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CONTENTS

The Lord of All Virtues
HUĐAYA KANDAHJAYA 1

Bianhong, Mastermind of Borobudur?
HIRAM WOODWARD 25

Theravāda in History
PETER SKILLING 61

Tsongkhapa on Tantric Exegetical Authority and Methodology
DAVID B. GRAY 95

Nāgārjuna’s Worldview: Relevance for Today
KRISTIN LARGEN 119

Pattern Recognition and Analysis in the Chinese Buddhist Canon: A Study of “Original Enlightenment”
LEWIS LANCASTER 141

Basing Our Personhood on the Primal Vow
JUNDO GREGORY GIBBS 183

Shinjin and Social Praxis in Shinran’s Thought
TAKAMARO SHIGARAKI, TRANS. DAVID MATSUMOTO 193

The Metaphor of “Ocean” in Shinran
TAKANORI SUGIOKA, TRANS. MARK UNNO 219

World Macrohistory and Shinran’s Literacy
GALEN AMSTUTZ 229
The Daoist Facet of Kinpusen and Sugawara no Michizane Worship in the Dōken Shōnin Meidoki: A Translation of the Dōken Shōnin Meidoki
TAKUYA HINO  273

The Taoist Priest (Daoshi) in Comparative Historical Perspective: A Critical Analysis
RUSSELL KIRKLAND  307

Pì xiè jí 闢邪集: Collected Refutations of Heterodoxy by Ouyi Zhixu (蕅益智旭, 1599–1655)
CHARLES B. JONES  351

Initiation and the Chinese Hevajra-tantra (T. 18, 892)
CHARLES WILLEMEN  409

A Comparison of the Tibetan and Shingon Homas
RICHARD K. PAYNE  417

BOOK REVIEW

Readings of the Lotus Sūtra, eds. Stephen Teiser and Jacqueline Stone
TAIGEN DAN LEIGHTON  451

BDK ENGLISH TRIPIṬAKA SERIES:
A PROGRESS REPORT  459
INTRODUCTION

During the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, Jesuit missionaries came to China. Among the most renowned of these was Matteo Ricci (1552–1610), or Li Madou 利瑪竇 in Chinese, but he was only one man among many European (primarily Italian and Portuguese) Jesuits to go into the Chinese mission field. By the end of the seventeenth century, there were 140 or so missionaries in China, and despite some objections to their presence and activities, occasional expulsions, and local resistance, the imperial court generally allowed them to stay and work. While they made some converts to Christianity, they also ran into much opposition from the Confucian bureaucracy; objections from this quarter have been well documented.

What has been less well-studied is the Buddhist reaction to the Jesuits’ message. The first sustained study of Buddhist responses was produced in the late 1960s by Douglas Lancashire in a double issue of the Journal of the Oriental Society of Australia. More recently, a monograph has come out by the Swiss scholar Iso Kern containing German translations of several major Buddhist anti-Jesuit writings (including the present document). In English, works by Standaert and Criveller may be consulted as well.

In the case of the Buddhist confrontation with the missionaries, a distinct dynamic came into play. While Confucians could speak from the high position of administrators of social structures and guardians of public morals, the Buddhists had no such official power. In fact, Buddhism had much in common with Catholicism at the time, and Confucian polemics often lumped the two together for condemnation.
Both were foreign religions; both centered on celibate elites; both were critical of society. However, sometimes similarity breeds keener competition rather than cooperation and common cause because the competitors are vying to fill the same “market niche.” In addition, the fact simply remains that Buddhism and Catholicism are two very different religions with real disputes.

GENERAL ISSUES AND THEMES

This work is notable for its depth of engagement with the Jesuits’ literature. During the late Ming period, few specifically Buddhist criticisms of the Christian missions appeared, and of those that have been anthologized in the collection Po xie ji (破邪集, Anthology of Refutations), the majority consist of xenophobic and patriotic polemics with no real depth. As Zhixu says in the introduction to the present work, it was lamentable that no one had seriously engaged the Jesuits’ writings in order to refute them systematically, save one pamphlet that had unfortunately gone out of print: “Only the book Assisting the Holy Dynasty in the Refutation [of Heterodoxy] (聖朝佐闢, Sheng chao zuo pi) has been enough to make the party of heretics tongue-tied, but regretfully it has not enjoyed wide circulation, and since then the disciples of Ricci and Aleni have become very numerous, and the wind of heterodoxy grows ever hotter” (pp. 11771–11772).

In order to correct this deficiency, Zhixu read four of the Jesuit publications as noted below and responded to them in detail. While in many cases he merely refutes isolated phrases without regard to context, in other instances his comments show a serious study and demonstrate a growing understanding of Catholic and Western thought outside the circle of Christian converts.

For example, Zhixu objects to the Christian use of the Chinese term “Heaven” (Tian, 天) as a designation for their deity. He shows himself very aware that the Jesuits, through this terminology, sought to bolster their argument that Confucianism during the Classical period (that is, the time of Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi) had been monotheistic, implying that a conversion to Christianity would constitute a return to the original spirit of the tradition of the ru (rujiao, 儒教). Zhixu responds in section five of the “Further Investigation” by citing the various words that denote some aspect of the ultimate reality in the Confucian classics and demonstrating how they are incompatible with the Jesuits’ idea of God. For scholars who wish to see how the
Jesuit accommodationist strategy was received by educated Chinese, this is invaluable.

Other sections of Zhixu’s response also shed valuable light on the comparison of Chinese and European thought. For example, Zhixu does not accept the idea that anything can have a beginning but not an end. In section 23 of the “Further Investigation,” he argues at great length against the proposition that the human soul, alone among all other phenomena, has a beginning (since it is created by God) but not an end (since it is destined for immortality). In his Buddhist/Confucian framework, either something is eternal or it is impermanent. If it is eternal, then it has no beginning and no end. If impermanent, then it has both a beginning and an end. Buddhist texts in particular make this claim, as it is the difference between a phenomenon being either “unconditioned” or “conditioned.” The assertion that the human soul has a beginning but is nevertheless permanent after it has been created appears to him to hybridize the unconditioned and the conditioned in a way that makes no sense within a Buddhist framework, and so he rejects it as patently absurd.

In section 24 of the “Further Investigation,” Zhixu rejects the Catholic claim that the creator of all things is Himself independent of all causes. After citing a passage from the work of Giulio Aleni in which God is likened to the root of a tree upon which its trunk, branches, and leaves depend, Zhixu snorts that even a tree’s root still depends upon the earth; upon what does the Lord of Heaven depend? This brief dismissal is supported by the unspoken Buddhist assumption that the world consists of an interlocking network of things that are simultaneously the cause and effect of each other with no single, primal, uncaused cause.

Finally, one aspect of Zhixu’s critique of the Jesuits may seem very strange until it is put into a tactical perspective. The text is attributed to one Zhong Zhenzhi 鍾振之, a Confucian scholar, with occasional contributions from a Buddhist Chan master named Jiming 際明. The preface is by a Buddhist monk named Shi Dalang 釋大朗. Nowhere does the name Ouyi Zhixu appear. There are even conversations between Zhong and Jiming reported at the beginning of the text and an exchange of letters between them at the end. Despite this multiplicity of voices, they are all in fact Zhixu himself. Zhong Zhenzhi was his secular style-name, and both Jiming and Dalang were among several monastic names that he used.6
Another curiosity that may appear separate but in fact is intimately related to this is the absence of any specifically Buddhist argument or textual citation anywhere in the text. For example, in section 28 of the “Further Investigation,” Zhixu asserts that “we Confucians” do not venerate buddhas and bodhisattvas. This is not unique; Buddhism is casually mentioned and dismissed in other parts of the text. For the most part, the arguments are aimed at the scholar-official class and are bolstered exclusively by citations from Confucian classics.

In fact, the issues of Zhixu’s many names and his apparent disavowal of Buddhism are closely related. As Ma Xiaoying notes, Buddhists and Christians, in their competition with one another, both vied for the support of the Confucian bloc to gain advantage. As a result, Zhixu knew that he could not couch his refutation of the Jesuits’ teachings in purely Buddhist terms; the Confucians would ignore it. Hence, he wrote under his lay name, specifically his style-name, a name that would have been given him upon passing the first level of Confucian examinations. He hoped that this tactic, along with the exclusive citation of Confucian classic literature in support of his arguments, would help him to turn the Confucians away from the Jesuits.

This prompts the question: to what extent is this really a Buddhist response to the Jesuits? Despite the lengths to which Zhixu goes to hide his Buddhist identity, there is still an overt Buddhist presence in the text in the form of his other, monastic nom de plumes. In addition, many of his arguments are based on Buddhist rather than Confucian presuppositions, and these are easily spotted by someone with knowledge of Chinese Buddhist thought. This will be pointed out in my commentary within the translation itself.

THE TEXTS

The text upon which I have based this translation is found in Ouyi Dashi Quanji (蕅益大師全集, Collected Works of Great Master Ouyi). This text is referenced by page within the translation. For comparison, I also used a Japanese edition published in 1861. This was reprinted in 1972 in the Japanese Editions of Chinese Classics series with notes by Shibata Atsushi. This edition features ofurigana and other markups that greatly aided in the translation.

This text is treated, with translations of short extracts, in Gianni Criveller, Preaching Christ in Late Ming China: The Jesuits’ Presentation of Christ from Matteo Ricci to Giulio Aleni. According to Criveller, the
“Preliminary Investigation” was occasioned by Zhixu’s reading of a Jesuit pamphlet by J. da Rocha and Xu Guangqi entitled *Tianzhu shengxiang lüeshuo* (天主聖像略說, *Short Explanation of the Sacred Images*). The second part of the tract, the “Further Investigation,” is aimed at three other Jesuit works:11

Matteo Ricci’s *True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven* (天主實義, *Tianzhu shiyi*)

João Soerio’s *Brief Account on the Religion of the Lord of Heaven* 天主聖教約言

Giulio Aleni’s *Learned Conversations of Fuzhou* 三山論學紀

Since Ricci’s *True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven* has already been published in an English translation by Douglas Lancashire and Peter Hu, I have not re-translated Zhixu’s quotations from it except as necessary to preserve consistency or because Zhixu himself read it differently; in the latter case, leaving the Lancashire-Hu translation unchanged might make Zhixu’s replies appear irrelevant.12 When Zhixu quotes from any of the other texts, I have translated the passages myself only after consulting the original works in which they appeared. This procedure allowed me to comment on Zhixu’s usage of the quotations. Where English translations appear of the Confucian sources to which Zhixu appeals for support, I have quoted them as appropriate. However, there are instances in which a direct quotation of these translations would not fit the context here. Differences in English translation equivalents or the fact that Zhixu reads the passages differently from the English translators would yield only nonsense. In such cases, I have provided my own translation. In all cases, the sources of the translations are noted. Finally, throughout the process, I consulted Kern’s German translation closely, but I did not base my translation on it. While his critical notes were very helpful and saved me a good bit of time, I re-checked everything myself and made changes as necessary.

*Pì xiè jí* 闢邪集: *COLLECTED REFUTATIONS OF HETERODOXY*


*Collected Refutations of Heterodoxy*

In the dharma there is no heterodoxy or orthodoxy; heterodoxy or orthodoxy reside with people. After the final nirvana of the Buddha Kāśyapa,13 the periods of the true dharma and the counterfeit dharma14 passed away, and the language of permanence, bliss, self, and purity15
became the ninety-five types of heterodox teaching. The Buddha Śākyamuni emerged in the world and thereupon refuted them with [the teachings of] impermanence, suffering, no-self, and impurity. [Their] schemes were washed away, and the holy truths manifested. Arriving at the sala trees [he] entered nirvana and again proclaimed true permanence. This is what is meant by “his illness was eliminated, not the dharma.” Coming to the present day, Buddhist teachings have again become almost heresy (waidao, 外道). Thus, there are men like Matteo Ricci (Li Madou, 利馬竇) and Giulio Aleni (Ai Rulüe, 艾儒略). On a pretext, they came from the great West [Europe], adopted the designation “Confucian learning” (rushu, 儒術), and attacked the teachings of Śākyamuni as their folly. They style their [own doctrine] the “Teaching of the Lord of Heaven” (Tian zhu jiao, 天主教) or the “Learning of Heaven” (Tian xue, 天學). The Buddhist clergy rose up en masse to revile them, but this led only to their own defamation. Only the book Assisting the Holy Dynasty in the Refutation [of Heterodoxy] (Sheng chao zuo pi, 聖朝佐闢) has been enough to make the party of heretics tongue-tied, but regrettably it has not enjoyed wide circulation, and since then the disciples of Ricci and Aleni have become very numerous, and the wind of heterodoxy grows ever hotter.

The layman Zhong Zhenzhi 鍾振之 has accordingly [p. 11772] in his fear written the “Preliminary Investigation” (“Chu zheng,” 初徵) and “Further Investigation” (“Zai zheng,” 再徵) and sent them to Chan Master Jiming 際明禪師. Jiming laughed and said,

Śākyamuni Tathāgata received the repudiation of the six heretical masters, after which [his] teaching of the Way fared greatly. [Master [Seng]zhao’s Treatise on the Immutability of Things received Kongyin’s refutation, and [this] raised it before the [people of the] world, who only then knew to study it. How do I know that these two men, Ricci and Aleni, are not inconceivable bodhisattvas who have come here riding the power of great vows especially to encourage the buddhadharma? Thus, it is nothing over which disciples of Śākyamuni need be indignant or debate. Only let the layman [i.e., Zhong] uphold the study of principle (lixue, 理學), uphold public morality (shidao, 世道), and these will be your refutation. One may primarily defend Confucius and Mencius and secondarily help to illuminate the buddhadharma.

Finally, it fell to Mengshi 間 Chỉ to evaluate [the text] and arrange for the carving of the printing blocks, and he asked the monk Gao’an [Dalang] to add a preface. The monk Gao’an read it through and also
read the two exchanges of correspondence between the author and the Chan master in order to evaluate them.²⁹ He said,

It is good that these two gentlemen Ricci and Aleni were able to pretend to put forward absurd theories in order to touch on the true vehicle. It is good that layman Zhenzhi is able to use the principles of Buddhism to argue Confucian principles. It is good that Chan master Jiming is able to debate by means of not debating and then send [p. 11773] his argument to Mengshi for critique. Ricci and Aleni are inconceivable! Zhenzhi is inconceivable! Mengshi is inconceivable! Jiming is especially inconceivable! Inconceivable heterodoxy! Inconceivable orthodoxy! Inconceivable speech! Inconceivable silence! A public case (gongan, 公案)³⁰ is fully present: By the characteristic of heterodoxy enter into orthodoxy. By the characteristic of orthodoxy enter into heterodoxy. Know that speech is silence; know that silence is speech. This is in the one who has eyes!

Written by the monk Dalang of Gao’an on the Yue Creek on Tianmu Peak in the autumn of the guiwei year (1643).

I. The Preliminary Investigation

[p. 11775] Preliminary Investigation into the Learning of Heaven (Tian xue chu zheng, 天學初徵) by Yishi 逸史 Zhong Shisheng 鍾始聲, courtesy-name (fu る) Zhenzhi 振之 of Jinchang 金閶 [i.e., Suzhou], with critical notes by Mèngshi 梦士 Cheng Zhiyong 程智用, courtesy-name Yongjiu 用九 of Xin’an 新安³²

Master Zhong studied the Book of Changes by the seashore of Zhenze.³³ A certain guest came knocking at his cottage to ask,

I have heard that for the last twelve or thirteen years, you have taken personal responsibility for the eternal lineage of learning, refuting Buddhism and Daoism [lit., “the Buddha and Laozi”] and defending the way of the sages [i.e., Confucianism]. Today [you] are over thirty years old! But is it enough not to [ever] take a peek outside your window, to have no exchanges with famous personages or great men, and furthermore to never even think of putting yourself in the service of the ruler and bring the benefits of peace to the world? Moreover, have you not heard that in recent generations there is this Catholicism (Tianzhujiao, 天主教)? Its people came from Europe. They took one look at our Chinese books and were able to understand them in depth. They could also refute Buddhism and respect
Confucianism. This is to comport deeply with the master’s35 thinking. Could we discuss them together?

Master Zhong was pleased and said, “Is there such a thing? Since they have come from Europe with a bias against Buddhism and [p. 11776] have become partial to Confucianism, does this mean that there is an opportunity to take our darkened sagely way [i.e., Confucianism] and renew its brilliance? I wish to hear their teaching.” The guest then took out the pamphlet Short Explanations on the Sacred Images36 to show him. Master Zhong read it from start to finish. He then reviled it and said: “Bosh! These are nothing more than heretical barbarians! Overtly, they attack Buddhism, but covertly they crib from its chaff. They feign reverence for Confucianism, but in reality they are throwing its teaching-lineage into chaos. Please [let me] take this occasion to attack them with their own teachings.”

[First objection:] They say: “The Lord of Heaven is the great Lord (Zhuzai, 主宰) who at the beginning gave rise to heaven, earth, the spirits, humanity, and all things.”37 But one may ask: Does this great Lord himself have the quality of form or not? If he has the quality of form, then what gave rise to him? Also, if heaven and earth did not yet exist, where did he abide? If he did not have the quality of form, then he is what we Confucians call the Great Ultimate (Taiji, 太極). The Great Ultimate is also the Ultimateless (Wuji, 無極). How could one say it have love or hate? How could one say it wants people to worship and obey it? How could one say it allots fortune and punishment? This is the first of their absurdities (butong, 不通).37

[Second objection:] Moreover, the Great Ultimate is simply the principle that enfolds yin and yang. For this reason, when it stirs, it is yang; when it is at rest, it is yin. Yin and yang can both reach extremes of either good or evil. Therefore, the responsibility for regulating and assisting the two [p. 11777] is man’s alone.38 Confucius said, “It is man who makes the Way great.”39 He also said, “Humanity (ren, 仁) is from the self.”40 Zisi said [in The Doctrine of the Mean], “Let the states of equilibrium and harmony exist in perfection and a happy order will prevail throughout heaven and earth, and all things will be nourished and flourish.”41 The Book of Changes says, “When he precedes Heaven, Heaven is not contrary to him.”42 If, as they say, all creation is to be attributed to the Lord of Heaven, then since he is able to create spirits and humans, why did he create not only the good spirits and people, but the bad spirits and people as well and accumulate this inheritance
through the ten thousand generations? This is the second of their absurdities.

[Third objection:] Also, [with regard to] that Lucifer (露際弗爾) that the Lord of Heaven created, why was he given such great power and ability? If [the Lord of Heaven] did not know that he would give rise to such great pride and conferred them [i.e., power and ability], then He was not wise. If He did know that [Lucifer] would give rise to great pride and still conferred them, then He was not kind [ren, 仁]. Unwise or unkind, yet still [He is] called the Lord of Heaven. This is the third of their absurdities.43

[Fourth objection:] Again, Lucifer was already punished by being sent down to hell but is also allowed to secretly tempt people in this world. This is not like when Shun punished the four rogues; [on the contrary,] it is enfoeffing the arrogant.44 This is the fourth of their absurdities.

[Fifth objection:] Moreover, since heaven and earth [p. 11778] and the myriad things are all the creations of the Lord of Heaven, then he should have chosen to make things that would benefit them and not choose to make things that would harm them, or, having made these [harmful things], should have eliminated them. Why would [the Lord of Heaven] create this body of flesh, these customs (fēngsu, 風俗), and the demons as our three enemies without being able to eliminate them?45 When a good earthly artisan makes an implement, he makes it beautiful. If the image is not beautiful, then he abandons it. Why would not the most great, most venerable, most spiritual, most holy true Lord not be like a good craftsman? This is the fifth of their absurdities.

[Sixth objection:] Confucius said, “Does Heaven say anything?”47 Mencius said, “Heaven does not speak. It simply showed its will by his personal conduct and his conduct of affairs.”48 Now it is said that in olden times Heaven handed down the Ten Commandments. Thus, in what way does it differ from the Celestial Book of the Han-Song imperial sacrifices to Heaven and Earth?49 Nothing exceeds this in deluding the world and insulting the people. This is the sixth of their absurdities.

[Seventh objection:] Moreover, the Lord of Heaven “took birth as a man, and transmitted the great Way.”50 Where did He live prior to descending to take birth? If in heaven, then the Lord of Heaven would depend on heaven to have a place to live, so how could one say that the Lord of Heaven created heaven? If one says that as He created heaven he needed [p. 11779] heaven as a place to live, like a man constructing
a room while living in that room, then prior to creating heaven where would He live? If He does not depend upon anything, then He is like the Great Ultimate (Taiji). It does not correspond to the Great Ultimate in depending upon a heaven while rewarding and punishing human beings, and it does not correspond to the Great Ultimate in taking birth as a man. This is the seventh of their absurdities.

[Eighth objection:] Also, after taking birth as a man, did His original body (benshen, 本身) remain in heaven or was it absent? If absent, then heaven was without its Lord. If present, then [their doctrine] overlaps with the Buddhist doctrine of the two bodies of the Buddha, that is, the true and the response (zhên yìng èr shēn, 真應二身), but without reaching the wondrous illusion of their myriads of transformation bodies. This is the eighth of their absurdities.

[Ninth objection:] Also, they assert that the Lord of Heaven redeemed the faults of all the world with His own body, which is especially absurd. Now the Lord of Heaven is incomparably venerable, and His mercy is boundless. Why not just pardon people’s faults directly; why is there the need to redeem people’s faults with [His own] body without having examined to see from whom they are redeemed? This is the ninth of their absurdities.

[Tenth objection:] Further, if He is able to redeem people’s faults by means of His own body, why was He not able to make them refrain from incurring faults in the first place? This is the tenth of their absurdities.

[Eleventh objection:] Furthermore, since they say that [God has] redeemed the faults of people for ten thousand generations, but now it appears that if one commits faults one will fall into hell, then the redemption is not complete. This is the eleventh of their absurdities.

[Twelfth objection:] We Confucians say that the sagehood of Yao and Shun was not able to cover their sons’ evil. Filial sons and compassionate grandsons cannot change the fault of You and Li. Therefore, “From the emperor down to the mass of the people, all must consider the cultivation of the person as the root.” But now that the Lord of Heaven is able to redeem men’s faults, people can do all the evil they please and wait for the Lord of Heaven to redeem them in his mercy. This is the twelfth of their absurdities.

[Thirteenth objection:] The teachings and rules that have been handed down [by the Jesuits] say that there is only one true Lord who
created things and who is greatest and most praiseworthy. He wants humanity to worship and make offerings to Him and to utterly do away with heaven, earth, the sun and moon, and all the stars. They is different from what the Buddhists call “I alone am honored” (wei wu du zun, 唯吾獨尊)? They covertly imitate [the Buddha's] sayings while publicly anathematizing him. This is the thirteenth of their absurdities.

[Fourteenth objection:] Even though the Buddha said, “I alone am honored,” he still asserted that heaven, the earth, the sun, moon, and stars, all shine back upon the world, and there are protective spirits possessing great merit who bless and protect humanity, and it is fitting to think about repaying their kindness. But these days [the Jesuits] say that one should not [p. 11781] offer [them] worship and sacrifices, thus [manifesting the greater] evil of seeking name and advantage on their own authority than the Buddhists did. This is the fourteenth of their absurdities.

[Fifteenth objection:] Having disallowed the doctrine of rebirth, they still say that peoples' souls (linghun, 靈魂) partake of immortality; it has a beginning but not an end. Thus, [souls] accumulate and become many; where is there room to put them? This is the fifteenth of their absurdities.

[Sixteenth objection:] If one asserts that heaven and hell are both great and can both accommodate [human souls], then how is this different from the doctrines of the Buddhists? This is the sixteenth of their absurdities.

[Seventeenth objection:] Also, they claim that the “great trichilocosm of the Lotus Calyx World” that the Buddhists teach has never been seen by people, and thus is ridiculous. But who has ever seen the heaven and hell that they teach? This is the seventeenth of their absurdities.

[Eighteenth objection:] Also, they assert that although heaven and hell have never been seen, they are still real principles. So, how would one know that the “three thousand lotus calyx” is not a real principle and bitterly refute it? This is the eighteenth of their absurdities.

[Nineteenth objection:] They also assert that, “At the moment at the end of life, having then heard and followed God’s teaching, one can still repent, reform, and [one’s sins] will be turned away.” Then this is exactly the same as what the Buddhists say about the ten recitations (shi nian, 十念) at the end of one’s life. If what you say is true, then what the Buddhists say is also true. If you say [p. 11782] “in dependence on
the Ten Commandments," then what the Buddhists say must also be supported from the ten precepts. [If] you say “truly bringing forth from one’s own body and mind,” then the Buddhists also say, “truly bringing forth from one’s own body and mind.” If you say that “By the power of the repentance of a true mind and right intention one will expiate [sin] and not dare sin again,” then the Buddhists also say, “By the power of the repentance of a true mind and right intention one will expiate [sin] and not dare sin again.”

They steal everything from the Buddhists and then say it’s all not true. This is the nineteenth of their absurdities.

**[Twentieth objection:]** Also, the Buddhists specialize in making clear how all the myriad phenomena (wan fa, 萬法) are mind-only, and that therefore all ordinary phenomena (fan shi, 凡事) depend only upon the One Mind. Since you [Jesuits] have made specially clear that all the myriad phenomena are only [created by] the Lord of Heaven, then it suffices that ordinary phenomena depend only upon the one Lord of Heaven. So how do you use [the argument that] things come forth from one’s own body and mind? If you continue to want things to come forth from one’s own body and mind, then the power is not exclusively with the Lord of Heaven. This is clear. This establishes the Lord of Heaven on a delusion. This is the twentieth of their absurdities.

**[Twenty-first objection:]** You want to attack the “two houses of Buddhism and Daoism,” so you need to detail the root of their illness; only then will they be convinced. Now if you say that they [Buddhists and Daoists] “want people to give some of their wealth in alms, prepare some vegetarian fare, burn some [p. 11783] paper money, and all this will count as merit,” then I’m afraid that those two [i.e., Buddhists and Daoists] will not necessarily be convinced. And if you moreover keep teaching people to make offerings and worship before the sacred images (or icons) of the Lord of Heaven, then how are you any different [from Buddhists and Daoists]? This is the twenty-first of their absurdities.

**[Twenty-second objection:]** We Confucians say that all things comprise the one Great Ultimate (Taiji); “That which Heaven confers on them we call their nature.” Because of this, each person can take their place in the Mean. The highest and humblest ranks therefore can inspire awe without being disordered. Thus, the emperor worships the Lord on High (Shangdi, 上帝); princes sacrifice to the mountains, rivers, and gods of soil and grain (sheji, 社稷); high officials perform
the five offerings (wu si, 五祀); and the gentry make offerings to their ancestors. [But] now [the Jesuits] have said that the Lord of Heaven is the greatest and most venerable, and they go on to tell every family to serve [Him] and in every household to honor [Him]. How does this differ from images of the Buddha and Laozi? Yet they go unreasonably commending themselves as different. This is the twenty-second of their absurdities.

Comment: Here, the criticism is twofold. First, that in having everyone worship the greatest deity regardless of social position, the Jesuits are denying the Confucian ideal of a harmonious, hierarchical social order. If the Lord of Heaven is at the apex of divinity, then only the emperor should worship Him. Second, their teachings do not differ from those of Buddhists and Daoists in this respect, so they have no originality or uniqueness.

Thus, I say: [The Jesuits] openly argue against Buddhism while secretly imitating it; they falsely [claim to] respect Confucianism while in reality they are destroying it. Expel their people, destroy their books, and forbid their icons throughout the land; are they not to be considered traitors to China? I hear that their heretical followers are intelligent debaters. [If] there are any who can answer this investigation, then I will make another.

II. The Further Investigation

[p. 11785] Further Investigation into the Learning of Heaven (Tianxue zai zheng, 天學再徵) by Yishi 逸史 Zhong Shisheng 鍾始聲, courtesy-name (fu, 甫) Zhenzhi 振之 of Jinchang 金閶 [in Suzhou], with critical notes by Mengshi 夢士 Cheng Zhiyong 程智用, courtesy-name Yongjiu 用九 of Xin’an 新安

After Master Zhong wrote his “Preliminary Investigation into the Learning of Heaven,” a guest read it and laughed, saying, “Really! How reckless you are! You have only just heard the doctrines of [the Lord of] Heaven; you have not yet penetrated them deeply. You quickly found some so-called ‘absurdities,’ and you critiqued them. The master should read further the Xilai yi (西來意), San shan lun xueji (三山論學記), and the Shengjiao yueyan (聖教約言). Then, what is absurd will be with you and not with them.” [So] Master Zhong obtained them and read them carefully and afterwards inquired into them as follows.
They say:

[Now, when we observe] the supreme heaven we see that it moves from the east, while the heavens of the sun, moon, and stars travel from the west. Each thing follows the laws proper to it, and each is secure in its own place. If there were no Supreme Lord to control and to exercise authority, would it be possible to avoid confusion? For example, when a boat crosses a river or the sea and is enveloped by wind and waves, if there is no danger of its foundering and the passage is made in safety, one can be sure there is someone with his hand on the tiller who knows his seamanship, etc.72

The “Investigation” says: This is a matter of a boat crossing a river or a sea. Each boat has to have a tillerman, but I have never heard that the tillerman universally operated the movements of all boats. Moreover, it is not the case that those who steer boats are also the ones who build boats. Can one say that in heaven there is one Lord, and that He both created and moves [all things]?

They say: “Material things cannot come to completion of their own volition, but must have a cause external to them to bring them to fruition. A tower or a building cannot rise of its own accord, but is always completed at the hands of artisans. . . . Heaven and earth cannot come into being by their own will, but arise from the Lord of Heaven, etc.”73

The “Investigation” says: This is just about artisans building buildings and residences. [But artisans] must have orders [from someone] to complete the work. As to the Lord of Heaven completing heaven and earth, who ordered it? Workmen complete buildings and residences; they cannot then be the lords of those buildings and residences. How can he who completed heaven and earth also be the Lord of heaven and earth?

They say: “[T]he things in this world are exceedingly numerous, and if there were no supreme Lord to keep and maintain order among them, they would inevitably [p. 11787] disperse and be destroyed. . . . Therefore, each family has but one head, and each nation has but one sovereign. . . . A man has only one body, and a body has only one head,” etc.74

The “Investigation” says: It is all right to say that a single body does not have two heads; one cannot say that besides a single body with a single head there are not other bodies and other heads. It is all right to say that a single family does not have two heads; it is not all right to
say that outside of this single family with its single head, there are not other families with other heads. It is all right to say that a nation does not have two sovereigns; it is not all right to say that outside of this single nation with its single sovereign there are not other nations and other sovereigns. It is also all right to say that heaven does not have two Lords; is it all right to say uniquely that outside of this one heaven with its one Lord there cannot be other heavens with other Lords?

Moreover, although a body has only one head, the head must be produced along with the four limbs and the whole body; the head does not produce the four limbs and the whole body. Although a family has only one head, this head of the household must come into being along with the dependents, children, and servants; the head of the family does not produce the dependents, children, and servants. Although a nation has only one sovereign, the sovereign must come into being along with all the ministers, officers, and people; the sovereign does not produce the ministers, officers, and people. Thus, although [p. 11788] one heaven only has one Lord, he must come into being along with the spirits, demons, people, and things; can one say that this Lord produces the spirits, demons, people, and things?

*Comment:* This is a specifically Buddhist argument. In the first place, Zhixu criticizes Ricci for apparently thinking there is only one cosmos and that therefore there can only be one Lord of it. In Buddhist cosmology, there are multiple worlds, and so there could well be multiple Lords in each one, even though each world could indeed have only one Lord. In the second place, Zhixu sees Ricci as positing a pre-existent Lord who is self-sufficient and creates all things without in turn being affected by them. To this, Zhixu opposes the Buddhist doctrine of interdependence in which lines of causality move in all directions at once. The Lord of Heaven could not be what he is independently of creation, and, therefore, creatures create him as well as vice versa. Neither of these points could be pronounced from a strictly Confucian perspective, and it is noteworthy that Zhixu cites no Confucian text here.

*[Section 4]* They say: “The Lord of Heaven is not heaven and not earth. [His] loftiness and intelligence are much more extensive and much more ample than that of heaven and earth. He is not a ghost or a spirit; His spiritual essence transcends all ghosts and spirits. He is not a man; He totally surpasses all sages and men of wisdom” . . . “He lacks
any beginning and any end,” [and] “No place can contain Him, and yet there is no place where He is not present,” etc.76

The “Investigation” says: Since there is no place that He does not fill, then He is not only in heaven, but also in hell. He not only fills heaven and earth, but He is also in the places of spirits, ghosts, people, animals, grass, trees, and various impurities. If one says that He is high in heaven, the most exalted, with none higher, then one does not fulfill the meaning of being present everywhere. If one says that He pervades every place, then one does not establish the substance of being most exalted. Or perhaps one salvages this by saying that the Lord of Heaven is revered like the sun in the sky, whose light goes everywhere. Although it pervades in this fashion, it does not lose its exaltation, and although venerable, its light goes out from the source to pervade everywhere. Now, the “Investigation” further says: [p. 11789] This is still to have a place, direction, borders, and image. The sun has form, and it is said that the Lord of Heaven made it. So if the Lord of Heaven has form, then who made Him?

[Section 5] They say: “Our Lord of Heaven is the Sovereign on High (Shangdi, 上帝) mentioned in the [ancient Chinese] canonical writings,”77 and then they go on to quote what several Hymns [of Zhou (i.e., the Odes)] say, what the Yijing transmits, the Doctrine of the Mean, and so on, in order to prove their case.

The “Investigation” says: How profound is their ignorance of Confucian principles! That which our Confucians call “Heaven” is of three types.78 The first is the one upon which one gazes and is vast and hazy (cangcang, 蒼蒼). The words, “is only this bright shining spot, but when viewed in its inexhaustible extent”79 mean just this.

The second is the Heaven that is the controller of the world who superintends the good and punishes the bad. This is what is called Shangdi in the Odes, the Yijing, and Doctrine of the Mean. They [i.e., the Jesuits] only know this and nothing more. This Sovereign of Heaven (Tiandi 天帝) only rules the world; he did not create the world. He is like an earthly ruler who only rules the people; he does not create the people. To absurdly think that he is a Lord who creates people and things is a great absurdity.80

The third is that which inherently has the nature of numinous brightness (ling ming, 靈明), which has no beginning and no end, which is neither produced nor extinguished. This is called “Heaven.”
The primordial source of heaven, earth, and the myriad things [p. 11790] is called “destiny” (ming, 命). Thus, when the *Doctrine of the Mean* says, “What Heaven has conferred [also ming, 命] is called the nature,” it is not [referring to] the bright and hazy sky, nor to “Heaven” in the sense of the Sovereign on High. “Confer” here is not that which means “by specific instruction,” nor is it understood to mean “to endow.” Confucius said, “At fifty, I knew the decrees [also ming, 命] of Heaven,” truly and deeply proving this fundamental nature.

Comment: The word ming 命 has several valences, which can cause confusion. It can mean “destiny,” and it can mean “to order” or “to confer,” as a king might issue orders or confer benefits. Zhixu’s point here is that, when one encounters the word ming in Confucian texts, one should understand it as “destiny,” that with which one is born and constitutes part of one’s nature. The Jesuits, by equating the Heaven that confers one’s nature with the Christian God, have illegitimately ascribed to Heaven the kind of ability to bestow by decree that a sovereign might exercise, and they thus have not understood Heaven in an authentically Confucian way.

We also call it “the mean” (zhong, 中). Thus it is said, “While there are no stirrings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, or joy, the mind may be said to be the mean.”

This is “the mean”; it is the great root of everything under heaven. It is also called “change” (yi, 易), and thus it is said, “Change is without thought and without purpose; in quiescence, it causes everything to move. It responds, and thus can penetrate all under heaven.”

It is also called “innate knowing [of the good],” and thus it is said, “Their knowledge being complete, their thoughts were sincere.” It is also called “not seeing, not hearing” (bu du, bu wen, 不賭不聞), and it is also called “alone.” Thus it is said, “[The superior man] does not wait till he sees things to be cautious, nor till he hears things to be apprehensive” [and] “Therefore the superior man is watchful over himself, when he is alone.” This is what Confucius meant by the words “Be in awe of the decrees of Heaven.” It is also called “mind,” and thus it is said, “The great end of learning is nothing else but to seek for the lost mind.”

It is also called “self” (ji, 己), and thus it is said, “What the superior man seeks is in himself” [and] “Is the practice of humaneness from a man himself, or is it from others?” It is also [p. 11791] called “myself” (wo, 我), and thus it is said, “All things are already complete.
in ourselves.” It is also called “sincerity” (cheng, 誠), and thus it is said, “When intelligence comes from sincerity, this is called ‘nature’” [and] “Sincerity is the way of Heaven.” This is truly the primal source of heaven, earth, and the myriad things, and it is truly without joy or anger, without creating or acting, lacking in rewards or punishments, and having no sound or odor. And yet how effulgent is the power of the Mean in Heaven’s nature! Principle (li, 理) and primal material (qi, 氣), substance (ti, 體), and function (yong, 用) are all complete.

Comment: In neo-Confucian thought, both of these pairs of terms relate a quiescent and an active element that work together to produce all the things in creation. Zhixu is emphasizing that the Taiji, unlike the Christian God as he understands it, does not actively create from outside the world, as a potter making a pot, but rather is a dynamic, creative process within the world that manifests in endless transformations according to patterns.

Thus it is said, “[In] change there is the Great Ultimate; this produced the two modes,” etc. But although it says “[In] change there is the Great Ultimate,” still, the Great Ultimate is nothing but this change. It is like the nature of wetness, which is water, and yet water completely is this wetness. Although it says, “The Great Ultimate produced the two modes [yin and yang],” still, the two modes [yin and yang] completely are the Great Ultimate. Although it says the two modes [yin and yang] produced the four images (si xiang, 四象), still, the four images are also completely the two modes. Although it says, “The four images produced the eight trigrams,” the eight trigrams are also completely the four images. They multiply together into the sixty-four [hexagrams], and the sixty-four multiplied together become the 4,096. Among these 4,096, if you take as an example a single hexagram or a single line (yao, 爻), there are none that are not in their entirety the eight trigrams, or in their entirety the four images, or in their entirety the two [p. 11792] modes of yin and yang, or in their entirety the Great Ultimate, or in their entirety the principle of Change. It is as when one touches one wave of the great ocean, there is nothing in its substance that is not entirely water and entirely wetness. As to “nature,” it is also like sprinkling water, silver, or pearls; they all remain round [or complete, yuan, 圓]. Thus, as for Heaven, ghosts and spirits, and humans all being able to see the whole of the Great Ultimate, and the principle of Change in every affair (shi, 事) and thing (wu, 物). If in Heaven, then it is called
the Sovereign on High; if in ghosts and spirits, then it is called spiritual brightness; if in humans, then it is called the sagely person upon whom devolves the right of governing, transforming, and leading.

Now let us suppose that prior to the division of Heaven and Earth there was one who was most spiritual and holy called the Lord of Heaven. Such a being would have the power to govern and there would be no disorder; he would be good and there would be no evil. Also, why would there be any need to wait for subsequent powers of spirits or philosophies of sages to trim, complete, or supplement its features? People also would not “combine their virtue with [that of] Heaven and Earth” or “precede Heaven and yet Heaven is not contrary to him”! How could they know that we Confucians are the line that “continues Heaven [’s teaching] and establishes morals (继天立极)?”

Comment: Zhixu’s argument here is against the Christian notion of Heaven as an omnipotent, law-giving, and thus perfectly virtuous God. He is saying that such a God would have no need to create humanity in order to cooperate in bringing about peace and virtue. He opposes this with the Confucian idea that humanity takes the Heavenly Way and instantiates it in society, thus bringing it to perfection in practice. If, as the Jesuits say, God’s virtue is already perfect even before creation, then creation seems pointless and there is nothing for humanity to do or contribute.

[Section 6] They say: There are three levels of souls. The lowest is called the vegetative soul [shenghun, 生魂] and is the soul of grass and trees. The middle level is called the sentient [p. 11793] soul [juehun, 觉魂] and is the soul of birds and beasts. These two [kinds] are both extinguished; they also say [that these two kinds of soul] have both a beginning and an end. The highest is called the intellectual soul [linghun, 灵魂], that is, the human soul. This soul is not extinguished; they also say that it has a beginning but no end."

The “Investigation” says: The intellectual differs from the sentient in having a beginning but not an end. The sentient is [supposedly] different from the vegetative, so how is it that they both have a beginning and an ending? Moreover, as to their assertion that birds and beasts have the sentient but not the intellectual soul and that only humans have the intellectual, we can see foolish people in the world who think only about [their] desire for drink, food, and sexual desires. They don’t know about anything else, so how do they differ from birds and beasts?
We can see righteous dogs and righteous monkeys in the world who give up their lives to save their masters, who censure officials and penetrate principle. How do they differ from human beings? Thus, Mencius further says: “That whereby man differs from the birds and beasts is but small. The mass of people cast it away, while superior men preserve it.” How can one ignorantly distinguish them as one having an end, the other not having an end?

[Section 7] They say: “Where in the teachings of the Duke of Chou and Confucius . . . is there a person who cares to show disrespect to the empress and emperor and to insist that he is as worthy of respect as him? If an ordinary citizen asserts that he is as noble as the emperor, can he avoid being guilty of a crime? If people in the world are not permitted recklessly to compare themselves with the king of this world, how can they regard themselves as being the same as the Heavenly Sovereign on High?”

The “Investigation” says: That common people would not dare to mimic [their] emperor and king is “names and ranks”; that they do not dare to reproach the emperor and king is “virtuous nature.” Thus it is said: “At court there is nothing like nobility . . . and for helping one’s generation and presiding over the people, there is nothing like virtue.” It is also said: “When it comes to the practice of humanity, one should not yield even to his teacher.” It is also said: “From the Son of Heaven down to the mass of the people, all must consider the cultivation of the person the root.” In this way, King Wen [of the Zhou] was a prince over the people, whose “purity was unceasing,” and could be worthy of Heaven. Confucius was a commoner (pifu, 匹夫), and yet his handing down the ancestral doctrines and regulations is not called lèse majesté. Moreover, as to a father’s producing a son, who would not want their own son to be able to equal them? Since this “Lord of Heaven” is to be considered a “Great Father” that truly gives birth to people, then how could he not want people to be his equal?

[Section 8] They say: “The minds of the wise embrace heaven and earth and contain the myriad things; [but] these are not the real substance of heaven, earth, and the myriad things. . . . If still water or a bright mirror were to reflect all of the myriad things, and thereupon we said that the bright mirror and still water equally possessed heaven and earth, that is, were able to produce them, how would that be admissible? . . . The Lord of Heaven is the source of the myriad things and is
able to produce the myriad things. If [p. 11795] people were the same as Him, then they should also be able to produce them."

The “Investigation” says: The reflections in still water or a bright mirror are the myriad things. The mirror or the water are here; the myriad things are there; there is a distinction, and there is a boundary [separating them]. Thus we know that they are reflections and not the substance [of what is reflected]. This is “the mind . . . contains heaven, earth, and all the myriad things.” [But] can you [really] point to the mind’s boundaries and distinctions as you can [that of] the mirror or water? If [one asserts that] the mind has no form and is not able to produce the myriad things, it be [the case] that the Lord of Heaven, who also lacks form, would be unable to produce the myriad things. If [it is true that] the Lord of Heaven lacks form and yet is able to form forms, then how is the mind alone unable to form forms while lacking form?

Comment: This question would be of particular interest to Zhixu as a Buddhist monk. In the text of The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven that immediately precedes the passage that Zhixu quotes, Buddhist concepts of the mind’s role in creating reality are specifically criticized. Zhixu would of course want to answer this, but, consistent with his strategy of representing himself as a defender of Confucian interests, he does not quote any Buddhist texts or raise any Buddhist doctrinal arguments to refute the Jesuits. Since no Confucian text spoke to this point, Zhixu was forced to rely on pure logic.

The structure of Zhixu’s refutation seems to be as follows: (1) They say that the mind only reflects or embraces things; it does not actually create them or bring them about any more than water or a mirror bring into being the things that they reflect. (2) But the mind is not like water or a mirror. Those have definite forms, and you can distinguish them from the things reflected in them. The mind does not have form in the same way. (This would go with the general Buddhist view that the mind is nothing but its contents and that therefore it cannot be clearly distinguished from its contents in the way that a mirror can be distinguished from that which is reflected in it.) (3) If one then counters that something without form cannot create things with form, then you contradict other assertions to the effect that the Lord of Heaven has no form, yet creates things
that have form. If this is possible for the Lord of Heaven, why not for the human mind?

[Section 9] They say: “There is that part which is internal to things, such as yin and yang. There is that part which is external to things, such as the category of active causes (zuozhe, 作者). The Lord of Heaven created things, . . . and thus is external to things.”  

Comment: In this part of the text, Ricci is refuting the view of both Buddhism and Daoism that the ultimate creative principle inheres in all things. For Ricci, this is pantheism as understood in the West. Just after the part that Zhixu excerpts here, Ricci asserts that the Lord of Heaven, being the universal active cause, has to be external to all things. Like the preceding passage, this would have been of special interest to a Buddhist such as Zhixu. I have translated zuozhe 作者 as “active causes” because earlier, when Ricci was discussing the four Aristotelian causes, he used this term for “active cause,” and in this passage he also explains that “active cause” is external to phenomena. The full passage reads: 四之中，其模者、質者此二者在物之內，為物之本分，或為陰陽是也；作者、為者此二者在物之外，超於物之先者也，不能為物之本分。Lancashire and Hu translate this passage thus: “Of these four [causes], the formal cause and the material cause, as found in phenomena, are internal principles of phenomena or, if one wishes to state it in that way, are the Yin . . . and Yang . . . principles. The active and final causes lie outside phenomena and exist prior to phenomena, and therefore cannot be said to be internal principles of phenomena.” Ricci then goes on to state that the Lord of Heaven is among these latter two types of causes, and thus exists outside of phenomena.  

The “Investigation” says: That which is above heaven creates heaven, earth, and the myriad things; it must necessarily be external to heaven, earth, and the myriad things. If an artisan makes a vessel or a basin, [then] he must be external to the vessel or the basin. That is definite! However, this Lord of Heaven has boundaries and has distinctions [as argued in the previous section], [p. 11796] and so is not one who could have pervaded everything from the beginning. Thus, He must have parts, and He must undergo change. How could He be
without beginning and without end and [still] be able to be the Lord of the myriad things in the world?

Comment: It appears that Zhixu is pointing out what he takes to be a contradiction in the Jesuit’s arguments. On the one hand, the Jesuit claim that God is separate from creation means that He must have boundaries and be distinct from other entities; He cannot pervade all. On the other hand, anything that has boundaries and creates must undergo change, and thus cannot be beginningless, endless, and changeless. If one remembers that Zhixu’s mind is working in Buddhist categories, then it appears that he is taking the Jesuits to be asserting that God is a true ātman, while at the same time asserting qualities of God that Buddhists use to prove the teaching of anātman. It could not but appear a contradiction. Again, since this is a Buddhist argument, Zhixu cannot appeal to Confucian texts for support, but must rely on logic alone.

[Section 10] They say: “That which has form is in a place and therefore can fill that place. Spirit is without form, so how could it fill up its place? [A space] the size of a grain [of rice] can be the residence for ten thousand spirits. So why speak only of [spirits of] the past? The spirits of the future will also be accommodated without obstruction.”

The “Investigation” says: It is fine for them to say that spirits are without form. However, to be without form also entails being without coming or going, and also to be without number, and also to be without arising or cessation, and yet they say that they are produced by the Lord of Heaven. How is this permissible?

[Section 11] They say: “The creator of heaven, earth, and the myriad things is the father of the great multitude. Also, the one who rules and gives sustenance at the [right] time is the highest Lord. If people of the world do not reverence and serve Him, then they have no father and no prince, and they are unfilial and disloyal in the extreme.”

The “Investigation” says: The phenomena (fa, 法) of this world are not omnipotent. Therefore, heaven [p. 11797] and earth can cover and support, but they cannot illuminate. The sun and moon can illuminate, but they cannot bear and rear [offspring]. Fathers and mothers can bear and rear [offspring], but they cannot instruct. Teachers and friends can instruct, but they cannot reward or punish. The sovereign can reward and punish, but not without some slipping through the net.
Ghosts and spirits can reward and punish without anyone slipping the net, but again, they cannot cover and support, illuminate, and so on. If the Lord of Heaven is indeed omnipotent, then the Lord of Heaven could directly cover, support, illuminate, bear, rear, instruct, reward, and punish, and what need would there be for the actions of heaven, earth, the sun, the moon, the prince, parents, ghosts, and spirits? If we still await heaven to cover, earth to support, and so on up to parents to bear and princes to rule, then where is the omnipotence of the Lord of Heaven? The lives of human beings are manifestly visible right now. Heaven covers them; earth supports them; the sun and moon illuminate them; fathers beget them; mothers rear them; princes of the country govern them; ghosts and spirits judge and protect them. However, if one is unaware of their kindness and virtue, and credits the kindness to a Lord of Heaven who has never been seen or heard, and regards him as the “great father” and “great prince,” then one must necessarily regard one’s own father and prince as a “little father” and “little prince”! How could this be without an extreme lack of filial piety and an extreme lack of loyalty?

Also: suppose they aver that the Lord of Heaven’s omnipotence is delegated\textsuperscript{117} to heaven, earth, the sun, the moon, princes, parents, ghosts, and spirits as the ruler of a country might delegate his functions to his palace ministers and directors of pasturage.\textsuperscript{118} If he does so, then when the common people do well, then the officials may reward them; if the common people incur guilt, then the officials may punish them; what need is there for each and every matter to come before the ruler of the country?

Also, the service that the common people undertake is service only to the officials in charge without disobedience. This is considered [the same as] serving the country’s ruler. Why must [they] only serve a single ruler and be forbidden to serve the officials in charge? Now, to declare that immortals and buddhas are usurpers, and to forbid rendering service to them, is like this. [To maintain that] heaven, earth, the sun and moon, ghosts and spirits, were indeed made by the Lord of Heaven in order to cover, support, illuminate, and protect humanity, and yet to forbid worshiping and making offerings to them: is this not strange?

[Section 12] They say: “The mind, nature, and destiny of humanity are originally what the Lord of Heaven has bestowed.”\textsuperscript{119}
The “Investigation” says: “What Heaven has conferred is called the nature.” Zi Yang’s (紫陽, i.e., Zhu Xi’s) explanation [of this] is in profound error. I have already explained the main meaning before. That which is bestowable would have [p. 11799] to have form; what form or image do the mind and nature have that could be bestowed? If they lack form and image but are still bestowed, then the Lord of Heaven’s own spiritual brightness must have been bestowed [on Him by someone else]. Also, if it can be bestowed, it can also be taken away. How then do you say that it has a beginning but no end?

[Section 13] They say: “First there must be things; only afterward is there principle.” Then they quote the Odes where it says: “There are things, and there are their laws.”

The “Investigation” says: Principle is that which connects both the ends and beginnings of things, enabling them to come to completion. Thus it is said, “Sincerity is the end and beginning of things; without sincerity there would be nothing.” When the Odes says, “There are things, and there are their laws,” it is properly [interpreted as meaning that] from principle, things come to completion, and that is why these very things are principle. This is like [using] gold to make a utensil; the entirety of the implement is gold. If one says that first there are things and then there is principle, then prior to their being things, would there be no principle? Since the lack of things would equate to the lack of principle, then when there is no heaven or earth, it would especially entail that there would be no principle, and this would be a case of the very profound error that the Lord of Heaven, being prior to heaven and earth, has no principle.

[p. 11800] [Section 14] They say: “It is necessary that first there be that which has no beginning, and then afterward can there be that which has a beginning; that which is formless, and afterward that which is able to give form to forms. . . . Before my body could come to be, there had to be a father and mother to give me birth; there must be the Lord of Heaven to confer virtue upon me.”

The “Investigation” says: What a felicitous theory this “without beginning, without form” is! If the Lord of Heaven is beginningless, then are father and mother also beginningless? The Lord of Heaven has no form, so must one’s father and mother also lack form?

Perhaps we should understand them as saying that father and mother have form, and therefore they have a beginning. The Lord of Heaven lacks form, and therefore is beginningless. [To this] the
“Investigation” says that my body has form, and therefore it has a beginning. My mind and nature lack form; how would you then say that they are not beginningless?

[Section 15] They say: “Heaven and earth are like a palace. Palaces and towers must await a master (zhu, 主) to have built them, and only afterward are they completed. Even so for the greatness of this heaven and earth; if there were no Lord for them, could they actually create and complete themselves?”

The “Investigation” says: Before a palace is completed, the Lord, along with laborers and artisans, depend upon land and workshops [with which to build]; before heaven and earth are completed, upon what does the Lord of Heaven depend? Again, a palace requires earth, wood, tiles, and stones to be completed; what things does [the Lord of Heaven] use to complete [p. 11801] heaven and earth? Again, before there are heaven and earth, are there materials for the completion of heaven and earth? Do these materials exist primordially, or does the Lord of Heaven have to produce them? Moreover, where are they kept? Are they inside the Lord of Heaven’s body, or outside it? If outside, then the Lord of Heaven does not exist everywhere. If inside, then did He not have to sever a bit of His own self in order that it might become heaven, earth, and the myriad things?

[Section 16] They say: “The explanation of the “Great Ultimate” (Taiji, 太極) is nothing more than the two words “principle” (li, 理) and “raw energy and material” (qi, 氣); I have never heard it said that it had bright intelligence or sentience. Since there is no intelligence or sentience, by what means does [the Great Ultimate] superintend the myriad transformations?”

Comment: In Aleni’s text, this is the beginning of his response to his interlocutor, the Grand Secretary (xiangguo, 相國) Ye Xianggao (葉向高, 1562–1627), who asserts that the Great Ultimate creates heaven and earth by dividing or distinguishing them. Aleni is repeating the neo-Confucian belief that creation occurs within the Great Ultimate when “material,” which includes both matter and energy, organizes into patterned transformations in accordance with “principle.”

The “Investigation” says: Did Confucius not say, “[In] change there is the Great Ultimate; this produced the two modes”? Now change (yi, 易) is precisely the original nature of bright intelligence and sentience. Thus, [change is] “without consciousness and is without deliberate
action. Being utterly still, it does not initiate movement, but when stimulated it is commensurate with all the causes for everything [that happens in the world].’’ However, there is properly no need to take this as superintending the myriad transformations. If the myriad transformations had a definite superintendent, then things would change only for the good, never for the bad, only for pleasure and never for suffering, and the teachings of sages on the cultivation of the Dao would be of no use at all!

Comment: Aleni’s text faulted teachings of the Great Ultimate (Taiji) for failing to account for the apparent order of things. He argued that such order ought to lead one to believe that a sentient, intelligent being designed the world and governs its processes. Zhixu, in response, appeals to the first part of the Xici commentary of the Book of Changes, which speaks specifically of the Great Ultimate, and explicitly denies that it has intelligence or sentience in any human sense and yet governs the world. Furthermore, Zhixu uses the cosmology of this part of the Book of Changes to argue that intelligence and sentience are subsidiary phenomena that come into being after the Great Ultimate and through its creative ordering. Being subsequent, they cannot come before the creation and governance of the world as Aleni assumes.

[p. 11802] [Section 17] They say: “Confucians say that each and every thing contains a single “Great Ultimate.” Thus, the Great Ultimate is of the same substance as things. It is limited to things, and thus cannot be considered the Lord of heaven and earth.”

Comment: Zhixu has greatly truncated Aleni’s text here, but without altering the main point. Here is a translation of Aleni’s text: “The Confucians say that each and every thing contains a single Great Ultimate. Thus, how could the Great Ultimate fail to be the original [good] quality (yuan zhi, 元質) of things and of one substance with things? Since it is of one substance with things, then it is confined to things and cannot be considered the Lord of heaven and earth. Thus, in your esteemed country’s maxims things are illuminated in an orderly way, and I have never heard it said that things are the Great Ultimate.”

The “Investigation” says: The Great Ultimate is wondrous principle; it has no internal divisions, no boundaries, and thus each and
every thing possesses it in its entirety, and its entire substance is within things, yet it is not confined within [any individual] thing. Confucius said: “It forms and gives scope to the transformations of heaven and earth, and nothing goes beyond it; with meticulous care it completes the myriad things and nothing is left out. It penetrates through the Way day and night, and one knows.” This is what is meant. You aver that the one single Lord of Heaven is not of the same substance as things, and so must abide above things. This shows that He has divisions and has boundaries. How can you claim that there is nowhere He does not pervade?

Comment: There is a very fundamental philosophical difference between Chinese thought and European theology on display here. Aleni takes for granted that the orderly processes of the universe point to an intelligence that directs them but is outside of them, a “superintendent” (zhuzai, 主宰) in my translation. Zhixu takes for granted that the orderliness of natural processes is due to the patterning of events by “principle” (li, 理), which requires neither sentience nor intelligence for events to proceed along regular pathways. In fact, as shown in the previous section, Zhixu affirms that sentience and intelligence are effects of the orderliness of the cosmos, not causes of it. He finishes by pointing out that the Christian supposition of a superintendent of creation who stands outside of it contradicts the other Christian claim that God is omnipresent.

[Section 18] They say: “Human beings are created by the Lord of Heaven, and they incline entirely toward the good. If there are some who are evil, then that is certainly their own doing.”

Comment: Aleni’s original text has or 有為惡, whereas Zhixu’s text in both editions at my disposal substituted 乃 for 有. I have decided to follow Aleni’s original here. In context, Aleni is answering Ye Xianggao’s objection that an omnipotent God could surely have created humans to be wholly good. Aleni explains that through their own free actions, humans who are originally good may become bad, and this does not impugn God’s omnipotence. The structure of his argument is, perhaps very intentionally, parallel to the case Mencius makes when he asserts that human nature is originally good even as one can see manifestly evil people in the world.
The “Investigation” says: Since the Lord of Heaven is omnipotent, how could He love the good and yet people are not good; hate evil and yet people commit evil? To rescue it [i.e., Aleni’s argument] they say: “It is like parents who give birth to a son; they only desire his good, and do not desire evil for him. If the son then inclines to do evil, how would the parents be at fault?” The “Investigation” says: Parents give birth to the son’s body; they do not give birth to the son’s mind and nature (xin xing, 心性), and thus they do not have free rein in this. Since the Lord of Heaven produced [people’s] minds and natures, how could He not produce only good minds and natures?

[Section 19] They say: “The Lord of Heaven created things in the desire that they nourish humans; He created humans in the desire that they serve Him.”

The “Investigation” says: Since the Lord of Heaven is beginning-less, what people were serving Him in beginningless [time] when He suddenly got the idea to create people to serve Him? Again, parents have children to prevent [the problems associated with] old age and death. Since the Lord of Heaven has no end, what is the use of creating humans?

[Section 20] They say: When people are born, from whence do they come; when they die, from whence do they go?”

The “Inquiry” says: The Buddhists have discussed this, and it is a secret doctrine for us Confucians, but in function, they are very different. Confucius said, “Originating at the beginning, returning to the end, one knows the explanation of death and life. Essential qi (jingqi, 精氣) forms things; the escape of the spirit (hun, 魂) makes for alteration. Therefore, one knows the real situation (qingzhuang, 情狀) of ghosts and spirits.” Also: “Ji Lu asked about serving the spirits [of the dead]. The Master said, ‘While you are not able to serve men, how can you serve [their spirits]?’ [Ji Lu added,] ‘I venture to ask about death?’ He was answered, ‘While you do not know life, how can you know about death?’” From this view, it is clear that life and death do not have two [separate] principles, and [p. 11804] humans and spirits do not have two [separate] ends. This is clear! The phrase “If a man in the morning hears the right way, he may die in the evening without regret” means that a person’s “death” retains “non-death.” Since death is non-death, then it follows that life must involve non-life. So can one maintain that the Lord of Heaven confers it [at the] beginning of life?
Comment: This is the first time that Zhixu has put forward an explicitly Buddhist argument against the Jesuits. His main point is that the Jesuits posit too solid an idea of birth and death, as if there were a “beginning of life” (shi sheng, 始生), prior to which the person in question did not exist in any sense. Zhixu adduces Confucian texts that he interprets as expressing the view that birth and death are non-dual or mutually interpenetrating. Because these ideas are never explicit in Confucian texts but have to be read into them, Zhixu claims that this is the “secret doctrine” (mi zhi, 秘旨) of Confucius. This reflects Zhixu’s overall strategy of trying to demonstrate that Buddhism is more consonant with Confucian teachings than Christianity and thus more deserving of the literati’s support. It is also consistent with his Buddhist commentaries on the Confucian classics.

[Section 21] They say: “When the Lord of Heaven was born from on high, it was only that the original substance of His primal nature joined with the nature and substance of us humans. It is analogous to joining a peach [branch] to a pear [tree]; the pear [tree] uses the peach [branch] to produce peaches. What loss has there ever been to its original substance?”

The “Investigation” says: [First] they say that human beings’ nature and spirit are all the creations of the Lord of Heaven, and now they use peaches and pears as similes for them. Are they going to claim that all the pears in the world are born of peaches? If pears are originally produced by peaches, what need is there to wait until they are joined? If one must wait until they are joined, and only then they are produced, then peaches would originally not be able to produce pears!

Comment: As Kern observes, in this section Zhixu grossly misunderstands the point of Aleni’s allegory. Aleni is simply demonstrating that two living things with distinct natures can be joined in such a way that the one can produce the other without a confounding or a metamorphosis of their natures in order to counter the idea that God somehow transformed into a human being, thereby losing His divine nature. Zhixu thinks that the peaches symbolize God and the pears symbolize humanity in a straightforward way.

[Section 22] They say: “1,100 years before the Lord of Heaven came down to take birth, there were already signs foretelling His coming
down.” And: “His coming down to birth was also announced by heavenly spirits . . . all kinds of extraordinary signs.”\footnote{143} “The books would fill [p. 11805] a building, only they have not yet been transmitted and translated, etc.”\footnote{144}

The “Investigation” says: How is this any different from Buddhist narratives about the miraculous signs that accompanied the birth of the Buddha? Asserting that Śākyamuni was born of Māyā without being more than human, so does [saying that] the Lord of Heaven was born of the holy woman [i.e., Mary] make Him the only non-human?

If you assert that Jesus was definitely the Lord of Heaven coming down to birth, how do we know that Śākyamuni was not the Lord of Heaven coming down to birth?

If you assert that the scriptures of the Buddhists are absurd and false, then how do we know your books are not absurd and false?

If you assert that your books have clear and distinct warrants, then can’t the Buddhist scriptures also make their own claims to clear and distinct warrants?

If you assert that no one ever witnessed the Buddha [or Buddhism] leaving the Western regions to come here, and that the claim is therefore absurd, then [since] no one witnessed you leaving Europe to come here, is this not also absurd?

Buddhist scriptures come from India, and thus you think that they are misappropriated. You claim to come from ninety thousand li away, so who knows whether or not you speak falsely?

Since you came here all alone, from homes far away and a long time ago, how would there be anyone to trade with you? But you still have curios from your own country to present [to people]. Could you really have such extremely strong backs\footnote{145} that on the day [that you arrived] the things you were carrying [p. 11806] could be so many? Or perhaps [you] have supernatural powers and can go and fetch [these things] in the morning and be back by evening? Or maybe you have miraculous skills, and you can create them at will?

I have furthermore heard about your background! You were born in a small country near Macao.\footnote{146} The clever evildoers set their minds on coveting the imperial power of China, and so they floated on the ocean and snuck in at Lingnan (嶺南, i.e., Guangzhou) where they first studied the language and writing of this place and afterward peeked at the scriptures of the three teachings, pulled [things out of] Buddhism and appended [them to] Confucianism, fabricated and twisted to create
this heterodox teaching. By it you mean to delude the world and dupe
the people, eating away and destroying the basis for the country’s
fortunes. Of themselves they claim that they have cut off sexual immo-
rality and do not marry, and then by pulling out the nonsense about
holy water they entice stupid men and women into [their] selfish prac-
tices and corruption, and the common people in Min and Yue must
customarily conduct trade relations every year with the Philippines and other coun-
tries, and your supporters attach themselves to the ships that deliver
valuable items for you to give away. Because of this, you do not expect
those with whom you have dealings to give you the smallest donation,
and you even favor them with curios. As a result, people say that you
are honest and incorruptible, make no demands [of people], and are
better than the Buddhists’ and Daoists’ advising people to make donations,
to the extent that even the gentry (jinshen, 縉紳) and
the intelligentsia (dashì, 達士) are bamboozled by you and take you as
showing the great Confucian attributes of respectability and reserved
modesty.

Alas! Who knew that Wang Mang, so modest and respectable,
would be a usurper of the Han court? Or that Jiefu’s (Wang Anshi’s)
“new learning” was actually a parasite of the [Northern] Song period.
Your intentions are also very wicked!

Comment: Zhixu shows here his own deep antipathy to the
Jesuits, dropping any pretense of answering a specific Jesuit
assertion and letting loose a pure rant. In doing so, he voiced
what others had and have occasionally asserted: the suspicion
that the Jesuit missionaries were fronts for a Western incursion
into China’s sovereignty at the economic and political
levels. The references at the end are to Wang Mang (王莽 33
BCE–23 CE), who usurped the throne of the Han dynasty and
ruled 9–23 CE; and to Wang Anshi (1021–1086), a reformist
official in the court of the Northern Song dynasty, whose pro-
aposed reforms, while very progressive and modern, incurred
the staunch resistance of traditional Confucian scholars and
entrenched moneyed and landed families. Zhixu finds these
examples apt, since the Confucian tradition took them both as
wolves in sheep’s clothing, men who presented themselves as
proponents of new ideas that could save an empire in trouble
but whose programs turned out in the end to be disastrous for
the nation.
[Section 23] They say: “Some things have a beginning and an end, like grass, trees, birds, and animals. Some have a beginning but no end, such as heaven, earth, spirits, ghosts, and the human soul. Only the Lord of Heaven is without beginning or end and is able to bring to a beginning or an end the myriad things. Without the Lord of Heaven there could be no things.”

The “Investigation” says: We Confucians claim that sincerity (cheng, 誠) is the end and the beginning of things. No sincerity, no things. “Next to the above is he who cultivates to the utmost the shoots of goodness in him. From those he can attain to the possession of sincerity. This sincerity becomes apparent. . . . It is only he who is possessed of the most complete sincerity that can exist under heaven, who can transform.”

“It is characteristic of the most entire sincerity to be able to foreknow . . . the individual possessed of the most complete sincerity is like a spirit.”

“One who has] complete sincerity is able to develop his own nature to the fullest, is able to develop the natures of other people and things to their fullest, help in transformation and nourishment, and participate with heaven and earth.”

Thus, initially by means of [these] two words [we] fix the bent of the doctrine. That which is said, “When we have intelligence resulting from sincerity, this condition is to be ascribed to nature; when we have sincerity resulting from intelligence, this condition is to be ascribed to instruction,” further combines to indicate the doctrine that nature and practice are non-dual, that Heaven and human beings come together in a unity. Therefore [the text] says: “Given the sincerity, and there shall be the intelligence; given the intelligence, and there shall be the sincerity!”

This is the true root and source of the transformation of things, not this so-called Lord of Heaven. If we must set up a single Lord of Heaven as the most spiritual and most holy, omnipotent, and whose power is undivided [with any other], then there would definitely be no labor [for people to] assist in, and also no way [for people to] participate with Heaven and Earth. How could this be reasonable?

Also, [the argument] they set up has the three phrases: “having both a beginning and an end,” “having a beginning but no end,” and “having neither a beginning nor an end.” This is particularly absurd. The Changes says, “What is prior to physical form pertains to the Dao, and what is subsequent to physical form pertains to concrete objects.”
Comment: This quotation from the Book of Changes is particularly apt, as it appears within a discussion of the Dao of Heaven and Earth and the way in which a person may cooperate with this Dao to achieve success.

“Concrete objects” (qi, 器) thus have a beginning and must have an end. The Dao thus has no end and must have no beginning.

Since [they] allow the phrase “having a beginning but no end,” then why do they not also establish the phrase “having no beginning but having an end?”

Comment: Zhixu’s argument here seems aimed at the Jesuit’s use of the phrase “having a beginning but no end” to discuss the human soul, which is created but thereafter eternal in their theology. Based on this passage from the Changes, Zhixu thinks that either things have both a beginning and an end (i.e., are impermanent), or have no beginning and no end (i.e., are eternal), but that the other two possibilities are absurd.

Moreover, grass and trees differ greatly from birds and beasts, but still they all have beginnings and ends. “People differ from birds and beasts in just a few respects,”

Again, the fathers and sons of this world are of the same type. Cause and effect must resemble one another. One may manifestly see that humans give birth to humans, [p. 11809] birds definitely give birth to birds. Melons do not give birth to beans, and beans do not bear melons. Since the Lord of Heaven is the one who gives birth to humanity, then if people have beginnings but no ends, then the Lord of Heaven should also have a beginning but not an end. If the Lord of Heaven is so miraculous (lìngmiào, 精妙) that He has no beginning, then the human mind must also be miraculous; why say that only [humanity] has a beginning? If the miraculousness of the human mind was bestowed by the Lord of Heaven, then how would one know that it is not the case that the Lord of Heaven bestowed His own miraculousness?

Comment: Since Zhixu has been arguing that like must beget like, the point of this last assertion seems to be that God has only one kind of “miraculousness” to give, i.e., a nature that has no beginning and no end.

Furthermore, the Lord of Heaven created humanity; thus, He must be acknowledged as humanity’s great father. Would not creating birds
and beasts make [Him] the great father of the birds and beasts? Would not creating grass and trees make Him the great father of grass and trees? How could a father of birds, beasts, grass, and trees be a Lord worthy of veneration?

[Section 24] They say: “As an analogy, a tree’s flowers, fruit, branches, leaves, and trunk all come from its root. Lacking a root, then there would be nothing else. The tree’s root is its solid origin; there is not another root out of which it arises. The Lord of Heaven is the root source of the myriad things; from what [other source] could He arise?”

The “Investigation” says: The root of a tree has to be dependent on the earth. Is the Lord of Heaven the only one that depends on nothing else?

Comment: Zhixu’s brief and scornful response is based on the Buddhist idea of dependent origination. According to this idea, everything depends on something else (or, in Tiantai and Huayan terms, everything depends on everything else). The Jesuits were coming from a Thomistic tradition that took for granted that the cosmos had a first cause, which itself was uncaused and independent. According to Frederick Streng, these represent two of the three fundamental cosmologies of human religion (the third being the urgrund out of which everything arises, an example of this being the Hindu idea of Brahman). This shows both the Buddhist underpinnings of this seemingly-Confucian text and the depth of the religious differences between the author and his Christian targets.

[p. 11810] [Section 25] They say: “In the beginning, the Lord of Heaven wished to create the myriad things for human beings to use. First, He separated the heavens from the earth and brought the myriad things out in all their own kind. Afterward, He brought forth a single man and a single woman, etc.”

The “Investigation” says: With heaven and earth not yet separated and no human beings yet [created], then for what reason would [the Lord of Heaven] want to create the myriad things for humans to use?

[Section 26] They say: During their lives, human conduct may be good or may be evil. Each soul will have to go before the Lord of Heaven after death for judgment.

The “Investigation” says: If the Lord of Heaven is without form, sound, or abode, then to what place would the deceased go? If they
can go to be heard for judgment, then it must be that\textsuperscript{163} [He] is like an ordinary official or teacher or [the being that] the Buddhists call Yama. However, if one proposes officials and teachers, officials and teachers are born of parents and they cannot avoid old age and death. If one proposes Yama, then Yama is numbered among the sentient beings and cannot avoid rebirth. How is it all right to call [such a one] the True Lord who, having no beginning and no end, created [all] things?

\textbf{[Section 27]} They say: Retribution in heaven or hell is absolutely unavoidable; therefore, there must be an afterlife. Not [p. 11811] a single person can remember anything from a previous life; therefore, there is no previous life.\textsuperscript{164}

The “Investigation” says: Stop someone on the road and ask them about events of their infancy, and you will also not find a single person who can remember. Can you then also assert that they were never infants? Even though one cannot remember one’s infancy, one cannot thereby claim that one was never an infant. Even though one cannot remember past lives, how does one know that one also never had any past lives?

\textbf{[Section 28]} They say: Immortals, buddhas, and bodhisattvas lead people to worship themselves and defy the sovereignty of the Lord of Heaven.\textsuperscript{165}

The “Investigation” says: Although immortals, buddhas, and bodhisattvas are not what we Confucians venerate (\textit{zong}, 宗), one must admit that all immortals, all buddhas, and all bodhisattvas are what the people of the world respect, in addition to which one would have to say heaven, earth, the sun, the moon, the stars, ghosts, and spirits all should be served, in which case it is not merely worshipping oneself. Jesus would lead people to worship only one Lord and does not allow the service of heaven, earth, the sun, the moon, and so on. Is not his jealousy of his own monopoly even deeper?

\textit{Comment}. The last few sections contain the few overt references to Buddhism in this piece, and it is interesting that, in this last section, Zhixu, a Buddhist monk, disavows worship of buddhas and bodhisattvas and speaks of “we Confucians.”

\textit{Appendix to “Collected Refutations of Heterodoxy”}

The [Buddhist] layman Zhong Zhenzhi sent the “Preliminary Investigation” to the Chan Master Jiming 邊明 in a letter.
Remember that the two of us were born on the same day, studied under the same teacher, and as children had the same ambitions.

Comment: This opening sentence appears to quote a poem, as the lines break into three four-character rhyming lines (生同一日，學同一師，幼同一志). The sentiment is very funny when one realizes that the writer and the recipient are both alternative names for Zhixu himself!

One would not have expected that at the age of twenty-four sui you would have abandoned Confucianism and entered into Chan. For the past twenty years, we have gone our own ways, and news of you has become scarce. Now I have been lying ill by the lakeshore and suddenly heard the heretical talk of the Lord of Heaven. I have borrowed their spear to strike their shield and sketched out this “Preliminary Investigation.”

Comment: The phrase “borrowed their spear to strike their shield” may refer to Zhixu’s having borrowed the Jesuits’ books in order to attack them.

I know that for a long time you have been engaged in Chan study, so you must have talent to spare for defeating opponents [in debate]. Moreover, they [i.e., the Jesuits] attack Buddhism especially, and you also cannot bear it in silence. I am presenting my poor manuscript for your correction.

Chan Master Jiming’s Reply

In the world outside, the clouds follow closely upon one another, and [I have] long since lost touch. However, the vows one made forever when young I’ve not yet dared to forget. I have read your letter and the “Preliminary Investigation.” It is very clever. You have undertaken the learning of Confucius, and it is proper to respond by bringing out this prompt response. Since I have abandoned the ways of the world, there is no need to engage in debates. You assert that they attack Buddhism; in truth, Buddhism is not something that they can defeat. Moreover, at the present time there are many who carry the name “son of the Buddha” [i.e., monk] but do not know the doctrines. This external difficulty could be an opportunity to startle them; this is not necessarily a misfortune for Buddhism. If one does not grind the knife, it is not sharp; if one does not strike the bell, it does not sound. The “Three emperors Wu” tried to extinguish the clergy,
but the buddhadharma benefited and flourished. [This] monk will keep rubbing his eyes in expectation. This is a rough response and is not exhaustive.  

*Letter Accompanying Zhong Zhenzhi’s “Further Investigation”*

Before, I sent the “Preliminary Investigation into the Study of Heaven” for criticism. My expectation was that you should bring out your hands and eyes in joint support of the sagely way, but you just put your hands in your sleeves and looked on from the side. How is this both “the vows one made forever when young” and “completely forsaken the ways of the world”? What is this claim that “I’ve not yet dared to forget”? Lately, the heterodox teachings are flourishing more and more. I could not stand this, and so I have once again examined it. I must pray you to give it some consideration. Do not say that you have not yet completely converted to Buddhism; I myself do not have the full knowledge of a Confucian master.

[p. 11815]

*Chan Master Jiming’s Letter of Reply*

The two traditions of Confucianism and Buddhism are the same and also different, are different and also the same. Only a sage can deeply penetrate them; they are not such that heterodoxy can confound them. Only a true Confucian can understand Buddhism, and only [one who] studies Buddhism can understand Confucianism. To read the layman’s [i.e., Zhong’s] “Further Investigation,” in the places where it exhibits principle, it is like the sun in the middle of the sky; in the places where it refutes heresy, it is like shooting arrows at a willow from behind an embankment. One could say that the single lineage of Confucius and Yan cannot fail! How could this monk add another word of praise? [I] only hope that the layman will continue to use his intellect to go further in studying the mind-transmission of Buddhism. Thus, the ways of [being in] the world and leaving the world both have their support; although their forms may be far apart, they connect and are not separate. It should not be made into nonsense by me.
NOTES

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5. Gianni Criveller, Preaching Christ in Late Ming China: The Jesuits’ Presentation of Christ from Matteo Ricci to Giulio Alesi, Ricci Institute Variétés Sinologiques, n.s. 86, Fondazione Civiltà Bresciani, 10 (Taibei: Ricci Institute, 1997); Standaert, Handbook of Christianity in China, Vol. 1.

6. For a listing of these and other names by which Zhixu was known, see Shi Shengyan 釋聖嚴, Mingmo zhongguo fojiao zhi yanjiu 明末中國佛教之研究 (Study in Late Ming Chinese Buddhism), trans. Guan Shiqian 關世謙 (Taibei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1988), 162–164.


9. See Ouyi Zhixu, Pi xie ji (闢邪集, Collected Refutations of Heterodoxy [1643]), with a synopsis and annotations by Shibata Atsushi 柴田篤 (Kyoto: Chūbun shuppansha, 1861), 10849–11044.

11. Ibid., 390.


13. In early Buddhist mythology, Kāśyapa was the buddha who preceded the historical buddha, Śākyamuni.

14. These are the first two parts of a three-part system of schematizing time that arose in East Asia. It is said that after the passing away of a buddha, his true teachings persist for a while. With the passing of time, it deteriorates into a mere semblance of the teaching, and finally even that passes away so that only vestigial forms of the teaching remain, but none of its substance. These are, respectively, the ages of the true dharma, the counterfeit dharma, and the final dharma.

15. Buddhist texts use these words to denote four kinds of misconception about the present world: seeing permanence where there is only impermanence, bliss where there is really suffering, an essential self in each person when in fact none exists, and purity in things that are impure. In the following sentence, these will be juxtaposed with their opposites, indicating that the Buddha Śākyamuni will replace error with truth.


17. The text from the *Collected Works* has 情汁 here, which makes no sense. The Japanese edition has 情計, which Morohashi defines as “plan, scheme.” See Morohashi Tetsuji 諸橋轍次, ed., *Dai kanwa jiten 大漢和辭典*, 13 vols. (orig. pub., Tokyo: Daishukan; repr., Taipei: Xinwenfeng, 1984), 10756.44, 4:1075a. The Ming dynasty Jiaxing canon 嘉興藏 (120:47a4) has 情計 in a more cursive style (more like 態計). Prof. Jiang Wu noted in a private communication that the meaning is something like “emotional calculation.” Thus, I think “scheme” works best here.

18. That is, the permanence of nirvana, not the permanence falsely imputed to worldly experiences and phenomena by the heretical teachers.

19. Normally Ricci’s Chinese name is written 利瑪竇.

20. This term has come to mean simply “Catholicism,” even in modern usage. In this context, I prefer the more literal translation, as it conveys the sense of strangeness the term had for many Chinese at this time.

22. On this earlier anti-Jesuit work, see the article by Adrian Dudink. After examining a wide array of evidence, Dudink concludes that the reason the book did not circulate widely is that the author, after handing copies out quite vigorously for a time, was convinced by a Christian literatus of the absurdity of its arguments, and burned his remaining copies (Dudink, “The Sheng-ch’ao tso-p’i (1623) of Hsü Ta-shou,” 136–137). Dudink suspects that the author, Xu Dashou 许大受, had been a convert himself who had turned against Christianity; perhaps this made him susceptible to his friend’s counter-arguments. The text is still extant as part of the collection Po xie ji (破邪集, Anthology of Refutations of Heterodoxy).

23. These are both names for Ouyi Zhixu himself. Criveller states that Zhixu used this secular name when writing from a Confucian viewpoint; he used other names in other contexts (Criveller, Preaching Christ in Late Ming China, 413n60). Ma Xiaoying states that, in the Buddhist-Jesuit debate, both sides tried to coopt the Confucian bloc to strengthen their own side, and Zhixu’s decision to write under his lay name (specifically his style-name, which had Confucian significance) may have been an instance of this tactic at work. See Ma, “Wan Ming Tianzhujiao yu Fojiao de chongtu ji yingxiang.”

24. This refers to the monk Sengzhao (僧肇, 374–414).

25. This appears to be a reference to a contemporary work by the monk Kongyin (空印, 1547–1617) called Critical Discussion of [Sengzhao’s] Treatise on the Immutability of Things (Wu bu qian zhengliang lun 物不遷正量論) (Taipei: Xinwenfeng, 1993), 54:912–926. According to the introduction, Kongyin, while admiring Sengzhao’s work, found it liable to misunderstanding among his contemporaries, so he wrote a critical commentary on it. This work is in the Xu Zang Jing 繼藏經, vol. 54, 912–926. It can also be found online through CBETA at http://cbeta.org/result/normal/X54/0879_001.htm. On Kongyin, a disciple of Hanshan Deqing, see the Foguang Da Cidian 佛光大詞典, 6632c–6633a. Jiang Wu discusses this work in his Enlightenment to Dispute: The Reinvention of Chan Buddhism in Seventeenth-Century China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

26. This term could mean the neo-Confucianism of the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi, which was the orthodox Confucian teaching for purposes of the civil examinations.
27. On the first page of the “Preliminary Investigation,” the layman Mengshi is identified as Cheng Zhiyong 程智用.

28. The signature line to this preface was written by a monk Dalang 釋大朗 of Gao’an 當庵, i.e., the Gao Hermitage.

29. Kern’s translation omits the previous two sentences, thus leaving out all references to the monk Gao’an.

30. There is some ambiguity here that may be deliberate. It can mean a Chan/Zen story used as an object of contemplation or meditation, often rendered into English by its Japanese pronunciation kōan. However, the term also means a public legal case or brief placed before a magistrate for adjudication.

31. This term is a bit mysterious. It might possibly be an official title, but if so, it does not appear in Charles O. Hucker’s Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China (repr., Taipei: SMC Publishing, 1995). The term does occur in Morohashi, Dai kanwa jiten, 3895.62, 11:98c, but is defined as an unofficial history derived from official histories.

32. Not surprisingly, a glance in a geographical dictionary reveals that Xin’an 新安 has been a very common place name throughout Chinese history. I think it most likely, pending further research, that the reference is to Xin’an County in Guangzhou 廣州, whose name was changed to Bao’an County 寶安縣 during the Republican period. See Xie Shouchang 謝壽昌 et al., Zhongguo gujin diming da cidian 中國古今地名大辭典 (Great Dictionary of Ancient and Modern Place Names in China) (Taipei: Taiwan shangwu, 1993), 1008a. The “critical notes” appear in small type between the columns of text, and I have not translated them except where they seem significant. In such cases, the translation will appear in an endnote.

33. Zhenze County is in Suzhou 蘇州. See Xie Shouchang et al., Zhongguo gujin diming da cidian, 1205b.

34. Literally, “Teaching of the Lord of Heaven,” since Catholic translators rendered “God” by 天主. To this day, this distinguishes Catholics from Protestants, who render “God” with the term “Lord on High” (shàngdì, 上帝).

35. Both my main text and the Japanese reprint have the word zi 子, “master,” in this place, but an online version of the text has the very similar character yu 予 here, meaning “I, mine.” If this is correct, then it would mean that the visitor, not Mr. Zhong, finds the Jesuits’ views compatible.

36. The full title of this work is Tianzhu shengxiang lüeshuo 天主聖像略說 (Brief Explanation of the Sacred Images), a brief work by Jean de Rocha (1566–1623) and Xu Guangqi, a Chinese Catholic convert. See Criveller, Preaching Christ in Late Ming China, 390. A facsimile of this text is available online through the archives of the Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong at Facsimile downloaded from the website of the Hong Kong Catholic Diocesan Archives: http://archives.catholic.org.hk/books/dtj.12/index.htm. This website gives the date of
publication for the edition they provide as 1609. In subsequent notes, it will be referred to as Sacred Images.


38. Compare with Criveller's translation of the first objection in Criveller, Preaching Christ in Late Ming China, 391. He renders xingzhi 形質 as "corporeal substance." Kern translates it as "Körper" (Kern, Buddhistische Kritik am Christentum im China des 17. Jahrhunderts, 225). Also, Kern translates 不通 as “inkohärenz” (incoherence) (ibid., 225 and passim).

39. The layman Mengshi's marginal note here says, "This is the very essence of the eternal sagely study [Confucianism]." 千古聖學要在於此。


44. For the text on Lucifer that Zhixu finds objectionable, see Sacred Images, folio 2b.

45. This is a reference to a story from the Zuozhuan 左傳, commenting on the entry for the eighteenth year of Wengong 文公. The Zuozhuan relates how, during the reign of the sage-emperor Yao, his minister Shun assessed the virtue of all the nobles. He found four whose riotous and rapacious behavior, described in detail in the text, were completely beyond the pale, and he banished them, while employing sixteen virtuous nobles. The story is found in James Legge, trans., Zuozhuan 左傳, vol. 5 of the Chinese Classics (orig. pub., Hong Kong: London Missionary Society, 1872; rpt., Taipei: SMC Publishing, 1991), 280, 283. I am grateful that Iso Kern led me to this reference in Kern, Buddhistische Kritik am Christentum im China des 17. Jahrhunderts, 227n52.

46. Zhixu is responding to the text of the Sacred Images, folios 3b–4a, that describe the “three enemies” (san chou, 三仇). As described by Da Rocha and Xu Guangqi, it appears that they are simply describing the classic trio of
temptations, “the world, the flesh, and the devil.”

47. Analects, 17:19. Legge’s translation.


49. The passage in Sacred Images to which Zhixu refers is found on folio 4a. As for the obscure term Fengshan tianshu 封禪天書, according to a website on Chinese history, this refers to an episode that took place during the Song dynasty. In 1004, the kingdom of Liao 迦國 invaded and the Song emperor Zhenzong 真宗 was forced to pay tribute. Song and Liao signed a treaty and peace prevailed. Zhenzong himself thought he had demonstrated fine tactical ability, but certain nobles thought that his offering tribute to a tribal people was a humiliation for the Song court. Zhenzong began to doubt himself in light of this talk, and, at the suggestion of his chancellor, decided to hold a Han-era imperial sacrifice called the Taishan fengshan 泰山封禪, which had traditionally been carried out on Mt. Tai 泰山, where feng 封 refers to an offering to heaven carried out on the peak, and shan 禪 refers to an offering to the earth carried out on one of the hills below the peak. (On this, see the lengthy description in Morohashi, Dai kanwa jiten, 3412.122, 4:10d–411b.) Not having a credible reason to hold such a grand sacrifice, the emperor, also at his chancellor’s prompting, feigned having a dream in which a spirit revealed to him the location of a ritual text wrapped in silk that he then “found,” artisans having fabricated it earlier; this is the tianshu 天書 to which Zhixu refers. With great expense and fanfare, the sacrifice was carried out in 1008 over a period of forty-seven days. Peace continued with the Liao kingdom thereafter, and the common people credited the power of the sacrifice with averting invasion, but in fact trouble was forestalled by the Liao government’s own internal politics. By Zhixu’s time, if not earlier, this episode was known as an example of fraudulent religious claims. For this story, see the article 天書降神: 宋真宗泰山封禪一場自欺的戲 (“The Celestial Book Descends from the Gods: Song Zhenzong’s Fengshan Sacrifice, a Drama of Self-Deception”), at http://www.singtaonet.com:82/weekly/weekly0604/weekly0604_11/t20060731_290484.html.

50. Sacred Images, folio 4b.

51. The section dealing with the Jesuits’ putative plagiarism of the Buddhist doctrine of buddha-bodies is also translated by Criveller, Preaching Christ in Late Ming China, 392.

52. Paraphrased from Sacred Images, folio 4b1.

53. You and Li 幽厲 are named in the Book of Mencius 4.a.2, verse 4. Zhixu is more or less quoting the text here, but he rearranges the phrases. Interestingly, Legge (Mencius, 293) does not recognize these as proper names, but translates
the passage, "He will be known as 'the Dark' or 'the Cruel,' and though he may have filial sons and affectionate grandsons, they will not be able in a hundred generations to change [the designation]." Wing-tsit Chan likewise takes the words to function as symbolic names for unenlightened kings and cruel kings (see Wing-tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963], 73). However, Morohashi (Dai kanwa jiten, 9205.464, 4:543b) says that You and Li were kings of the Zhou dynasty whose names paired as in the Mencius came to symbolize misgovernment. Note that Zhixu is quoting Mencius here when he refers (in my translation) to “filial sons and compassionate grandsons.”


55. This is a very loose paraphrase from the Sacred Images, folio 5a. Starting from line three, it says, “There is only one true Lord who creates things, most great, most revered, who creates and nourishes humankind. The Lord guides all under heaven in this and future generations, who requites good and evil and is to be worshipped and served by men. All other spirits, buddhas, [spirits of] heaven and earth, sun, moon, and all stars are the Lord’s creations and ought not to be worshipped or given offerings as if they were the lords of humanity.”

Thus, while Zhixu seems to think that the Jesuits’ Lord wants to wipe out all other gods (oddly omitting the fact that the original passage mentions buddhas in this connection), the claim here is that all other spiritual beings are creatures and unworthy of worship, not that they should be obliterated.

56. In Buddhist scriptures, this is what the Buddha-to-be said after he was born from his mother’s side and had walked seven paces pointing both up at the sky and down at the ground. A search of texts in CBETA found this phrase occurred many times in Chan texts that recount the story of Śākyamuni’s birth.

57. The Sacred Images, at folio 55a6–7, says, “We further teach people to know that the human soul is eternal and is not extinguished.” 又教人知道人的靈魂常在不滅。As we shall see in subsequent passages, the idea that the human being (or any entity) can have a beginning but no end struck the Chinese as very odd. Things were either eternal, beginningless, and endless, or they were impermanent and had a beginning and an end. To emphasize this, the layman Cheng Zhiyong (who arranged for the publication of this tract) adds this marginal note here: “The heaven and hell of the Buddhists have both ingress and egress, and thus are reasonable. They [the Jesuits] say there is only ingress but
no egress, and this is absurd.”

58. Like the eighth objection, this seems not so much to say that the Catholic teaching is actually absurd, but rather that it is plagiarized from the Buddhists.

59. This objection is not based on anything contained in the Sacred Images and so appears to be something that Zhixu has merely heard somewhere. Interestingly, though, the Sacred Images does admit that heaven and hell are invisible in discussing God’s creation of heaven and earth. It says that each of these has two parts: the part humans can see (skies and earth) and the part humans cannot see (heaven and hell). Thus, Zhixu’s point loses potency, as the Jesuits present the same point forthrightly. However, Zhixu’s main point, that the Jesuits should not criticize Buddhist realms on the grounds that no one has ever seen them when they themselves assert the existence of invisible realms, remains valid. See Sacred Images, folios 1a–2a, 6a6.

60. Zhixu quotes the Sacred Images out of context here. In fact, the meaning of the Jesuit text is quite the opposite of that which Zhixu takes it to be. Here is the full quotation (Sacred Images, 6a9–6b4):

Even though right now one does not see [heaven and hell], [if] we wait until we can see [them] [that is, after death] and then try to reform and repent, they will not be turned. Therefore, we must act now to reform and repent. It only needs to be genuine. God will naturally pardon one’s sins and confer blessing. [We] do not preach something like ‘now’ is the same as the moment at the end of life, having then heard and followed God’s teaching, one can still repent, reform, and [one’s sins] will be turned away. Sin abides right up until our last breath. One absolutely cannot make it [after that]!

61. Quoted from Sacred Images, folio 6b5.

62. The Jesuits chose the term shi jie 十戒 to translate “Ten Commandments.” This term is also a Buddhist term for the ten precepts of a novice cleric. Zhixu’s claim of identity between the two, leading to his conclusion that the Jesuits are merely plagiarizing Buddhist moral teaching, is unjustified.

63. Quoted from Sacred Images, folio 6b5.

64. Quoted from Sacred Images, folio 6b6–7.

65. These last three quotations from the Sacred Images are sentence fragments taken out of context. The text at this point is discussing the need for true repentance by a sincere mind. It is possible that Zhixu has seen identical phrases in Buddhist literature, but I have not checked for this.
66. This is, in fact, far from clear. In the *Sacred Images*, readers are exhorted to keep the Ten Commandments truly and sincerely from their own bodies and minds. 追依了十戒從自己身心上。 實實做出來。 方是。 *Sacred Images*, folio 6b6. This is a moral exhortation, not, as Zhixu takes it, a doctrine of creation that infringes on God’s status as creator of all things.

67. The second-to-last line of the *Sacred Images*, 7a4 makes a disparaging reference to the “two houses of Buddhism and Daoism” 釋道兩家, which Zhixu quotes, rightly observing that the authors make no specific criticism.

68. This is a direct quotation from *Sacred Images*, folio 7a1–2, which goes on to disparage these propositions as without reason (此無之裡也). It concludes by saying that if people do not inquire closely, they will assume that the sacred images of the Christians are on par with those of the Buddhists and Daoists, and that is why the tract was published. Interestingly, in the last statement in this objection, Zhixu seems to have assumed exactly that when he asks how the images or icons differ.

69. *Doctrine of the Mean* 1:1; see Legge’s translation, p. 383. Kern incorrectly takes the entire sentence as a quotation from this text; see Kern, *Buddhistische Kritik am Christentum im China des 17. Jahrhunderts*, 234 and 234n73.

70. Again, at the conclusion of the *Sacred Images*, folio 7a, Xu and Da Rocha emphasize that the “image” (xiang, 像) of the Lord of Heaven is different from the “images” of Buddhists and the Daoists, although their text uses *shi dao* 釋道 rather than *fo lao* 佛老 as Zhixu does here.

71. Criveller, *Preaching Christ in Late Ming China*, 390 identifies these three works as Matteo Ricci’s *True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven*, Giulio Aleni’s *Learned Conversations of Fuzhou*, and J. Soerio’s *Brief Account on the Religion [of the Lord of Heaven]*. He says this shows Zhixu had a vast knowledge of Christian literature. Kern, in contrast, does not translate the phrase *xilai yi* 西來意 as the title of Ricci’s work, but simply as *Opinions from the West*, which is a literal translation of the phrase. However, against this, it should be noted that much of what follows quotes Ricci’s *True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven* and critiques it, and so it would be strange for Zhixu not to name it in his introduction to this second part. Thus, I have taken 西來意 as standing in for the real title of Ricci’s work, despite the fact that it is not actually so named.

72. This quotation is taken almost verbatim from Ricci’s *True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven* (*Tianzhu shiyi* 天主實義). See Lancashire and Hu’s translation, *True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven*, 73–75. I have quoted directly from the Lancashire-Hu English translation.

73. Lancashire and Hu, trans., *True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven*, 76–77. Zhixu has abridged the passage and misquotes the last clause as 即吾所謂天主也, in fact it reads 即吾所謂天主也. In subsequent quotations, Zhixu’s abridgements will be marked with ellipses, even though Zhixu himself does not
indicate abridgements in his text.


75. Literally, “the hundred bones” (bai hai, 百骸). This is a common idiom meaning “the entire body.”

76. Lancashire and Hu, trans., *True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven*, 94–95. These are not exact quotations, as Zhixu skips around and omits several words.

77. See Lancashire and Hu, trans., *True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven*, 122–123 and following, wherein Ricci quotes many ancient Chinese classics, including the Shi jing 詩經, Zhou song 周頌, and others, concerning the Sovereign on High. The translators of Ricci’s text provide many footnotes on pp. 122 and 124 tracing the sources of Ricci’s quotations.

78. Kern notes that Zhixu derived this threefold analysis of the meaning of “heaven” in the Confucian classics from the neo-Confucian thinker Zhu Xi (朱熹, 1130–1200), as expounded in the first chapter of the posthumous work Zhuzi yu lei 朱子語類. See Kern, *Buddhistische Kritik am Christentum im China des 17. Jahrhunderts*, 240n89.

79. This is from the *Doctrine of the Mean*, 26.9, Legge’s translation. The full quotation is 今夫天斯昭昭之多,及其無窮也,日月星辰繫焉,萬物覆焉. “The heaven now before us is only this bright shining spot; but when viewed in its inexhaustible extent, the sun, moon, stars, and constellations of the zodiac, are suspended in it, and all things are overspread by it.” See Legge, trans., *Zhongyong*, 420.

80. Zhixu uses the word mu 謬 twice in this sentence. “Absurdity” here does not translate the term bu tong 不通 as in the “Preliminary Investigation.”


82. Zhunzhun 諄詩. Here, Zhixu is alluding to Mencius 5a5.3, which reads: 天與之者, 諄詩然命之乎? This is a question that Wan Zhang puts to Mencius after Mencius has affirmed that heaven (tian, 天) gave the empire to the legendary emperor Shun 蹇. In this sentence, Wan Zhang asks Mencius to clarify what he means by this. Legge translates Wan Zhang’s question as: “‘Heaven gave it to him’—did Heaven confer its appointment on him with specific instructions?” (see Legge, trans., *Works of Mencius*, 355). Chan translates it as: “By Heaven’s giving it to him, do you mean that Heaven gave it to him in so many words?” (Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, 77). Mencius, in the following verse, answers that this is not his meaning because heaven does not speak, and thus does not give specific orders or instructions. Thus, when Zhixu uses this phrase, his Confucian audience would understand that he was clarifying the meaning of “heaven” as reflected in the first line of the *Doctrine of the Mean*, i.e., as an agency that confers a basic nature on beings rather than as a
sovereign that issues instructions. This also clarifies what the word *ming* 命 means here.

83. *Analects* 2.4.4: 五十而知天命. Legge's translation. See Legge, *Analects*, 146–147. In Zhixu’s time, the official commentary on the *Analects* studied by all examination candidates was that of Zhu Xi. For this particular passage, Zhu Xi understood “the decrees of heaven” very broadly. While Confucius may have only meant his own personal duties, Zhu Xi understood it to mean all of the processes of nature, and this fits well with the argument that Zhixu is mounting here. See Daniel K. Gardner, *Zhu Xi’s Reading of the Analects: Canon, Commentary, and the Classical Tradition* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 44 for an English translation of Zhu Xi’s comments on this passage.


85. 易無思也, 無為也, 寂然不動, 感而遂通天下之故。This is from the first part of the Xici commentary (繫辭上) of the *Yijing*. I have not followed Richard John Lynn’s translation of this passage (at Lynn, *Classic of Changes*, 63) because he takes the word *yi* 易 to mean the title of the *Book of Changes* itself, whereas Zhixu, seeking to supply a variety of synonyms for “heaven,” clearly means change as such.


93. *Doctrine of the Mean* 21, my translation of 自誠明, 謂之性.

94. *Doctrine of the Mean* 20.18, Legge’s translation. See Legge, trans., *Zhongyong*, 413.

95. My primary text has 法 here, while the Japanese text has 洪.I have chosen to abide by the Japanese text.

96. This is the opening of a quotation from the *Book of Changes* that describes
the genesis of the sixty-four hexagrams. The text is from a commentarial portion called the Xici (繫辭, “Appended Commentary”), section 11. The “two modes” (兩儀) are yin and yang. It will go on to mention the four images and the eight trigrams. I am following Richard John Lynn’s translation of this section of the Book of Changes; see Lynn, Classic of Changes, 65–66.

97. This is a very loose quotation of a well-known phrase from the “Commentary on the Text” for the first hexagram qian (qian wen yan, 乾文言) of the Yi Jing that speaks of the ability of the sage to cooperate with heaven and earth: “The great man is someone whose virtue is consonant with heaven and earth, his brightness with the sun and the moon, his consistency with the four seasons, and his prognostications of the auspicious and inauspicious with the workings of gods and spirits. When he precedes heaven, heaven is not contrary to him, and when he follows heaven, he obeys the timing of its moments. Since heaven is not contrary to him, how much the less will men or gods and spirits be!” Translated in Lynn, Classic of Changes, 138.

98. The phrase 隨天立極 is used by Zhu Xi in his commentaries to both the Great Learning and the Doctrine of the Mean. It indicates the sage’s ability to inherit the true way from heaven and transmit it to people in order to establish virtue. For the phrase 立極 as meaning “establish morals,” see Morohashi, Dai kanwa jiten, 8:697b.

99. This is condensed considerably from Ricci’s True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven, and I have borrowed the translation equivalents used by Lancashire and Hu, trans., True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven, 145.

100. The word xùn 禧 can also mean “to be buried alive with.”

101. The text I am primarily working from has 理究, which does not make much sense. The Japanese edition has 究理, which would mean “to penetrate [moral] principle.” This makes sense, and it is adopted here.

102. Mencius 4.2.19. I have used Legge’s translation (Legge, trans., Works of Mencius, 325) with adaptation.

103. Houdi 后帝. Lancashire and Hu translate this term as “sovereign or emperor,” but this seems incorrect. Morohashi (Dai kanwa jiten, 3298.26, 2:837c) gives only one definition for this term, another name for heaven, but this cannot be what Ricci means, since his whole point is that one cannot recklessly show disrespect for earthly sovereigns, so how much less would disrespect for God be permissible. A third possibility is that this is not a compound, but the two separate words “empress” and “emperor,” which would make Ricci’s assertion gender-inclusive. I have used this meaning and amended Lancashire’s and Hu’s translation accordingly.

104. Zhixu’s text has tong zun 同尊, “equal respectability,” but Ricci’s original text has tong deng 同等, “the equal of.” I have amended Lancashire’s and Hu’s translation to reflect Zhixu’s misquotation.
105. An abridged quotation from Lancashire and Hu, trans., True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven, 204, 205.

106. A truncated citation of Mencius 2B.2.6. I have consulted Legge’s translation (see Legge, trans., Works of Mencius, 214) but altered it to match the original Chinese better.

107. Analects 15:35. Here I have preferred Wing-tsit Chan’s translation over Legge’s. See Chan, Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 44.


109. A reference to Doctrine of the Mean 26:10. This is the end of a passage describing King Wen’s virtue. See Legge, trans., Zhongyong, 421.

110. This is a reference to Doctrine of the Mean 30:1. In Wing-tsit Chan’s translation this reads, “Chung-ni (Confucius) transmitted the ancient traditions of Yao and Shun, and he modeled after and made brilliant the systems of King Wen and King Wu.” See Chan, Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 111.

111. This quotation from The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven is heavily abridged and not completely accurate. Also, the translation by Lancashire and Hu is overly interpretive and uses different vocabulary from that employed here. Thus, I have translated the passage myself. See Lancashire and Hu, trans., True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven, 210–213.

112. Ibid., 206–207.

113. Ibid., 222–223, my own translation.

114. See ibid., 84–87.

115. Ibid., 256–257. Zhixu abridges the text somewhat. Ricci wrote this in response to the difficulty that, if human souls are created but never destroyed, would the universe not eventually be filled beyond capacity?


117. The Collected Works text uses the word ji 寄, “to send to,” which I am translating here as “delegate.” However, the Japanese text uses the word zai 宰, “to govern,” instead. This would give the sense that the Lord of Heaven oversees the forces of nature and one’s parents and rulers as they perform their functions. In either case, the sense of the passage is much the same: the Lord of Heaven allows subordinates to perform their functions instead of doing everything directly.

118. Rhetorically, Zhixu is depicting the gamut of officialdom from the highest to the humblest positions.

119. Giulio Aleni (Ai Rulüe艾儒略), San shan lun xue ji 三山論學記 (Learned Conversations at Fuzhou) (orig. pub., n.p.: n.p., 1847); rpt. in Tianzhujiao dong chuan wenxian xu bian 天主教東傳文獻續編 (Supplement to Documents
Relating to the Catholic Missions to the East), 3. vols. (Taipei: Xuensheng shuju, 1966), 1:419–493; see 1:438. This section presents the first of a series of quotations from Giulio Aleni’s *San shan lun xue ji* 三山論學記 (Criveller translates the title as “Learned Conversations of Fuzhou”; see Criveller, *Preaching Christ in Late Ming China*, 390). This particular passage is followed immediately by an unfavorable assessment of Buddhist theories of mind, which may be what drew Zhixu’s attention to it.

120. From *Doctrine of the Mean* 1:1, Legge’s translation. See Legge, trans., *Zhongyong*, 383.

121. This might be a reference to Zhixu’s commentary on the *Zhongyong*, entitled *Zhongyong zhizhi buzhu* 中庸直指補註, *Supplementary Notes to Direct Pointing to the Doctrine of the Mean*, in *Ouyi Dashi Quanji* 蕅益大師全集 (Collected Works of Great Master Ouyi), 21 vols. (repr., Taipei: Fojiao chubanshe, 1989), 19:12312374–12312416. Although neither his general introduction and explanation of the title nor his comments on this specific passage makes direct reference to Zhu Xi’s commentary, his differences with Zhu Xi are stark. Zhixu explains the Mean (zhong 中) in terms of the Tiantai notion of “Middle-Way buddha-nature” (zhongdao foxing 中道佛性), and the mind in equilibrium as the ālayavijñāna or “storehouse consciousness.” See Ouyi Zhixu 蕅益智旭, *Zhongyong zhizhi buzhu* 中庸直指補註 (Supplementary Notes to Direct Pointing to the Doctrine of the Mean), in *Ouyi Dashi Quanji* 蕅益大師全集 (Collected Works of Great Master Ouyi), 21 vols. (repr., Taipei: Fojiao chubanshe, 1989), 19:12378–12416.

122. Aleni, *San shan lun xue ji*, 1:441. Zhixu cites Aleni’s text out of order. The passage from the *Book of Odes* is 有物有則. Aleni asserts that the term “law,” or ze 則, means “principle,” or li 理. Aleni’s point here is that, contrary to neo-Confucian thought, principle does not give rise to things by informing qi 氣. Rather, he insists that things come first, and only afterward do their principles manifest. God, as creator, stands behind both things and their principles, as an author stands behind both the things in a text and the principles by which they interact. I have translated it following Legge’s note at the bottom of p. 541 of his translation of the *Odes* rather than quoting Legge’s translation itself, which is unnecessarily long. See James Legge, trans., *Shijing* 詩經 (Book of Odes), vol. 4 of the Chinese Classics (orig. pub., Hong Kong: London Missionary Society Printing Office, 1871; rpt., Taipei: SMC Publishing, 1991), 541.

123. Legge, trans., *Zhongyong*, 418. *Doctrine of the Mean* 25:2, Legge’s translation. Kern misidentifies this as *Doctrine of the Mean*, chap. 23, which expresses a somewhat similar idea but is not the source of this quotation. See Kern, *Buddhistische Kritik am Christentum im China des 17. Jahrhunderts*, 253n158.

124. The marginal note here says 尤妙邪人當自大笑, “Especially profound! The heretics ought to have a big laugh at themselves.”
125. Abridged from Aleni, *San shan lun xue ji*, 1:442–443. Aleni follows this by posing the question: “Without that which confers on me a spiritual nature (*lingxing*, 竄性) and produces my bodily form, then where do spirit and body come from?”

126. Zhixu misquotes Aleni here. Aleni’s text (*San shan lun xue ji*, 1:444, line 2) says *lingming zhijue* 靈明知覺, while Zhixu, in both editions that I have, mixes up the words as 靈知覺明. In translating Zhixu, I have used Aleni’s original text because Zhixu himself uses the correct word order in his response.


128. Zhixu quoted this same line from the *Book of Changes* once before, in section 5 at p. 11791.

129. This is a quotation from the *Book of Changes*, *Xici* (Appended Commentary), A.10.9. I have followed Richard John Lynn’s translation of this passage. See Lynn, *Classic of Changes*, 63. Some phrases are in square brackets because Zhixu has abridged the passage somewhat.


131. For this quotation, I have departed from Richard John Lynn’s translation because he depends upon the commentary of Wang Bi, who thought this passage described the person who has come to understand the *Changes*. Thus he takes the first clause to mean that one comes to imitate heaven and earth so that one completes them (Lynn, *Classic of Changes*, 52). This is clearly not what Zhixu means, since such an interpretation would utterly miss the point of Aleni’s contention about the nature of the Great Ultimate. Thus, the translation from the *Changes* here is mine, in consultation with the Baynes translation. See Wilhelm Baynes, trans., *The I Ching: The Book of Changes*, Bollingen series XIX (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), 296. The original is in the Xici A:4.


133. This quotation is not from Aleni’s text. Its source is unclear.

134. Aleni, *San shan lun xue ji*, 1:452, line 1. Aleni here is discussing the presence of plants and animals that are dangerous to human beings in a world created by a good God. He blames this on original sin and human disobedience.

135. Aleni, *San shan lun xue ji*, 1:456. Zhixu misquotes Aleni here. In the second clause, he quotes Aleni as saying 死從何去, when Aleni’s original says 死歸何去, “When they die, to whence do they return?” This sentence in Aleni’s text does not represent a serious assertion, but a rhetorical question that opens the topic of human life. In fact, it is preceded by wuhu yixi 嗚呼噫嘻, a pair of expletives meaning roughly, “Alas, how astounding!” Thus, Zhixu’s response below does not really address Aleni’s actual point.
136. *Book of Changes, Xici* 繫詞 A.4. While I consulted both Lynn and Baynes’s translations of this passage, I felt that they both added too much to the text by way of explanation. While following their lead, I have provided my own translation, which I hope retains more of the conciseness and enigmatic language of the original. See Lynn, *Classic of Changes*, 51–52; and Baynes, trans., *I Ching*, 294.


138. *The Collected Works* has 由 here, while the Japanese edition has 繇. Both mean roughly the same thing.


141. *The Collected Works* has 世間, but the Japanese edition has 世界, “in the world” or “worldly,” which makes more sense.


143. Kern translates 奇功異瑞 as two terms: “Wundern und aussergewöhnlichen Dingen.” However, all of my dictionaries, including Morohashi, *Dai kanwa jiten*, 5892.104, 3:574a, translate 奇功 as an adjective meaning “of special merit.” Thus, I have used it as an adjective modifying 異瑞.

144. Aleni, *San shan lun xue ji*, 1:485. Zhixu has selected scattered phrases from around this page.

145. The phrase lìlì 腦力 is literally “the strength of the back,” but usually it is just used to mean one’s strength in general. I have translated it more literally because Zhixu is speaking so sarcastically about the amount of goods that the missionaries must have carried into China in a single day. This is curious, since in the next section Zhixu is obviously aware of the Jesuits’ supply lines into Macao and their cooperation with European traders for communications and transport.

146. 香山澳之小國 (*xiangshan ao zhi xiao guo*). Kern writes that this refers to an area in the Pearl River delta between Hong Kong and Macao; See Kern, *Buddhistische Kritik am Christentum im China des 17. Jahrhunderts*, 262n192. However, Prof. Jiang Wu, who raised the matter with a Chinese geographer, informs me that it refers to Macao itself. At the time this work was composed, Xiangshan was a county in Guangdong to which Macao belonged. Personal communication, December 2007.
147. According to Morohashi, *Dai kanwa jiten*, 33824, 10:114d, the character used in the text is a variant of dù 蠟, which has a very rich set of connotations including parasitism, malpractice, and bringing harm to a people or nation.

148. I.e., Fujian and Guangdong provinces.

149. Kern believes that this was the original ending of this tract and that Zhixu appended the material that follows after reading Soerio’s book. See Kern, *Buddhistische Kritik am Christentum im China des 17. Jahrhunderts*, 263n197.


151. Legge, trans., *Zhongyong*, 417. Legge’s translation. The ellipses indicate Zhixu’s use of nàizhì 乃至, which conventionally indicates text skipped over in a quotation.

152. This is a very truncated quotation from the *Doctrine of the Mean*, section 24 (Legge, *Zhongyong*, 417–418), Legge’s translation. I have added the ellipsis, since Zhixu himself does not indicate the large amount of text he skips over. Kern misidentifies the quotation as coming from *The Doctrine of the Mean*, section 22 (see Kern, *Buddhistische Kritik am Christentum im China des 17. Jahrhunderts*, 264n201).

153. I have put this passage in quotation marks, but it is really a very abridged paraphrase of *The Doctrine of the Mean*, section 22. I have used my own translation here, as Legge’s or anyone else’s would have to be truncated in such a way as to be unintelligible and fail to convey Zhixu’s point. Kern has also misidentified this source in Kern, *Buddhistische Kritik am Christentum im China des 17. Jahrhunderts*, 264n202.

154. This sentence is difficult. First, the referent of the phrase “two words” (*er yù*, 二語, possibly also “two sayings”) is unclear. The “two words” might mean the phrase “utmost sincerity” (*zhí chéng*, 至誠), which occurred several times in the previous passage. If it means “two sayings,” then Zhixu might mean the two quotations from the *Doctrine of the Mean* that will come up next. The phrase zōngqù 宗趣 does not appear in any of my dictionaries, although the Japanese edition of the text has a ligature between these two words, making clear that the editor of this edition considered them a compound. I have tentatively translated it “the bent of the doctrine.”


156. Legge, trans., *Zhongyong*, 415, section 21, Legge’s translation. This phrase follows directly after the one just quoted. Zhixu would not necessarily agree with Legge’s reading, as he wishes to establish that intelligence and sincerity are undifferentiable, not that one arises from the other.
Xici (系辭, Appended Commentary), section A, 12. I am quoting Richard John Lynn’s translation; see Lynn, Classic of Changes, 67.


159. Soerio, Tianzhu shengjiao yueyan, 257. Zhixu does not quote it exactly, but the discrepancies are minor and do not affect the sense.


161. Soerio, Tianzhu shengjiao yueyan, 257–258. Again, the quotation is not completely verbatim but preserves the sense of the original.

162. This is not a direct quote from Soerio’s text but a condensation of Soerio’s discussion of postmortem judgment as laid out in Soerio, Tianzhu shengjiao yueyan, 260–261. Thus I have not put it in quotation marks. In this section, Soerio also mounts a direct refutation of the Buddhist belief in rebirth, and this may be the reason it especially caught Zhixu’s eye.

163. 堪 dài seems to have a number of meanings, many of which are appropriate here. It seems to mean (1) “it must be that . . .”; (2) “this is nearly; this amounts to . . .”; and (3) “I’m afraid that . . .”

164. This statement does not appear in Soerio’s book. Zhixu may be summarizing statements from different parts of The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven here. Ricci argues in chap. 3 that retribution in heaven and hell prove that the human soul is immortal; see Lancashire and Hu, trans., True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven, 142–143. In chap. 5 Ricci asserts that no one can remember anything from previous lives, thus proving that human beings have no previous lives; see ibid., 242–245.

165. This is not an exact quote, but is cobbled together from ideas found in the section of Soerio’s tract that deals with the first of the Ten Commandments. Zhixu seems to be working from memory here since he changes some wording. See Soerio, Tianzhu shengjiao yueyan, 266–268.

166. Shengxue 聖學. See Morohashi, Dai kanwa jiten, 29074.21, 9:202a. It generally means the study of the works of past sages, but it seems specifically to mean the study of Confucianism. Two subsequent sub-entries give the titles of two old books on Confucianism, both of which begin with this phrase.

167. San wu 三武. The three major persecutions of Buddhism prior to the writing of this tract, in 446, 574, and 845 CE, were all carried out under emperors named Wu 武.

168. This last phrase is 草復不既, which is probably just a conventional phrase of self-deprecation. Thanks to Dr. Jiang Wu for his help in translating it.

169. This phrase is obscure. It occurs in no dictionary, nor does a Google search turn it up in anything but the present document. The Japanese edition parses...
the grammar by linking the first two characters, 基箭, as a compound noun, and putting the last two characters, 射柳, in a relation of transitive verb-object. Given the context, it therefore might mean something like “shooting fish in a barrel,” i.e., taking free shots at a helpless opponent.

170. 深究西竺心傳. I am translating this as “Buddhism” because of the reference to “India in the west” and the Chan idea of “mind transmission.”