Freedom in Submission: Kiyozawa Manshi’s Organic Critique of the Bunmei Kaika Movement in Meiji Japan

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This paper focuses on the understanding of freedom in the thought of the True Pure Land (Shin) Buddhist philosopher, reformer, and cleric Kiyozawa Manshi (1863–1903). Its starting point is located in contradictory statements which Kiyozawa makes in regard to the issue of individual freedom. One the one hand, Kiyozawa writes, “As the story of Śākyamuni Buddha teaches, anyone who seriously wishes to enter into the religious world must abandon parents, wife, and children, wealth and nation. Further, one must abandon one’s self. In other words, one must abandon worldly beliefs such as filial piety and patriotism.”

From writings such as this, scholars have presented his thought as promoting a radical form of individual autonomy in response to the Meiji state’s indoctrination program of national morality (kokumin dōtoku). As encapsulated in the Imperial Rescript on Education (1890), national morality insisted that the duties of loyalty and filial piety toward the emperor were the foundation of Japanese national identity. Through the public education system and civic rituals, Japanese were inculcated in these values to produce loyal and obedient subjects who would be willing to sacrifice themselves to the state in “times of crisis.” In contrast, Kiyozawa’s injunction to abandon “wealth and nation” and “filial piety and patriotism” seemed to reject soundly the tenets of national morality. Further, his insistence upon personal conscience as the ultimate locus for responsibility as well as religious belief appeared to negate the absolutist claims of state and society and to create a space for autonomous and independent human agency and identity.

On closer inspection, however, this characterization is hard to uphold. For example, Kiyozawa closes the very same article in which the above quote appears by writing, “Take the law of the king as the
foundation and put its ethical code first. Follow the common ways of the world, and deepen your faith (anjin) within your heart.” Here he seems to subordinate the needs of the individual to this very same national morality, arguing for subservience to the “law of the king” (ōhō), a Buddhist formulation that had become equated with the state’s ethical program. To this could be added numerous other passages where Kiyozawa calls for hierarchy in society and obedience to those in power. For example, in his talks on self-cultivation he writes that one must “obey one’s lot in life…. Forgetting your lot and thoughtlessly yelling about equality and recklessly crying about freedom, this is to mistake one’s direction and to completely fail to distinguish the way.”

In other places, he speaks of the naturalness of social classes and the duty of the poor to obey the rich. Given this, what are we to make of Kiyozawa’s insistence that his signature reform movement of spiritual activism (seishinshugi) represented a stance of “complete freedom” (zettai jiyūshugi)? Was this simply a sham? Further, what was the meaning of his claim that “freedom and submission” went hand in hand? In order to answer these questions, this paper will attempt something rather unusual. It will examine Kiyozawa apart from his usual role as a Buddhist modernizer or Shin sectarian reformer and recast his thought as a reaction to a particular historical form of freedom, that of classical liberalism.

In Meiji Japan this was most clearly represented by Fukuzawa Yukichi and the movement for civilization and enlightenment (bunmei kaika) in the 1870s. This paper will argue that while Kiyozawa did ultimately embrace the illiberal ideas of inequality and obedience to authority, he did not share national morality’s goal of bolstering state power. Rather, Kiyozawa’s thought represented an attempt to replace the heteronomy of the atomistic and self-interested individual of classical liberalism with the autonomy of a divine whole. As Kiyozawa saw the present social order as in fact an expression of the divine will, submission to its dictates became one with the realization of personal autonomy.

This paper will consist of three sections. The first will look at the form of freedom associated with the civilization and enlightenment movement and Kiyozawa’s critique of it. The following sections will examine Kiyozawa’s own attempt to provide for both individual freedom and social harmony through an analysis of a central term of his thought, “all things as one body” (banbutsu ittai).
CIVILIZATION’S DISCONTENTS

Kiyozawa’s own understanding of freedom must be seen against problems he saw in the classical liberal conception of freedom put forth by the movement for civilization and enlightenment. As such, a brief outline of this position is in order. According to the leader of the movement, Fukuzawa Yukichi, the Japanese people still suffered from the pernicious effects of what he termed the attitude of “moral subordination” which resulted from the Confucian informed status system (mibunsei) of the previous Tokugawa era. While the Meiji government had done away with legal strictures regarding hereditary occupations, Fukuzawa was concerned with the system’s lingering effects within the spiritual makeup of the Japanese people.

The rule of status meant that during the Tokugawa era individuals were bound to each other through complex networks of immediate, personal ethical relationships of obligation and responsibility between superior and inferior. As Fukuzawa writes, “The samurai’s status, the honor of his house, and his lord were the great Way according to which the samurai lived and the basic bonds binding his conduct throughout his life. In Western terminology, they were moral ties.” While these concrete “moral ties” had served to preserve social harmony and were conducive to a certain level of civilization, Fukuzawa laments, “The millions of Japanese at the time were closed up inside millions of individual boxes…. The four level class structure of samurai, farmers, artisans and merchants froze human relationships along prescribed lines.” The net result was the suppression of individual talent, economic stagnation, and ultimately Japan’s semi-colonial status to the Western powers.

In order to end “moral subordination” and promote Japanese national independence, Fukuzawa appealed to the classical liberal value of “equality” based in innate “natural rights” (tenpu jiken). Using equality as a standard, Fukuzawa railed against such basic underpinnings of the Confucian social order as the subordination of women and filial piety. Rather than an intricate web of reciprocal social obligations and responsibilities, society is re-imagined as an association of free individuals. Identity was no longer tied to birth or occupational status but in particular to one’s economic activity. Fukuzawa writes, “heaven does not give riches and dignity to man himself, but to his labors.... It is only the person who has studied diligently...who becomes noble and rich, while his opposite becomes base and poor.”
Against Confucian strictures on acquisitiveness and desire, Fukuzawa condones the “love of money” as a “part of human nature.”15 Freed from status restrictions on economic activity, with an understanding of their basic equality and armed with certain rights, individuals were free to pursue their material interests.16 This in turn would lead to the prosperity and independence of Japan and the progress of universal civilization. Here freedom is specifically identified with freedom from socially enforced moral bonds and the freedom to pursue one’s own material desires.

The outcome of such a policy, however, was not social cohesion and a harmony of interests as the enlightenment modernizers had hoped. Rather, the results were the so-called “social problems” (shakai mondai) which became major concerns especially with the increased industrialization that followed in the wake of the Sino-Japanese War (1894–95). The social problems were several—a widening gap between rich and poor, labor unrest, and environmental degradation. Social critics such as Uchimura Kanzō, Abe Isō, Kinoshita Naoe, and others brought public attention to these issues through a new type of muckraking journalism.17 Kinoshita took aim at theories of progress such as that of Herbert Spencer, wondering if the current “golden age” was the result of such progress. “Well the golden age is here. But it is not as the English philosopher predicted.... Instead of the golden age of peace and freedom, we have an age of almighty gold.... Who said that the peaceful wars of industry and trade would replace the wars of aggression characteristic of the barbaric age? The wars of industry and trade are, after all, not peaceful wars....”18 Writing in his diary, the politician and environmental activist Tanaka Shōzō opined that “the progress of material, artificial civilization casts society into darkness. Electricity is discovered and the world is darkened.”19 Kiyozawa himself wrote, “Isn’t what is now called ‘civilization and enlightenment’ nothing other than the external adornment of a nefarious world of the survival of the fittest where the strong prey upon the weak?”20 As is clear from Kiyozawa’s words, for these critics, the social problems were merely the “branches” whose “roots” were found in the social program of civilization and enlightenment and its embrace of the imported Western theories of individualism, materialism, and utilitarian self-interest.

Kiyozawa’s response is to examine in particular the roots of the classical liberal theory of freedom. He begins with a general inquiry into the two basic conditions that must be recognized in order for
social life to be possible. The first concerns the “freedom and rights of the individual” which are connected with the full exercise of each person’s “individual and independent capacities.” The second recognizes that “the capacities of the self are inter-related with the capacities of others” and thus seeks to restrict the freedom of the individual to provide for the rights of others.21 Thus, at the basis of any conception of human freedom Kiyozawa notes a fundamental tension, or what he terms in other places a “fundamental contradiction” (konpon dochaku) between the demands of self and the competing demands of others.

The classical liberal theory of freedom essentially joined these two sides of the contradiction into the so-called law of equal freedoms.22 Citing Francis Wayland’s Elements of Moral Science, Fukuzawa provided one typical formulation of this law as “a man can conduct himself in freedom so long as he does not infringe upon the rights of others.”23 Underlying this theory is the assumption that humans exist as fundamentally unrelated and atomistic individuals. With no common connection, the pursuit of self-interest becomes the only shared pursuit. However, while each person wishes to pursue his or her individual freedom to the greatest extent possible, the individual is confronted by the equal demands of others. In order to prevent a war of all against all, restrictions must be placed upon the rights of the individual, usually in the form of political or legal structures. Now the individual must submit to forces external to the will and demands of the self. Kiyozawa expands on this understanding as follows: “These two [individual freedom and its restriction] are in mutual contradiction and are completely incompatible. That is, if you make the freedom and rights of the individual perfect and complete, you cannot allow the slightest restriction. [On the other hand] if you make these restrictions firm and definite, the rights and freedom of the individual cannot be supplied. Consequently, in the theories of law and politics when these two conditions are raised together, extreme confusion arises.”24 Thus, for Kiyozawa, freedom appears as the highest human value. By its very definition it cannot be limited or restricted, or something fundamental to human existence is lost. Yet, in classical liberal theory, individual freedom can only be preserved through its curtailment. The task then becomes one of finding a form of social existence in which there are no external determinations of one’s actions, yet a harmony can arise between the needs of self and other. It is this task, I argue, which drives Kiyozawa’s intellectual and practical projects.
Kiyozawa’s solution to the fundamental contradiction in the liberal conception of freedom is found in the several meanings of the term *banbutsu ittai* (万物一体). This phrase is typically translated as “the unity of all things” or the “oneness of the universe.” It occurs most prominently as the title of an essay which Kiyozawa wrote for the *Spiritual World* (Seishinkai) in which he argues for a universal ethics of responsibility for all sentient beings. However, the Japanese term *ittai* (一体) can also mean “substance” or, more literally, “one body.” It is these more philosophical understandings that I wish to address here.

The common portrayal of Kiyozawa as primarily a Shin sectarian reformer has had the tendency to elide or at least to downplay his training in philosophy. In fact, his academic training in Western philosophy (seiyō tetsugaku) was crucial in his reformulation of Shin doctrine and for his solution to the problem of freedom. This section will examine the role of “substance” in Kiyozawa’s thought while the next will look at the role of “body.”

The key influence on Kiyozawa’s understanding of substance was the philosophy of Spinoza. Before looking at Kiyozawa’s own position, it is necessary to provide some background in the tradition of substance metaphysics and the thought of Spinoza. In the tradition of philosophy stemming from Aristotle, a substance performed two functions. It referred both to that which possesses truly independent existence and to the substrate in which a change of state occurs. In the early modern period, Descartes inherited this idea of substance and attempted to reconcile it with the Christian notion of God. While Aristotle argued for a plurality of substances in the world, for Descartes there could really be only one fully independent existent, God. For Descartes, God was the only true substance as God’s own existence was not due to another entity but arose from his own power. Further, God possessed a radical freedom to do as he willed, most apparent in his creation of the world *ex nihilo*. Material beings were “secondary substances” as they depended for their existence upon the constant creative activity of God.

Spinoza inherits and further develops the notion of substance but radically alters Descartes’ interpretation. Spinoza argues that things in the world have only a relative or finite existence because each is opposed by other beings which serve to determine or limit its ability to act. For this reason, the things of the world cannot properly be
termed substances. Spinoza agreed with Descartes that God was the only true substance, but he radically altered the conception of God’s freedom. For Spinoza, to posit “secondary substances” outside of God entailed that God was somehow involved with and thus causally dependent upon these substances, and, to that extent, God was restricted and lacking in freedom. In order to overcome this logical inconsistency and to provide for God’s complete freedom Spinoza equated God with the universe as a whole and referred to God as the “absolutely infinite.” In doing so, Spinoza recasts God’s freedom not in opposition to necessity but rather as one with it. Unlike Descartes, God’s freedom is not the ability to create arbitrarily, as for Spinoza all activities require a necessary cause and are thus determined. Rather, as the entire cosmos itself, God is free as all things arise necessarily within and through God’s own nature. In other words, Spinoza replaces Descartes’ notion of freedom with that of self-determination or autonomy. Individual freedom, to the extent that it exists, arises through an “intellectual intuition” of one’s place within the infinite and necessitated series of causal relations.

The influence of Spinoza and his conception of substance on Kiyozawa’s thought, which he encapsulates as “two entities, same substance” (niko dōtai), is pervasive. In his major monograph, The Skeleton of the Philosophy of Religion (1892), Kiyozawa begins his investigation into the nature of religion with an examination of the types of things that exist. His analysis relies on a principle taken from Spinoza, “omnis determinatio est negatio” which Kiyozawa renders as, “Every thing is what it is by being distinguished from other things.” He then writes, “distinction or negation is or implies limitation. Hence all things of the universe are finite.” As finites, they are “relative,” “imperfect,” “dependent,” and a “part of something else.” This last attribute is of central importance because from it Kiyozawa, again following Spinoza, concludes that it is only the infinite collection of finites that is truly a substance and so possesses true independence. Like Spinoza, he terms this the Absolute Infinite (zettai mugen) as there is no determining force which exists outside of it to restrict or limit it. Religion then becomes the unity of an individual finite with the Infinite.

Kiyozawa’s understanding of freedom also shows a direct inheritance from Spinoza. He argues that all actions are necessitated by certain causes (in) and conditions (en). The belief that we act from a free will is simply due to a lack of awareness of the causes.
then, are determined by necessary causes and freedom appears to be an illusion. However, in an essay entitled “Freedom of the Will and the Necessity of Cause and Effect,” he argues further,

Freedom and necessity are not direct antitheses. The direct antithesis of freedom is un-freedom (fujiyū).... That is, an action which is limited and restricted and which cannot go outside of a particular sphere is finite and un-free. Activity which is unlimited, unrestricted, and can expand wherever it will is infinite and free. Therefore, the pairing of freedom and un-freedom is the pairing of infinite and finite.35

Like Spinoza, Kiyozawa reframes the issue of freedom and necessity in terms of the locus of necessity. Here he identifies the Absolute Infinite with freedom because all causal necessity arises not from some external source but rather from within its own nature. In other words, while its internal structure functions under the guise of necessity, as a cause of itself (causa sui) the Absolutely Infinite whole acts autonomously. Recast in religious terms, when the individual develops the mind of faith and realizes an identity with the Infinite Amida Buddha, there is a personal participation in Amida’s infinite freedom. In this manner, Kiyozawa’s religious philosophy is able to fulfill the individual demand for the experience of unrestricted freedom. Kiyozawa now must try to provide a harmony of interests between self and other.

**BANBUTSU ITTAI AND THE ORGANIC BODY OF THE INFINITE**

We have seen that the philosophical notion of substance had two functions. It referred both to a fully independent entity and to the substrate of change. Here we will examine Kiyozawa’s use of this second meaning of substance to argue for the Infinite as an organic body in which finites exist as its inter-coordinated parts. In this manner, he will provide for a harmony of interests between self and other. Here, Kiyozawa will utilize the thought of the German post-Idealist philosopher Hermann Lotze (1817–1881) which he first encountered as a philosophy student at Tokyo Imperial University.

Kiyozawa first uses an argument based upon the notion of substance as a kind of substrate in relation to the issue of karmic causality. He concludes, “The principle of causation is established only on the principle of persistent identity of a substance (ittai) through cause and effect; for, if there be no such identity of substance, there will be no connection between cause and effect, and hence no ground for the effect’s necessarily coming from the cause.”36 Thus, he argues that some
kind of a soul (*reikon*) is logically necessary as the substrate, or recipient, of karmic causes and effects within individual consciousness.37

Kiyozawa makes use of this same logic when considering causal relations within the external world. He notes that our normal understanding of causality is problematic. He writes,

> What kind of relation exists between A and B? To say “this is purely A” and “this is purely B” means that A and B are independent and separate substances (*betsuritsu bettai*). A toward B is a separate thing, and B toward A is a separate thing. So, to say that cause A produces effect B is the same as to say that cause and effect are from different sources (*tain taka*). We cannot say that this is the proper [understanding of] cause and effect. We are unable to explain why the separate and independent entities A and B have a relationship. That is, we say that B exists because A exists, but we are unable to explain the reason.38

In other words, Kiyozawa is arguing that for the relationship of cause and effect to make sense, there must be something between them which brings about their relationship. Without this, cause and effect would merely be accidental and there would be no persistent associations between causes and effects. Rather than “cause and effect from different sources,” Kiyozawa argues for both arising from the “same source” (*jiin jika*). He writes, “Things are relative and finite. Moreover, due to relations of cause and effect they are all interdependent. The reason which lies at the root of this condition is that all are [part of] the same substance (*dō ittai*) existing within these relations [of cause and effect]. They do not possess independent and separate essences.”39

While the soul serves as the unifying source of identity for the subjective world of consciousness, it is the Infinite itself as a universal substance that provides the coordination for all causal interactions in the objective world.

Kiyozawa is here making an advance on the position he took in the *Skeleton of the Philosophy of Religion*. As we have seen, there he followed Spinoza in arguing for the Infinite as the totality of finites. However, unlike Spinoza, who had argued that finites are simply phenomenal attributes of the Infinite, Kiyozawa took the relation between the two to be more akin to a mathematical set. The Infinite is a set of which the finites are members, or as he writes, “Only the substance of infinite number of the finite can be identical with the substance of the Infinite.”40 He is now claiming that the Infinite is more than simply a set or container for all existence. The Infinite has real existence itself
as a substrate or coordinator of change. In order to further articulate the relationship, he will utilize the organic metaphor. A proper understanding of this is key to an understanding of how the notion of substance will come to mean in fact a real physical and spiritual body.

The use of the organic metaphor to describe society was commonplace in the late nineteenth century but was most closely associated with the work of Herbert Spencer. Kiyozawa’s teacher of philosophy, Ernest Fenollosa, was a devotee of Spencer and had attempted to create a grand philosophical synthesis by uniting the thought of Hegel and Spencer. Kiyozawa does mention Spencer frequently in his writings and his library contained many of Spencer’s works. Spencer used the organic metaphor to argue for increasing mutual interdependency between individuals and their activities due to the division of labor. He writes, “These activities are not simply different, but their differences are so related as to make one another possible. The reciprocal aid thus given causes a mutual dependence of the parts and the mutually dependent parts, living by and for one another, from an aggregate constituted on the same general principle as an individual organism.” The appearance of an organic society was important for Spencer because it signified a more harmonious and peaceful form of civilization.

Kiyozawa appears to use the metaphor in a similar fashion to articulate the relationship among finites in the world. He writes, “The mode or structure in which numberless finites form one body (ittai) of the Infinite is organic constitution (yūki soshiki).” He continues, “Numberless units are none of them independent of, and indifferent to each other, but are dependent on, and inseparably connected with, one another. Not only so, but by this very dependence and connection, every unit obtains its real existence and significance.”

On the surface this seems to be a restatement of Spencer’s position. However, in Spencer’s account inter-dependence come about through each individual performing a specific function within the larger society. In this account, other than one’s function, there is nothing within or between individuals which unites them in any deeper fashion. Though the depiction of the organic as present in the Skeleton of the Philosophy of Religion does seem to embrace such a functional understanding, when this is read in the context of Kiyozawa’s other writings, it becomes clear that this represents only a rather superficial description of reality. In contrast to Spencer, who argues that society functions like a body, Kiyozawa will submit that the Absolute Infinite is a body. As
parts of this body, finite beings have an essential relationship as all actions are coordinated by the will of the Infinite. Kiyozawa’s source for this novel understanding is not Spencer but Hermann Lotze.

As part of his graduate study, Kiyozawa studied Lotze’s *Metaphysics* and *Philosophy of Religion* under Fenollosa’s successor, Ludwig Busse, a former student of Lotze. In 1887 Kiyozawa gave a lecture course entitled “Pure Philosophy” (*junsei tetsugaku*) in which he provided a summary of Lotze’s *Metaphysics*. As Kiyozawa explicates, Lotze begins his *Metaphysics* with a discussion of what he terms the “natural conception of the universe” which is “that conception which finds the course of the world only intelligible as of a multiplicity of persistent things, of variable relations between them, and of events arising out of these changes of mutual relations.” This “natural conception” or “natural ontology” is the world of common sense. It assumes a world of independently existing entities that interact through physical contact in space.

Lotze’s *Metaphysics* will attack this ontology and argue that in fact the existence of completely unrelated and independent entities is illusory. Like Kiyozawa, Lotze argues that such an ontology cannot explain the regular and necessary occurrence of causal relationships which provide the basis for the laws of empirical science. He writes that for completely independent entities there would be no necessary reason for them to regularly enter into some relations and not others. Rather than assuming the existence of spatially separate and discrete entities which then somehow interact, Lotze argues that “things can only exist as part of a single Being, relative to our apprehension, but not actually independent.” Rather than being independent, entities exist as the “immediate internal reciprocal actions” of the Being in which they exist.

In order to explain how these actions are coordinated, Lotze uses the organic metaphor but in a way very different from that of Spencer. Lotze’s organic metaphor is in fact not so much a metaphor any longer but an actual depiction of reality. Finite entities are “manifold elements of which the existence and content is throughout conditioned by the nature and reality of the one existence of which they are organic members.” For Lotze, and unlike Spencer, the various things which we experience in fact share the same nature, like the cells of our body all share the same DNA. The coordination that exists between entities and actions, such as in relations of cause and effect, is not due to an
external phenomenon like the division of labor but is rather due to the existence of a mechanism internal to and shared by all things. To explain this mechanism, Lotze appeals to scientific laws, but he also uses language which could imply some sort of spiritual entity or universal will as when he writes, “One thing, finally, operates on another, not by means of any force of its own, but in virtue of the One present in it....”

In explicating Lotze’s philosophy, Kiyozawa gives the example of the pans on a balance or the separate fingers on a hand. If we did not know the pans were connected by a balance or that the palm connected the fingers, we would assume that these coordinated movements were due to the relations of cause and effect between spatially independent entities. However, for Lotze the world does not consist of entities which then fall into relations “among” themselves. Rather, entities are always already in reciprocal relations that maintain a continuous equilibrium so that a change in one part leads to a corresponding change in the whole.

Lotze’s understanding of reality as a universal Being in which all things exist as its coordinated actions had a decisive influence on Kiyozawa. He uses Lotze to reformulate the Infinite as not simply a substance but as “one body” (ittai) in which finites are its constituent parts. He writes, “The true body (shintai) of the finite and the source of its appearance is not a purely finite individual. We must absolutely recognize that its true body and nature is the Infinite. As its body and nature is the Infinite, it is natural to see a reflection of the Infinite in its activity. That is, though at first sight, the finite existence of ‘this’ and ‘that,’ ‘self’ and ‘other’ appear to be independent, the reality is the same body (dō ittai) of the Infinite.”

Finally, following Lotze, Kiyozawa recognizes a single will which coordinates and makes possible individual actions. Echoing his analogy of pans on a balance to describe Lotze’s thought, Kiyozawa uses the analogy of the hand to explain the actions of the Infinite. “Various individual actions respond to the essence and body of the one Infinite. The five fingers on each hand and their coordinated and unified movement is nothing other than this. They respond to the directives of only one mind. It is nothing but the transmission and response between this and that, this finger and that finger.” Here, human activity is in fact subject to the will, the “one mind” of the Absolute Infinite.

Part of the reason why Kiyozawa is able to adopt Lotze’s thought in this manner is because of its resonances with traditional Mahāyāna
and Shin Buddhist doctrine. There is of course the well-known doctrine of the three “bodies” of the Buddha (Skt. trīkāya, Jpn. sanjīn). According to this theory, Amida Buddha, the principle object of Shin faith and practice, is in fact the “reward body” (Skt. saṃbhogakāya, Jpn. hōjin) who results from the merit generated by the religious practice of Dhamākara Bodhisattva (Jpn. Hōzō Bosatsu). There is also the Shin doctrine of kihō ittai, “the union of believer and Buddha as one substance” which the great medieval Shin patriarch Rennyo (1415–1499) popularized. In explicating its significance he writes,

What it means for faith to be established is for one to understand completely the significance of the six characters Namu Amida Butsu. The two characters Namu stand for sentient beings of limited capacity (ki) who have faith in Amida Buddha, and the four characters Amida Butsu signify that Amida Tathāgata of Absolute Truth (hō) saves sentient beings. Hence, the meaning is that in Namu Amida Butsu those of limited capacity and that of absolute truth are [united] as one substance (kihō ittai).

It is clear from the above that in Rennyo’s usage, kihō ittai is directly connected with the magical properties found in intoning the nenbutsu. Here ittai denotes a mystical spiritual union between the believer and the power of Amida Buddha as an embodiment of the Buddhist Law (hō).

Kiyozawa maintains this idea of a spiritual union between believer and Buddha as well as the understanding of Amida Buddha qua Infinite as a body. However, his reconfiguring of Shin doctrine through the lens of rational philosophy has the effect of making the doctrine more literal. As the Absolute Infinite, Amida loses any transcendent and magical character. For Kiyozawa, the spiritual union between sentient being and Buddha in the doctrine of kihō ittai becomes the actual embodiment of the individual within the cosmic body.

CONCLUSION

Kiyozawa’s understanding of the infinite as both a self-determining whole and as an integrated and immanent organic body provides the means to overcome the fundamental contradiction present in the classical liberal understanding of freedom espoused by Fukuzawa Yukichi. Due to the fundamental identity between finite individual and infinite whole, restrictions upon individual activity are not imposed from without, but arise from out of one’s own nature. Further, like the fingers
on a hand, self and other do not ultimately act from self-interest but rather from the will of the “one mind” of the Infinite. Thus, a harmony of interests occurs.

Kiyozawa’s theoretical response to Fukuzawa is only possible through his radical refiguration of the traditional Shin understanding of Amida. In Kiyozawa’s hands, rather than a transcendent object of devotion and faith, Amida becomes an abstract and rational construct imminent in, and nothing other than, the world. The identification between the Infinite and the world had the unfortunate tendency to justify the status quo as the workings of the divine will. It is for this reason that Kiyozawa can at one and the same time claim to be providing for individual freedom while stating, “In times of crisis, shoulder your rifle and go off to war, practice filial piety and patriotism.” In his thought, the real became the ideal. The Meiji social order as it was became identified with how it should be, and Kiyozawa’s philosophy thus becomes a species of *amor fati*.

However, his position must still be differentiated from that of the state’s national morality. For one, its goal was different. Kiyozawa’s support for the existing order was not to bolster state power *per se* but arose from his own attempts to address the social crisis affecting late Meiji society. More importantly, Kiyozawa remained critical of any religious or ethical system imposed from without. The acceptance of and submission to the present order can only be an individual matter and is a result of the demands of faith which must arise autonomously from within the self itself. It is only after awakening to one’s identity with the whole that the social order is sacralized and made secure.

**NOTES**

1. This paper draws from my dissertation, “Kiyozawa Manshi (1863–1903) and the Search for Autonomy in Modern Japan” (University of Chicago, 2012). A somewhat different version of this paper was presented at the Association of Asian Studies Southeastern Regional Meeting in Greenville, SC in January 2012. I am grateful to our panel moderator, Robert Stolz, for his insightful comments.


3. For this viewpoint, see in particular *Terakawa* Shinshō, *Kiyozawa Manshi ron* (Kyoto: Bunseidō, 1973).

9. By classical liberalism I am referring in particular to a complex of ideas that were associated with eighteenth and nineteenth century thinkers such as John Locke, Adam Smith, and J.S. Mill. In politics it meant individual rights and freedom from state interference, in economics the rational pursuit of self-interest, and in ethics the utilitarian emphasis on collective happiness. These ideas entered Japan from the 1850s onward and became the basis for both the movement for civilization and enlightenment in the 1870s and later for the freedom and people’s rights movement (jīyū minken undō).
12. Ibid., 207.
13. David Howell has noted this as a general process in the transition from Tokugawa to Meiji. Using revealing examples from various strata of society, Howell writes, “During the Tokugawa period, economic relations were given social expression through the status system…. Livelihood had no meaning as an economic activity divorced from status.” However, with the onset of modernity, “the locus of political meaning in everyday life shifted from the corporate status group to production and the individual’s (or household’s) relationship to it” (David Howell, “Territorial and Collective Identity in Tokugawa Japan,” Daedalus 127, no. 3 [Summer 1998]: 125–126).
15. Ibid., 81.
16. In An Encouragement of Learning, Fukuzawa speaks of rights of association and speech. He also supported the freedom of religious belief.
18. Ibid., 405.
19. Ibid., 404.
22. The term “law of equal freedoms” is associated with Herbert Spencer. His version of the law is, “Every man has freedom to do all that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man” (Herbert Spencer, Social Statics [London: John Chapman, 1851], 103).
23. Ibid., 50.
24. Ibid.
27. Descartes defines substance as “an existent thing which requires nothing but itself in order to exist” (Frederick Coppleston, A History of Philosophy, Book Two [New York: Doubleday, 1985], 117).
29. Ibid.
30. Kiyozawa, Skeleton of the Philosophy of Religion, in Kiyozawa Manshi Zenshū, 1:140. In fact, Spinoza’s original formulation is “determinatio negatio est.” It was Hegel who coined “omnis determinatio est negatio” and made it a programmatic statement of his dialectic by creatively (mis)interpreting Spinoza and rendering the phrase as, “All determination is negation.” For Hegel, this indicated the process by which the concept (Begriff) comes to greater conceptual clarity through self-determination, or in Hegel’s terms, self-negation. However, Kiyozawa’s translation reflects Spinoza’s intent and not Hegel’s. For a discussion of the differences between Hegel and Spinoza here see Yitzhak Y. Melamed, “‘Omnis Determinatio Est Negatio’: Determination, Negation, and Self-Negation in Spinoza, Kant and Hegel,” in Spinoza and German Idealism, ed. Yitzhak Y. Melamed and Eckart Förster (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 175–176. Kiyozawa probably encountered the term during his studies of Western philosophy at Tokyo Imperial University (1883–1887) under his American philosophy professor, Ernest Fenollosa. A discussion of the phrase occurs in one of the main texts Fenollosa used for his survey course on modern philosophy. Interestingly, it occurs in the section on Hegel, not

32. Ibid.
33. Ibid., 1:142.
37. Though Kiyozawa defines the soul as apperception, he does not violate the Buddhist doctrine of no-self as apperception is the activity of synthesis of the contents of consciousness and is not a separate essence.
42. The contents of his library can be found in *Kiyozawa Manshi Zenshū*, 9:337–367.
47. Ibid., 166.
48. Ibid., 192.
49. Ibid., 168.
50. Ibid., 198.
52. Kiyozawa, Tarikimon tetsugaku gaikotsu, 2:52.

53. Ibid.


55. Ibid., 146.


57. *Funayama* Shinichi makes this argument in regard to the tradition of Japanese Idealism (*nihon kannenronsha*) and the use of the Mahāyāna Buddhist logic of *soku* (即). He specifically targets *Inoue Enryō* and *Inoue Tetsujirō*, but Kiyozawa is vulnerable to this critique as well. *Funayama* Shinichi, *Nihon no kannenronsha* (Tokyo: Eihōsha, 1956), 310.