shek. Pointing out continuities with earlier burials including those of Sun Yat-sen and Ch'ing and Ming emperors, Wakeman details the remarkable similarity between the services and memorial edifices of Mao and Chiang as well as the political theater of the funeral process. Finally, Martin K. Whyte's article on "Death in the People's Republic of China" begins to delineate continuities and changes in contemporary China, as well as the growing gulf between rural and urban practice and belief.

If there are any weaknesses of the volume they are in the scanty attention payed to religious elites—the Buddhist and Taoist priests. Watson focuses on funeral specialists (*nahm mouh lo*) who are not members of these corporations while Naquin mentions monks and nuns in passing (pp. 59, 61). Perhaps this may become the topic of a future effort in this series.

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The Pacific World

notes with sadness the passing of

several scholars in the fields of Buddhist Studies,

Asian Religions and Buddhist-Christian Dialogue

in the past year:

Leo Marvel Pruden

Anna Seidel

Joseph Kitagawa

Ulrich Mammitzsch

Bimal K. Matilal

Charles Lohman